Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory

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Websites/Multiple Documents

Description: Talks, interviews, conversations etc.
Source/publisher: Youtube
Date of entry/update: 2018-02-11
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: "Daily independent news program, hosted by Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez, airing on over 800 stations."...Topics in the News...
Creator/author: Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez
Source/publisher: Democracy Now!
Date of entry/update: 2016-01-17
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "...Here are some of the things I try to fight: environmental destruction, undemocratic power, corruption, deception of the public, injustice, inequality and the misallocation of resources, waste, denial, the libertarianism which grants freedom to the powerful at the expense of the powerless, undisclosed interests, complacency..."
Creator/author: George Monbiot
Source/publisher: George Monbiot
Date of entry/update: 2017-09-27
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Advancing the politics of small deeds.... "In this beautifully animated clip from Dirt! The Movie, Wangari Maathai tells an inspiring tale of doing the best you can under seemingly interminable odds. Join us at www.DirtTheMovie.org"
Creator/author: Wangari Maathai
Source/publisher: www.DirtTheMovie.org
Date of entry/update: 2016-01-22
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "About 11,100,000 results, February 2018, of a Google search for Noam Chomsky
Source/publisher: Google
Date of entry/update: 2015-10-20
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Avram Noam Chomsky (/ˈnoʊm ˈtʃɒmski/; born December 7, 1928) is an American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, logician, political commentator, social justice activist, and anarcho-syndicalist advocate. Sometimes described as the "father of modern linguistics", Chomsky is also a major figure in analytic philosophy. He has spent most of his career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he is currently Professor Emeritus, and has authored over 100 books. He has been described as a prominent cultural figure, and was voted the "world?s top public intellectual" in a 2005 poll..."
Source/publisher: Wikipedia
Date of entry/update: 2015-10-20
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Wide-ranging collection of videos
Creator/author: Noam Chomsky
Source/publisher: Youtube
Date of entry/update: 2016-02-29
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Noam Chomsky was born on December 7, 1928, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He has written and lectured widely on linguistics, philosophy, intellectual history, contemporary issues, and particularly international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. Chomsky has been a writer for Z projects since their earliest inception, and a tireless supporter of our operations."
Source/publisher: Z Communications
Date of entry/update: 2015-10-20
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: 347 videos, November 2016; 111,000, February 2018 - of Noam Chomsky - interviews, debates, lectures etc. on politics, education, philosophy, activism.... from 2 minutes to more than 2 hours -
Source/publisher: Youtube
Date of entry/update: 2016-11-13
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Tom Engelhardt launched Tomdispatch in November 2001 as an e-mail publication offering commentary and collected articles from the world press. In December 2002, it gained its name, became a project of The Nation Institute, and went online as "a regular antidote to the mainstream media." The site now features Tom Engelhardt?s regular commentaries and the original work of authors ranging from Rebecca Solnit, Bill McKibben, and Mike Davis to Chalmers Johnson, Michael Klare, Adam Hochschild, Robert Lipsyte, and Elizabeth de la Vega. Nick Turse, who also writes for the site, is associate editor and research director. Tomdispatch is intended to introduce readers to voices and perspectives from elsewhere (even when the elsewhere is here). Its mission is to connect some of the global dots regularly left unconnected by the mainstream media and to offer a clearer sense of how this imperial globe of ours actually works..."
Source/publisher: tomdispatch.com
Date of entry/update: 2018-02-11
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Individual Documents

Description: "This Situation Update describes events occurring in Tha Htoo (Thaton) Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District, during the period between September 2022 and January 2023, including constant indiscriminate shelling committed by the State Administration Council (SAC) resulting in property destruction, casualties and fear. On November 10th 2022, SAC Military Training Number #9 arrested Kaw Kya Ther villagers by accusing them of being informants for the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and detained them in the camp. As a result, fighting broke out between SAC and PDF, and SAC conducted indiscriminate shelling in the area. On January 11th 2023, the SAC indiscriminately shelled mortars into Maw Lay village tract in three different instances, injuring three villagers, after a drone attack by the local PDF and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). On February 9th 2023, SAC Artillery Unit #314 fired mortars into plantations in Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, injuring another civilian. Villagers are facing livelihood insecurities as a result.[1] Arbitrary arrest of villagers, fighting and shelling On November 10th 2022, State Administration Council (SAC)[2] Military Training Number #9, under Light Infantry Division (LID)[3] #44, based in Ah Lan Ta Ya camp arrested Kaw Kya Ther (Htoe Bo Lin) villagers [unknown number], from Way Raw (Win Yaw) village tract[4], Tha Htoo Township, accusing them of being spies for the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[5]. The next day, on November 11th at about 8:42 pm, fighting broke out between PDF forces, combined with the local Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[6], and SAC Military Training #9 at Ah Lan Ta Ya camp, which is led by the Deputy Battalion Commander [unknown name] and Major Chit Win Thu. During the fighting, SAC shelled eight rounds of mortar into Kaw Kya Ther village, Way Raw village tract, Tha Htoo Township. Therefore, six houses owned by Kaw Kyaw Ther villagers were damaged by the mortar shells’ explosion. During the fighting, three SAC soldiers including Major Chit Win Thu were killed, PDF soldiers confiscated some ammunition from the SAC, and rescued the detained Kaw Kya Ther villagers. Constant shelling conducted by SAC soldiers into villages Since the 2021 coup in Burma, indiscriminate and deliberate shelling conducted by the SAC has been one of the most common attacks [against civilians] happening in Tha Htoo Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. For instance, the SAC K--- army camp, under the command of LID #44, is located in the centre of K--- village, Maw Lay village tract, Tha Htoo Township, beside the village’s main road. SAC troops usually conduct shelling in K--- village [since their camp is located in the centre, and so they shell the surroundings]. One villager from K--- village, Naw[7] H---, reported to KHRG: “I can’t even count [the number of shelling incidents]. Sometimes, they [SAC] shelled every day. […] Three months ago [around September 2022], a mortar landed on my house. And the shrapnel hit my aunt’s house too. […] They [SAC] shelled [mortars] regularly.” Since the [2021] coup, SAC soldiers in Tha Htoo Township have conducted shelling into the villages surrounding their army camps as retaliation after being attacked by local KNLA or PDF soldiers. Other times, they [SAC soldiers] have done it [conduct shelling] when receiving information from their informants about an imminent attack by KNLA and PDF. However, sometimes the SAC has conducted shelling for unknown reasons. Some of the mortars landed on farms and plantations owned by villagers and nearby villages, such as Y--- village, P--- village, L--- village, or K--- village. Some mortars landed in the villages, beside houses, schools and monasteries. Therefore, local villagers, especially villagers who live close to the army camps, have been facing high [security] risks to their lives and fear. They have also suffered injuries and property damage and destruction. According to Naw H---, the witness from K--- village: “Sometimes [mortar shells landed] in our village, near the school, near the monastery, ... Children who attended school know best [have experienced it]. Children [in school] were scared and cried loudly. […] During a shelling [incident in 2022], young children like my nieces were only seven and nine years old. They told me: ‘Moegi [term of affection for women]! [Hearing] mortar shells’ [explosion] sound makes me feel scared. We dare not to walk on the first floor [of the school]; we stay on the ground floor under the bed. Moegi! When the school closes, pick me up, okay?’. I feel pity for the children. […] My niece is only nine years old. She is very intelligent. She said: ‘Moegi, once the shells landed nearby, and I was scared, so I cried and the teacher hugged me. [All children in] the whole school were crying.’ When I heard that, my heart Ummm [felt worried; anxious]!” In January 2023, the army camp in K--- village was operated by SAC battalions under LID #44 and some of their soldiers were based in the monastery. On the morning of January 11th 2023, local PDF and KNLA attacked K--- army camp with a drone. As retaliation, the SAC indiscriminately shelled about five mortar rounds around K--- village area. Two of the mortar shells landed in K--- village, in the Muslim community area. The mortar shells injured two villagers, and killed two of their bulls -which cost about five million kyat [2,378 USD[8]]. It also destroyed one motorcycle, and several parts of their house. Another house was also damaged. The two victims are married and have children. Their children were safe because they were at school. The damages caused major impacts on the family’s livelihood and well-being. After the incident, their neighbours immediately took them to the local W--- clinic, under the Karen National Union (KNU)[9]-controlled territory, for medical treatment. On the same day, from 7 pm to 11 pm, SAC battalions under LID #44 based in K--- army camp shelled three more mortar rounds in K--- village. Two mortar shells landed on a villager’s rubber plantation and one mortar shell landed beside a villager’s house. Before this shelling incident [in the evening], no armed group, either PDF or KNLA, had attacked them [the SAC] and villagers did not receive any prior warning about the shelling. Villagers do not know why the SAC indiscriminately conducted the shelling [in the evening]. The two mortar shells that landed on a rubber plantation also damaged one farm hut, including the roofing. Fortunately, the hut owner was not in the hut [during the incident] so nobody got injured or killed. At about 11 pm, another mortar shell landed beside a villager’s house in K--- village and the shrapnel injured a 52-year-old villager, named Saw[10] O---, on his thigh. The incident happened when he was visiting his friend; the house owner. He was outside of the house chatting with the house owner who was inside the house. The victim explained [to KHRG]: “When I was going [to the friend’s house], [I heard] the sound of [mortars] exploding coming from K--- [army camp] two times. […] When there were no more sounds, I went to the villager’s [his friend’s] house in the village. Soon after I spoke one or two words [with the house owner], mortar shells landed [beside me]. And the shrapnel hit me. […] As soon as I got hit, I fell down. […] My blood flowed down [he sustained heavy blood loss], so it got dark [he fainted].” After, villagers surrounding the incident place went to help Saw O--- by providing first aid, bandaging the wound with a longyi [piece of clothing]. Villagers brought him to a monastery by motorcycle to get medical treatment from an SAC medic who is based in the monastery. The SAC medic injected some [unknown] medication and bandaged the wound. During that night, villagers could not bring him immediately to the Thaton Town hospital [run by the SAC] because of the curfew (enforced by the SAC between 6 pm to 6 am) and the risk of stepping on landmines on the way planted by armed groups. Therefore, he had to wait the whole night and then villagers took him to Thaton hospital the next morning by car. The cost was 50,000 kyat [23.78 USD] for transportation and he had to be in the hospital for eight days. The total cost was about one million kyat [475.51 USD] for medical treatment. According to the victim, Saw O---: “When we went [to the hospital] and I got the X-ray, shrapnel was visible [in the test result]. The doctor took out everything [all shrapnel]. The shrapnel was very big and very long.” When KHRG conducted the interview on January 26th 2023, Saw O--- had already been discharged from the hospital. He could not walk properly yet, so he was not able to work on his farm for his family livelihood. He still had to go to the hospital for further treatment and checks. Therefore, he struggled financially to pay the medical fees for the whole medical treatment. On February 9th 2023, at 10:06 am, SAC Artillery Unit #314 fired 80mm mortars into the rubber plantations near I--- village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, in KNU-controlled territory. Two mortar shells landed in a rubber plantation, damaging 13 rubber trees owned by a villager named Naw A---. A 52-year-old villager named Saw B---, from I---, was minorly injured by the shrapnel on his face, near the eyebrow. Further background reading on the situation of indiscriminate shelling in Southeast Burma can be found in the following KHRG reports: “Taw Oo District Short Update: House burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes by the SAC in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (September to November 2023)”, March 2024 “Dooplaya District Situation Update: SAC indiscriminate shelling and healthcare and livelihood challenges (February to April 2023).”, February 2024. “Mu Traw District Situation Update: SAC air strikes, arrest of villagers, and indiscriminate shelling causing casualties, and landmine explosion, March 2022 to February 2023”, January 2024. Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers' lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023. Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received in December 2022 and January 2023. It was provided by a community member in Doo Tha Htoo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [3] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Burma Army is commanded by a brigadier general and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents. They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army). [4] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village. [5] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalized the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army. [6] The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [7] Naw is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name. [8] All conversion estimates for the kyat are based on the February 7th 2024 mid-market exchange rate of 1,000 kyats to USD 0.48 (taken from https://wise.com/gb/currency-converter/mmk-to-usd-rate). [9] The Karen National Union (KNU) is the main Karen political organisation. It was established in 1947 and has been in conflict with the Burma government since 1949. The KNU wields power across large areas of Southeast Burma and has been calling for the creation of a democratic federal system since 1976. Although it signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015, relations with the government remain tense. [10] Saw is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-03-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Even three years after the coup d'état on February 1, 2021, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate as airstrikes and fighting continue throughout the country, killing and injuring many innocent people on a daily basis. According to the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Myanmar announced by OCHA last December, 18.6 million people, including 6 million children, are still in need of humanitarian assistance. Under these circumstances, the Government of Japan has continuously provided humanitarian assistance totaling more than US$109.5 million through international organizations and NGOs since immediately after the coup d'état, directly benefiting the people of Myanmar. In response to the further increase in humanitarian assistance needs for the people of Myanmar, the Government of Japan has now decided to provide additional humanitarian assistance totaling approximately US$37 million. Specifically, through international organizations such as UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, UN Women, and AHA Center as well as NGOs. The assistance will include medical services, improved nutrition for pregnant women and infants, water and sanitation infrastructure, access to education, food and medicine distribution, support for women victims of trafficking in persons, and support for anti-drug measures and rehabilitation. This assistance will be provided not only in Myanmar but also in neighboring Thailand. The Government of Japan will continue to strongly urge Myanmar military to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access and will continue to provide diverse assistance so that as many people as possible can receive the support in need..."
Source/publisher: Government of Japan
2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This Short Update describes events that occurred in Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District during the period between September and November 2023, including house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes. In September 2023, tensions were heightened between the State Administration Council (SAC) and local armed resistance groups in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, after People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) extrajudicially killed an SAC soldier who had been sent to the area as a spy. After this killing, the SAC burned down at least 27 villagers’ houses in five different villages, shelled mortars into villages, and conducted air strikes in the area, causing three casualties. The shelling injured one villager, damaged five villagers’ houses and one shop, as well as plantations, and killed one cow. The air strikes injured two villagers and damaged a villager’s house.[1] House burning in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract From the second week of August 2023, combined forces of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[2] and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[3] increased their military activities in every village in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. As reported by local villagers, Maung[4] Kyaw Htun, a soldier from State Administration Council (SAC)[5] Infantry Battalion (IB)[6] #39, was ordered by his leader to return to his parents’ village, A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, to investigate the military activities of the KNLA and PDF there while posing as a civilian. Soldiers from the KNLA and PDF knew about this situation. On September 12th 2023, the KNLA and PDF arrested Maung Kyaw Htun whilst he was at his father’s house, took him to a place outside the village, and killed him. Maung Kyaw Htun’s family members went to SAC IB #39 army camp immediately after finding out he was killed and informed the SAC about what had happened. On September 13th 2023, at 6 am, SAC combined forces, including IB #39 which is based in Lay Maing village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, went with five military trucks and two artillery trucks to A--- village, B--- village, and C--- village, in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. At around 10 am on September 14th 2023, these SAC combined forces burned down four houses in B--- village. The owners of those houses are Saw[7] D---, Saw E---, Saw F--- and Saw G---. Also on this day, these SAC combined forces burned down seven houses in C--- village. The owners of those houses are Ko[8] H---, Ko I---, Ko J---, Ko K---, a daughter of Ko K---, Daw[9] L---, and Daw M---. After the SAC troops burned down villagers’ houses in these two villages, they stayed in B--- village for three days. On the third day, September 16th, at 6 am, the SAC troops retreated from the village and returned to their army camp. On the afternoon of September 16th 2023, KNLA and PDF soldiers burned down Maung Kyaw Htun’s father’s house. This contributed to increasingly heightened tensions between local armed resistance groups and SAC troops in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. On October 20th 2023, SAC combined forces, including IB #39, went to N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, where they burned down three villagers’ houses. The owners of those houses are Saw O---, Saw P--- and Saw Q---. On November 12th 2023 at 1:30 pm, the combined forces of the KNLA and PDF attacked these SAC troops using tripwire bombs in a place between A--- village and N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, after which fighting broke out. On the evening of November 12th 2023, the SAC troops burned down nine houses in B--- village, as well as four houses in A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. Villagers whose houses were burned down in B--- village are Saw R---, Saw S---, Saw T---, Saw U---, Maung V---, Naw[10] W---, Naw X---, Saw Y--- and Saw Z---. Villagers whose houses were burned down in A--- village are Aa---, Ko Ab---, Ko Ac--- and Ko Ad---. The SAC combined forces that are based in Lay Maing village, including IB #39, often fired mortar shells into villages and surrounding areas where they thought the KNLA and PDF soldiers might stay, regardless of whether fighting had occurred or not. During the reporting period, the SAC also conducted air strikes in this area. Indiscriminate shelling into Day Loh Mu Nu village tract On October 19th 2023, at around 1 pm, the SAC combined forces, including IB #39 that is based in Lay Maing village, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. These villages include A---, B---, C---, N---, Ae---, Af---, Ag---, and Ah--- villages. One of the mortar shells landed in a shop owned by U[11] Ai--- in C--- village. The mortar shell exploded, damaging the shop. On November 17th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired mortar shells into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a farm near Ae--- village. It exploded and its shrapnel killed a cow owned by Saw Aj---. On November 19th 2023, the SAC troops again indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu area. One of the mortar shells landed in a villager’s house in N--- village. It exploded and damaged the roof of the house owned by Ak---. Shrapnel from the mortar shells also hit other three houses nearby, damaging them. On November 27th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a rubber plantation owned by a villager near Af--- village. It exploded and damaged the rubber plantation. There were no casualties [caused by the shelling] in this village. Also on November 27th 2023, at 9:04 pm, the SAC combined forces based in Lay Maing army camp and Kon Nit Maing (Seven Miles) army camp, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into Ag--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The mortar shells exploded in a rubber plantation owned by a villager, damaging it. Shrapnel from the mortar explosion hit a house owned by a 34-year-old female villager, Naw Al---. She was also hit by the mortar shrapnel, sustaining injuries to her elbow. Air strikes in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract On November 27th 2023, at 3:17 pm, the SAC conducted an air strike in Ah--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The air strike injured two villagers, one of whom was seriously injured. A villager’s house was also damaged by the air strike. Further background reading on the situation on house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes in Taw Oo District, Southeast Burma, be found in the following KHRG reports: “Taw Oo District Situation Update: Fighting, shelling, and house burning in Thandaung Town, and air strikes in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (January to July 2023)”, January 2024 Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers’ lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023. “Taw Oo District Incident Report: Killings, property destruction, and indiscriminate shelling by the SAC in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township (July 2023)”, November 2023. “Taw Oo District Short Update: Air strikes, displacement and property damage in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, July 2023”, August 2023. Burning Karen State: Retaliatory burning of houses and property against rural civilian communities of Southeast Burma (2021 and 2022), March 2023. Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received in November and December 2023. It was provided by a community member in Taw Oo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma (Myanmar), which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army. [3] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed (KNLA) wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [4] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name. [5] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [6] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [7] ‘Saw’ is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name. [8] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives. [9] ‘Daw’ is a Burmese female honorific title used before a person’s name. [10] ‘Naw’ is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name. [11] ‘U’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-03-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: "This week, in Melbourne, the Australian government for the second time is hosting leaders for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia Special Summit. It's been six years since the last summit on Australian soil. While many countries in the region have seen economic growth during that time, repression and democratic backsliding has also been growing. The rights of people across the region are being trampled or ignored. The summit is an opportunity to put those issues, and the rights of south-east Asian people, front and center. In 2018, Aung San Suu Kyi represented the government of Myanmar at the summit. Since then, the military has ousted the civilian-led government and has drawn the country into a spiraling human rights and humanitarian crisis. The military has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity - Aung San Suu Kyi is among the tens of thousands arbitrarily detained. She is serving 27 years in prison under a slew of fabricated charges. Six years ago, Hun Sen was Cambodia's leader posing for selfies at Sydney Harbor and brazenly threatening Cambodians who dared to protest that he would "beat them." Now his son Hun Manet is leader. As Human Rights Watch has documented, physical assaults of opposition members have continued. The opposition leader Kem Sokha is serving a 27-year sentence confined to his home, and the main opposition party was banned from contesting the sham 2023 elections. Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited last time and will attend the summit again, but his term is ending. Indonesia's democratic institutions meant to provide a check on power such as the Constitutional Court and Anti-Corruption Commission have been eroded, with a return to dynastic patronage politics. His likely successor is currently the defence minister, Prabowo Subianto - implicated in massacres in East Timor in 1983, and the 1997-1998 kidnappings of activists in Java that led to his dismissal from the army. The lesson is that when there is no proper accountability following a truth commission as in Timor-Leste, even notorious human rights abusers can go on to hold political power. Prabowo has the support of Widodo, who paired his son Gibran Raka to be Prabowo's vice-president. Then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte skipped the last summit. Now it's Ferdinand Marcos jnr son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. His son is desperate to rehabilitate the family name and is being feted by Western leaders from Washington to Canberra. While the Australian government may be relieved to have a non-volatile pro-West partner in Malacaang Palace, the summary killings of drug suspects still occur regularly because of the lack of accountability for police violence. The government refuses to co-operate with the International Criminal Court's investigation into the "drug war" killings, and killings of leftist activists and trade unionists continue, fueled by the authorities' practice of "red-tagging" them as "communists." Thailand's then-Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, who seized power in a 2014 military coup, attended the last summit. As in Myanmar, Thai generals had the foresight to shore up their continued domination of the political process through a constitutional and legal framework that enabled the military to determine who became prime minister. So when the reformist Move Forward Party resoundingly won the most votes in the May 2023 election, entrenched interests had ways to prevent them from assuming power. Now Thailand is ruled by Srettha Thaivisin, a former businessman from the Pheu Thai party, while the former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is back home, on parole and holding court for ruling party politicians. Malaysia's leader in attendance is Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who doggedly won the last election after years of trumped-up charges against him. As Anwar struggles to hold together a fragile coalition of parties, many of his promises for reform have gone unmet. Vietnam and Laos both remain Communist Party states that don't even pretend to hold independent elections. Laos is chairing ASEAN this year. Vietnam is enjoying attention from Western capitals and companies looking to "de-risk" from China. Meanwhile, its crackdowns have intensified against activists, including environmental defenders. This regional backsliding on democracy and human rights should be of immense concern to the Australian government and Australians. The government is rightly worried about the Chinese government's growing influence in the region. Across south-east Asia, Chinese companies as part of China's mass surveillance infrastructure are building "smart" city systems that collect massive amount of personal and other data without oversight. Beijing is actively seeking to shore up support for votes from governments in the region to evade accountability at the United Nations and in the global arena. And it is pressing south-east Asian governments to return dissidents and ethnic Uyghurs, sending a stark reminder to Chinese nationals that even if they have left the mainland, they are not truly safe. Instead of taking bold steps to defend democracy and human rights, Australia and other democratic governments have shown less willingness to hold human rights abusers responsible if those abusers are strategic allies, trade partners in "de-risking," or otherwise considered helpful in containing China. The approach is deemed "pragmatic" but involves passively monitoring the decline of human rights and democracy across the region or raising matters privately, where there is little chance of impact. Meanwhile, civil society activists, government critics and journalists are facing intimidation, threats, harassment, and in some cases physical attacks. ASEAN has proven woefully inadequate in addressing regional human rights crises - most starkly evident with its impotent and ineffectual response to atrocities in Myanmar. This is hardly likely to improve now that Laos is the chair. Australia should use this summit to press for meaningful co-ordinated action on Myanmar. Australia is right to forge greater trade and security ties and strengthen its relationships in the region. But those ties alone will not be enough to stop the authoritarian slide. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up each other's human rights concerns..."
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Source/publisher: The Canberra Times via Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
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Description: "On 1 March 2024, H.E. Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, participated in the Interactive Dialogue on High Commissioner’s Oral Update on Myanmar during the 55th Session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, Switzerland. On this occasion, Ms. Usana Berananda, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations Office at Geneva, delivered a statement by Thailand, stating that as an immediate neighbour, Thailand is deeply concerned about the current situation in Myanmar, especially the plight of people in the country. For this reason, Thailand has undertaken the initiative to upscale humanitarian assistance along the Thai - Myanmar border to support the implementation of the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. In addition, Thailand hoped that ASEAN, neighbouring countries, and external partners would seek to build on this initiative by encouraging all parties to work towards dialogue, reconciliation, and a return to democracy, with a goal to achieve a peaceful, stable, and unified Myanmar where human rights of the Myanmar people are fully respected. On the same day, VFM also met with H.E. Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations in Geneva to share Thailand’s visions in enhancing the effectiveness of HRC, especially in emergency situations. VFM reaffirmed Thailand’s readiness to work with all countries and stakeholders to advance the work of the HRC..."
Source/publisher: Government of Thailand
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
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Sub-title: Albanese, Southeast Asian Leaders Should Address Myanmar, Other Regional Crises
Description: "Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders. Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years, and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members. Key concerns include the need for stronger sanctions against Myanmar and ending attacks on dissidents in Cambodia and Vietnam, and security forces’ targeting of activists in the Philippines. (Sydney) – Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Albanese will host leaders from nine of the countries making up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit on March 4 to 6, 2024, in Melbourne. The 60-page report, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia,” summarizes critical human rights issues that Albanese should raise at the summit. Human Rights Watch urged the Australian government to put its values as a rights-respecting democracy at the core of its relations with ASEAN countries. As the Australian government approaches the summit with the goal of removing blockages to regional economic cooperation, it should not bypass human rights concerns in the hopes that they will resolve themselves, because they will not. “This high-level meeting would be a lost opportunity for Australia and the people of ASEAN countries if the Australian government were to gloss over human rights issues,” said Daniela Gavshon, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Australian government should send the message that human rights violations are a key foreign policy concern.” It will be especially important for Australia to guide discussion toward human rights since the subject has been left off the summit agenda. The summit marks 50 years of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations. Over the past five decades, successive Australian governments have pursued closer economic, security, and political partnerships with ASEAN countries. Australia continues to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asian countries to offset the shift in global power dynamics. United States influence in the region is being challenged by the growing political, economic, and military clout of a more assertive China. To counter China’s threat to human rights and the rules-based international order, Australia should center its dialogue with ASEAN leaders on the rights of Southeast Asian people rather than just on strengthening friendly relations. The anniversary presents a unique opportunity to reflect on human rights in the region and to reframe the next 50 years of Australia-ASEAN cooperation. Albanese has already projected the next half-century to be “even more successful than the last” for ASEAN-Australia relations, and pledged A$95.4 million (US$63.9 million) to kick-start Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040. In a February letter, Human Rights Watch urged Prime Minister Albanese to press for commitments from individual countries at the summit, and raise specific human rights issues with individual governments. “Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members,” Gavshon said. “Australia’s failure to directly address human rights concerns at the summit would be a propaganda coup for abusive leaders, and it will embolden new ASEAN leaders to continue the human rights abusing legacies of their predecessors.” In its most serious human rights lapse, ASEAN has not dealt with the spiralling humanitarian and human rights crisis in Myanmar. The consequences have spilled over the borders of Thailand, India, and China, and contributed to the continued suffering of ethnic Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh. Tens of thousands have sought safety in neighboring countries since the 2021 coup by the Myanmar military. In addition, Rohingya who fled crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in 2017 cannot return. Given increasing insecurity and deteriorating conditions in the camps housing one million Rohingya in Bangladesh, 4,500 made the high-risk sea voyage to Indonesia or Malaysia in 2023, according to the United Nations refugee agency. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus – which Myanmar’s junta repudiated days after agreeing to it in April 2021 – is not a viable framework for dealing with a military that continues to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes. Australian and ASEAN governments should agree to enforce sanctions against Myanmar, including those newly imposed by Australia on banks and jet fuel suppliers, in their own jurisdictions. Together, Albanese and Southeast Asian leaders should commit to strengthening multilateral action at the UN Security Council. Among other key rights issues to be addressed is the Thai and Cambodian governments’ cooperation to uncover, intimidate, and arrest Cambodian civil society activists in Thailand. In Vietnam, the government systematically suppresses freedom of expression and other basic liberties. In the Philippines, the security forces target activists, rights defenders, and journalists, often with deadly results. State-sponsored discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia remains pervasive. On an institutional level, ASEAN purports to respect the human rights of its 685 million citizens. However, its Human Rights Declaration and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) have no real impact. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its own domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up allies’ human rights concerns, Human Rights Watch said. “The 50th anniversary of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations marked at this summit could be a turning point,” Gavshon said. “Looking forward to 2040, the region will face environmental challenges, economic uncertainty, and strategic competition, but these challenges can be lessened if governments show respect for human rights and democracy.”..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-28
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Description: "A deadly stampede outside a passport office that took two lives and unending lines outside embassies - these are just some examples of what has been happening in Myanmar since the announcement of mandatory conscription into the military. Myanmar's military government is facing increasingly effective opposition to its rule and has lost large areas of the country to armed resistance groups. On 1 February 2021, the military seized power in a coup, jailing elected leaders and plunging much of the country into a bloody civil war that continues today. Thousands have been killed and the UN estimates that around 2.6 million people been displaced. Young Burmese, many of whom have played a leading role protesting and resisting the junta, are now told they will have to fight for the regime. Many believe that this is a result of the setbacks suffered by the military in recent months, with anti-government groups uniting to defeat them in some key areas. "It is nonsense to have to serve in the military at this time, because we are not fighting foreign invaders. We are fighting each other. If we serve in the military, we will be contributing to their atrocities," Robert, a 24-year-old activist, told the BBC. Many of them are seeking to leave the country instead. "I arrived at 03:30 [20:30 GMT] and there were already about 40 people queuing for the tokens to apply for their visa," recalled a teenage girl who was part of a massive crowd outside the Thai embassy in Yangon earlier in February. Within an hour, the crowd in front of the embassy expanded to more than 300 people, she claims. "I was scared that if I waited any longer, the embassy would suspend the processing of visas amid the chaos," she told the BBC, adding that some people had to wait for three days before even getting a queue number. In Mandalay, where the two deaths occurred outside the passport office, the BBC was told that there were also serious injuries - one person broke their leg after falling into a drain while another broke their teeth. Six others reported breathing difficulties. Justine Chambers, a Myanmar researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies, says mandatory conscription is a way of removing young civilians leading the revolution. "We can analyse how the conscription law is a sign of the Myanmar military's weakness, but it is ultimately aimed at destroying lives... Some will manage to escape, but many will become human shields against their compatriots," she said. Myanmar's conscription law was first introduced in 2010 but had not been enforced until on 10 February the junta said it would mandate at least two years of military service for all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27. Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson for the military government, said in a statement that about a quarter of the country's 56 million population were eligible for military service under the law. The regime later said it did not plan to include women in the conscript pool "at present" but did not specify what that meant. The government spokesperson told BBC Burmese that call-ups would start after the Thingyan festival marking the Burmese New Year in mid-April, with an initial batch of 5,000 recruits. The regime's announcement has dealt yet another blow to Myanmar's young people. Many had their education disrupted by the coup, which came on top of school closures at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2021, the junta suspended 145,000 teachers and university staff over their support for the opposition, according to the Myanmar Teachers' Federation, and some schools in opposition-held areas have been destroyed by the fighting or by air strikes. Then there are those who have fled across borders seeking refuge, among them young people looking for jobs to support their families. Young Burmese confront dashed dreams in exile Why India wants to fence its troubled Myanmar border In response to the conscription law, some have said on social media that they would enter the monkhood or get married early to dodge military service. The junta says permanent exemptions will be given to members of religious orders, married women, people with disabilities, those assessed to be unfit for military service and "those who are exempted by the conscription board". For everyone else, evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine. But Robert doubts the regime will honour these exemptions. "The junta can arrest and abduct anyone they want. There is no rule of law and they do not have to be accountable to anyone," he said. Wealthier families are considering moving their families abroad - Thailand and Singapore being popular options, but some are even looking as far afield as Iceland - with the hope that their children would get permanent residency or citizenship there by the time they are of conscription age. Others have instead joined the resistance forces, said Aung Sett, from the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, which has a long history of fighting military rule. "When I heard the news that I would have to serve in the military, I felt really disappointed and at the same time devastated for the people, especially for those who are young like me. Many young people have now registered themselves to fight against the junta," the 23-year-old told the BBC from exile. Some observers say the enforcement of the law now reveals the junta's diminishing grip on the country. Last October, the regime suffered its most serious setback since the coup. An alliance of ethnic insurgents overran dozens of military outposts along the border with India and China. It has also lost large areas of territory to insurgents along the Bangladesh and Indian borders. According to the National Unity Government, which calls itself Myanmar's government in exile, more than 60% of Myanmar's territory is now under the control of resistance forces. "By initiating forced conscription following a series of devastating and humiliating defeats to ethnic armed organisations, the military is publicly demonstrating just how desperate it has become," said Jason Tower, country director for the Burma programme at the United States' Institute of Peace. A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses Who are the rulers who executed Myanmar activists? Mr Tower expects the move to fail because of growing resentment against the junta. "Many youth dodging conscription will have no choice but to escape into neighbouring countries, intensifying regional humanitarian and refugee crises. This could result in frustration growing in Thailand, India, China and Bangladesh, all of which could tilt away from what remains of their support for the junta," he said. Even if the military does manage to increase troop numbers by force, this will do little to address collapsing morale in the ranks. It will also take months to train up the new troops, he said. The junta had a long history of "forced recruitment" even before the law was enacted, said Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. "So the law may merely serve as a facade for forcibly conscripting new recruits into the military. With a severe shortage of manpower, there is no time to wait for the lengthy and gradual process of recruiting new soldiers, prompting [officials] to exploit the law to swiftly coerce people into service," he said. Even for those who will manage to escape, many will carry injuries and emotional pain for the rest of their lives. "It has been really difficult for young people in Myanmar, both physically and mentally. We've lost our dreams, our hopes and our youth. It just can't be the same like before," said Aung Sett, the student leader. "These three years have gone away like nothing. We've lost our friends and colleagues during the fight against the junta and many families have lost their loved ones. It has been a nightmare for this country. We are witnessing the atrocities committed by the junta on a daily basis. I just can't express it in words."..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
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Sub-title: In Part 2 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description: "The Resistance Let’s start with the difference between an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) and a People’s Defense Force (PDF). Put simply and broadly, a PDF does not seek autonomy within the State, while autonomy within a federal state (but no longer succession) is a key demand of most EAOs.[1] PDFs were created in response to the 2021 coup, while EAOs uniformly pre-dated it. Some but not all PDFs are connected to the NUG, although the term PDF also includes Local Defense Forces (LDFs), which are autonomous. Taking PDFs and EAOs as a whole, Andrew Selth estimates ‘up to 250 loosely organised local defence groups, urban resistance cells and EAOs… there could be about 25,000 active members of the various militias and resistance groups, and a further 30,000-35,000 in the relevant EAOs.’ This and other claims arrive with the caveat that no one has an accurate macro-level tally: local organizations are the only ones likely to have accurate estimates, but those too would be limited and area-specific data, which is constantly shifting. Therefore, any tally is out-of-date soon after it occurs. Ethnic Armed Organizations Regarding EAOs, in 2018, I wrote about the failure of the deposed civilian government’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and that relates to Selth’s key use of the word relevant. His count of 30,000-35,000 EAO troops discounts EAOs not currently at war with the junta, most through ceasefires – a situation that predates the current junta’s seizure of power. Let’s briefly consider EAO numbers as a whole, because those with ceasefires still represent potential combatants. The sit-tat’s aforementioned manner of signing and breaking ceasefires is a deadly game, and EAO’s with current ceasefires know that they are not durable. Estimates of pre- and post-coup EAO numbers (i.e. not PDFs) are represented in the table below: * includes reserves. ** indicates no known or significant change from pre-coup numbers Since the coup, we can only note that EAO numbers have increased. If Ye Myo Hein’s estimates are correct, there is at least a parity between EAO numbers overall and the sit-tat’s human resource capacity. Prior to the October 27 offensive, the disorganization of the resistance was what in part held back faster territorial acquisition and greater sit-tat attrition. The sit-tat, in many ways inept, at least acknowledges the stark fact that it can’t fight the strongest EAOs, and so it continued to play the aforementioned game of musical chair ceasefires. The momentum building against the sit-tat makes this option less attractive for EAOs. Back to Selth’s ‘relevant,’ select EAOs falling under the China-backed Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC), deserve particular mention. The FPNCC is a negotiating block created and led by the United Wa State Party (UWSP), which formed out of the remnants of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989. The UWSP for its part has been built by China into the largest, best armed, and most cohesive EAO in the country, and perhaps after the now-defunct Wagner Group and the thoroughly desiccated Islamic State, is now the largest non-state armed group on the Asian continent. The Three Brotherhood’s AA, MNDAA, and TNLA are under the FPNCC umbrella, as are the National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla), and the Shan State Army North (linked to the Shan State Progress Party). Unlike many an EAO alliance, the FPNCC proved more durable, and at present it contains the absolute majority of EAO fighters countrywide. The Chin National Front’s (CNF) armed forces are allied with several newly formed Chinland Defense Forces – which are PDF groups based in Chin State. Their exponential post-coup growth is noteworthy and harken back to the CNF’s bloody and unexpected arrival on the resistance scene in the mid-1990s after they were trained and armed by the KIA. An outlier in the EAO continuum is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Other Rohingya groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and other EAOs, regard it as a terrorist organization, with links to other Jihadist groups worldwide, although ARSA denies this. ARSA have also been implicated in massacres in Rakhine. They are mostly involved in intra-Rohingya political struggles in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and are more actively engaged in killing Rohingya alternates to their authority there, and occasional Bangladeshi security officials, than killing sit-tat in Rakhine. Rohingya people, as far as the author is aware, have no representation in PDFs, nor are they part of any resistance not wholly concerned with their own specific ethno-religious-territorial concerns. This is despite some outreach on the part of NUG to build bridges with Rohingya, firstly by actually using the word ‘Rohingya’, in contrast to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, who only referred to them as Bengalis in order to cement the claim that they were recent migrants from Bangladesh. NUG has since acknowledged the violence they were subjected to by the sit-tat, but has hardly acknowledged the structural violence adhered to by the NLD against them. And so NUG’s claims – that it would provide justice, repatriation, and reparation for Rohingya – are yet to be tested. People’s Defense Forces The most recent PDFs in Myanmar began forming and arming immediately after the 2021 Military coup. However, they have a long and potted history in Myanmar, explained by Jasnea Sarma at the University of Zurich as follows: In the past too there used to be such groups. They went by different names like Swan Ar Shin စွမ်းအားရှင်, ပြည်သူ့တဝန် or civilian task force, ရွာတာဝန်ပြည်သူ့စွမ်းအားရှင် or village task force etc) . These groups were driven by self-defence and formed often as a response to circumstance, namely local protection from threats. The post-coup PDFs, often referred to as ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် or ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်, are a direct response to the coup, all fighting the sit tat, but they do mimic the workings of these older groups. This explains in-part why it’s difficult to clearly understand which PDF is aligned with which group. They are not necessarily always linked to previously elected representatives, although many are. Not all PDFs are tied to NUG. Many are now allied with EAOs, some are standalone, with occasional alliances of convenience. There are many composed mainly of armed university students assisted by EAOs. Some also have church affiliations. What’s important is that they have arms and can maintain a defensive posture and have been extremely important and effective after the 2021 coup. History tells us that if anything, they will keep forming in (and around) Burma, adapting to the needs. Jasnea Sarma PDFs have been able to mount effective resistance across Bamar areas and have been able to recruit a significant number of fighters, including former soldiers and police officers; as mentioned, many Bamar youth in Sagaing and Magwe who might have joined the sit-tat are in PDFs instead. They have also received weapons from abroad, although most of their firearms originate from actions against the sit-tat or from select EAOs. Local manufacture of firearms also occurs, but the artisanal nature of these operations not only limits their impact, but poses danger to both manufacturer and shooter. Civilian drone conversion is another factor. Regarding numbers, NUG claims 50-100,000 fighters in 259 trained PDF battalions and 401 LDFs. The formal size of a PDF battalion is 200 personnel, but some are up to 500. Hein estimates that PDF personnel numbered 40,000 as of February 2022, with no less than 30,000 LDF personnel. These PDFs are concentrated in the Anyar theatre of Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay, where there are at least 15,000 PDF and 20,000 LDF combatants. As of November 2022, independent observers speaking with Ye Myo Hein estimated that 30 percent of PDFs/LDFs fell under the command of NUG, 40 percent had some links to NUG, while 30 percent were wholly independent. At the local level, it’s likely that all PDFs have more authority than local NUG representation. They’re armed, after all. However, some PDFs are under the control of NUG (which raised $44 million for its defense ministry alone in its first 14 months), with a clearer integration between the two, rather than the diffuse and grassroots nature of many other PDFs which resemble the franchise nature of many an insurgency. However, the PDFs face deep challenges, including a lack of coordinated leadership, limited support from the international community, and even the populations of some areas they control, due to the predatory behavior of select groups. Limited resources are worth highlighting: Min Zaw Oo from the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security estimated to Deutsche Welle that at the beginning of 2022, only 10 percent of PDFs had automatic weapons, although they are now generally better armed. Despite this, we have evidence of local support, of retention in numbers, of the capacity of fighters, all found in the sit-tat body count the PDFs are responsible for. Overall, the balance of personnel favors the armed resistance. Credibility Issues The support EAOs might give to PDFs in particular and the NUG in general is constrained by the lack of credibility the deposed civilian government had with some EAOs. AA chief General Twan Mrat Naing summarized it well: “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people, but after they came to power, they didn’t keep the promise. So we have learned the lesson and we are not naive anymore.” The past relationships of many EAOs with the deposed civilian government surely shapes EAO relations with the NUG and PDFs and this issue will come to the forefront in any NUG-EAO victory. Promises of federalism will not be taken at face value. International Support for the Sit-tat Since the coup, elements of the “international community” have imposed sanctions on the sit-tat and affiliated individuals. The countries and institutions most in support of NUG are peripheral in comparison to the countries which maintain pragmatic relations with the sit-tat. Who cares about Switzerland when you’ve got China? While, as mentioned, sanctions may bite because of the predominance of the US dollar, this is not an insurmountable issue for either the junta or allies who seek alternates to said dollar. China and Russia protect the sit-tat from United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolutions, and both can offer the veil of legitimacy to any staged elections. India and other Myanmar neighbors must keep their options open with a state they must trade with and absorb refugees from. China In 2004 the sit-tat began reaching out to “the west”, which was seen as a hedge against China’s hegemony in the region. The situation is now an inverse of the one which led to the removal of Khin Nyunt and his China clique two decades ago. China’s support is crucial to the sit-tat’s survival. However, China’s nuanced approach to the Three Brotherhood Alliance reflects both a loss of patience and a hedging of bets. Since the February 2021 coup, China has justified engagement with the sit-tat to both support stability and ensure bilateral relations, although a recent USIP report showed how, with regard to stability, the opposite is occurring, with negative implications for China. China also cites principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Implicitly, Myanmar is firmly within China’s sphere of influence. The notion of a ‘sphere of influence’ was once imagined to be terminally ill by liberal internationalists, but it is both healthy and real, and extends to China’s drug control policy as well as its vaunted Belt and Road Initiative, which binds Myanmar and her eastern neighbors to China, economically and infrastructurally. The bond already exists culturally, in Yunnan in particular. China is Myanmar’s predominant economic partner, much to India’s consternation (see below), and has invested heavily in Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure development, and natural resource extraction, providing a much-needed source of economic support for the country, both under the civilian government and the latest junta. Myanmar, however, has a considerable amount of authority in the relationship. Key Chinese investments include the Kyaukphyu deep sea port, power plant, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which will connect Kyaukphyu and Yunnan via pipeline and reduce China’s reliance on fuel shipments through the Straits of Malacca; the Mee Lin Gyaing natural gas power plant in Ayeyarwady; and numerous others. This is imperial thinking of a scale not comprehensible to many a government, especially ones who only see foreign relations through the prism of their own domestic elections, and still others who automatically discount the effectiveness of state-controlled enterprises in favor of the sacraments of a ‘free market’. This relationship has not always been so smooth. Myanmar and China cooperated in the subjugation of Chinese Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) forces which had fled Yunnan and established themselves in Shan in the late 1940s, with a delusion that they would one day re-invade with the support of the CIA. Those wash-outs were a theoretical threat to the China’s ruling communists, entirely overblown. The dregs of the GMD in Shan, unlike the sit-tat, was an institution entirely hollowed out by corruption, and was generally only interested in making money. China-Myanmar cooperation was, at the time, an aberration. During the Cold War, Myanmar considered China both rival and threat. After the dictator Ne Win’s expulsion of large numbers of ethnic Chinese in the late 1960s, China increased support to Communist Party of Buma (CPB) forces in Bago Yoma, just north of Yangon, while Red Guard ‘volunteers’ supporting the CPB invaded Northern Shan in 1968. Reconciliation began after the death of Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as China’s paramount leader in the late 1970s. The CPB’s vocal support for the ’Gang of Four’, a faction of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials whom Deng had purged, led Deng’s support to the CPB to decline. The removal of the sit-tat’s ‘China clique’ in 2004 did not end Chinese overtures and investments, although the derailing of the Myitsone dam project in 2011 was a further hiccup in the relationship. Since the coup, China has not only blocked efforts to impose sanctions on Myanmar but has increased its own investments. Even before the recent offensive, China hedged its bets vis a vis the sit-tat, and the civilian government they deposed, with EAOs, though the FPNCC; a coalition of EAOs that were by and large excluded from peace process before the coup. China’s facilitation with these EAOs led to ceasefires which allowed the overextended sit-tat to reallocate overextended forces elsewhere. China also froze out the western powers that sought to engage FPNCC, leaving those westerners – “conflict” and “peacebuilding” experts and the like – to content themselves with NCA signatories, the KNU and NMSP especially. China’s relations with FPNCC members continued after the latest offensive; indeed, it is likely that the Three Brotherhood Alliance alerted China of its intentions in advance. China’s continued subtle approach toward both the sit-tat and the alliance reflects their stated policy of non-interference, but it also likely reflects a loss of patience in the sit-tat’s sheltering of the operations of ethnic Chinese criminal gangs in Shan and elsewhere. The October 27 Offensive has resulted in the capture and extradition of numerous of these criminals to China, and China has also mediated temporary ceasefires between the warring parties which will likely peter out soon due to the sit-tat’s incorrigible belief in its own battlefield genius, despite all evidence to the contrary. China also extends the occasional fig leaf to NUG, while explicitly stating their displeasure at the NUG’s continued relations with Western powers. This seems mostly for show. NUG, for its part, has issued a policy paper on China which includes support for the ‘One China’ policy. If NUG were to emerge victorious in the struggle against the sit-tat, China would find itself temporarily sidelined, because despite its insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its dealings with the current sit-tat is implicitly a bet on its success. However, this sidelining would be temporary. China simply has too much authority—economic, political, and otherwise. Russia The sit-tat hedges its China bets with Russia. During the Cold War, Myanmar was closely aligned with the Soviet Union—the USSR even built the Inya Lake Hotel following Nikita Khrushchev’s 1958 visit—and Russia retains much of that goodwill. This remains, however, a relationship of convenience: the sit-tat needs arms, and Russia needs cash. Russia is currently the sit-tat’s largest arms supplier, and this includes artillery and fighter jets. This cooperation extends to tourism, trade, and nuclear energy. Russia also blocks UNSC attempts to sanction the sit-tat. Russia’s support to development of nuclear energy in Myanmar is of particular note: the sit-tat claims that such development is peaceful. However, surely Min Aung Hlaing is following the example of Kim Jong Un and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), just as Kim learned from what happened to Moammar Qaddafi in Libya. Weapons of mass destruction are protective amulets westerners also believe in. India India’s position toward the sit-tat and the February 2021 coup has been aptly described as ‘fractured between words and deeds’ – sweet diplomatic words about upkeeping democracy, and deeds reflecting an extremely short-sighted military, political, and economic support for the junta, as well as a reluctance to understand the important role of other resistance actors. India tries to maintain a positive relationship with whoever happens to be running Myanmar, and the reason is a) China, and b) security in Northeastern India, including counterinsurgency along the long and porous border with Myanmar. This border security also involves China, which regards Northeastern India’s Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet. India’s current policy dates back to at least 1988. Like China, India justifies this engagement with the principle of non-interference and the need for stability. During the brief democratic transition, it maintained a balance in its relations with the sit-tat and the civilian government, with the aim of promoting its strategic interests in the region, including security, energy, and connectivity. India has reverted to its pre-democratic stance, maintaining positive relations with the current junta to the extent that the Modi government has downplayed junta bombs erroneously falling into Indian territory and return soldiers safely back to Myanmar who escape to safe Indian army/paramilitary controlled areas. Myanmar is an important partner for India’s ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to deepen India’s ties with Southeast Asia and strengthen its position as a regional power. It is seen as key to India’s energy security, with several major projects underway, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project which connects Sittwe and NE India, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway; India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The sit-tat’s attitude toward India is more transactional. They look the other way while Indian Naga, Meitei, Mizo and other insurgents to use Myanmar as a base. The sit-tat likely see the presence of these foreign insurgents as useful bargaining chips in any negotations with Indian authorities. The insurgents pay for the privilege in the form of protection fees, and they purchase weapons and supplies from local sit-tat as well.[15] Other neighbors are less, but still, important: Thailand has maintained a pragmatic relationship with the powers that be in Myanmar since the departure of the Raj. Bangladesh, despite the burden of the expelled Rohingya, and delays to their repatriation, does likewise. Near neighbors have had to be more serious than the utopian foreign policies of distant states. Short-term predictions Who’d have known? That three years on this fight would continue. That the Bamars would lead it. That some EAOs would finally, meaningfully, join forces, not only with one another, but with PDFs. That the sit-tat would shrink in the face of it. What we’ve learned firstly is that the sit-tat is an ineffective and inefficient war-making enterprise. They draw from the same limited toolbox across juntas and acronyms; they don’t seem to have any new ideas, other than conscription. And so, while they won’t likely collapse anytime soon, they will continue to weaken and bleed. We will see more defections, more forced conscription, and ever less enthusiasm for the fight. We may even see foreign support for the sit-tat in the form of foreign fighters, namely Russian military, although the parameters of this limit the extent of it: firstly, sit-tat ego needs to be overcome; second, China needs to approve. Such foreigners would be labelled ‘advisors’, and the resistance would have no small fun in killing them. The sit-tat’s brutality will increase within an ever-shrinking space. We can anticipate a further revamping of the sit-tat’s ‘Four Cuts’ (လေးဖြတ် ဗျူဟာမှာ/ ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်) counterinsurgency strategy, first used in the 1960s in the Bago Yoma – an area that remains depopulated to the present day. Four Cuts aims to deny food, funds, intelligence and recruits to enemies of the state, and involves large-scale detentions, population transfers, and the inevitable killings. This is already happening, especially in order to secure transport routes, and we can anticipate more systematic actions in the Bamar heartlands of Sagaing and Magwe in particular, where the sit-tat will attempt to depopulate inconvenient areas whose populations they cannot adequately control. Given attrition rates and growing emphasis on less reliable militias, in addition to growing financial shortfalls, we can anticipate the sit-tat’s further loss of territory, with the junta essentially surrendering remaining tracts of Chin, Kayah, Northern Shan, and Rakhine in particular. The same will happen in Bamar areas in which Four Cuts cannot be effectively implemented; they will fall back to flatlands distinguished by all-weather roads, and EAO and to a lesser extent PDF territories will expand in response. Personnel attrition will lead to a further reliance on air power, which in turn leads to more reliance on Russia for planes, parts, and training. Areas of the country controlled by the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other members of the FPNCC which have ceasefires with the junta will continue to expand and assert sovereignty. So will independent-minded BGFs and criminal gangs. The oft-claimed fiction that Myanmar is a state will become ever more untenable. Ultimately, we will witness a desiccated sit-tat ruling a desiccated Bamar space, surrounded by enemies. This will also prove untenable: the international community has no stomach for any new states, and this includes China and Russia. The future Myanmar will be federal by fiat. It’s worth returning to the dream of impending collapse: a remote possibility that still cannot be discounted. The degrading of such an institution as the sit-tat occurs at what looks to be a slow pace which suddenly accelerates. If enough officers believe it is going to happen, their own individual decisions will combine to make it happen. What happened to Romania in December of 1989 illustrates such a process. Political wits once said of Romanians that they were like corn mush in that they could be boil forever yet never explode, but they had the strength to boo the dictator in Timisoara, on live television. The regime, at that moment, ended, because it ended in the minds of its enforcers, who shot Ceausescu and his wife and then turned on one another in a brief killing frenzy while re-labelling themselves a democratic opposition. The sit-tat’s implosion would be far bloodier, and that sour-faced major general I ran into in Paletwa in 2019 will be either in front of the firing squad or behind the rifle stock. The one thing we can bank on is that the people of Myanmar will continue to suffer..."
