Social and Cultural History

expand all
collapse all

Individual Documents

Description: "အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များ၏ နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်တစ်ရက်ဖြစ်သည့် "အီဒုလ်အသွဟာ" ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှု အိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့အခါသမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ၊နိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်အပေါင်း ရွှင်လန်းချမ်းမြေ့ကြပါစေလို့ ဦးစွာဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သ လိုက်ပါသည်။ အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များသည် နှစ်စဉ်နှစ်တိုင်း ဇွလ်ဟဂျ်လ (၁ဝ) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှု အိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့တွင် အလ္လာဟ်အသျှင်အမြတ် ထံတော်ပါး ဝတ်ပြုဆုတောင်းခြင်း၊ အလ္လာဟ်အသျှင်အမြတ်၏ အမိန့်ကိုလိုက်နာခြင်း အားဖြင့် ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှု၊ ကောင်းမှုကုသိုလ်များ ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းနှင့်အတူ နွမ်းပါး သူများအား ပေးဝေလှူဒါန်းခြင်းသည့် ကောင်းမှုသီလများအား ပြုလုပ်ရင်း ဆင်နွှဲကြကြောင်း သိရသည်။ ယခင့်ယခင်ကတည်းက "အီဒုလ်အသွဟာ" ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှု အိးဒ်ပွဲတော် နေ့တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ၊နိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များမှ ဟင်းလျာများချက်ပြုတ်ကာ ဘာသာလူမျိုး မတူသူများအား ဖိတ်ခေါ်ဧည့်ခံကျွေးမွေးသည့် အလွန်အပင် နှစ်လိုဖွယ်ကောင်း သော အစဉ်အလာတစ်ရပ်ရှိခဲ့ပြီး၊ ယနေ့တိုင် ကုရ်ဘာနီနေ့တွင် နေရာအတော်များများတွင် အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်များမှ ချက်ပြုတ်လှူဒါန်းမှုများ ရှိနေသည်။ သို့သော် ယခုအချိန်အခါသည် အမိမြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ အဓမ္မ သိမ်းယူထားပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့အလိုကျ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ပြည်သူများအား နေ့စဉ် ရက်ဆက် အကြမ်းဖက်လျက်ရှိနေသည့်အတွက် တနေ့တခြားဆိုးရွားလာသည့် အခြေအနေ များကို ပိုမိုသတိကြီးစွာ ကာကွယ်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ တစ်ဖန် အကြမ်းဖက်ရန်လိုနေသည့် စစ်တပ်အား မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ၊နိုင်ငံသား ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးက နည်းမျိုးစုံဖြင့် တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲ ဝင်လျက်ရှိနေပြီး ပြည်သူ့အင်အားဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်နေသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးမှာ အားရစရာ အခြေအနေတစ်ရပ်သို့ ရောက်ရှိနေပြီးဖြစ်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသူ၊နိုင်ငံသား အစ္စလာမ်ဘာသာဝင်အပေါင်းတို့မှာလည်း ကျရာကဏ္ဍကနေ အမိမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်ကြီးအား ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကဏ္ဍ တွင်ပါဝင်နေကြောင်း သိရှိရ၍ ဝမ်းမြောက်ဝမ်းသာ ဂုဏ်ယူရပါကြောင်း ပြောကြားလိုပါသည်။ ဆက်လက်ပြီး စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးတိုင်ဖျက်သိမ်းရေးနှင့် လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ဘာသာပေါင်းစုံ ခွင့်တူညီမျှသည့် ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကို ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး နှင့်အတူလက်တွဲကာ အကောင်အထည်ဖော် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်းလည်း အသိပေးလိုပါသည်။ "အီဒုလ်အသွဟာ" ကုရ်ဘာနီစွန့်လွှတ်လှူဒါန်းမှု အိးဒ်ပွဲတော်နေ့တွင် အစ္စလာမ် ဘာသာဝင်အပေါင်း ကိုယ်ကျန်းမာ၊ စိတ်ချမ်းသာကြပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် ဘေးအန္တရာယ် အပေါင်းမှ ကင်းဝေကြပါစေကြောင်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့မှ ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာပို့သရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်သည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 442.72 KB
more
Description: "၁။ နှစ်ဟောင်းကုန်၍ နှစ်သစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းသော အချိန်ကာလတွင် မကောင်းသော အညစ်အကြေးများအား ဆေးကြောကြသည့် အယူအဆနှင့် သင်္ကြန်ရေပက်ဖြန်း၍ ရေသဘင်ပွဲ ကျင်းပသည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် မြန်မာတို့၏နှစ်သစ်ကူးနေ့တွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအားလုံး ကျန်းမာသောကိုယ် ရွှင်လန်းသောစိတ်နှလုံးဖြင့် ဘေးအပေါင်းကင်းဝေးပါစေကြောင်း ဆုတောင်း မေတ္တာပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ "သင်္ကြန်"ဟူသော ဝေါဟာရသည် ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းဟု အနက်အဓိပ္ပာယ်ရသည်နှင့်အညီ မြန်မာလူမျိုးတို့သည် မြန်မာနှစ်တစ်နှစ် ကုန်ဆုံးကာ နှစ်သစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းသောကာလတွင် သင်္ကြန်ရေဖြင့် နှစ်ဟောင်း၏အညစ်အကြေးများကို ဆေးကြောသန့်စင်စေရန် အတာရေ သဘင်ပွဲတော်ကို ကျင်းပကြကာ အေးချမ်းစွာ နှစ်သစ်ကို ကြိုဆိုလေ့ရှိပါသည်။ ၃။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် သင်္ကြန်ပွဲတော်သည် အစည်ကားဆုံးနှင့် အခမ်းနားဆုံး