International Bill of Human Rights

Includes versions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Burmese, Shan and other languages of Burma
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Websites/Multiple Documents

Source/publisher: United Nations
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English (also available in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish)
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Description: "As Operation 1027 shifts the balance of power from the Myanmar military to revolutionary forces, we argue that the on-the-ground sociopolitical realities advocate moving past conventional nation-state models, and even the federalism debates, and demand a political will to adapt to the Mandala order, a governance style indigenous to Southeast Asia for centuries before the colonialism of the West. The future of Myanmar centers on transformative political visions that reject the reestablishment of a “national/federal army” and “central state”. It is fundamental to accept this paradigmatic change because only this will enable all parties involved to embrace and align with the emergence of various governance systems, as the material reality demands. Next, we must insist that these systems are democratic, inclusive, responsive and well-coordinated.....Beyond nation-state and federalism .....Myanmar’s economy has transitioned into a war economy. On the military junta’s side, the domestic economy has collapsed, hit by bank runs, inflation and, in rural areas, the inability to farm due to village burnings, as well as increased military spending amidst reduced public service budgets, as reflected in a recent report by the World Bank. Soaring dollar exchange rates and aviation fuel and gasoline prices, combined with international pressure and sanctions, make their fuel-dependent administration unsustainable. On the revolutionary and ethnic armed organization (EAO) side, Operation 1027 symbolizes a transition from guerrilla tactics to a coordinated alliance-led offensive with significant public support and resource flow. Despite the fact that the Myanmar public has endured unprecedented hardships, there seems to be no desire for the military to succeed, even if it would bring a return to stability. Coupled with the declining morale among the rank-and-file soldiers, as evidenced by unprecedented defections during Operation 1027, the larger picture and economic analysis points to the fact that the military will not be able to continue this fight. Despite the military generals’ lack of interest in pursuing a political exit, the international community is reluctant to decisively support the revolution, preferring to safeguard their own interests—a stance akin to the Burmese saying of “trying to get the snake out without breaking the cane” (မြွေမသေ တုတ်မကျိုး). Having provided little substantive support, now they presumptuously debate Myanmar’s future and what the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs should do, obsessing over a “power vacuum” and “political fragmentation”. This stance stems from the assertions of certain politicians and analysts who warn that the chaos following the military’s collapse might intensify into greater violence and conflict. Such a perception is not only misguided but ironically might cause the very chaos they anticipate. We emphasize that the chaos and violence could only happen for two reasons: externally due to attempts to reimpose central control, rather than the lack of it, and internally because of attempts to create exclusive ethnic-based systems in regions with diverse ethnic populations. In fact, it is mainly the analysts and elites who are wary of what they call “political fragmentation”, not the local populace, who have experience with Mandala-like political arrangements, with two or more than two political authorities trying to govern them, such as those seen in the long-sustaining Wa State. This may sound quixotic to the political elites but it is very practical and realistic for the local populace. The realities on the ground demand a new imagination beyond the conventional nation-state. Now is the opportune moment to offer the people a governance system they are familiar with, rather than enforcing a federal system with extensive decentralization; even setting up a federal system will invariably require a somewhat central authority—a “federal government”. Such models, dependent on a nation-state structure, would necessitate the NUG—or whoever is charged with the task—successfully uniting all EAOs under a singular political leadership and vision, which is next to impossible and a feat that no politicians have achieved over seven decades. The current fixation on establishing a central command stems from persistent assertions by Western analysts, who argue that the lack of unity among opposition forces is the reason why the foreign governments were not providing meaningful assistance to them. If the international policy industry insists the NUG and EAOs must create a central command under a singular political leadership, it is bound to fail spectacularly. While opposition groups share the objective of overthrowing the junta, on-the-ground political realities are almost antagonistic to a single, central command or joint command. A prime example is in Chin State, where, despite military successes, politicians face growing internal divisions, rooted in both geographical and linguistic differences. Similarly, in Shan State, local Shan groups express frustration over being marginalized and have held longstanding grievances against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In central dry regions too, there are reported conflicts among the opposition armed groups and governing bodies. Meanwhile, groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Arakan Army (AA) have also explicitly stated their political vision of achieving a confederation, differing from other factions’ goals. Myanmar’s present landscape makes one recall the historical period following the disintegration of the Bagan Empire in the 13th century, which saw 250 years of political interregnum, characterized by the emergence of multiple regional powers such as the territorially limited local kingdoms of Myinsaing, Pinya, Sagaing, Taungoo, Hanthawaddy, Ava and others, including the notable rise of the Tai people with the establishment of the Lanna kingdom. Currently, various groups exert control over specific territories, necessitating both domestic and international negotiations for effective governance. For instance, Chin communities now administering India-Myanmar border towns and