China-Burma relations

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Source/publisher: China Daily
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
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Source/publisher: "Inside China Today"
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
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Description: Search for "Myanmar". 337 hits (February 2005)...3191 hits (January 2009)...3944 hits (October 2009)...4930 (January 2015)...5656 hits (August 2017)...16,200 results for a Google site-specific search (August 2017)
Source/publisher: "People?s Daily"
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
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Source/publisher: Various sources via Youtube
Date of entry/update: 2017-08-22
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Language: English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Source/publisher: www via Google
Date of entry/update: 2018-01-23
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Description: 23,000 results, June 2017
Source/publisher: "China Daily" via Google
Date of entry/update: 2017-06-07
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Source/publisher: "Global Times" via Google
Date of entry/update: 2017-06-06
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" via Google
Date of entry/update: 2011-05-30
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Source/publisher: Google
Date of entry/update: 2017-09-03
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Description: "Welcome to my Site ! Let me introduce myself. As a French researcher in International Relations, I have been working for the last 7 years on geopolitics in Asia, with a special focus on India and Burma (Myanmar). In December 2006, I successfully defended my Ph.D Dissertation (Political Science, Asian Studies) at the Institute of Political Science, Paris, France : "India, China and the Burmese Issue : Sino-Indian Rivalry through Burma/Myanmar and its Limits since 1988" (with distinction). You will find in this website a glimpse of the works I have done so far on those issues (articles, publications, fieldworks) as well as some links and contacts which could be of interest on these matters. Enjoy the visit "... Dr. Renaud EGRETEAU
Source/publisher: Renaud Egreteau
Date of entry/update: 2007-06-27
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Description: "Ties between China and the Myanmar junta are getting warmer, and diplomats and observers following the issue recently received a message that suggests the relations between Beijing and Naypyitaw could reach a new milestone soon with a visit to China by regime boss Min Aung Hlaing in September. Every China-Myanmar relations watcher knows that—if the news is true—it would be really mind-blowing for the junta leader, who has mostly been ostracized by Western democracies for his 2021 coup, and has even been banned from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) capitals and excluded from their summits. Since then, Russia and China have turned out to be his allies, and Moscow has invited him for several official visits, but Beijing hasn’t. Following the coup, Min Aung Hlaing desperately tried to visit China to seek Beijing’s blessings for his regime. But his attempts were turned down by Chinese officials. What’s significant about the September trip—the message says—is he would be there at Beijing’s official invitation! But can China handle this hot potato? The Irrawaddy has not been able to independently verify the message that emerged in June, one month after Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit to Naypyitaw. Qin is so far the most senior Chinese official to see Min Aung Hlaing in more than two years since the takeover. Following Qin’s visit, regime spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun briefly visited China. Neither side made any announcement. Early this month, Min Aung Hlaing disappeared from public for a few days after a July 2 meeting in Yangon with officials from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and associates to discuss national economic promotion. Asian intelligence sources and others in Naypyitaw said he flew to Guangzhou, southern China. The reason behind the visit was unknown. Obviously, Min Aung Hlaing is desperate to visit China to be received by high-ranking officials, and there is evidence to suggest that he will do whatever it takes to get invited. In May, Major General Yang Yang, acting director-general of the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, met the junta’s No. 2 official, Soe Win, for talks on “cooperation between the two armies.” During the meeting, Soe Win reportedly proposed a resumption of the controversial Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State. In September 2011, then President Thein Sein suspended work on the Chinese-funded Myitsone Dam in response to a mounting public outcry over the project, which critics say threatens the source of the Irrawaddy River. The Chinese were upset with the decision. The surprise suspension was also interpreted as a cue to Western governments, including the US, to ease sanctions. In any case, if Soe Win raised this controversial proposal with visiting Chinese officials, analysts believe it indicates Min Aung Hlaing is desperate for further endorsement from Beijing, including an official visit. It will be a quid pro quo. But will Beijing buy it? For China, welcoming Min Aung Hlaing officially will be seen as an endorsement and the lending of full legitimacy to the brutal and totally condemned regime in Myanmar. China should think twice before inviting Min Aung Hlaing. Deep anti-China feeling Following the February 2021 coup, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar faced daily demonstrations in which thousands of protesters demanded that their neighbor stop supporting the military. Despite widespread international condemnation of the coup, China called it merely a “major cabinet reshuffle” and said the takeover was an internal affair, provoking huge protests. At the time there were calls for a boycott of Chinese products and threats to China-backed projects and