နှစ်သစ်ကူးပွဲ တော်တစ်ခုဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များက မြန်မာပြည်သူတို့၏ဘဝများကို ဖျက်ဆီးကာ အကျည်းတန်ရုပ်ဆိုးစေသည့် ယခုကဲ့သို့အချိန်ကာလတွင် ၎င်းတို့ကိုယ်တိုင် နိုင်ငံတကာသို့ နိုင်ငံတော်သည် အေးချမ်းနေသယောင် လိမ်လည်ပြသရန် ကြိုးစား၍ ရေသဘင် ပွဲတော် အခမ်းအနားများ ပြုလုပ်ကျင်းပရာ ပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးသည် ပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲခြင်း မရှိဘဲ တော်လှန်သင်္ကြန် ရေမစို သင်္ကြန် အဖြစ်သာ တသားတည်း ရပ်တည်ကြသည့်အတွက် အထူးပင် ဝမ်းသာဂုဏ်ယူမိပါသည်။ ၄။ ပြည်သူလူထုသည် အခက်အခဲပေါင်းစုံကို တွေ့ကြုံခံစားကြရပြီး အသက်ကိုပင် ပဓာနမထားဘဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးကို တိုက်ဖျက်ရင်း နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး တိုက်ပွဲအား ဆင်နွှဲလာခဲ့သည်မှာ တစ်နှစ်ကျော်ကာလသို့ ရောက်ရှိလာပြီဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အရှိန်ကောင်းလာသော တော်လှန်ရေးခရီးနှင့်အတူ ကျရာအခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ပေးအပ်သောတာဝန်ကို ကျေပွန်အောင် ထမ်းရွက်နေကြသော ပြည်သူတစ်ဦးတစ်ယောက်ချင်းစီ၏ ပြင်းပြသော ဆန္ဒ၊ ဇွဲ၊ သတ္တိတို့သည် သမိုင်းတွင် ထင်ကျန်နေမည့် ပုံရိပ်ကောင်းများ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၅။ လွှတ်တော်နှင့်ပြည်သူ တသားတည်းဖြစ်ကာ အစိုးရတစ်ရပ်အား ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ခဲ့ ကြပြီး ရရှိထားသည့် အခြေအနေများပေါ်တွင် အကောင်းဆုံး ကြိုးစားရုန်းကန်၍ ပြည်တွင်းမှ သာမက နိုင်ငံတကာမှ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ကူညီမှုများကိုလည်း ကြိုဆိုလက်ခံပြီး ဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ ၆။ တွေ့ကြုံခဲ့ကြရသော နှစ်ဟောင်း၏ ဘေးအန္တရာယ်များ၊ အခက်အခဲများ၊ စိန်ခေါ်မှုများကို ရင်ဆိုင်ကျော်လွှားကြကာ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် မြန်မာနှစ်သစ်ကူးနေ့တွင် တော်လှန်သင်္ကြန်မှသည် အောင်ပွဲဆီသို့ တက်ညီလက်ညီ အရောက်သွားရင်း မိဘပြည်သူများ အားလုံး ဆန္ဒရှိသော မျှော်မှန်းထားသည့် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်ကို အားအင်သစ်များဖြင့် ကြိုးစားတည်ဆောက်ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2022-04-17
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 258.03 KB
more
Description: "Opponents of military rule in Myanmar have urged residents to boycott the country's traditional New Year celebrations, as activists and Buddhist monks defied security forces by staging small protests against last year's coup in some areas. The country's most important holiday, known as Thingyan, runs to Saturday and is usually celebrated with prayers, ritual cleaning of Buddha images in temples and high-spirited water fights on the streets. "I want the world to know that our country is not back to normal yet," said Zay, a 34-year-old activist from the city of Yangon, who declined to give his full name for security reasons and called on people not to participate in festivities. Celebrations for Thingyan have been muted for the past two years. In 2020, then leader Aung San Suu Kyi barred gatherings due to the pandemic and last year's holidays were hit by protests after her government was ousted by the military. Myanmar has been in turmoil since the coup, with security forces cracking down brutally on dissent and killing hundreds, and some protesters taking up arms to form People's Defence Forces to take on the military. One of the main groups behind earlier protests, the General Strike Committee of Nationalities, in a poster on social media urged people to boycott celebrations. "The blood of our comrades... who have died on the streets will not be washed away by Thingyan water," it said. A military spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment, but military leader Min Aung Hlaing said last month Thingyan celebrations could take place due to lower numbers of COVID-19 infections. State media also reported that extra flights had been arranged to allow more visitors from the country's main cities to vacation in beach areas. But on Thursday photographs shared on social media showed some of the main streets in Yangon appeared deserted, with almost no spectators to watch artists perform on a stage in front of the city's town hall. Protests also occurred in several areas, with a march in the Sagaing area, while in Mandalay monks held up placards asking people to donate money for striking state workers and displaced people, photographs showed..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2022-04-13
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title: Junta's foreign secretary says website contains 'false and misleading statements and information.'
