Drugs and the Burmese Government

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Websites/Multiple Documents

Description: Opium yield surveys, seizures, photos of drug burnings etc
Source/publisher: SPDC
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Individual Documents

Description: "Long-distance truck drivers, people working on fishing boats or those scavenging jade and gold mines are among those vulnerable to drug dependence in northern Myanmar. In the north of the country, where the reach of the central government is comparatively limited, workers may be partly paid in opium in recognition of the fact that their working lives are so benighted and subject to risk. As the demand for drugs is sustained, it is not surprising that the supply of drugs also remains strong. In the hilly areas of Kachin and Shan states, opium is grown as a second crop after rice by subsistence farmers. Those in the drug trade will then come to collect the crops from the farm gate at an agreed rate. This overcomes a significant problem of market access for farmers who lack access to roads as well as irrigation — for them, the prospect of obtaining substitute crops remains out of reach with significant government or NGO-led extension services unavailable in conflict areas. Despite attempts to hold talks that might yield peace, any real breakthrough seems to be far away. Opium is just one of many narcotics widely available throughout the country. A range of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines are also manufactured and distributed across Myanmar. These too are associated with conflict regions — heroin is linked with cash-rich mining operations while amphetamines are used by the truck drivers and fishing workers. These manufactured items tend to be the preserve of organised gangs which the security forces can tackle by various means. Opium, though, remains the drug woven into the fabric of society. There is no doubt that the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar military force which generally acts for the government in the north of the country, would eliminate the drugs trade as it currently stands, not least because some of the proceeds continue to finance armed attempts at securing autonomy by various ethnic groups. In some cases, that means taking control of the trade — for years, the military has financed its own developmental schemes through drug money among other sources...."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2019-09-21
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: "With unique access and information from the ground, the Lahu National Development Organisation (LNDO) examines in this report how the Burma Army benefi ts directly from the drug trade in eastern Shan State. The findings show how conflict and drug production in Burma are inextricably linked, and that only a political resolution of the decades- long ethnic conflict will enable Burma?s drug crisis to be addressed. Despite ceasefires, the central government?s refusal to cede to ethnic demands for federalism has caused a steady military build-up by both the Burma Army and ethnic armed groups in eastern Shan State. Over the past ten years, the number of Burma Army troops in seven eastern Shan townships has risen from over 10,000 to over 14,000. Significantly for the drug trade, this includes a substantial increase in the number of Burma Army militia troops—from about 2,300 to 3,400—who serve the vital purpose of maintaining central government control over inaccessible mountainous areas. The Burma Army militia-controlled areas are where most opium in eastern Shan State is being grown, as shown by maps of the United Nations Offce of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). These areas are also where scores of drug refineries that produce large amounts of heroin and methamphetamines (?yaba”) are located. The Burma Army militia groups provide security to the drug syndicates operating the refineries. In the process they make huge profits from buying opium from farmers and selling it to refinery owners, from joint investments in refineries, and from transporting drugs to distributors. These profits not only subsidize the upkeep of the militia forces, but enable militia leaders to gain substantial personal wealth. This is a key incentive to remain loyal to the Burma Army, and to continue their policing duty against ethnic resistance groups..."