pipelines. There were also attacks on Chinese-owned factories in Yangon. Then there were attacks on China’s pipelines in Mandalay Region. At the time, Chen Hai, Chinese ambassador to Myanmar, came out to say that the current situation in the country was “absolutely not what China wants to see,” adding that China hoped all parties in Myanmar “could handle the current problem through dialogue and consultation properly and lead the country back on track as soon as possible.” Despite such anti-China sentiment among Myanmar people, Beijing hasn’t been totally alienated from the regime over the past two-and-a-half years. In 2023, China stepped up its most high-profile engagement with the Myanmar regime since the 2021 coup by sending Qin. Prior to his visit, there came the Chinese special envoy, Peng Xiubin, who is the director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, as well as visits by senior officials of Yunnan Province. However, there have been no regime ministers separately invited by their Chinese counterparts to Beijing for direct engagements since the coup. Engagement between the two militaries has also been at a low level since the takeover, even though China is a major ally and arms supplier to Myanmar. Once Min Aung Hlaing sets foot in Beijing on an official visit, it will only fuel anti-Chinese feeling in Myanmar. There will be consequences. Myanmar opposition forces may attack Chinese projects in Myanmar and protests will likely take place in and outside of the country. Last time, after Foreign Minister Qin’s visit, anti-China protests broke out across Myanmar. Activists, student union members and general strike committees across the country launched an online campaign, sharing the message, “Hey China: stop killing Myanmar’s people by supporting fascist criminals,” in Chinese and English..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-07-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Description: "Less than a decade ago, Wan Kuok Koi, better known as “Broken Tooth”, was incarcerated in a purpose-built top-security detention facility on Coloane, one of the two islands that once formed part of the old Portuguese possession of Macau off the coast of southern China. He was arrested in May 1998 after a bomb exploded in a minivan belonging to Antonio Marques Baptista, nicknamed “Rambo”, the new crime-busting head of the then Portuguese territory’s police force. No evidence of his involvement in that attack was ever revealed in court. Instead, he was brought to justice on old charges related to intimidation of employees at the Lisboa Casino in Macau, loan-sharking and suspicion of being a member of “an illegal organization”. In plain language, that meant a triad, the secret societies that are the Chinese equivalent of the Mafia. After a lengthy and complicated trial—where one witness after another was struck by sudden bouts of amnesia and could not remember anything—he was nonetheless sentenced to 15 years in prison and had all his assets confiscated in November 1999, a month before Macau reverted to Chinese rule and became, like Hong Kong, a “Special Administrative Region” (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China. Among the many outlandish ventures Wan was accused of running, and made public by jurists during the trial, was a weapons business in Cambodia, where he allegedly sought to trade in rockets, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles and other kinds of military equipment in the then civil war-wracked country. Few envisioned that he would ever re-emerge as what he had always claimed to be—just “a prominent businessman”. But that is exactly what happened when he was granted early release in December 2012. Wan had by then spent 13 years and 10 months behind bars. Leveraging old connections, Wan nestled himself back into the casino business in Macau and, after a few years, launched a cryptocurrency called Dragon Coin. He also established three entities operating out of Cambodia: The Hongmen History and Culture Association; the Dongmei Group, which is officially headquartered in Hong Kong; and the Palau China Hung-Mun Cultural Association, supposedly based in the Pacific Ocean nation Palau. The designations said it all. Hongmen, or Hung Mun in Wan’s native Cantonese dialect, is the name of the original underworld triads formed in the 18th century. According to a Dec. 9, 2020 statement by the US Treasury Department, the Hongmen History and Culture Association in particular soon spread its influence across Southeast Asia, first in Cambodia—and then in Myanmar. Wan’s Dongmei Group is a major investor in the casino enclaves near Myawaddy that were established after a faction of the Karen National Union and its Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) broke away, entered into ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar military, and became a Border Guard Force (BGF). The first such enclave was Shwe Kokko, which was built on the ruins of a former KNLA military base known as Kawmoorah, or Wangkha, which was overrun by the Myanmar military in 1995. The BGF that gained official control over the enclave is led by Saw Chit Thu, a former KNLA officer whose army protects all activities at Shwe Kokko. Officially called Yatai New City and locally known as “Chinatown”, the project was launched in April 2017 and when completed is supposed to include luxury housing, hotels, shopping malls, trade centers, factories, golf courses, casinos, and perhaps even an airport. Shwe Kokko was soon followed by two other, similar self-governing “special economic zones” near Myawaddy, the so-called Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone. Wan’s Dongmei Group and its network of shady affiliates are major investors in those projects. Wan is also known to be involved in projects in Mong Pawk southeast of the Panghsang (Pangkham) headquarters of the United Wa State Army on the border between Myanmar and China. According to a July 2020 report by the United States Institute of Peace, “The Dongmei Company itself appears to have incorporated as a business in Hong Kong on March 3, 2020, but is operating out of Kuala Lumpur. Wan promotes the project through the official