the MNDAA initiating governance in the Kokang region, bordering China, must engage in complex discussions with multiple actors. Similarly, the NUG, now in control of the town of Kawlin, faces the challenge of implementing effective administration. This power structure reflects the dynamics of the Mandala system, characterized by local autonomy and complex alliances, a system from the not-so-distant past and familiar to the local populace. The Mandala system, unlike a modern nation-state, features multiple political power centers (kingdoms back in those days) with diminishing political power as one moves away from the center, characterized by ill-defined, porous boundaries in contrast to the well-demarcated borders of nation-states. Within this Mandala system, these polities existed in a hierarchical order, with lesser tributaries and a possible supreme king or overlord. Allegiances were fluid and overlapping, and yet, as Thongchai Winichakul puts it, “each king had his own court, administrative and financial system, tax collection, army, and judicial system”. Thus, these polities maintain distinct autonomy and independence. The call for a new, responsive Mandala With our call for a new responsive Mandala, the better focus would be on ensuring democratic, inclusive and representative governances, rather than attempting to re-centralize control or establish a federal/national army. This approach involves: 1) acknowledging the emergence of multiple governance arrangements across Myanmar, no matter whether it is called “federal” or “confederal”; 2) prioritizing the establishment of democratic, inclusive and representative governance in captured territories, recognizing that international recognition is secondary to providing effective local governance for residents whose immediate concern is sustenance; and 3) avoiding the expenditure of time and resources on creating a centralized command structure, and instead fostering coordination mechanisms across different polities. Perhaps more importantly, the new political system or systems in Myanmar must transcend narrow ethnic identities, acknowledging the diverse populations across regions, be it Shan Land (ရှမ်းပြည်), Arakan Country(ရခိုင်ပြည်) or Sagaing Nation (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း). An ethnic-based political system in places like Arakan (Rakhine) or Shan will be a recipe for disaster as the current armed conflicts have already witnessed rising inter-ethnic tensions. In the same spirit, the calls to establish a Bamar state overlook the diverse ethnic populations in the central dry regions, not to mention the Chinese, Hindu or Muslim communities who have been persecuted by successive governments. Instead, efforts should focus on establishing democratic and inclusive governance systems that reflect the Mandala-like order today. The specific form of these new polities, whether one-party systems akin to Singapore, constitutional monarchies like Thailand, Sweden or the UK, or even communist systems like China or Vietnam, is secondary to their adherence to these democratic inclusive and responsive principles of governance. This is what the internal actors starting with the NUG should aim for. At the same time, the international community must be prepared to accept this, not push for a single political authority who will represent the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. While the role of armed groups in the current stage of Myanmar’s revolution is undeniable, it’s crucial to remember that the military success of these armed groups stems from unprecedented civilian participation and public support. The revolution must center on the people, not the armed groups, ensuring these groups remain accountable and adhere to democratic principles. While the abolition of all armed forces should be a political aim for the long term, the immediate priority right now is to embrace the emerging Mandala-like political arrangements, avoiding the futile pursuit of a centralized chain of command under a singular political leadership. The focus must now shift to ensuring that these emerging political entities embody democratic, inclusive and responsive governance systems tailored to meet the immediate needs of the people, providing the essential services and support required in the here and now. This approach, grounded in current realities, paves the way for a more stable and prosperous future for the peoples of Myanmar. Htet Min Lwin is a scholar of religion, social movements and revolution, currently writing a PhD at the York Centre for Asian Research at York University, Toronto. Thiha Wint Aung is a political scientist who holds an MA from the Central European University (CEU) and an MPP from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, Japan..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Council Fifty-second session 27 February–4 April 2023 Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention The Human Rights Council, Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights, and reaffirming all relevant General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions and decisions on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Welcoming Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) of 21 December 2022, the Security Council statements on Myanmar of 4 February, 10 November, 8 December and 29 December 2021 and of 2 February 2022, the statement by the President of the Security Council on Myanmar of 10 March 2021, the meetings of the Security Council held on 2 February and 5 March 2021 and the briefing convened by the General Assembly with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar on 16 March 2023, Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Myanmar, Condemning in the strongest terms the military coup by the Myanmar military on 1 February 2021, and the continuation of the state of emergency, including the extension on 1 February 2023, the declaration of martial law and its expansion on 1 February 2023, the suspension of the parliament and the arbitrary detention, arrest and politically motivated conviction and sentencing of President Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, other government officials and politicians, human rights defenders, journalists, civil society members, local and foreign advisers, religious leaders and many others, Condemning also in the strongest terms the arbitrary detention, arrest and politically motivated convictions, sentencing and executions, including of pro-democracy activists, as well as violent acts, including extrajudicial killings, systematic sexual and gender-based violence, and