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Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
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Description: "Louise Taylor 1 February 2024 marked the third anniversary of the coup in Myanmar. Although there is much geopolitical tension and conflict at the moment occupying people’s minds, with developments in the Middle East and Ukraine particularly dominating the news, the situation in Myanmar been delicately avoided by donors and international partners for some time. However, as the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index shows, organized crime in Myanmar has significantly worsened, to the point that the country currently has the highest levels of organized criminality in the world. Furthermore, Myanmar’s resilience to organized crime has weakened significantly since its low ranking in 2021. The gap between its criminality and resilience scores is so large that it has no meaningful global comparator. This calls for urgent intervention in Myanmar and could be a cautionary tale for countries such as Ecuador and Haiti, whose emerging crime–resilience gap scores may not be at this critical juncture yet but are steadily approaching Myanmar’s dire, unenviable situation. In 2021, Myanmar’s criminality score of 7.59 (out of 10, where 10 is the worst ranking), placed it third among all countries in the world. By 2023, a score of 8.15 propelled Myanmar to the top of the global ranking, i.e. it has the highest levels of criminality globally. The most significant increases in its criminal market scores (one component of the criminality ranking) were in non-renewable resource crimes (following a surge in illegal rare earth mining after the 2021 coup) and human trafficking, where cases of forced labour and of trafficking for forced criminality and marriage, as well as the plight of the Rohingya people, were exacerbated by the conflict and subsequent sanctions imposed by the international community. Myanmar’s score for criminal actors (the other component of the criminality ranking) also jumped between 2021 and 2023 – with a particular upward trend for foreign (namely Chinese) actors operating in the country – to a record 9 out of 10. This now matches the score also reached by state-embedded actors, who are active in most, if not all, criminal markets. In particular, state-embedded actors are facilitators in Myanmar’s drug markets (where the country scores 10 for synthetic drugs). Overall, Myanmar has the highest combined score for criminal actors in the world. But the biggest shifts are seen in Myanmar’s ability to resist and withstand organized crime. The Index shows that the more a country is affected by conflict or instability, the more likely it is to have reduced resilience to organized crime. Myanmar is no exception. The country’s resilience score, already low at 3.42 (out of 10) in the 2021 edition of the Index, slid to a paltry 1.63 in 2023. This is not the lowest score in the world – Libya and Afghanistan rank lower – but two key findings are nonetheless striking. First, the country has seen a drop of between 1 and 3 points in every single resilience indicator. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the gap between criminality and resilience is so large that it puts Myanmar eons away from any other country. In 2021, the gap between criminality and resilience was 4.17 points, but by 2023 it had widened to an alarming 6.52 points (the gap ‘growth’ between 2021 and 2023 is shown in the figure below, alongside other countries that also experienced growth gaps). The biggest resilience score drop was seen in the international cooperation indicator, which fell from 5.0 to 2.0. Much of this can be explained by the decisions of many international partners not to engage directly with the military government, and Myanmar’s exclusion from international forums, and information and exchange mechanisms until the coup is resolved. Donors suspended their government-to-government aid agreements, partnerships and projects after the coup, and promised to support more civil society and humanitarian projects. However, these promises may not have been realized. Aid delivery and programming in Myanmar is challenging. Civil society and communities are literally under fire; there are difficulties in getting funding into Myanmar (possibly complicated by the unintended consequences of the Financial Action Task Force blacklisting); and there are concerns about the safety of project staff. Data from the OECD shows a considerable 85% drop in overall aid contributions since 2021 – arguably at a time when intervention and support are most urgently and desperately needed. There were other demands on donors during this period, such as Ukraine, which saw a surge in aid in 2022. However, in December 2023, the UN reported ‘gross underfunding’ for the estimated 1.9 million people who had been prioritized for aid. The drop in donor activity and aid, and the knock-on effect of limited programming and interventions, has also affected the ability to monitor the situation in Myanmar. This has been exacerbated by a significant decline in the resilience capacity of non-state actors. This is not surprising, given the well-documented targeting of civilians and the repressive tactics of the military government. The conflict in Myanmar has not only increased vulnerability, but the resulting lawlessness has fuelled crime and enabled new illicit markets to consolidate. Myanmar scores 7.5 for the cyber-dependent crimes market. Cyberscam centres have sprung up across the country, particularly in border towns and special economic zones, facilitated by state-embedded and Chinese actors. The cyberscam phenomenon is also an example of how domestic criminality, if left unchecked and unregulated, can affect the stability and security of neighbouring countries – such as Thailand –, the wider region and the world. The scale of cyberscam activity has become so significant that it appears to have even affected China’s delicate geopolitical balance in the region, eventually forcing Beijing to issue arrest warrants for key figures linked to cyber fraud in Myanmar’s Shan State. The absence of scrutiny in Myanmar has therefore not only contributed to the widening and deepening of the country’s crime–resilience gap, but has also been instrumental in allowing rising criminality to have reach and impact far beyond its borders. While cyber fraud in Myanmar has attracted much international scrutiny and attention, it is primarily a manifestation of an internal, complex picture of intertwined criminality, vulnerability and risk. The ‘gap’ that exists for Myanmar is a canary in the coal mine for us all – it needs to be top of the agenda in 2024 for governments and civil society practitioners alike. Prescribing a tonic of acute diplomatic attention, rapid redirection of aid and programming efforts that navigate complexity to create innovative solutions to address state-embedded criminality while supporting and building community resilience is an urgent imperative for the country. This analysis is part of the GI-TOC’s series of articles delving into the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The series explores the Index’s findings and their effects on policymaking, anti-organized crime measures and analyses from a thematic or regional perspective..."
Source/publisher: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (Geneva)
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
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Sub-title: They were returning home after the junta enacted a military conscription law.
Description: "More than 100 ethnic Rakhine youths detained by Myanmar’s junta as they returned by bus to Rakhine state from the commercial capital Yangon last week remained incommunicado on Monday, with relatives expressing concern that they were forcibly recruited to join the military amid a rollout of the country’s conscription law. Junta troops arrested the youths on Feb. 20 at a checkpoint in Shwe Pyi Thar township, according to a monk who was a fellow passenger on one of the buses and who lobbied to authorities on their behalf. “Of the three buses that were stopped, the two that I tried to intercede for carried between 90 and 100 passengers [in total],” said the monk who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke to RFA Burmese on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “The last thing I knew, they were arrested,” he said. “The reason I know this is because they entered the military checkpoint and never came out.” The youths, aged between 18 and 30, had been working in garment, shoe and other factories in Yangon, the monk said. They were returning to their homes in the Rakhine townships of Myepon, Minbya, Mrauk-U, and Kyauktaw because their wards in Yangon would no longer register them as guests and they feared arrest after the junta enacted the military conscription law earlier this month. They departed the Aung Mingalar Bus Yard in two buses operated by the Aung Si Khaing bus service and a third operated by the Pwint Phyu bus service, the monk said. The buses typically carry up to 50 passengers. The youths are currently being held at the junta troop unit in Yangon region’s Hlaing Tharyar township, he said, adding that he had been unable to contact them as of Monday. No contact since arrest The military has suffered heavy losses on the battlefield in recent months – most notably in western Rakhine state, where the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, ended a ceasefire in November and has since gone on to capture six townships. On Feb. 10, the junta enacted the People’s Military Service Law, sending draft-eligible civilians fleeing from Myanmar’s cities. They say they would rather leave the country or join anti-junta forces in remote border areas than fight for the military, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat. RFA Burmese has since received reports of recruitment roundups and arrests of young people, despite pledges from authorities that the law will not be enforced until April. A relative of one of the detained youths told RFA that 14 of them are from his home village of Ywa Thar Yar, in Myebon township’s Yaw Chaung district. “Four are male and 10 are female,” he said. “We haven’t had any contact with them since their arrest. They were working in factories in Yangon.” The relative urged the junta to “release them as soon as possible,” as they had committed no crimes and were supporting their families with their income. Aid workers confirmed to RFA that more than 100 Rakhine youths were arrested at the checkpoint on Feb. 20, but were unable to provide the details of those in custody, such as their names, ages or hometowns. Nowhere is safe Residents said that in the past two weeks, authorities in Yangon and Mandalay have been strictly enforcing the Guest List Law, which mandates either seven days’ imprisonment or a fine of 10,000 kyats (about US$5) for those who fail to register. And last week, junta troops arrested around 600 civilians after their flights from Yangon landed at two airports in Rakhine state, according to family members and sources with knowledge of the situation, who said the military is holding them on suspicion of attempting to join the armed resistance. A young Rakhine man working in Yangon told RFA that the junta is arresting people from his state who are living in the city “even if they are registered on guest lists,” but said returning home isn’t safe either. “Now, if you go back to Rakhine, you will be arrested at Sittwe Airport … [or] at Kyaukpyu Airport. But if you stay [in Yangon], there are difficulties with the military service law,” he said. “I fled here to avoid the fighting in Rakhine, but it’s not safe here either. That’s just the current situation." Rakhine military commentators told RFA they believe that the junta is likely targeting youths returning to Rakhine state because they “fear they will join the AA.” Attempts by RFA to contact junta spokesperson Maj. General Zaw Min Tun for comment on the detention of young people in Shwe Pyi Thar township went unanswered Monday. On Feb. 20, the AA said in a statement that the junta is “unlawfully arresting Rakhine people” in cities such as Yangon and Mandalay to use as soldiers, in addition to subjecting them to daily discrimination, torture, extortion, and execution. The group called on Rakhines fleeing fighting in the state to move to territory under its control, instead of relocating to the cities..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: In Part 1 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description: "Starting in 2017, the insurgent Arakan Army (AA) waged war against the Union of Myanmar across the complex topography of Paletwa township in southern Chin State. In January 2024, Paletwa fell to them. I had worked in Paletwa with the deposed civilian government’s Department of Rural Development (DRD) before the February 2021 coup. From 2017 onward, in response to the AA’s guerilla actions, the civilian government had constricted my movement across the township; by 2019 I was limited to Paletwa town and the expanse of the Kaladan River stretching south. I still heard small arms fire at night. Back then the river was my only way in or out of town, and it wasn’t safe either: boats transporting soldiers were strafed. In what is now a memory steeped in irony, back in 2019 the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw, of late referred to as စစ်တပ် / sit-tat, hosted a ceremony in Paletwa town to commemorate their “re-taking” of the township from AA. They hadn’t re-taken any territory at all, but no matter: the sit-tat has never let reality get in the way of self-adulation. That afternoon I sat obliviously on the side of the road which ran down to the jetty, eating ဝက်သားဟင်း tamin hin (pork curry). I paid and I happened to step outside just as a major general and his entourage passed on foot. He stopped and looked at me, open mouthed, and I did the same to him. My first thought was that he looked like a cut rate scoutmaster: U Baden-Powell. Then I wished I’d paid more attention before I stepped out. None of the soldiers lining the street were there when I’d entered the mess an hour before. I smiled dumbly, hoping for reciprocity. Instead, I got a look of hatred that felt white-hot; an expression that spread across the soldiery. Civilian officials later told me that the major general was vexed that I was in Paletwa. And he was especially vexed because I had permission to be there from the civilian government. I’d passed security checkpoints on the Kaladan with the requisite paperwork and had checked in with the town’s police and immigration officials—in the Union, immigration officials control the internal movement of both foreigners and Myanmar citizens. That sour look stayed with me. For a commander, who would have had total control over the township prior to the quasi-democratization that began a decade earlier, back in Paletwa for a victory lap, it must have been a rude shock to be blindsided by a useless, grinning, pale guy. I flatter myself in hindsight by imagining that in some miniscule way I was, to that commander, representative of everything abhorrent about civilian rule. This essay considers the possibility for a return to civilian rule in the face of both sit-tat intransigence and stunning recent losses at the hands of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance – comprised of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – launched a coordinated offensive against the sit-tat on October 27, 2023, and have since seized much of northern Shan state, while People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) launch new operations countrywide. This has all served to put down the myth of the sit-tat’s dominance. I consider alternating claims of sit-tat resiliency and fragility, with particular attention to the demographics of both the sit-tat and the resistance; as well as sit-tat coherence, mindset, funding, territorial control, and international relations. I conclude with a few predictions. Myanmar’s military Myanmar’s military has dominated the country’s political and social landscape since independence. It ruled Myanmar as a dictatorship from 1958 to 1960, then from 1962 until 2011, when a series of political and economic reforms initiated by the sit-tat through their affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) under Thein Sein led to a transition to a semi-democratic system which ultimately saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) win elections in 2015. However, prior to this ‘loss’, the sit-tat, learning from the Indonesian military’s post-1998 mis-steps in that country’s abrupt and disorganized transition to civilian rule, had enshrined their dominance through a constitution they drafted. The 2008 Constitution gave the sit-tat undisputed control of key ministries including Home Affairs and Defense, and allocated them 25 percent of seats in the parliament or Hluttaw, making reforms of the aforementioned constitution impossible. The sit-tat’s constitution also provided a legal basis for any future coup d’état. The NLD’s expert on constitutional law, U Ko Ni, believed in a democratic future and noted that what could not be amended could be replaced. In 2017, he received a bullet to the head by way of reply. The sit-tat would remain in control, and any future civilian government would be, for all intents and purposes, window dressing. On February 1, 2021, the sit-tat deposed the civilians anyway. Sit-tat head, Min Aung Hlaing, justified his coup by alleging widespread ballot fraud in the November 2020 elections which had seen the NLD accrue a majority of votes. The coup was widely condemned by the international community, bar the sit-tat’s most powerful friends: the People’s Republic of China, which referred to the coup as a ‘cabinet reshuffle,’[1] and Russia. The civilian government reconstituted itself as best it could in non-sit-tat-controlled territories and abroad, forming the National Unity Government (NUG) together with its allies from EAOs, activist groups, and political parties in April 2021. While the coup was historically predictable, as was resistance in non-Bamar, ethnic minority areas, the violent ferocity of the resistance in Bamar areas that came perhaps as a shock to the military. Some civilians began to band together in People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Some PDFs sheltered in territories controlled by the country’s myriad EAOs, receiving training from them. Some PDFs also aligned themselves with the NUG. And soon, PDFs began killing soldiers in droves. The sit-tat, for their part, responded to resistance predictably, and with increasing sadism, moving from the first days of jailing NLD figures and dispersing protesters to levelling entire communities from the air, recently with the deadliest airstrike thus far in the conflict. The 168 civilians dead in Pa Zi Gyi in April 2023 join untold thousands in graves, while many survivors join two million displaced. Many Myanmar-focused academics and journalists have staked positions on the sit-tat’s resiliency or fragility. In 2021, the Center for Strategic and International Studies claimed hopefully that the sit-tat was on their last legs, while in 2023, The Irrawaddy more subtly and intelligently noted that the sit-tat’s implosion is not impossible. Numbers Before the coup, general estimates of sit-tat personnel ranged from 300,000 to 400,000. These were overblown. In the past three years, more sober estimates have emerged. On the low end, in May 2023 Ye Myo Hein estimated 150,000 personnel, of which 70,000 are in combat roles. However, the line between combatant and non-combatant in that structure has essentially been erased due to understaffing and losses, and this attrition in numbers was obvious even before the October offensives. As for police, who serve as auxiliaries to the sit-tat, Andrew Selth suggests 80,000, while Ye Myo Hein estimates 70,000. Police would be less reliable regime enforcers: they are not indoctrinated in the manner of soldiers (see below) and they reside in civilian communities. Border Guard Forces (BGF) and Pyu Saw Htee – newly-created and armed militias[2] – may also be counted, but they are peripheral. BGF loyalties are local and diffuse; as a rule they once fought the state but then switched sides, generally betraying previous ideologies, and so their loyalties can be fluid. They are essentially rural gangs running small fiefdoms with state protection. As for militias in general, their numbers are growing due to an inability for the sit-tat to recruit fast enough to replace their own losses. Such militias- staffed with retirees, criminals and EAO turncoats- are a cheap and collateral interim. Losses Even before the October 2023 offensive in northern Shan State, Ye Myo Hein estimated 13,000 sit-tat casualties since the start of the coup, along with 8,000 defections and desertions. He estimated 7,000 police losses, although this police figure is not disaggregated by casualty, or desertion/defection. Nikkei noted that unnamed Yangon diplomats believed that the sit-tat was losing an average of 15 soldiers per day, or roughly 5,500 per year. The NUG claimed nearly 5,000 dead soldiers in the first 10 months following the coup, and prior to the October 27, the 2023 Offensive claimed that the sit-tat had lost half of its combat forces in the last two years, or 30,000 troops. These claims, however, cannot be confirmed, nor can the vast number of changing estimates following the recent offensives, and so sticking with conservative estimates is prudent. If we accept Ye Myo Hein’s estimates as accurate – and this author does – then losses estimated by Nikkei of 5,500 per year constituted 3.7 percent of the overall. That is a considerable bleed. To this we need to add desertions and defections: Hein estimated an additional 8,000, while the NUG claimed that roughly 14,000 sit-tat and police left the ranks as part of the civil disobedience movement (CDM) as of March 2023. The NUG claims to offer financial incentives for deserters, but this is unlikely to be a deciding factor in a soldier’s choice. There simply aren’t funds available to create a durable financial incentive to leave; a decision which is complicated by many other factors. These numbers have increased since the October 27 offensive, and although the totals are unknown, they are stark. In early January 2024, at the capture of Laukkai alone, 2,389 military personnel, including six brigadier generals, surrendered: “the largest surrender in the history of Myanmar’s military”, according to Ye Myo Hein. Which begs the question: even before the October offensive, were sit-tat recruitments keeping pace with losses? Not by a long shot. The recent activation of the Conscription law starkly bears this out, but even before the recent offensive, the sit-tat faced ever-growing issues in both recruitment and retention. Their traditional recruiting grounds, such as Sagaing and Chin, are now charnel houses, and many of the young who may have sought sit-tat careers are now rebels instead. The Irrawaddy indicates that applications to the sit-tat’s officer academies are significantly down. While this might constrain talent, talent itself is relative. This sit-tat is hardly a group of innovative tacticians. They throw bodies at problems, including medically unfit ones. Ye Myo Hein reasonably asserts that the sit-tat is “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force, much less a government”: they were understaffed even before the coup. However, the sit-tat is used to bleeding, and managing multiple rebellions across both broad topographies and decades. The potential for a sudden collapse has been bandied about, but there is no historical precedent the author is aware of that looks anything like the current situation in Myanmar. However, conscription can be seen to reflect desperation. Other comparable militaries have ‘collapsed’ because they were either miniscule or corrupt or faced overwhelming force, or a combination of the three. The sit-tat maintains a disciplined, hierarchical corruption variant which functions because civilians are the prey, and so this corruption has not yet served to hollow out the institution. The culture of the sit-tat supports its longevity. A 2021 Deutsch Welle article claimed that soldiers were being “brainwashed” into buying the army’s worldview”. But they already knew that worldview. The sit-tat always has been a Bamar-supremacist, totalitarian organization.[3] While Theravada Buddhism is a part of this identity, it exists more as a marker to distinguish the sit-tat from non-Buddhists, Muslims especially. The sit-tat’s willingness to kill Buddhist monks when the sangha diverges from the sit-tat shows how disposable this marker can be: indeed, to its officer class, the sit-tat may be a religion that supersedes Buddhism, or at least embodies a ‘purer’ form of Buddhism than the monks who have dedicated their lives to its practice.[4] And while the sit-tat’s lower ranks may contain Rawang, Chin, and other non-Bamar and Christian foot-soldiers, the officer class is entirely Bamar. This doesn’t mean that the lower ranks joined because they prescribe to the worldview: escaping poverty is a more plausible rationale. This culture is supported by insularity.[5] Recruitment is multi-generational. Soldiers and their families live apart from civilians and tend to intermarry. They have their own schools and universities, their own health care, their own insurance and pensions, and their own courts. Civilians, to this group, are entirely untrustworthy, occasionally traitorous. The sit-tat has always ‘safeguarded’ the nation and so they believe they own it. The sit-tat’s sadism is also part and parcel of its culture: gore is bonding materiel. The massacres carried out by soldiers and militias forge a palpable hatred of the sit-tat among civilians, and surely give soldiers the feeling that reprisals await, and there is nowhere else to shelter but in the bloody organization that stains them. In the face of this, the security the Tatmadaw offers, financial and otherwise, is a powerful motivation to stay.[6] This motivation may be seen in the sit-tat personnel who recently fled into Mizoram, India; all opted to return. With the mitigating circumstance of desperate poverty for many of the rank-and-file, to join this group is to knowingly join a criminal, sadistic, totalitarian endeavor. Funds Bodies are one count; cash is another. The sit-tat’s FY 2023-4 budget is US$2.7 billion equivalent – 25 percent of the national budget. The source of their on-budget funding is largely from Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and revenues linked to extractive industries. The sit-tat has a much larger business structure than the state budget; they directly run two business conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). MEC and MEHL holdings are vast, expanding across mining, industry, banking, food, and tobacco. Contributions to MEC, MEHL, and associated insurance and pension schemes operated by conglomerate subsidiaries are automatically deducted from soldier’s pay, with select contributions converted to MEC or MEHL shares, further bonding soldiers to the sit-tat. Loot for the rank-and-file is also an aspect of economic embeddedness. By way of illustration, much livestock was stolen by soldiers and proxies from fleeing Rohingya during the 2017 expulsions that the price of meat temporarily collapsed in Sittwe.[7] Other illicit local economic opportunities for officers in particular abound, which the aforementioned BGFs and allied militias play an important role in, especially regarding the sit-tat’s need for plausible deniability in such illicit businesses. Indeed, the system of promotion in the sit-tat is based in part on the funds which junior officers can amass and funnel upwards. These opportunities remain a fundraising and control mechanism for regional sit-tat commands and BGFs in particular. Narcotics have been a form of conflict resolution utilized by the sit-tat at least since the 1960s, and this became especially evident after collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989, when the sit-tat made immediate ceasefires with the CPB’s successor organizations and turned a blind eye to their manufacture and trafficking of heroin, and later, methamphetamine. Bertil Linter, Ko Lin Chin, Tom Kramer and others have described these dynamics extensively. Myanmar recently became, again, the world’s biggest opium producer. In exchange for policing territories as state proxies, the sit-tat has turned a blind eye to such illicit economies at least, and more likely, is engaged in the trade. The application of outside theories upon the sit-tat leadership is a type of anthropomorphism. This includes economics. Myanmar’s GDP growth fell to a negative 18% in the year following the coup, although it did eventually recover to 1%. Before the coup, it averaged a positive 6% per annum. In discarding or being ignorant of economic theories, the sit-tat has demonstrated that it is not as subject to them as N. Gregory Mankiw and other Economics 101 textbook authors would imagine. This also applies benefit to us outsiders in that it demonstrates that economics, for all the ambition of its proselytizers, is a social science, not a hard one. How many times, according to economic predictions, should the country have collapsed under Ne Win or Than Shwe? Although Myanmar is not experiencing hyperinflation, it is worth comparing it to an extreme example: the hyperinflation in rump Yugoslavia in 1993. In August 1993, inflation climbed to 1,880 percent; at an annualised rate, this totaled 363 quadrillion percent. By December of 1993, 500 billion Dinar notes were printed. At the time, I was a teen blissfully unaware of economics. But I did note while I was there that, in bars, the prices of drinks would change between rounds. And yet Yugoslavia kept going – with no friends save a weak Russia, no natural resources worth mention, no China. The country’s institutions continued under a much more effective sanctions regime than is currently imposed on Myanmar, under what were effectively new “rules of the game” only seen clearly in the rear-view mirror. And so the sit-tat also stumbles onward, economics be damned. The sit-tat often displays a rawer understanding of how money works than many an economist who would have bet on collapse. The trend of cronyism displays this understanding all too well: the mutuality of oligarchy and junta is a support mechanism that proves durable for all parties, and I hope someday Joe Studwell, former editor of the Far East Economic Review and author of Asian Godfathers and How Asia Works, chooses to write about this interrelation in Myanmar. That said, Min Aung Hlaing’s recent complaints about finances indicate that even he senses something is economically amiss. But the leadership’s short-sightedness limits their response to inflation to targeting cooking oil producers, threatening local banks that Min Aung Hlaing labels traitorous, and most revolting of all, attempting to rob Myanmar’s migrant workers by demanding they remit 25 percent of their wages home at the regime’s ‘official’ (i.e. fake) exchange rate, in addition to imposing a ten percent tax rate on earnings abroad. Meanwhile the price of rice has doubled, and the military’s answer in the form of price caps will hurt farmers immensely. Sean Turnell uses the word ‘catastrophe’ in his review of Myanmar’s current economy, but it is only that if one cares about people. It is not a catastrophe if it is seen through the prism of organized crime. Surely demonetization, a tool used by the much-hated Ne Win, and which wiped out the kyat savings of civilians countrywide in 1964, 1985 and 1987, is around the corner, even though it is expressly forbidden in the 2008 constitution. Factionalism Sit-tat culture and economic interconnectedness restrict the possibilities of factionalism. The coup and the subsequent crackdown, it is alleged, have led to tensions and divisions within the sit-tat. Terence Lee and Gerard McCarthy evaluate this in the forthcoming “Fracturing the Monolith: Could Military Defections End the Dictatorship in Myanmar?”, while Anders Kirstein Moeller did so in “Peering under the hood: Coup narratives and Tatmadaw Factionalism”. Both attempt to discern the contours of factionalism within the sit-tat. However, it bears reminding that, for all our knowledge of the sit-tat, we do not know what’s happening inside the ranks. Reports of low morale among troops deployed to areas of armed resistance means that the sit-tat deals with the same issues as every other occupying force in history. Low morale in the face of the latest offensive is resulting in surrender, but it has yet to lead to revolt. It’s fair to assert that any factionalism happening within that olive drab opacity is limited to the point where said factionalism does not threaten to change the organizational philosophy of the group, nor the core beliefs it holds. An intra-sit-tat revolt against Min Aung Hlaing will not occur because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist. Rather, it will happen because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist who is losing. Nor will the sit-tat compete against civilians in a game that they haven’t already fixed in their favor. The system remains totalitarian, supremacist, and monolithic. For those arguing that factionalism is possible, I hope for the same, but we simply don’t know. Nevertheless, these hopes of factionalism within limits have precedent. The previous junta’s ‘opening’ in 2010 dated as far back as 2004 with the arrest of Military Intelligence Commander Khin Nyunt and the deposing of his ‘pro-China’ clique. Despite the sit-tat’s overarching ideology, there may be a minute amount of pro-NUG elements within it. Select PDF attacks, according to Ye Myo Hein, “were likely only possible with the collaboration of military insiders, and they have aroused anxiety within the military’s leadership.” Territorial control The sit-tat has been able to maintain control in all major cities and many of the roads connecting them, but even prior to the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s October 27 offensive, the sit-tat controlled less territory and faced more complex and violent resistance than at any time in their history. Shona Loong starkly illustrates this in Post-coup Myanmar in Six Warscapes. Back in February 2023, Min Aung Hlaing stated that only 198 out of over 330 townships in Myanmar were ‘100 percent stable’. If we take ‘stable’ as code for ‘under control,’ Min Aung Hlaing was implying that 40 percent of the country’s townships were ‘out of control’. By July 2023, the sit-tat had imposed martial law in 37 townships, including resistance strongholds in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah. Prior to the October 27, 2023 offensive, most of Chin state was already under resistance control, as was much of Kayah. The same for Rakhine, which was largely run by the Arakan Army (see below). In Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah, the sit-tat was forced to rely on air power and artillery. It also faced difficulties in maintaining supply lines and, apparently, ensuring the loyalty of troops deployed in these areas. To shore up its own defense, the sit-tat made changes to the Arms Act to arm pro-junta militias and security organizations. As of August 2023, they began conscripting civil servants into militias in southern Shan and Kayah state, including health and education staff – a telling indicator of the effect of the bleed the PDFs were subjecting the sit-tat to. Other proxies were being mobilized to guard foreign investments the sit-tat could not commit numbers to. In a repeat of the practice of previous juntas, the sit-tat also conscripted criminals. Implicitly, then, recruitment was not keeping up with losses. And territories continued to be lost. And then came the October 27, 2023 offensive, in which the Three Brotherhood Alliance overran dozens of towns across Northern Shan State, and the garrisons which supposedly were there to defend them. Most of Northern Shan, and within it, the entirety of Kokang, was lost. Offensives began simultaneously in Rakhine, Chin, and Kayah, effecting the loss of nearly all the remaining territory in the latter two, while much of Western Rakhine is also lost to the sit-tat, and where even distant Ramree island is hosting fighting between the AA and the sit-tat. The coordination was not limited to EAOs: PDFs ramped up operations in Sagaing and elsewhere, and the Pa’O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) is now fighting the sit-tat as well. Even the criminal Karen BGF, guardians of Shwe Kokko, has apparently gone over to the resistance. This was a signature moment, and one that the sit-tat, with its decades of successful ‘musical chairs ceasefires’ in which an offensive against one EAO gives another breathing space, could not have imagined. Nor could they have imagined that, in another signature event, the United Wa State Army would assume administrative control of areas the alliance had seized from sit-tat control. Despite this stunning set of losses, sit-tat tactics are not deviating from past practice. This includes asking China to broker ceasefires which they then speedily violate. This criminal, totalitarian endeavor holds such a supremacist belief in itself that it cannot comprehend battlefield realities..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Many in Myanmar have condemned what they perceive as seriously flawed Western criticism of the Burmese ex-leader.
Description: "On 18 October 2023, the Brighton and Hove City Council in the United Kingdom revoked the Freedom of the City awarded to Burmese politician Aung San Suu Kyi in 2011. Their special meeting lasted only 18 minutes, with Councillor Bella Sankey, the Labour leader of the Council, stating that it was not right to honour a person who “presided over the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Muslim Rohingya community” and was “an enabler to racial and religious discrimination and ethnic cleansing”. Sankey was supported by all 50 or so of the Council members present. This revocation was the latest act by Western institutions and human rights groups, at times inclined to zealotry and intolerance, to humiliate and punish Suu Kyi for her perceived failure to “speak out” against the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic minority in Myanmar. Yet not one of her critics has ever attempted to say why she supposedly did not speak out, nor offered any word of explanation other than, like Bob Geldof, to denigrate her as a “handmaiden to genocide”. Their main concern has been to topple her from the pedestal on which they put her, and not to seek to understand her fraught and fragile relationship with the military, which has led to her detention and imprisonment for more than three years. This year, an invaluable compendium of documents was published by the American Buddhist scholar Alan Clements and his British colleague Fergus Harlow entitled “Burma’s Voices of Freedom”, which includes interviews, articles and speeches by Suu Kyi and several of her Burmese associates. The four-volume set offers a clear and persuasive narrative of her policies from a Burmese perspective, which would come as a complete surprise to many of her Western critics. Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse. Suu Kyi’s consistent approach over the years to the Rohingya – as on all issues – is inspired by the Buddhist virtues of loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karunā), empathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā). In practical terms it is based on: Reconciliation, not condemnation. A refusal to take sides in the communal disturbances between Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine State. Cooperation with the military at all costs. A refusal to condemn publicly, but to search for a modus vivendi with the aim of securing their understanding and support for the country’s political transition. Determination not to endanger the prospects for democratic change after so many years of military rule, even at the risk of being seriously misunderstood in the West. Suu Kyi had discussions with a considerable number of Western politicians and personalities once she began to travel overseas in 2012. To some, she would undoubtedly have explained in confidence how fragile was her position, but publicly she did not dare make reference to this. Her spokesman, U Win Htein, confided to Clements on 10 April 2015 that Suu Kyi “did clearly express her position about the Rohingya, but what she expressed was that, if she spoke up for the Rohingya or advocated too heavily on their behalf, it would have unfavourable repercussions among the Burmese … It might help the international community understand the situation, but it won’t help Burma.” Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse, sully her relations with the military, and endanger her very political existence. Yet this is what human rights organisations pressed her to do. Instead, Suu Kyi put the interests of her country before her personal reputation. In an interview with NHK World (Japan) on 6 October 2018, she stated, “I don’t care about prizes and honours as such. I am sorry that friends are not as steadfast as they might be. Because I think friendship means understanding, basically, trying to understand rather than to just make your own judgement. But prizes come and prizes go.” On her decision to represent Myanmar at the International Court of Justice on 11 December 2019, Suu Kyi’s Burmese associates are unanimous that she did not go to The Hague to defend the military, but to appear as a representative of her country in their dispute with The Gambia, and to defend Myanmar’s honour and dignity. The human rights activist and Harvard graduate Ma Thida Sanchuang said in January 2020: “But for the eyes of the general public, Aung San Suu Kyi took the lead to defend our country’s image … The general public’s stand with her on the ICJ case was the signal … to show how much they are still against the military and its party.” This is entirely opposite to most Western interpretations. Not surprisingly, many of Suu Kyi’s closest collaborators have condemned what they see as seriously flawed Western criticism of her policies, especially on the Rohingya. U Win Htein commented: “They are false judgements. They are misperceptions. They are from the uninformed and misguided … Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the most compassionate people I have ever met.” A senior Buddhist monk, the late Myawaddy Sayadaw Abbot of Mingyi Monastery, was even blunter in December 2017: “Wait and see. Only those who revoked the awards will lose their dignity in the end.” And as Myanmar’s version of Lady Gaga, Phyu Phyu Kyaw Thein, a Christian, noted in January 2020: “But one thing for sure is Daw Suu, as a devout Buddhist, forgives them for she knows that ‘they know not what they say’.” One day soon, Suu Kyi may be free to put the record straight. Her detractors can then eat humble pie, if they have the moral courage..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Lowy Institute via The Interpreter
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Three years after the failed military coup in Myanmar, there is genuine hope within the country for democratic resistance. By the end of 2023 and into the beginning of 2024, Myanmar reached a turning point, with significant successes achieved by the revolutionary movement, particularly on the battlefield. For the first time since the coup, there is a growing possibility that the resistance movement may prevail against the military dictatorship. Three years after the military coup, approximately 17.6 million people in Myanmar are facing a humanitarian emergency, and 2.6 million people are homeless. The military has been responsible for the deaths of over 4,500 people, including about 500 children. In addition, more than 26,000 individuals have been detained, with 20,000 still languishing in prison. While the struggle in Myanmar is tragic, marked by a great deal of brutality and significant loss of life, it is also deeply inspiring. The previously deeply divided nation with various ethnic groups has united against the military, which illegally seized power on February 1, 2021. Likely driven by a combination of the military’s significant electoral defeat (in the form of a pro-military party, composed of formed generals) and the personal aspirations of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military arrested most of the country’s civilian leadership, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and halted all democratic processes, in order to install a new government, a military junta under the name State Administration Council (SAC). At first, the people of Myanmar faced daunting odds. However, they persevered, and now, three years later, we see the balance of power beginning to shift in their favor. The prospect of overcoming the junta seemed bleak in the aftermath of the coup, as the military seemed poised to violently suppress the initially non-violent protests that eventually escalated into armed defense. For the first two years, the resistance movement struggled to survive, clinging on despite the military’s vast advantage, eventually reaching a tipping point where the coup leaders could not quash the resistance, yet the resistance could not overcome the junta. The year 2023 brought a change to this situation: the first half of the year saw an improvement on the side of the revolutionary forces compared to previous years but without major victories. It was only in the second half of the year that the situation changed significantly. With Operation 1027, named after the date of its start – October 27, 2023 –it seems for the first time that the revolutionary forces may eventually emerge victorious. The duration of this process, however, remains uncertain and will depend on a number of factors, including internal, regional, and international dynamics. Key external players that can influence events in Myanmar include China, Thailand, and India, three neighboring countries. China deserves special attention because it has been extensively involved in Myanmar’s affairs for decades and is known for its ability to turn violence in Myanmar’s border regions on and off like a switch, depending on China’s needs. Moreover, the 2017 Operation has had a strong impact on Myanmar’s relations with China. For months, China’s central government pleaded with the SAC to crack down on cross-border cyber scam syndicates run primarily by Chinese criminals from guarded compounds on the Myanmar side of the border, controlled by local warlords, but to no avail. Then came the solution for China in the form of Operation 1027, essentially greenlighted by Beijing. In the short term, cracking down on scam centers took precedence over peace on the border. Publicly, China called for a de-escalation of the conflict. In October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of three ethnic armed organizations joined by the people’s defense forces, known as PDFs (armed units formed post-coup to resist the military regime and recognized by the National Unity Government, the parallel legitimate government formed by representatives elected in the 2020 elections), launched an operation with a dual objective: to eliminate the scam syndicates operating in the region and to confront and defeat the military dictatorship. The first objective led to the liberation of numerous compounds, with the return of the enslaved, mostly Chinese, to their homes. The second objective resulted in unprecedented battlefield losses for the Myanmar military. The second outcome was unexpected by China, as the Myanmar military suffered unprecedented battlefield losses, highlighting the effectiveness and impact of the operation. Operation 1027, which is still ongoing, has emerged as the most significant threat to the military regime since the coup. The alliance has successfully blocked the junta’s access to the northern part of Shan State, seized key cities and town in the region, and gained control of the Myanmar-China border, thereby disrupting the lucrative border trade (which had previously funneled cash into the hands of the junta). Throughout these developments, China mediated talks between the military and the alliance (with the primary goal of averting a prolonged disruption of border trade). However, the negotiated ceasefires have been tenuous, with numerous instances of breakdown. There is an interesting dual dependency and influence at play. Operation 1027 was made possible by the broader resistance movement in Myanmar, as the junta has been under attack by a national uprising in various towns across the country over the last three years. This further stretched the junta’s already thinning forces. In turn, Operation 1027 not only capitalized on this weakening of the junta, but also served to significantly strengthen the revolutionary forces in other parts of Myanmar, such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Sagaing, and Magway. The revolutionary forces in these areas accelerated and began to occupy military bases. As a result, the army suffered losses as several bases fell and many soldiers were detained. While serious battles between the military and the resistance movement continue, one thing is certain: there is no turning back at this point. At present, everything in Myanmar revolves around the removal of the junta’s cruel rule and, more broadly, the removal of the military’s influence from the country’s political landscape. The entire population shares the belief that the continued existence of a military junta in society is untenable. A return to a compromise situation in the form of a hybrid regime, similar to that of the 2010s, in which the military wields significant political power alongside the civilian government, is not a realistic solution for Myanmar’s future. While the people of Myanmar believe that victory is within reach, it remains to be seen how long this process actually takes – it could be years before we see a real change. But for now, we can look at it through a lens of hope..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Reset Dialogues on Civilizations
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The arrests were for writing or sharing anti-junta posts on Facebook and other social networks.
Description: "Myanmar junta authorities have arrested and jailed nearly 1,500 people they say posted anti-junta messages on Facebook, TikTok and Telegram over the last two years, research group Data for Myanmar has found. The arrests included a woman who had been working in Thailand and was sentenced to life in prison in December after she returned to Myanmar to have her passport and work visa renewed, a family friend told Radio Free Asia. Officers checked her phone during the renewal in Yangon and found anti-junta messages that she had sent privately, the family friend said. “After that, she was arrested and taken to the North Dagon jail,” the friend said. “Then she was sent to Insein Prison.” The junta has struggled to gain popular support since taking power from a civilian government in a Feb. 1, 2021, coup d’etat. Responding to critical messages with criminal prosecution has had a chilling effect on how people express themselves online. It has also earned Myanmar a ranking as the second worst country in the world for internet freedom, according to Washington-based Freedom House. The Data for Myanmar report said that most of the 1,480 people detained between Feb. 29, 2022, and Jan. 30, 2024, were Facebook users. The independent NGO also found that an average of 62 people were detained every month. Almost half of the detainees – nearly 700 people – were from the Yangon and Mandalay regions. Data for Myanmar compiled data for the Jan. 31 report by monitoring junta-affiliated daily newspapers and news media. Jailed for sharing news Another social media-related arrest was that of Mandalay resident Khin Maung Chin, who was detained in December 2022 for sharing news articles and critiques of the military written by other Facebook users, a friend of his told RFA. Khin Maung Chin was also found to have written messages about Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the deposed National League for Democracy and the country’s former de facto leader. And last November, junta troops raided the home of Yangon resident Min Nyo, who had worked to provide clothing and medicine to war victims. A family member told RFA.that pro-military supporters had informed authorities about his online criticism of the junta. Min Nyo is also serving a sentence at Insein Prison, where many pro-democracy activists are held. Freedom House noted in a report released in October that the junta has reduced broadband speeds, cut internet connections and blocked some text and calling services in areas where anti-regime resistance has been strong. ‘Procedure used by dictators’ Junta authorities have also restricted Burmese citizens from accessing social media platforms while junta-controlled publications frequently warn that people can be charged under the Penal Code and Telecommunications Law, the report said. In December, the junta announced the formation of a committee to further monitor and take action against what people write and share online. RFA’s attempts to reach junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun to ask about the Data for Myanmar report were unsuccessful. However, junta officials have previously stated that the regime will take action if posted messages are aimed at inciting people to destroy the country’s peace and stability or to abolish the junta’s governing mechanism. A former military officer told RFA that arresting people for critical comments is an understandable part of governing. “As a ruler, he would arrest those who spoke ill of him,” he said. “This has become an obligation. It must be done. It is his job to arrest those who raised the rebellion.” Aung Myo Min, the human rights minister for the shadow National Unity Government, criticized the arrests as merely a “procedure used by dictators to prevent people from speaking up” – not as a way to maintain stability..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "BANGKOK – ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) strongly condemns the decision by the Myanmar military to enforce a national conscription law that would mandate all men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve for at least two years in the armed forces. “We are deeply concerned about the impact the Conscription Law will have on the young people of Myanmar. This is yet another disgraceful attempt by the military junta to rule through fear and sabotage,” APHR Board Member and former Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya said today. The People’s Military Service Law was enacted in 2010 but never enforced or repealed under the National League for Democracy, despite calls to do so from civil society organizations. Nearly two decades later, the law is being implemented as the Myanmar junta’s bases and territory are rapidly being lost to the armed resistance forces. It is apparent that the junta is seeking to make up for the casualties it has lost at the cost of the future of Myanmar’s youth. “This law seeks to undermine the youth-led struggle against the dictatorship and knowingly pits them against the opposition forces so many of them have supported. Its enactment also shows the utter cowardice of the Myanmar junta; they – quite literally – cannot fight their own battles,” Kasit said. The announcement has caused widespread uncertainty for young people and their families who have no desire to serve under the military’s corrupt and violent dictatorship, which is deeply unpopular throughout the majority of the country. Myanmar’s young people have shown exceptional bravery in the wake of the military’s increasing violence and have done so to ensure their generation does not inherit another era of authoritarian rule. In a brutal and coordinated attempt to silence those efforts, the junta is forcing them to the frontlines. “We urge ASEAN member states and the wider international community to help provide access, including visas and educational opportunities, to Myanmar youth who seek to flee to other countries ahead of the draft. We also call on the international community to recognize that this is a desperate attempt from a failing regime to cling to power and act decisively to support Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces and bring an end to the junta’s rule,” said Kasit..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
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Sub-title: Six are critically injured after being struck by shrapnel in a monastery compound, locals said.
