See also the Military/Tatmadaw Section
|Title:|| ||Burma Campaign
|Description/subject:|| ||"The Burma Campaign in the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II was fought primarily between British Commonwealth, Chinese and United States forces against the forces of the Empire of Japan, Thailand, and the Indian National Army. British Commonwealth land forces were drawn primarily from British India. The Burmese Independence Army was trained by the Japanese and spearheaded the initial attacks against the British forces....Contents:
1 Japanese conquest of Burma:
1.1 Japanese advance to the Indian frontier;
1.2 Thai army enters Burma...
2 Allied setbacks, 1942–1943...
3 The Balance Shifts 1943–1944:
3.1 Allied plans;
3.2 Japanese plans;
3.3 Northern and Yunnan front 1943/44;
3.4 Southern front 1943/44...
4 The Japanese Invasion of India 1944...
5 The Allied Reoccupation of Burma 1944–1945:
5.1 Southern Front 1944/45;
5.2 Northern Front 1944/45;
5.3 Central Front 1944/45;
5.4 Race for Rangoon;
5.5 Operation Dracula...
6 Final operations...
8 See also...
11 Further reading...
12 External links:
12.4 Primary sources;
|Date of entry/update:|| ||14 August 2012|
|Title:|| ||Burma Star Association
|Source/publisher:|| ||Burma Star Association|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||03 June 2003|
|Title:|| ||The Burma Campaign
|Description/subject:|| ||"Capt. Dinesh Hukmani's Military History Site" .....
These pages contain order of battle information for the Burma Campaign, 1941-1945, historical details and other items of interest.|
|Author/creator:|| ||Capt. Dinesh Hukmani|
|Source/publisher:|| ||The Burma Campaign|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||16 November 2010|
|Title:|| ||WWII: China-Burma-India Theater of Operations
|Description/subject:|| ||This site covers various aspects of the WWII campaigns in Burma, largely from a US military perspective. Chronological account, in cluding
# Burma, 1942: 7 December 1941--26 May 1942
# India-Burma: 2 April 1942--28 January 1945
# Central Burma: 29 January--15 July 1945 as well as maps, bibliographies, photographs.|
|Source/publisher:|| ||HyperWar Foundation|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||24 June 2003|
|Title:|| ||The scramble for the Waste Lands: Tracking colonial legacies, counterinsurgency and international investment through the lens of land laws in Burma/Myanmar
|Date of publication:|| ||2014|
|Description/subject:|| ||"This article traces the revenue category and legal concept of the Waste Land in Burma/Myanmar
from its original application by the British colonial apparatus in the nineteenth century, to its
later use in tandem with Burma Army counterinsurgent tactics starting in the 1960s, and finally
to the 2012 land laws and current issues in international investment. This adaptation of colonial
ideas about territorialization in the context of an ongoing civil war offers a new angle for under-
standing the relationship between military tactics and the political economy of conflict and
counterinsurgent strategies which crucially depended on giving local militias—both government
and nongovernment—high degrees of autonomy. The recent government changes, including the
more civilian representation in parliament and its shift to engage with Western economies, raise
questions regarding the future of the military, as well as local autonomy and the rural peasantry’s
access to land. As increasing numbers of international investors are poised to enter the Myanmar
market, this article will revisit notions of land use and appropriation, and finally the role of the
army and its changing relationship with Waste Lands...
Burma, colonialism, counterinsurgency, land law, Myanmar, Waste Land|
|Author/creator:|| ||Jane M. Ferguson|
|Source/publisher:|| ||Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 35 (2014) 295–31|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (460K)|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||01 January 2015|
|Title:|| ||Constructing an intelligence state: the development of the colonial security services in Burma 1930–1942.
|Date of publication:|| ||January 2010|
"My doctoral research focuses on the development and operation of the
intelligence services in British colonial Burma during the years 1930 to 1942.