torture committed against civilians, including health-care workers, children, teachers, students, lawyers, artists, journalists, human rights defenders and many others, which exacerbate the polarization and violence and worsens the humanitarian situation in the country, Expressing deep concern at the ongoing use of violence and the escalation of the conflict by the Myanmar military, which seriously undermine the enjoyment of human rights of individuals in Myanmar, especially those of women, children and older persons, as well as those of persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, including Rohingya Muslims, owing to the heavy militarization of Myanmar, aggravated by the continued access to arms by the Myanmar military, and at the deaths and many injuries as a consequence of the increase in the indiscriminate use of lethal force against civilians by the Myanmar armed forces and police, Underlining the need to uphold the rule of law and to fully respect human rights, stressing in particular the need to fully protect the enjoyment of human rights by women and children, stressing the importance of accountability, and expressing deep concern at restrictions on medical and humanitarian personnel, civil society, labour union members, journalists and media workers, Expressing deep concern at the increasing military build-up and use of military force throughout the country, in particular in the south-eastern, central, north and north-western parts of the country, which is making de-escalation and the provision of humanitarian aid even more challenging, Expressing grave concern at the attacks against and the harassment of journalists and other media workers, including arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment, killings and surveillance, and Internet shutdowns and other restrictions on and interruptions to the Internet and social media, including the amendment to the law on television and radio broadcasting, and the proposed revival of the law on cybersecurity, which unnecessarily and disproportionately restricts the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and the right to privacy, as set forth in article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Expressing grave concern also at the ongoing conflicts between the Myanmar armed forces and other armed groups, at the increased use of violence by the Myanmar armed forces against civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence, and grave violations and abuses against children, at airstrikes killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure, at the burning of villages, at the continuing forced displacement of civilians, including of ethnic and religious minorities, at reports of violations and abuses of human rights, including abductions, arbitrary detentions, arrests and killings, and other violations involving the use of facilities functioning as schools, hospitals and houses of worship for military purposes, the use of landmines and at the enduring impunity that exists in Myanmar, particularly in the Myanmar armed and security forces, Reiterating the obligation of Myanmar to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of the child in accordance with its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, including the right to education and the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, and alarmed that children continue to be subjected to the six grave violations against children during armed conflict and that the scale and recurrent nature of such violations and abuses will affect generations to come, Reiterating also the responsibility of the Myanmar armed forces to ensure the protection of the human rights of all persons in Myanmar, including persons belonging to ethnic, religious and other minorities, including the Rohingya, and reiterating the urgent need to undertake a full, transparent, impartial and independent investigation into all reports of violations and abuses of international human rights law, violations of international humanitarian law and crimes under international law, to ensure that perpetrators are held accountable in fair, independent and impartial criminal proceedings, including in domestic courts or tribunals, in accordance with international law standards, and to ensure that victims and their families have access to effective remedy, including by prompt, effective and independent casualty recording and guarantees of non-recurrence, Alarmed at the continued attacks on medical and humanitarian personnel, on medical facilities and on transport and equipment, and at the lack of humanitarian access, and calling upon all parties, in particular the Myanmar armed forces, to abide by international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and to allow and facilitate safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access across the entire country for local and international staff of humanitarian and other relevant international agencies to provide humanitarian assistance independently, neutrally and impartially to all in need, in particular to persons displaced by the conflict..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "WASHINGTON — The United States believes there is no chance that proposed elections in Myanmar will be free and fair, according to Derek Chollet, a senior adviser to Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Myanmar and other issues. In an interview at the State Department on Thursday with Khin Soe Win, acting chief of VOA’s Burmese Service, Chollet also discussed the recently passed Burma Act, which provides for humanitarian assistance and civil society support to pro-democracy factions in Myanmar and imposes targeted sanctions on elements of the ruling junta accused of human rights abuses. Other issues discussed included Russian support for the military junta that seized power in Myanmar, also known as Burma, in February 2021, and U.S. efforts to build support for Myanmar opposition forces such as the National Unity Government and People’s Defense Forces, and among Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity. VOA: President Biden recently signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which includes the Burma Act, which is welcomed most Burmese people, particularly the resistance groups, as well as the National Unity Government and People’s Defense Force. But how effectively and how soon can you deliver this assistance to the targeted groups? Derek Chollet, senior adviser to Secretary of State Antony Blinken: Well, first of all, we're already working — and we have been working over the last several years — to provide