Description: "A drone test by pro-junta militia injured 13 children in Myanmar, residents told Radio Free Asia. Regime soldiers working in collaboration with the Pyu Saw Htee militia are responsible for a weapons accident that occurred on Saturday, locals said. The militia is made up of pro-junta supporters, veterans and Buddhist nationalists. The drone, carrying several bombs, flew over Sagaing region’s Kale township, close to the Chin state border. Soldiers are permanently stationed in Kale township’s Aung Myin Thar village, leading them to believe the attack was an accident, they added. A resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told RFA on Tuesday that a drone mounted with explosives flew over a nearby monastery compound when it suddenly crashed and exploded. Thirteen children playing in the monastery’s soccer field were injured when the bombs detonated. “The military junta gave weapons to the Pyu Saw Htee members and they were testing them to carry out bombardments with drones that evening. The bombs fell on the soccer field where the children were playing,” he said. “Six of the children were critically injured. Some of them were hit in their faces and eyes. Some had to have their limbs amputated.” The children who are critically injured are being treated at Kale city’s military hospital, while the remaining seven are being treated at Kale General Hospital in the township’s capital, he added. All victims are between the ages of eight and 15 years old, but identifying information is not known at this time. The junta’s Ministry of Information released a statement on Tuesday saying that the accident was fake news, reporting that the blasts in Aung Myin Thar village were due to landmines planted by terrorists. RFA contacted Sagaing region’s junta spokesperson Sai Naing Naing Kyaw for more details, but did not receive an answer. According to data compiled by RFA, 1,429 civilians have been killed and 2,641 were injured by junta airstrikes and heavy artillery from the Feb. 1, 2021 coup until Jan. 31, 2024..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Fighting continues in northern Rakhine State since the Arakan Army (AA) launched an offensive against Myanmar’s junta in mid-November last year. The AA has seized Mrauk-U, Minbya, Kyauktaw and Pauktaw towns and Paletwa in southern Chin State along with numerous junta bases and border outposts. The AA is attacking Rathedaung town and has told the Regional Operations Command in the state capital, Sittwe, to surrender. Sittwe is the junta’s administrative seat in Rakhine. The regime blew up a bridge on the Yangon-Sittwe road to disrupt AA troops advances on the city and senior administrative officials have allegedly left Sittwe. Many of Sittwe’s residents have left but The Irrawaddy recently talked to someone who remains in the city. What is the situation in Sittwe? The AA has taken most of northern Rakhine State but Buthidaung has not fallen. The AA controls Paletwa, Kyauktaw, Minbya and Mrauk-U along the Kaladan River. Only Sittwe is left. Many residents have fled and people fear the city could be flattened, like Pauktaw and Minbya. Those who can afford it have gone to Yangon, Mandalay or Pyay. Half of the city has already fled and many are waiting to buy air tickets. Flights are apparently booked until late April. Canceled tickets cost around 700,000 kyats (US$200), about eight times the normal price. The regime has blockaded Sittwe, which is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal and some try to escape by sea. Residents fear fighting could break out at anytime and junta shelling and airstrikes will follow if fighting starts. They know about the regime’s indiscriminate attacks elsewhere. Many residents cannot afford to leave and there is no way out from Sittwe if fighting breaks out. We heard junta administrators are leaving Sittwe. The government neighborhood is heavily guarded and cordoned off. We heard reports that they are moving to Thandwe [200km to the south]. Is there enough food despite the regime’s blockade? Commodities are running low since the roads were blocked. Shops are selling off their stocks as they want to leave. They are not restocking. Garlic is unavailable and an onion costs 1,000 kyats. We still can buy peppers from the Muslim villages but the fuel prices make it difficult to get there. Some cycle. A used bike sells for around 500,000 kyats. Fuel has dropped from 30,000 kyats to around 18,000 kyats per liter. [The Yangon price is around 2,600 kyats]. There are no children’s snacks and rice and cooking oil prices have soared. Many people left with nothing and they need blankets at night. They also need food. Fighting started more than three months ago and people are facing serious food shortages. How are transport, communications and health care? They have cut off internet access. And we can only use [military-owned] Mytel sims to make phone calls but the signal is unstable. We switched to Mytel but we can’t transfer cash online. Many people working in Thailand and Malaysia cannot transfer remittances. I heard Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Ponnagyun are deserted. Hospitals and clinics still operate. The regime has imposed a curfew in Sittwe. A motorbike taxi driver was shot dead last week. No one knows who did it. Some blamed junta soldiers but others said it was the Arakan Liberation Party. The city is in panic. How are residents earning a living in Sittwe? Businesses have not been able to operate for months. People do odd-jobs and business owners eat what they have. Many motorbike taxi drivers now use cycle-rickshaws due to high fuel prices. Theft has increased. The police are not interested in crime as they are busy ensuring their safety. Fishing and trade are the main sources of income in Sittwe but businesses have closed and the streets are largely deserted..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
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Description: "(CNN) — Anna wakes up about four times a night from dreams in which she is being sent to the front lines of a bloody war and forced to fight. It’s a terrifying prospect that could become a reality for Anna and millions of her peers across Myanmar after the military junta activated a mandatory conscription law for all young men and women. “We are in panic mode and are considering a way to escape,” said Anna, an educator in her 20s from the country’s south who requested to use a pseudonym to protect her safety. “I don’t think I can keep living in Myanmar.” Three years on from its bloody coup, Myanmar’s military junta is facing the biggest challenge to its fragile hold on power as it struggles to fight a nationwide armed resistance on multiple fronts across the Southeast Asian nation. The junta’s surprise announcement that it’s seeking to boost its armed forces with compulsory service prompted a rush by young people to get visas out of the country. Videos shared on social media show long queues of people clutching documents at the Thai Embassy in Myanmar’s biggest city Yangon. Young people told CNN they’re scrambling to figure out how to avoid being sent to the barracks, with some planning hasty exit strategies – illegal if necessary – from Myanmar or weighing up leaving their homes and families to join resistance forces that have taken up arms against the military. Under the law, all men ages 18 to 35 and women ages 18 to 27 are required to serve for up to two years under military command. Specialists such as doctors up to age 45 must serve for three years. Evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine. Analysts say the law, which has been on the books since the previous military regime in 2010 but not enacted until now, will force a young generation to fight their own people and could be used to justify human rights abuses. It could also result in further regional instability by sparking a mass exodus of people fleeing conscription into neighboring countries, they said. Some say conscription is a desperate effort by the military to boost ranks depleted by death, desertions and defections. “While wounded and increasingly desperate, the Myanmar military junta remains extremely dangerous,” Tom Andrews, United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, said in a statement. “Troop losses and recruitment challenges have become existential threats for the junta, which faces vigorous attacks on frontlines all across the country. As the junta forces young men and women into the military ranks, it has doubled down on its attacks on civilians using stockpiles of powerful weapons.” ‘We don’t have another choice’ Myanmar’s military has been weakened by unprecedented coordination between ethnic armed organizations and resistance groups known as People’s Defense Forces, analysts say. These groups, which support the National Unity Government in exile, and ethnic rebel armies have taken control of hundreds of strategic border towns, key military positions and vital trade routes since launching an offensive last October. Analysis from the United States Insitute of Peace suggests the military only has about 150,000 personnel, including 70,000 combat soldiers — “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force” — and has lost at least 30,000 soldiers since the coup. Defense Minister Adm. Tin Aung San said the military has capacity to recruit up to 50,000 people a year and conscripts “will receive salary, rations, and entitlements according to their grades and qualifications,” according to the state mouthpiece Global New Light of Myanmar. People who have been temporarily exempted from serving in the military — those with a medical reason, civil servants, students and carers — must return to serve even if over the age of military service, Ting Aung San said, according to the paper. Veterans could also be called up, the Global New Light reported. Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said about 13 million young people would be eligible for conscription, with 60,000 men the first to be recruited reportedly beginning in April. There’s little detail about how they’d be called up – and what training they’d receive to fight. Young people CNN spoke to are scared that conscripts will be sent to the front lines – in mountainous, jungle terrain – without proper training. “People know for sure that no matter what is written in the conscription law, they will have to go to the front lines. That is one thing that every person in the country is sure of,” said Kyaw Naing, 28, a teacher from Yangon region who requested to use a pseudonym for his security. Myanmar's junta chief Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who ousted the elected government in 2021, presides at an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2021. Reuters Aung Myo Min, human rights minister for the shadow government in exile said it has received reports of mass defections to People’s Defense Forces, with some soldiers abandoning the military because “they don’t have enough food and they are forced to take up a position to fight against civilians.” Some of those former soldiers told the National Unity Government the military’s power has weakened, and it desperately needs recruits, according to Aung Myo Min. But both Anna and Kyaw Naing say they’ll refuse to join their ranks. Anna said she doesn’t have the money or connections to buy a visa out of the country, and worries the junta will be monitoring the airports, stopping those of age and arresting them. Her parents have urged her to escape as soon as possible, but that means finding a way to cross the border illegally to Thailand. “All the information on Facebook right now is about how to escape this country,” Anna said. “From my side, I will try and do as much as possible to escape but if not, I will join (the People’s Defense Forces),” Anna said. “It seems like we don’t have another choice.” Neighboring Thailand would likely be the country of choice for many of those deciding to flee. Thailand’s Foreign Ministry told CNN Monday its embassy in Yangon has experienced an “increase in the number of Myanmar citizens applying for Thai visas in recent days” and was implementing a token system to process 400 walk-in applicants per day. While Thailand has hosted Myanmar nationals fleeing conflict for decades in displacement camps along the border, it has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and considers those fleeing persecution to be illegal immigrants, who face jail and potential deportation. Reports of kidnappings and arrests For Kyaw Naing, fleeing to Thailand is not an option as he is the sole breadwinner of his family and cares for his elderly parents. “If I leave, no one is there to look after them. I just have to survive,” he said. Kyaw Naing says he’s stopped going out at night for fear he’ll be arrested and sent to the barracks. “My parents are afraid I might be kidnapped by police and soldiers when I’m on my way back home from work, or when I go outside to hang out with my friends, or even when I go out to throw litter into the dustbin in the street,” Kyaw Naing said. Even before the announcement of the mandatory conscription law, local media has reported an increase in the arrests of young people in several towns and cities and military vehicles picking people up in the street. There are also reports of dozens of young people detained at airports in western Rakhine state in recent days, with no official explanation. CNN cannot independently verify the reports and has reached out to the military for comment. Khin Ohmar, founder and chairperson of Progressive Voices, a Myanmar human rights research and advocacy organization, said the conscription law will “provide the junta legal cover for abusive forced recruitment practices — grabbing young men and women, especially the disenfranchised and impoverished including minors, from bus stops and factories in the cities.” Maung Nyein, 32, lives and works in Yangon, and worries how his wife and 8-year-old daughter will cope if he’s forced to serve. “In Myanmar, young people are not safe anymore,” said Maung Nyein, who also requested to use a pseudonym for safety reasons. “If you are forced to enter the military, there are so many things to worry about.” The prospect of being forced to fight and kill his compatriots terrifies him. “In other countries, this law is to train you in case of another country’s invasion, but here there is civil war going on. This is to force you to kill each other.” CNN has reached out to Myanmar’s military spokesperson for comment but has not received a response. The junta’s ministry of Immigration and Population said in a statement that there is “no restriction on overseas leave” and international airports and the entry and exit points with neighboring countries “are operating as usual,” according to Global New Light. The junta also denied that its “security forces and administrative organizations are conscripting youths for military training and arresting passers-by,” calling it “misinformation” spread by “malicious media networks.” Forced labor already happening Myanmar’s military has a long and documented history of using civilians as human shields or forcibly recruiting them to work in the army, either as porters – carrying military equipment to and from the front lines — or performing the risky task of clearing land mines from fields. A major concern is that the law will be used by the military to legalize this practice. A report from the International Labour Organization’s commission of inquiry from October 2023 found that since the coup, the Myanmar military junta “continues to exact different types of forced labor in the context of armed conflict … as well as forced recruitment into the army.” Wing Ko, a farmer from Shwebo in central Sagaing region, said he was forcibly recruited to work for the military for three months in 2023. “One day when I was in my tent, a military troop caught me and took me to carry their clothes and weapons,” Wing Ko told CNN, using a pseudonym for safety. “After that, I was forced to walk all day with their stuff,” he said. “There were days I didn’t get to eat and drink.” He says he was one of 42 men, most over the age of 50 with the youngest just 16, who were forcibly taken by junta troops from their villages. “If we knew the areas, we were forced to walk in front of them so that they don’t risk themselves (standing on) land mines.” Wing Ko said those who tried to escape were shot and killed. CNN cannot independently verify his account. “I never thought I would see my family again. When I got home, I felt like I came back from being dead,” he said. Maung Aye, also from Sagaing region, said six people from his village were taken by the military in June last year and forced to carry clothes and weapons. He said there’s no way his neighbors would willingly join them. “Our villagers won’t join the military forces or leave the country, instead we will join our resistance forces. I won’t let my children be taken by the military, instead I’d rather risk them joining the (People’s Defense Forces) for the revolution’s sake,” said Maung Aye, who also used a pseudonym for safety. Impact on millions of young people Conscription is not just about boosting troop numbers, analysts and human rights workers say, but a means to break up the powerful democratic resistance movement that has only gained in strength since the coup. “The junta’s decision to enforce the conscription law now is also a way to remove the young people who were spearheading the Spring Revolution from the civilian population and put them in positions where they are likely to be killed or to kill their fellow people,” said Khin Ohmar. The law would allow corruption, extortion and crime to flourish and could exacerbate a brain drain that’s already seen many young people leave Myanmar, impacting education and the labor market, which would “cause utter devastation to the country,” she said. Those too young to be conscripted are already feeling the weight of the law. “Today one of my teens asked me if all the lessons she is learning right now in class are still useful for her life in the future if she has to go to the front line,” Kyaw Naing said of his student. “I was deeply saddened by that.” Kyaw Naing says he’d join the resistance if faced with conscription. But he would offer to teach over holding a gun. “I don’t want to kill people,” he said. “But if the situation pushes me to do it, I will have to. I won’t have a choice.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
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Description: "As many Myanmar people flee their country to evade its regime’s mandatory military service law, neighboring Thailand has warned that Myanmar nationals entering illegally would face legal action. The Myanmar junta recently activated the People’s Military Service Law as the army struggles to contain an anti-junta insurgency. The move was met with a public outcry as military officials announced that 14 million of the country’s young people are eligible for conscription. That amounts to 26 percent of the country’s population of 54 million. Since the announcement of the enforcement of the law, the number of Myanmar citizens applying for visas to enter Thailand has increased sharply. “They are welcome if they enter the country legally. But if they sneak into the country illegally, legal action will be taken against them. I already discussed the matter with security agencies,” Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin said. The prime minister also tried to allay concerns that Myanmar immigrants would take jobs away from local people, stressing that one of the reasons Myanmar citizens are currently fleeing to Thailand is to avoid mandatory military service, the Bangkok Post reported. He also said Thailand’s unemployment rate is currently lower than 1 percent and that it still needs many more laborers from neighboring countries, though they must follow proper procedures to work in the country. Thailand shares a more than 2,400-km-long border with Myanmar and has a long history of sheltering people displaced by fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed groups on the border. There are also 2.1 million migrant workers from Myanmar registered to work in Thailand as of January 2024. Since the Myanmar junta’s military coup in 2021, Bangkok has seen new arrivals: political activists evading arrest by the the regime, as well as well-to-do families who left Myanmar for greener pastures. There have been reports of people who entered Thailand illegally via the border being arrested. Since the announcement of the conscription law, the Thai Embassy in Yangon has been coping with an influx of visa applicants. It recently announced that it would only accept 400 applications per day, effective from last Thursday. Meanwhile, the number of people entering Thailand via its border with Myanmar’s southern Shan State is on the rise. Local people said this was due to the junta’s national conscription law as well as mandatory military service requirements imposed by some local ethnic armed groups active in the state..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "20 February 2024: Comments from SAC-M’s founding members in response to the Myanmar military’s decision to enforce the 2010 conscription law: Marzuki Darusman: “Myanmar’s youth have been abandoned to wage a three-year long struggle alone against military tyranny in pursuit of a Myanmar built on peace, justice and human rights. If the UN and ASEAN allow Min Aung Hlaing to forcibly conscript millions of young people into his junta death cult, then they will be further complicit in denying Myanmar this future.” Chris Sidoti: “The Myanmar military’s conscription implementation reflects its desperation. They are losing the war and have run out of ideas. This is an indication that the junta’s total collapse is only a matter of time.” Yanghee Lee: “Min Aung Hlaing’s forced conscription directive won’t save him or his junta. Instead, his depraved attack on the country’s future illustrates he is willing to destroy an entire generation rather than accept the failure of his disastrous coup. He must accept that the old military playbook will not work this time.”..."
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
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Description: "While the world’s attention has been focused on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the civil war in Myanmar has taken an unexpected turn back toward democracy. In the battle between the military junta — which staged a coup in 2021 to pre-empt the seating of Aung San Suu Kyi’s newly re-elected government — and the representatives of that government, the resistance now seems to be winning. That shift in what has been at times a horrifyingly brutal war by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, against its own citizens, has implications for democracy in the region, for China’s regional role and foreign policy, and for the future of an imprisoned leader whose status as an icon of freedom has been tarnished internationally but who remains a national cult figure at home. This is but the latest chapter in Myanmar’s struggle for democracy, which — from its independence in 1948 through its shedding of the colonial name of Burma in 1989, through the democratic rise of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) — has swung like a pendulum between military dictatorship and elected government. After the country’s democratic transition began in 2011, Aung San Suu Kyi finally became state counsellor. Her National League for Democracy won another landslide victory in 2020, but the military once more seized power on February 1, 2021 before the government could be sworn in. The coup triggered massive protests. Far more threatening to the military junta, or Tatmadaw, were the speed and skill of the defeated government in galvanizing the entire opposition. Within weeks, they had established an alternative power centre, the National Unity Government (NUG) — for which I, full disclosure, serve as an unofficial advisor — with multi-ethnic representation in its leadership, including the Rohingya, for the first time in the nation’s history. Thousands of young people fled to the cities to join the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) — the NUG’s army — transformed from shop clerks and students into guerrilla fighters in training camps in the highland jungles. Today, the PDF and the ethnic armed organizations fight under joint commands, their unity a weapon against decades of tactical ethnic division sown by the military. They have now seized nearly half of the national territory. Three things make this challenge different from any previous battle with the Tatmadaw. First, today’s resistance struggle comes after nearly a decade of partial democratization under the NLD. Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back. Secondly, the army badly miscalculated the skillful political leaders of the government they had deposed. The NUG quickly reached out internally to build political and military alliances with the now-powerful ethnic community governments and armies; and externally to a broad network of international allies. Within a year, the PDF and the so-called “ethnic armed organisations” were creating new legal, medical and educational institutions on the ground in liberated territories. A year later, a series of attacks by the NUG’s military joint commands were inflicting heavy losses on the Tatmadaw. Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back. Finally, the wanton cruelty and lawlessness with which the junta waged war; bombing schools, hospitals, and entire villages began to turn sentiment even in its former strongholds. The opposition took in thousands of defectors and many thousands of Myanmar people fled into neighbouring countries. This year, the army has begun forcible kidnapping of citizens to serve as its porters and human shields. It recently announced a massive conscription drive, which the NUG has vowed to resist. The most serious turning point came last fall, when the world was watching the Middle East. On October 27, the joint rebel forces of the Three Brotherhood Alliance staged “Operation 1027”, capturing key cities, towns, and military basesalong the northern border with China. It was a shock to the junta and a deep concern to Beijing. China’s always-opportunistic foreign policy was strained by this new turn in the conflict. They had carefully balanced support for the junta, feeding it billions of dollars in resource revenues and military assistance, and the ethnic organizations, several of whom were of majority Chinese ethnicity. It seems likely that as the opposition continues to seize more territory, and morale among the junta forces sags more and more deeply, that China will in the end support the opposition. China rarely backs a loser, and the junta’s days seem numbered. The big question facing the NUG now is what happens the day after victory. The country has no history of shared governance. In some areas, they have only decades of warfare. The institutions on the ground, for a country of 55 million people, in medicine, law and local governance are shallow or non-existent. The challenges of finding common ground among peoples who are separated by language, history, and in the case of the Rohingya and other Muslims, by religion, could not be more daunting. Some regional pundits predict that a new opposition government will inevitably fail over internal tensions within a year or two and the army will come marching back in. That is not merely spin on behalf of the war criminals who lead the Tatmadaw. They have billions of dollars squirrelled away from decades of corruption. They have a massive military infrastructure. They have a record of success in stirring up conflict between and among the various ethnic communities who surround them. Still, it would not be prudent to see this latest battle against the military as facing the same end as previous collisions. For the reasons cited above — new alliances, a new generation of citizen soldiers committed to democracy, and a skillful and demonstrably capable cadre of leaders already successful in creating a new government with a broad commitment to a loosely federal democracy; this time, the odds are better. The early months, post-victory, will turn on how quickly and how firmly a new government can bring all of its internal partners to agree on some governance minimums. They have wisely set the consensus bar low, and the transition process long. They recognize that communities that have operated as nation states, with their own legal systems, taxation frameworks, and local bureaucracies are not quickly going to cede all of that to a new central government in Yangon. Nor are they going to be willing to make detailed long-term commitments without some evidence that there is a feasible path forward that includes everyone. The tension has already emerged behind the scenes between the seize-the-moment, ‘go faster’ caucus and the careful, ‘slow and patient’ caucus. As Canada’s constitutional wars revealed, the only successful path forward — with far fewer issues and groups — is one of slow trust-building, endless meetings that build that trust, friendships across borders, and the recognition that one may need many small steps over many years before even seeing the finish line. Our process took nearly 40 years, from Victoria to Charlottetown, and is only partially successful to this day. Canada and other nations have contributed some of our best brains in constitution-making to the most difficult and risky task there is in governing. Another key early task will be swift investigation and then prosecution of war crimes. Not only because it is the essential moral responsibility after a conflict so targeted at killing women and children, but also because it will give early proof and confidence to a skeptical nation that this time it really will be different. Russia and China have been aiding the junta in training and equipment on the battlefield. They have to understand that they could become the targets of greater sanctions than those already imposed —and that they are wasting their time and money on a losing battle. The ASEAN nations have been powerless in attempting to find a way to return to democracy — not entirely surprising, since fewer than half of the members can claim any democratic credentials themselves. Canada has an international expert on Myanmar in our service in UN Ambassador (and Policy contributor) Bob Rae, who did the definitive study of the Rohingya genocide and its consequences. He remains deeply involved in bridge-building among allies of the fight for democracy. The EU and the US have both strongly condemned the junta, and granted money and political support to the NUG. This year could be the year that these elements come together. With greater public support, and private assistance from its international allies, 2024 could be the year that Myanmar returns to the club of nations attempting to build stable and free democracies. Veteran political strategist and Policy Contributing Writer Robin V. Sears lived and worked in Tokyo as Ontario’s senior diplomat and later as a management consultant in Hong Kong. Today he serves as a volunteer senior advisor to the leadership of the NUG..."
Source/publisher: Policy Magazine
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
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Description: "As the resistance forces gain momentum in the Spring Revolution, the Myanmar military, disparagingly known as the Sit-Tat, finds itself increasingly on the defensive. Amidst this backdrop, the State Administration Council (SAC) announced on February 10, 2024, the enforcement of the 2010 Conscription Law, a move widely perceived as another ill-judged attempt by General Min Aung Hlaing to drag the entire nation down with him. The People’s Military Service Law, enacted by the State Peace and Development Council—the precursor to the SAC—and signed into law by General Than Shwe on November 4, 2010, mandates service in the armed forces for all men aged 18 to 35 (extending to 45 for those with professional expertise) and women aged 18 to 27 (extending to 35 for those with professional expertise) for a period of two years, which can be extended to five years during national emergencies. Failure to comply with conscription can result in imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both.1,2 The question arises: why resurrect this 14-year-old law now? The apprehensive coup leader highlighted the law at the Veterans Convention on November 22, 2021, and again at the SAC’s annual meeting on February 2, 2022.3,4 According to Ye Myo Hein, a visiting Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, the Sit-Tat had approximately 150,000 members, including around 70,000 combatants, as of May 2023.5 However, there has been a significant decrease in morale and numbers among the military due to a series of defeats inflicted by the coordinated democratic forces across Myanmar as well as an increase in casualties, desertions, defections, and detentions as prisoners of war since Operation 1027 in October 2023.6,7In addition to colossal losses on the battlefields, the junta has also experienced severe setbacks on the economic front due to Western sanctions. In a desperate bid to replenish his depleted forces, General Min Aung Hlaing attempted two unsuccessful measures. On November 14, 2023, the members of the University Training Corps were ordered to report their biodata to the Directorate of People Militia and Border Guard Forces. On December 21, 2023, 645 deserters were released from prisons under a decree with the stipulation that they re-enlist.9 After these two attempts failed, the “Commander-in-Mischief” opted for what many see as a last-ditch effort: the enforcement of Conscription Law on February 10, 2024, followed by the activation of Reserved Military Force Law on February 13, 2024.10 The latter mandates veterans to serve in the reserved force for five years post-retirement. The repercussions of the Conscription Law have far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the people and the junta but also the revolution and neighboring countries. The plan to draft 60,000 young men and women starting in mid-April has already triggered widespread panic, prompting a mass exodus of the youth. Families of the 13 million youth in Myanmar are feeling the acute impact, compounded by economic hardships, shortages of essential goods, soaring prices, and inflation. The private sector is further burdened, being compelled to continue paying salaries for drafted employees. This law will essentially sanction a longstanding abusive practice of coerced military service, which has been both ad hoc and illegal. The generals may hope to replace experienced troops with these inexperienced recruits, using them primarily as cannon fodder. However, forced enslavement runs the risk of these reluctant conscripts turning their weapons against their own ranks or becoming informants. Morale is expected to plummet further as troops witness their relatives being forcibly conscripted, potentially driving more individuals to join the armed resistance. In response, the National Unity Government (NUG) issued a statement on February 13, 2024, stating that “the NUG of Myanmar, in collaboration with allied organizations will take all necessary measures to prevent the junta’s attempted roll out of forced conscription and will address dangers faced by the public.”8 This reflects a strategic and thoughtful approach by the NUG and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) to avoid the pitfalls of the junta’s scheme, which would result in the displacement of young individuals—a scenario that would pose immense challenges in terms of accommodation, basic needs, and security. In the words of Sun Tzu, “Know thyself and know thy enemy,” and “Who wishes to fight must first count the cost. Don’t let sacrifices sneak up on you. Whatever path you take, know the consequences.” The revolutionary leaders are thus urged to remain vigilant, not allowing the junta’s actions to distract from the broader goals of the revolution. The international community, and particularly neighboring countries, must brace for a massive humanitarian crisis due to significant influx of migrants, including a surge in unregulated and hazardous labor migration, on top of the existing refugee crisis and cross-border instability. This situation underscores the role of the Myanmar military as the primary source of chaos within country and a key contributor to regional instability. Despite the turmoil, there lies an opportunity to dismantle the military dictatorship. The people of Myanmar are called upon to deepen their engagement in the Spring Revolution and to support the revolutionary forces with prudence, patience, and perseverance. The revolution must ensure that conscription becomes a constriction not for the people’s movement but for the military dictators themselves. References: http://www.asianlii.org/mm/legis/laws/pmslpadcln272010638.pdf https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/six-key-points-about-myanmars-newly-enforced-conscription-law.html https://vk.com/@sac.council-mnof https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/junta-leader-wants-conscription-law-2020-02042022065126.html https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/myanmars-military-smaller-commonly-thought-and-shrinking-fast https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/charting-the-shifting-power-balance-on-myanmars-battlefields.html https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/the-existential-threat-facing-myanmars-junta.html https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/15/7181 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gH1Fu9B_TT0 https://www.myanmaritv.com/news/myanmar-reserve-forces-law-sac-enforced-reserve-military-force-law ..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: East Asia Forum
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The People’s Representatives Committee for Federalism (PRCF) published its constitution for a federal democracy on Feb. 12. The committee comprises 12 political parties: the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Arakan League for Democracy, Karen National Party, Zomi Congress for Democracy, Democratic Party for a New Society, United Nationalities Democracy Party, Danu Nationalities Democracy Party, Daingnet National Development Party, Mro National Democracy Party, Karen National Party, Shan State Kokang Democratic Party and Mon Affairs Association. Previously known as the PRF, the committee changed its name to PRCF in March 2021. Sai Kyaw Nyunt, a joint secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, recently spoke with The Irrawaddy about the objectives of the constitution and its most important features. What is the intention of publishing a constitution? It has been nearly two years since we drafted the constitution in 2022. So, we decided that it was time to publish it. What is the PRCF? The PRCF was formed after the 2021 coup. It comprises primarily members of the United Nationalities Alliance and their partners. The PRCF mentioned three main tasks in its statement about publishing its constitution. Can you elaborate on them? We can’t accept any form of dictatorship, either military dictatorship or civilian dictatorship. The conflict in our country since independence is deeply connected to the constitution. The 1974 constitution did not meet the wishes of the people and the same is true of the 2008 constitution. In our view, federalism is the best [form of government] for this highly diverse and multi-ethnic country. But federalism alone is not enough. There must also be democracy. So, there is a need for a federal, democratic constitution. But again, a constitution alone is not enough. Peaceful co-existence is also critically important for us to come together to form and maintain a union. How do you see the current political landscape in Myanmar? Myanmar is at war now. We are politicians so we don’t know much about military affairs. Military solutions alone can’t solve problems in a country. Space for politics is necessary. It is more powerful than military action in terms of fulfilling the wishes of the people. We want things handled peacefully. So, your political parties prefer non-violence? We don’t want to say which is right and which is wrong. I am only talking about our tendency. By political means, I mean…… you don’t necessarily have to establish a party and contest the election. You may oppose the voting, and release statements about your views. These are all political means. Dialogue is also a political means. This is what we believe. What drove the PRCF to design a constitution? Eleven of the 12 organizations in the PRCF are political parties. We believe certain conditions must be met for our country to have greater peace and stability. So, we have designed the constitution, outlining the conditions that we think are necessary to have peace and stability. Those parties have won votes and support from people in their respective constituencies. So, we designed the constitution to convey our idea about an ideal union. What are the salient points about your constitution? We refer to four documents: the fundamental principles of the PRCF, the fundamental principles in a federal democracy charter, the constitution from the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee, and the constitution from the UNA and allies. Our constitution touches upon new topics, such as financial matters, relations between government agencies, and administration and public services. So, is it fair to say the constitution drafted by the PRFC is one that reflects the federal democracy charter declared by anti-regime political forces? We can’t say so. Many organizations, including ethnic armed organizations, were involved in designing the federal democracy charter. Our constitution was drafted solely by PRCF members, but it can be used as a draft for all the stakeholders to discuss in the future. Will you accept recommendations, if there are any, to your constitution? We are willing to accept any recommendation that does not go against our principles. The military regime upholds the 2008 Constitution. What will you say if they say they don’t accept your constitution? We represent people to a certain extent, and we live among the people. So, the constitution represents our view of what this country should be like. Everyone is aware that one group or organization representing all the others was not successful. We need to try to write a constitution that is acceptable to all by negotiating between all stakeholders. How did stakeholders in the country respond to your constitution? No one has yet strongly responded to our constitution. It was only published recently, and perhaps stakeholders are still studying it. Our constitution is largely based on documents of ethnic armed organizations, ethnic political organizations and ethnic Bamar organizations. So, there won’t be much difference between ours and theirs. There might be differences in the way we operate, but I don’t think there will be much disagreement regarding policies. The policies of the regime and the military, however, can be markedly different from ours. In the future, we will have to accept what is best for the people. What is the PRCF’s next step? We established political parties to do our share for the country. So, we will continue to work in our way to restore peace and build a country that all citizens want to see..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar: Journalist tortured and killed in military custody The body of Western News journalist Myat Thu Tan has been found after he was shot and killed by military personnel on January 31, along with seven other political prisoners in the custody of Myanmar’s ruling junta. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and its affiliate, Myanmar Journalist Network (MJN), strongly condemn this horrific murder and call on the military junta to immediately prosecute those responsible and cease the rampant impunity for crimes against journalists in Myanmar. The body of journalist Myat Thu Tan was found on February 5, after he was shot and killed by military personnel in Myanmar's Rakhine state. Credit: Western News According to IFJ sources, Myat Thu Tan, also known as Phoe Thiha, was shot by two personnel from the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 378 in a detainment ward in Mrauk-U Town, in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state. Myat Thu Tan was a contributor with online media outlet Western News as well as a reporter for Democratic Voice of Burma, one of the country’s largest independent media organisations. The journalist’s body was discovered buried in a bomb shelter in the battalion’s headquarters near the town’s hospital, along with six other political prisoners including rapper Kyaw Zan Wai, after the ethnic armed organisation Arakan Army seized the camp on February 5 following several days of fighting. Local media reported the bodies found at the showed signs of torture. The prisoners had been charged by the junta under its amended Section 505 (A) of the country’s Penal Code, which criminalises ‘causing fear, spreading false news, or agitating directly or indirectly criminal offences against a Government employee.’ The draconian legislation has been consistently used to target journalists in the three years since the military coup on February 1, 2021. The junta has yet to issue a statement on the incident, with Myat Thu Tan’s family not notified of his death. The journalist was arrested on September 22, 2022 at his Mrauk-U home for social media posts critical of the junta, and had not been tried or convicted before his death. Amidst intensifying conflict with rebel groups across the country, the junta announced a new mandatory conscription law effective from February 10 for all men aged 18 to 35, and all women aged 18-27. In the days following, thousands of young people have been documented attempting to flee the new legislation into neighbouring countries. The MJN said: “The killing of Myat Thu Tun along with other civilians constitutes the highest threat and intimidation to journalists working in conflict areas. Despite stepping back from the media field a few years ago, the junta continues to see him as a journalist, which triggered his killing. This case stresses that journalists could be killed at any time in Myanmar by the junta forces.” The IFJ said:“The IFJ condemns the heinous, cold-blooded killing of Myat Thu Tan as an attack on press freedom to the highest degree. Held in pre-trial detention without conviction, the journalist and six other civilians were purposefully tortured and murdered by military personnel, with their bodies subsequently discarded. The junta must put an end to the impunity running rife in Myanmar and ensure those responsible are immediately brought to justice.”..."
Source/publisher: International Federation of Journalists
2024-02-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "For all the rhetoric surrounding Myanmar’s instability since its coup d’état in 2021, those paying close attention to Myanmar recognize an even more important fact: it may only become more unstable. The essential combination of historical precedent and political theory suggests that not only is Myanmar better off with a centralized government, but that if it maintains its crash course towards decentralization, it will result in devastating consequences for all different populations in Myanmar. If international actors advocating for the restoration of a democratic Myanmar fail to intervene or otherwise assist democratic advocates in Myanmar, the ensuing conflicts will ravage the state and destabilize an increasingly strategically important region. The inherent nature of Myanmar as a multi-ethnic state has been a source of division since its independence in 1948. Its consistent oppression of the Rohingya people resulted in massive sources of conflict in 2012 and 2017, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Yet the recent coup has in many ways united many minority groups, creating a common enemy out of the oppressive majority government, which has forced armed rebel groups to work synchronously to effectively combat the military government. Al Jazeera reports that the unity of these armed groups has resulted in the creation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, which have waged combat against the military junta quite effectively, and garnered significant momentum since late 2023. When considering the overall instability of the region, the military junta’s proven inability to establish sovereignty at home and legitimacy abroad has become flashpoints of concern. The Associated Press reports that inflation and displacement are increasing in Myanmar, whilst economic growth remains stagnant at best. Furthermore, as armed groups establish their own regions of governance, the decentralization of power will likely result in further economic decline and civilian safety. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the junta’s inability to maintain control over specific regions controlled by ethnic minority groups has also destabilized trade in the region, led to increased crime, starvation, and homelessness. It must be acknowledged that the current form of governance in Myanmar is unacceptable from a moral and political standpoint. The Guardian reports that since the military took over in 2021, 4,000 civilians have died at the hands of the military, and the possibility that crimes against humanity have been committed has been raised by multiple rights groups. Yet the success of armed groups in rebelling against the military has and will continue to only increase these issues. Decentralization has rarely worked in global politics, and although the prospect of multiple ethnicities experiencing self-determination appears a flowery and conclusive concept, the inevitable consequences are frightening. Even in scenarios where ethnic, religious, or racial groups have managed to split into their self-governing states, it is not a process that has occurred peacefully or accompanied by economic growth. Whether it is an artificial split, a practical split, or a blend of both, the potential for genocide, protracted conflict, and continued oppression persists. Examples of these are plentiful, whether it be Yugoslavia in the early 1990s or Palestine in the 1940s, these regions still maintain incredibly volatile conflicts. Myanmar appears to be set on the same path if multiple ethnic groups continue to establish power within their own regions and decentralize Myanmar as a whole. It becomes increasingly imperative that the U.S. and other powerful actors stand by supposed liberal values and intervene. The prospect of increased instability in Myanmar is disconcerting to all actors in the region and on the international stage. Additionally, the idea that a democratic state could turn into a decentralized failed state within a decade raises serious concerns about the international community’s commitment to these ideals and capability in addressing them. Amid this crisis, China has become an increasingly relevant actor, stepping in to act as a mediator between rebel groups and the military junta, reports Reuters. Motivated by threats to trade and the potential for a refugee crisis, China has acted in its own self-interest in attempting to stabilize the conflict as much as possible. This contrasts sharply with the actions of important Western actors, who provide only lip service to the values of democratic freedom and anti-authoritarianism that they purportedly espouse. Sanctions and condemnations are insufficient in providing necessary change, and China’s proposed rules of order in international politics will only gain more traction the longer the West allows states to drift further towards authoritarian structures. Advocacy for the restoration of Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic government should become a focal point of the Biden administration’s Southeast Asian foreign policy agenda. If it does not, the U.S. becomes complicit in the demise of yet another potential democracy..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Diplomatic Envoy - Seton Hall University
2024-02-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The United States strongly condemns the January 7 airstrike on Kanan Village in the Sagaing Region town of Khampat, Burma. Reporting indicates this latest attack killed at least 17 civilians, including nine children. This is yet another example of the horrors experienced by people in Burma since the military coup and the violence it has fueled across the country. We reiterate our call on the Burma military regime to cease all forms of violence, free all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with regard to the protection of civilians. We reaffirm our continued support of the Five Point Consensus, and stress that the United Nations Security Council must fully implement Resolution 2669 and also consider further actions to stem the regime’s violence. The United States underlines its commitment to using all tools at the Security Council’s disposal to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, a commitment affirmed by the vast majority of the Security Council. The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and an inclusive dialogue to promote genuine and inclusive democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN. The people of Burma, after nearly three years since the military wrested power away from the democratically elected government, are looking to us all for support. The international community must step up and speak out..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: United States Mission to the United Nations Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
2024-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This decision, mandating service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27, comes amidst intensifying conflicts with resistance forces and widespread international condemnation of the junta’s legitimacy and actions. As a result, a significant exodus towards relative safety is underway, with Thailand becoming a primary destination for those fleeing conscription and conflict. Thailand stands at a crossroads, presented with a humanitarian dilemma and a strategic opportunity. The flow of young, potentially skilled individuals from Myanmar poses a question of not just moral duty but also of long-term benefits to the Thai workforce and society at large. It is a moment that calls for compassion, foresight, and leadership from the Thai government and its people. First and foremost, welcoming the young refugees from Myanmar is a humanitarian imperative. These individuals are seeking to escape serving a regime that has been widely criticized for its oppressive tactics, human rights abuses, and illegitimate claim to power..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: ASEAN Now
2024-02-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The junta’s Labor Ministry has instructed overseas employment agencies to suspend recruitment drives as of Feb. 13, according to the Myanmar Overseas Employment Agencies Association (MOEAA). The suspension comes after the regime introduced mandatory military service for the young population, which is expected to trigger a stampede for the border. Nationwide, 14 million people – 6.3 million men and 7.7 million women – are eligible for conscription, according to the 2019 census. The ministry has not issued an official suspension notice but instead replied to agencies seeking permission to post recruitment letters that it had stopped accepting international employment offers. “The ministry said it had suspended accepting job offers from around the world as of Feb. 13. It did not say how long the suspension would last,” said an MOEAA official. The abrupt suspension has created problems for employment agencies, said a manager. “We have to spend a lot of time to get a letter of job offers. We have to negotiate an agreement with the foreign employer, and there is a long process before we get the contract to hire people for him. The ministry has now suspended it abruptly, which causes problems for us,” said the manager. The order does not affect people hired for job contracts posted before Feb. 13. Employment agencies send 500 to 800 legal migrant workers daily to Thailand under a government-to-government memorandum of understanding. Between 200 and 300 people are sent daily to other countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan. The conscription law, which was activated by the regime on Feb. 10, requires all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve in the Myanmar military for two to five years. The call-up to fight in a military widely reviled for perpetrating countless war crimes on civilians is expected to accelerate young people’s plans to study or work abroad..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: After a recent junta announcement on mandatory service, youths look for ways to get to Thailand.
Description: "Young people in Myanmar’s commercial capital are lining up outside the Thai embassy to apply for visas and looking for other ways to leave the country following an announcement from the junta regime that it will call up conscripts for mandatory military service. Starting in April, about 5,000 people each month will be enrolled into the military to perform “national defense duties,” junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun said in an interview with BBC Burmese. Zaw Min Tun told several junta-affiliated newspapers on Thursday that as many as 50,000 men will be recruited this year into the military, which has suffered numerous battlefield defeats and large-scale surrenders in recent months. In Yangon, young people have already started heading for the Thai border, which is about 420 km (260 miles) away, several residents told Radio Free Asia. About 50 people – most of them young – had already formed a queue in front of the Thai embassy at 5:30 a.m. on Thursday, one Yangon resident, who didn’t want to be named for security reasons, said to RFA. Additionally, young people riding on city buses are talking to each other about entering the Buddhist monkhood to avoid military service if they get out of the country, the Yangon resident said. They all seemed deeply worried, he added. Because of the recent rush of visa applicants, the Thai embassy said in a statement on Wednesday that only 400 applicants would be accepted per day. Also, the Buddhist University in Thailand’s city of Chiang Mai, which has an affordable tuition fee, announced Wednesday that it is no longer accepting applicants from Myanmar because it had already received too many applications. ‘They have lost their way’ An poor job market and the turmoil of the ongoing civil war had already made it very difficult for young people to build a life for themselves in the country, a young man who also lives in Yangon told RFA. Now, with the enforcement of the conscription law, young people know for certain that they don’t have a future in Myanmar, the young man said. “All of them are preparing to leave the country because there are no jobs for them,” he said. “Now, with the implementation of this conscription law, they have lost their way.” The young man said he had been searching for jobs in Japan, but is now focusing on finding work in neighboring Thailand. “I heard that the junta is blocking workers from going abroad,” he said. “I also heard that [they block] new job offers by foreign countries. It’s hard to leave the country.” Sai Kyi Zin Soe, a political commentator, said that targeting young people – who typically have the highest productivity among all age groups – will damage the country’s economy and cause widespread resentment. “It is natural for many people who have their own goals in life to avoid armed conflicts,” he said. “They are educated young people. They can learn things. We see the targeting of this age group for use in conflict – to gain political advantage – as a very bad move.” State-level committees Zaw Min Tun’s comments on Thursday about conscription followed a Feb. 10 announcement from junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing that a military service law enacted in 2010 by a previous military regime would go into effect immediately. Enforcement of the law comes as anti-junta forces and ethnic armies have scored significant victories against the military in Myanmar’s civil war, which escalated in October 2023 when the rebel groups joined together and launched new offensives, causing significant casualties. Under Min Aung Hlaing’s directive, Burmese men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 could face up to five years in prison if they refuse to serve for two years. Doctors, engineers and technicians – aged 18-45 for men and 18-35 for women – must also serve, but up to five years. In the initial rounds, fewer women will be recruited, Zaw Min Tun told state media. The junta will appoint a central committee and regional- and state-level committees to oversee the conscription, according to Zaw Min Tun. But because the junta would have to provide salaries, food and other items, the military won’t need more than 50,000 recruits, he said. “I want to emphasize that we will not call up everyone who is eligible for military service,” he said. The CIA World Factbook estimated that last year Myanmar’s military had somewhere between 150,000 and 400,000 personnel. The Washington-based U.S. Institute of Peace has suggested that 21,000 service personnel have been lost through casualties, desertions and defections since the February 2021 military coup d’etat, leaving an effective force of about 150,000..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: " Three years ago today, on February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military junta seized power in a violent and deadly coup. Since then, the junta has escalated its attacks, both online and offline, perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, violating human rights every day. Despite thunderous silence and dwindling support from so-called global allies, the people of Myanmar are unwavering in their determination to courageously resist the military, and take back control of their country. 2024 is a critical turning point in their fight. The international community must urgently stand with the people of Myanmar, offering not only solidarity, but also concrete resources to help topple the military junta and consign this troubled chapter to the history books. The Myanmar people’s resistance to dictatorship needs international support to dismantle the digital “iron curtain” built by the junta to track and target the people of Myanmar. Otherwise these same people will continue to be crushed and terrorised by a surveillance state intent on destroying lives, livelihoods, and any resistance to their oppressive rule. Only when these oppressive structures fall can the people of Myanmar rebuild a new country that reflects their vision and courage. A digital “iron curtain” The military’s complete control of Myanmar’s telecommunications network allows it to use internet shutdowns and communications blackouts to facilitate vicious attacks and block humanitarian aid from reaching those who need it. In 2023, the military weaponised shutdowns and blackouts, especially in conflict zones where resistance is strong. Reports reveal that, before bombing towns and villages, the military frequently uses jamming devices installed on military scout aircraft to block all communication networks. This means that people seeking safe paths to flee the conflict are unable to communicate with each other, wounded people cannot seek medical assistance, and families are cut off from critical humanitarian support. It is difficult to document the exact number of regular internet shutdowns imposed by the junta, but they likely number in the hundreds. According to a report by the Myanmar Internet Project, 11 out of 14 states have experienced shutdowns, with prolonged shutdowns common in areas of escalating conflict, including Bago, Kachin, Karenni, Kayin, Magywa, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The rise of a surveillance state Under the guise of creating e-government projects, Myanmar’s military is raising funds and collecting resources to strengthen its massive surveillance infrastructure, pushing forward with data collection projects like the national census, e-ID system, and the establishment of a “National Database”. In 2023, the military announced that it was developing an e-government masterplan to provide public services and sought support from international organisations, including the UNFPA, to do so. Despite no such support being provided, the military continues to seek support from other countries, including in the form of domestic and foreign technologies to run the projects. The military needs to track and target those who oppose its reign of terror. So far, the military’s e-ID system contains the personal data of 52 million people (including six types of geographic data) and data from over 13 million households. It’s also thought that the military has collected biometric data from 2.1 million people in Myanmar — this includes fingerprints, facial features, and eye pupil scans. The military also surveils people in several other ways: Checkpoints restrict people’s right to freedom of movement, with unlawful arrests occurring frequently. Random security checks, including indiscriminate inspections of ID documents and phones and other devices, are conducted on the street. Financial activities are monitored; Radio Free Asia reports that more than 700 mobile payment account were closed in the month of May 2023 alone.​​​ The international community must stop all forms of support that allow the military to strengthen its surveillance infrastructure against the people, even as they present them as “pro-people” propaganda projects. An ongoing campaign of terror The military is weaponising the law to violate fundamental human rights, including the right to information and freedom of expression, as part of efforts to legitimise its abusive acts: Failure to register a SIM can put you in prison for up to six months. The military is using section 72 of the Telecommunications Law to justify the SIM registration order. The military has adopted extensive by-laws to the Anti-Terrorism Law, giving them the power to censor activities against the military, intercept electronic communication data, and obtain people’s location data. At the start of 2024, documentary filmmaker, Shin Daewe, was sentenced to life in prison under this law. The military is criminalising online expression, criticism, and journalism. Data for Myanmar shows that an average of 65 individuals per month were detained for criticising the junta and supporting anti-juta activities on social media platforms, with more than 1,300 arrested for their social media content. Sixty-four journalists are in detention, making Myanmar one of the world’s biggest jailers of journalists, second only to China. In 2023, many artists, celebrities, and social influencers changed their Facebook profile pictures to black in solidarity with the victims of military atrocities. Many individuals who commented, liked, or shared posts or news reports about anti-coup movement activities were arrested. Byuhar, a hip-hop singer who criticised the military during a Facebook Live for its failure to provide a regular electricity supply was given a 20 year prison sentence. Meanwhile U Ye Htut, who served as Information Minister under the Thein Sein government in the early 2000s, was given a ten year jail sentence for his Facebook post criticising the military’s policies.​ To push back against the junta’s increasing campaign of repression against the people of Myanmar, the international community must: Establish and commit resources for a coordinated action plan to provide the people of Myanmar with alternative access to telecommunication services. Local communities in Myanmar struggle to use satellite communications or other means to resist the military’s control and authoritarian grip over communication networks. With a coordinated action plan, people in Myanmar can push back against worsening digital authoritarianism. In areas of crisis and conflict, recognize and fund alternative access to the internet and other communication channels as critical tools for protecting lives and fundamental human rights. Cut off or prevent financial, technical, and other forms of support that benefit the military’s massive surveillance infrastructure. In 2023, the military had difficulty securing funding from other countries or from international organisations for its e-government projects. This was a welcome step and must continue. The international community must deepen its efforts to stop the sale of dual-use surveillance technologies to Myanmar. Push tech and telecom companies to uphold human rights and make them accountable when they fail to provide effective remedy for violations. Governments must not allow companies to profit from the suffering of Myanmar’s people. Stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar. The international community must provide support to the people of Myanmar so they can resist the abuses of the military, while addressing the emerging challenges of building a new nation state. Companies must: Urgently explain how they conduct due diligence to ensure that their operations and products in Myanmar do not negatively or adversely impact human rights. Telcos must do this without delay, as their partnerships with the military significantly enable the military junta’s human rights abuses. Companies producing or selling other types of technologies, including dual-use surveillance technologies, must stop all transactions involving the military and its allies. If leaving the market becomes the ultimate decision after a thorough human rights due diligence process, ensure that comprehensive remedies are in place to address the human rights impacts of the departure. Companies must be held accountable for irresponsible exits out of areas of crisis and conflict. Conduct heightened due diligence to ensure that their products and services are not used in violation of human rights by the military or by military-controlled institutions, and immediately remove these products or services from the market if they are being used to facilitate rights abuses. Invest significant resources to implement human rights-based content moderation practices, data protection policies, and privacy safeguards to resist increasing attempts to extend surveillance, censorship, and rights violations. Pursue genuine public engagement in its decision-making process and implement effective remedies when human rights violations are committed..."