Source/publisher: Lahu National Development Organisation (LNDO)
2016-10-27
Date of entry/update: 2016-10-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Description: Executive Summary: Community assessments by the Palaung Women's Organisation during the past two years reveal that the amount of opium being cultivated in Burma's northern Shan State has been increasing dramatically. The amounts are far higher than reported in the annual opium surveys of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and are flourishing not in "insurgent and ceasefire areas," as claimed by the UN, but in areas controlled by Burma's military government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Between 2007-2009, PWO conducted field surveys in Namkham and Mantong townships, and found that the total area of opium cultivated increased almost fivefold over three years from 964 hectares in the 2006-7 season to 4,545 hectares in the 2008-9 season. Namkham and Mantong are both fully under the control of the SPDC. The areas have an extensive security infrastructure including Burma Army battalions, police, and pro-government village militia. These militia are allowed to engage in illicit income-generating activities in exchange for policing against resistance activity, and are being expanded in the lead up to the regime's planned 2010 elections. Local authorities, in "anti-drug teams" formed by the police in each township, have been systematically extorting fees from villagers in exchange for allowing them to grow opium. During the 2007-8 season in Mantong township, at least 37 million kyat (US$37,000) in bribes in total were collected from 28 villages. PWO data shows that the "anti-drug teams" are leaving the majority of opium fields intact, and are filing false eradication data to the police headquarters. PWO found that only 11% of the poppy fields during the 2008-9 season had been destroyed, mostly only in easily visible places. The fact that authorities are profiting from drug production is enabling drug abuse to flourish. In one village surveyed in Mantong, it was found that that the percentage of men aged 15 and over addicted to opium increased from 57% in 2007 to 85% in 2009. Around the town of Namkham, heroin addicts flock openly to "drug camps," and dealers sell heroin and amphetamines from their houses. PWO's findings thus highlight the structural issues underlying the drug problem in Burma. The regime is pursuing a strategy of increased militarization in the ethnic states to crush ethnic resistance movements, instead of entering into political negotiations with them. For this, it needs an ever growing security apparatus, which in turn is subsidized by the drug trade. The regime's desire to maintain power at all costs is thus taking precedence over its stated aims of drug eradication. Unless the regime's militarization strategies are challenged, international funding will make little difference to the drug problem in Burma. A negotiated resolution of the political issues at the root of Burma's civil war is urgently needed to seriously address the drug scourge which is impacting the region..."
Source/publisher: Palaung Women's Organization
2010-01-26
Date of entry/update: 2010-01-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf pdf
Size: 3.38 MB 3.93 MB
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Description: Die vorliegende Untersuchung entlarvt den angeblichen ?Krieg gegen die Drogen”, den Burmas Militärregime im Shan Staat zu führen vorgibt, als eine reine Farce. Er liefert Beweise dafür, dass die Drogenindustrie vielmehr einen integralen Teil der Regimepolitik darstellt, um das Gebiet des Shan Staats ruhigzustellen und zu kontrollieren. "Pseudo"-War against drugs in Shan-State; Neutralitaion of the Shan
Source/publisher: Burma Riders
2007-06-22
Date of entry/update: 2007-08-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: German, Deutsch
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Description: "Burma's military junta is evicting thousands of villagers from previously drug-free areas for refusing to transform their rice fields into poppy plantations as part of a United Nations-backed "drug control" programme. The regime has told its UN sponsors that it is moving villagers away from regions where drugs are being produced and uprooting the poppy fields left behind. However, an investigation by The Sunday Times and two independent human rights organisations, has found that the junta is secretly expanding the number of opium farms in these designated drug control areas. Video footage of burning poppy fields presented to the UN in support of funding applications for schemes worth millions of pounds has been faked."
Creator/author: Adrian Levy, Cathy Scott-Clark
Source/publisher: "The Sunday Times"
1998-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2007-01-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : html
Size: 9.89 KB
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Description: "...In a way, this report starts off from where our last report "Show Business: Rangoon?s War on Drugs in Shan State" (2003) left off. It describes the unimaginable extent of corruption in Burma, and the live-off-the-land policy of Burmese military units that has forced local authorities to turn a blind eye to drug activities. It also exposes how cultivation of opium poppies has increased, and gives insight into the production and trade of methamphetamines, better known as yaba in Thailand and yama in Shan State. The major difference is that whereas "Show Business" focused mostly on opium and its derivative heroin, Hand in Glove puts the spotlight more on yaba. It also highlights the growing role of pro-Rangoon militia in the drug trade, as the regime has begun openly favouring them over the ceasefire groups..." 1. Military collusion in the drug trade: - Rain leaking from the roof; - Military expansion and "self reliance"... 2. Opium trends: - Poppy upsurge since 2004; - Bumper 2005-2006 crop; - Selective slashing; - Opium output decreasing or increasing?... 3. Churning out the pills: - Factories; - The precursors; - Brands... 4. Shipping out... 5. Militia on the rise: - New faces... 6. Crackdown charades... 7. Drug use in Shan State: - Rehabilitation efforts... 8. Conclusion... Appendix: Burma Army units reported to be involved in the drug trade.
Source/publisher: Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.)