nonlethal assistance to the pro-democracy opposition inside Burma. We've been very engaged with the National Unity Government as well as some of the ethnic groups within Burma, talking to them about ways we could be most helpful in their efforts to put Burma back on the path to democracy. The Burma Act that was recently signed into law is something we in the Biden administration strongly support. We worked very closely with the Congress in the development of the Burma Act. It's something we welcome, and the fact that that was put into law in a bipartisan basis with both Democrats and Republicans working together shows the depth of support here in the United States for the people of Burma. [It also shows] the strong position we have against what the junta has done. VOA: Yes, it's about $136 million. But compared to the U.S. assistance to Ukraine, it's just peanuts. But this is an encouragement for the resistance group as well as the moral support for the Burmese people who are under the military suppression. Chollet: Yes, absolutely. And I think it's important to note the Burma Act is not the sum total of everything we are doing for Burma. Since 2017, the United States has provided nearly $2 billion in support to Burma, Bangladesh, the areas ... afflicted by this conflict. And we're going to continue to try to find ways that we can support the people of Burma and the pro-democracy opposition there. VOA: The junta seems not to be winning in the fight against the People's Defense Forces and ethnic armed groups on the ground and focusing on air power. There are reports of some calling to impose a no-fly zone. Is it possible for the U.S. to coordinate with the U.N. Security Council on a no-fly zone? Chollet: Well, that's not something we're considering now. What we're trying to find is a way that we can peacefully resolve the situation inside Burma. We strongly condemn what the junta has done and is doing every day. We fully support the efforts by ASEAN in particular to stick to the five-point consensus to ensure that Burma and the junta remain isolated within ASEAN and not being able to enjoy the benefits of membership in certain ways — certainly by not having political representation at key ASEAN meetings. When we held the U.S.-ASEAN summit here in Washington and President Biden met with nine leaders of ASEAN, there was an empty chair. And that was because Burma was not welcome at a political level at that meeting. VOA: Back to NDAA and assistance for Burma, including the nonlethal assistance for armed resistance groups. Russia might retaliate against the U.S. because the Burmese junta was the very first to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you think Russia might react? Chollet: We have seen over the last several years that the relationship between the junta and Moscow has only grown stronger. Russia is the biggest military supporter of the junta. It has been backing the junta in very significant ways. It's something we strongly condemn. And Russia is at a point right now where it's got very few friends in the international community, and it's found that the junta is one of the more reliable friends. That said, we were able to work with our partners in the U.N. Security Council to have a significant resolution passed, the first time the U.N. Security Council had spoken to the issue of Burma since the coup. Russia allowed that Security Council resolution to go forward. And so, we've shown that we can get some things done. But the reality is Russia and the junta are very, very close. I expect they'll remain that way. But that will only cause us to redouble our efforts to support the people of Burma, to work with our like-minded allies in the region and beyond to try to bring about a resolution to this crisis. VOA: Neighboring countries are crucial for Burma. The military leader Min Aung Hlaing today met with the Thai army chief in the beach resort in Rakhine state. Thailand's role in the Burma crisis is critical because of the exodus of migrants to Thailand. When you visited Thailand together with Secretary Blinken last year, representatives of the National Unity Government and various armed ethnic organizations were not able to meet you because they feared Thai intelligence would find their location. So how do you assess Thailand's role in this conflict? Chollet: Thailand shares a very, very long border with Burma and is quite concerned about the spillover effects of the instability. We fully understand that Thailand has been a critical partner of us for many, many years, and working to deal with the refugee crisis in Burma and all of its manifestations over decades. Now, we are very close partners and Thailand is an ally of the United States. Thailand is a key partner within ASEAN. So we're working very hard to stay close to our Thai partners as we're working together to try to resolve the situation inside Burma. It's something that we're doing also with our other ASEAN partners, because there's many countries with a lot at stake in Burma's future. And I think the one thing we have been able to accomplish in the years since the coup is by maintaining the strong unity — seeing the unity within ASEAN and then building unity between ASEAN and countries like the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and others with an interest in a secure and peaceful and democratic Burma. VOA: Secretary Blinken urged the international community to reject the sham elections that the junta is going to hold. And then yesterday the military spokesperson confirmed they are going to hold a National Security Council meeting at the end of this month, and they are going to set the election date. I don’t know how they are going to do it, because the military regime’s state of emergency expires at the end of this month. Chollet: Look, our position hasn't changed. These elections have no chance of being free and fair. It's a transparent attempt to try to legitimize what the junta has done and try to create an offramp somehow for its coup. Our view is very simple. There was an election that was deemed free and fair. It was in November of 2020. The junta did not like the outcome of that election, which is why they did what they did on February 1, 2021. They don't control up to 50% of the territory right now. It's unclear how they could even hold elections. You can't have a free and fair election when you're jailing every significant opposition, when you're committing atrocities, when you're shutting down a free press. So, we should drop any pretense that if they were to hold an election— and they probably will try to hold one — that it would be free and fair..."