This involves an examination of the causes of intelligence development, its
progress throughout 1930-1942, its rationale and modus operandi, and the
pressures it faced. This time period permits us to assess how intelligence
development was a product of the colonial government's response to the 1930
peasant uprising which came as such a shock to colonial security and how
thereafter intelligence helped prevent popular hostility to the government from
taking the form of an uprising. As a result, intelligence information was
increasingly used to secure colonial power during the period of parliamentary
reform in Burma in 1937. The thesis further examines the stresses that riots and
strikes placed on colonial security in 1938, the so-called ‘year of revolution’ in
Burma. The thesis then proceeds to consider how intelligence operated in the
final years of colonial rule before the Japanese occupation of Burma in 1942.
This study is significant not only because very little work on the colonial security
services in Burma exists for the period under review, but also because it reveals
that intelligence was crucial to colonial rule, underpinning the stability of the
colonial state and informing its relationship with the indigenous population in
what remained, in relative terms at least, a colonial backwater like Burma. The
argument that intelligence was pivotal to colonial governmental stability in
Burma because of its centrality to strategies of population control departs from
conventional histories of Burma which have considered the colonial army to
have been the predominant instrument of political control and the most
significant factor in the relationship between the state and society in colonial
Burma. Rather it will be argued here that the colonial state in Burma relied on a
functioning intelligence bureau which collected information from local
indigenous officials and informers and employed secret agents to work on its
behalf. This information was collated into reports for the government which then
became integral to policy formulation. The primary source base for this work
includes British colonial material from government and private collections
predominantly in the British library as well as government papers in the National
Archives in Kew."|
|Author/creator:|| ||Edmund Bede Clipson|
|Source/publisher:|| ||University of Exeter (doctoral dissertation)|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (2MB-OBL version; 12MB-original))|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||https://eric.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/98382/ClipsonE.pdf?sequence=1|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||01 July 2012|
|Title:|| ||Heroes and Villains
|Date of publication:|| ||March 2007|
|Description/subject:|| ||"When the soldiers of the Burma Independence Army, led by the Thirty Comrades, infiltrated Burma from neighboring Thailand in a brave action to oust the British, the modern history of the Burmese armed forces was born. The fragile, inexperienced and ill-equipped army had faced many ups and downs in Burma’s often turbulent political history.
A year before independence in 1948, Aung San, the founder of the BIA and Burma’s independence hero, was gunned down by rivals, aided by British army officers.
The country descended into turmoil and civil war. The legendary Thirty Comrades were also divided, dominated by two political factions. Gen Ne Win led and united the army, while his comrades went into hiding in the jungle, joining “multi-color insurgent groups” aiming to topple the government.
Ne Win, also a prominent member of the Thirty Comrades, once proudly said that the Burmese army was founded by farmers, workers and other people of Burma, not by mercenaries. But he later fell victim of his own words, when he quelled street protests and dissent in the country by ordering troops to shoot and kill just to prolong his rule. So it’s no surprise to hear Burmese people saying that the armed forces were Ne Win’s pocket army.
When the country was rocked by nationwide protests in 1988, Ne Win warned the nation in a state television address: “If in future there are mob disturbances, if the army shoots, it hits—there is no firing into the air to scare.”
Historians note that Ne Win and Aung San had entirely different views on the army, with the latter wanting to steer it away from politics. Thus, throughout the history of the army, we have learned that things are not black and white.
There are military leaders who adhered to the wishes of the people and sided with them. Burmese will definitely remember and admire them. In this issue, we have singled out a number of the country’s fine, professional soldiers who were admired by the people.
There are many more unnamed and unknown heroes who sacrificed themselves for the country and its people—too many for us to name all. We have also chosen some military leaders who have stubbornly stuck to their guns, driving the country into limbo. They definitely fall into the category of the villainous.