public WeChat of the Hongmen Association, as well as in partnership with a Guangdong-based representative of the Huaguan Holding Company.” It is evident that Wan has powerful connections and is protected by high-level officials in China. According to a researcher who is following developments in Myanmar’s frontier areas, “Wan Kuok Koi clearly has tremendous influence across China, Hong Kong and Macau, close relations with the local government in Guangdong province, and very deep ties with the [Chinese Communist] Party’s united front organizations and Overseas Chinese Associations. In my view, the Party sees him as useful in doing a lot of its political work—both in Hong Kong and Macau, and in Southeast Asia more broadly.” But how has it been possible for a former convicted felon and alleged leader of an organized crime group to become an influential and seemingly untouchable business tycoon? While criminals may live outside the law, they have never been outside society. In China especially, there has always been a symbiosis between law and crime. The links between officialdom and secret societies became obvious to the outside world in the run-up to Hong Kong’s return to the “motherland”, which eventually happened in 1997. On April 8, 1993, Tao Siju, chief of China’s Public Security Bureau, gave an informal press conference to a group of local reporters in the then still British territory. After making it clear that the “counter-revolutionaries” who had demonstrated for democracy in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989 would not have their long prison sentences reduced, he began talking about the triads: “As for organizations like the triads in Hong Kong, as long as they are patriotic, as long as they are concerned with Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability, we should unite with them.” Tao also invited “the patriotic triads” to come to China to set up businesses there. The statement sent shockwaves through Hong Kong’s then professional police force and there was an uproar in the still independent media. But the people of Hong Kong should not have been surprised. Deng Xiaoping, the father of China’s economic reforms, had over the years hinted at the existence of connections between China’s security services and some Hong Kong triads. In a speech in the Great Hall of the People in October 1984, Deng had pointed out that not all triads are bad. Some of them were “good” and “patriotic”, he said. Before Hong Kong was handed over to Beijing, and people could demonstrate their support for pro-democracy groups inside China, certain “patriotic triads” were Beijing’s eyes and ears in the territory. They infiltrated trade unions and even the media and reported their findings back to the authorities inside China. In July 2019, by which time Hong Kong had been a supposedly self-governing SAR for more than two decades and local people were demanding democratic reforms, masked men equipped with wooden sticks and metal rods stormed into a train station in Hong Kong, assaulting people returning home from a pro-democracy protest. In other incidents, thugs were seen beating up pro-democracy demonstrators and removing tents and barriers they had set up. Needless to say, no action was taken against the perpetrators. Wan may have spent more than a decade in a Macau prison, but he nevertheless fits the profile of a “true Chinese patriot” and, therefore, has proven useful to China’s security services. According to the World Hongmen History and Culture Association’s public profile, it is a patriotic organization supportive of China’s worldwide infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and advocates the transfer of Taiwan to control by the authorities in Beijing. The association has also criticized what it calls “separatists” in Hong Kong, meaning the territory’s pro-democracy movement, and condemned US “interference” in Chinese politics. Like many other Chinese organized crime figures, Wan has humble roots. Born in the slums of Macau in 1955, he joined at an early age one of the many violent youth gangs in the territory and reportedly still bears scars from his street-fighting days. He was shot and wounded twice and severely injured when he was attacked by a rival gang armed with meat cleavers. He lost several teeth in another fight, which earned him the nickname “Broken Tooth Koi”. He later rose through the ranks of the street gangs and became a full-fledged member of the 14K triad and eventually became the boss of its Macau chapter. As such, he commanded a band of several hundred young ma jai, or “horse boys”, which ran various street protection and extortion rackets that sometimes led to gunslinging turf wars with rival gangs. And he even clashed, briefly and verbally, with the media. In early 1997, an unsigned letter was sent to several newspapers in the area saying: “Warning: From this day on it is forbidden to mention Broken Tooth Koi in the press, otherwise bullets will have no eyes and knives and bullets will have no feelings.” Outlandishly dressed in a striped suit, boldly designed shoes, flashy silk shirts and with a couple of mobile phones attached to his belt, he could be seen dining with his men at the most exclusive restaurants in Macau. He seemed untouchable until his arrest in 1998, and now appears to have established, or perhaps even re-established, a working relationship with Chinese authorities. Today a rich and free man, Wan has had his broken teeth fixed and can smile confidently at his new transnational business empire. Interests in Myanmar’s frontier areas form an important part of his intricate network of overseas enterprises—but international public and private investigators tracking his activities are not convinced of what he claims to be benevolent pursuits of happiness. In Cambodia, Wan claims to be involved only in the establishment of schools where people can learn more about “Chinese culture”. The US Treasury believes otherwise and claimed in that statement issued on Dec. 9, 2020 that he is “a leader of the 14K triad” which engages in “drug trafficking, illegal gambling, racketeering” as well as “bribery, corruption and graft.” The Treasury Department went on to accuse