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
2023-01-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Ukraine has developed deep links to the Myanmar military, with arms exports and technology transfers continuing, even after the Myanmar military has committed mass murder amounting to atrocity crimes following its illegitimate coup attempt. According to Ukrainian export data, accessed via Import Genius, Motor Sich exported engines and parts to Myanmar twice since the military’s attempted coup. A May 2021 shipment to the Myanmar army's directorate of procurement contained turbojet engine equipment, and a February shipment to the private air force supplier Sky Aviator contained mechanical parts. Motor Sich is a major Ukrainian manufacturer of engines for aircraft and missiles. The Ukrainian state is nationalising the firm from its majority-owned Chinese. A Ministry of Defence document leaked to Justice For Myanmar, details the purchase of Mil Mi-17 parts from Motor Sich in 2015-16 via Myanmar Avia Export (predecessor of Myanmar Avia Services), a crony company owned by Tay Za. Ukrainian export records also show a series of shipments to the Myanmar Air Force from 2019 onwards. In May 2021, state-owned arms manufacturer Ukroboronservice shipped over 164 kilos of aircraft parts to Yatanarpon Aviation. This followed shipments in December 2020 of navigational devices and control instruments to Yatanarpon Aviation. In June 2021 Ukraine voted in favour of a UN General Assembly resolution to stop the flow of arms to Myanmar. The country’s transfers are only the most recent examples of significant arms links that amount to aiding and abetting the atrocity crimes of the Myanmar military. See a list of businesses and individuals linked to Myanmar arms procurement from Ukraine for targeted sanctions: Download Excel File (21 kb) Building Myanmar’s arms industry Ukraine’s significant military ties with Myanmar can be seen in a joint project to produce BTR-4 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), MMT-40 light tanks and 2SIU self-propelled howitzers. The plant is a partnership between the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defence Industry, Ukrainian state-owned arms conglomerate, Ukroboronprom, the state arms trade company, Ukrspecexport, and Myanmar Chemical & Machinery (MCM), a private Myanmar arms broker. The project may be the outcome of a 2019 agreement, according to Defence Blog. An October 2020 Facebook post by Ukrspecexport described a three-year contract, signed with the Ministry of Defence of an unspecified Asian country, likely Myanmar. The contract was for the production and repair of armoured personnel carriers, as well as for the repair and upgrading of light armoured equipment. It is unclear if the plant is already in production. This follows a 2018 agreement on military-technical cooperation negotiated between Ukraine and Myanmar defence ministries that came into force in June 2019. The agreement, signed under the National League for Democracy-led government, specified seven points for military cooperation, including research and development of arms, production of conventional weapons, the supply of arms and related equipment, and joint sales and marketing of arms in third countries. Ukrainian export records show MCM received initial shipments of equipment for the production of BTR-4U APCs and 2S1Us from Ukrspecexport in 2015. Through 2018 and 2019, Amethyst Trading, a subsidiary of MCM, received shipments of BTR-3U and MMT-40 parts from Ukrspecexport. This included chassis, engine parts, electrical components, night vision devices and laser rangefinders, as well as technical documentation for assembly, and machine sets for production. From 2015 to 2020, Ukrspecexport also shipped equipment to the Directorate of Defence Industry for the joint plant, such as horizontal boring, welding, cutting and lathe machinery. Other exports from Ukrspecexport include 80K6K1 and 36D6 3D mobile air surveillance radar and electrical equipment shipped to the Myanmar Air Force from 2018-2020. Ukroboronprom and Ukrspecexport did not respond to questions from Justice For Myanmar regarding their business with the Myanmar military and the status of the joint project. The Myanmar military’s brokers Ukraine’s business with the Myanmar military has enriched private Myanmar companies who facilitate the arms trade. They must be targeted for sanctions to stop the flow of arms and related materiel to Myanmar. Aung Hlaing Oo and MCM Group Aung Hlaing Oo, a major arms procurer conducting substantial business with Ukrainian state arms manufacturers, was appointed as Ukraine’s honorary consul to Myanmar in January 2017. Aung Hlaing Oo heads Myanmar Chemical & Machinery (MCM) group of companies. Amethyst Trading, a main consignee of parts for the Ukrspecexport project, is listed on the MCM Pacific website as one of MCM group’s companies. Ukraine’s foreign ministry website lists an MCM Pacific email address as the contact for Ukraine’s honorary consul in Myanmar. According to a private sector source with military connections, Aung Hlaing Oo receives commissions of 20-30% on arms sales from Ukraine, which amount to substantial profits for his businesses and the Ukrainian state. A leaked Ministry of Defence document, received by Justice For