However, all in all, we hope you will enjoy this special feature, marking the 62nd anniversary of Burma’s Resistance Day, now officially called Armed Forces Day..."|
|Source/publisher:|| ||"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 15, No. 3|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||04 May 2008|
|Title:|| ||Notes on Cavalry Employed in Upper Burma From October 1886 to October 1887
|Date of publication:|| ||1889|
|Description/subject:|| ||Editor’s Note:
Colonel Heyland’s observations on army horses and cavalry regiments in the final
stages of the Third Anglo-Burmese War was originally published as a chapter (XVII)
in History of the Third Burmese War, 1885, 1886, and 1887, in 1889. The
organization of transport and mobile field forces was a significant problem for British
forces in the early months of the war. In December 1885, for example:
“[S]ome 199 royal elephants and 300 ponies from the Manipur Cavalry in
Mandalay were brought into the Transport Department of the Field Force,
but of these half the elephants were without mahouts or only half trained,
and half of the ponies were unserviceable.|
|Author/creator:|| ||Colonel Heyland 1st Bo. Lancers|
|Source/publisher:|| ||History of the Third Burmese War, 1885, 1886, and 1887 via SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 2004|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (388K)|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/10213/|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||16 November 2010|
|Title:|| ||NARRATIVE OF THE BURMESE WAR, DETAILING THE OPERATIONS OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL'S ARMY, FROM ITS LANDING AT RANGOON IN MAY 1824, TO THE.CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF PEACE AT YANDABOO, IN FEBRUARY 1826.
|Date of publication:|| ||1827|
|Description/subject:|| ||CONTENTS: .
Junction of the combined forces from Bengal and Madras, at Port Cornwallis—Capture of Rangoon, and release of the British and Americans, who were made prisoners by the enemy
Description of Rangoon, and the situation of the Army after landing there
State and position of the Burmese forces at the period of our landing in Pegu, and exertions of the court of Ava in calling out the military resources of the country—First encounter with the Burmese troops
Arrival at Rangoon of two Deputies from the Burmese camp—Continuation of the military operations, and situation of the army up to the first of July
Feeble attack of the enemy on the British lines—Attack and capture of his fortified camp at Kummeroot — Expedition sent against Mergui and Tavoy on the
Coast of Tenasserim
CHAPTER VI. The King's two brothers, the Princes of Tonghoo and Sarrawaddy, with Astrologers, and a corps of Invulnerables, join the army—Operations of the British Force up to the end of August
Recal of Maha Bandoola and the Burmese army from Arracan—Continuation of hostilities at Rangoon— Their effect upon the court of Ava
Friendly assurances of the Siamese—Their preparations for war, and probable line of policy—Capture of Martaban and Yeh
State of the force at the conclusion of the rains— Reinforcements and equipment for taking the field sent from India—Approach of the grand army under Maha Bandoola
.. CHAPTER X.
Actions in front of Rangoon, from the first to the seventh of December
Attack on the enemy's fortified camp at Kokeen.on the 15th December, and his final retreat to Donoobew
CHAPTER XII. Plan of operations—Force equipped for field service
Journal of the march from Rangoon to Donoohew
Operations before Donoohew—Its evacuation by the enemy—Journal of the march to Prome
.. CHAPTER XV.
March of a detachment towards Tonghoo, and close of the Campaign
Winter-quarters at Prome—State of the country— Conduct of the inhabitants; with some remarks on their character and government
CHAPTER XVII. Renewed exertions of the Burmese, government, in preparations for the prosecution of the war—Meeting of the British and Burmese Commissioners at Neoun-ben zeik, and their ineffectual efforts to conclude a peace
Strength and position of the British and Burmese armies—Defeat of the enemy in front of Prome
Preparations for an advance'upon Ava—Plan of the campaign
Journal of the march from Prome to Melloone
Conclusion of a treaty of peace—Is not ratified by the king—And the Burmese army, in consequence, is again defeated, and driven from Melloone
Continuation of the march upon Ava—Renewal of negotiations—Battle of Fagahm-mew—Conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace....
CHAPTER XXIII. Concluding Remarks....
APPENDIX......N.B. THE GOOGLE NOTE, PAGES AND COVERS PRECEEDING THE TITLE PAGE HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE END OF THE TEXT. FOR THE ORIGINAL ORDER, SEE THE ALTERNATE URL.|
|Author/creator:|| ||MAJOR JOHN JAMES SNODGRASS,|
|Source/publisher:|| ||JOHN MURRAY via Google Books|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (5.2MB)|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://books.google.com/books?id=NYs2AAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Burmese&as_brr=1#PPR3,M1 (pdf 10MB)|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||05 April 2008|