him of “corruption, including misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gains, and corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources.” The Irrawaddy was not able to contact Wan for this article, but the Treasury Department has announced that it has blocked any holdings he may have in the US and banned all transactions between him and US nationals under the Global Magnitsky Act. Named after Russian tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died in a prison in Moscow in 2009, the act was originally signed into law by then US President Barack Obama in 2012. Amended in 2016, it authorizes the US government to sanction foreign government officials worldwide who are human rights offenders, freeze their assets, and ban them from entering the US. At the same time, the Treasury Department blacklisted and imposed sanctions on Wan’s three main enterprises: the World Hongmen History and Culture Association, the Palau China Hung-Mun Cultural Association and the Dongmei Group. Shwe Kokko soon became a hub for all kinds of illegal activities and Wan’s networks are engaged in lucrative pursuits in the Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone as well. Casinos are perfect vehicles for money laundering, and cross-border smuggling is rampant. Hundreds of people from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and as far away as Kenya have been lured by promises of well-paid jobs “in the IT industry” in Thailand—only to find themselves working in online scam operations run by Chinese syndicates across the border in Myanmar. Many Thai women, hoping to get jobs as waitresses in various establishments, were tricked into sex work in the area’s casinos. The exact nature of Wan’s connections with local authorities on the Thai side of the border may be a matter of conjecture and has never been investigated thoroughly. But it is obvious to anyone visiting the area around Mae Sot that construction material, equipment for the casinos, food and other supplies are coming from the Thai side. All new cross-border establishments north and south of Myawaddy also rely on electricity from Thailand. On June 5, Thailand ceased providing Shwe Kokko with power, but that only led to a brisk trade in generators in Mae Sot. All these developments should serve as a warning to Western peacemakers who have repeatedly lauded various ceasefire agreements between some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Myanmar military, the most extensive being the so-called “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” concluded in 2015. A ceasefire agreement with only promises of business opportunities—which so far has been all that the Myanmar military has promised the EAOs—and no political settlement can only lead to one thing: the border rebels become border bandits. It is, as we have seen across the border at Mae Sot, a recipe for disaster. And BGF commander Saw Chit Thu is not the only example of a rebel commander-turned-resourceful private entrepreneur after entering into a non-political ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military. He has not managed to secure any political concessions for the Karen or brought prosperity to his community, but, in November 2022, the junta awarded him the title of Thiri Pyanchi, one of the country’s highest honors. A similar development can be seen in Kachin State, where a former Communist Party of Burma unit in the eastern part of the state made peace with the Myanmar military as far back as 1989. First known as the New Democratic Army-Kachin, it quickly became engaged in opium and heroin trafficking, illegal logging with massive sales of timber to China, and even the production of guns, which have been sold on the black market. Other, smaller former EAOs have also become involved in—to say the least—unsavory business activities. So-called BGFs under the ultimate command of the Myanmar military exist not only among the Kachin and the Karen but also in the Pa-O area south of the Shan State capital of Taunggyi and in the Kokang area of northeastern Shan State. China’s role in this imbroglio appears ambivalent. When Myanmar still had democratically elected members of parliament, the scams and rackets in Shwe Kokko were raised by civilian politicians and questions were asked during public hearings in Naypyitaw. In June 2020, a tribunal was even set up to investigate the Yatai New City in Shwe Kokko and developments there were halted—at least temporarily. After the 2021 coup, investors in Yatai New City were allowed to resume their construction activities, expanding the area and their range of criminal enterprises. In 2020, the Chinese Embassy in Yangon expressed its “support” for the then government’s efforts to investigate Yatai New City, saying in a statement that China was “strengthening law enforcement and security with Myanmar” to crack down on “cross-border illegal and criminal activities such as illegal gambling and telecommunications fraud.” But it was far from clear that Beijing had any intention of pursuing the well-connected Wan on any of the various accusations made by the US Treasury Department. Some of Wan’s old associates are back in prison in Macau, serving time in the Coloane facility for money laundering and racketeering. Wan may also have to stay clear of his old Macau stomping ground, where he is too well-known and anything he did would be embarrassing for the local SAR authorities. But Cambodia and Myanmar are not a problem, and his interests there coincide with those of China. According to the USIP report, Chinese state-owned companies such as the China Railway 20th Bureau, which has investments in construction projects outside China, and MCC International, another company involved in infrastructure projects, are working closely together with the Yatai New City project. Guojing Consulting, an affiliate of official think-tank the Center for International Economic Exchanges, has signed a partnership agreement with Yatai New City. All those endeavors are part and parcel of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and Beijing’s BRI. Wan and enterprises run by him and his associates represent the new face of Chinese investment in Myanmar—and the criminalization of the country under the current junta. Not only have construction activities at Shwe Kokko, or the Yatai New City, resumed, but the Huanya International City and the Saixigang Industrial Zone have also seen a revival, with criminal networks running new areas and an even wider range of enterprises. The impact of those developments, and the possibility of more potentially disastrous “ceasefire agreements” between some EAOs and the military, could, in the long term, turn Myanmar into a failed state where only China would be able to pick up the spoils. And with the outside world preoccupied with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there seems to be little hope of Myanmar regaining some of the international attention it once had..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-07-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-17