2006-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2006-08-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf
Size: 1.88 MB
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Description: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: "This investigative report exposes as a charade the Burmese military regime?s "War on Drugs" in Shan State. It provides evidence that the drug industry is integral to the regime?s political strategy to pacify and control Shan State, and concludes that only political reform can solve Burma?s drug problems. In order to maintain control of Shan State without reaching a political settlement with the ethnic peoples, the regime is allowing numerous local ethnic militia and ceasefire organisations to produce drugs in exchange for cooperation with the state. At the same time, it condones involvement of its own personnel in the drug business as a means of subsidizing its army costs at the field level, as well as providing personal financial incentives. These policies have rendered meaningless the junta?s recent "anti-drug" campaign, staged mainly in Northern Shan State since 2001. The junta deliberately avoided targeting areas under the control of its main ceasefire and militia allies. The people most affected have been poor opium farmers in "unprotected" areas, who have suffered mass arrest and extrajudicial killing. The anti-drug campaign was not waged at all in Southern Shan State, and in only a few token areas of Eastern Shan State. Opium is continuing to be grown in almost every township of Shan State, with Burmese military personnel involved at all levels of opium production and trafficking, from providing loans to farmers to grow opium, taxation of opium, providing security for refineries, to storage and transportation of heroin. The diversification of drug syndicates into methamphetamine production since the mid-90s has also been with the collusion of Burmese military units. S.H.A.N. has documented the existence of at least 93 heroin and/or methamphetamine refineries in existence this year, run by the regime?s military allies, with the complicity of local Burmese military units. Raids on refineries carried out during the regime?s "war on drugs" have targeted only smaller players and served to consolidate control of the refineries into the hands of the major drug operators such as the United Wa State Army. High-profile drug-traffickers continue to operate with impunity, many using legal businesses as a front. None have been prosecuted under the new anti-money laundering legislation introduced in 2002. While colluding in and profiting from the drug business, the regime has taken no serious measures to deal with its social impacts. It has failed to implement public health campaigns against drug abuse, leading to growing addiction problems, particularly with methamphetamines, which Shan villagers are now routinely taking as "energy" pills. The lack of state drug treatment centres has led many communities to set up their own. The junta?s token attempts at crop substitution, often with international assistance, have also failed miserably, due to poor planning, coercive implementation and complete disregard for the welfare of local populations. Under the so-called "New Destiny" project launched in April 2002, farmers in many townships have been forced to plant a new strain of rice from China, which has failed in each locality. The report also questions the latest figures for opium cultivation given by UNODC in its 2003 Burma opium survey, which show a decrease of 24% since the previous year, and an overall decrease of 62% since 1996. Data collected by S.H.A.N. in Mong Yawng, show that the actual amount of land under opium cultivation in the township during the 2002-2003 growing season was at least four times higher than that listed in the UNODC survey. The UNODC field teams surveyed only along the main roads, collecting data from villagers who were too intimidated to reveal the truth about the extent of poppy growing in the area. Given the regime?s use of the drug trade within its political strategy to control Shan State, it is clear that no amount of international aid will succeed in solving the drug problem unless there is political reform. As Shan analysts have reiterated for decades, this can only be achieved through the restoration of genuine peace, democracy and the rule of law in Burma."
Source/publisher: The Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.)
2003-12-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-12-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Testimony of two escaped porters from Shan State"
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) Regional & Thematic Reports
1993-02-01
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Burma?s history of militias immersed in corruption dates back a long way...In a military effort to contain the southward spread of communism, a convoy of military vehicles relocated Kokang and Wa warlords and landlords from Tangyan to mountain areas closer to the border. The increase in traffic meant that heroin could transit freely in mule caravans from Tangyan to Doilerng under military protection. The genie was out of the bottle. Khun Sa and his army set up a sovereign kingdom of their own in places once haunted by the Kuomintang. With profits from the burgeoning drug trade, Khun Sa could rest easy in his mountain kingdom. It wasn?t until 1973, when the international community begged for something to be done about Burma?s flourishing drug trade, that the junta dissolved the kakweye. But the junta?s response was too little, too late. And though there has been campaign after campaign against armed opposition forces, the Burmese army has never called for a serious military campaign to quell or wipe out drug barons. Why would they? Top military leaders enjoy all kinds of favors and kickbacks from drug traders..." "
Creator/author: Pho Thar Aung
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 11, No. 1
2003-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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