Description: "The Burmese junta has protested to the International Organization for Migration about a website the U.N. agency set up to preserve the history of the marginalized Rohingya community of Myanmar, saying the site contains false statements. The site for the Rohingya Cultural Memory Center is an IOM initiative. The military regime’s appointed Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement on Friday, criticized the IOM for creating this website. “The establishment of such a website is beyond the scope of the IOM’s jurisdiction and expertise, and the Myanmar Permanent Representative Office in Geneva sent a letter of protest to the IOM on 23 December 2021 against the IOM’s inability to approve the false claims of certain groups,” the ministry said in the statement posted on its website and dated Jan. 7, 2022. “The term ‘Rohingya’ has always been rejected by the Burmese people and is not recognized by the Burmese people. Myanmar has also rejected the false and misleading statements and information contained on the website,” the statement says. For decades, Burmese administrations have refused to call the stateless minority “Rohingya.” Even today, Myanmar insists on calling them “Bengalis.” BenarNews, an RFA-affiliated online news service, tried to contact the ministry and the IOM to get more details but did not immediately hear back on Friday. Myanmar, a country of 54 million people the size of France, recognizes 135 official ethnic groups, with majority Burmese accounting for about 68 percent of the population. The Rohingya ethnicity is not recognized. And both civilian and military governments have kept this status quo. The Muslim Rohingya have centuries of history in Myanmar, a former British colony that became independent in 1948. But they are denied citizenship and voting rights, prevented from obtaining jobs and formal education, and restricted from traveling freely. In August 2017 the Burmese military launched a brutal offensive – unleashing a host of atrocities – against the minority community in their home state of Rakhine. As many as 740,000 Rohingya fled across the border to Bangladesh and now live in camps in and around southeastern Cox’s Bazar district. A year later, IOM conducted a mental health assessment of Rohingya refugees and the findings are what inspired the creation of the Rohingya cultural center. The assessment found that that 45 percent of those surveyed were living with distress symptoms, such a nightmares, panic attacks, or suicidal thoughts, according to an IOM fact sheet about the cultural center that the IOM shared with BenarNews last August. “The Rohingya community is at specific risk of mental health issues due to a number of factors, including prior history of systematic dehumanization, persecution and bearing witness to or directly experiencing extreme violence,” the fact sheet said. The survey also showed that 50 percent of Rohingya refuges surveyed had an “identity crisis” and 73 percent of respondents identified a loss of cultural identity following their forced exodus from Myanmar in 2017. “It was in light of the findings in Cox’s Bazar, [that] IOM envisioned the concept of a Rohingya Cultural Memory Centre (RCMC),” the fact sheet said. “One of the main objectives of the RCMC project is to provide the Rohingya refugees in the camps of Cox’s Bazar with a creative and safe space to share their knowledge, preserve their cultural heritage and reconnect with their individual and collective memory, as a community and as an ethnic group from Myanmar." Dildar Begum, a Rohingya chef, holds up rice cakes that she learned to make from her mother and grandmother before they died. [Photo courtesy of the Rohingya Cultural Memory Center] The center first started as a website and now has a physical location, Shamsuddoza Noyon, an additional commissioner for refugee relief and repatriation in Bangladesh, said on Friday. “The Rohingya Cultural Memory Center was established at Camp-18 at Ukhia to store the culture and traditions of Rohingya. It would help Rohingya to remember their old memories,” he told BenarNews, referring to a refugee camp in a sub-district of Cox’s Bazar. The website showcases the art, architecture, food, music, memorabilia, stories and much more of the community. For instance, one article talks about the love songs of the Rohingya. It says: “For this brave community, who have resisted generations of discrimination and displacement, love is the architecture that holds them together, that strengthens their bonds, and creates windows and doors for greater connection and meaning. Better than most, the Rohingya know that love is what makes life livable." According to the Burmese junta’s foreign ministry, the IOM and the Bangladesh embassy in The Hague had also jointly organized an online exhibition titled “Art, Life, Rohingya.” The website says the exhibition ran from Dec. 10 to Dec. 31. Visitors could click through a 3D virtual gallery, moving through different rooms to view collections such as Rohingya architecture and boat models, needlework, pottery, basketry, musical instruments, and the like, said the cultural center’s website. The IOM notes in its fact sheet that many experts around the world say that one’s cultural and ethnic identity is central to a person's identity, to how they see themselves, and how they relate to the world. “This is especially true for the Rohingya as their identity has historically been questioned by the Myanmar authorities,” the fact sheet says. Dil Mohammad, a Rohingya leader who lives in the no-man’s land in Bandarban district, on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border lauded the idea of the center. “This center was established to remind and tell the Rohingya community about their history, culture, traditions and memories by preserving those elements,” he told BenarNews on Friday. “This is a great initiative.”..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2022-01-07