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Description: "The ASEAN Summit in Indonesia in May 2023 saw, once again, the problem for Southeast Asian leaders seeking better outcomes to Myanmar’s political and humanitarian crises. Pleas for giving greater attention to the fading Five-Point Consensus from 2021 jostled with growing disdain for the self-destructive tendencies of Myanmar’s military leadership. Part of the deal for respectability in ASEAN is to focus on practical and reasonable steps to achieve agreed outcomes. Myanmar now fails every time. Such failure means Myanmar is a problem for China’s leaders too, who have been watching closely since the 2021 military coup. China’s foreign policy establishment and analysts think deeply about the opportunities and risks of future scenarios across Southeast Asia. It should not be forgotten that former leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s deposed government in Myanmar was in key respects a useful partner for China’s regional ambitions. The coup was probably judged an unhelpful complication. For Chinese strategists, a primary consideration is access to the Indian Ocean. That access made it possible for China to import around US$1.5 billion of natural gas in 2022 from the Rakhine State coast, across central Myanmar, up through Myanmar’s mountainous Shan State and to Yunnan province in China. In a future regional security crisis, where maritime access was in doubt, Myanmar might also allow valuable ‘back door’ access for China to friendly ports on the Bay of Bengal. With such scenarios in mind, the economic relativities of the Myanmar–China relationship are worth considering. According to 2021 World Bank data, Myanmar’s nominal GDP was US$65 billion (US$1200 per capita), while China’s was US$17.73 trillion (US$12,200 per capita). To put Myanmar’s poverty in perspective, if it were a Chinese province, its economy would be the third smallest. It would only best two of China’s remote landlocked regions, Tibet and Qinghai — which are both still at least five times richer per capita. Yunnan — the Chinese province neighbouring Myanmar, and with many geographical and cultural commonalities — has a GDP of around $430 billion a year. This is over six times larger than Myanmar’s, and around nine times more on a per capita basis. With such incredible disparity in wealth, anti-Chinese politics in Myanmar, while usually only a fringe issue, can ignite quickly given local resentment against Myanmar’s commercially successful ethnic Chinese minority. This old story, replayed around Southeast Asia over centuries, is a fact of life for Chinese diplomats seeking to build relationships that offer mutual benefit. With China a significant supplier of weapons and training to Myanmar government forces, and also to some ethnic armies, it is entangled in the country’s politics in ways that are both profitable and problematic. Exactly how much of this involvement is centrally planned in Beijing is an open question. Yunnanese authorities have a habit of seeking local solutions through the often unruly borderlands. Under President Xi Jinping, Chinese diplomacy has yet to get much momentum for its ‘peacemaking’ activities in such a contested environment. More than two years after the coup, China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently met with Myanmar Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, becoming the highest-ranking Chinese official to meet with the coup leader. With more high-level engagement likely soon, the question of how China can encourage positive outcomes for Myanmar requires a focus on its core interests. While Myanmar’s economic growth until the coup was advantageous, the fact that the coup leaders are almost friendless — and despised even in ASEAN — offers different upside. For now, China can harness the Myanmar military’s appetite for attack aircraft, heavy weapons and constant resupply of ammunition and technical equipment to bolster its role as the patron-in-chief. Russia has traditionally taken a similar approach. For Beijing and Moscow, Myanmar is part of a convenient global constellation of countries pushed to the outer edge of the international system. Whatever its short-term strategy, it would help China’s standing in ASEAN, and even in countries like Australia, if it showed a creative instinct to use its wealth and influence to broker better outcomes for the people of Myanmar. The fear is that China will instead continue to manipulate Myanmar’s impoverished and downtrodden status while fuelling, through its lucrative weapons exports, some of the most atrocious violence seen in Southeast Asia for generations. When the dust finally settles in Myanmar, its people will rightly ask who sustained the reviled military regime. Right now, the answer is that Beijing offered ‘friendship’ to the coup-makers, an irony for a Communist Party so committed to regime and institutional stability. Yet with the right attention to China’s role and self-interests, it is still possible to imagine shifting positions, where Chinese institutions eventually work out how to negotiate a more peaceful settlement. At a time when China talks regularly about peace in European, Middle Eastern and African conflict zones, a positive contribution in Myanmar would be welcomed by all..."