Myanmar, detail procurement activities in 2016-17 involving MCM Pacific Pte. Ltd., Aung Hlaing Oo’s Singapore business, for Mil Mi-2 and Mil Mi-17 helicopter parts, APC parts, a marine diesel engine, a ship propulsion system and stern arrangement. Myanmar Chemical & Machinery Co. Ltd in Yangon also procured T-72 battle tank parts. Items are billed in US dollars and Euros. Ukrainian export records show a large number of Ukrspecexport shipments to Amethyst Trading of T-72S tank parts in 2018 and BTS-4 armoured recovery vehicle parts in 2019. In addition to its business in Ukraine, MCM also procures arms from Serbia for the Myanmar military. A 2019 MCM proposal for the Myanmar Air Force, leaked to Justice For Myanmar, details aircraft-mounted rocket launchers, rockets, free-fall bombs, a multiple bomb launcher for use “on large surfaces” and fuses. MCM lists Sinotruk, a Chinese truck company that supplies trucks to the Myanmar army, as a partner in their business profile. Sinotruk vehicles are ubiquitous in the military’s brutal crackdown following their attempted coup and the company’s links to German truck manufacturer MAN have been investigated by Justice For Myanmar. The private sector source disclosed that MCM is involved in the production of Miltruk-branded Sinotruk military vehicles produced in an assembly plant in Meiktila. Myanmar Consultancy Company and Yatanarpon Aviation Support Company Ukrainian export data shows that Myanmar Consultancy Company received regular Ukrspecexport shipments from 2016-2020, largely of MiG-29 fighter jet parts, installation machinery, as well as 36D6 air surveillance radar components and an IGLA-1M surface-to-air missile simulator. In 2019, Myanmar Consultancy also received shipments of RD-33 turbofan engines from the state-owned Lutsk Repair Plant “Motor”, used in MiG-29 aircraft. Justice For Myanmar previously detailed shipments of land-based radar sold to Myanmar Consultancy by Indian state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd. Dr Naing Htut Aung, a major arms broker, is a former director and shareholder of Myanmar Consultancy. Dr Naing Htut Aung’s businesses, Gateways International Holding Company and International Gateways Group of Company, were registered at the same address as Myanmar Consultancy until late 2020. Gateways International continues to have the same phone number as Myanmar Consultancy. According to a private sector source with military connections, Dr Naing Htut Aung is a dominant procurer of weapons systems, spare parts and upgrades for the navy and air force and is an agent for major Chinese state-owned arms producers. International Gateways Group also donated funds to the Myanmar military in September 2017, supporting the crime of genocide. Myanmar Consultancy’s website has been down since 2012. An archived copy lists the company’s mission to provide a “gateway” for foreign direct investment to the public and private sectors. A core objective is “to develop the industry and high technologies in the State.” Justice For Myanmar has published a leaked Myanmar Consultancy air force technical proposal from 2019. Myanmar Consultancy was an online exhibitor at the MAKS 2021 air show in Russia, which coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attended in person. Myanmar Consultancy is registered at the same address as Yatanarpon Aviation Support Company with the same phone number. The two businesses also share a common director, Than Lwin. Yatanarpon Aviation Support received aircraft parts from Ukroboronservice in December 2020 and May 2021. Yatanarpon Aviation Support is headed by Sit Taing Aung, the son of Aung Phone, the forestry minister under Myanmar’s previous junta, the State Peace and Development Council. Sit Taing Aung’s Suntac group of companies was previously subject to EU sanctions for its links to the military junta. Sit Taing Aung is Mexico’s honorary consul to Myanmar. ‍ Sky Aviator Sky Aviator is an arms supplier based in Yangon that has received a number of shipments of Ukrainian aircraft parts from Motor Sich, from May 2018 to as recently as February 2021, following the attempted military coup. A leaked Ministry of Defence document shows the company has additionally provided T-72S tank parts to the army. Since the February attempted coup, Sky Aviator has also received a number of Russian arms shipments including YAK-130 support equipment from Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies (KRET), refitted turbojet engines from United Engine Corporation and engine parts from Rosoboronexport. Sky Aviator has expertise in Russian helicopters. A leaked August 2019 Sky Aviator proposal to the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force offers an upgrade to Mi-24P helicopters and states they are the exclusive representative of JSC Russian Helicopter in Myanmar. In May, the company’s chief engineer reviewed a Moscow State Technical University of Civil Aviation PhD thesis, disclosing that the research had practical application for Sky Aviator’s maintenance, repair and operations of Mi-17 helicopters. ‍ Trident Marine Trident Marine is a private company whose director includes Zaw Win Oo, an associate of the Myanmar military through his directorship of Solutions Hub, part of military linked mobile money service Easy Pay. According to