Source/publisher: Access Now
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 has led to widespread conflict and has had a severe impact on its health care system. Many health care workers have been involved in civil disobedience and protests against the coup, including boycotts. Organisations such as the WHO and Insecurity Insight have also reported on attacks on health care in the country. Since February 2021, the UK government has provided over £120mn in humanitarian and development assistance in Myanmar. On 29 of February 2024, Lord Crisp (Crossbench) is scheduled to ask the following question for short debate: Lord Crisp to ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the role that the United Kingdom could play in supporting health workers in Myanmar, and contributing to the reconstruction of the country’s health system. 1. The 2021 military coup Headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) took power following elections in 2015 after decades of military rule.[1] Elections in 2020 led to further NLD gains and the military made an accusation of electoral fraud. In February 2021, Myanmar’s military commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing launched a military coup that overthrew the elected government. A civil disobedience movement (CDM) developed following the coup. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H Andrews, stated that this led to the development of a national unity government: Following the formation of CDM, members of parliament who had been elected in the November national elections but prevented from taking their oath of office by the junta established the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. From the Committee emerged the broader and more inclusive National Unity Government in April, to provide leadership, build international support and serve as the legitimate representatives of the people of Myanmar.[2] Militias formed in opposition to the coup, including as part of the ‘People’s Defence Force’ (PDF) under the National Unity Government.[3] The UK government has said that a wide range of people were involved in the protests: In response to military rule, people from a range of backgrounds and professions took part in large scale protests across Myanmar throughout 2021. Sources differ on the scale of the protests from daily figures of 10s to 100s of thousands depending on the location and timing. However, the UN summarised that by March 2021 millions of people had protested across 100s of towns. ACLED [The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project] recorded over 6,000 anti-coup demonstration events throughout 2021. In 2022, direct action continued but evolved to include civil disobedience, flash mobs, silent strikes and smaller anti-junta protests across the country.[4] The response of the military has included violence and arrests: Military response to opposition includes violent oppression of peaceful protests, arbitrary arrests of protestors and family members, property raids and seizures (particularly of NLD members), and to a lesser extent enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Threats, harassment, violence, and direct attacks occur against those associated with or perceived to support pro-democratic or anti-junta groups, and on civilians in areas where there is conflict between the military and armed groups.[5] In a written statement in February 2023 marking two years since the coup, minister of state at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Anne-Marie Trevelyan, said the coup had led to millions needing humanitarian assistance: The consequences for domestic and regional stability are clear; over 17 million people are now in need of humanitarian assistance—a staggering increase of 16 million in just two years; over 1.5 million people are displaced within Myanmar, with a million more in neighbouring Bangladesh, Thailand and India; illicit economies are thriving; and democratic gains have been reversed. Recent figures indicated Myanmar suffered some of the most intense violence in the world in 2022, with conflict-related deaths second only to Ukraine. There is a clear trajectory of increasing violence, human rights violations and abuses, to which the UK has responded with a range of tools.[6] Ms Trevelyan said the UK condemned the “brutal actions” of the military regime and supported “all those working peacefully to restore democracy in Myanmar”. She said that the military must engage with the National Unity Government and respect the “democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar”: We support all those working peacefully to restore democracy in Myanmar. The military must engage in inclusive and meaningful dialogue with the full range of opposition voices, including the National Unity Government (NUG), and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar. In 2022, UK ministers spoke regularly with counterparts in the NUG. We call on the military to immediately end its campaign of violence and release the thousands of people it has detained arbitrarily, including Aung San Suu Kyi. The military must engage in inclusive and meaningful dialogue with the full range of opposition voices in order to respect the federal, democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.[7] In a January 2024 answer to a written question asking when the UK government had last raised the treatment of pro-democracy advocates in Myanmar at the UN, the government said it had co-sponsored a resolution at the UN general assembly and supported the International Criminal Courts investigation of acts committed against the Rohingya: On 15 November 2023 the UK co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution calling on the Myanmar military to release all those who have been arbitrarily detained on political grounds. We will continue to seek opportunities to raise our concerns at the UN and other multilateral fora. We support the International Criminal Court Prosecutor’s initiative to investigate acts committed against the Rohingya. In November, we jointly filed a declaration of intervention at the International Court of Justice in The Gambia’s case alleging Myanmar has perpetrated genocide against the Rohingya, in order to set out our interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Genocide Convention before the Court.[8] 2. Impact of the coup on Myanmar’s health system The World Health Organization (WHO) has said “the crisis has spread in such a way” that the entire population of Myanmar, 56 million people, are now facing some level of need.[9] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has stated that a third of the population, 18.6 million people, are now estimated to be in humanitarian need.[10] The OCHA’s ‘Humanitarian needs and response plan’ (December 2023) for Myanmar estimates that 12 million people will need humanitarian health assistance in 2024. The OCHA has stated that whilst the provision of public essential health services has “partly resumed” in large urban areas, overall access to health care, essential medicines and medical supplies continues to be “fragile, fragmented, and uneven”.[11] The OCHA says that this is exacerbated by long-term inequalities and that the health system is deeply politicised, which is affecting the return of health workers. This in turn hinders access to health care particularly for girls, women, people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. The WHO has also reported that whilst the situation has improved in some large cities, overall health service access is still severely constrained: The health services remain significantly impacted by the increasing conflicts and security and economic stress. While a reversal in the trend in the provision of services is observed in some large cities, such as Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon, since the pandemic and the events of February 2021, the overall access to health services remains severely constrained and fragmented, with a heavy reliance on local partners supporting their own communities.[12] The WHO has said that prior to the current situation Myanmar had made progress in reducing the prevalence of communicable diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis.[13] The WHO said Myanmar had also shown “remarkable progress with regard to key sustainable development goals (SDG) targets of maternal mortality, newborn mortality and child mortality”.[14] However, it has stated that the established monitoring systems, such as District Health Information System 2, that allowed for an evidence-based determination of the functionality of Myanmar’s current health system “are non-functional”. The WHO’s country office therefore developed “alternative, ad hoc monitoring systems” to allow it to monitor access to health services: The data had been collected by observation from 360 townships by WHO field-based staff and Myanmar Country Office staff since April 2021. WHO, in collaboration with the World Bank, has conducted a phone survey across Myanmar to analyse the current situation regarding access to health care and medicines, and private sector providers’ response. Increased challenges to availability and affordability of essential medicines were observed while difficulties in transporting supplies to conflict-affected areas were also noticed.[15] The WHO reported that the Covid-19 pandemic had impacted medical training resulting in the “closure of all training institutions throughout the year 2020 with no graduation of the health workforce cadres, adding to the constraints”.[16] The WHO has characterised health care in Myanmar as facing the following challenges: In Myanmar, people are facing heavily restricted access to formal health services, including those run by public hospitals and de facto government clinics. Moreover, a large share of households continues to depend on health care services that are provided by private health care facilities while self-care remains a key approach adopted by them. Additionally, ethnic health organizations (EHOs) continue to fill significant gaps in health care provision. Lack of primary health care in villages, high cost of secondary health care at hospitals and movement restrictions in availing tertiary health care in capital cities continue to hinder access to health services. These restrictions are causing life-threatening suffering, notably mental and psychosocial burden, and death from medical emergencies. Minorities and other ethnically vulnerable populations continue to face severe constraints and a fragmented health care system in the wake of Covid-19 and the political changes in February 2021. Although Myanmar was hit by the deadliest wave of Covid-19 during June–September 2021, severely disrupting health sector functioning, the third and fourth waves in 2022 continued to put the health system under strain. The health system was crippled by a limited bed capacity, challenges to making oxygen and essential medicines available, and an inadequate health workforce, leading to excess death and disability. However, since then, the testing capacity and the vaccination rate have increased, which in turn have improved the level and development of seroprevalence.[17] The WHO has said that nearly half of Myanmar’s population (46%) is reported to be facing poverty, with “serious repercussions for the cost of health care”. It has said, that particularly in conflict areas, access to health care has been put out of the reach of common people by: significant shortages of key essential medicines continuing supply chain disruptions high inflation rates (about 20% in 2022–23) The WHO also said that a “continued depletion of tax revenue” had resulted in budgets cuts to the health sector.[18] The WHO has said the “total collapse” of the health management information system has meant that the availability of data is constrained. This has led to health programmes related to diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDs seeing a reverse in data collection and analysis used to monitor these diseases and assist with their prevention and control. The WHO has said that a new law had forced several NGOs to either shut down or reduce their operations: Declaration of a new Registration Law, mandating civil society organizations including health facilities and associations in 2022, has forced a sizeable number of NGOs to either shut down or partially close operations. The new law has crippled their functions, restricting access to financial resources from donors, in a considerable manner.[19] The UNHCR stated that the law made “registration compulsory for both national and international non-governmental organizations and associations”.[20] 2.1 Health workers in Myanmar Particular concern has been raised about the impact of the current situation on health workers in Myanmar. BBC News reported that organised resistance to the February 2021 coup “started with health care workers announcing a boycott of state-run hospitals”.[21] The WHO has also said that health workers “were among the first to express dissent with regard to the military takeover through civil disobedience; this involved 50% of the health workforce in the public sector”.[22] It said this led to a “significantly reduced health workforce in the public sector”. The WHO has said that the ‘national health workforce account’ could not be updated due to “limitation in engagement with the de facto authority since 2021”. There have also been attacks on health services following the coup. The WHO has said that there have been 385 attacks on health care reported via its surveillance system since the coup: Since February 2021, more than 385 attacks on health care have been documented via the WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). These attacks have led to at least 58 deaths and 188 injuries. Each attack is deeply concerning as it affects access to and availability of essential health services–especially for women, children and other vulnerable groups.[23] The non-governmental organisation Insecurity Insight has reported that there have been 1,087 attacks on Myanmar’s health system since the 1 February 2021 coup.[24] It has said “at least 880 health workers have been arrested, 97 killed and 117 injured undermining health care providers’ ability to maintain safe staffing levels to effectively meet patient needs”. The OCHA has said that whilst the numbers of attacks reported differ between organisations they continue to be among the highest globally: Attacks on health care are monitored by a number of organizations, notably World Health Organization and the non-governmental organization (NGO) Insecurity Insight. Across all tracking efforts, reported attacks on Myanmar’s health care system continue to be among the highest globally in 2023, varying between at least 66 to 330 depending on the different definitions and levels of verification used. Even considering likely underreporting, indicative records shows that at least 14 health workers were killed and 21 wounded in 2023, with local aid workers most at risk.[25] The non-governmental organisation Physicians for Human Rights has said that attacks on health care workers “include arbitrary arrests, detentions, and violence committed against all types of health care workers, ranging from doctors and nurses to emergency medics and volunteers”.[26] In a report published in January 2022, Physicians for Human Rights reported that at first attacks were primarily targeted at health workers involved in nationwide protests: Initially, attacks primarily involved Myanmar security forces taking action against health workers participating in nationwide protests, the Civil Disobedience Movement [CDM], and the provision of medical care to injured protesters and bystanders.[27] However, the organisation has said that over time the attacks changed: Over time health care workers believed to have ties to the NUG [National Unity Government] or PDFs [People’s Defence Force] were targeted, including during raids of health facilities and charity organizations accused of aiding injured PDF members or supporters. Attacks by other armed actors on health care workers have emerged, particularly against those who have continued or returned to their civil servant roles and have reportedly pressured staff participating in CDM to return to work, or are believed to be military informants.[28] The OCHA’s humanitarian response plan has said that an estimated 372 medical teams are needed to meet humanitarian needs across Myanmar, “with a current gap of 202 teams”.[29] The OCHA has said the effective provision of health assistance is being undermined by a series of factors, including armed conflict and limited funding: Amid the continuation and escalation of armed conflict, limited funding and legal, administrative and security barriers persist in undermining the effective provision of adequate health assistance to an increasingly vulnerable population.[30] Number of workers in Myanmar’s health system before the coup In a section on the status of Myanmar’s health system “pre-crisis”, the WHO expressed concern that the density of health workers in the country was one of the lowest in the South-East Asia region. Prior to 2021, the WHO had observed a density of 17.8 health workers per 10,000 population in Myanmar. It has said an average of 22.8 health workers per 10,000 population is required to deliver a package of health services, compatible with the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[31] The MDGs were 8 goals that UN members agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015.[32] They have been superseded by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[33] The WHO now estimates that 44.5 health workers per 10,000 population are required to “adapt services to the standards” of the SDGs. However, the WHO has described Myanmar as having one of the lowest health worker availability levels in the region, with issues including the even deployment of staff: Comparing health worker densities across countries in the South-East Asia Region and with the thresholds just described, Myanmar is one of the countries with the lowest health worker availability; it is only above Bangladesh. Beyond the overall limited availability of human resources in the system, deployment is also suboptimal since it is based on norms linked to facility nomenclature and size rather than on need or performance. The resulting allocation leads to insufficient personnel in some areas and exceeding capacity in others, along with inadequate skill mix, as proven by the limited number of complete critical care teams to run ICU beds during the COVID-19 crisis.[34] 3. UK government assistance to Myanmar In March 2023, Lord Crisp (Crossbench) asked the government in an oral question what support it was providing for health workers in Myanmar “who are caring for patients outside the areas controlled by the military government of that country”.[35] Responding for the government, then minister of state at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Lord Goldsmith, said that Myanmar’s health system had been in crisis since the coup and the UK was a leading donor on supporting health care needs in the country: My Lords, Myanmar’s public health care system has been in crisis since the coup. We are concerned about Myanmar’s level of basic health care services and childhood immunisation rates. The UK is a leading donor on supporting health care needs in that country. This financial year, the UK has provided £13.95mn for health care in Myanmar, which is being delivered by the UN, by civil society and by ethnic health care organisations. This support is saving the lives of vulnerable women and children.[36] Lord Goldsmith also said the UK government supported health professionals in Myanmar who were risking their lives: We applaud the Myanmar health professionals who are risking their lives to continue treating patients. We commend the NHS volunteers who are sharing their skills and knowledge with colleagues and friends in Myanmar, taking huge risks in doing so. I absolutely pay tribute to them. Since the coup, we have provided around £100mn to support those in need of humanitarian assistance, to deliver health care and education for the most vulnerable and to protect civic space. In 2021–22, we provided nearly £50mn in aid to Myanmar, including £24mn of life-saving assistance for 600,000 people. I am not in a position to comment on future expenditure, but I think it is very clear from our recent track record that this remains a priority focus for the FCDO.[37] As part of its approach to increase transparency in the government’s aid spending, the FCDO publishes the ‘UK–Myanmar Development Partnership Summary’ (17 July 2023). This provides an overview of the department’s development activity, development priorities, and financial information (including budgets and breakdowns of spend) in Myanmar. This sets out information on key programmes, including the ‘Myanmar-UK health partnership programme’: [The] Myanmar-UK Health Partnership programme (MUHP)—£6mn—aims to promote equitable access to health services for people from the most disadvantaged areas in Myanmar—especially in ethnic and conflict-affected areas—and to enhance the health partnership between the UK and Myanmar. The key intended impacts of the programme are: a reduction in maternal, newborn and child illness and deaths; and a reduction in the burden of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), drug-resistant tuberculosis and malaria through supporting stronger local health responses including in partnership with UK institutions.[38] In December 2023, the government said it had provided over £120mn in humanitarian and development assistance in Myanmar, “focussed on life-saving assistance, emergency health care, water, hygiene and sanitation services, and education”.[39] In July 2023, the government provided the following breakdown of spending on official development assistance (ODA) by year: From 1 Feb 2021 to 31 Mar 2022: we provided £8mn In financial year 2021/22: we provided £49.5mn In financial year 2022/23: we provided £57.3mn In financial year 2023/24: our allocated budget is £30.1mn (we have spent £5.13mn so far).[40] 4. Further reading OCHA, ‘Myanmar humanitarian update No 35: 2023 year in review’, 12 January 2024 Medicins San Frontieres, ‘Health workers struggle to respond amid severe restrictions in Rakhine state’, 16 January 2024 Physicians for Human Rights, ‘“Our health workers are working in fear”: After Myanmar’s military coup, one year of targeted violence against health care’, January 2022..."
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Source/publisher: House of Lords Library - UK Parliament
2024-02-13
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-13
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Description: "The government in Myanmar has announced compulsory military service for all young men and women as the country's turmoil continues. The army seized power from the civilian government in a coup in February 2021. But in recent months it has been defeated in a series of battles with ethnic militias and anti-coup fighters. The move announced on Saturday will require all men aged 18-35, and women aged 18-27, to serve at least two years under military command. No further details have been released. But in a statement, the junta said its defence ministry would "release necessary bylaws, procedures, announcements orders, notifications and instructions". The military has faced a series of humiliating defeats in recent months. At the end of last year, three ethnic insurgent armies in Shan State - supported by other armed groups that oppose the government - captured border crossings and roads carrying most of the overland trade with China. Last month, the Arakan Army (AA) said it had taken control of Paletwa in Chin State and the last military post in Paletwa township, the hilltop base at Meewa. The military-installed president of Myanmar, Myint Swe - a former general - has previously warned the country is in danger of breaking apart if the government could not bring fighting under control. A law allowing conscription was introduced in Myanamar in 2010, but has not been not enforced until now. Under the legislation, the terms of service can be extended up to a period of five years during a state of emergency. Those ignoring summons to serve can instead be jailed for the same period. A state of emergency was announced by the country's junta in 2021 and was recently extended for a further six months. Myanmar had endured almost 50 years of rule under oppressive military regimes before the move towards democracy in 2011. On 1 February 2021, the military announced it had taken control of the country. Disorders and fighting have affected the country ever since, with more than one million people being displaced and thousands killed. The performance of the army in its recent battles with ethnic armed groups - some of which have ended in defeats and retreats - has sparked criticisms and doubts among its supporters..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
2024-02-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-11
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Sub-title: State media report all men aged 18-35 and women 18-27 must serve for up to two years and up to five years in a state of emergency
Description: "Myanmar’s junta has declared mandatory military service for all young men and women, state media said, as it struggles to contain armed rebel forces fighting for greater autonomy in various parts of the country. All men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 must serve for up to two years, while specialists like doctors aged up to 45 must serve for three years. The service can be extended to a total of five years in the ongoing state of emergency, state media said on Saturday. The junta “issued the notification of the effectiveness of People’s Military Service Law starting from 10 February 2024,” the junta’s information team said in a statement. Myanmar has been gripped by chaos since the military seized power from an elected government in a 2021 coup, which sparked mass protests and a crackdown on dissent. Three years on, the junta is struggling to crush widespread armed opposition to its rule. Since October, the Tatmadaw, as the military is known, has suffered personnel losses while battling a coordinated offensive by an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent groups, as well as allied pro-democracy fighters who have taken up arms against the junta. The success of this offensive and the military’s failure to mount a counterattack has dented morale among low- and mid-level officers, according to several military sources, all of whom requested anonymity. Analysts have said the Tatmadaw is struggling to recruit soldiers and has begun forcing non-combat personnel to the frontline. A “national military service system involving all people is essential because of the situation happening in our country,” junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said in an audio message released by the information team. A law mandating conscription was introduced in 2010 but has not been enforced until now. Those who fail to comply with the draft face imprisonment for up to five years, the legislation says. Saturday’s statement did not give further details but said the junta’s defence ministry would “release necessary bylaws, procedures, announcements orders, notifications and instructions.” It did not give details on how those called up would be expected to serve. More than 4,500 people have been killed in the military’s crackdown on dissent and over 26,000 arrested, according to a local monitoring group..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
2024-02-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Feb 1 to 7, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Tanintharyi Region, and Kayin State from February 1st to 7th. 4 children died and 10 children were injured by the bomb dropping airstrike of Military Junta in Demoso Township, Kayah State on January 5th. Military Troop arrested over 300 civilians and used them as human shields from Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Mandalay Region, and Kayin State. A female political prisoner from Mandalay O Bo Prison died from a lack of medical treatment and care. Over 8 civilians died and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 12 underaged children were injured and 9 died when the Military Junta committed abuses.7 civilians were injured and 1 died by the landmine of Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-02-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When a country is strong and united, no one can manipulate and control it. But if, like Myanmar, it is weak and fragmented, this weakness will be exploited. China’s actions in Myanmar since the coup offer a textbook example of how superpowers take advantage of political crises in smaller countries to advance their own interests. In recent months, China has intervened in northern Myanmar to consolidate and strengthen its geostrategic position in the region, where the two countries share a more than 2,000-km-long border. There is no doubt that the West’s sanctions since the coup have weakened the economy in Myanmar and that China today is an important source of financial assistance and political backing for the regime. But when the junta was slow to respond to Beijing’s demands for a crackdown on transborder crime and online scam syndicates along the countries’ shared frontier, China decided to take concerted action. Beijing gave its tacit approval to ethnic armed organizations based in northern Shan State to launch Operation 1027 to target “pig butchering”, as the online scam and other crime . The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Arakan Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army—who together form the Brotherhood Alliance—launched coordinated attacks against the military regime in northern Shan State in late October. To the surprise of seasoned observers the operation was highly successful. The alliance’s forces seized Laukkai, the capital of Kokang, after about two months of fighting the regime’s troops and its allied militias. As a result, China, in collaboration with the ethnic armies in the north, was able to crack down on the online scammers and criminal activities on the Myanmar side. After losing a large swath of territory in northern Shan to the alliance, the regime in December asked Beijing to intervene on its behalf. Junta-appointed acting President Myint Swe commented that the offensive could “break the country into pieces” if left unchecked. China then forcefully intervened to halt the successful offensive after the MNDAA regained Laukkai City. In December, after the fighting spread to Rakhine State, China and the regime signed an addendum to their concession agreement for the massive China-backed deep seaport project in the state’s Kyaukphyu Township. And in late January, economic attaché Quyang Daobing of the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar met with junta investment and commerce officials to discuss cooperation on China-Myanmar megaprojects, the safety of Chinese citizens employed by those projects, and matters related to improving the quality of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor—a component of Beijing’s vast Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure development scheme—among other things. There’s only one word for it: Ingenious. China has minimized its costs and maximized its profits. Today, its protectorates are expanding in northern Myanmar along with its control and influence over ethnic armed forces in the region. And even as this relationship deepens, the regime continues to depend on China for investment and military supplies, not to mention political backing at the UN. Recently, the military regime handed over to Chinese authorities six alleged bosses of online scam empires in the Kokang region of Shan State along the Chinese border. It was widely suspected that the crime syndicates had been protected by the regime. The suspects were named in an arrest warrant issued by Chinese authorities in December for alleged involvement in online scams in Laukkai. When Operation 1027 started, China’s official position was that easing the situation in northern Myanmar would be in the interests of all parties and conducive to peace and stability in the China-Myanmar border area. Its Foreign Ministry said continually that China and Myanmar are friendly neighbors and that China has always respected Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. To Myanmar people this all just sounded like a joke—and not a particularly funny one at that. China maintains a number of geostrategic and economic interests in Myanmar, including infrastructure projects and a gas pipeline that connects with Yunnan Province, not to mention access to the critically important Indian Ocean, with its trade and transit routes. Beijing will invest more in northern Shan State as the “provinces” under China’s influence become more autonomous. The Wa and Kokang, as well as the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—better known as the Mongla Group—are effectively dependent on China for internet services, currency, and supplies and logistics. They issue their political statements and conduct their administrations in the Chinese language. Since Operation 1027, the MNDAA has forged a stronger alliance with the Wa and its new generation of leadership, who bring strengthened military and administration capacities. For its part, the Wa region is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. It is like a small Chinese province, even if the Wa continue to fly the Myanmar national flag over it. This is only the beginning. China’s influence has become so strong that, as far as its neighbors are concerned—and whether they like it or not—having a poor relationship with Beijing is simply not an option. The Myanmar regime and the country’s ethnic forces know that China will always act in accordance with her own interests. So, of course, do Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, but Myanmar, with all its complexity and now devastated by civil war, is in a far weaker position than its Southeast Asian neighbors. Since the coup, only one “winner” has emerged so far—Myanmar’s powerful neighbor to the north..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "QUESTION Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of the ongoing situation and the progress of implementing the “Five-Point Consensus” in Myanmar, what is the Ministry’s assessment of the impact on ASEAN’s unity and image. REPLY Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN has taken a firm and consistent approach to the situation in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup, which is reflected in the Five-Point Consensus. The ASEAN Leaders reviewed the situation at their Summits in 2022 and 2023 and agreed on a series of steps to send a clear signal to the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat last week, ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to the Five-Point Consensus as well as the Leaders’ decisions. There has been little progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and in fact the situation in Myanmar has become more dire of late. However, the rate limiting factor for progress is not ASEAN, but the Tatmadaw. Singapore will continue to work with ASEAN Chair Laos, fellow ASEAN Member States, and our external partners to press the Tatmadaw to cease violence and implement the Five-Point Consensus swiftly and fully. SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS Question 1 Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: I thank the SMS for her answer. May I ask the SMS what alternate steps does ASEAN have if Myanmar refuses to implement the consensus plan? REPLY: Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN Leaders have reviewed the issue twice and remain committed to upholding the Five-Point Consensus. Question 2 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: Thank you, Speaker. I would like to ask the SMS, with the change of ASEAN Chair this year to Laos, does Singapore expect any change in the momentum of ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar? How does Singapore continue to expect itself to support the new ASEAN Chair in ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar regarding the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus? Thank you. REPLY: Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Let me address that supplementary question because I just returned last week from the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat. I would emphasise that the key word is “consistency”. ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Laos has expressed our clear intention to maintain that consistent position, and the paramount expression of that is the Five-Point Consensus. I would say as far as ASEAN is concerned, there is no change. 2 The unfortunate change which is happening is on the ground in Myanmar. If you would check with your contacts there, the security situation remains dire. It is almost tantamount to a civil war. Whilst the military has no intention of ceding power, their ability to maintain authority on the ground is being severely challenged by a variety of groups, both the ethnic armed organisations as well as the resistance from the Burmese majority within Myanmar itself. 3 The other point which we have all emphasised is that there is a need to continue humanitarian support. ASEAN is engaged on this, and we are also expecting that Thailand will do a bit more to enable or to facilitate the cross-border delivery of humanitarian assistance. I think our priority remains the welfare of the citizens, the people of Myanmar. 4 We should be under no illusions that ASEAN can magically resolve the problems. Ultimately, this is a political problem. This is a problem of leadership and the political leaders across the spectrum in Myanmar need to get together and reconcile their diverse positions. We still believe that there needs to be direct, face-to-face negotiations conducted in good faith amongst all the political leaders there. It is a complex situation, but we will continue to maintain our consistent position..." . . . . .
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
2024-02-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Will Myanmar’s instability subside anytime soon?
Description: "This year is the third anniversary of the military coup led by Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing that ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the last three years the Tatmadaw has plummeted the country into ever-increasing violence and despair. Millions of civilians have been forced to flee from their homes because of the fighting between the Myanmar military and the opposition forces -- a collection of experienced ethnic armies, civilian militias and recently formed activist-based defence forces. Throughout the country there is a burgeoning humanitarian crisis threatening to engulf the country in serious starvation. On top of that a major economic crisis that has sent the Myanmar currency, the Kyat, tumbling -- it is now more than 3,500 kyat to the dollar: Less than half its value before the coup. Sources in the country's central bank have confirmed the lack of foreign currency has made it difficult to pay for imports. There is an acute shortage of oil, gas, and petrol: Motorists face increasingly long waits at the pumps, and the price of fuel has sky-rocketed; electricity shortages and black-outs are worse than they have ever been -- reminiscent of the mid-1990s, when black and brown outs were endemic. Residents in Yangon and Mandalay complain that they get less than four hours of electricity a day, and even that is irregular and intermittent. In fact, some economic analysts believe the military government will run out of money by the end of February. On the ground, only the Tatmadaw's superior air power has kept them in the game. Only concerted carpet bombing of civilian targets, which has wreaked havoc and devastation on areas deemed to be giving assistance or are sympathetic to the so-called revolutionary forces, has helped them maintain a certain degree of superiority. But even that is now under threat with the Kachin forces having downed two aircraft recently. In the last three months, ethnic forces in the north of the country -- known as the Three brotherhood -- the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) -- have launched highly coordinated and well-planned attacks on Myanmar's Tatmadaw. During that time, the army has suffered severe losses on a scale not experienced since the days of independence. Since October 27, 2023, when the current ethnic offensive was launched, the Tatmadaw has lost nearly 40 townships, over 500 army outposts, and more than 10,000 troops have been killed, injured, or have surrendered or defected. Myanmar's military now faces an existential threat for the first time in its more than seven-decade history. Morale and discipline within its ranks are at their lowest ebb. Changes to training schedules and military preparations in the last decade under the current commander-in-chief has left the armed forced inadequately trained and unready for armed battle. The last time the Tatmadaw was engaged in full-scale military action was in the mid-nineties against the Karen National Union -- apart from an extended skirmish against the MNDAA in 2009. The current battles in the north have left the army further demoralized. And the sentencing of the handful of commanders in charge of the recent Tatmadaw surrender to the MNDAA won't have helped morale or discipline either. What's happened to the Tatmadaw in the last three years, especially the last three months, has been unprecedented, a former senior officer in the Tatmadaw has admitted. He blamed a lack of discipline in the lower ranks for the spate of surrenders, especially amongst the junior officers. Military families are also questioning the continued violence, fearing for their safety. The democratic forces' use of drones has been a major ingredient that has helped level the military playing field. They have proven crucial in the battle for territory, and instilled a measure of fear amongst all civilians, especially military families. The personal safety of leading government and business figures has also become a matter of serious concern. Several prominent businessmen who fled abroad after the coup are being courted by the regime and encouraged to return. Their hesitancy to do so however was interpreted as hinging on safety concerns. But this concern about personal safety extends right up to the very top, where it is increasingly accentuated. Sources close to top general, Min Aung Hlaing, have revealed that he has become increasingly paranoid and generally becoming more and more isolated. His concern for his personal safety has extended to having all Myanmar visitors, including the number two general, Soe Win, fully searched before they can see him. His precarious situation appears to be playing on his mind. He suffers from acute insomnia, according to sources close to the general. He cannot sleep without having an injection administered every night. To many, Min Aung Hlaing has become the most hated and despised army commander of all time. He is loathed throughout the ranks within the Tatmadaw. No one has a good word for him. He is universally blamed for the mess of the last three years. There is widespread ill feeling -- especially amongst nationalist Buddhist monks and the Ma Ba Tha. One of their number publicly called for Min Aung Hlaing to step down and hand power to Soe Win. He was briefly arrested after the outburst and quickly released. More crucially, Soe Win was moved from the War Office and replaced. In the meantime, the push for Min Aung Hlaing to step down is gathering support, albeit under the surface. A group of former senior military officers, mostly associated with former president Thein Sein, are marshalling their supporters and preparing to launch a putsch. They call themselves nationalist hardliners. For the present they are biding their time to see what the early days of February bring. Today, Min Aung Hlaing must convene the National Defense and Security Council. At that meeting he must either extend the current state of emergency for another six months or form a "civilian" provisional government to oversee the next steps towards his plans for an election, which he says will be in the first quarter of 2025. This is after a census is held this October which would pave the way for the electoral rolls to be compiled. For the time being, all eyes are on that meeting today -- the day of the anniversary: It may help clarify the direction Myanmar's military supremo is plotting, although by the same token it may also spell the end of Min Aung Hlaing's brutal and illegal reign -- but not immediately..."
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Source/publisher: "Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
2024-02-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-07
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Description: "As the conflict in Myanmar enters its third year, we see an under-reported war marked by a sharp rise in the use of explosive weapons. Reports by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) indicate a 114% increase in such attacks by the military government in 2023, highlighting escalating tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organisations seeking autonomy. Consequently, the conflict resulted in 2,164 reported civilian casualties from explosive weapons in 2023, including 745 fatalities, reflecting a 121% and 155% increase in casualties and deaths, respectively, over 2022. The military is linked to 85% of these civilian casualties and 88% of the fatalities. Since 2010, AOAV has recorded 1,825 explosive weapon incidents in Myanmar, leading to 4,343 civilian casualties, including 1,450 deaths. Notably, 50% of these casualties, and 51% of those fatalities, occurred in the last year alone, emphasising the conflict’s intensity. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) identifies Myanmar as the most violent among the 50 wars it tracks globally, with an estimated death toll of at least 50,000 since the 2021 military coup, including at least 8,000 civilians. The conflict has displaced approximately 2.3 million people, according to the United Nations, yet it has received relatively muted international attention compared to crises in Ukraine and Gaza. This discrepancy is attributed to Myanmar’s lower strategic significance to Western powers and the complexities within its borders. Human Rights Watch has praised the resilience and grassroots resistance of Myanmar’s people against military oppression and human rights abuses. However, the international community’s focus has shifted, with criticisms of the lack of attention to Myanmar’s plight compared to other global conflicts. The widespread use of air strikes and shelling by the military and the junta’s political isolation, dismissing diplomatic efforts by regional entities like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, have drawn criticism. The complexity of the situation and the junta’s refusal to engage in dialogue present significant challenges to resolving the conflict. The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has expressed deep concern over the escalating violence, appealing for the protection of non-combatants and the facilitation of humanitarian aid. The displacement crisis has grown, with two million people affected. Recent successes of an alliance of ethnic armed groups in Shan State, along with increased operations by ethnic Karenni insurgents in Kayah State and Volunteer People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) capitalising on military setbacks, indicate a shift in the conflict’s dynamics. Despite being less experienced, PDFs have shown improved capabilities and often collaborate with seasoned ethnic soldiers. The military’s loss of control over significant border areas and reports of low morale and recruitment challenges within its ranks suggest a strained capacity to respond effectively to the expanding resistance. The failure to counter-attack in Shan State highlights either a lack of resources or a misunderstanding of the opposition’s strength. Overall, the conflict in Myanmar has been characterised by the military government’s tried and tested ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting the civilian networks that sustain the opposition. This means, over the past three years, towns and villages, schools and hospitals, have borne the brunt of military violence. As non-state actors continue to escalate their resistance, and the military junta escalates its own established strategies in response, civilians will inevitably continue to suffer acutely and disproportionately as a result of this devastating conflict. Dr Iain Overton, CEO of Action on Armed Violence, warns “The conflict in Myanmar, as it enters its third year, is a tragic testament to the escalating use of explosive weaponry in warfare, marking a period of intense and under-reported violence. Our data reveals a staggering 114% increase in explosive weapon attacks by the military government in 2023 alone. This sharp escalation underscores the growing tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organizations. Such figures are a clear indicator of the intense suffering and instability faced by the people of Myanmar, further exacerbated by the international community’s shifting focus away from their plight. As this conflict continues to evolve, with the military facing challenges on multiple fronts, the need for a concerted and meaningful international response has never been more urgent.”..."
Source/publisher: Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-03
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Jan 22 to 31, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from January 22nd to 31st. Military Junta arrested a civilian from the Mandalay Region and 5 from the Sagaing Region and used them as human shields. 8 civilians died by the arresting and killing of Military Junta troops within a week. A female political prisoner from Magway Prison died from the lack of medical treatment and care. Over 50 civilians died and about 50 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children were injured and 1 died when the Military Junta committed abuses. Civilians left their places 6 times because of the Military Junta Troop’s marching and raiding within a week. 4 civilians were injured by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest sanctions on the illegal Myanmar junta and its business associates, three years after the military launched a coup attempt that has failed because of the courageous mass resistance of Myanmar people. Since the attempted coup, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, enabled by a network of domestic and international companies. New sanctions targeted the military’s sources of funds and jet fuel. Australia’s second round of sanctions since February 1, 2021 designated Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), state banks illegally seized by the junta. The banks are key nodes in the military cartel’s economic networks, supporting the junta’s campaign of terror. Australia also targeted three companies that are part of Shoon group (formerly Asia Sun), which is the junta’s main partner in the import, storage and distribution of jet fuel. The Shoon companies designated were Asia Sun Trading Company Limited, Cargo Link Petroleum Company Limited and Asia Sun Group Company Limited. The US sanctioned Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate founded by Thein Win Zaw, who is the group’s chairperson. Following the military’s coup attempt, Shwe Byain Phyu bought Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, providing the junta with enhanced surveillance capabilities and access to personal data. Justice For Myanmar exposed the business interests of Shwe Byain Phyu Group in 2022. The US also sanctioned Thein Win Zaw, his wife Tin Latt Min, and their adult children, Win Paing Kyaw and Theint Win Htet. In addition, the US sanctioned Myanma Five Star Line Company Limited, a shipping subsidiary of the US-sanctioned military conglomerate, Myanma Economic Holdings Limited. The UK sanctioned No. 1 Mining Enterprise (ME1) and No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME2), state-owned enterprises illegally seized by the junta that play a central role in Myanmar’s mining sector. The two mining enterprises illegally channel funds and resources to the junta through production sharing contracts with local and foreign companies. Last year, JFM exposed Greenway Mining Group, a Chinese company that is using British Overseas Territories for its continued business in Myanmar with ME1. The UK also sanctioned Light Infantry Division 77 and Light Infantry Division 101, which are directly responsible for perpetrating international crimes. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “New Australian, UK and US sanctions are necessary to block the junta’s access to funds and jet fuel and come after sustained pressure from civil society. However, far more needs to be done to cut the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel. “Sanctions continue to be too slow, lack coordination and are not covering whole networks of companies and individuals, leaving too many openings for the junta and its associates to bypass measures. “The slow pace of Australian sanctions in particular is clearly inadequate. Australia should start imposing regular rounds of sanctions, including against the mining sector, in which Australians continue to have a significant presence. “UK, US, EU, Canada and Australia should extend sanctions to the whole network of entities and key individuals in the junta’s natural resources ministry, join the EU in fully sanctioning MOGE, and join Canada in banning the export, sale, supply and shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar. “The people of Myanmar have struggled against a terrorist junta for three years and successfully blocked it from taking control of Myanmar. The fight continues and should be supported by the international community through targeted sanctions, a global arms embargo and a UN Security Council referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. “The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-02
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Description: "A Message from Timothy Moore, Acting Executive Director, The Border Consortium On this solemn day, marking the third anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar on 1st February 2021, we at The Border Consortium (TBC) pause to reflect on the profound and ongoing impacts of the crimes against humanity committed by Myanmar’s armed forces. As we look back over these three years, it is with a heavy heart that we acknowledge the continued and escalating violence perpetrated by the Myanmar armed forces against civilians and their homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship. Such actions not only violate fundamental human rights but also hinder the path to peace and stability in the region. TBC remains steadfast in its condemnation of these atrocities. Our mission is rooted in the principles of justice, human dignity, and the right of all individuals to live free from fear and persecution. We recognise that the path to healing and rebuilding for the people of Myanmar is a long and arduous one. However, we remain committed to standing in solidarity with the conflict-affected communities in Myanmar and Thailand. Our efforts, aimed at providing humanitarian assistance and advocating for the rights and needs of these communities, are more crucial than ever. We continue to work tirelessly together towards a just and sustainable solution for the nation of Myanmar, a solution that respects the rights of all its people. On this day of remembrance, we reaffirm our unwavering commitment to supporting the people of Myanmar. We urge the international community to join us amplifying the voices of conflict-affected Myanmar people, and working towards a future where every individual can live in dignity, security, and prosperity. Together, we can make a difference. Together, we can help build a future that is just and peaceful for Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: The Border Consortium (Thailand)
2024-02-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-01
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Description: "1 February 2024: The international community must formally recognise Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and establish a special tribunal to prosecute the military for the commission of international crimes, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). SAC-M hosted an online panel discussion “Emerging Realities in Myanmar: What Can the International Community Do?” to mark the third anniversary of the start of the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which sparked the Spring Revolution. His Excellency Duwa Lashi La, Acting President of the NUG, opened the event by addressing the historic successes of recent revolutionary offensives against the military junta. “The Spring Revolution’s military triumphs have shattered a decades-old myth: that the Myanmar people can never topple the military,” said H.E. Duwa Lashi La. “This has now been replaced by the evident truth that the criminal military will never crush the will of our people.” The junta has responded to its mounting territorial losses with intensified aerial bombardment and indiscriminate shelling of towns and villages under resistance control and in contested areas. “The junta’s collapse is inevitable. The real question is when, not if, and how much devastation will occur before the end,” said Marzuki Darusman, SAC-M founding member. The humanitarian impact of the junta’s persistent attacks is enormous and growing at an increasing rate, yet international assistance is limited. “Every aspect of people’s basic needs – food, shelter, health care – is an emergency need right now,” said Esther Ze Naw Bamvo, a leading Kachin social justice advocate. “Almost all of the citizens from cities in conflict areas have moved to [Ethnic Revolutionary Organisation]-controlled areas. If the international community wants to provide direct support to the Myanmar people, they should find ways to contact and work with local [civil society organisations] and those organizations who are working in these areas.” Action must be taken to apply pressure on the junta to cut its capacity to commit atrocities and other human rights violations, said SAC-M. Ending the military’s impunity was highlighted in particular. “I believe that establishing a special criminal tribunal for Myanmar is the path forward that we all need to pursue,” said appeals prosecutor Martin Witteveen. “Accountability and criminal law will not solve every problem, but without a credible accountability, the problem will certainly not be solved.” At the same time, action must be taken to support the democratic movement and facilitate the realisation of the Myanmar peoples’ clearly expressed democratic will and aspirations. SAC-M founding member Yanghee Lee called on the international community to recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar: “The NUG are not a shadow government and they are not a government in exile. The NUG is the de facto government and the legitimate government.” Marzuki Darusman echoed this call: “It is clear that it is time for the international community to get off the fence and fully back the people and their representatives in the form of the NUG and the [National Unity Consultative Council]. This is the way forward to peace, stability, and democracy—no less than what Myanmar deserves.” H.E. Duwa Lahsi La, in his closing remarks, urged the international community to join the Myanmar people as they stand firm in their resolve to deliver a truly federal Myanmar that is united, free and fair. “There is still time for the international community – ASEAN, the UN, our neighbours and other nations – to stand with us on the right side of history.”
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
2024-02-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-01
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Description: "In the early morning of February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military sent armored vehicles through the capital, Naypyidaw, arresting the country’s elected civilian leaders. Three years on, the junta’s relentless efforts to consolidate power have caused a spiraling human rights and humanitarian catastrophe. Junta security forces have killed over 4,000 people, arrested over 25,000, and deliberately blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions of people amid countrywide economic and infrastructure collapse. The number of people needing assistance has grown from 1 million before the coup to 18.6 million in 2024, including 6 million children. The military’s widespread and systematic abuses amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, fueled by decades of impunity and meager international efforts to stop the violations. While atrocities spiral and slivers of refuge disappear, the United Nations Security Council remains at a standstill. In December 2022, the Security Council passed its first resolution on Myanmar since the country’s independence in 1948, denouncing the military’s post-coup abuses. But the final text was troublingly watered down, with the calls for sanctions and arms embargoes in an initial United Kingdom-led draft removed to stave off threatened vetoes from China and Russia. The UK, the Security Council’s designated penholder for resolutions on Myanmar, has for years taken a hyper-cautious approach to the country, a strategy that failed to promote any chance of accountability in the wake of the military’s 2017 crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the ethnic Rohingya. When the resolution passed—with 12 members in favor and abstentions from China, Russia, and India—the UK and others presented the compromised text as a first step, opening the door to heightened scrutiny of the atrocities taking place on the ground. “We stand ready to take further action,” the UK ambassador said. “We expect this resolution to be implemented in full.” One year on, that further action has not materialized. Without any leverage or enforcement mechanism in the resolution, the junta has disregarded the document’s calls, such as for the release of prisoners and full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access. Instead, since the resolution was passed, security forces have arrested more than 2,200 people, killed over 1,700, and bombed schools, hospitals, and displacement camps. The junta has ramped up its deadly blockages of humanitarian aid as a method of collective punishment against the civilian population. After Cyclone Mocha made landfall in May, junta authorities refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance for millions of people in need. The UN estimates that 10,000 children under 5 died in 2023 due to the lack of treatment for malnutrition. Since late October, fighting between junta forces and alliances of ethnic and anti-junta armed groups has erupted across much of the country. Over 660,000 people have been forced to flee their homes in the months since, pushing the total number of internally displaced to 2.6 million. “We’re living in constant fear of attacks, arrests, and harassment by the military,” said a villager in Rakhine State, where fighting broke out in mid-November, ending a year-long unofficial ceasefire. “Most of the men from Rakhine villages have gone into hiding to avoid arrest. The fighting left so many of our houses destroyed to the ground. All communication from other townships has been shut down.” The latest spike in fighting has triggered further restrictions, with the military blocking urgently needed access to major roads, telecommunications services, and waterways. “All the nongovernmental organization work has been suspended and the roads and communication to the north and south have been blocked since the attacks on November 13,” an aid worker in Rakhine State told Human Rights Watch. “There are new checkpoints set up by the Border Guard Police at the town entry points. We’re already facing a food crisis because we can’t get essential goods and food from the blocked villages. The costs of everything have gone so high.” The authorities have prevented the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from operating its 25 mobile clinics in Rakhine State. “The continuation of these current blockages will have a catastrophic impact on people’s health,” MSF said. These restrictions sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, designed to exert control over an area by isolating and terrorizing civilians. They also violate Myanmar’s international obligations on the rights to life, health, and shelter. The junta’s abuses are having an increasing impact beyond Myanmar’s borders as well, spilling over into China, India, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the 2022 Security Council resolution has not become the hoped-for on-ramp to stronger action, but the feeble peak of council activity on a country in harrowing crisis. The coup anniversary and the junta’s unrelenting repression should mobilize the UK to lead Security Council members into taking concrete steps. Members should pass a binding resolution instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on the junta’s leadership and military-owned companies. And if Russia and China block a resolution, then individual governments should use their own national sanctions capabilities to work toward a de-facto global arms embargo—in line with the UN General Assembly’s call for states to halt arms transfers to Myanmar back in 2021. The Security Council should hold regular public meetings to be briefed on junta atrocities and people’s efforts to assert their rights. Governments should take more concerted measures to pressure the junta and support Myanmar civil society. The voices of the Myanmar people should be guiding international efforts, their resolute struggle for democracy and freedom a clarion call that global actors need likewise to persevere. There is no other way forward..."
Source/publisher: The Diplomat (Tokyo) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "THREE YEARS OF POST-COUP ATROCITIES IN MYANMAR Tomorrow, 1 February, marks three years since the military in Myanmar (Burma) overthrew the civilian-led government. Since then, the people of Myanmar have endured war crimes and crimes against humanity as the military has imposed crackdowns on anti-coup protests and perpetrated an increasingly violent campaign in anti-junta strongholds across the country. The military has perpetrated mass detentions, indiscriminate bombardments and arson campaigns, targeted attacks on schools and religious buildings, rape and the weaponization of vital humanitarian aid. Since the coup, at least 4,400 people have been killed, including 1,600 in 2023 alone, and 2.6 million displaced while nearly 20,000 people remain detained. In October a group of ethnic revolutionary organizations – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance – launched Operation 1027, targeting the junta’s outposts and strongholds across the country. Operation 1027 – the most significant challenge to the junta since the coup – has galvanized other armed groups to launch attacks, with fighting now engulfing two thirds of the country. Fighting has particularly intensified in Rakhine State, where clashes on 26 January between the Arakan Army and the military in Hpon Nyo Leik village killed at least 12 Rohingya civilians. The military repeatedly shelled the village, destroying infrastructure. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Arakan Army allegedly positioned its troops in and around this Rohingya village in anticipation of the military’s attacks. Since October, at least 554 people have been killed and 800,000 newly displaced. On 30 January the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned, “As the military have suffered setback after setback on the battlefield, they have lashed out, launching waves of indiscriminate aerial bombardments and artillery strikes… Military tactics have consistently focused on the punishment of civilians who they view as supporting their enemies. As a result, the military has routinely targeted civilians and protected objects under international humanitarian law, especially medical facilities and schools.” Targeted attacks on civilians and civilian objects, the use of human shields and the indiscriminate bombardments of civilian-populated areas violate international humanitarian and human rights law and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Three years into the crisis, both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the UN Security Council are paralyzed by divisions and have made little progress on a coordinated response as civilians continue to endure atrocities. The Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Savita Pawnday, said, “In the three years since the military coup, populations across Myanmar have suffered from atrocities and daily abuses at the hands of the military who have been emboldened by impunity. The international community must collectively cut off the junta’s access to the jet fuel, funds and the legitimacy it needs to continue committing atrocities against civilians.”..."