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Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2023-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
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Description: "Anti-China protests have broken out across Myanmar following last week’s meetings between Beijing’s foreign minister Qin Gang and Myanmar’s military dictators. China stepped up its engagement with Myanmar’s regime with the visit by the most senior Chinese representative to Naypyitaw since the 2021 coup. Qin met junta boss Min Aung Hlaing and former dictator Than Shwe. Following the visit, activists, students’ union members and general strike committees across the country launched an online campaign, sharing the message, “Hey China: stop killing Myanmar’s people by supporting fascist criminals,” in Chinese and English. Protests were staged in Yangon and Yinmabin, Salingyi and Letpadaung in Sagaing Region, where the Chinese flag was burned. Following the February 2021 coup, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar faced daily protests in which hundreds of thousands of protesters demanded that their neighbor stop supporting the military. China said the takeover was an internal affair not requiring foreign intervention and failed to denounce deadly crackdowns on protesters, despite widespread international condemnation. At the time there were calls for a boycott of Chinese products and threats to China-backed projects and pipelines. In the following months, there were a few attacks on China’s pipelines in Mandalay Region. Letpadaung General Strike Committee in Salingyi, which is home to the Chinese-run copper mines, stated that the Chinese meetings fueled anti-China anger. “We strongly say that our people do not want any country or government to cooperate with the regime,” the committee announced. Yangon activists warned China that public anger would grow if it continued to work with the junta. On Tuesday, a flash mob in the city called on China to respect the will of the people and to respect Myanmar’s sovereignty, instead of protecting dictators Min Aung Hlaing and Than Shwe. Prominent activist Dr Tayzar San wrote that the neighbors would have to coexist after the fall of the dictatorship and there were many good examples of friendly, close bilateral relations over centuries. Positive relations cannot be built with a terrorist regime, the activist said. “If the Chinese government continues to support the fascist military like this, China will enter the list of Myanmar’s common enemies. We have a serious message and both countries will face the consequences,” Dr Tayzar San added. Myanmar’s civilian National Unity Government also criticized Qin’s visit saying the “terrorist” junta offers no stability with its brutal killings, arbitrary arrests and arson attacks. It said public consent was the only way to achieve long-term stability in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-10
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Description: "Citizenship issues are a vital element in any state’s sovereignty. Countries vary and individually adapt under the two generally recognized systems of law: jus soli (right of the soil—where one was born) and jus sanguinis (right of blood—one’s heritage). States continuously redefine the qualifications, such as whether—and how—the male or female blood line applies, religious beliefs, historical records, and the issue of dual citizenship. Myanmar has a unique system based on its 1982 citizenship law. Under it, only taingyintha (literally, “sons of the land,” called “national races” (actually ethno-linguistic groups) long and traditionally resident in Burma/Myanmar are full citizens with whatever rights such status stipulates. Members of other ethnic groups, such as Chinese or Indians, may, depending on a number of factors such as length and proof of family residence before 1823, become citizens, but that number must be small. The remainder may become associate or naturalized citizens with less status and rights. The Myanmar government until the coup of Feb. 1, 2021 has regarded the Rohingya as alien Bengalis. The issue is now under dispute. So, the system in Myanmar is a type of modified and combined jus sanguinis and jus soli system. But what happens when another country with extensive expatriates has a different system, and seems more intent on recognizing its perceived authority over them? The case is China, with important implications for Myanmar, and indeed far beyond Myanmar to those Chinese resident in the West. In May 2019, in a highly significant event basically ignored by the international media, President Xi Jinping attended the 9th World Ethnic Chinese Association Conference in Beijing, jointly sponsored by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. The conference called for “the members of the association of Chinese in the world to follow the guidance of the Xi Jinping socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era…” (Xinhua News). He seemed to demand political and economic orthodoxy for worldwide Chinese—some 