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description: "Burma/Myanmar’s postcolonial elites have established a military-state with hybrid-imperial structures, characterized by high despotic but low infrastruc- tural modes of power, and fueled by rent-extraction. Given the resulting eviscera- tion of opposition political groups, citizens understand explicit politics as dangerous. That said, cleavages between state and the polity afford vast space for “civil society” groups (CS) to form and operate. CS stabilize the political economy by managing citizen needs; conversely, CS stand as a wedge between state and masses, (potentially) constructing spaces to coordinate and magnify potential demands. Yet CS currently err toward managing needs. Opposition must politicize Burmese masses and CS through idioms that interface with CS’s material tasks—a “politics of the daily”—encouraging them to make, collec- tively, a multiplicity of non-adversarial demands. This may compel the state to pivot and seek new bargains, at which point elite advocacy-oriented CS can provide progressive policy reforms. The paper will examine recent inchoate social-political movements in Burma for models of this politics. AFTER A TUMULTUOUS FOUR years for Myanmar—punctuated by mass protests in September 2007, the devastation of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, and a con- tentious national election in November 2010—by early 2011 many Burma- watchers were left wondering if those epic events amounted to sound and fury signifying nothing.1 Indeed, they had anticipated that 100,000 protesters and a mismanaged natural disaster would subsequently lead to the cracking of the ruling military regime and a transition to democracy (OSI 2007). Instead the ruling military-state junta created a proxy civilian party, presided over an election beset with fraud and intimidation, and installed a “new” government. This effectively normalized the 2008 Constitution and closed the book on the coun- try’s last democratic poll, which had been held in quasi-abeyance for two Elliott Prasse-Freeman ([email protected]) is Founding Research Fellow at the Human Rights and Social Movements Program at the Carr Center for Human Rights and an Advisory Board Member with the Sexuality, Gender, and Human Rights Program at Harvard University. 1 Contrary to popular understanding, both “Burma” and “Myanmar” have always been used by those native to the space, the former typically in colloquial speech, and the latter mostly in the formal written language. To consciously avoid the binarism ascribed to the use of one over the other in English (where “Burma” signifies solidarity with the opposition, while “Myanmar” endorses the regime), this paper will use them interchangeably. decades.2 Most ethnic groups put down weapons to reluctantly rejoin this politi- cal process (Smith 2006), while the principal opposition, the National League for Democracy (NLD), remained irreconcilable and was officially dissolved as a con- sequence. When its leader, Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, was finally released from house arrest, her political activities were initially declared “illegal” and she was threatened with reincarceration.3 Actors on the outside, too, were ineffectual in their central focus on effecting democratic change: U.N. mediation was repeatedly unsuccessful, and neither sanctions nor punitively low foreign aid4 directly coerced the junta into capitulation (Pedersen 2008, 232). China (Steinberg 2001a, 223–39), ASEAN (Tonkin 2008, 3–4), and India contin- ued to support the junta economically and covet it strategically, providing exter- nal cover from Western coercion. But beyond this, internal political challenge appeared anemic; the military-state maintained an effective monopoly over explicit political expression. And yet, despite its effective weathering of these paroxysms (protest, emer- gency, election), the military-state then began showing stunning signs of reform: by late 2011, political prisoners had been freed, the unheard-of phenomenon of public pressure leading to a change in policy (the halting of the Myitsone mega-dam project) had occurred, and the same Suu Kyi—threatened only months before to avoid politics—had been allowed to run for parliament. When this article went to print, debate was raging over what the changes signi- fied, if anything at all. Sanguine observers heralded nothing less than a new dawn in Myanmar (ICG 2011), while wary counterparts insisted that the superficial “reforms” risked papering over deeper consolidation of military control (Zarni 2011). How to reconcile these two stories? Rather than adjudicating between them, this article seeks two orthogonal objectives: first, to make the apparent contradic- tions explicable by describing the system of political economy and social regu- lation that has developed in the sixty years since independence. The second objective will be to argue that these political events risk capturing the attention of internal and external actors alike, when more important lessons generated by the events perhaps lay elsewhere. The paper will argue that recent events have illuminated actors that heretofore had been flying below the radars of many observers and policymakers: whether organizing protests, pulling bodies out of lakes, or delivering civic education seminars, civil society groups (hereafter “CS”) are literally and figuratively everywhere in Burma (Heidel 2006). As such, exploring how they function can stimulate a new way of seeing the challenges facing Myanmar: instead of making state-to-state or “international community”-to-state politics the only ways to contest an authoritarian regime, Burmese CS provide a window through which we can penetrate an opaque pol- itical economy and inform us about the way life (in the villages and urban