Source/publisher: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled In February of 2021, the Myanmar military launched its illegal attempt to seize power. In the three years since, the junta has failed to gain control of the country because of the courageous resistance of Myanmar people. The Myanmar military has a decades-long record of mass killings, torture, sexual violence and other gross human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities in particular. Since the attempted coup three years ago, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, and caused an economic and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The military's unprecedented violence and inhuman acts have been enabled by a network of domestic and international companies, illicit trade in natural resources and drugs, and ASEAN’s provision of diplomatic, military, technical, financial and intelligence. How has the resistance movement come this far? Spring Revolution: On the ground in Myanmar, ordinary people rose up across ethnic, religious, generational and class lines. They organised strikes against the illegitimate junta, boycotted military businesses and took up arms alongside ethnic armies to defend democracy. The Myanmar military has lost thousands of troops through defection and many others have surrendered. They continue to lose ground on all fronts to an alliance of ethnic armies and Spring Revolution resistance and defence forces. Humanitarian Aid: People-to-people community-based emergency humanitarian aid have supported and saved lives of the most vulnerable population displaced by the Myanmar military's campaign of terror. They continue to resist the military junta as frontline humanitarians. Sanctions: Courageous people throughout Myanmar, the diaspora and civil society organisations around the world acting in solidarity urged governments to act. Coordinated targeted sanctions are hitting the military’s global arms and financial network. Boycotts: Mass boycotts against military products have hit the generals’ hip pockets and irreparably hurt their corrupt network of businesses. Products like Myanmar Beer, Red Ruby cigarettes and Mytel sim cards have been removed from shops and publicly destroyed. Divestment: Under pressure, companies have cut ties with the military and its businesses, and shareholders have divested from companies that continued business as usual with the junta. Multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military. Together we can dismantle the military cartel. In 2023, Justice for Myanmar published a report identifying 22 foreign governments, 26 intergovernmental organisations (including 14 UN entities), 8 foreign financial institutions, and 8 other international organisations that have provided the junta with political and financial support. The report also recognises “an increasing number of governments and organisations that have taken steps to prevent or rectify their support for the military junta”. While rounds of sanctions have been imposed by the US, UK, Canada, EU and Australia on senior junta individuals and some of the junta’s business interests, ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar military junta has been one of enablement and complicity. ASEAN has allowed the junta to participate in and even lead regional initiatives for military cooperation and training. Notably, Singapore remains the third biggest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military since its coup attempt, in a trade valued at $254 million from at least 138 Singaporean companies, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “For three years the people of Myanmar have successfully blocked the illegal military junta from taking control of their communities, country and future. “The people of Myanmar have refused to accept or legitimise the junta. “Myanmar’s federal democracy forces are rapidly expanding territorial, governance and administrative control and thousands of soldiers have defected or surrendered from the military itself. “Targeted sanctions have hit the military cartel’s global network and multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the illegal junta. “It’s a three-year long losing streak caused by pressure from all sides. “The international community needs to unite around the use sanctions and step up to finally cut off the flow of revenue and arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel to the junta to protect civilian lives. “They must listen to the Myanmar people resisting the military and act in solidarity now.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "Poor decision-making and an inflexible strategy are compounding the junta’s losses and driving discontent among army commanders. On 5 January, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) accepted the conditional surrender of the Laukkaing Regional Operations Command, giving it control of Laukkaing city, the prime objective of the joint anti-junta Operation 1027. One hundred kilometres to the west, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has expelled junta forces from large towns and strategic roadways and gained near-total control of its primary area of operation. On the other side of the country, in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army’s (AA) campaign has accelerated in recent weeks, resulting in the rapid retreat of junta forces. And yet the impact of Operation 1027 is not confined to the battlefield, with the junta’s failure to stem its losses stirring deep dissatisfaction among its ranks according to sources close to the army and regime. After spending three years on the sidelines, the Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the MNDAA, TNLA and AA, entered the post-coup war by launching Operation 1027 along the border with China in late October 2023. The blitz has expelled the regime from swathes of territory in the country’s north and inspired fresh attacks by opposition forces elsewhere. This month’s conflict update explores recent battlefield developments and analyses what went wrong for the regime’s forces in northern Shan State, where a new ceasefire came into effect on 11 January.....Following two rounds of talks brokered by Beijing, junta forces ceded control of Laukkaing city to the MNDAA on 5 January. About 2,400 personnel, including six brigadier generals, were granted safe passage as a part of a negotiated withdrawal.....Junta soldiers managed to disable or destroy some of their larger weapon systems before leaving, but were required to surrender their small arms.....The Myanmar armed forces expelled the MNDAA from Laukkaing in 2009, so the city’s capture marks the end of a nearly 15-year campaign to ‘return home’. The MNDAA is now effectively in control of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ). In December 2023, Chinese officials began pressuring the Brotherhood Alliance to de-escalate and negotiate with the junta. The MNDAA mostly complied, having already won itself a favourable bargaining position. The TNLA’s progress had been more limited. The group responded to Chinese pressure by instead accelerating assaults on junta bases and towns. The MNDAA assisted its partner by sending units to fight in TNLA uniforms.....The TNLA is now effectively in control of the Palaung SAZ, the heartland of the Ta’ang people. It also secured a land bridge to the Myanmar–China border by capturing Namhkam Town on 18 December. The TNLA has made inroads outside the SAZ as well. Ta’ang fighters captured Namtu Town on 28 December, and occupied the town of Kutkai after the junta withdrew on 7 January.....TNLA fighters also captured Monglon and a small base outside Mongmit Town. The bases lie near or along a key weapons-smuggling route that links Shan to both Kachin and Myanmar’s interior.....Though the junta retains an isolated presence at Muse, the country’s largest border gate, it has lost control of the two most important roads linking Myanmar to China. Many of the units forced out by the Brotherhood Alliance have regrouped in Lashio......After a slow start, the AA’s offensive in Rakhine and southern Chin states began to accelerate in late December.....The AA has overrun more than 20 outposts across Paletwa Township, Chin State. On 15 January, AA fighters captured Paletwa Town.....Though some regime outposts remain, the AA is now the dominant force in Paletwa. Control here opens access to the Indian and Bangladeshi borders, and an alternative supply route via Matupi, Chin State.....The fighting between the AA and the regime has implications for regional development. A key segment of India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a US$500-million effort to link Kolkata with Mizoram, runs through Paletwa.....On 7 and 8 January, the AA fired rockets at the Dhanyawadi naval base on Ramree island, just ten kms from the terminus of the Sino-Myanmar pipeline. China plans to build a Special Economic Zone and deep-sea port on the island.....Elsewhere in the country, opposition forces continue to experience advances and setbacks.....Inspired by Operation 1027, a coalition of Karenni resistance groups began a large-scale assault on Loikaw, the Kayah State capital, on 11 November. Despite the initial capture of about half the city, the offensive has stalled.....But the operation forced the regime to pull its forces from other positions around the state, allowing the Karenni resistance to consolidate control across remote areas and several small towns.....In the southeast, an opposition coalition involving elements of the Karen National Union (KNU) and People’s Defense Forces (PDF) tied to the National Unity Government (NUG) has not recreated the territorial successes seen elsewhere.....An early December assault on the town of Kawkareik failed, but the fighting over the past month has disrupted Asian Highway 1, the main trade route between Thailand and Myanmar.....In early November, coalition forces captured the police station and bridge at Chaung Hna Khwa, on the border of Mon and Kayin states. Regime forces retook the village on 29 December, though the bridge is now destroyed.....On 4 January, a joint KNU and PDF unit destroyed a small bridge along the road somewhere between the towns of Kyauktaga and Phyu. That same day, opposition fighters reportedly downed powerlines near the village of Zee Kone.....In early November, PDF fighters linked to the NUG took part in the capture of Kawlin and Khampat, the first towns to fall in Sagaing Region. The NUG now claims to administer both.....To deny the NUG’s ability to govern, the junta has adopted a strategy of attacking civilians in the towns, probably with the aim of making the areas uninhabitable.....On 28 December, junta soldiers stationed in Wuntho Town fired shells at Kawlin, which lies just 12 km to the south. Four civilians, including two children, were reportedly killed. Six more civilians were killed by a second artillery attack days later.....On 7 January, a regime airstrike on the edge of Khampat reportedly killed 17 civilians, including nine children. Twenty more civilians were wounded.....Junta missteps compound losses As early as the second week of Operation 1027, Chinese officials acting as mediators suggested to the junta that it allow the MNDAA and TNLA to administer their own areas. The junta refused to concede territories it had not yet lost, like Laukkaing, and opted to fight it out instead. But the army ultimately failed to launch a counter-offensive or utilise available resources to defend its remaining positions. Though some battalions pivoted to mobile defense, many were left to guard exposed or isolated hilltop positions and so they were overrun, partially destroyed, or forced to surrender. Sources indicated that Naypyidaw’s inflexible strategy and the avoidable losses that followed have harmed morale among ground commanders. The army’s withdrawal from Laukkaing on 5 January forfeited its greatest bargaining chip, yet it is unclear what, if anything, the junta received in exchange. According to various reports, the second round of talks held between 22 and 24 December had not produced a concrete agreement on the fate of Laukkaing. Surprisingly, the withdrawal took place before all sides convened in Kunming, China for a third round of talks on 10 and 11 January. This suggests that the city’s commanding officers may have prematurely withdrawn, leaving the junta with little to no leverage over its opponents. Media reported that the six brigadier generals were detained upon arriving in Lashio after the withdrawal. A source confirmed that at least five of them are facing court martial. The ceasefire deal struck on 11 January appeared to freeze the conflict along the new lines of demarcation that the Brotherhood won by force, so the regime’s acceptance is indicative of a decisive defeat, rather than a compromise. Moreover, the junta can no longer access the border area in Shan State, raising the prospect of a long-term inability to tax a significant portion of the country’s trade with China. Its losses now include large towns like Hseni and Kutkai, which were not necessarily primary objectives for the Brotherhood Alliance. By refusing to bargain, the junta has lost more territory, depleted its fighting strength, allowed the capture of large arms and munitions stockpiles, and precipitated a crisis of confidence among its officer corps. Several sources close to the regime and army have indicated widespread dissatisfaction with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and even consideration of a leadership change among at least some internal elements. While the territorial losses inflicted by Operation 1027 do not pose an existential threat to the regime, the embarrassment of the defeat and its impact on morale could potentially generate some internal instability. Yet any effort to sideline Min Aung Hlaing will be difficult. Since the coup, the junta leader has carefully consolidated his power by removing potential rivals from important positions (the regime announced a reshuffle of several senior officials immediately after the fall of Laukkaing). Although Min Aung Hlaing has lost respect, unseating him would also equate to challenging the long-standing norms of the Tatmadaw, which most senior officers still view as sacrosanct. Moreover, it would be hard for any reform-minded faction to initiate a negotiated transition, given how deeply the regime is reviled both at home and abroad..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
2024-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-19
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Jan 8 to 14, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Rakhine State, Chin State, Shan State, and Kachin State from January 8th to 14th. Military people arrested, beat, and extorted the civilians who did not have NRC cards or Smart cards in Ayeyarwady Region. Military Junta killed 8 civilians from Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region. About 20 civilians died and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 2 underaged children were injured and 2 died when the Military Junta committed abuses. Civilians left their places 8 times because of the Military Junta Troop’s matching and riding..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-01-17
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The persistent conflicts plaguing Myanmar since its independence in 1948 remain unresolved as it fails to address the root cause of the issue. The result has been an enduring struggle for ethnic rights, leading to the world’s longest-running civil war. Despite the constitution’s proclamation in September 1947, genuine union and equality as promised have not been realized. Ethnic nationalities, notably the Shan and others, have not experienced the equality envisaged in the constitution. The military regime’s exclusion and marginalization of non-Bamar ethnicities, coupled with a policy of Burmanization, have suppressed the cultural, linguistic, historical, and ethnic expressions of other nationalities. The military government’s inability to meet ethnic nationalities’ demands has prompted uprisings by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) seeking increased autonomy or independence. Even officially recognized ethnic nationalities face challenges in enjoying full civil and cultural rights. For example, many Shan Saophas and politicians attempted to establish a federal system in 1958-1961, however they were met with repression. This led many to take up arms against the military regime. The military regime’s unitary system has been marred by inequalities and imbalances, perpetuated through a perceived correlation between population size, political legitimacy, and entitlements. It divides the 135 ethnic groups and restricts legislative representation to those with suitable population sizes. In addition, the 2008 Constitution, one of the world’s lengthiest, further entrenched these disparities. These divisive tactics aimed to prolong its dictatorship. It only gives self-administered areas for some groups such as the Danu, Kokang, Naga, Palaung, Pa-O, and Wa. Consequently, the ongoing conflict in Myanmar is not merely a problem among ethnic minorities but stems from the country’s governance structure. The absence of a federal system, where every nationality enjoys equal rights, exacerbates the situation. To achieve peace and unity in Myanmar, a shift in the system, rather than a mere regime change, is imperative. All nationalities within the country must collaboratively build and reform a system that paves the way for a genuine federal and democratic union..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Shan Herald Agency for News" (Chiang Mai)
2024-01-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Thailand would need to implement essential refugee policies that align with international standards to deal with the ongoing humanitarian crisis
Description: "Thailand lies at a critical intersection in Southeast Asia, where the vibrant tapestry of cultures meets the complex weave of geopolitics. As the nation grapples with the escalating number of Myanmar refugees, it's not merely facing a geopolitical conundrum but a humanitarian crisis which demands global attention. Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin is actively advocating for Thailand to play a central role in engaging with the Myanmar military regime to address the two-year civil war. While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection. This exodus, in turn, necessitates the provision of essential services to address their needs. While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection. PM Srettha's recent statement indicates a shift in Thailand's approach from the previous government's stance, which largely supported the Junta, to a more humanitarian-focused role. However, the current government's engagement remains limited to the Junta, highlighting the need for broader connections with other groups. Roots of displacement The Kayin State, formerly the Karen State, has witnessed a history of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Junta, particularly against the Karen ethnic minority seeking greater autonomy. Well-documented instances of systematic violence, including rape, torture, and forced labour, explicitly targeting Karenni women and girls, showcase the severity of the situation. The military's use of both women and men as human shields violates international humanitarian law. The coup has exacerbated the crisis and made these people easy targets of violence. There are restrictions on travel and a shortage of essential resources in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar. Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces. Consequently, a growing number of individuals, including men, women, and children, are seeking refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border to escape the worsening conditions. Attending the displaced Bangkok's historical role as a haven for displaced people, mainly from Myanmar, is evident. Since the mid-1980s, the nation has provided shelter to approximately 90,801 displaced people from Myanmar across nine camps. However, following the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, an additional 45,025 displaced people sought refuge. Thailand's humanitarian efforts include providing temporary shelters, a few core relief items, food, and medical assistance. Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces. Despite allowing these new arrivals to stay in temporary shelters near the border, the Thai government has sporadically pushed them back. Notably, these recently displaced populations are not allowed to enter established refugee camps, and Thai officials impose stringent restrictions on their movement. In July 2023, around 9,000 hapless people sought safety in Thailand's Mae Hong Son district due to frequent airstrikes in Karenni State. Initially, Thai authorities permitted them to stay in temporary shelters, however, on 21 October, they were asked to return to Myanmar within two weeks. Consequently, the shelters were vacated as people walked back across the border into Karenni State, a journey taking four to five days. Many resettled in Doh Noh Ku, a settlement for internally displaced people at the Thai-Myanmar border. Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. Subsequently, opposition forces elsewhere in Myanmar launched attacks against the military, prompting retaliatory airstrikes, including in Karenni State. By 27 November, over 2,387 Myanmar individuals had fled again, crossing back into the Mae Hong Son district. The Thai Foreign Minister's announcement on 3 December to construct shelters for displaced people underscores a recognition of the escalating violence and the potential for more people to seek refuge. Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. On 8 December, Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed that Myanmar officials had reached an agreement to establish a task force to enhance humanitarian aid for those displaced within Myanmar due to the ongoing conflict. Despite good intentions, concerns arise about the effective distribution of assistance to all affected regions, considering the track record of the Junta. Predicaments Thailand's response to the crisis is challenging. The delicate balance between engaging with the Myanmar military regime and advocating for humanitarian provisions poses a diplomatic dilemma. The strain on resources and infrastructure due to the growing refugee population is a significant concern. The need for sustained efforts, both domestically and through international collaboration, is crucial to address the humanitarian crisis effectively. Thailand's response is constrained by its non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol. However, in 2018, Thailand voted in favour of the Global Compact on Refugees, and subsequently, the National Screening Mechanism (NSM) was established in 2019. The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee. Despite delays in application due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2023, Thailand's Cabinet approved a regulation outlining the procedure and eligibility criteria for individuals seeking NSM status, which officially came into effect on September 2023. Additionally, the rollout of the NSM will occur incrementally as the Thai government, with technical assistance and advocacy from UNHCR, continues to develop the comprehensive set of procedural standards and policies needed for its implementation. The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee. However, concerns exist regarding the NSM's effectiveness and legal subordination to the Immigration Act. While Clause 15 of the NSM regulation delays the deportation of individuals asserting protected-person status, it fails to shield them from arrest, detention, or prosecution based on their immigration status. Additionally, as the NSM is legally subordinate to the Immigration Act, the predominant experience for refugees seeking protection under the NSM in Thailand would involve initial encounters with arrest, detention, and prosecution. There also remains apprehension that the NSM excludes migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos under its provision from receiving adequate protection in Thailand. Actions required To address the challenges, the Thai government should utilise the power granted by Section 17 of the Immigration Act to exempt NSM applicants from arrest, detention, or prosecution. Explicit provisions for determining protected status under NSM need to be established. Exempting refugees from arrest, detention, and prosecution under the Immigration Act, as emphasised in an open letter by eight organisations on 12 December, will signal Thailand's commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees. Urgent action from Thai authorities is imperative to enhance efforts in granting appropriate status and protection to those fleeing persecution, aligning with international standards. The escalating Myanmar refugee crisis necessitates a comprehensive and swift response from Thai authorities. While challenges persist, Thailand can set an example in the region by implementing essential refugee policies. Addressing humanitarian concerns, engaging in regional cooperation, and enacting necessary policy reforms are imperative for Thailand to effectively manage the evolving crisis and provide sustainable solutions for refugees and displaced persons..."
Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2024-01-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Opinion: “We Won’t Be Satisfied Until the end Of The World”[1] Over the past couple of years, it has not been uncommon to come across headlines such as “Why Has the World Forgotten About Myanmar?”, “U.N. Rapporteur: Myanmar Crisis ‘Has Been Forgotten’”, “Myanmar’s ‘forgotten war’”, and “Myanmar: the Forgotten Revolution”. To be sure, while the uprisings in countries such as Sudan (2019-2022), or the Palestinians’ ongoing resistance to settler-colonial genocide in the Gaza Strip, have received international coverage from major media outlets, it seems that the world has all but forgotten about the ongoing struggle against Myanmar’s military dictatorship, which will enter its third year in 2024. This is particularly striking in light of the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) most recent report on “The top 10 crises the world can’t ignore in 2024,” which listed Myanmar as the country that is currently undergoing the fifth most urgent humanitarian crisis and projects a worsening of the situation for, what IRC classifies as, approximately three million “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPS). According to the language of the report, in terms of the total number of persons in need, the crisis in Myanmar is rivaled by only four other countries: Sudan, the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, South Sudan, and Burkina Faso. And as of December 2023, outside of “Ukraine and Syria, Myanmar recorded the highest number of conflict-related incidents (more than 8,000) for the year.” The 1221 Coup[2] On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s Army (Tatmadaw) staged a successful coup which saw the arrest of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and the installation of the Army as Myanmar’s new governing authority, led by Army Chief, Min Aung Hlaing. In the weeks and months that followed, the country witnessed mass demonstrations against the military junta as well as its brutal repression by the military junta, including the army’s use of live ammunition against protestors. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), “at least 6,337 civilians were reported as killed and 2,614 as wounded for political reasons in Myanmar in the twenty months between the military coup of February 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022.” Meanwhile, the United Nations Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) expressed concerns similar to those of IRC in their December 2023 report, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Myanmar, concluding that more than two years of a military junta has resulted in an all but “grim” humanitarian landscape “with a third of the population” now said “to be in humanitarian need.” According to the report findings, the military junta’s “attempt to suppress opposition and consolidate power” has included the use of “systematic violence against the civilian population resulting in over 4,000 deaths, tens of thousands of arbitrary arrests and other human rights violations, including the use of sexual and gender-based violence.” While the State of Emergency imposed by the military in 2021 remains in place alongside restrictions on the freedom of assembly in 127 townships, Martial Law has now been imposed on 59 out of 330 townships across the country. And to make matters worse, the difficulty in satisfying basic subsistence needs for a growing number of Myanmar’s population has been compounded by “the devastating impacts of Cyclone Mocha in May…placing the people of Myanmar in increasing peril.” In total, “some 18.6 million people are estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2024 — one million more than the same time last year — with the number of displaced people expected to continue steadily rising during the year from the record 2.6 million at the end of 2023.” By 2024, an estimated $994 million will be required to address the needs of more than 19 million people in Myanmar. From 3D Printed Warfare to Operation 1027 A military dictatorship that the world has all but been happy to forget and the worsening effects of compounded political, social, and environmental crises: it is on all of this that the people of Myanmar, displaced in their millions, have nourished themselves and refined their struggle. What began as a popular uprising has transformed into an exodus to the countryside to take up makeshift arms — ranging from bow and arrows to refurbished wooden rifles — against Min Aung Hlaing’s military. Thus unfolded a now three-year-long protracted guerrilla war, wherein resistance fighters have reached the point of being able to 3D print drones capable of carrying explosives in various, nondescript, caves amidst an otherwise ordinary South East Asian landscape. Speaking with a Dutch journalist who spent time with one armed resistance unit, one guerrilla who goes by the name “3D” (a nom de guerre stemming from his overseeing of the manufacture of 3D printed guns and drones) said, “[the military] can’t win on the ground, so they resort to bombing us from above. We can’t defend ourselves. All we can do is hide…Drones are the only thing we have to make them feel even a fraction of the trauma we feel when they bomb us with their fighter jets.” Despite their capability to engage in warfare both on the ground and in the air, analysts have tended to view Myanmar’s armed conflict as a stalemate with no clear end in sight. However, on 27 October, the anti-junta coalition known as ‘The Brotherhood Alliance’ — made up of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Arakan Army (AA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — “launched a coordinated offensive taking control of several military posts and towns near the border with China,” with additional news of the MNDAA having “closed the roads from the trade hub of Lashio to Chinshwehaw and Muse on the China border in advance of a ‘major offensive.’” After a mere two weeks, “anti-junta fighters operating with ‘unprecedented coordination’ have overrun 100 military outposts and the junta stands to lose control of key border crossings that account for some 40% of cross-border trade, and a vital tax revenue source.” According to analysts, “the current offensive poses the biggest threat to the junta’s grip on power since the 2021 coup.” Speaking with DW, Anthony Davis, a Bangkok-based security analyst, said, “the offensive has denied the military regime access to key trade hubs on the Chinese border and the revenue derived from them,” while emphasizing the offensive’s “potential to bring down a regime that is already facing deep economic and political crises.” Earlier this month, China succeeded in brokering “a ceasefire [agreement] in northern Myanmar between the junta and an alliance of rebels.” A few days into the ceasefire, however, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced that “it had taken control of the town of Namhsan in northern Shan state as well as the so-called 105-Mile Trade Zone, a key trading area on Shan state’s border with China.” Despite this shift in China’s regional policy and demonstrated willingness to assume a more active, diplomatic, and despite China’s interest in eliminating forms of illicit and illegal activity along its shared border with Myanmar, one of the main allies of the Brotherhood Alliance, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — the military wing of the de facto ruling party, the United Wa State Party (UWSP) in Wa State, a self-administered division in the north-eastern part of the country — continues to be “entirely equipped with modern weaponry and equipment produced in China”. Hence, Davis noted, given China’s “powerful influence over the UWSA, [it] could undoubtedly affect a major reduction in munitions reaching northern groups if it wanted to.” As things currently stand, China has yet to show any interest in reducing the cross border flow of arms and munitions that make it into the hands of the UWSA. ‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu’ Myanmar’s is a young war relative to those waged by imperial states from the global North, especially when the median age of the country’s population is 29.6 years. And the youthfulness of this armed struggle is something on full display amongst the various guerrilla camps spanning its countryside. Having previously lived as precariously employed workers, delivery drivers, university students, engineers, and the like; never having seen a day of military combat in their lives before the armed resistance against the military junta; Myanmar’s 20-somethings are now seasoned guerrilla fighters initiated into that long tradition of the struggle for liberation using armed resistance. [1] This title is taken from the Burmese-language anthem ‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu,’ which was sung during the 1988 People Power Uprisings (also known as the “8888 Uprising”). On 8 August 1988 (8/8/88), in what was then still known as Burma (present-day Myanmar), a major wave of protests and strikes ushered in a period of national mobilizations. This wave of protests, which has come to be known as the People Power Uprisings, culminated in a harsh crackdown and eventual military coup on 18 September 1988. This 1988 anthem of the People Power Uprisings would be sung once again by demonstrators during the 2021 protests against Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) coup d’etat. [2] In a country known for auspicious dates, just as the People Power Uprisings have come to be known as the “8888 Uprisings”, the military coup of 1 February 2021 (1/2/21) was quickly dubbed the “1221 coup.”..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Zamaneh" (Amsterdam)
2024-01-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "As Operation 1027 shifts the balance of power from the Myanmar military to revolutionary forces, we argue that the on-the-ground sociopolitical realities advocate moving past conventional nation-state models, and even the federalism debates, and demand a political will to adapt to the Mandala order, a governance style indigenous to Southeast Asia for centuries before the colonialism of the West. The future of Myanmar centers on transformative political visions that reject the reestablishment of a “national/federal army” and “central state”. It is fundamental to accept this paradigmatic change because only this will enable all parties involved to embrace and align with the emergence of various governance systems, as the material reality demands. Next, we must insist that these systems are democratic, inclusive, responsive and well-coordinated.....Beyond nation-state and federalism .....Myanmar’s economy has transitioned into a war economy. On the military junta’s side, the domestic economy has collapsed, hit by bank runs, inflation and, in rural areas, the inability to farm due to village burnings, as well as increased military spending amidst reduced public service budgets, as reflected in a recent report by the World Bank. Soaring dollar exchange rates and aviation fuel and gasoline prices, combined with international pressure and sanctions, make their fuel-dependent administration unsustainable. On the revolutionary and ethnic armed organization (EAO) side, Operation 1027 symbolizes a transition from guerrilla tactics to a coordinated alliance-led offensive with significant public support and resource flow. Despite the fact that the Myanmar public has endured unprecedented hardships, there seems to be no desire for the military to succeed, even if it would bring a return to stability. Coupled with the declining morale among the rank-and-file soldiers, as evidenced by unprecedented defections during Operation 1027, the larger picture and economic analysis points to the fact that the military will not be able to continue this fight. Despite the military generals’ lack of interest in pursuing a political exit, the international community is reluctant to decisively support the revolution, preferring to safeguard their own interests—a stance akin to the Burmese saying of “trying to get the snake out without breaking the cane” (မြွေမသေ တုတ်မကျိုး). Having provided little substantive support, now they presumptuously debate Myanmar’s future and what the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs should do, obsessing over a “power vacuum” and “political fragmentation”. This stance stems from the assertions of certain politicians and analysts who warn that the chaos following the military’s collapse might intensify into greater violence and conflict. Such a perception is not only misguided but ironically might cause the very chaos they anticipate. We emphasize that the chaos and violence could only happen for two reasons: externally due to attempts to reimpose central control, rather than the lack of it, and internally because of attempts to create exclusive ethnic-based systems in regions with diverse ethnic populations. In fact, it is mainly the analysts and elites who are wary of what they call “political fragmentation”, not the local populace, who have experience with Mandala-like political arrangements, with two or more than two political authorities trying to govern them, such as those seen in the long-sustaining Wa State. This may sound quixotic to the political elites but it is very practical and realistic for the local populace. The realities on the ground demand a new imagination beyond the conventional nation-state. Now is the opportune moment to offer the people a governance system they are familiar with, rather than enforcing a federal system with extensive decentralization; even setting up a federal system will invariably require a somewhat central authority—a “federal government”. Such models, dependent on a nation-state structure, would necessitate the NUG—or whoever is charged with the task—successfully uniting all EAOs under a singular political leadership and vision, which is next to impossible and a feat that no politicians have achieved over seven decades. The current fixation on establishing a central command stems from persistent assertions by Western analysts, who argue that the lack of unity among opposition forces is the reason why the foreign governments were not providing meaningful assistance to them. If the international policy industry insists the NUG and EAOs must create a central command under a singular political leadership, it is bound to fail spectacularly. While opposition groups share the objective of overthrowing the junta, on-the-ground political realities are almost antagonistic to a single, central command or joint command. A prime example is in Chin State, where, despite military successes, politicians face growing internal divisions, rooted in both geographical and linguistic differences. Similarly, in Shan State, local Shan groups express frustration over being marginalized and have held longstanding grievances against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In central dry regions too, there are reported conflicts among the opposition armed groups and governing bodies. Meanwhile, groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Arakan Army (AA) have also explicitly stated their political vision of achieving a confederation, differing from other factions’ goals. Myanmar’s present landscape makes one recall the historical period following the disintegration of the Bagan Empire in the 13th century, which saw 250 years of political interregnum, characterized by the emergence of multiple regional powers such as the territorially limited local kingdoms of Myinsaing, Pinya, Sagaing, Taungoo, Hanthawaddy, Ava and others, including the notable rise of the Tai people with the establishment of the Lanna kingdom. Currently, various groups exert control over specific territories, necessitating both domestic and international negotiations for effective governance. For instance, Chin communities now administering India-Myanmar border towns and the MNDAA initiating governance in the Kokang region, bordering China, must engage in complex discussions with multiple actors. Similarly, the NUG, now in control of the town of Kawlin, faces the challenge of implementing effective administration. This power structure reflects the dynamics of the Mandala system, characterized by local autonomy and complex alliances, a system from the not-so-distant past and familiar to the local populace. The Mandala system, unlike a modern nation-state, features multiple political power centers (kingdoms back in those days) with diminishing political power as one moves away from the center, characterized by ill-defined, porous boundaries in contrast to the well-demarcated borders of nation-states. Within this Mandala system, these polities existed in a hierarchical order, with lesser tributaries and a possible supreme king or overlord. Allegiances were fluid and overlapping, and yet, as Thongchai Winichakul puts it, “each king had his own court, administrative and financial system, tax collection, army, and judicial system”. Thus, these polities maintain distinct autonomy and independence. The call for a new, responsive Mandala With our call for a new responsive Mandala, the better focus would be on ensuring democratic, inclusive and representative governances, rather than attempting to re-centralize control or establish a federal/national army. This approach involves: 1) acknowledging the emergence of multiple governance arrangements across Myanmar, no matter whether it is called “federal” or “confederal”; 2) prioritizing the establishment of democratic, inclusive and representative governance in captured territories, recognizing that international recognition is secondary to providing effective local governance for residents whose immediate concern is sustenance; and 3) avoiding the expenditure of time and resources on creating a centralized command structure, and instead fostering coordination mechanisms across different polities. Perhaps more importantly, the new political system or systems in Myanmar must transcend narrow ethnic identities, acknowledging the diverse populations across regions, be it Shan Land (ရှမ်းပြည်), Arakan Country(ရခိုင်ပြည်) or Sagaing Nation (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း). An ethnic-based political system in places like Arakan (Rakhine) or Shan will be a recipe for disaster as the current armed conflicts have already witnessed rising inter-ethnic tensions. In the same spirit, the calls to establish a Bamar state overlook the diverse ethnic populations in the central dry regions, not to mention the Chinese, Hindu or Muslim communities who have been persecuted by successive governments. Instead, efforts should focus on establishing democratic and inclusive governance systems that reflect the Mandala-like order today. The specific form of these new polities, whether one-party systems akin to Singapore, constitutional monarchies like Thailand, Sweden or the UK, or even communist systems like China or Vietnam, is secondary to their adherence to these democratic inclusive and responsive principles of governance. This is what the internal actors starting with the NUG should aim for. At the same time, the international community must be prepared to accept this, not push for a single political authority who will represent the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. While the role of armed groups in the current stage of Myanmar’s revolution is undeniable, it’s crucial to remember that the military success of these armed groups stems from unprecedented civilian participation and public support. The revolution must center on the people, not the armed groups, ensuring these groups remain accountable and adhere to democratic principles. While the abolition of all armed forces should be a political aim for the long term, the immediate priority right now is to embrace the emerging Mandala-like political arrangements, avoiding the futile pursuit of a centralized chain of command under a singular political leadership. The focus must now shift to ensuring that these emerging political entities embody democratic, inclusive and responsive governance systems tailored to meet the immediate needs of the people, providing the essential services and support required in the here and now. This approach, grounded in current realities, paves the way for a more stable and prosperous future for the peoples of Myanmar. Htet Min Lwin is a scholar of religion, social movements and revolution, currently writing a PhD at the York Centre for Asian Research at York University, Toronto. Thiha Wint Aung is a political scientist who holds an MA from the Central European University (CEU) and an MPP from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, Japan..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: They say the junta must first ensure their labor rights, while others refuse to fund a coup regime.
Description: "Myanmar nationals working abroad say they won’t pay income tax to their country’s junta as required by a newly passed law unless they are guaranteed protection of their labor rights, while others oppose funding what they see as an illegitimate military regime. Myanmar’s Union Taxation Law of 2023, signed by junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, went into effect on Oct. 1, requiring migrant workers to pay a portion of their income to the regime. The new law ends an exemption that had been in effect since 2012. On Dec. 13, the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok announced a tax rate of 2% on the earnings of migrant workers in Thailand. But workers in Thailand are questioning why they should be forced to make the payments when they are afforded little assistance from the junta in protecting their rights abroad. “We’ve witnessed many migrant workers suffering violations of their labor rights, but they don’t receive any assistance from Myanmar officials,” said Kyaw Zeya, a Myanmar national who works in Thailand. “So we won’t pay taxes without any protections.” Migrant workers in Thailand told RFA Burmese that they are already struggling to make ends meet on low wages and that the new income tax will mean additional burdens. Salaries for migrant workers in factories, workshops, agriculture and livestock, construction, and services is fixed at 7,500 baht (US$220) per month, meaning they will now be required to pay 150 baht (US$5) to the junta from each monthly paycheck. In Japan, the Myanmar Embassy in Tokyo also recently announced a 2% tax on migrant worker incomes. Under this taxation scheme, a Myanmar national in Japan who earned 200,000 yen (US$1,385) or more each month had to pay the junta 4,000 yen (US$30), while those who earned less had to pay 3,000 yen (US$20). Following resistance to the scheme, the requirements were reduced to 3,000 yen and 1,000 yen (US$5), respectively. And while labor rights are generally better protected in Japan, Myanmar nationals working in the country told RFA that they prefer to pay their income taxes to the host nation, where the money won’t be spent on funding a military that kills and arrests those who object to its seizure of power in a Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat. “Those [Myanmar nationals] who need to extend their passport cannot avoid the tax,” said Ye Zaw Htet, who lives and works in Japan. “But I refuse to pay a tax that can be used to harm people in Myanmar.” Migrant workers who have paid the tax receive a certificate, which is needed to renew one’s passport, apply for labor ID cards and request certain official documents. Funding a civil war Analysts RFA spoke with said that the junta wants additional revenue to fund its purchase of aviation fuel, arms and ammunition, even while Myanmar has seen its economy contract and foreign investment vanish amidst a raging civil war. With an estimated 5 million Myanmar nationals working in Thailand, the junta can expect to earn nearly 750 million baht (US$22 million) per month at a rate of 150 baht per worker. From Singapore, where around 300,000 Myanmar nationals work and are required to pay a tax rate of 2%, the junta can expect to earn some 2.4 million Singapore dollars (US$1.8 million) per month. One Myanmar citizen in Singapore who is working as a technician and spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, said they will only pay taxes to a government with a legitimate mandate. “We aren’t talking about a tax payment,” the worker said. “We will pay taxes to both our home and host countries for the development of our country under an elected government. But we aren’t willing to pay the coup regime.” Sein Htay, an economist, said that regardless of how it is generated, government revenue “should be spent for public development programs and services, not for war expenses,” and certainly not to fund a civil war. Attempts by RFA to contact Myanmar’s embassies in Tokyo, Bangkok and Singapore, as well as the junta’s Planning and Finance Ministry, for their response to criticism of the taxation plan went unanswered by the time of publishing. However, Nyunt Win, the permanent secretary of the junta’s Labor Ministry, characterized the tax scheme as a way to pay for “work permits” for Myanmar nationals overseas. “Work permits abroad have no connection to the government in the homeland,” he said. “The tax is needed to pay to the home country.” In addition to the recent taxation plan, the junta has forced migrant workers to hand over 25% of their salaries to the regime when remitting money home through official transfer channels. Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand staged a protest against the monthly 2% taxation plan in front of the United Nations’ office in Bangkok on Dec. 17, which received a message of support from the Ministry of Labor under the country’s shadow National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The number of children killed by junta forces in Myanmar since the February 2021 coup reached 578 on Wednesday, based on statistics compiled by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and additional casualty reports from the past few days. The figure covers those killed who were under the age of 18. Myanmar regime forces’ indiscriminate air strikes, shelling and raids on villages and other civilian targets across the country have killed large numbers of non-combatants including many children since the Min Aung Hlaing-led military seized power from Myanmar’s elected civilian government on Feb. 1, 2021, NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy. He said his ministry recorded at least 576 child deaths from Feb. 1, 2021 to Monday. Since then, Nyan Min Hein, a 3-year-old child from Myauktaung Village in Rakhine State’s Kyauktaw Township was killed by junta shelling on Tuesday and Joseph Malsawmhlua, 9, from Let Pan Chaung Village in Sagaing Region’s Kale Township was killed in another junta artillery strike on Wednesday, taking the total death toll among children to 578. Already this year, junta troops have fired artillery shells indiscriminately at residential areas as well as schools and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in several parts of the country where clashes between regime forces and resistance forces are ongoing, resulting in fresh child casualties. The junta has been using aircraft and artillery to attack resistance forces in their stronghold areas of Karenni (Kayah), Kachin, Karen and Chin states and Sagaing and Magwe regions since the armed resistance movement started, but frequently targets civilian locations in those areas as well. According to the NUG, the junta committed nine mass killings in 2021 causing 147 civilian deaths, followed by 44 cases in 2022 killing 515 civilians. In 2023 the number of mass killings increased dramatically to 86, leaving 1,342 civilians dead. According to a report by the NUG’s Ministry of Human Rights, 172 children were killed last year alone, following 165 the year before. “The regime has targeted civilians as the enemy and this continues to affect children. In 2023 alone it killed 108 boys and 64 girls, including some who were just months old, in their indiscriminate attacks,” U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy. The Myanmar military has committed a number of crimes against humanity, the minister said. A few significant cases are the Pazi Gyi Village attack on April 11, 2023 in Sagaing Region in which 40 children were killed; the Let Yet Kone air strike, which killed 11 children on Sept. 23, 2022; the Mone Lei Khet IDP camp artillery strike in Kachin State, which killed 11 children on Oct. 11, 2023; and the A Nang Pa incident on Oct. 28, 2022, which killed dozens of people, although it is unclear exactly how many children died. All people under the age of 18 are protected and it is the responsibility of all armed groups to shield them from conflict, according to international laws and child rights principles, U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy. “Although we can confirm the total death toll of the children, the number of wounded and those who have been left disabled is beyond our capacity” to record, U Aung Myo Min said. In Karenni, Rakhine and northern Shan states the junta is currently facing its greatest military challenge since seizing power, having lost many bases and outposts to resistance forces including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force and the Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful ethnic armies: the Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Amy and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On behalf of the United States of America, I reaffirm our commitment to the people of Burma as they mark the 76th Anniversary of the country’s independence on January 4. The United States has long supported the people of Burma and their right to chart their own future toward a cohesive union. The military’s campaign of violence since the February 2021 coup has not dimmed the strong commitment of the people of Burma to regain their prosperity and advance the goals of freedom, peace, and justice. We mourn and honor the lives lost in this pursuit. We stand in solidarity with the people of Burma in their resolve to bring democracy, self-determination, stability, and security to their country. The military regime must end its violence, release all those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and recognize the people’s desire to return to the path of progress and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher: U.S. Department of State
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနှံ့အပြားတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှု အခြေအနေများကို လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနက စုဆောင်းကောက်ယူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ ကောက်ယူရာတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုဖြစ်စဥ်များနှင့်ပတ်သက်ပြီး ခိုင်မာသည့် သတင်း မီဒီယာများကို စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာမှု၊ Online Monitoring တို့မှတဆင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှု ဖြစ်ရပ်ပေါင်း (၄၆၅၆)ခု တို့ကို ကောက်ယူရရှိခဲ့ပြီး၊ မြေပြင်အခြေအနေနှင့် ဆန်းစစ်အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုဖြစ်စဥ် စုစုပေါင်း (၆၅၇)ခု ကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်သိမ်းဆည်းထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုဖြစ်ရပ်များထည်းမှ အင်တာဗျူး၊ ဓာတ်ပုံမှတ်တမ်း များအပါအဝင် အချက်အလက်များရရှိပြီး မှန်ကန်ကြောင်းခိုင်မာစွာ အတည်ပြု နိုင်ခဲ့သည့် ဖြစ်စဉ်ပေါင်း (၃၂၂)ခု ရှိခဲ့သည်။ IIMM နှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာသို့ ဖြစ်စဉ် (၁၆၅)ခု ပေးပို့နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူထားရှိသည့် အချက်အလက်များအား အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် ခေါင်းစဉ် (၇) ခုဖြင့် ပိုင်းခြားသတ်မှတ်၍ ပြည်သူသို့ လေးစားစွာ တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး တန်းတူညီမျှမှုရရှိရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးတည်းဟူသော ဦးတည်ချက်များကို ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာလက်ကိုင်ဆွဲထား၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ကျုးလွန်မှုများကိုအပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူနိုင်ရေး အစွမ်းကုန်တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Human Rights
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The National Unity Government expresses profound sadness upon learning about the earthquake that struck the central region of Japan on January 1, 2024, and the potential threat of a subsequent tsunami. We extend our heartfelt condolences for any loss of life and express ongoing concern for all those who may be affected. We want to assure the government of Japan that, during this critical time, the people of Myanmar stand in solidarity with them, and our thoughts are with the entire nation.....ဂျပန်နိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်းတွင် ၁ ဇန်နဝါရီ ၂၀၂၄ ကလှုပ်ခတ်ခဲ့သောငလျင်နှင့် နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ဆူနာမီဖြစ်နိုင်ကြောင်း သတင်းကို ကြားသိရသည့်အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင်တုန်လှုပ်မိပါသည်။ ငလျင်ဘေးဒဏ်သင့် ဂျပန်တိုင်းသူပြည်သားများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်များ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးရမှုအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင်ကြေကွဲဝမ်းနည်းရပါသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူပြည်သားများက ပူဆွေးသောကရောက်နေရသောဂျပန်နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများနှင့်အတူ နွေးထွေးစွာအတူရှိနေပေးပါကြောင်း ဂျပန်အစိုးရအား ထပ်လောင်းပြောကြားရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။.....統一致政府 ミャンマー連邦共和国 2024 年 1 月 2 日 挙国一致政府は、本日日本の中部地方を襲った地震と、それに伴う津波の可能性について、深い悲しみを感じています。 私たちは、命が失われたことに心から哀悼の意を表するとともに、影響を受ける可能性のあるすべての人々に引き続き懸念を表明します。私たちは日本政府に対し、この危機的な時期にミャンマー国民達が思いを共にしていることを保証します。 ミャンマー統一致政府..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2024-01-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: "NUCC and NUG Issue Joint New Year Statement for 2024.....Spring Development Bank to Open First Branch in Kawlin Township.....Ministry of Defence: Resistance Forces Take Over the Military Base in Thabeikkyin Township.....Cabinet: Acting President Urges People to Escalate Perseverance for the Success in 2024.....Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration....Acting President States to Respect for Justice and Human Dignity in His Christmas Greeting Message.....Central Committee for Implementation of Interim Local Administration.....Ministry of Defence: Officers of Myanmar Military Council Desert Naung Gyi Ine Police Station in Ayadaw Township.....Interim Board for Heritage Administration.....National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).....December 2023 Military Affairs Brief Review.....New Year Greetings..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 4.15 MB
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Description: "NUCC and NUG Issue Joint New Year Statement for 2024.....Spring Development Bank to Open First Branch in Kawlin Township.....Ministry of Defence: Resistance Forces Take Over the Military Base in Thabeikkyin Township.....Cabinet: Acting President Urges People to Escalate Perseverance for the Success in 2024.....Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration....Acting President States to Respect for Justice and Human Dignity in His Christmas Greeting Message.....Central Committee for Implementation of Interim Local Administration.....Ministry of Defence: Officers of Myanmar Military Council Desert Naung Gyi Ine Police Station in Ayadaw Township.....Interim Board for Heritage Administration.....National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).....December 2023 Military Affairs Brief Review.....New Year Greetings..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
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Description: "1။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူကို ဗဟိုပြုသည့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်သော ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်ရန် ရည်မှန်းထားသည်နှင့်အညီ လွတ်လပ်၍ တက်ကြွပြီး ဘက်မလိုက်သော နိုင်ငံခြားရေးမူဝါဒကို ချမှတ် လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးလျက်ရှိသည်။ 2။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နှစ်နိုင်ငံအကြား သမိုင်းကြောင်း အရ အလွန်ခိုင်မာ၍ နီးကပ်သည့်ဆက်နွှယ်မှု အစဉ်အလာများရှိသည်သာမက တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသည် ကမ္ဘာ့အင်အားကြီးနိုင်ငံ တစ်နိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်သည့်အားလျော်စွာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် အထူးအရေးပါသည့်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည်ဟု ခံယူသည်။ 3။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နယ်နိမိတ်အားဖြင့် ကီလိုမီတာ နှစ်ထောင်ကျော် ထိစပ်လျက်ရှိပြီး၊ ကမ္ဘာတည်သရွေ့ အတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်သွားရမည့် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား စစ်မှန်သည့် “ဆွေမျိုး-ပေါက်ဖော်” ဆက်ဆံရေးတည်ဆောက်သွားမည်။ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံအတွက် အိမ်နီးချင်းကောင်း ဖြစ်ရေး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံက အမြဲ ကြိုးပမ်း၊ ရပ်တည်မည်။ 4။ တရုတ် တစ်နိုင်ငံတည်း မူဝါဒကို ဆက်လက်ထောက်ခံကျင့်သုံးမည်။ 5။ တရုတ်နှင့်မြန်မာ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား ပြည်သူနှင့်ပြည်သူ ဆက်ဆံရေးကို အလေးထားလျက် အပြန်အလှန် ချစ်ကြည်မှု၊ ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစွမ်းကုန် မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။ 6။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား လူမှုစီးပွားအရ အကျိုးတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစဉ်သဖြင့် ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။ 7။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံပြည်သူများ၏အကျိုးစီးပွားဖြစ်ထွန်းရေးကိုမျှော်ရည်လျှက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်းရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ စီးပွားရေးအရ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများနှင့် အခြားလူမှုစီးပွားလုပ်ငန်းများ၏ လုံခြုံရေး ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်မည်။ 8။ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများ၏ နိုင်ငံတော်လုံခြုံရေးကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်နေသည့် မည်သည့် အဖွဲ့ အစည်းကိုမျှ မြန်မာ့ပိုင်နက်အတွင်း အခြေချခွင့်မပြု။ 9။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုမတိုင်ခင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်နိမိတ်သတ်မှတ်မှုစာချုပ်များ အပါအဝင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား သဘောတူချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သည့် စာချုပ်များအားလုံးကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ တာဝန်ယူ ဆက်ခံမည်။ 10။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်စပ်တည်ငြိမ်ရေး နှင့် လုံခြုံရေးသာမက ဒေသတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်ရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကိုပါ ထိခိုက်စေသည့် ကျားဖြန့် အွန်လိုင်း လိမ်လည်မှုနှင့် လောင်းကစားလုပ်ငန်း၊ လူကုန်ကူးမှုလုပ်ငန်း၊ မူးယစ်ဆေးဝါးလုပ်ငန်းများအပါအဝင် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် ရာဇဝတ် မှုခင်းများကို တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ တိုက်ဖျက်သွားမည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: How HRW Documents Wartime Abuses, Advocates to Protect Civilians, and Promotes Justice