60 million in about 200 countries and regions—under his and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This has historical Chinese roots. Starting in 1909, the Chinese Qing Dynasty regarded Chinese anywhere in the world as theoretically subject to Chinese central government authority to ensure “perpetual allegiance to the state”; i.e., jus sanguinis. This policy was reaffirmed under the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government until it was overthrown in 1949 by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which continued the policy for half a dozen years after its founding. The Burmese civilian government was disturbed by this policy, as China at that time was regarded by the Burmese military as its only external threat and indigenous Chinese as a potential fifth column. It regarded the status of Chinese residents in Burma as one of the four major problems with the new PRC, the other three being a disputed border demarcation, Chinese support for the Communist Party of Burma, and the residual KMT forces that had retreated into northern Burma. It was only after Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reassured Prime Minister U Nu in the mid-1950s that the Chinese ought to obey Burmese law and customs that the Burmese government’s fear of Chinese residents was assuaged, at least until China exported the Cultural Revolution into Chinese schools in Burma, resulting in anti-Chinese riots and many deaths in Rangoon in 1967. The overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are a critical component of governance and the individual and collective economies of the region. Ethnic Chinese residents in Myanmar and Southeast Asia are more than simply numerous. In Myanmar, illegal Chinese immigration has resulted in several million Chinese (perhaps 4 percent of the population), excluding Sino-Burmese who are also very numerous. Chinese play extensive roles in the retail trade, even though the Burmese census of 2014 has not released their figures but regards them as essentially minimal. By 2000, there were some 25,000 Chinese firms involved in the retail trade in household sundries. In Indonesia several decades ago, scholars estimated that overseas Chinese controlled 80 percent of private capital in that country. Although the Chinese in Thailand have been better integrated into that society than in any other regional state except Singapore, which is largely ethnically Chinese, they remain profoundly important in the region. In at least the first two decades of the PRC, communist control over large swathes of the Chinese-language school system in Southeast Asia was evident, causing concern that they could be an internal fifth column for PRC influence or control. Attempts to counter this was evident through the supply of anti-communist textbooks to a large number of schools by Taiwan, Hong Kong, and third-force Chinese, often with foreign support. Under Deng Xiaoping the tensions eased, shifting to the more recent “soft power” attributes of the Confucius Centers designed to teach Chinese language and culture essentially to the ethnically non-Chinese. But now Xi seems determined to bring the overseas Chinese into line. China does not allow dual citizenship, so in many countries in the region the PRC can only bring moral suasion to their expatriates, although the power of China and the forces of family, the economy, and group identity are important. In Myanmar, the situation is complex, as the Chinese are essentially not Burmese citizens. Given the alacrity and vigor with which the Chinese bureaucracy responds to perceived commands from the top of its very steep hierarchy, we may expect some additional pressures and tensions to surface. Recent reports have indicated increased official worldwide Chinese surveillance of Chinese, and current indications demonstrate the dictates of Xi cannot be easily ignored. If China pushes the overseas Chinese in Myanmar to adhere to the dictates of the CCP, the problems of the past, which resulted in some riots but more recently strong anti-Chinese sentiments because of its aid program, may well intensify. Chinese surveillance and attempted control worldwide are dangers to expatriate host states. It needs to act more discreetly and carefully on these issues everywhere, but especially in fragile countries like Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-05-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