slums) actually functions, and can also demonstrate how an alternative politics may contest the status quo. Myanmar scholars—including in a recent issue of this journal (Thawnghmung 2011)—are increasingly mining these political spaces and practices, exploring daily experiences of average citizens. This article hopes to continue this conversation, contributing to determining what role these largely forgotten actors can play in driving change from within. Indeed, if the government is serious about reform, these forgotten actors will be seminal in channeling and shaping it; if the government is not, these actors will need to emerge to help compel change. METHODOLOGIES Against simplistic binary descriptions—totalitarian accounts in Burmese commentary and classic authoritarian portrayals in political science—I describe Burma’s political space as incorporating multiple particular governmentalities (Foucault 2007); I examine those by exploring (a) the institutions or actors that de facto govern subjects (states, customary leaders, CS representatives, businesses, spiritual guides, etc.); (b) the modes that those forms of governance take (“rights”-based, negotiated bargains, implicit deals, etc.); therefore (c) the kinds of relationships that develop (patron/client, state/citizen, corporation/ employee, NGO/“partner,” “international community”/victim); through which (d) power then flows to produce, regulate, punish, discipline, or expel subjects. And finally (e) how the different zones constituted by these different fields of governmentality, with their respective intensities, intersect with and hence influ- ence one another to create a broader system or assemblage (Deleuze and Guatarri 1987 [1980]). Taking up each of these permutations is beyond the scope of any single paper, but this methodological framework informs the project. Indeed, only by more precisely understanding this system can collective political attitudes become comprehensible and social space at Myanmar’s periph- eries and within its interstices become apparent, thereby contextualizing current CS actions and animating our ability to perceive the form this potential takes. To accomplish this, inter alia, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 150 members of 61 Burmese CS and/or political organizations in December 2009 and January 2010. Organizations were identified through referrals, and cross-referenced with NGO lists compiled by the Burma Library (in Mae Sot, Thailand) and Local Resource Center in Yangon, respectively, to ensure adequate coverage. Organizations are kept anonymous due to their sensitive activities. Finally, two conceptual deviations from classic civil society conceptualizations attend my use of CS. First, I define CS as those groups making social decisions outside of direct state control and without ambition toward capture of, or partici- pation in, the state. I avoid language such as “individuals coming together” to “make collective decisions” because I neither imply quasi-democratic or even necessarily collaborative decision making, nor do I suggest that individuals are what drive CS decisions. Instead, CS often take on institutional conscious- nesses and logics that act recursively on those people who constitute them (Zizek 2008, 167). Second, CS will be used plurally—signifying a multiplicity of organizations—and will also imply an alternative space that CS both constitutes (by virtue of its operation) and enters into..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Journal of Asian Studies (Vol. 71, No. 2)
2012-05-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 148.52 KB (27 pages)
more
Description: "The Abhiraja/Dhajaraja story, the most important origin myth legitimizing Burmese kingship, is widely viewed as a central Burmese (Burman) tradition. Based on evidence from available pre-eighteenth century historical texts, many previously unexamined by scholars, this article finds that the Abhiraja/Dhajaraja origin myth developed in western Burma over three centuries before its appearance in central Burma in a 1781 court treatise. This analysis demonstrates that during a significant 1 The author owes gratitude to numerous colleagues who, at different stages, offered help of various kinds. Special gratitude, however, is owed to Vic Lieberman, Ryuji Okudaira, and Atsuko Naono for their extensive comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. In addition, Ryuji Okudaira helped me gain a copy of one of the chief western Burmese chronicles under examination in this article. Help has also been provided in gaining access to premodern Burmese texts by Patricia Herbert and the late Daw May Kyi Win. The author is also indebted to U Saw Tun for raising my interest in premodern Burmese literature during my language training in literary Burmese. period of cultural borrowing, from the 1780s until the 1820s, central Burmese (Burman) literati inserted western Burmese (Arakanese) myths and historical traditions into an evolving central Burmese historical perspective with which most scholars are more familiar. Introduction Several origin myths made the royal ancestry of Burmese kings sacred by connecting them genealogically to a solar dynasty. The first, likely pre-Buddhist, origin myth traced the lineage of Burmese kings to Pyu-zàw-htì (Pyu-mìn-htì), the son of the Sun God and a naga princess.2 Second, Mahasammata, the first human king of the world in Buddhist thought, served as both a legitimizing model for unifying Burmese kings and, secondarily, as an origin myth for certain Burmese kings who drew up loose genealogies connecting themselves to him.3 A third origin myth provided a fuller elaboration of these genealogies to demonstrate a clearer lineage from Mahasammata to the Burmese kings, through the intermediary of the solar race of the Sakiyan clan (the same clan from whom later sprang Gotama Buddha). 