Description: "Armed conflict dominates the headlines, from the hostilities in Israel and Palestine, to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to the militaries and militias committing atrocities in Sudan. For nearly four decades, Human Rights Watch (HRW) researchers have investigated international armed conflicts and civil wars, reporting on violations of human rights and the laws of war, and working to protect civilians caught in the crossfire. But what exactly does this look like? We sat down with Human Rights Watch’s Executive Director Tirana Hassan to discuss how the organization – which has been defending human rights since 1978 – operates in times of armed conflict and how teams of people specializing in research, communications, and advocacy work together to compel world leaders to protect civilians and push for justice. What does Human Rights Watch do when conflict erupts? We seek to keep civilians safe during fighting by pressing warring parties to respect international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, which are the rules that guide and limit warfare. Human Rights Watch’s job is not to say whether war should be waged or not, but to make sure the conduct of warring parties respects the law. It’s clear what humanitarian organizations do during conflict – they work to get civilians food, water, and shelter, and help those at risk to be protected. What is our role? We have worked in armed conflicts for decades, from the civil wars in the Americas in the early 1980s to the current hostilities in Israel and Palestine today. We have warned the international community of potential armed conflicts and the risks that violations of the laws of war pose for civilians. Our researchers document the conduct of the parties to the conflict and any laws they have violated during the fighting. We analyze this evidence and bring it to the warring parties, using our findings to lean on them – or convince governments around the world to lean on them – to change their conduct and protect civilians caught in the middle, as is their legal duty. We also campaign for justice and accountability before national courts and global courts, like the International Criminal Court, when violations amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. Your answer leads me to another question – can Human Rights Watch’s work prevent conflict before it starts? Our work can help prevent armed conflict by shining a spotlight on the human rights abuses that are the root cause of so much fighting in the world. When security forces abuse the populations they are meant to protect, when governments repress ethnic, national, or religious groups, when free media or the internet is shut down and when journalists are killed, allowing disinformation to flourish, when weapons flow into places that lack governance. Our research on violations like these, and our advocacy to get governments to change course and respect rights, can help stem tensions that often lead to armed conflict. What type of laws-of-war violations do we look at? The laws of war that we use today to protect civilians – also known as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its additional protocols – were created in response to the atrocities and inhumanity of World War II. These laws have been adopted by all countries and govern how a war is fought to limit civilian suffering as much as possible. Warring parties – including national armed forces and non-state armed groups – don’t have carte blanche to do anything they want. They must respect international humanitarian law as well as international human rights law, which remains in effect. International humanitarian law says that the warring parties are required to distinguish between civilians and combatants when carrying out attacks. Detainees are also protected from mistreatment and torture. The laws make sure civilians have access to food, water, and somewhere safe to live. International humanitarian law also protects essential civilian institutions and services, including hospitals, medical staff, markets, schools, and aid workers delivering life-saving assistance. Taking hostages is a violation, as is recruiting children to fight. Places of worship, such as mosques and churches, and key cultural and historical sites are also protected. For example, when Taliban forces detained and then summarily executed some members of the former Afghan government’s security forces, that was a serious violation of the laws of war. We have people with different research specialties across Human Rights Watch. When conflict hits, who does what? We deploy multidisciplinary teams because conflict affects people in different ways. We have teams of country experts who have been working in and on these situations for a very long time. So, for example, when covering the conflict in Sudan, our Sudan researcher helped gather evidence on the ground and led our efforts to push governments to do more to stop abuses and protect civilians. For the conflict in Ukraine, our researchers specializing both in Ukraine and Russia are essential. The overwhelming majority of abuses are by Russian forces in Ukraine, but some also take place in Russia. Human Rights Watch also has a Crisis and Conflict division, with researchers who are trained for and have experience working in conflict zones and crisis situations. This year they documented abuses in Sudan, Ukraine, Haiti, and Israel/Palestine. Armed conflicts also affect different groups of people differently. In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, we documented how Ethiopian and Eritrean military forces, as well as local militias, used sexual violence, including rape, mainly against women and girls. Our Disability Rights Division documented that civilians with disabilities and older people in Gaza were unable to flee the Israeli government’s bombing and faced difficulties accessing necessities and aid under Israel’s blockade. Our health and human rights experts can speak to the health effects of sieges and blockades, which are violations of international law if they are used to deny civilians food and water. Children, we know, are disproportionately affected by conflict, and our colleagues specializing in children’s rights have documented how schools have often been used by warring parties as bases or weapons depots. Our work has led to soldiers vacating schools in Thailand, Somalia, Yemen, the Central African Republic, India, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Increasingly in conflict, our researchers can’t get close to where the abuses are happening because it’s unsafe or they are blocked from entering the country. Thanks to our Digital Investigations Lab, we can use technology to corroborate and strengthen our on-the-ground research and eyewitness testimony we’ve been told over the phone or a messaging app. These researchers scrape the internet for open-source evidence from photos and videos that people post on social media. They also conduct digital analyses to confirm that what they find is true, and they triangulate photos or videos depicting abuses with satellite imagery and geospatial analysis to confirm their accuracy. We used satellite imagery in Myanmar in 2017 to help show the torching of 700 buildings in an ethnic Rohingya village in Rakhine State. The images show large burn scars and destroyed tree cover consistent with widespread destruction, corroborating accounts from refugees who described killing and arson by Burmese military, police and ethnic Rakhine mobs. Our Arms Division specializes in all-source weapons analysis and treaty compliance monitoring. Among other activities, they conduct field investigations, book-research, and collaborate with technical sources and research teams to identify the specific type of weapons used by analyzing any remnants, impact craters, and other information that munitions leave behind after they are used. The division also monitors and documents when controversial weapons are used, including incendiary weapons like white phosphorous, which leave people with severe thermal burns. We report on new use of cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines, which are banned internationally because they are inherently indiscriminate against the civilian population. In addition, the division advocates for stronger international law to better protect civilians from problematic means or methods of warfare in future armed conflicts. And our advocates campaign to stop weapons transfers to armed forces or groups that are likely to use them in violation of the laws of war. What types of research have we done recently? We have been documenting unlawful attacks by Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza and Israel. Israeli forces have apparently unlawfully struck hospitals and medical facilities in Gaza and put civilians at risk by using white phosphorus in populated areas. They have also used explosive weapons in densely populated areas on a massive scale. These strikes have caused large-scale destruction and loss of civilian life. In Lebanon, Israeli forces have killed a number of civilians in unlawful attacks amounting to apparent war crimes. We have also documented that Palestinian armed groups have deliberately killed civilians, taken hostages, and launched rockets indiscriminately into Israel’s civilian areas, which are war crimes. The Israeli government has also cut off basic services, like electricity and water, to the civilian population in Gaza as collective punishment, blocked all but a trickle of aid and food, and used starvation as a weapon of war. These acts amount to war crimes. We use our research to push for justice. Human Rights Watch was the first human rights organization to publish in-depth research on the issue of forced transfers and deportations of Ukrainians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and his children’s rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, for alleged war crimes involving the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia. How do we get our research in front of key people? Part of our strategy is through the media and strategic communications. We share our unique research with journalists, who cover our work in the news. We leverage new and sometimes local communications channels to get the information not only to those in power, but also the communities who are affected. Our reports are based on detailed investigations, which are more important than ever in a world rife with disinformation. When the world has forgotten about certain armed conflicts, we work to keep them in the news and on policy makers’ agendas. We advocate with people who are in positions to make the changes we want to see. For example, if we document an armed group using cluster munitions, we will go to the warring parties and say these are illegal under international law. If we can identify who manufactured and sold these weapons, we can go to those countries, show them our evidence, and tell them they may be complicit in war crimes. We have also focused on identifying the leaders – like senior commanders in the armed forces – who are responsible for the abuses taking place. Then we can work with governments to implement targeted sanctions or travel bans. For example, we are now pressing the European Union to use sanctions against those responsible for grave violations in the armed conflict in Sudan. It is our job to hold governments and their leaders accountable when they violate their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, no matter how powerful they are. When a military coalition including the United States and United Kingdom invaded Iraq in 2003, we documented their laws of war violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes that killed civilians and the torture of detainees. We also reported on Iraqi violations. Many years later, that work isn’t over. Righting wrongs is usually a marathon, not a sprint. But it can take time. Human Rights Watch’s documentation of abuses in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s contributed to the creation of war crimes tribunals and the prosecutions of leaders for war crimes. These trials began in the 2000s and continue in 2023. When it comes to our advocacy, where are our advocates located and what does their work look like? Our advocates take our research and engage with people in power to influence the political response to fighting on the ground. Sometimes they are engaging with the warring parties themselves, and sometimes they are urging change among those funding and supporting the warring parties. Our advocates’ goal, in the most general sense, is to make sure human rights are centered in these policy responses. We advocate with multilateral institutions at the global and regional level, whether it be the United Nations, the African Union, or the European Union, or other local and regional bodies that have responsibilities to protect civilians. We have a research presence in about 100 countries, and our advocates and researchers can advocate with governments in each of these countries. We have other advocates based all over the world, including in Tokyo, London, Washington DC, and Johannesburg, and in Australia, Brazil, and across Europe. Here’s an example of what our advocacy looks like. Starting in 2014, we worked to expose the violent crackdown on dissent by Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro government, which led to a spiraling humanitarian emergency and the exodus of millions of people. We shared our research at the UN Security Council and pushed for a UN response, and the pressure we helped generate ultimately resulted in more aid reaching people. Our research was cited by the Biden administration to grant temporary protected status to Venezuelans living in the United States, and by the Brazilian refugee agency to grant thousands of Venezuelans legal status. In short, our research, communications, and advocacy all work together in an incredibly effective way, ensuring that we deploy information in a way that compels those in power to take action. Who does Human Rights Watch work with during conflict? Our advocates and researchers work closely with partners – local human rights and other civil society groups, like humanitarian organizations, labor unions, and faith communities. For example, after armed conflict broke out in Sudan in April 2023, we knew we needed more power behind documenting – and preserving evidence of – the atrocities. Sustained advocacy by Human Rights Watch, combined with the power of the voices of Sudanese and regional partner organizations across Africa, helped lead the UN Human Rights Council to establish an independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan. What are the challenges you face? Today we see a number of conflicts raging where one side or the other – or both – shows little respect for these laws. I know some people can be skeptical of whether international humanitarian law and human rights law helps while a conflict rages. There are armed conflicts where the warring parties don’t seem to be showing any restraint – they seemingly flout these laws without consequence. We’ve seen this in the Horn of Africa since 2020. Government forces and allied militias in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have used rape as a weapon of war and destroyed infrastructure critical to civilians’ survival. They also had cut off the region from food, power, and communications for almost two years. This year, in neighboring Sudan, war has broken out – despite consistent warnings about escalating abuses by the country’s notorious security forces. Eight months later, we’ve documented ethnically motivated attacks on civilians in Darfur, how explosive weapons repeatedly used in urban areas have killed civilians and damaged critical infrastructure in the capital, Khartoum, and widespread obstruction of aid. In both countries, perpetrators of the crimes have faced very few consequences. In Ethiopia, after warring parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement, international investigations into conflict-related atrocities were jettisoned as Ethiopia’s international and regional partners sought to normalize relations with the federal government. In Sudan, despite investigative efforts, accountability for crimes is just not being made a priority in political discussions. That doesn’t mean we give up. And the laws of war do matter, as they give us a framework to render meaningful judgments against combatants, affording victims and their families a measure of justice. Also, we know that when the laws of war are enforced, including through trials, they can help prevent atrocities by breaking cycles of violence and impunity. Our research shows that, all too often, when justice is scrapped to protect the powerful, these crimes just recur, creating new generations of victims. We’ve seen this in Afghanistan, when warlords granted themselves immunity, and when the International Criminal Court downgraded investigating US abuses in its investigation of alleged war crimes. We’ve also seen this in the Democratic Republic of Congo. If you want to stop recurring abuses, you need justice. And sometimes justice in a courtroom is a long time coming. In Syria, Human Rights Watch and many other groups spent years painstakingly documenting human rights violations and war crimes while those responsible were seemingly getting away with murder. Over 10 years on, though, we see that prosecutions for these crimes are gaining steam. You mentioned that we also campaign for support for justice, including before courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). One of our ultimate goals is justice and accountability for abuses. This includes shaping investigations and pressuring governments to arrest people wanted for serious crimes. We also push for effective war crimes courts, and work to secure financial and political support for accountability efforts. We sustain these campaigns for justice over many, many years. This often starts by making sure our published reports are brought to the attention of the international community and to authorities working before national courts, international courts – including the International Criminal Court – and hybrid courts, which are domestic courts containing international elements. Human Rights Watch has also advocated for national authorities to put in place the laws and expertise needed to support the practice of “universal jurisdiction,” under which national judicial authorities investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in other countries, regardless of the nationality of the suspects or their victims. Over the course of 2020-2022, a German court held a trial on state-sponsored torture in Syria, ultimately convicting a former Syrian intelligence officer of crimes against humanity. A Human Rights Watch report documenting torture in Syria’s detention centers was referenced by the court during the trial. Any last thoughts? If I could wave a magic wand and stop conflicts around the world and bring people to an understanding, I’d do it. But that’s not reality. This is what we do instead. We document war crimes and other abuses. We make sure the world knows what’s happening, and we push for change. It’s not a perfect system, and sometimes it’s a long road to justice. But Human Rights Watch has done this work for decades, and we know from experience that justice is possible, and we do everything we can to make it probable..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2023-12-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Abductions, Forced Recruitment Violate Laws of War
Description: "(Bangkok) – An ethnic armed group in northern Myanmar has abducted and forcibly recruited civilians fleeing fighting in Shan State, Human Rights Watch said today. Myanmar’s military also has a long record of using adults for forced labor and recruiting children, but getting recent information about unlawful practices in junta-controlled areas is difficult. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group, should immediately end its abusive practices against civilians, and take all available measures to protect them during hostilities against Myanmar’s armed forces and pro-junta militias. “The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army is violating the laws of war by abducting and forcibly recruiting civilians, putting them at grave risk,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Civilians should be able to seek safety from fighting without fearing that the Myanmar military or ethnic armed groups will force them into their armies.” On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army – began Operation 1027, an offensive targeting Myanmar military outposts in northern Shan State. The offensive triggered attacks by opposition armed groups elsewhere in the country. Since late October, fighting between opposition forces and the military has displaced more than 600,000 people, including almost 100,000 in Shan State. Tens of thousands have fled Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Special Autonomous Zone in northern Shan State, in advance of an anticipated MNDAA assault on the town, which the group formerly controlled. Although the MNDAA assisted those fleeing by opening up previously closed forest roads, the armed unit also confiscated mobile phones and detained an unknown number of people as they left Laukkai, local media and witnesses said. On November 24, the MNDAA abducted seven men as they traveled from Laukkai to Chin Shwe Haw, near the Myanmar-China border. Relatives told the Shan News Herald that the men’s friends last saw them detained on the roadside just outside Chin Shwe Haw, before Alliance Army fighters took them away. The Shan News Herald reported that an MNDAA spokesperson said that Sai Ai Naw, 18; Maung Nyi Ka, 19; Sai Lianghan, 20; Sai Ilaw, 26; Maung Nor Goon, 26; Sai Aung Heng, 27, and a seventh, unnamed 20-year-old man would be assigned to military service. On November 25, a doctor who left Laukkai along the same route said he witnessed many young men pulled over and detained by MNDAA fighters outside Par Hsin Kyaw, a village between Laukkai and Chin Shwe Haw. “They [MNDAA fighters] were pulling over men who were on motorcycles in groups of twos and threes,” he said. They did not pull over couples, and I had one of the female nurses riding pillion, so we didn’t get stopped. But there were scores of young men pulled over and I saw them being rounded up. I was too afraid to stop and look but they were being gathered together and taken away somewhere.” On December 12, the parents of seven other young men who did not arrive home after fleeing Laukkai in late October issued a letter to the MNDAA, pleading for their release. The families wrote, in the letter obtained by Human Rights Watch, that they last saw their sons being led away by MNDAA fighters near Chin Shwe Haw. All those abducted were of Ta’ang ethnicity and came from Man Khite village, Namhsan township, in northern Shan State. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army operates in northern Shan State along the China-Myanmar border. It was founded as the Communist Party of Burma collapsed in 1989 and agreed to a ceasefire with the Myanmar military later that year. The ceasefire ended in 2009, when a military-aligned faction of the Alliance Army became the Kokang Border Guard Force and was put in charge of Laukkai, where illegal activity, most recently cyber scam centers, has thrived. The MNDAA has attempted multiple times to regain the territory, including Laukkai, that it lost in 2009. Some ethnic armed groups, including the MNDAA, impose quotas requiring villages or households to supply a recruit, who in some cases may be willing to serve. Myanmar’s military and pro-junta militias also use forced recruits, including children, to bolster their armed forces or for other roles such as porters, cooks, or cleaners. In a widely shared video dated December 5 that Human Rights Watch reviewed and verified, an MNDAA official in uniform warns families not to shirk their responsibilities and to ensure those recruited were at least 15 years old and younger than 50. “If [you don’t] have a boy … if you have a girl … if you have three [one must serve],” the official tells a crowd gathered at a monastery in Pang Hseng village, Monekoe township, in northern Shan State. “If you have five, two of them must serve. Got it? If you have five males at home, two of them must serve.” He continued: “So, if you’re thinking about not bringing your sons and daughters because you’re concerned, don’t do that. … One day when they come back because things are peaceful, we are going to collect household registrations and we will know that they did not serve, and we will arrest them for it.” Under international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, applicable to the non-international armed conflicts in Myanmar, warring parties are prohibited from arbitrarily depriving anyone of their liberty, including through abductions and forced recruitment. Parties must treat all civilians humanely; arbitrary deprivation of liberty is incompatible with this requirement. In September 2019, Myanmar ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which obligates non-state armed forces not to, “under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18.” The 2019 Myanmar Child Rights Law also forbids recruiting anyone under 18 into the armed forces or non-state armed groups. In 2023, the United Nations secretary-general's annual report on children in armed conflict identified the Myanmar military as responsible for the majority of the cases the UN had verified as recruiting and using children the previous year. However, the report also named the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as having recruited up to seven children and separately, abducting up to seven others. The UN special rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has also received various reports that the Myanmar military’s recruitment and use of children has increased since the 2021 military coup. “Governments with any influence over opposition and ethnic armed groups in Myanmar should impress upon them that violations by the Myanmar armed forces never justifies abuses by their own forces,” Pearson said..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2023-12-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-21
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Description: "၁။ အဖက်ဖက်က မရှုမလှ ရှုံးနိမ့်လျက်ရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၎င်းတို့ သက်ဆိုးရှည်စေရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုကို အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်ရန် အရေးတကြီးလိုအပ် နေသော နိုင်ငံခြားငွေ ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ယင်း၏အမည်ခံ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ စစ်ကောင်စီဗဟိုဘဏ်၊ စစ်ကောင်စီထောက်တိုင်ဘဏ်များပူးပေါင်း၍ ပြည်ပရောက် ရွှေ့ပြောင်း အလုပ်သမားများ၏ သမ္မာအာဇီဝချွေးနှဲစာအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်ရယူရန် နည်းလမ်း ပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၂။ ထို့အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၃၀-၈-၂၀၂၃ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ညွှန်ကြားစာ တစ်စောင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီး ရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ မိသားစုလွှဲပို့ငွေအဖြစ် အခြေခံ လစာ၏ အနည်းဆုံး ၂၅ % ကို လစဉ် သို့မဟုတ် သုံးလလျှင် တစ်ကြိမ် ၎င်းတို့ သတ်မှတ် ထားသော ငွေလွှဲဝန်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများမှတဆင့် လွှဲပို့ကြရန် ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင် အကျိုးဆောင် အေဂျင်စီများကို ဖိအားပေးညွှန်ကြားခဲ့ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။ ၃။ သို့ပါသော်လည်း မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများသည် တရားဝင်မှု အလျဉ်းမရှိ သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အမိန့်အာဏာဟူသမျှကို တော်လှန်လိုစိတ်ပြင်းပြစွာဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်အန်တုခဲ့ကြသည့်အတွက် ယခုအခါ ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများတွင် ရောက်ရှိအလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင် နေသော မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းသို့ ပြန်လည်လွှဲပို့ငွေ များသည် ယခင်ကထက် ၁၀ ပုံ ၁ ပုံခန့်သာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီထံသို့ ရောက်ရှိတော့ ကြောင်း လေ့လာသိရှိရသည်။ ၄။ မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ စိတ်အားထက်သန်စွာ အာဏာဖီဆန်မှုကြောင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအတွက် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေရရှိမှု သိသာစွာလျော့နည်းခဲ့ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြပ်အတည်းဆိုက်ရောက်စေခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်း အလုပ်သမားများအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့ ကျရာနိုင်ရာအခန်းကဏ္ဍက အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီထံ လွှဲပို့ငွေများ မရောက်ရှိစေရန် အချိန်ကိုက်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းသည် ဘဏ္ဍာရေး တိုက်စစ်တွင် တတပ်တအားပါဝင်ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါ၍ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံအသီးသီးသို့ရောက်ရှိနေသော မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများအား အထူးကျေးဇူးတင် မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-12-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Bago Region, Rakhine State, Shan State, and Kayin State from December 8th to 14th. 7 civilians including a child who liked and shared the posts about against Military Junta on social media, were arrested and charged. Military Junta arrested 8 locals from Ywangan Township, Southern Shan State, as hostages on December 12th. Military Junta Troop forced to plant the sunflower to the farmers in Ayeyarwady Region. 16 civilians died and over 20 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 6 underaged children were injured and 5 died when the Military Junta committed violations. Over 80 civilians were arrested and over 30 were tortured within a week by the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-12-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar faces a protracted learning crisis where the COVID-19 pandemic was compounded by a coup in February 2021, which furthered school closures. Save the Children created Catch-up Clubs (CuCs) to support children’s remedial learning in a matter of weeks and address barriers to children’s successful return to school in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. An innovative model that offers community-led, play-based literacy instruction to children grouped by ability, not age, CuCs assess children’s foundational literacy and Social and Emotional Learning (SEL), while addressing child protection and economic barriers to education. CuCs were piloted with over 3000 children in upper primary to lower secondary grades across 36 communities in the conflict-affected states of Rakhine and Kayin in Myanmar. This quasi-natural experimental impact evaluation investigated the cause-and-effect relationship between CuCs and children's literacy outcomes and SEL competencies. The study was contextually adapted to consider children affected by conflict, gender, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity. The results show that children who participated in CuCs had significantly higher literacy level and SEL competency than children who did not participate. Children participating in CuCs also showed greater self-confidence and educational aspirations to remain in education or continue their schooling to a higher level..."
Source/publisher: Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies
2023-12-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Joint media release with: The Hon Andrew Giles MP, Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and, Multicultural Affairs The Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, Minister for International Development and the Pacific The Albanese Government has pledged $265 million at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-led Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in Geneva to support refugees and to sustain humanitarian assistance in protracted crises. As the world faces a deepening crisis with more than 114 million people displaced across the globe, Australia is working to take a leading role in international resettlement efforts. In response to the ongoing displacement crisis, Australia will provide: $235 million to support displaced Rohingya and communities in need in Myanmar and Bangladesh. $20 million to support people in Afghanistan and those displaced to neighbouring countries. $10 million to support people in Sudan and those displaced to neighbouring countries. At the GRF, Australia reaffirmed its commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees, enhancing refugee self-reliance, and expanding access to third country solutions through resettlement and complementary pathway places. Australia's Humanitarian Resettlement Program has been increased to 20,000 places, the highest core intake in over a decade, and we are committed to growing skills-based pathways. Australia is also working to support other countries to establish and grow their own resettlement programs. The Australian Government recently established a Refugee Advisory Panel to Government to ensure those with lived experience can advise Australia's settlement programs. Australia's official delegation to the GRF includes one of its members Mr Danijel Malbasa, an advocate, writer, lawyer, and a former Yugoslav refugee, who co-delivered Australia's National Statement. Quotes attributable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong: “We are seeing the largest displacement crisis unfolding in modern history, with more than 114 million people displaced globally. “Our humanitarian assistance is part of a broader effort to address the causes of displacement and find durable solutions. “Through our partners, Australia will deliver vital support to vulnerable people displaced by conflict.” Quotes attributable to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the Hon Andrew Giles MP: “Our pledges aim to ease pressure on host countries and demonstrate our commitment to responsibility sharing, in recognition of the shared global challenge of displacement. “Through our pledges, Australia is firmly committed to supporting refugees globally and the communities that host them at a time where there are more people forcibly displaced than ever before. “The Albanese Government is committed to working with others globally to find practical, and sustainable solutions for the increasingly complex situations driving displacement, such as through the adoption of machine-readable refugee travel documents”. Quotes attributable to the Minister for International Development and the Pacific, the Hon Pat Conroy MP: “Australia is deeply concerned by the unprecedented number of displaced people around the world. “We are making an important contribution to the humanitarian response in partnership with other countries and international organisations at the Global Refugee Forum.”..."
Source/publisher: Government of Australia
2023-12-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-17
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Description: "1. Today marks the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. The democratically elected representatives of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw are striving for a future where human rights and dignity are upheld for everyone in Myanmar. At a time when the resistance movement has made dramatic gains against the illegal military junta, we once again can glimpse a future where human rights are promoted and protected in our country. We call for the international community to support us in our efforts to realize this future at this critical juncture. 2. As of today, human right abuses in many forms continue in many countries, including Myanmar where the situation is worsened by conflict. In Myanmar, we have witnesses the military junta carrying out unspeakable and horrific human rights violations against civilians, including the democratically elected lawmakers in the 2020 general election since the unlawful attempted coup on February 1 2021. 3. The military junta’s atrocities include arbitrary arrests, inhumane torture, extrajudicial killings, massive killings, sexual abuse and gender-based violence, property loot, seizure and destruction, mass arson and targeted aerial attacks against civilians and civilian objects. Some of them amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The executions of four democratic defenders including former lawmaker U Phyo Zeya Thaw constitute some of the most heinous human rights violations committed by the junta. 4. Since the attempted coup, over 4,250 civilians have been killed and 25,522 detained. An estimated 80,000 civilian houses and other infrastructure has been burnt down and destroyed. Schools, hospitals, religious buildings and even IDPs camps have been targeted frequently by airstrikes. The recent airstrikes on Mung Lai Hkyet Village in Laiza Township, Kachin State killed 28 people including 11 children and injured over 60 persons. The unlawful coup and unspeakable violence of the military junta’s armed forces has resulted in nearly 2.5 million people displaced and 18 million people including women and children in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The international community is reminded again that it is very necessary to make practical cooperation with the National Unity Government and ethnic resistance organizations for the effective humanitarian aid to those in need of help. 5. In order to end the human rights violation and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, we must strive to reverse the coup and return Myanmar to democracy. The people of Myanmar are bravely resisting the brutal military junta in the cause of upholding their freedom, human rights, human dignity and justice. The military junta and those involved in human rights violations must be held accountable for their long reign of terror against all people of Myanmar including ethnic minorities and the Rohingya people. This is a critical step to progress towards a political transition to an inclusive federal democratic nation. Our vision is of a world where human rights and democracy are protected for all, not only in Myanmar but across Asia and in all countries worldwide. 6. We call on the global community including the United Nations and ASEAN to understand the current situation in Myanmar which is in a new phase. Democracy’s supporters are united in moving forward towards an end of military dictatorship and the victory of the Spring Revolution. This is an essential time for support from the international community. We welcome the coordinated sanctions of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and urge all countries to take such actions. 7. We mark this Human Rights Day by reiterating our call to the United Nations, ASEAN, democratic countries, human rights organizations and individuals to help us to end the military coup and support the country’s democratically-elected representatives, legitimate institutions and ethnic representative organizations to restore democracy, peace, human rights and the rule of law in Myanmar. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့သည် ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံ၌ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကြေညာစာတမ်းအား အတည်ပြုခဲ့သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်ပြည့်မြောက် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူသားတိုင်းအတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် လူ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာအားခံစားနိုင်မည့် အနာဂတ်အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်၊၊ တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်မှုများသည် သိသာထင်ရှား သောရလဒ်များ ပိုင်ဆိုင်နေသည့် ယခုအချိန်တွင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့နိုင်ငံတွင် လူ့အခွင့် အရေးအား ကာကွယ်မြှင့်တင်ပေးမည့် အနာဂတ်ကိုလည်း မြင်ယောင်ကြည့်နိုင်ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် ယခုကဲ့သို့ အရေးကြီးသည့်အချိန်အခါတွင် မျှော်လင့်ထား သည့် ထိုအနာဂတ် အောင်မြင်စေရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုများတွင် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီ ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်၊၊ ၂၊၊ ယနေ့ခေတ်ကာလတွင် ပဋိပက္ခကြောင့် အခြေအနေပိုမိုဆိုးရွားနေသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံအများအပြားတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများသည် ပုံစံမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ဆက်လက် ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေဆဲဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းသည့်အချိန်မှစ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သက်သေများစွာရှိပါသည်၊၊ ၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ ဆိုးရွားသောအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများတွင် အကြောင်းပြချက်မဲ့ဖမ်းဆီး ခြင်း၊ လူမဆန်စွာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ တရားလက်လွန်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာစော်ကားခြင်းနှင့် လိင်ဖြစ်တည်မှုအပေါ်အခြေခံသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် ခြင်း၊ ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကိုခိုးယူခြင်း၊ သိမ်းဆည်းခြင်းနှင့် ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ နေအိမ်များကို မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ များနှင့် အများပြည်သူဆိုင်ရာနေရာများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထား၍ လေကြောင်းဖြင့်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းများ ပါဝင်ပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းတို့အနက် အချို့သည် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်ပါသည်၊၊ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဟောင်း ဦးဖြိုးဇေယျာသော် အပါအဝင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ကာကွယ်သူ ၄ ဦးကို သေဒဏ်ပေး ကွပ်မျက်ခြင်းများသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးသော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများထဲမှ အချို့ပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ၄။ အာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည့်အချိန်မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူ ၄,၂၅၀ ဦး အားသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ၂၅,၅၂၂ ဦးအား ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်၊၊ ပြည်သူ့အိုးအိမ်နှင့် ပြည်သူပိုင် အဆောက်အအုံ ၈၀,၀၀၀ ခန့်ကိုမီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းများ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည်၊၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဆေးရုံများ၊ ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အအုံများသာမက စစ်ဘေးရှောင်စခန်းများကိုပါ လေကြောင်း ဖြင့် မကြာခဏပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်၊၊ မကြာသေးမီက ကချင်ပြည်နယ်၊ လိုင်ဇာမြို့ရှိ မုန်လိုင်ခတ်ကျေးရွာအား လေကြောင်းဖြင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့မှုကြောင့် ကလေးငယ် ၁၁ ဦးအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူ ၂၈ ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး ၆၀ ဦးကျော် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရခဲ့သည်၊၊ ဥပဒေမဲ့ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုနှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကြောင့် ၂.၅ သန်းကျော်သော ပြည်သူများ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်နေရသည်၊၊ ထို့အပြင် အမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေး သူငယ်များအပါအဝင် ၁၈ သန်းကျော်သည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းအကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသူများထံသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများ အမှန်တကယ်ရောက်ရှိရန်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်း အနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် လက်တွေ့ ကျကျ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်းအသိပေးလိုပါသည်၊၊ ၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လျက်ရှိသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများနှင့် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ပဋိက္ခများ အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရန် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ရရှိစေရန် ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်ရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ မြန်မာ ပြည်သူများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး၊ လူ့သိက္ခာနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ရရှိနိုင် ရန် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီကို ရဲရင့်စွာ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေဆဲ ဖြစ်ပါ သည်၊၊ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသူများ အနေဖြင့် လူနည်းစုတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများအပါအဝင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ အပေါ်၌ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်က ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် ရက်စက်အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအတွက် တာဝန်ယူ ရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းသည် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသို့ လျှောက်လှမ်း နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကူးအပြောင်းအား ပိုမိုချောမွေ့စေမည့် အရေးကြီးသော အဆင့်တစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်သာမက အာရှအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ နိုင်ငံများတွင် လူသား အားလုံးအတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအား ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်မည့် ကမ္ဘာကြီး ဖြစ်တည် စေရန်မှာ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ မျှော်မှန်းချက် ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ၆။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့် အာဆီယံအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာ့အသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် တိုးတက်အောင်မြင် မှုအဆင့် အသစ်တစ်ခုရှိနေသော လက်ရှိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အခြေအနေကို နားလည်ရန် တောင်းဆိုလို ပါသည်၊၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီ ထောက်ခံအားပေးသူများသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အဆုံးသတ်ရေးနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အောင်မြင်မှုအတွက် ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားရန် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်လျက် ရှိပါသည်၊၊ ယခုအချိန်သည် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းထံမှ အကူအညီပေးအပ်ရန် အရေးကြီး အချိန်တစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု၊ ယူကေနှင့် ကနေဒါနိုင်ငံတို့၏ ပူးပေါင်း အရေးယူ ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများကို ကြိုဆိုပြီး အခြားသော နိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် အလားတူ အရေးယူ မှုများ ချမှတ်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်၊၊ ၇။ ယနေ့ကျ‌ရောက်သည့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနေ့တွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှု အား အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေး ကူညီဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးအတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ တရားဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား ကိုယ်စားပြုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီပေးရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် ထပ်မံ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 3.42 MB
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Dec 1 to 7, 2023 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Mon State, Rakhine State, Shan State, and Chin State from December 1st to 7th. Military Junta also burnt and killed 11 civilians in Monyea Township, Sagaing Region on December 2nd. 2 Sittwe locals who shared Rakhine News on Facebook, were arrested and opened cases by the Military. The Military Junta also arrested a Community-Based Organization member from Kyaukme Township in North Shan State. 15 civilians died and almost 18 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 4 underaged people were injured and 1 died when the Military Junta committed violations. Over 32 civilians were arrested and 12 were killed within a week by the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-10-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf pdf pdf
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုအားလုံးနှင့်တကွ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိရေး တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေကြသော ရဲဘော်များအားလုံး ဘေးအန္တရာယ်အပေါင်း ကင်းဝေးကြပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် အားလုံးရည်မှန်းကြိုးပမ်း နေကြသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ နိုင်ငံသစ်အား အမြန်ဆုံး တည်ဆောက်သွားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် စိတ်ကူးသစ်၊ အကြံဉာဏ်သစ်၊ ခွန်အားသစ်များနှင့်အတူ ဆတက်ထမ်းပိုး ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ကြပါစေ ကြောင်း ဆုတောင်းမေတ္တာ ပို့သအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂၊၊ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့လက်အောက်ခံဘဝ ၁၉၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ ရက်( မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော် ၁၀ ရက်နေ့)တွင် တက္ကသိုလ်ကျောင်းသားများက ဦးဆောင်၍ ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေမူကြမ်းကို သပိတ်မှောက်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြပြီး ပထမဆုံး အကြိမ် အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုအဖြစ် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယင်းလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးသည် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးသို့ တစ်ဟုန်ထိုးပျံ့နှံ့သွားခဲ့ကာ အမျိုးသားအထက်တန်းကျောင်းများ၊ အမျိုးသား ကောလိပ်များ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့ပြီး နယ်ချဲ့တို့လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်လိုသည့် မျိုးချစ်စိတ်များ ရှင်သန်နိုးကြားလာခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ၃။ တိုင်းပြည်တာဝန်များကို ပခုံးပြောင်းထမ်းဆောင်မည့် လူငယ်လူရွယ် အမျိုးသားများ အနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၏ အတိတ်သမိုင်းအား သင်ခန်းစာယူ၍ အနာဂတ်သမိုင်း ပိုမိုကောင်းမွန်အောင် တည်ဆောက်ရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံ၏ အမျိုးသားနေ့သည် လွတ်လပ်ရေးလမ်းကို စတင်လမ်းဖောက် လျှောက်လှမ်းခဲ့သည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ်ဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့ မီးခဲပြာဖုံးနေသော ကျွန်စိတ် ကို သခင်စိတ်အဖြစ်သို့ အသွင်ပြောင်းနိုင်ခဲ့သည့် နေ့တစ်နေ့လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့တို့ လက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများအားလုံး အသက်၊ သွေး၊ ချွေးတို့ဖြင့် ရင်းနှီးရယူခဲ့ရခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ပေးဆပ်မှုကြီးမားစွာ ရယူခဲ့ရသည့် လွတ်လပ်ရေးသည် အလုံးစုံ လွတ်လပ်သည့်နိုင်ငံအဖြစ်သို့ မရောက်ရှိခဲ့ပေ။ မိမိလူမျိုးအချင်းချင်း စိုးမိုးချယ်လှယ် ဖိနှိပ်ချုပ်ချယ်သော စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏လက်အောက်တွင် နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော် ကြာ ခါးသီးစွာ ရင်ဆိုင်ခံစားခဲ့ကြရပါသည်။ ၄။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ (၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို ပြည်သူ့ဆန္ဒမဲဖြင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထား သော နိုင်ငံတော်သမ္မတ ဦးဝင်းမြင့်နှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်တို့ ဦးဆောင်သည့် ပြည်သူ့အစိုးရထံမှ လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်ရန် တစ်ဖန်ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည်။ ၅။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ ဖိနှိပ်အုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့မှုကြောင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံးတို့ သည် နှစ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော်ကြာ အမြစ်တွယ်နေသည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကို အမြစ်ပြတ် တိုက်ထုတ်ရန် အနှစ်နှစ် အလလက ကိန်းအောင်းနေသော အမျိုးသားစိတ်ဓာတ်သည် ယနေ့နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ပြန်လည်နိုးကြားလာခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယနေ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် တိုင်းရင်းသား ပြည်သူများအားလုံးသည် အမျိုးသားနေ့မှ ပေါက်ဖွားလာခဲ့သော အမျိုးသားစိတ်ဓာတ်ကို အခြေ တည်ကာ မိမိတိုင်းပြည်နှင့် လူမျိုးကို လုံခြုံအေးချမ်းသော နိုင်ငံတစ်ခုတွင် ကောင်းမွန်စွာနေထိုင် နိုင်ရေး၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုတိုင်းရင်းသား၊ လူမျိုးအားလုံး ဥမကွဲ၊ သိုက်မပျက် အတူတကွ နေထိုင်နိုင် ရေး၊ ကမ္ဘာ့အလယ်တွင် တင့်တယ်ဝင့်ထည်စွာ ရပ်တည်သွားနိုင်ရေးတို့အတွက် မွန်မြတ်သော စိတ်ဓာတ်များဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသည့်အတွက် ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ရပါသည်။ ၆။ ယခုအချိန်ကာလသည် အာဏာလု အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား စစ်ရေး၊ နိုင်ငံရေးနည်းလမ်း အမျိုးမျိုးအား ကိုယ်စီထမ်းရွက်ကာ ညီညွတ်သော ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်မှုများကြောင့် တော်လှန်ရေး ခရီးတစ်လျှောက် အားကောင်းသော အောင်မြင်မှုများကို ရယူပိုင်ဆိုင်ထားနိုင်သည့် အချိန်ဖြစ်ပါ သည်။ ထို့ပြင် တည်ဆောက်ထားပြီးသော ညီညွတ်ခြင်း၊ အပြန်အလှန်နားလည်ခြင်း၊ လေးစား တန်ဖိုးထားခြင်းများကို အခြေပြုလျက် မိမိတို့နိုင်ငံတွင် အာဏာရူးစစ်မိစ္ဆာများအား အချိန်တိုတို အတွင်း အမြစ်ပြတ်မောင်းထုတ်နိုင်ပြီး နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အောင်ပွဲကိုလည်း အချိန်တိုတို အတွင်း ရရှိနိုင်လိမ့်မည်ဟု အခိုင်အမာယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ ၇။ မိမိတို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီအနေဖြင့် အချင်းချင်း အပြန် အလှန်လေးစားမှု၊ နားလည်ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်မှုတို့ကို ပိုမိုခိုင်မာအောင် တည်ဆောက် သွားပြီး ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် လွတ်လပ်၍ငြိမ်းချမ်းပြီး ဝါဒဖြူစင်သည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသစ် တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများ၊ တော်လှန်ရေး အင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့်အတူ ဆက်လက်လက်တွဲ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယနေ့ ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃) နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယမှသည် နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးကြီး၏ အောင်ပွဲနေ့သို့ တွဲလက်ညီညီ အရှိန်မြှင့် ချီတက်ကြစေလိုကြောင်း လေးလေး နက်နက် တိုက်တွန်းလျက် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: " ယနေ့ မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၃၈၅ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀)ရက်နေ့၊ ခရစ်က္ကရာဇ် ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၏ (၁၀၃)နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသားနေ့အောင်ပွဲ အခါသမယတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုဖွား တိုင်းရင်းသားညီနောင် အပေါင်း ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာချမ်းသာကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်းတောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့ခေတ်အတွင်း ကန့်သတ်ချုပ်ချယ်ချက်ပေါင်း များစွာပါဝင်သည့် ရန်ကုန်တက္ကသိုလ် အက်ဥပဒေ(၁၉၂၀) ပြဌာန်းခဲ့သည်ကို လက်မခံနိုင်သောကြောင့် ရန်ကုန်ကောလိပ် ကျောင်းသား/သူများ ဦးဆောင်ပြီး မြန်မာသက္ကရာဇ် ၁၂၈၂ခုနှစ်၊ တန်ဆောင်မုန်းလပြည့်ကျော်(၁၀) ရက် (၁၉၂၀ပြည့်နှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၅ရက်)နေ့တွင် ဆန့်ကျင်သပိတ်မှောက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ထိုလူထုသပိတ်ကြီးမှ အမျိုးသားပညာရေး ကို တောင်းဆိုဖော်ပြသည့် အမျိုးသားလှုပ်ရှားမှုကြီးတစ်ရပ် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။ မတရားအုပ်ချုပ်သူ ကိုလိုနီနယ်ချဲ့အစိုးရကို ပထမဆုံး ထိထိရောက်ရောက် တော်လှန်ခဲ့သော ထိုနေ့ကို အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့ဆိုလျှင် (၁၀၃)နှစ်ပင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ယခုမျက်မှောက်ခေတ်ကာလတွင်လည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ပြည်သူလူထုထံမှ အချုပ်အခြာအာဏာကို လက်နက်အားကိုးဖြင့် မတရားလုယူရန်ကြိုးစားပြီး၊ အဆိုပါ လုပ်ရပ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်ဆန္ဒပြခဲ့ကြသည့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအား အကြမ်းဖက် ဖိနှိပ်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုများကို ရက်စက်စွာ ကျုးလွန်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ မတရားအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား ခုခံကာကွယ်နိုင်ရေး၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ချုပ်ငြိမ်းရေးနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူအားလုံး လိုလားတောင့်တခဲ့ကြသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံတဝန်းရှိ ကျောင်းသားလူငယ်များ အပါအဝင်၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအသီးသီး စုပေါင်းကာ နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအား ယနေ့အထိ တမျိုးသားလုံး တက်ကြွစွာ ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအနေဖြင့်လည်း တဖက်တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အပြီးသတ်ကျဆုံးရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအစရှိသည့် ကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ၊ စစ်မျက်နှာစာမျိုးစုံ ဖွင့်လှစ်ကာ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နေသကဲ့သို့၊ အခြားတဖက်တွင် အနာဂတ် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စု၏ မျှော်ရည်ချက်များကို အမြန်ဆုံး ချမှတ်အကောင်အထည် ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပါအဝင် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုအားလုံးနှင့် ချိတ်ဆက် ပူးပေါင်းကာ ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အောင်ပွဲအတွက် ဆက်လက် ကြိုးပမ်းလုပ်ဆောင်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ အတိတ်သမိုင်းတွင် မတရားဖိနှိပ်မှုအမျိုးမျိုးကို ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်ခဲ့ကြသည့် လူထုတစ်ရပ်လုံး ပါဝင်လှုပ်ရှားမှုများကြောင့် နယ်ချဲ့ကိုလိုနီလက်အောက်မှ လွတ်မြောက်ခဲ့ရသော သမိုင်းအောင်ပွဲ သာဓကရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ပင် ယခုပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင်လည်း တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထု၏ လိုလားချက်၊ဘုံရည်မှန်းချက်ကို အခြေပြုပြီး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ် (FDC)တွင် ဖော်ပြထားသည့် လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ တရားမျှတမှုနဲ့ တန်းတူညီမျှရေး စသည့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို ကိုင်စွဲကာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို လက်တွဲညီညီ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ပြီး ဆက်လက်တော်လှန်သွားမည်ဆိုပါက ခေတ်သစ် အမျိုးသားအောင်ပွဲနေ့ တရက်ကို ထပ်မံ ဖန်တီးနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်ဟု အလေးအနက် ယုံကြည်ပါကြောင်း သတင်းစကားပါးလျက်၊ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၀၃)နှစ်မြောက် အမျိုးသား အောင်ပွဲနေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ်အတွက် ပြည်သူလူထုထံသို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2023-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-07
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Description: "The illegal Myanmar military junta is set to host the 26th Ministerial Conference of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program, on December 15 in Naypyidaw, according to Justice For Myanmar sources. In a welcome move, the Asian Development Bank, which acts as the GMS Secretariat, has told Justice For Myanmar that it will not attend the Ministerial Conference and will not provide any support. In response to an email, an ADB spokesperson told Justice For Myanmar, “The Asian Development Bank (ADB) will not attend the 26th GMS Ministerial Conference. In addition, ADB will not provide any funding for the event, nor provide logistical or advisory support. ADB also will not finance the costs of any developing member countries’ attendees.” Justice For Myanmar calls on GMS countries to cancel the conference and ban the junta from the GMS program. The ADB should reconsider its support for the GMS program while it continues to engage with the junta. The conference is planned to take place as the junta continues to lose control of Myanmar, is rapidly losing territory and is waging a campaign of terror against the people, committing mass killings, carrying out indiscriminate air strikes and shelling, arbitrary arrests, torture and mass displacement that has surged to more than 2.5 million. The conference host is Kan Zaw, the junta’s minister for investment and foreign economic relations, who is sanctioned by the US and EU. The EU noted that Kan Zaw “takes an active role in supporting the military’s efforts to attract foreign investment, thereby contributing to securing the financial needs of the military regime. Therefore, he is responsible for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Myanmar/Burma as well as for engaging in actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Myanmar.” According to Justice For Myanmar sources, Kan Zaw has invited China’s finance minister, Lan Fo’an, Cambodia’s deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, Sok Chenda Sophea, Lao’s planning and investment minister, Khamjane Vongphosy, Vietnam’s planning and investment minister, Nguyen Chi Dung, and Thailand’s deputy finance minister, Julapun Amornvivat to the conference. The conference is being organised by a steering committee headed by the junta’s deputy minister for investment and foreign economic relations. The committee also includes a member of the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) as the sole private sector representative, according to Justice For Myanmar sources. MEC is sanctioned by the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia. The junta-controlled Myanmar Police Force is providing security for the conference, overseen by the deputy police chief who is also a member of the steering committee. The junta’s police force is directly responsible for killings, torture and arbitrary arrest, which amount to crimes against humanity. The junta is preparing to maximise propaganda from the conference, having formed a committee to manage the release of information to control journalists. The conference is being held at the Grand Amara Hotel, which is part of the junta-linked crony conglomerate International Group of Entrepreneur (IGE) owned by Ne Aung, the brother of the junta’s navy chief. The junta is covering the accommodation of delegates, their flights between Yangon and Naypyidaw and hosting a gala lunch. The upcoming conference comes after Min Aung Hlaing participated in the 7th GMS Leaders’ Summit hosted by Cambodia in 2021. The ADB told Justice For Myanmar that they had provided Cambodia with advisory support to prepare documentation for the summit, which was held virtually. The Leaders’ Summit, which is the program’s highest body, was featured prominently in junta propaganda. In a speech at the summit, Min Aung Hlaing defended his illegal coup attempt and falsely stated that the 2020 election was rigged and that the coup attempt was constitutional. At the 2021 Leader’s Summit, Min Aung Hlaing illegitimately endorsed the GMS Strategic Framework 2030, which aims to promote investment and tourism that would help generate revenue for the junta, which it needs to finance its terror campaign. In 2022, Laos hosted the 25th GMS Ministerial Conference, in which the junta was also wrongly allowed to participate. In the conference, the junta illegitimately endorsed the GMS Regional Investment Framework for 2023-2025, in which the junta has proposed US$208.3 million in projects in sectors that include energy, information and communications technology, tourism and agriculture, mostly to be funded by unspecified “development partners”. The GMS program was established in 1992 under Myanmar’s previous dictatorship, and has focussed on promoting trade and the development of economic corridors and infrastructure, including in ethnic areas of Myanmar. As part of the Myanmar junta’s chairing of the GMS, the junta linked Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) is leading the GMS Business Council, a grouping of chambers of commerce from GMS countries. The GMS Business Council is currently chaired by Zaw Min Win, a former UMFCCI president and the chair of the Myanmar Industries Alliance, which invests in the mobile operator Mytel with the military conglomerate MEC. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is unfathomable that the GMS program and its members are not only inviting the illegal junta to participate but are even appointing it as host of a ministerial conference. “The junta is a terrorist organisation that is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity. The military's coup attempt is failing and the GMS program and its members are making a serious moral and strategic error in legitimising it and attempting to facilitate investment that will help it generate revenue and further fuel atrocities. “GMS members should immediately cancel the planned conference or, failing that, refuse to attend. The junta must be barred from the GMS program, which should instead recognise and support the National Unity Government, which is the legitimate government of Myanmar. “We welcome the decision of the ADB to withdraw support for the Ministerial Conference and to refuse to attend. The ADB should now reconsider its institutional support for the GMS program as long as its members continue to legitimise the illegal junta. “The involvement of UMFCCI and the junta-linked crony Zaw Min Win in the GMS Business Council is alarming and is a further sign that the junta and its cronies are using the program to promote investment that can strengthen the junta and worsen the crisis in Myanmar caused by the military’s illegal coup attempt.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2023-12-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-05
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Nov 22 to 30, 2023 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Kayah State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from November 22nd to 30th. Military Junta Troop is accused of using Chemical Gas Bombs and high destructive 500-pound bombs in airstrikes. The Ministry of Transport and Communications, which works under the Military, released and announced on November 22nd that they will take action for people who use Satellite Connection. Military Junta extorted and arrested the civilians and youths in Mandalay Region and Tanintharyi Region. Over 36 civilians died and almost 40 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 4 underaged children were injured and 5 died when the Military Junta committed violations. A child also died by the Military Junta Troop’s landmine..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-12-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-02