Ukrainian export records, state-owned arms manufacturer Ukroboronservice sent ship technical documents and parts to Trident Marine Co. Ltd. in 2019. A leaked Ministry of Defence document shows that Trident Marine also procured ship parts for the Myanmar Navy in 2015-16, including navigation equipment, electrical fittings and steering equipment. These purchases were made through Singapore-based D&K Intertrade, a private company whose directors are all Myanmar nationals. D&K Intertrade’s website describes its business as trade in “semiconductors and other electrical parts and components”. Trident Marine’s 2019 purchases from Ukraine were shipped to an address at No.25, Myint Zu Street in Yangon, which is not the listed business address of the company. The Myint Zu Street address is the location of Amber Star Trading Co. Ltd. The Amber Star website lists its business scope as including naval architecture, reverse engineering, unmanned systems and technology transfer, and describes D&K Intertrade as its Singapore branch. It also has a branch in Naypyidaw. ‍ Interstellar, Limited A leaked 2019 Interstellar proposal to the Myanmar Air Force shows the company is an official sales agent for the import of aviation parts from Ukroboronprom, specialising in Mi-2 and Mi-17 helicopters and MiG-29 fighter jets. Interstellar is also a broker for ALLWE Foreign Trade Company. Interstellar was an online exhibitor at the MAKS 2021 air show in Russia, which coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attended in person. ‍ Ukraine is aiding and abetting atrocity crimes In August and September 2017, the Myanmar military carried out a campaign of genocide against the Rohingya, committing mass murder, rape and gang rape, destroying property and driving more than 800,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh. Instead of fulfilling their international obligations and standing for justice, the Ukrainian government increased cooperation with the Myanmar military. Following the international crimes committed by the Myanmar military in 2017, the European Union and USA strengthened sanctions against the military, and the UN Human Rights Council formed an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar to investigate the atrocities. In August 2019, the Fact-Finding Mission released a report on the economic interests of the Myanmar military, which detailed Ukrspetsexport and Ukroboronprom arms manufacturing activities in Myanmar, which supports the Myanmar military’s arms production capabilities. The Fact-Finding Mission noted that Ukraine is a signatory of (but not party to) the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and warned against contravention of the object and purpose of the treaty. Ukraine must have known that arms provided to Myanmar would be used to breach the human rights of the people. The Fact-Finding Mission concluded that Ukraine “provided arms and other related equipment in breach of their Common Article 1 obligations as a matter either of treaty law or of customary international humanitarian law. The Mission also reached the conclusion under the general rules of State responsibility that prohibit aiding or assisting another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, that these States knew, or were virtually certain, that the assistance would be used for unlawful purposes.” Ukraine has so far blatantly ignored the Fact-Finding Mission’s recommendations, proceeding with arms and technology transfers and the development of the manufacturing plant after the August 2019 report. Following the attempted coup, Ukraine’s shameful history of arms sales was on display in the streets as the military used older Ukrainian BTR-3Us as part of the bloody crackdown. Despite overwhelming evidence of Ukraine’s complicity in the Myanmar military’s international crimes, the country is sticking to its bilateral military technical cooperation agreement and has not imposed an arms embargo. Asked by Deutsche Welle if they will stop cooperation with the Myanmar military following the attempted coup, a spokesperson for Ukroboronprom, the association of state arms enterprises, responded that they export in accordance with Ukrainian law and international obligations, noting that Ukraine has not imposed sanctions or an arms embargo on Myanmar. The spokesperson also said that the military technical cooperation agreement is still valid under the military junta. “Following socio-political stabilisation of the situation in Myanmar, we hope to continue to continue to pursue our existing obligations”. ‍ Stop the flow of arms! Since the illegal attempted coup, the military junta has murdered 1049 people, including children as young as six, with over 6200 still detained as of September 6. An estimated 230,000 have been displaced as of June, many in ethnic areas, as the Myanmar military has dramatically increased airstrikes and shelling, which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These attacks likely involve Ukrainian technology. Ukraine must end its complicity in the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes. Immediate steps that need to be taken include imposing an arms embargo, cutting ties with the Myanmar military, revoking the bilateral military technical cooperation agreement, preventing production at the joint arms