2 Maung Kalà [Ù Kalà], Maha-ya-zawin-gyì, Saya Pwa (ed.), Rangoon: Burma Research Society, 1926, I, p. 143; Shin Sandá-linka, Maní-yadana-bon, Rangoon: Di-bat-sa Press, 1896, pp. 10-11; Zei-yá-thinhkaya, Shwei-bon-ní-dàn, Yangon: Zwei-sa-bei-reib-myoun, 1957, pp. 99-100; See also the discussion in Ryuji Okudaira, “Rekishiteki Haikei,” in Ayabe Tsuneo & Ishii Yoneo (eds.)., Motto Shiritai Myanmar, 2nd ed., Tokyo: Kobundo, 1994, pp. 9-13. This work was thankfully translated for the author by Atsuko Naono. 3 For Burmese thought on the Mahasammata myth as legitimation for earthly rulers, see William J. Koenig, The Burmese Polity, 1752-1819: Politics, Administration, and Social Organization in the Early Kon-baung Period, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1990, pp. 65-67, 69-71, 73-74, 93; Victor B. Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580-1760, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 66, 72-4, 83; S. According to this myth, a king of this clan, having lost his kingdom in Northern India, found his way to central Burma. There he established the first Burmese state, Tagaung. When Tagaung was later destroyed, a second ruler of the Sakiyan clan reestablished it.4 According to this origin myth, all Burmese kings are descended from this clan and, given the connection made in Burmese histories between Mahasammata and the Sakiya clan, from Mahasammata himself.5 Although this origin myth has been treated in the secondary literature on Burmese history as a development stemming out of central Burmese thought, it did not surface in central Burmese texts until 1781 in Shin Sandá-linka’s Maní-yadana-bon. 6 The absence of any reference to this myth in Burmese inscriptions and its late appearance in Burmese chronicles led the epigraphist G. H. Luce to argue that: The old view of some (not all) Burmese historians [concerning Tagaung] is hardly worth discussion. The Abhiraja/Dhajaraja legends were presumably invented to give Burmans a noble derivation from the Sakiyan line of Gotama Buddha himself. But one has only to put a Burman between a North Indian and a Chinese, to see at a glance where his racial connections lie.7 J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against a Historical Background, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 93-4. 4 Hman-nàn maha-ya-zawin-daw-gyì, Mandalay: Ratana Theiddi Press, 1908, I, pp. 175-182. 5 Koenig, The Burmese Polity, pp. 86-87. 6 Shin Sandá-linka, Maní-yadana-bon, Rangoon: Di-bat-sa Press, 1896. Pe Maung Tin explains, however, that this myth did not enter central Burmese chronicles until 1785, with the appearance of the New Pagan Chronicle. See Pe Maung Tin, “Introduction,” in Pe Maung Tin & G. H. Luce (trans.), The Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma, London: Oxford University Press, 1923, p. xv..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: School of Oriental and African Studies (London)
2002-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 315.6 KB
more
Description: "On 14–17 December 2017, Lisu Protestants celebrated their Literature Centenary Jubilee in Pummati of Myitkyina, the capital city of Myanmar’s northern Kachin State. Local community members, Lisu guests outside Myanmar, government officials and leaders of Kachin subgroups gathered together to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the creation of the Lisu Christian script, known as the ‘Fraser script’. Central to the festivities were daytime worship services, transnational fellowship meetings, cultural shows and evening music concerts. People could visit the business area, which was packed with trading stalls selling food, Lisu traditional clothes, handicrafts and Lisu‐language music albums. Between 2012 and 2014, I conducted fieldwork on the church singing and socio‐religious change of the Lisu in Yunnan’s northwestern Nujiang Prefecture. That doctoral work set the path of my postdoctoral book project on how transnational sound production, circulation and consumption become integral to the Lisu perception and practice of faith on the China–Myanmar border. The conceptualisation of the book benefited from an intensive 40‐day field trip (December 2017–February 2018) in Myanmar’s Kachin State and Yangon. Therefore, I was fortunate to attend the Jubilee that drew the Lisu from around the globe during that fieldwork in addition to my interviews with Lisu media practitioners and observations of their studio production. I was intrigued by an apparent paradox I had seen in the Jubilee. It was advertised as a cultural event, but was permeated by Christian formality. It seemed to have provided an opportunity for Lisu participants to share their Christian identity while having consciously incorporated traditional artefacts and musical traditions to articulate ethnic identity. This presented a contrast to what I had observed in Nujiang, where most Christian Lisu still followed the unwritten rule of abstaining from animistic worship, traditional performing arts and other traditional practices deemed inappropriate.1 Moreover, ‘litpix’,2 a Lisu term that was unfamiliar to me, was frequently used to refer to ‘culture’ during my conversation with Lisu participants and in the church and political leaders’ public speech. It appeared in the name of the Jubilee’s organising committee, the Lisu Tot’et be Litpix Zzujei Yong (Lisu literature and culture committee). Pummati, the Lisu land purchased in around 2013 for hosting community events, was appraised as ‘Lisu Litpix Mut’ (the land of Lisu culture). During my time in Myanmar, most people I talked to – Christian leaders of various domains, media practitioners, Bible school teachers and students, and performers of Lisu cultural dance – used ‘tradition’ interchangeably with ‘culture’ to explain to me the meaning of ‘litpix’. But when I asked them to articulate what ‘culture’ stands for, they would turn to specific artefacts, performing