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Description: "H.E. Fumio Kishida, Prime Minister H.E. Yoko Kamikawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. Shunichi Suzuki, Minister of Finance H.E. Tetsuo Saito, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism ‍ Statement calling on the Japanese government to stop ODA and publicly-funded projects benefiting the Myanmar military ‍ ayus:Network of Buddhists Volunteers on International Cooperation Friends of the Earth Japan Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC) Network Against Japan Arms Trade (NAJAT) Mekong Watch Progressive Voice ‍ More than two years and ten months have passed since the failed coup by the Myanmar military. The military continues to commit serious human rights abuses amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. At least 4,192 people including pro-democracy activists and civilians have been confirmed killed by the military as of November 21, 2023. Among those protesting the attempted seizure of power by force by the military, a total of 25,425 people have been arrested. Across Myanmar, 2 million people are estimated to be internally displaced as of November 10, including 1.7 million currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since the coup. By 2020, the Japanese government provided JPY 356.518 billion in total in grant aid as well as JPY 109.94 billion in total in technical assistance to Myanmar, and promised JPY 1,378.47 billion in loan aid (figure based on loan agreements). After the failed coup, then Foreign Minister Motegi made the following statement regarding these Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Myanmar on May 21, 2021: “If the situation continues in this way, it is possible that we will be compelled to review ODA and that companies may become unable to provide investment even if they want to.” However, since then, despite the worsening human rights crisis in Myanmar, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have simply repeated that it would “comprehensively consider what measures may be effective while viewing the situation of the efforts made by Japan and the international community”. No contract has been signed on new ODA, but no official announcement has been made as to whether any review or assessment has been conducted regarding the existing ODA. A large part of ODA to Myanmar is loan aid (yen loans) for development of a special economic zone and surrounding infrastructure, construction of roads, and repairing railroads. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated in the Diet that 34 loan aid projects totaling JPY 739.6 billion based on figures in loan agreements are being implemented currently, making it clear that these projects have continued even after the failed coup. Besides ODA, the Japanese government provides public funds for private projects in Myanmar. Redevelopment of the Defense Services Museum Project (commonly known as the “Y Complex Project”) involves building and operating a large-scale real estate complex at the army-owned site of the former military museum in Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar. Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN), a government-funded infrastructure investment corporation under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) which is Japan’s public export credit agency, invests or lends to the Y Complex Project. Tokyo Tatemono, Fujita Corporation (a subsidiary of Daiwa House Industry), and JOIN set up a Joint Special Purpose Company (J-SPC) in Singapore. JBIC along with Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Mizuho Bank co-financed a loan to this J-SPC, and the J-SPC in turn is co-investing in Y Complex Company Ltd., a Myanmar corporation set up jointly by the J-SPC and Yangon Technical and Trading Company Limited (YTT), a Myanmar crony company. The land lease agreement is between YTT and "Colonel Aung Min Thein (Officer No. Army 17642), Vice Quarter Master General, Office of the Quarter Master General, Commander-in-Chief (Army).” Land lease payments are to be made to "Defence Account no. MD 010424,” an account likely to be under control of the Office of the Quartermaster General. The US, UK and Canada imposed sanctions on the Office of the Quartermaster General on December 10, 2021. Further, on June 21, 2023, the US designated Myanmar's Ministry of Defence as a “Specially Designated National” subject to financial sanctions, noting that the Ministry was “responsible for the command and control of the armed forces, which has conducted decades of repressive military rule that was violently resumed following the coup in 2021.” Following are some of the issues that that the continuation of the provision of public funds and ODA could entail: First, by continuing ODA which requires bilateral agreements even though one of the parties to those agreements has ceased to exist due to the coup in February 2021, and by providing public funds to the Y Complex Project, a venture that allows funds to flow to the Office of the Quartermaster General, it appears that the Japanese government is giving implicit support to the military junta. We share the concern of Myanmar citizens regarding this point. Second, ODA projects and projects receiving public funds in fact benefit the Myanmar military. It has been made clear by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar that in Myanmar, revenues from business operations conducted by companies owned or controlled by the military are a source of funds for the military, supporting their atrocities. The UK government has pointed out that the Office of the Quartermaster General which is involved in the Y Complex Project "plays a crucial role in procuring equipment for the Myanmar Armed Forces, including ammunition, bombs and jet fuel.” It has been revealed that the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), one of the military enterprises that the Fact-Finding Mission recommended to the international community not to "enter into or remain in a business relationship” with, is involved in the construction of Bago Bridge, a yen loan project. It has been pointed out that Yokogawa Bridge Corporation made payments to MEC from July to November 2022. Further, in the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Development Project, the Japanese government along with major trade companies and banks is investing in the Myanmar Japan Thilawa Development Ltd. (MJTD) which operates the industrial area using “Private Sector Investment Finance,” a type of ODA. Myanmar established the Thilawa SEZ Management Committee and holds 10% of MJTD. Soon after the coup, the military detained the chairperson of the Management Committee and appointed a new chairperson. Dividend payments are to be made if MJTD makes a profit, but under these circumstances, the possibility cannot be denied that such dividend payments will benefit the military. Third, in the type of ODA called “Two-Step Loans” under which ODA funds lent by the Japanese government are held and managed by financial institutions in Myanmar, there is concern that the funds may come to be managed by the military through its control over the financial institutions. Projects in question include the Housing Finance Development Project, Project for the Development of Finance for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, and the Agriculture and Rural Development Two Step Loan Project. Fourth, funds provided through yen loans are money lent at interest that Myanmar needs to repay, which will increase the debt owed by the people of Myanmar. Japan had already lent a cumulative total of USD 2761.8 million to Myanmar by 2020,but Myanmar will owe an additional JPY 739.6 billion (USD 4.93 billion as of November 10, 2023). This means that the people of Myanmar who are suffering from serious human rights abuses and atrocities by the Myanmar military will be made to bear the burden of repaying ODA for the next decades that is or may well be a source of funds for the military. As we expressed in our statement in December 2022, we believe that the Japanese government should respect the National Unity Government (NUG), Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and civil society organizations in Myanmar and effectively support the will of the people of Myanmar. We express deep concern that Japan may be complicit in the atrocity crimes by the military by providing ODA and public funds to the benefit of the military. We strongly demand that the Japanese government suspend all yen loan projects currently being implemented. Regarding the Y Complex Project, we strongly demand that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism immediately withdraw the investment made by JOIN, and that the Ministry of Finance immediately cancel the loan made by JBIC. Statement has been endorsed by the following organizations: 1 Action Committee for Democracy Development (Coalition of 14 Grassroots Networks) 2 Active Youths Kalaymyo 3 Africa Japan Forum 4 Ah Nah Podcast - Conversations with Myanmar 5 All Arakan Students' & Youths' Congress – AASYC 6 All Burma Indigenous People Alliance (ABIPA) 7 Alternative People's Linkage in Asia 8 ALTSEAN-Burma 9 ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights 10 Asian Community Center 21 11 Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) 12 Asian Health Institute, AHI 13 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners 14 Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters 15 Association Suisse-Birmanie (ASB) 16 Associazione per l'Amicizia Italia Birmania "Giuseppe Malpeli" 17 Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization 18 Burma Action Ireland 19 Burma Campaign UK 20 Burma Human Rights Network 21 Burmese Relief Center Japan 22 Burmese Women’s Union 23 CRPH & NUG Supporters Ireland 24 CRPH Funding Ireland 25 CRPH, NUG Support Team Germany-Deutschland 26 Democracy, Peace and Women’s Organization 27 Earth Tree 28 Educational Initiatives Prague 29 Equality Myanmar 30 Federation of Workers’ Union of the Burmese Citizen in Japan (FWUBC) 31 Freedom and Labor Action Group (FLAG) 32 Fukuoka NGO forum on ADB 33 Future Light Center 34 Future Thanlwin 35 General Incorporation Association WORKSPACE ASIA 36 Generation Wave 37 Grass-root People 38 HANDS(Health and Development Service) 39 Human Rights Educators Network 40 Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) 41 Human Rights Now 42 Info Birmanie 43 Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) 44 International Association, Myanmar-Switzerland (IAMS) 45 International Karen Organisation 46 Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) 47 Japan Catholic Council for Justice and Peace 48 Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES) 49 Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service 50 Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN) 51 Justice For Myanmar 52 Karen Human Rights Group 53 Karen Peace Support Network 54 Karen Swedish Community (KSC) 55 Karenni Human Rights Group 56 Karenni National Women's Organization 57 Keng Tung Youth 58 Mandalay Regional Youth Association Revolution Core Group 59 Metta Campaign 60 Myanmar Campaign Network 61 Myanmar Diaspora Group Finland 62 Myanmar International Assistance Organization 63 Myanmar News Now 64 Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State) 65 Myanmar Refugee Policy Group 66 Network for Human Rights Documentation - Burma (ND-Burma) 67 Nway Oo Guru Lay Myar 68 Padauk Finland-Myanmar Association 69 Pakokku Youth Development Council 70 Peace Boat 71 Peace Village United 72 Political Prisoners Network 73 Progressive Voice 74 Save and Care Organization for Women at Border Areas 75 Services for the Health in Asian and African Regions 76 Shan MATA 77 Southern Youth Development Organization 78 Ta'ang Legal Aid 79 Ta’ang Women’s Organization 80 Tanintharyi MATA 81 The Ladies 82 U.S. Campaign for Burma 83 Women's Democratic Club, Femin 84 Yokohama NGO Network and one other organization..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2023-12-01
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-01
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Nov 15 to 21, 2023 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Mandalay Region, Bago Region, Mon State, Chin State, and Shan State from November 15th to 21st. Military Junta destroyed 4 of the civilian bridges in Kale, Sagaing Region, and Kyaikmaraw Township, Mon State. The military also prohibited access to travel and fishing in Kyaukphyu Township, Rakhine State on November 19th. Military Junta arrested and extorted the youths who go out at night in the Yangon Region. Over 50 civilians died and 9 were injured within a week by the Military Junta’s heavy and light attacks. 11 underaged children died when the Military Junta committed violations. PSLF/TNLA released a statement on November 18th that the Military Junta Troop used the Toxic Gas Bombs in the fighting in Namkhan Township, North Shan State..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-11-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-11-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Shan State, and Chin State from November 1st to 7th. Military Junta arrested the local civilians and used them as human shields in Shan State and Mandalay Region. They also arrested 5 people from Mandalay who wrote about supporting the 1027 Operation. Military Junta Troop arrested the rice truck in the Tanintharyi Region and took the rice bags. Over 30 civilians were killed and 34 injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Civilians left their places 5 times within a week because of the Military Junta Troop’s matching and raiding. An underaged child was injured and 5 children died when the Military Junta committed violations..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-11-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-11-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Oct 15 to 21, 2023 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Bago and Mandalay Region from October 15th to 21st. Military Junta arrested 17 civilians and used as human shields in Sagaing Region. The civilians from Sintgu Township, Mandalay Region, fled from the Military attack from the ship, and a civilian was killed and two were injured from Salingyi Township, Sagaing Region. October 20th, 7 civilians from Pyapon Township, Ayeyarwady Region were sentenced to death by District Judge who works under the Military Junta. About 11 civilians were killed and over 17 injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Over 10 civilians were arrested and 14 were killed by the Military Junta within a week. Civilians left their places 7 times within a week because of the Military Junta Troop’s raiding and matching..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-10-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Attack in Kachin State Shows Need for Arms Embargo, Aviation Fuel Bans
Description: "(Bangkok) – The Myanmar military attacked a village hosting hundreds of displaced civilians in Kachin State on October 9, 2023, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children, committing an apparent war crime, Human Rights Watch said today. The nighttime attack on Mung Lai Hkyet, which also injured more than 60 people and caused extensive damage to civilian structures, did not appear to be targeting a military objective. Human Rights Watch interviewed five witnesses and reviewed 20 images and three videos of the aftermath of the attack, which suggest Myanmar forces initially conducted an airstrike on the village, then fired a barrage of ground-launched mortars or artillery. Images of areas hit by the initial strike show debris and damage consistent with the effects of shockwaves from large high-explosive bombs delivered by aircraft. Human Rights Watch found no evidence of opposition armed groups in the vicinity of the village at the time of the attack. “The Myanmar military’s repeated strikes and shelling of a village filled with displaced people were either unlawfully deliberate or indiscriminate,” said Manny Maung, Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Concerned governments shouldn’t just condemn this reckless disregard for civilian life, they should take meaningful and concrete actions to stop the military from committing future violations.” Mung Lai Hkyet is located about five kilometers from the ethnic Kachin Independence Army (KIA) headquarters in Laiza, near the border with China. For decades, the KIA has been engaged in conflict with the Myanmar military, which has a long record of committing war crimes in Kachin State and elsewhere. When a ceasefire with the KIA broke down in 2011, Mung Lai Hkyet, which was mainly inhabited by ethnic Lisu, began hosting internally displaced people fleeing the renewed hostilities. Clashes in Kachin State have increased since the KIA opposed Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021, causing further displacements to areas such as Mung Lai Hkyet. The KIA has also been training recruits in new armed groups opposing Myanmar’s junta. A resident of Mung Lai Hkyet told Human Rights Watch that despite the KIA’s presence in Laiza, there were no KIA fighters in the village due to a nightly curfew and there had been no fighting near the village leading up to the incident. A Laiza resident told Human Rights Watch that the first explosion was the loudest and could also be felt in Laiza: “It shook everything and then we heard a few more, smaller blasts.” Witnesses told local media that they woke to the sound of the first blast around 11:30 p.m. followed by at least four more blasts. Images of the aftermath show a razed area about 500 meters wide and at least one crater roughly 6 meters deep, splintered wood from buildings, and twisted metal from vehicles. The Laiza resident, who went to Mung Lai Hkyet the next morning to assist, said that villagers described hearing shells hissing through the air as they ran for cover. “It’s a sound we’re familiar with since up here, we’ve all experienced the military’s attacks,” the resident said. “But when you see the damage, it could not just have been shells that did this.” All six members of one family were killed in the attack, while in another family the only surviving members were a 1-month-old and a 3-year-old, the resident said. Among those killed were 10 women, 10 girls younger than 18, seven men, and one 3-year-old boy. Human Rights Watch reviewed a local hospital’s patient registry from October 11 that lists 15 injured survivors, including five children, receiving ongoing treatment. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, a military spokesperson, denied responsibility for the attack in state media and suggested the explosion was caused by explosives stored in the village by the KIA. The Myanmar military has repeatedly conducted airstrikes on populated areas in violation of the laws of war. In April, Myanmar forces killed at least 160 people in an airstrike using a thermobaric bomb – or “fuel-air explosive” – in Sagaing Region. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) reported that airstrikes in Myanmar have increased every month since February this year. The laws of war prohibit attacks that target civilians and civilian objects, that do not or cannot discriminate between civilians and combatants, or that are expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian property that is disproportionate to any anticipated military advantage. The laws of war require parties to a conflict to distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives, and attacking forces must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives. If there is doubt as to whether an object normally used for civilian purposes, such as a school, is being used for military purposes, it should be presumed not to be. Individuals committing or ordering serious laws-of-war violations with criminal intent, meaning deliberately or recklessly, are responsible for war crimes. The repeated unlawful attacks on Mung Lai Hkyet, without demonstrating the presence of military targets, strongly suggest that the attack was deliberate or reckless. United Nations officials, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other groups have repeatedly said that the UN Security Council should impose an arms embargo on the Myanmar military and measures to cut off its aviation fuel, as well as targeted sanctions on the military’s revenues. The United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and other countries have imposed targeted sanctions on the Myanmar military and its business and banking interests, meant to pressure the military to stem abuses and engage with diplomatic efforts over Myanmar’s current crisis. Several concerned governments have taken bilateral steps to block sales or transfers of aviation fuel. Concerned governments should better coordinate to enforce those sanctions and make them more effective, while pressing the Security Council to match them globally, Human Rights Watch said. “The Myanmar military won’t stop committing atrocities until other governments work together to impose real economic restrictions and meaningful blockages of weapons, fuel, and materiel,” Maung said. “The status quo will only bring more war crimes and civilian deaths.”..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
2023-10-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Insight Email No. 25 This Insight Email is published on October 16, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on October 13, 2023. In this week’s Insight Email No. 25, ISP-Myanmar focuses on the incident of the Mung Lai Hkyet explosion and what the consequences could be. In addition, it gives an analysis of “the Military’s Succession Crisis” and the widening generation gaps in military leadership. The bulletin also discusses the extreme weather and severe floods in Myanmar brought by El Niño at the beginning of the season: Bago City, for example, encountered the worst recorded incident of flooding in 60 years. Furthermore, a widespread trend of corruption is discussed, along with ISP-Myanmar’s socio-economic survey findings. Last, but not least, the ILO’s Commission of Inquiry report on Myanmar and the future consequences of it are examined......1.Huge Explosion in Mung Lai Hkyet IDP Camp A huge explosion occurred on the night of October 9 in Mung Lai Hkyet, a place close to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) headquarters on the China–Myanmar border. This is a region of plains between two mountain ranges: “hkyet” means “ravine” in the Kachin language and holds a shelter for many refugees. The bizarre explosion in Mung Lai Hkyet was so severe that a large earthen hole remained at ground zero. The whole Mung Lai Hkyet IDP camp was damaged, and at least 130 families of the 600 displaced persons it houses were evacuated in an emergency. Reports indicate that 29 people, including eleven children, were killed and that 57 others were injured in the explosion. There are controversies surrounding who committed the October 9 attack. A KIA spokesperson said it was presumably an artillery or drone attack by the State Administration Council(SAC) and is still investigating what type of weapon was used. The SAC’s spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, denied that the deed was committed by the SAC, and explained that it may have been an explosion of stored ammonium nitrate. The KIA rejected this statement.....The BBC Burmese news mentioned on October 10 that the destructive explosion in Mung Lai Hkyet caused all residents living within 300 meters to be killed and injured many outside the 300-meter area. The blast left a large hole in the ground and damaged buildings and vehicles in the surrounding area. The scene is likely to be mentioned as a discarded mine site, BBC reported. Mung Lai Hkyet turned into a bald mountain that seem like bulldozed by machines, causing a village to disappear overnight. The SAC’s military columns have been attacking KIA forces in Nam Sam Yang village for months since July. Concurrently with the Mung Lai Hkyet explosion, the SAC had fired on the area. On September 28, 2023, the SAC forces shelled places near Mung Lai Hkyet, killing one Arakan Army (AA) officer and injuring another ten. Reportedly, the shells were fired from Khara ridge, situated six miles distance from KIA HQ. Khara ridge was a former post of KIA base and the SAC force occupied in 2013. In another incident, on November 19, 2014, the military fired artillery on KIA’s officer training school, and 23 cadets of KIA’s allied forces were killed. In December 2016, the military shelled Mung Lai Hkyet village and at least 400 refugees were forced to flee. The consequences of the Mung Lai Hkyet incident may be enormous. Immediately, it will have an impact on the SAC’s preparations for the anniversary of the eight-year Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which it is aiming to organize differently than in the past. The incident may have a moral and sentimental impact on invited guests of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), leaders of political parties, and local and international guests. The incident may fuel distrust and escalate conflicts. If the SAC is sure they were not responsible for the incident, the parties can request an international investigation by China and ASEAN officials. The SAC mentioned that Chinese police are investigating the cause of the explosion while China’s foreign minister only stated that “China is paying close attention to the reports” and “calling on relevant parties to resolve disputes peacefully through dialogue and consultation, avoid escalation of the situation, and take concrete and effective measures to ensure security at the China–Myanmar border.”.....2.The Military’s Succession Crisis and Generation Gap Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun, a member of the State Administration Council (SAC), and Brig. Gen. Yan Naung Soe were convicted of many offenses, including high treason and corruption, and sentenced by court martial on October 10, 2023, to suffer transportation for a life sentence, equal to a 20-year term. Until this adjudication, Moe Myint Tun (DSA 30) took charge of the military as chief of staff and presumably, he gained favor with the commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing. He was then poised to become Min’s successor. It is typical to deduce who is going along on the trips with the SAC head and who are among the top brass by observing the standing protocol in the official newspapers. Much like the synchronized retirements of Snr. Gen. Than Shwe and Deputy Snr. Gen. Maung Aye, if the current Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and Deputy Snr. Gen. Soe Win retire concurrently, Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo (DSA 25), who was serving as the chief of general staff for the army, navy, and air force, was once speculated to be the next commander-in-chief of Myanmar defense services. Reportedly, he was thought to be chosen by former junta leader Than Shwe. Nevertheless, since the 2021 military coup, he became minister of defense and was later transferred to deputy prime minister and minister of transport and communications, an apparent demotion. After the punishment of Moe Myint Tun, Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo was assigned to key positions as his replacement. But now he is turning 62 and is therefore less likely to lead the military as commander-in-chief. When Min Aung Hlaing (DSA 19) was selected for the commander-in-chief, he was a military cadet generation 18–19 years younger than his superiors, Snr. Gen. Than Shwe (OTS 9) and Deputy Snr. Gen. Maung Aye (DSA 1). For that reason, the next commander-in-chief could be chosen from the younger military generation from the Defense Service Academy (DSA), and may end up being someone such as the 30th-batch graduate, Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun. Moreover, it is generally thought that the new commander-in-chief should be in their 50s, as he would be able to serve under two terms of government (two terms of five years). Since the prospective Moe Myint Tun was removed from the scene, who will become the next commander-in-chief for the Myanmar military is still being speculated about. Some military analysts anticipate he could be the rapidly rising Lt. Gen. Kyaw Swa Lin (born 1971, present age: 52) (DSA 35), the present quartermaster general of the defense services. He was popular when he was commanding the Central Military Command in Mandalay with the rank of brigadier general. In 2020, he was promoted to lieutenant general and became the youngest in that position in Myanmar’s army. Though he is taking the position of quartermaster general, he has not been assigned to lead the military’s Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which sets him apart from his predecessors. Moreover, he is reportedly linked to the now-removed Moe Myint Tun. Another potential contender for the commander-in-chief position is Lt. Gen. Ko Ko Oo (DSA 38), present commander of Bureau of Special Operation (BSO) No. 1. In 2020, he was appointed to command the Central Military Command in Mandalay with the rank of brigadier general, he was only 45 and the youngest commander of a military regional command. He became head of BSO No. 1 in August 2023. Previously, he commanded the military chief of staff and Military Operation Command (MOC). He is reportedly the son of former deputy minister of President Office No. 4, U Aung Thein, in U Thein Sein’s administration. Lt. Gen. Thet Pon (DSA 29), the present commander of BSO. No. 5 is another possible successor. He is currently commanding in Yangon. He was honored for his performance on the 2020 National Independence Day. But as he was leading the forces to violently crush peaceful protestors, sanctions were imposed upon him by the governments of the European Union and Canada. But he is unlikely to be selected because of his rather old age. According to the SAC’s Protocol, another important possible contender is Lt. Gen. Ye Win Oo (OTS 77), who is currently the SAC’s joint secretary and commander of Military Affairs Security (MAS). According to the official seating plan, he seems to be on the front line and quite stable in the SAC. Nevertheless, in Myanmar military tradition, commanders of auxiliary forces rarely become commanders-in-chief, but rather, it is most often infantry commanders that come to this highest position. He is now 57. Yet, military commanders junior to Lt. Gen. Kyaw Swa Lin (DSA 35) could also be selected as commanders-in-chief to be. BSO No. 4 Commander, Lt. Gen. Nyunt Win Swe (DSA 36), should be on watch lists. If the successor selection reaches this point, there will be a widening generation gap in the military. Once, there was an 18- or 19-year gap in the military cadet generation, between Snr. Gen. Than Shwe and Min Aung Hlaing, and the gap between Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and the next commander-in-chief will be at least 17 years. The younger officers will find it very difficult to raise questions to the present commanders in charge of the military. In case, if there were some senior officers selected to be the next commander-in-chief, it is customary to nurture them at least three years in service and it may take time. The present commander-in-chief may groom these officers until he is satisfied. Then the time frame of the military succession will conflict with the speculating election timeline in 2025. Min Aung Hlaing’s dream to shift his career to politics could take longer if he is to leave his military chief post in good hands. At this moment, Myanmar’s military faces tremendous challenges in its legitimacy, in its centrality, in its performance, in its guardian role, and in its popular support. Last, but not the least, there is an interesting point for military leadership. When the military staged a coup in 1988, the head of SLORC/SPDC, Snr. Gen. Than Shwe, was 48 and Secretary, Gen. Khin Nyunt was in 40s. At the time of 2021 coup, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing was 66 (presently, he is 68). This could be interpreted as a large difference in age. The current heads of the SAC could lack in proactivity, aggression, attentiveness, and innovation, compared to the junta leaders of SLORC/SPDC in the past. As people age, they become more conservative and resistant to change. Current senior military commanders may want to retire peacefully at ease after their terms. They could be hardly become change makers. As time progresses, the military succession crisis and the deepening generational gap will assume increasing significance.....3.Extreme Weather and Acute Flooding in Myanmar... Soon after the commencement of the extreme weather phenomenon of El Niño, some areas of Myanmar experienced acute floods. In Bago City, the water level reached 940 cm on October 9, above the “danger level” of 880cm. In three days of flooding, fifteen wards and nine villages (80 percent of the city) were inundated, amounting to the worst flooding in 60 years, affecting 13,000 people. News reported that in addition to Bago City, Hmawbi, Taik-Kyi, Kyaik Hto townships and some places on the Yangon–Mandalay highway and railway were underwater. During the El Niño phenomenon, extreme weather can cause drought, extreme heat and floods in various places, which can damage crops. In SAC’s official newspaper, the SAC officials explain the nature of El Niño to the public in many townships. However, this is not enough, and many preparations should be made on the side of the authorities, such as disaster preparedness, the empowerment of the population, climate-sensitive budgeting, and linking to international humanitarian agencies and climate diplomacy. During the last year of the U Thein Sein administration, in July and August 2015 (during the previous El Niño phenomenon), floods inflicted extensive damage in Myanmar: twelve out of 14 states and regions were inundated, affecting a million people. Myanmar faces the problem of flooding almost every year and some years are much worse than others. In 2015, some estimated that Myanmar could lose two percent of its GDP because of flooding. For coming natural emergencies, the mantra of “self-help” is not enough: more preparation is required.....∎ Trends to be watched Widespread Corruption in Myanmar To understand the post-coup insight into Myanmar’s society, ISP-Myanmar conducted a socio-economic study in 110 townships to identify the SAC’s performance of public services in the three months of May, June, and July 2023. One question in the study was whether it is necessary to pay bribes to township-level officials to get things done. The findings indicated that it is required to pay cash bribes to township officials in 70 to 107 out of 110 townships observed (64 to 97 percent). It is common for people to have to pay gifts to officials and staff in exchange for the public services they receive. The study observed the SAC’s municipal, tax office, immigration office, electricity supply office, education, hospitals, and administration offices in terms of taking bribes. According to the July findings, people need to pay immigration officials in 109 townships out of 110 townships observed. The second most corruption-ridden offices are municipal, courts and administration offices. The survey result shows people use money to pay bribes in 103 out of 110 townships surveyed. The office that is most likely to accept gifts, rather than money, as bribes is the education department; this was reported by 57 out of 110 townships in May, and this increased to 76 townships in June and July. Another office likely to accept gifts as bribes is the township court; this was observed in 55 townships in May, and 69 townships in June and July.....It is conspicuous that people use gold to pay bribes. It was found that people pay gold as a bribe to township court officials in nine townships in May, eight townships in June, and nine townships in July. Survey results found that administration offices were second most likely to accept gold jewelry; this was reported by six townships in May, two townships in June, and four townships in July, respectively. The tax offices are the third most likely to accept gold: three townships reported this in May, three townships reported this in June, and four townships reported this in July. The least corrupted departments were found to be hospitals. This was reported by 25 townships in May, 22 townships in June, and 19 townships in July. This was followed by electricity supply offices, as reported by 18 townships in May, 24 townships in June, and 21 townships in July. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (2022), Myanmar received a score of 23 out of a range from 0 (“highly corrupt”) to 100 (“very clean”). Myanmar ranked 157th out of the 180 countries in the Index. What the results of the ISP-Myanmar’s survey show is the ‘petty corruption’ present among public servants working at the township level. However, the bribe payments involve gold and cannot be underestimated as petty. It is presumable there could be “policy-level corruption” at higher levels of administration. The recent SAC’s actions taken against Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun, Brig. Gen. Yan Naung Soe and other officers may be a good example. However, ISP-Myanmar’s survey findings cannot reveal the corruption of such “big fish”. Academic studies suggested there will be more corruption if there is a combination of a “monopoly of power” and the “discretion of officials” while lacking “accountability.” In post-coup Myanmar, check-and-balance mechanisms are dysfunctional, as no parliamentary representatives question public services, and there is a very limited and risky role of activists and the media. On the other hand, the pay given to public servants hardly rises in accordance with rapidly increasing inflation and commodity prices. Because of inflation, their spending power is largely dwindling. This trend will inevitably drive these public servants to compensate for their falling standard of living with corruption. ∎ What ISP is reading? ILO’s Investigation Report and Potential Bigger Impacts on Myanmar ILO. (August 4, 2023). Towards Freedom and Dignity in Myanmar. 207 pages A few days ago, the International Labor Organization (ILO) published an investigation report on Myanmar. In June 2021, after the military coup in Myanmar, the ILO called upon the military to restore democracy and respect its citizens’ human rights. At the 344th governing body meeting of Switzerland’s Geneva-based ILO from March 14 to 26, 2022, it was decided to set up a high-level commission of inquiry with respect of the non-observance by Myanmar of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29). The SAC’s Labor Ministry issued a statement on April 4, 2022, strongly rejecting the decision, as it was unilateral. The Governing Body of the ILO later appointed persons to serve on the Commission of Inquiry: Judge Raul Cano Pangalangan (Philippines) as chairperson and Judge Dhayanithie Pillay (South Africa) and Dr Faustina Pereira (Bangladesh) as members. ILO’s Commission of Inquiry emphasized particularly Convention 87 and Convention 29. The Commission concluded in the report that the military control has “had a disastrous impact on the exercise of basic civil liberties. Trade union members and leaders have been killed, arbitrarily arrested, subjected to sham trials, convicted, detained, abused, and tortured, threatened, intimidated, subjected to surveillance, forced into exile.” In addition, the report of more than 200 pages mentioned with evidence that “women trade union leaders have been exposed to particularly violent treatment on the part of the security apparatus, including sexual violence.” The ILO’s high-level Commission of Inquiry on Myanmar is the 14th action in its history spanning more than a hundred years. There is a three-month deadline for the Myanmar junta to respond. The Commission has investigated not only the SAC but also the forced labor practices of EAOs in conflict areas, such as the Shan State Army (SSA/SSPP), the Shan State Restoration Council (SSA/RCSS), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Arakan Army (AA). The SAC Labor Ministry issued a statement mentioning that “Myanmar is a member state of the ILO, complying with ILO Convention No. 87: no one is punished or taken action for practicing his or her rights peacefully or being a member of a trade union. According to the Labor Organization Law (2011), Myanmar granted registrations to over 3,000 organizations – 2,886 basic labor organizations, 162 township labor organizations, 26 region/state labor organizations, nine labor federations, one confederation of trade unions of Myanmar, one basic employers’ organization, one township employers’ organization, and one employers’ federation. More than 190,000 workers are enjoying their rights in these organizations.” Again, on September 2, 2022, the SAC Labor Ministry strongly rejected the ILO’s website display about Myanmar. A trade unionist assisting with labor issues in Myanmar discussed the ISP-Myanamr for their sandwiched difficulties. Though the SAC claims no official ban on trade unions, the most restrictive new organization law makes it difficult to be registered. These labor campaigners are not collaborating with higher-level ministries, but they are assisting garment workers with township-level officers to mediate industrial conflicts with factory owners and laborers when there were protests and sit-ins to demand pay raises and healthier worksites. Then, they faced criticism from exiles as collaborating with the illegal junta. In the post-coup situation, tripartite negotiations between employers, workers and the government and industrial arbitration have stopped. The SAC announced the minimum wage as 5,800 kyats, changed from 4,800 kyats on October 5, 2023. However, it is unilateral and does not follow the 2013 Minimum Wage Law, which requires to set the minimum wage based on the negotiated result of employers, workers, and government representatives. Unquestionably, workers in Myanmar are losing their rights to be represented, to make demands, and to organize themselves in trade unions. What could happen if the Myanmar junta doesn’t accept the recommendations of the ILO? In the late 1990s, international sanctions against Myanmar were initiated because of forced labor issues, rather than political ones. This time, if the junta commits similar violations as the ILO demands it to stop, or fails to reform according to the recommendations, the ILO refers the matter to the International Court of Justice, the UN’s top court, without passing through the UN Security Council. On the other hand, the trade unions’ actions will be immense and will fight for the rights of workers in Myanmar, which could result in a heavy blow to trade and tourism..."
Source/publisher: Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar
2023-10-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Between October 8th and 14th Military Junta arrested and used as human shields more than 7 civilians from the Sagaing Region . Military Junta burnt and killed 2 civilians including an underaged child from Kale Township in Sagaing Region. Military Junta Troop attacked with heavy artillery to Monelaichat IDP camp in Laiza, Kachin State and 32 civilians including 13 children were killed. The Military Troop also started cutting off Telecommunication in Tedim, Chin State on October 13th. About 35 civilians died and over 18 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light attacks within a week. They arrested over 22 civilians and killed 7 within a week. 4 children were injured and 15 killed when the Military Junta committed violations..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-10-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-16
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Sub-title: The Time for Reflection and New Solutions
Description: "15 October 2023 marks the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which the State Administration Council and few remaining ethnic armed organisations in the accord are honouring in Nay Pyi Taw. Although the NCA process did involve a lot of theatre, the SAC’s true commemoration of the NCA occurred in the middle of the night earlier this week, when the military bombed the Kachin internally displaced persons’ camp of Munglai Hkyet, near the border with China. The attack killed at least 29 persons, including young children, with 56 more injured. Throughout the NCA negotiation and attempted implementation periods, fighting and human rights violations raged on, especially in the country’s north. The Myanmar military and government blocked humanitarian assistance then, as the SAC continues now. The international community responded at times with statements of concern and other assistance, but lacked coherent approaches to curtail the killing or ensure compliance with agreements. On this anniversary, the NCA’s vestigial institutions remain without public legitimacy, manipulated as part of the SAC’s strategy to divide, confuse, and manipulate national and international actors. The NCA’s basic principles remain valued by various actors, but would be more likely to be practised through new and different approaches and processes. Drawn from an analysis of the NCA published by TNI earlier this year, this summary highlights how the accord was never inclusive, effectively developed or truly implemented and is not fit for purpose in a political and conflict landscape greatly changed since the 2021 coup.* During the past three decades, the term ‘peace process’ has been commonly used in Myanmar to describe endeavours to end the country’s long-running political and ethnic conflicts. In reality, the Myanmar peace process has always been one of the most labyrinthine in the world. Dating back to 1989, a diversity of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral processes has been underway. In recent years, they were held together by the aspirations of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and 21st Century Panglong Conference. These two initiatives came to an abrupt halt with the military coup on 1 February 2021. To date, there has been no ‘peace process’ breakthrough that has led to national reconciliation and meaningful reform. The country remains far from the achievement of peace that reaches to all peoples, and Myanmar is currently in the midst of one of its most violent and conflict-divided periods of history since independence in 1948. The peace process – as reconfigured by government after 2011 – no longer exists. The present breakdown, however, should not be a time of resignation and despair. In the determination of young people and re-imagining of national politics since the coup, there are hopes that a new realism has entered the peace and reform vocabulary which will ultimately lead to effective solutions. For this to happen, it is vital that lessons are learned from the injustices and experiences of the past. Far from being new, the NCA was the latest in a long line of peace process failures, and it repeated many of the inequalities and inconsistencies that undermined peace efforts during previous cycles of government. Despite its high profile, the NCA never marked a moment of national breakthrough. Rather, conflict spread in several parts of the country from the time of its signing, pre-shadowing the state of ethno-political collapse which exists today. For these reasons, the NCA’s journey demands close examination. A Backdrop of Failure Many problems can be identified in the failure to build a nationwide process for peace. These were evident even before the 2021coup and renewed spread of civil war. Following the NCA’s 2015 signing, a catalogue of errors quickly built up. The treaty was initiated under the quasi-civilian administration of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). But the difficulties continued after the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to government office in 2016. Problems and weaknesses in the NCA were not acknowledged; the peace process was not inclusive; the hand of the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat) was never far away; and initiatives to address the reform impasse too often ended in stagnation, political regression and increased conflict. Ultimately, over many years of meetings, the NCA did not bring the key stakeholders and conflict actors to the same table. Underpinning these failures, the complex nature of the NCA process led to procedural breakdowns and a build-up of disagreements over technical issues. Restructuring the peace process and addressing technical problems was undoubtedly necessary. But the challenges at the root of conflict and failure in negotiations have always been political. Technical fixes alone were never likely to bridge the political divides that exist on such scale. The outcome was the prioritisation of process over delivery, meaning that many commitments were never fulfilled. In part, these failures stemmed from very different perspectives among NCA signatories over the role of the agreement as a process towards ending armed conflict, protecting the human rights of war-affected communities and negotiating reform. For their part, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – both those party to the NCA and those outside the agreement – focused on the need for trust-building and substantive agreements first. In contrast, government and Tatmadaw leaders insisted on resuming formal meetings or signing agreements before addressing concerns about trust, substance and the implementation of ceasefires. Meanwhile, despite the promise of Panglong-21, NLD leaders focused on electoral politics rather than the peace process as the instrument for reform once in office. In consequence, fundamental differences in interests and needs were never addressed, and the parliamentary and peace processes were never brought on to the same track. These proved errors of historic proportions. The NCA never acted as a catalyst for building ethnic peace and national unity. Instead, dysfunction and instability grew at the heart of the peace negotiation process. National politics remained dominated by the ethnic Bamar (Burman) majority; the NLD and Defence Services were uneasy partners in government under the 2008 constitution; the Tatmadaw maintained a controlling role in many aspects of political, economic and security affairs (including selecting dialogue partners); ethnic armed movements were represented by a diverse array of ceasefire and non-ceasefire organisations; ethnic political parties and civil society organisations were never effectively included in the NCA or wider peace process; and the Tatmadaw continued to back a multitude of local militia groups and Border Guard Forces that play a key role in their efforts to manage conflict in the ethnic borderlands. Warning signings were persistently ignored. After the NCA was signed, frustration with the peace process tangibly grew in many ethnic states and regions. Continued fighting, land expropriation, the internal displacement of civilians, natural resource exploitation and the acceleration of business deals with outside investors all sustained an impression that the peace process was being used as a delaying device to constrain ethnic demands while the social, legal, political and economic landscape was reshaped to the government’s agenda and advantage. Too often, renewed conflicts in different parts of the country (including anti-Rohingya violence) were regarded by NCA donors and supporters as exceptions rather than evidence of urgent and systemic failings that need to be addressed. Rather than aiming towards peace, many political actors came to view the process as a continuation of war by other means. In consequence, the NCA never gained the momentum of countrywide support. Among many failings, the most outstanding was the continuing launch of military operations by the Defence Services. Even while the NCA and peace talks continued, further militarization and the build-up of Tatmadaw forces took place in both ceasefire and non-ceasefire territories of the country. While new ceasefires were agreed in areas that had seen decades of fighting, old ceasefires broke down in places where armed conflict had been mostly absent for 15 years. For communities living in these areas, the words ‘peace process’ sounded very hollow. Military security – not human security – appeared to be the main priority of the central authorities, raising serious questions about the intentions of both the government and Tatmadaw leaders. For all these reasons, contemporary judgments will be harsh. Despite many fine words, there were no fundamental changes in the conflict landscape before or after the NCA signing. Rather than charting a political roadmap for inclusive peace, the NCA process all too frequently appeared to be a vehicle for asserting and increasing Tatmadaw control. All the major challenges in conflict resolution remained, most of which exacerbated over time, and no political endgame ever came in view. Once the NCA had been signed, there was little momentum towards improving the functioning of ceasefires, deepening the reform basis of dialogue or making the process work. As these failures continued, key elements in the NCA architecture either fell by the way side or were never fully implemented. Major omissions and weaknesses included the inadequacies or lack of national-level dialogue meetings, interim arrangements, security sector reform and new processes for political negotiation and agreement. Warnings were constantly flagged up. But ameliorative steps were never sufficiently taken. Instead, from the beginning of 2020 both the NCA and national landscape were dominated by two new imperatives: Covid-19 and the November general election. Hopes that they might produce reflective shifts in the transitional landscape swiftly evaporated. The opportunity to use political and health responses as a means to promote cooperation and understanding between EAOs and government departments was missed by the NLD-led administration. Continued fighting, NCA neglect and the conduct of polling amidst a global pandemic only exacerbated ethno-political concerns. In reality, long before the 2021 coup it was clear that the NCA was malfunctioning as a process for national reform. The Lack of International Focus and Cohesion As these events unfolded, the actions of the international community also reflected different, and often divergent, aspects of Myanmar’s conflict impasse. A decade of international support for the peace process and political transition ultimately came to count for very little. Many decisions came out of self-interest rather than informed understanding of the diverse and complex challenges on the ground. A coherent peace programme never emerged, and there were many inconsistencies in the international response. There was no shortage of international actions. Egregious human rights violations became the subject of investigation by the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. At the same time, political and business actors in China, India, Japan and various Western states were in rivalry for influence over the country’s political and economic direction. All affirmed support for the NCA and peace process as an essential step in political transition. But there was no consensus on policies or priorities to pursue. There was a failure to recognise Tatmadaw stratagems and the inherent weaknesses of the Myanmar state, opportunities were lost, and the manifest problems within the NCA were never addressed. Adding to the difficulties, while Western actors mainly focused their peace efforts on engagement with the Myanmar government and ethnic armed organisations based in the southeastern borderlands with Thailand, the prism of Chinese officials and businesses – always a key influence in the country – was mainly through the Myanmar government, Tatmadaw and EAOs based along its Yunnan border. Neither Western nor Chinese actors seemed willing and able to engage with all relevant groups. Rather, both apparently failed to understand that leaving out key groups in the peace process would be a major obstacle to achieving lasting solutions. Ultimately, these exclusions were never addressed. The SAC Coup: a New Cycle of Conflict and Division For the moment, the 1 February 2021 coup by the military State Administration Council (SAC) has consigned the NCA as a potential and inclusive model for political negotiation and peace-building to history. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the NLD which won the 2020 general election are in prison, and peaceful protests have been brutally suppressed. To all intents and purposes, the tentative moves during the past decade towards a new system of federalism and democracy, brought about by negotiation and peace-building, have been brought to an end. By seizing power, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing may have thought it easy to return the political clock back to the Tatmadaw-controlled past. Instead, the country is faced with a scale of repression, violence and humanitarian emergency that echoes the worst times of civil war since independence in 1948. Protest and resistance against the regime has spread among the Bamar-majority population; ceasefires – including by three NCA signatories – have broken down in different parts of Chin, Karen, Kayah, Mon and Rakhine States; existing conflicts have escalated in Kachin and northern Shan States; and new armed struggles have developed in Magway, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and other regions as well as urban areas. The consequences have been profound. The NCA and broader peace process have been subsumed into a very different ethno-political landscape from the context in which they developed. The structures and divisions in conflict have significantly changed. Amidst a diversity of new movements and alignments, there are two rival governments claiming legitimacy in the country: the SAC and National Unity Government (NUG). In this new battleground, a host of resistance groups – generally known as People’s Defence Forces – have proliferated across the country, and their roles in any future process of political negotiation and peace-building are very uncertain. Reflecting the scale of violence, the nature of warfare has also changed. Anti-regime forces seek to launch urban attacks, while the SAC has increasingly relied on aerial attacks targeting civilian populations and created new Pyu Saw Hti and other local militia forces as it loses control on the ground. Many communities and civilians are caught in the crossfire, with it dangerous to publicly express political opinions or allegiances. SAC leaders, in the meantime, have been using the empty language of a new general election and the NCA as a theatre to try and divide opponents and deceive credulous outsiders. Since the coup, there has been no peace process or political roadmap of real prospect underway. If the NCA did not achieve breakthroughs under an NLD-led administration, it is improbable that this could happen under a regime headed by the Tatmadaw which, even before the coup, was the most disruptive actor in the implementation of the accord, consistently escalating violence and negating its own agreements. In the propaganda struggle, there have been intermittent meetings by the SAC with some of the remaining EAO NCA-signatories that have agreed to talks since the coup. But they are mostly among the smallest and weakest in the country. Such parties, several of which are breakaway or remnant factions, can never be regarded as representative of political opinion in the country at large while civil war continues and most of the leading voices for political change are excluded. The same lack of credibility awaits any future general election held by the military while major pro-democracy parties are repressed and during ongoing suppression of freedom of expression. Looking forward, discussions continue in political circles – framed around the vision of federal democracy – about how a successful peace roadmap might be achieved. Although a single unifying platform may be difficult to achieve, the significance of the challenging work on coordination, relationship-building and practical governance across ethnic and pro-democracy forces should not be underestimated. It is urgent that these efforts be strengthened if military rule and state failure are to come to an end. As experience warns, national peace processes in Myanmar over the past three decades have only led to assimilation into systems designed by the Tatmadaw. They are not platforms for negotiation, demilitarisation and reform. Indeed the further proliferation in local militia and paramilitaries under Tatmadaw authority since the coup pushes even further into the future the prospect of a peace process that answers the root causes of conflict by political dialogue and democratic reform. After sixty years in power, the Tatmadaw strategy of ‘managing’ rather than ‘resolving’ conflict still continues. The post-coup landscape also compounds the challenges of engagement for the international community. Currently, the SAC is one of the most criticised armed actors in the world. This is evidenced by repeated condemnation by the Office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Independent Investigate Mechanism for Myanmar and other international bodies. Since the coup, impoverishment, the loss of life and civilian displacement due to conflict have only increased. Currently, there are counts of over three million refugees and IDPs, more than 19,000 political prisoners still in jail, 4,150 civilians killed by the security forces, and estimates of over 20,000 people, including combatants, killed in the conflict zones. Clearly, eight years after its signing, the NCA is effectively null and void. Recommendations and Lessons for the Future Given the scale of crisis, it is vital that a united response is developed which supports national healing rather than exacerbates division. It is for Myanmar’s peoples to determine their political future. But, in support of this, human rights protections are essential, and the perpetrators of violations on all sides must be held accountable if lasting peace and justice are to be achieved. In any conflict resolution path, accountability must be at the heart of peace-building. This has been demonstrably missing until now. To date, however, there is little indication of lessons learned. Despite the depth of humanitarian emergency, there has been no indication of a cohesive strategy to address the challenges of national breakdown, whether by the United Nations, ASEAN or other governments and international institutions. The same imperatives are also essential in any international efforts to build a future peace process. While peace is required, a new process may well be considered inappropriate in the circumstances of coup d'état and repression. New realities should be explored, including those that reflect the role of youth and social dynamics driving elite-level political change, the momentum supporting federal democratic reform, and agreements among stakeholder parties that go beyond the agenda of the 21st Century Panglong Conference. After decades of conflict and military rule, it needs to be recognised that fundamental mistakes were made in support for the NCA in the hopes for rapid change after the accord was signed. Manifestly, a different and broad-based approach has long been overdue. Since the coup, however, different international representatives have already sought to initiate talks between select groupings, including between the SAC and preferred EAOs, as if this will be enough to build a peace process that is just and equitable for the country. It is critical that such errors are not repeated once again. Simply continuing the same ceasefire practices, tinkering with accord guidelines and mechanisms, or changing faces around the NCA or other peace talk tables will never be sufficient. Most importantly, talks that exclude current major stakeholders or that primarily serve to reduce national and international pressure on the SAC to accede to the public’s demands for meaningful political change will never be enough, and indeed may instead further postpone the time when nationwide peace could become achievable. In this respect, Myanmar is not unique. After the ending of the Cold War, aid became a Western response to conflict. But this, in itself, does not provide the platform for peace and reform. Rather, it may entrench division and an unrepresentative elite in power. Too often the word ‘transition’ has been invoked as a panacea during the last three decades without understanding the political context and causes of state failure. At best, peace processes in Myanmar have frozen conflicts without opening the way to political solutions. Sustainable peace requires political agreement and compromise. In contrast, approaches that only serve to strengthen the state and existing security apparatus will cause resistance among the wider population, feed community grievances and delay the opportunity for meaningful change. In Myanmar, a legacy of failure has built up during the past decade that overshadows the NCA and peace process in five key areas: military dominance, non-inclusion, lack of implementation, lack of accomplishment, and lack of political will. After decades of conflict, all sides must take responsibility for their actions. But standing at the centre of these obstacles has always been the Tatmadaw. All too often, international actors have fallen for the illusion of a ‘normative’ state, which can be reformed, without recognising that the Tatmadaw has continued to dominate central government for more than half a century, claiming ‘prerogative’ powers for itself and intruding into every aspect of national life.** In the aftermath of the 2021 coup, the evidence is clear. Under the 2008 constitution, the Defence Services already enjoyed sweeping powers. But Tatmadaw leaders operate well beyond these parameters, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, land seizures, resource exploitation, paramilitary deployments, and political manipulation in favour of its own party, the USDP. As long as these practices continue, the NCA or any similar peace process can never be an instrument for national reconciliation and democratic reform. Transparency, inclusion, understanding, compromise and dialogue have always been essential steps in any meaningful process towards political transformation and lasting peace. On a cautionary note, precedent warns that the Tatmadaw leadership may continue to employ an ad hoc mixture of stratagems of political repression and ethnic ceasefires – bilateral, unilateral and NCA – as means to try and maintain central authority. In essence, the NCA, which had been used as a process to extend state control, is now being used to attempt to cling on to power – not as a gateway to political reform. As history has repeatedly shown, military-imposed systems will never achieve inclusive, just or sustainable solutions in the country. If the government does not represent the people, why should the people support it? Headed by a hermetic clique of ruling generals, the Tatmadaw leadership represents a Bamar-centric elite and a narrow nationalist view of the world. The question, then, remains for how much longer they can continue to find, persuade or coerce sufficient support to maintain such dominant position without long-needed reform. Myanmar today is a land in grave suffering and civil war. A decade after a new peace process began, the NCA did not lead to conflict resolution; it did not build the foundations for peace; and it did not lead to agreement for genuine political reforms to address the root causes of conflict and national instability. At the same time, the political landscape is far from static, and the polarisations in politics and society run deep. While military rule continues in Nay Pyi Taw, a diversity of ethnic armed movements remains in control of extensive territories, presenting very different visions for the future of the country. Adding to the complexity, there are a further cast of conflict actors in the wake of the new divisions created by the coup, claiming the right to be in the seat of government. These are presently symbolised by the SAC, NLD and NUG, while EAOs – in a number of alliances and positions – also demand that their voices are included if solutions are to be achieved. In any new peace process, these contested dynamics must be taken on board. A critical moment in post-colonial history has been reached. Hopes for better change still remain, and the struggle to shape Myanmar’s destiny is far from over. Shaken by the 2021 coup, there is a willingness among diverse parties to look at the challenges of conflict resolution anew, and there is a resolve that young people today will be the first generation to enjoy nationwide peace. The needs for reform are greater than simply regime change, requiring a federal democratic system of governance which, as the 1947 Panglong Agreement set out, is based upon the equality and union of all peoples. A political process towards peace, taking account of experiences in the past, can be a key element in such change. But to achieve this, the politics of exclusion must end and a fundamental change in political mind-set are essential. Political transformation, including sustainable and inclusive peace, are urgently required today. * Martin Smith and Jason Gelbort, The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar: Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control? (Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, April 2023). ** In Ernst Fraenkel’s theory of the ‘dual state’ (developed in the 1930s), the ‘normative’ state co-exists with the ‘prerogative’ state whereby authoritarian parties or actors employ unlimited, arbitrary powers and violence unchecked by legal protections: see, Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 2017)..."