plant and withdrawing Aung Hlaing Oo’s position as honorary consul. Given Ukraine’s persistent failure to abide by international law and norms, the international community must also act to ensure Ukraine fulfils its international obligations. Ukraine receives significant military aid from the US, UK and EU. The US alone has provided approximately US$2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine since 2014, with US$60 million announced in August. Ukroboronprom holds regular talks with NATO and its member states, while NATO as recently as July 2021 expressed a commitment to support the reform of Ukraine’s arms industry to bring it closer to “NATO standards”. So why have Ukraine’s donors and allies tolerated the arms trade with Myanmar? We call on Ukraine’s partners to make future aid conditional on Ukraine imposing an arms embargo on Myanmar, shutting down the arms manufacturing plant and ending all military ties. Without a global arms embargo on Myanmar, the criminal military junta will find ways to purchase arms to use against the people. It is imperative that the UN Security Council passes a resolution to stop the flow of arms to Myanmar. Finally, the Myanmar military’s network of private arms companies, their directors and owners must be urgently targeted for sanctions and denied access to international banks. The UK’s decision to impose sanctions on Tay Za and Htoo Group, and the US restrictions on King Royal Technologies, are positive steps but more businesses procuring arms and dual use goods for the Myanmar military must be sanctioned at a faster pace to make an impact on the military junta. Singapore must end the use of its territory as a business hub for arms brokers. As the Myanmar military’s terror campaign continues, the international community needs to step up and take concrete action against the criminal Myanmar military and its partners. The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled..." ‍
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2021-09-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: ''The ICJ, together with other 60 national and international human rights organizations urged today the Myanmar authorities, and in particular the Ministry of Transport and Communication and the Parliament, to ensure the repeal of the offence of criminal defamation...''
Source/publisher: International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
2017-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2019-02-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf pdf
Size: 100.41 KB 339.7 KB
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2018-12-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Sgaw Karen
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Description: Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; entry into force 3 January 1976... Myanmar signed the treaty on 16 July 2015 and ratified it on 6 October 2017, with the Declaration that: ?With reference to article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar declares that, in consistence with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, the term ?the right of self-determination” appearing in this article does not apply to any section of people within a sovereign independent state and cannot be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of a sovereign and independent state. In addition, the term shall not be applied to undermine Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.”
Source/publisher: United Nations
2017-10-06
Date of entry/update: 2017-10-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Source/publisher: United Nations Department of Public Information, NY
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2015-09-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Bengali
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Source/publisher: United Nations Information Centre, Pakistan
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2015-09-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Urdu
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Source/publisher: Chin Human Rights Organization (trans)
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2014-12-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Chin Matu (Nga La)
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2009-08-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Chin (Falam)
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2009-08-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Chin - (Hakha)
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2009-08-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Chin (Tiddim)
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2009-08-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Thai
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Description: Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976.
Source/publisher: United Nations
1966-12-16
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Pwo-Karen
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: (S'gaw-Karen
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Shan
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Source/publisher: United Nations
1948-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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