arts and customs for reference. Why is there a renewed interest among the Burmese Lisu in their pre‐Christian traditions? How does the notion of litpix come into use, and for what purposes? In this paper, I examine a Christian Lisu elite’s attempt to gain access to competitive political, economic and cultural resources to achieve future‐making goals through their positive engagement with traditional culture for the performance of self‐representation. In particular, I look into litpix’s operations and efficacies as markers of distinction and the ways that this relationship is articulated in practice against the background of the Lisu people’s ‘double‐minority’ status both within Kachin State and in the Burmese nation. As I will show, the Lisu elite’s future‐making attempt is not only for the development of the future generation but also for their greater involvement. The Lisu are a Tibeto‐Burman speaking highland group of over one million who reside across the mountainous areas of southwestern China and Southeast Asia.3 Over 100 years of migration from western Yunnan southwards to Myanmar, Thailand and elsewhere, the transformative social experiences of the Lisu have been shaped by different factors. The classic anthropological work highlighted the role of new economic conditions in transforming the social structures (Gillogly 2006) and gender relations (Hutheesing 1990) of the small Lisu community in northern Thailand. In Lisu‐populated areas of the China–Myanmar border, one important factor for social change has been conversion from animistic practices (Durrenberger 1975) to Protestantism since the early 20th century. Despite constraints facing the Lisu as marginalised members of society, they constantly attempt to establish a resilient path to becoming self‐positioned subjects as an autonomous but compliant people. In Myanmar, where Buddhism is deeply intertwined with the country’s culture and the Bamar‐ethnic majority, about 90% of the 500,000 Lisu population self‐ identified as Christians by December 2017.4 Kachin State hosts the largest Burmese Lisu population (more than 200,000). It is also home to several other small ethnic groups defining themselves in contrast to the dominating Bamar and Jinghpaw populations yet being part of the Kachin collective affiliation as their primary marker of socio‐political identities. In 1955, the national parliament recognised six sub‐groups of the Kachin – the Jinghpaw, Lawngwaw (Maru), Nung‐Rawang, Lisu, Zaiwa (Atsi) and Lachik – and grouped them under one umbrella.5 The word ‘Kachin’ started to serve as an ethno‐political category. It is against this historical background that I explore the recent formation of the litpix space by the Christian Lisu elite and how it becomes a significant discursive site relating to Lisu self‐representations of modern selves and relations. I should pause to clarify how I use the concept of ‘elite’ among the Lisu. I use ‘elite’ to refer to both long‐established church leaders, and emerging leaders of ethnic organisations, politicians and other sociocultural activists. Akin to the place of the village chief (vutddut reitsu) and animist priest (nitpat) in Lisu traditional socio‐political organisation, they are regarded by the Christian community members as ‘leaders’ who can guide community development based on their authorities in religious and social knowledge. My Lisu interlocutors identified three groups of Christian elite: church leader, cultural leader and political leader. The so‐called church leader – comprised of priests, senior preachers and pastoral team members at various levels – has long been in a monopoly ‘elite’ position among the Burmese Lisu in the sense that institutionalised churches of five denominations have been wielding influence over Lisu public and private life since the latter half of the 20th century. The church leader also constitutes the intellectual authority and remains in control of printed material and public speech, as well as paradigmatic shifts in socio‐religious practice. The emergence of leadership in cultural and political domains over the last three decades is a result of a Christian elite’s engagement with changing national economic, social and political circumstances and interaction with the forces of neighbouring Kachin and Burmese populations. General assumptions persist that those who are the ‘elites’ must control material resources (Scott 2008), maintain tight closed networks (Mills 2000 [1956]) and face confrontations with other social groups (see also the introduction of this issue). The Christian Lisu elite in the non‐Western, non‐industrial context challenge these assumptions. First, their elite position arises not out of any form of superiority but through serving as the community advocate for their ‘non‐elite’ people (see also Rumsby, this issue). Second, the foundation of Lisu elite status relies on their interactions, rather than confrontation, with superior groups such as the Jinghpaw and Burmese leaders. The concept of elite, from this perspective, is dependent more on relationships (political, religious, etc.) between (elite) groups than it is on specific qualifications. This echoes the view of Salverda and Skovgaard‐Smith’s recent article (2018) that the status of elites are both contested and attributed by people they interact with and relate to. Third, Lisu practice exemplifies how ‘the elites … are adapted and altered under the influence of social changes’ (Salverda and Abbink 2013: 10), as new leadership emerged out of religious authority. In the analyses that follow, I examine through what kind of politics the state, religion, ethnicity and other actors possibly influence the Christian Lisu elite’s renewed interest in their pre‐Christian litpix traditions, as well as the challenges involved in translating the singularity of its abstraction into various embodied forms through viable projects. Central to this process is the selection, revision and standardisation of previously marginalised traditional artefacts and practices in the Christian community which are readily tagged as ethnically Lisu when assertion of difference is needed. I argue that the construction of a specifically litpix space independent of religion was crucial in a Christian Lisu elite’s attempt to gain access to political, economic and cultural resources and to legitimise claims to rights for survival and future development of the Lisu while maintaining the church’s predominant influence in the faith community..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Special Section Article