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2023-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-15
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Description: "Highlights: According to recent monitoring of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) incidents during the first seven months of 2023, a total of 650 casualties have been reported nationwide. This figure represents a stark increase, amounting to 167% of the total casualties reported in 2022 (390 recorded). Delving into the regional breakdown, Sagaing Region emerged with the highest number of casualties, accounting for 39% of the overall total. Bago and Shan followed with 13% and 8% of the total, respectively. The remaining regions, encompassing Ayeyarwady, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Rakhine, Tanintharyi and Yangon, collectively accounted for the remaining 40% of the total casualties. Children constitute 22% of the total casualties arising from landmine and ERW explosions across the country. It is important to note that these figures only reflect civilian casualties.....အဓိကဖော်ပြချက်များ မြေမြှုပ်မိုင်းနှင့် ပေါက်ကွဲစေတတ်သော စစ်ကျန်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ၏ ဖြစ်ရပ်များကိုလတ်တလောစောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာချက်များအရ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ပထမ ခုနစ်လတာကာလအတွင်း တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး အတိုင်းအတာဖြင့် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက် (၆၅၀ ဦး) ရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤကိန်းဂဏန်းသည် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်တွင် အစီရင်ခံတင်ပြခဲ့သော အရေအတွက်ထက် သိသိသာသာတိုးမြင့်လာပြီး ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူစုစုပေါင်း၏ (၁၆၇) ရာခိုင်နှုန်း ရှိနေခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည် (၃၉၀ ဦး အစီအရင်ခံခဲ့)။ ဒေသအလိုက်အနေဖြင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း ဒေသကြီးတွင် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက် အများဆုံးဖြစ်ပြီး အရေအတွက်စုစုပေါင်း၏ (၃၉) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းရှိခဲ့ပြီး ပဲခူးတွင် (၁၃) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းနှင့် ရှမ်းတွင် (၈) ရာခိုင်နှုန်း အသီးသီးရှိကြပါသည်။ ဧရာဝတီ၊ ချင်း၊ ကချင်၊ ကယား၊ ကရင်၊ မကွေး၊ မန္တလေး၊ မွန်၊ တနင်္သာရီနှင့် ရန်ကုန် အပါအဝင် ကျန်ဒေသများတွင် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက် စုစုပေါင်း၏ (၄၀) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းရှိပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတစ်ဝှမ်း မြေမြုပ်မိုင်းနှင့် စစ်ကျန်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ၏ပေါက်ကွဲမှုများကြောင့် ထိခိုက်ခံစားရသူအရေအတွက်စုစုပေါင်း၏ (၂၂) ရာခိုင်နှုန်းသည် ကလေးများဖြစ်ကြပါသည်။ ဤကိန်းဂဏာန်းများသည် အရပ်သားထိခိုက်ခံစားရမှုများကိုသာ ထင်ဟပ်ကြောင်း သတိပြုရန် အရေးကြီးပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
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Description: "Three of Myanmar’s armed groups say they will not hold talks with the regime until violence against civilians ends. The Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, which all signed the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), said they will snub Sunday’s ceremony in Naypyitaw to mark eight years since the deal was agreed. The three organizations, who are fighting the regime alongside resistance groups, said the 2021 coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA and nullified the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. A joint statement said the junta’s repeated attacks on civilians violated international humanitarian law. “This reinforces our position that the NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to resolve problems,” it said. In establishing a federal democratic union and sustainable peace, the three groups said they had laid out common objects and positions, including toppling the regime and ending military involvement in politics. They agreed to reform and reorganize the military fully under civilian control, draft a new constitution based on federalism and democracy and seek justice for the victims of the conflict. The revolutionary groups said talks would not be held without the regime ending violence against civilians and accepting the common objectives. “We demand a system change, not a change within the regime. Changing one military regime to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable,” said the armed groups. A new constitution and electoral system will create future governments based on a nation-unity model with a transitional authority agreed by all stakeholders, the statement said. It called on the public, the other NCA signatories and the international community to boycott the regime’s activities. Since the 2021 coup, the KNU has provided military training to several thousand anti-regime activists who have joined resistance groups. It is fighting with its allies in Karen and Mon states, Bago and Tanintharyi regions and the capital, Naypyitaw. The CNF’s armed allies are fighting the regime along with the Chinland Defense Forces in Chin State and neighboring Sagaing and Magwe regions..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
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Description: "Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is planning to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Naypyitaw on Sunday, even though some of the signatories have been fighting the Myanmar military since the 2021 coup, saying the accord is no longer valid. To his embarrassment, three signatories—the Karen National Union, Chin National Front and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front—said on Thursday that any attempt by the regime to base the peace process on the NCA would just “deepen the country’s crisis and prolong armed conflict” as the military takeover violated the peace agreement’s principles and aims. What is the NCA and who signed it? The NCA was signed on Oct. 15, 2015 between the Myanmar military, the nominally civilian government of President Thein Sein and eight ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). They are: Quitting the NCA Since the 2021 takeover, the KNU, CNF and ABSDF have denounced the coup and resumed fighting the military, saying the NCA was rendered void by the putsch. They have been joined in fighting the regime by non-signatories including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). All are not only fighting against the regime, but also arming and providing military training for anti-regime forces known as People’s Defense Forces. Who is still engaging with the regime’s peace talks? Faced with growing pressure and diplomatic isolation, Min Aung Hlaing invited EAOs, including non-signatories, to peace talks in April 2022 in an attempt to revive the NCA. The KNU, CNF and ABSDF rejected the invitation, saying the talks were not genuine efforts at seeking peace. The remaining signatories joined the talks. Three NCA non-signatories—the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)—also joined the talks. Despite the KNU’s rejection of the NCA, former KNU chairman Saw Mutu Say Poe, who led the KNU when it signed the NCA in 2015, recently met with Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw for what the regime described as peace talks. The KNU has distanced itself from the meeting and reaffirmed its commitment to Myanmar’s revolution. Observers said those EAOs that have agreed to participate in peace talks with the regime all have their own reasons for doing so. Most need to avoid conflict with the Myanmar military either to protect or promote their interests, while a few are small in size and poorly armed. RCSS leader Yawd Serk even said the PDFs would become armed robbers if not properly controlled by the NUG. Min Aung Hlaing has conferred honorary Wunna Kyawhtin titles on the leaders of the seven NCA signatories that are still engaging in peace talks with his regime. Some were conferred posthumously..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "We, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), Chin National Front (CNF) and Karen National Union (KNU), signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), express our common position regarding the coup makers’ commemoration of the 8th anniversary of the NCA signing and the fake peace talks supposedly based on the NCA as follows: 1. The aim of the NCA was to resolve the deep-rooted political crisis that had not been resolved by successive governments for more than 70 years. We wanted to build a federal democratic Union by amending the 2008 Constitution according to the results of an extra-parliamentary political dialogue in order to achieve sustainable peace. 2. The military coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA as well as nullified the 2008 Constitution. Therefore, the implementation of the NCA and the NCA-based political dialogue process came to a halt. 3. The military's repeated vicious attacks that target civilians by using its Army, Air Force and Navy are a flagrant violation of International Humanitarian Law. This reinforces our position that the NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to resolve political problems. 4. SAC’s use of the NCA to pressure NCA signatories, the fake implementation of the NCA through sham peace talks, the pretended activities of proposing to amend the invalid 2008 constitution and preparing to hold sham elections will deepen the crisis and push the country into protracted conflict. 5. ABSDF, CNF and KNU, the revolutionary organizations that signed the NCA, have laid down the following common political objectives and common political positions for the establishment of a federal democratic union to achieve sustainable peace. Common Political Objectives 5.1. To remove the coup makers and end the military's involvement in politics. 5.2. To reform and reorganize the military and place it fully under the administration of an elected civilian government. 5.3. To draft and ratify a new constitution based on federalism and democracy that is acceptable to all stakeholders. 5.4. To implement a process of transitional justice and seek justice for victims of conflict. 5.5. To agree on international involvement in facilitation, technical and financial support, monitoring, witnessing, observing, etc. at all stages of the implementation of the process. Common Political Positions 5.6. Dialogue will not be held unless SAC ends all violence against the people and accepts the above common political objectives. 5.7. We desire a system change, not just a regime change. Changing one military regime to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable. 5.8. Power-sharing between politically privileged groups at the expense of the people will not be accepted. 5.9. Resolution of the Myanmar crisis will require a constitution and an electoral system that will create future governments of Myanmar that are based on a ‘national unity’ model. 5.10. SAC is the main conflict partner. It is not an interim authority. A transition period requires a genuine transitional authority agreed upon by all stakeholders. 5.11. New elections can be held in Myanmar only after all the above steps are successful. 6. We urge the international governments and the entire people of the country, including the NCA signatories, to support the implementation process of our proposed political objectives without participating in the activities of the military that prolong the military dictatorship..."
Source/publisher: All Burma Students' Democratic Front, Chin National Front, Karen National Union
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "At least two of three siblings hospitalized following the strikes that annihilated their village in Kachin State shortly before midnight on Monday have yet to learn that their mother was killed, according to a volunteer helping survivors. One is too young—one-and-a-half-months old—while the three-year old is unconscious. It is unclear whether their elder brother, a six-year-old, can comprehend what happened. “Their mother died at the camp while her three children suffered injuries from the bombing. The middle child is severely injured, and he remains unconscious,” the volunteer said, adding: “Their father is somewhere at a front line fighting against junta troops.” Like his oldest son, he may not yet know that his wife had been killed. He also may not know that his three children have been hospitalized. The three siblings are among the 57 people injured that night in a series of blasts that killed at least 29 people, including 13 children—one of whom was just one-and-half-years old. Regime troops bombarded the village located about two miles north of Laiza Town, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) said. Laiza is the KIA”s headquarters. “A girl from my village lost all of her family members; her parents, her older brother and his wife. She is the only one who was not harmed because she was studying away from home,” a resident of Mung Lai Hkyet Village said. “Now she has nothing.” She is not the only one. She is not the only one who lost an entire family, residents of the village that was home to internally displaced persons (IDPs) said. The junta said on Wednesday that the deaths were a result of an explosion at a KIA warehouse containing about 105 tonnes of ammonium nitrate and weapons—countering the media reports that said the deaths were caused by the junta’s airstrikes or shelling. KIA spokesman Colonel Naw Bu dismissed the regime’s account as “propaganda”, telling The Irrawaddy that the armed group would never position a gunpowder warehouse near civilians. A KIA investigation had determined that junta had either used a high-tech drone or a fleet of drones carrying bombs to strike the IDP camp, he added. Other media reports say a series of blasts began shortly before midnight, with some reporting that the first one occurred at 11.30pm. Former residents of the village told The Irrawaddy that there was a series of explosions. The first was massive, and it was followed by several more, they said. Some pointed to craters that they said were proof their village was obliterated by numerous bombs. More than 600 IDPs from Mung Lai Hkyet Village are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, local aid groups said on Wednesday. Most former residents of the village are taking refuge in four shelters near the office of Woichyai IDP camp, a representative of the camp told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday. “We are struggling … We don’t have enough space for a large number of people. We also don’t have enough food to feed them,” he said. “They lost everything. We need to provide food, water, clothes, bedding, blankets, diapers, utensils and all sorts of commodities for them,” he added. Road blocks due to ongoing fighting between KIA troops and junta infantry units make it almost impossible to deliver humanitarian assistance to the victims, said a volunteer from Myitkyina, Kachin State’s capital. Former residents of Mung Lai Hkyet cannot return to their village because it no longer exists. “We want justice … This is not the first time they [junta troops] committed crimes against humanity,” a Kachin human rights activist, adding: “I want to stress the need for humanitarian assistance for those affected.” Following the massacre, the KIA and Myanmar parallel National Unity Government condemned the bombing as a war crime. The United Nations responded with a press release. It quoted Secretary-General Antonio Guterres saying he was “alarmed” by the deaths and that “those responsible must be held to account.” “The Secretary-General condemns all forms of violence, including the military’s intensifying attacks throughout the country, which continue to fuel regional instability,” the press release from Guterres’ office added. The British embassy in Yangon also issued a statement. It said it was “appalled by reports of a Myanmar military strike” that killed civilians..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: At least 29 people, including children, have been killed in an artillery strike on a displaced persons' camp in north-east Myanmar, near the Chinese border.
Description: "The camp is in an area controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), one of several ethnic insurgent groups which have been fighting for self-rule for many decades. All the victims were civilians, a KIO spokesman told the BBC. It is one the deadliest attacks in the 63-year-long conflict in Kachin State. Kachin officials say the armed forces have scaled up attacks on KIO-run areas over the past year because of growing Kachin support for other insurgent groups fighting the military government. Much of Myanmar has been embroiled in a wider civil war since a 2021 military coup displaced the country's elected government. The military has increasingly used air strikes against opposition-controlled towns and villages since seizing power. The exiled National Unity Government (NUG) has blamed the junta for the attack on the camp, describing it as a "war crime and crime against humanity". Junta spokesman Maj Gen Zaw Min Tun denied that the military was behind the attack. He claimed the army did not have any operations in the area and said the destruction was "probably" caused by stockpiled explosives. Devastation from the air in Myanmar's brutal civil war Global firms fuelling Myanmar's killer weapons The Myanmar soldiers refusing to fight Images shared by local media showed bodies being pulled from the rubble and dozens of body bags lying side by side. The attack late on Monday night happened in the Mong Lai Khet camp for displaced persons - on the outskirts of Laiza, the town on the Chinese border where the KIO has its headquarters. Parts of the camp were destroyed by powerful explosions at about midnight, KIO officials told the BBC. Footage of the aftermath shows many houses obliterated and large numbers of casualties. Kachin officials believe at least 11 children are among those killed. Fifty-six more people were also injured in the latest attack, 44 of whom had been taken to hospital for treatment. The United Nations in Myanmar said it was "deeply concerned" about reports of deaths in the camp. "IDP camps are places of refuge, and civilians, no matter where they are, should never be a target," it said in a statement on Facebook. The British embassy in the capital, Yangon, said it was "appalled by reports of a Myanmar military strike" that killed civilians. The area around the camp has experienced conflict for many years, as it is not far from the front lines, where Kachin troops in trenches face off against government forces. However, locals say that no fighting has taken place near the camp in recent times. It is possible the attack was carried out from the air, but Col Naw Bu of the Kachin Independence Army said the group "did not hear any aircraft". Almost exactly one year ago, the Myanmar air force used precision-guided bombs to attack an open-air concert at another Kachin base in the night, killing more than 80 people. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) - the KIO's armed wing - is one of the largest and most powerful insurgent groups in Myanmar. It has been fighting the central government sporadically since 1960 and consistently since a ceasefire broke down in 2011. Since the coup, the military government has viewed the KIA as a significant threat, as it has been giving weapons and training to some of the new insurgent groups which have formed across the country to resist military rule. KIA also has a long-standing alliance with the Arakan Army, an insurgent group formed initially in Kachin State. But since 2016, it has been operating in Rakhine State, on the other side of the country, where it has successfully challenged the military for control of much of the territory. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said in its latest report on the country that it had found a "seemingly endless spiral of military violence"..."
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Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On October 11, 2023, on the sidelines of Russian Energy Week, the State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom” and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar signed the Memorandum of Understanding in the field of nuclear infrastructure assessment and enhancement. The document was signed by Alexey Likhachev, Director General of Rosatom, and Dr. Myo Thein Kyaw, Union Minister for Science and Technology of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. The parties plan to determine the current needs for the development of the nuclear infrastructure of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and draw up a work plan for priority areas important for implementation of the small nuclear power plant construction project in the country. The document determines that the development of nuclear infrastructure will be carried out in accordance with the IAEA approaches and recommendations as well as Rosatom’s best practices. The memorandum also provides for building up further Russian-Myanmar cooperation in the field of training and human resources development, enhancement of safety culture in the organizations, participating in the nuclear energy development program of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Communications Department of ROSATOM
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-11
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Description: "A Myanmar regime military court has handed life imprisonment terms to the junta’s former trade chief, ex-Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun, and his assistant, ex-Brigadier General Yan Naung Soe, for corruption, according to junta media. The life imprisonment terms are equivalent to 20 years behind bars. The two were also removed from their military positions. The court martial verdicts follow the regime’s investigations into the activities of the duo, other high-ranking officials and hundreds of businesspeople last month. Moe Myint Tun, who has also been purged from the junta’s top administrative body, the State Administration Council, abused his position for personal benefit in violation of economic policies, and committed high treason by going against the roadmap and objectives of the regime, junta media said Tuesday, adding that he took bribes from companies and illegally held foreign currencies. He was the chairman of the Myanmar Investment Commission, the Foreign Exchange Supervisory Committee, and the Central Committee for Ensuring Smooth Flow of Trade and Goods. The regime announcement said he was found guilty of failing to take action against persons who raised the price of palm oil rather than selling it at the reference price set by the government. The Central Bank of Myanmar sold US dollars in order to import palm oil to be sold at the reference price, it said. “Moreover he … [took] bribes from companies, applying his rank and authority, illegally keeping foreign exchange currencies in hand, and participating in civilian businesses by breaking directives related to military discipline,” the statement reads. Prior to the investigation, The Irrawaddy reported that Moe Myint Tun had squirreled away millions of US dollars in bribes from businessmen over the past two years. Some of the businessmen told The Irrawaddy they had to pay him at least US$20,000 or the equivalent in gold and gifts—Louis XIII cognac, with a list price of more than $4,000 for a 750ml bottle, was highly preferred—just to meet him. Yan Naung Soe, joint secretary of the Central Committee for Ensuring Smooth Flow of Trade and Goods, personally benefited from violating the economic policies of the state and committed betrayal of the state and treason together with Moe Myint Tun, the regime said. “He also exchanged foreign currency for Myanmar kyats for businesspersons by applying his rank and authority, accepted foreign currency and Myanmar kyats from businesspersons, created connections between businesspersons with ex-Lt-Gen Moe Myint Tun, illegally kept foreign currencies in hand, and participated in civilian businesses in violation of directives related to the military discipline,” the regime said. The corruption scandal involving Moe Myint Tun and Yan Naung Soe embarrassed regime chief Min Aung Hlaing. He issued a warning late last month that senior military officers and ministers caught abusing their power for personal benefit would face heavy penalties in addition to dismissal. However, despite Min Aung Hlaing’s highly publicized anti-graft campaign against his subordinates, it is common knowledge that he leads the regime in terms of corruption and that his son Aung Pyae Sone and daughter Khin Thiri Thet Mon have abused their father’s power to amass great wealth..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "OVERVIEW The humanitarian situation in Myanmar has been deteriorating since the military coup in February 2021 that overthrew the Government led by the National League for Democracy. The takeover of the military junta has intensified violence and conflict across the country and limited people’s freedom. The operating environment has also shrunk for humanitarian and development organisations. To design programmes, including life-saving interventions, and anticipate potential risks, humanitarian decision makers and responders need comprehensive, quality information and analyses to understand the evolving context and needs of affected communities. The generation of, access to, and sharing of data and information on the situation in Myanmar have significantly decreased since the coup. A limited amount of publicly available data and information products and scattered information characterise the Myanmar humanitarian analysis ecosystem for the humanitarian response. There are a few public repositories available, but they are not comprehensive with a potential risk of duplication in analysis and data collection efforts. This poses challenges to designing and planning a targeted and effective response. About this report This report analyses the current analysis ecosystem in the humanitarian context of Myanmar. It highlights the humanitarian sector’s analysis needs and gaps resulting from the reduced operational space and consequent constraints on data collection and data and information sharing. It also outlines a few opportunities to strengthen the ecosystem based on ACAPS’ expertise in humanitarian analysis. Understanding the information and analysis ecosystem in Myanmar, specifically regarding humanitarian needs, provides decision makers with an overview of what information already exists, what the information gaps are, and how some can be addressed. Methodology ACAPS went through the following steps to develop this report. We conducted a secondary data review of publicly available documents to collect information on the analysis landscape and existing access constraints in Myanmar. We also conducted a secondary data review of the main publicly available data and information products on Myanmar published between February 2021 and December 2022. ACAPS considered publicly available products related to the humanitarian context gathered on ReliefWeb and various organisations’ websites. From these, we developed a metadatabase using 610 unique products as a sample. Products published in a series (either at regular or irregular intervals) were considered unique regardless of the number of times they were published in the given time frame. The metadatabase was also built as a time-bound snapshot of publicly available data and information on Myanmar to use as a sample for the analysis. We interviewed 18 key informants, including information management (IM) representatives, research institutions, and individuals working on face-to-face and remote data collection and analysis in Myanmar. We analysed the above through the lens of an ideal analysis ecosystem. Limitations ACAPS developed the metadatabase that supported our study on the Myanmar humanitarian analysis ecosystem based on a selection of publicly available data and information products published between February 2021 and December 2022. Many reports in Myanmar are not publicly available because of context sensitivities. The scarcity of information and data collection restrictions in the country also make it difficult to understand the information and analysis landscape. ACAPS consulted different organisations and experts to complement the findings extracted from the metadatabase..."
Source/publisher: ACAPS
2023-10-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.4 MB
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Description: "The United States condemns yesterday’s attack by the Burma military regime on the Kachin State town of Munglai Hkyet, which hosts a camp for internally displaced persons, killing and injuring dozens, including women and children. This latest attack by the Burma military regime is yet another example of its disregard for human life and underscores the need for the UN Security Council to act beyond Resolution 2669. We underline our commitment to using all tools at the Security Council’s disposal to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, a commitment affirmed by the vast majority of the Security Council. We reiterate our call on the regime to cease all forms of violence, free all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with regard to the protection of civilians. The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and the establishment of a path toward a genuine and inclusive democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN..."
Source/publisher: United States Mission to the United Nations
2023-10-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Bago Region, Sagaing Region and Kayah State from October 1st to 7th. Heavy artillery attacks from Military Junta ships killed a civilian from Yesagyo Township, Magway Region on October 1st. Junta People arrested 11 civilians and 5 were used as human shields from Sagaing Region and Magway Region. 5 civilians died and 6 injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within ‌ a week. A child was also injured when the Military Junta committed violations. Civilians fled twice to safety by the matching and raiding of Military Junta Troop within a week..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-10-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: It’s time to start thinking beyond the country’s nightmarish era of military rule and begin planning for a better future
Description: "In our decades of interactions with presidents, prime ministers, government ministers and diplomats all over the world, one flawed assumption has underpinned their understanding and approach to our country. That assumption is that Myanmar’s military is somehow invincible. It’s not a word they use, because the assumption is so deeply ingrained that they don’t even talk about it. The military cannot be defeated—that is their starting point. Their whole policymaking approach stems from this. Over the years, this has led them down paths so convoluted that at some points they have even argued that cross-border aid to ethnic communities fleeing Myanmar army attacks will fuel conflict. The false assumption of Myanmar military invincibility led the international community to pressure ethnic revolutionary organisations to engage in the sham “peace process” 11 years ago. We warned them that the military’s claims that it wanted peace were not genuine. For the military, this was just a pause button, not a stop button, we said. But Western governments didn’t listen and instead wasted—and still waste—millions of dollars of aid money trying to convince themselves that there can be peace with the Myanmar military. The assumption of military invincibility led them to pressure Aung San Suu Kyi to run for election and serve in parliament under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. In the 2000s, the assumption that the military was invincible led some Yangon diplomats to decide that they knew better than the people of Myanmar, who wanted nothing more than to see an end to military rule. Instead, these diplomats argued that sanctions should be lifted and that ways should be found to engage with the military for some imaginary gradual reform process, despite everything we know about the military mindset and behaviour. We were told we had to compromise with the military and “dialogue” with them, even as they bombed our villages, schools and clinics. Even now, when we try to defend our people and our land, we are accused of provoking the military and blamed for the attacks against us. In largely peaceful Yangon, in the bubble where foreign diplomats and United Nations agencies reside, this false assumption still underpins their approach. They assume that the military is there to stay. From that starting point, they like to talk about “creative” alternatives. They talk about whether there are any members of the military or the junta who are a little more open-minded and suggest supporting a younger, reform-minded generation of the military unhappy with the current situation. It’s the same fruitless debate that diplomats have engaged in since the 1990s. Gradually, in the Yangon bubble, diplomats and international agencies are deciding that the military is here to stay, and that they have no choice but to step up their engagement with the generals. They say they have to do so for the sake of meeting humanitarian needs, even as they provide little or no aid to parts of the country that are not under military control and where civil society is ready to deliver life-saving aid. Outside of Yangon, there is a very different situation. People are doing everything they can to resist military rule. From boycotts to taking up arms, people know that there can be no human rights, no economic development and no true federal democracy while the Myanmar military holds power. For the first time in decades, the military is losing control of significantly more areas of the country. “A Shifting Power Balance—Junta Control Shrinks in Southeast Burma,” a new report released by the Karen Peace Support Network last month, reveals that since the coup, the Myanmar military has lost 62 military bases to Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army and its allies. On the western and eastern boundaries of northern KNU territory there have been big strategic gains. The KNU’s expansion westwards and southwards also poses a significant threat to the junta’s main road and rail transport artery from Yangon to Naypyitaw, as well as to the Asia Highway trade corridor from Yangon to Myawaddy on the Thai border. Areas under KNU civilian administration are expanding fast. Schools operated by the Karen Education and Culture Department have tripled to more than 900. Meanwhile, schools operated by the regime’s education ministry in KNU and mixed administration areas have fallen from 370 to zero. In Sagaing and Magway regions, the military has faced unprecedented resistance, losing large areas to the control of the People’s Defence Force (PDF). The military has ceded administrative control to the Arakan Army in large parts of Rakhine State. In Kachin, Chin and Karenni states, the military is struggling to maintain or regain territory. We are not claiming that the Myanmar military is about to collapse. We know only too well about the vast manpower and weaponry that it has at its disposal, having both experienced attacks by the military ourselves. What we are saying is that there has been a major shift in dynamics on the ground. The military has not faced this kind of pressure in living memory. The appearance of normality in Yangon and a handful of other cities is an exception, not the rule. The external pressures that the military is facing from the armed resistance and its loss of territory are visible to all. Internal pressures within the military are also increasingly evident, with the regime making sudden and erratic economic decisions and purging and reshuffling its members and other military personnel. The shifting power balance in Karen State and other areas should already have prompted governments and UN agencies to reassess their approach, both politically and logistically for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In the areas where they can be most useful, they remain woefully behind the curve. History is full of examples of seemingly invincible regimes which no longer exist. Some collapsed suddenly and almost overnight. Some took years of struggle to overcome. At the moment, the international community seems to have put all its policy eggs in the basket of military invincibility and a long grinding conflict. It seems to have done very little short- or long-term planning for a scenario in which the Myanmar military is, at long last, defeated by the country’s people. We can’t say when the military will fall. But fall it will. There is no alternative for our people or our country. What does it say about international policy-making towards Myanmar that so little thought has gone into preparing for the day that the people of Myanmar are working so hard to reach? The defeat of the military is the essential first stepping stone towards a free Myanmar. We—and the world—need to be ready for what comes next..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2023-10-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar junta’s Supreme Court says it has rejected appeals by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s lawyers to overturn six corruption convictions. Four related to the Daw Khin Kyi Foundation, a charity named after the 78-year-old state counselor’s mother, and two cases involved the accusation of receiving US$550,000 from crony Maung Weik. On August 29, the Supreme Court declined to hear five special appeals for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Her team has been asking unsuccessfully since January for a meeting to discuss an appeal for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint. They have been in detention since the February 2021 coup. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi faced 19 convictions and 33 years in jail but junta chief Min Aung Hlaing pardoned her of five convictions in a national amnesty on August 1. She faces 27 years in jail and denies all the charges. The Nobel laureate has been unwell and in September suffered from a serious dental problem, was unable to eat without vomiting and suffered from dizziness. The prison authorities denied her request to see an outside dentist. She is being held in solitary confinement in a Naypyitaw prison and has been denied prison visits and access to her legal team since late last year..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-07
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the universally despised leader of the deeply unpopular 2021 military coup that ousted the re-elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government, is preparing to hold a grand ceremony for the 8th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was signed on Oct. 15, 2015. The military leaders and endorsers of the 2021 coup, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, are a group of cunning, unprincipled and ruthless individuals, to belabour the obvious. They are not very bright, strategically speaking. They lack foresight. And they are anything but patriots. What kind of patriots would plunge their country into the abyss of nationwide violence, reignite the flames of civil war, condemn 30 percent of their fellow people to the worsening conditions of hunger or “food insecurity”, forcibly displace large segments of the population, including the majority Buddhists, order over 2,000 airstrikes in less than two-and-a-half-years against vulnerable civilians in clinics, hospitals, monasteries, resort to its colonial-style scorched earth operations, block the refugees’ access to emergency and humanitarian aid, burn down entire villages in the heartlands of the Bama majority, destroy nearly 80,000 homes across the country, and serially slaughter young men and women from all ethnic and faith backgrounds who staunchly resist the coup. I personally know well several of these coup plotters and endorsers, with blood on their hands, including the 3rd ranking coup leader General Mya Tun Oo (his former commander), and ex-Lt.-General Myint Swe who at the time of the coup was vice president in Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration, and Daw Yin Yin Oo (retired Foreign Service official and the military’s counter-intelligence agent) who serves as one of the two key female advisers in the coup regime. Daw Yin Yin Oo’s father the late Dr Maung Maung served as the legal adviser to the late military dictator General Ne Win until the latter’s death under house arrest. [The other woman who has the honour of being an advisor to the coup regime is Dr. Yin Yin Nwe, an ex-daughter-in-law of the late General Ne Win, who trained as a geologist at Cambridge University and worked as the head of UNICEF in China]. In the morning of the coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing instantly made Myint Swe “Acting President”, since the sitting President Win Myint refused to endorse the coup, while literally at gunpoint, as was required by the 2008 constitution. Twisting the military’s own constitutional requirement, Myint Swe play-acted the role of “President” and read out his presidential endorsement to Min Aung Hlaing’s coup. No such clause existed in the military’s 2008 Constitution that “the Commander-in-Chief shall instantly make the military’s handpicked Vice President “Acting President” in order to constitutionally endorse the coup in the event the real and sitting president refused to go along with the military’s seizure of power, even if a pistol is pointed to the latter’s head!” Joking and my personal assessment of men and women who made the coup aside, I offer my analysis of the coup and post-coup developments from an institutional perspective. Indeed, the Feb. 1, 2021 coup had inadvertently killed several birds with one stone, specifically the NCA and the 2008 Constitution birds. The constitution was the goose that laid the military’s golden eggs, whichever Senior General may serve as the Commander-in-Chief. This is precisely the most recent position – and analysis – of the Karen National Union: the coup had rendered null and void both the Constitution of 2008 and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015. The Myanmar military under the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing was a signatory, to the NCA, alongside the representatives of the parliament and the presidency, as well as eight other armed organizations, including the KNU and the Chin National Front (CNF). Its coup had abolished the parliament and the presidency, while imprisoning the sitting president and leaders of the legislature on trumped up charges, without due process, the KNU argues. According to the KNU reasoning, since the military as a key signer of the NCA had behaved in such a way that no other signatory has any moral or legal obligation to honour the otherwise legally binding treaty among the central state actors and the armed resistance organizations which signed the agreement, in good faith. The KNU is the country’s oldest pro-democracy and pro-federal union resistance organization founded in 1947 with 70-years of direct military and political experiences in dealing with the military in Myanmar. During the military-led reform period, the KNU leadership played an instrumental role in pushing for the peaceful political solution to bring an end to the country’s civil war of fluctuating intensities. First, a word about the 2008 constitution, which served as the basis of the NCA. To borrow the American lingo, it was the constitution of, for, and by the military. It was designed chiefly by the retired Senior General Than Shwe, who served as a young infantry officer under the command of my late great uncle the late Lt.-Colonel Ant Kywe over half a century ago. Than Shwe’s 2008 constitution was, for all intents and purposes, amendment proof and thus anti-democratic. That is to say, it was designed not to accommodate popular will or public opinion of the electorate as they “mature” or become more democratic and progressive. It contained no sunset clause for the military to allow itself to be phased out over a period of transitional electoral cycles, typical of all constitutions found in countries in a genuine democratic transition from the decades of military rule to a progressively democratic system (Indonesia, for instance). Furthermore, it also elevated the Ministry of Defence (or the Armed Forces) above any other institutions in society: the two other branches of the government, the legislature and judiciary, were to have no real control over the military, nor does the executive branch of which the military/Ministry of Defence was merely a component, theoretically. No political parties that enjoy a popular mandate from the people can influence the military’s policies or behaviour. It vested the power in the Commander-in-Chief to re-take power on any occasion which the number one soldier deems “a national emergency”. It gave the military, not just the Commander-in-Chief, the veneer of political legitimacy, and made lawful any future seizure of power even before such anti-democratic move took place. Alas, in a stroke of strategic genius, the military had killed both the NCA and its own constitution. When I was growing up during General Ne Win’s one party military dictatorship (1962-88), with the veneer of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, the military propagandists had put in circulation that the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the political wing of the military, was a good system, badly administered by “bad” party cadres, taking and executing dictates from the erratic number one, that is, Ne Win. Those 26 long years had passed, and General Ne Win and his deputies are now fertilizer. The post-BSPP era (1962-88) in Myanmar has seen two military-drafted constitutions (1974 and 2008) while the control of the state has been passed on from one crop of generals to another. The names of the ruling military cliques – usurpers really – have changed. But the military has remained as the most corrupt, incompetent, mafia-like, economy-wrecking actor, not to mention it being the spearhead of Rohingya genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against Kachin, Rakhine, Karen, Shan, Chin, Mon, Muslims, Christians and defiant Buddhist Mons. Enter the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with Senior General Saw Maung and General Khin Nyunt as Chairman and Secretary (1988-1992), the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) presided over by Senior General Than Shwe (1992-2010), the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) from 2010-15 and the National Security Council (controlled by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and his deputies who headed the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs) from 2015-2021, which constitutionally and effectively clipped the reformist wings of the NLD government of Aung San Suu Kyi, in a two-tiered system of power-sharing until it decided that the military could no longer tolerate the NLD’s directions and speed of the economic, legal and institutional reforms. To be sure, there are arguments that see some values and space for reform and federalism in the military’s 2008 constitution and some life in the NCA. They point out that the NCA and the constitution recognize the political nature of military conflicts in Myanmar – now in their 8th decade! And the constitution mandates the president – as opposed to the Commander-in-Chief – to seek peaceful solutions to these armed conflicts at the dialogue table. No one in their rational mind would argue against resolving political differences and ending violent conflicts and wars through negotiations, especially when the war is not going in your favour. In my recent visit to Neuengamme Concentration Camp Museum on the outskirts of Hamburg, Germany, I discovered that Heinrich Himmler, the dreaded head of the Nazi SS, of all the Nazis, was trying to incentivize the “neutral” Swedish government to reach out to Britain on its behalf for a ceasefire with the Allies: he freed 3,000 Norwegian and Danish inmates which the Swedish Red Cross came with white buses to fetch as the Nazi defeat was becoming apparent – to the SS leadership. Engulfed in the war at home with the society – and the popular resistance movements in virtually all regions throughout Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing and the coup regime has shown no inclination for suing for peace, NCA or not. Finally, no analysis of prospect for peace and reconciliation will be complete without a cursory glance at the military’s historical record at such endeavours. Whoever is the Commander-in-Chief, Myanmar’s single largest military force – out of roughly two dozen such armed organizations which are mostly ethnically organized, and thus so-named as Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) – has an unenviable record of failures after failures in making peace and seeking “negotiated settlements” in resolving political disputes. The ceasefire and peace negotiations did not begin in 2013, the year considered the origin of the NCA which the coup regime is trying to resurrect. The first coup regime of General Ne Win – the Revolutionary Council government with its BSPP wing – had held “peace talks” with “insurgent groups”, then less than six, including the Karens, Shan, Mon and Burmese communists – in 1963, 1972, and 1980. They all collapsed, with no exception as the Burmese generals attempted to make peace and negotiate ceasefires on their own terms, without addressing the root causes – the denial of basic human rights, the refusal to accept ethnic group equality and the need for the military to strictly adhere to the national defence, as opposed to meddling in the messy business of democratic nation-building. Throughout the last half-century, Myanmar’s resistance organizations have consistently sought peaceful resolutions with or without external support. In his letter addressed to Richard von Weizsacker, then President of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) dated Oct. 25, 1987 with the subject line “Regarding the Civil War in Burma”, M. Brang Seng, the late Chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and an authorized spokesman for the National Democratic Front, the then largest alliance of the 10 ethnic resistance organizations, wrote: As you are well aware, Burma has been plagued by civil war for the past forty years. The civil war (has) intensified since General Ne Win seized power in 1962, and established a totalitarian, centralistic and one party system of government….We have repeatedly called upon General Ne Win’s regime to solve the nation’s problem politically at the conference table. But he has responded to us with his armed forces only in the battle field …. Therefore, we, of the National Democratic Front, wish to earnestly request to you, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, to kindly help us find ways to peace negotiations between us and the Burma government. We have been and are willing still to end this forty year long drawn(-out) civil war to an end on the conference table.” Chairman M. Brang Seng was on a visit to West Germany at the time. Likewise, one of the leaders of the Shan resistance, the late Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who commanded the 1st Military Region of the Shan State Army (1969-1972) and served as a peace negotiator in General Ne Win’s 1963 peace talks, expressed his fervent desire for ending the civil war in Myanmar. In his book “The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile” (first published in 1987, by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), Chao Tzang wrote: “a military victory will not bring about any kind of nationhood, or lasting peace and stability. Uprisings will end and rebel armies disappear if and only if Rangoon accepts objective realities and gets down to the real business of providing the peoples of Burma, both the Burmese and the non-Burmese, with the kind of leadership which the country badly needs in the spirit that was displayed before independence of gained.” He was referring to the spirit of democracy, ethnic equality and federated union of independent Myanmar. Alas, ceasefire, peace, and reconciliation are a far cry in the country where the single largest military force – Myanmar military that seizes power at the whim of the senior military clique of the day, abolish or subjugate all constitutive institutions of the state – including executive, judiciary, and legislature – locking up democratic leaders, summarily executes dissidents, slaughters its own citizens in mass killings, burns down entire villages wantonly, and perpetrates the gravest crimes under domestic and international law. After six decades in power, the Myanmar military has proven itself to be no partner in peace. Its conduct is guided by neither principles of fairness, justice, equality or basic rights nor abiding sense of patriotism. It takes two hands to make the sound of peace. Even Himmler’s Nazi SS desperately sought an honourable exit, despite its heinous crimes. Not so with the coup-making military of Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Democratic Voice of Burma
2023-10-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-05
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Description: "Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process – A Reference Guide (2022 – 2023) Since 2013, our BNI-MPM has been publishing “Deciphering the Peace Process – Reference Guide ” annually by compiling conflict situations and findings during the peace process. This is the 8th book. We have selected and compiled worthy contents, events and facts, based on the evolving political, military and peace landscapes. We strongly believe it will be a reference guide that will reflect the current military, political and peace landscapes for the persons and organizations involved in the peace process, researchers, students, international organizations and journalists..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Peace Monitor
2023-10-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Europe’s largest LGBTQ+ right charity Stonewall has been joined by 245 other organisations across the human rights, refugee, LGBTQ+ and women’s sectors in a powerful display of solidarity, following comments by the Home Secretary, Suella Braverman, last week. The coalition, including organisations such as Amnesty, Oxfam, End Violence Against Women Coalition, Refugee Council and Women For Refugee Women, has written to UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, to reaffirm the UK’s commitment to protect LGBTQ+ people and women around the world. Many of the signatories work daily with LGBTQ+ and women refugees, and ‘bear witness to their scars from being persecuted’. The letter rejects Ms Braverman’s claim that LGBTQ+ and women refuges are misusing their identities to make false claims, and speaks of regret that the Home Secretary’s selective use of stats ‘have nothing to do with genuine concern or respect for international law, refugees or their protection.’ Read the full letter here. Robbie de Santos, Director of External Affairs at Stonewall, said: “We all deserve a government with the compassion and will to protect the most vulnerable in society. Not only is the incumbent UK Government failing LGBTQ+ people domestically, with inaction on rising hate crime, but they are also failing the international community by indicated their disdain for international law – in the process bringing great shame on party and country.” Steve Valdez-Symonds, Refugee and Migrant Rights Director at Amnesty International UK, said: “The Home Secretary’s verbal attack on the rights of LGBTQ+ and women refugees is deplorable. Not only did she once again stir utterly false prejudices against people seeking asylum, she also targeted refugees who often continue to face grave insecurity, hostility and violence – even long after escaping persecution and conflict. Ministers must stop their constant scapegoating and put their energy into repairing the utter wreckage they have made of the asylum system.” Alphonsine Kabagado, Director, Women For Refugee Women, said: “We strongly condemn Suella Braverman’s speech last week – which was dangerous, inflammatory and racist. Not only did her claims stoke hatred and fear, they were untrue. To be granted asylum in the UK, you must prove a well-founded fear of persecution. Her suggestion that people lie about their identities to make false claims for protection, or that it is possible to be granted asylum based on discrimination alone, is unfounded. We know from our work supporting refugee and asylum-seeking women, including LGBTQ+ women, that many face persecution including torture, gender-based violence, sexual violence, trafficking and rape. Braverman’s speech was also hypocritical. The Government has repeatedly stated its commitment to tackling violence against women and supporting survivors of such violence, as well as to supporting LGBTQ+ people. Yet when it comes to women or LGBTQ+ people seeking asylum in the UK, it seems these commitments do not apply. Instead of whipping up hatred, fear, and division against women and LGBTQ+ people seeking safety, the Government should treat them with compassion and kindness. How we treat people is who we are; the Government’s hostility does not represent us.” Enver Solomon, CEO of the Refugee Council, said: “Turning our backs on LGBTQ+ people and suggesting they are undeserving of a fair hearing in the asylum system is immoral. Of the small number of people who come to the UK claiming asylum based on their sexual orientation, the majority are recognised as having a well-founded fear of persecution and are given refugee protection. We know from our work how traumatised they often are – what they need is support to restart their lives in safety, rather than hostility and disbelief. The Refugee Convention’s fundamental purpose is to offer protection to those who need it, based on shared global values of humanity and fairness. Abandoning these values does not reflect who we are as a country.” Leila Zadeh, CEO, Rainbow Migration, said: “Across the world there are LGBTQI+ people experiencing violence and persecution simply because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Around 70 countries still criminalise same-sex relations, and in some places the picture is getting worse. Many LGBTQI+ people that we support every day tell us how they faced life-threatening situations back home. For example, Olu, a lesbian from Nigeria had to run for her life when her husband found out she was a lesbian and nearly killed her, or Adams was violently attacked in the street on several occasions by members of his community in Ghana because he was bisexual. We all want to live somewhere where we can be safe and live fulfilling lives and most of us welcome people who are fleeing for their lives. We ask that the PM gets in line with public sentiment and commits to the protection of the rights of LGBTQ+ people seeking safety in the UK.”..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
2023-10-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "3 October 2023: The United Nations (UN) is failing Myanmar, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). UN member States and their inter-governmental forums are failing to act, the UN Country Team (UNCT) is pursuing the same failed approach of appeasing the military despite growing risks and ever-fewer results, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres has neglected his responsibilities to the Myanmar people as head of the UN Secretariat, a new report by SAC-M has found. The report, How the UN Is Failing Myanmar, looks at the response from the UN’s component parts – the UN intergovernmental forums, the UN Secretariat and the UN Entities, represented in Myanmar by the UNCT – to the crisis in Myanmar caused by the coup that was launched by the military junta on 1 February 2021. For two and a half years, the junta has waged a campaign of atrocities against the civilian population in Myanmar that has left 2 million people internally displaced and up to 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN system is failing to respond in a manner that reflects the gravity of the crisis and the objections of Myanmar civil society to the actions of UN officials are being ignored. “The junta is the root cause of civil war, poverty, inequalities, and injustices in our country,” said Nai Aue Mon, Program Director, Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), a non-profit human rights and pro-democracy organisation in Myanmar. “We have urged UN agencies, regional and international actors to cut ties with the junta, to deliver humanitarian assistance directly to local humanitarian actors; and commit to meaningful engagement and collaboration with Myanmar’s legitimate stakeholders, including civil society organizations and local service providers.” “They must listen to our voices and stand in solidarity with us by supporting our calls,” Nai Aue Mon added. The report is written from the perspective of SAC-M’s members as former UN mandate holders on Myanmar, who, during their mandates, called for an inquiry into the involvement of the UN in Myanmar since 2011. The resulting inquiry published its findings in a 2019 report commonly referred to as “the Rosenthal Report”. It found ”systemic and structural failures” within and across the UN system that rendered the UN impotent in the face of massive human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military, including the atrocities committed against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. Measures taken by the Secretary-General to implement the Rosenthal Report’s recommendations have been insufficient. The UN’s failures in Myanmar are being repeated. “During the previous democracy uprising in 1988, the UN tried to use engagement with the military junta and it was a failure. We ended up with military rule for the next 30 years,” said Linn Yaung, a former university teacher in Yangon and current member of Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement. “Now there’s an even more brutal junta led by Min Aung Hlaing. The UN’s strategy did not work then, so why do they think it will work this time?” SAC-M’s report identifies key ways in which the UN system is failing Myanmar in the current crisis and makes recommendations for change. The UN Security Council must enforce the junta’s compliance with Resolution 2669, including by imposing a comprehensive arms embargo and targeted financial sanctions on the junta, and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. The UNCT must redefine its relationship with the junta and should coordinate directly with the National Unity Government, Ethnic Resistance Organisations and resistance authorities for humanitarian access. It should also support – but not co-opt – civil society networks engaged in the existing cross-border humanitarian response. This is the only effective way to reach all of those in Myanmar in need. Finally, the Secretary-General must fulfil his responsibility as the head of the UN Secretariat to lead the development of a unifying, comprehensive and coherent UN strategy on Myanmar with clear lines of responsibility to monitor and evaluate implementation and ensure accountability for UN actions. “The humanitarian provision from UN is not being effective and have not reached the people on the ground,” said Musel, a local humanitarian actor with Kyay Latt Myay, a local humanitarian group working in Karenni state of Myanmar. “In Karenni state, people who have been displaced due to the military attacks have not received any support from international humanitarian organizations, particularly from the UN agencies. There are some UN agencies in Karenni state, but they are only active in urban areas. They can only support where the junta allows them to reach… Therefore, I would like to urge the donors to support through cross-border.” Musel added: “To deliver humanitarian assistance effectively to the ground, the UN agencies must work together with local humanitarian service providers.” On the day that the military coup was launched, the Secretary-General issued a statement reaffirming “the unwavering support of the United Nations to the people of Myanmar in their pursuit of democracy, peace, human rights, and the rule of law”. That commitment has not been met. The people of Myanmar rightfully expect the UN’s support in their nation-defining struggle to free themselves once and for all from military dictatorship. The UN must end its cycle of failure in Myanmar. The UN must stand on the side of the Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
2023-10-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Sep 15 to 21, 2023 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing and Mandalay Region from September 15th to 21st. Over 130 civilians including women from Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi Region and Kachin State were arrested and used as human shields. Military Junta burnt and killed a civilian from Shweku Township, Kachin State. The families of political prisoners were extorted by prison authorities in Pathein Prison, Ayeyarwady Region. 18 Civilians died and over 29 were injured by the heavy and light artillery attacks of the Military Junta. They arrested around 50 civilians and killed 36 within a week. An underage child died and other 3 were injured by the Military junta committed violations..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-09-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf pdf pdf
Size: 367.54 KB 347.35 KB 129.99 KB
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Description: "In revolutions, citizens push to overthrow the power of unpopular and unjust leaders. Yet in these contexts, it is often the case that other established power relations in society are also challenged. Revolutions and crises can ‘lift the lid’ on other unequal relationships and injustices. In the case of Myanmar’s current revolution, the exiled National Unity Government, along with numerous armed groups and resistance movements around the country, are resisting the deeply unpopular and abusive Myanmar military. Amidst this revolution, however, there are other relationships that are being renegotiated, for example between different ethnic groups and, as millennials increasingly take on new leadership roles in the movement, between different generations. Meanwhile, relationships and power dynamics within the aid architecture are also being challenged, as local and national Myanmar organisations question the longstanding dominance of international actors in humanitarian decision-making and resourcing. Along with the revolution, there is currently a devastating humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that more than 17 million people, or almost one-third of the country, will need humanitarian assistance in 2023. As international NGOs and UN agencies are heavily restricted in their access to key areas of need, humanitarian programs are almost entirely reliant on local and national organisations. Yet despite their central role in aid program delivery, Myanmar humanitarian organisations remain on the periphery of humanitarian decision-making and resourcing. In late 2022 and early 2023, we did interviews with 25 leaders of these Myanmar organisations (along with ten interviews with international aid agency representatives in Myanmar), exploring the dynamics of aid localisation. One of our key findings is that there is a ‘conflict paradox’ for these local organisations – where local humanitarian actors can be both disempowered and empowered through international aid partnerships in settings of conflict. In conflict situations characterised by restricted international access, local actors can have greater control over aid resources and decision-making; yet such contexts can also result in the further disempowerment of local actors, when they are reduced to subcontractors delivering aid programs that remain controlled by international agencies. In Myanmar, on one hand, local organisations are facing severe restrictions from the military regime – who confiscate and block aid, attempt to control financial transactions, and frequently threaten the security of staff and communities. At the same time, these Myanmar humanitarian organisations also report being hampered in their work by the bureaucracy and risk aversion of their international aid agency ‘partners’. At times, international agency compliance rules – such as gaining three quotations for services, or keeping recipient lists – place local organisations and communities at risk from the regime. For example, one local aid provider told us how, in Sagaing division in Myanmar, the military regime recently destroyed all of the medicine at a local pharmacy and forced its closure, after local authorities saw the store listed on a voucher which had been kept for financial auditing of an aid project. While some international agencies have increased their flexibility, Myanmar agency leaders reported that many international partners had shown little awareness or willingness to change systems to be more appropriate. More broadly, local leaders said that the relationship between international and local organisations was often a disempowering one in the humanitarian system. One Myanmar leader said that the “donors’ approach … examining [local groups] and saying ‘you don’t have this and you don’t have that’ … it undermines and disempowers the locals from the initial contact.” On the other hand, local organisations have also, in some ways, been empowered in their work within the context of Myanmar’s conflict. They are able to operate more autonomously than international agencies as they have the ability to navigate the instability and dangers of the context. One Myanmar humanitarian organisation leader said, “Since COVID in 2020, and followed by the [military] coup [in February 2021], we know that, and we have proven that, local CSOs [civil society organisations] and agencies are the only actors on the ground.” Along with greater access, local organisations have often developed stronger relationships of trust with other local organisations and communities. In the context of instability and revolution, such trust is crucial and is seen by many to go beyond the context or duration of an aid project. A leader from one organisation said, “trust-building does not happen overnight … If we want to support, help, and work together with [communities], we need to go beyond the project.” Due to their access and relationships of trust with local communities, Myanmar humanitarian organisations, rather than international ones, are at the centre of current humanitarian responses. Yet regime and donor agency restrictions also hamper these responses. This conflict paradox, where Myanmar humanitarian organisations are both empowered and disempowered, has led local leaders to attempt to reposition their agencies within the aid architecture. Rather than being subcontracted through a chain of funding – going from bilateral donor to UN agency or pooled fund to international NGO to local NGO – many large Myanmar organisations are now seeking to establish more direct funding relationships with donors. This aim is in line with the commitments made by the largest aid agency donors through the Grand Bargain in 2016. Myanmar organisation leaders argue that they play a more effective aid intermediary role than international agencies. Access, local knowledge and trust allow them to support other local organisations and communities with more efficiency and context sensitivity. Yet more than simply having greater effectiveness, Myanmar organisations are pushing for more decision-making power within the aid architecture as a matter of political rights and self-determination. They argue persuasively that decisions made about humanitarian action should be made by the people who are affected by them. Revolution is not only a time of struggle towards regime change, but also a time when old inequalities of other kinds can be more clearly seen and challenged. This includes the old hierarchies in the aid sector. International aid agencies, including DFAT, need to adapt quickly and find sensible ways to address the inequalities in the aid system and more directly support the growth of Myanmar’s humanitarian organisations..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Australian National University
2023-09-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In Rakhine State, 51,590 individuals have been displaced across 10 townships due to the ongoing AA-Tatmadaw conflict. Additionally, 4,472 individuals have been displaced in Paletwa township in Chin State, bringing the total number of displaced persons to 56,062. As of August 2023, a further 4,174 individuals newly displaced remain in Mrauk-U, Kyautaw, Sittwe, Myebon, Minbya, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, and Ponnagyun townships. In collaboration with partners and other UN agencies, UNHCR is responding to the humanitarian needs and continues to provide assistance to affected communities. Since January 2023, UNHCR provided core relief items, emergency shelter support, dignity kits and cloth masks to some 44,917 individuals in Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun, Myebon, Sittwe, Pauktaw, Paletwa, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-09-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 7.34 MB
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