2021-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 581.8 KB
more
Description: "My friend David Arnott, who has died aged 77, made an important contribution to the struggle for human rights in Burma (Myanmar) through founding and running the Online Burma/Myanmar Library and the Burma Peace Foundation. Born in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, he went to Wakefield grammar school and studied languages at Reading University. He spent the 1960s and 70s immersed in parts of the counterculture: driving a van-load of youngsters to the Soviet Union; joining CND marches; living alone for months on meagre means in Ibiza, while expanding his interest in Buddhism. In London in the 80s he founded or co-founded several mainly Buddhist or Burma-related organisations, including the Tibet Support Group and Burma Campaign UK. From 1991 until 1996 he worked in New York, supplying documentation to the UN human rights mechanisms, introducing Burma democracy activists to the UN scene, and supporting their lobbying. He then played a similar role in Geneva, where I co-operated with him, along with members of the European Burma Network. Projects there included a conference on the impact of tourism on indigenous peoples. His life’s work culminated in the Online Burma/Myanmar Library, a database featuring more than 60,000 documents in many languages. David was ahead of his time in advocating free information access as being a key to Burma’s future. From 2004 until his death he lived in the Mae Sot district in Thailand, an important centre for Burmese exiles. Over the last few years he struggled to raise funding for the library and to arrange a satisfactory succession. It is now run by a younger group of people inside Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
2020-12-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description: "...Table Contents: Chapter (1) Before a.d. 639, Chapter (2) A.D. 639 to lOIO, Chapter (3) A.D. loio to 1298, Chapter (4) A.D. 1298 to 1557, Chapter (5) A.D. 1558 to 1599, Chapter (6) A.D. 1600 to 1752, Chapter (7) A.D. 1752 to 1760, Chapter (8) A.D. 1760 to 1784, Chapter (9) A.D. 1785 to 1819, Chapter (10) A.D. 1819 to 1826, Chapter (11) 1826 to 1853, Chapter (12) A.D. 1853 to 1885, Chapter (13) A.D. 1885 to 1900 ..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: John Stuart via Kham Koo Website
1910-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : PDF pdf
Size: 13.76 MB (Original version) - 274 pages, 13.27 MB (Reduce version) - 278 pages
more
Description: "For the first few years of my stay in Burma my life was so full of excitement that I had little care or time for any thought but of to-day. There was, first of all, my few months in Upper Burma in the King's time before the war, months which were full of danger and the exhilaration of danger, when all the surroundings were too new and too curious to leave leisure for examination beneath the surface. Then came the flight from Upper Burma at the time of the war, and then the war itself. And this war lasted four years. Not four years of fighting in Burma proper, for most of the Irrawaddy valley was peaceful enough by the end of 1889; but as the central parts quieted down, I was sent to the frontier, first on the North and then on the East by the Chin mountains; so that it was not until 1890 that a[Pg 2] transfer to a more settled part gave me quiet and opportunity for consideration of all I had seen and known. For it was in those years that I gained most of whatever little knowledge I have of the Burmese people..."
Creator/author: H. Fielding
Source/publisher: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. via Project Gutenberg
1899-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-01-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
more
Description: "The cult of the 'Thirty-Seven Lords', known in Burma as the thirty-seven 'naq' is commonly viewed as being a remnant of practices prevalent before Buddhicization, that is to say, as superstitions having their origins in the obscure period predating the establishment of Burmese civilization. This article will argue against this assumption and will assert that this cult cannot be properly understood if it is not considered as a part of the Burmese religious system still evolving with Buddhist society. The socio-religious structure of the 'naq' cult shows that it is neither a pre-Buddhist remnant, nor is it borrowed from India. Close analysis of the actual cult, of its legends of foundation, and of the historical evidence, clearly shows that it is a construct of Burmese Buddhist kings or, in other words, a produce of the localization of Buddhism in Burma..."
Creator/author: Benedicte Brac de la Perriere
Source/publisher: Newsletter, Issue 25, International Institute for Asian Studies (Leiden)
2001-10-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
more
Description: "Returning to Burma after a four-year absence, a visitor discovers that change has brought only a deepened sense of estrangement, not optimism, to ordinary Burmese..."
Creator/author: Thalia Isaak
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy", Vol. 9, No. 3
2001-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
more