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Description: "Your Excellency, On the occasion of the Lunar New Year 2023, firstly, we would like to wish the people of China and People’s Republic of China with peace and prosperity. The past year of 2022 has been a flourishing period of success for the people of China, Communist Party of China and People’s Republic of China. China has illustrated its importance not only in successfully convening the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China but also in regional affairs. The people of Myanmar and National Unity Government of Republic of Myanmar are very proud of such various achievements. We would reiterate our warm welcome to the third term of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Mr. Qin Gang's appointment as Foreign Minister. Moreover, we, National Unity Government, would like to express our deep gratitude to the People’s Republic of China for their support for the return of power to the people by Myanmar and people of Myanmar. We are exceptionally grateful for China's support and standing for the people of Myanmar in the international arena especially in the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By showing that the People’s Republic of China does not stand with the military junta that is violently oppressing our people of Myanmar, it is a proof of the good neighborliness of the People's Republic of China to the people of Myanmar and the people of Myanmar will always remember the People’s Republic of China's stand. In addition, we can confidently assure that the fruits of the revolution that the people of Myanmar and the National Unity Government are currently contesting will not harm the interests and the long-term stable development of the regional countries, including the interests of the People's Republic of China. The new Federal Nation envisioned by our National Unity Government and the people of Myanmar will only bring fruitful impacts to the neighboring countries and the People’s Republic of China. In conclusion, we believe that our two countries with the tradition of great friendship for many years, will be able to have closer relations in the coming year of the Rabbit). We convey our earnest wishes that the new year will promote and strengthen genuine Pauk Phaw relations for the people of both China and Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
2023-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-22
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Description: "ယခု ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် တွင်ကျရောက်သည့် တရုတ်နှစ်သစ်ကူး အခါသမယတွင် တရုတ်ပြည်သူများနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့ သမ္မတနိုင် ငံငြိမ်း ချမ်း သာယာပါ စေကြောင်း ဦးစွာ နှုတ်ခွန်း ဆက်သအပ်ပါသည်။ ကုန်လွန်ခဲ့သည့် (၂၀၂၂) ခုနှစ်ကာလသည် တရုတ်ပြည်သူများ၊ တရုတ်ကွန်မြူနစ် ပါတီနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတော် တို့ အတွက် အောင်မြင်မှု အသီးအပွင့်များ စွာ ရရှိခဲ့သည့် ကာလတခုဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြိမ် ၂၀ မြောက် တရုတ်ကွန်မြူနစ် ပါတီ ကွန်ဂရက်ကို အောင်မြင်စွာ ကျင်းပနိုင်ခဲ့သလို ဒေသတွင်း ကိစ္စရပ်များ တွင်လည်း တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ အရေးပါမှုကို ပြသနိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့သော အောင်မြင်မှုများစွာအတွက် လည်း မိမိတို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေနှင့် များစွာဂုဏ်ယူမိပါသည်။ တရုတ်သမ္မတ Xi Jinping ၏ တတိယသက်တမ်း ထမ်းဆောင်ခွင့် ရရှိမှုနှင့် အဆွေတော် Mr. Qin Gang ၏ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးအဖြစ် ရွေးချယ်ခံခဲ့ရမှုကို မိမိတို့ အနေနှင့် လှိုက်လှဲစွာကြိုဆိုကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်း ဖေါ်ပြလိုပါသည်။ ထို့အတူ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ် ရေးအစိုးရ အနေနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည် သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ ပြည်သူ့အာဏာ ပြည်သူ့ထံပြန်လည်အပ်နှံ့နိုင်ရေး အတွက် ရပ်တည်ခဲ့မှုများကို အထူးပင်ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိ အပ်ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံတကာ မျက်နှာစာ၊ အထူး သဖြင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ နဲ့ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီမျက်နှာစာ တို့တွင် ထောက်ခံ ကူညီပေးနေသည့် အတွက် အထူးပင် ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိအပ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ်အကြမ်းဖက် ဖိနှိပ်နေသည့် စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် အတူ မရပ်တည်ကြောင်း ပြသလိုက်ခြင်း သည် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံ၏ မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ် အိမ်နီးချင်း ကောင်းပီသကြောင်းသက်သေထူပြလိုက်ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ အဆိုပါရပ်တည်မှုအတွက် မြန်မာပြည်သူများမှ အမြဲ အမှတ်တရ ရှိနေမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများနှင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရတို့ လက်ရှိဆင်နွှဲနေသည့် တော်လှန်ရေး၏ အောင်မြင်မှု အသီးအပွင့်များသည် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွါးအပါအဝင် ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံများ၏ အကျိုးစီးပွါးနှင့် ရေရှည် တည်ငြိမ်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေး အတွက် မည်သည့် နည်းနှင့် မျှထိခိုက်မှုရှိစေလိမ့်မည် မဟုတ်ဘဲ ပိုမိုအကျိုးရှိစေလိမ့်မည်သာဖြစ်ကြောင်း မိမိ တို့ ယုံကြည်စွာအာမခံနိုင်ပါ သည်။ မိမိတို့အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့်မြန်မာပြည်သူများ မျှော်မှန်းထားသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ်နိုင်ငံတော်သစ်သည် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည် သူ့သမ္မတ နိုင်ငံသို့ ကောင်းကျိုး အသီးအပွင့်များသာ ယူဆောင် လာလိမ့် မည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ နိဂုံးချုပ်အနေနှင့် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာချစ်ကြည် ရင်းနှီးသော အစဥ်အလာရှိသည့် မိမိတို့နှစ်နိုင်ငံအနေနှင့် လာမည့် (ယုန်နှစ်) နှစ်သစ်တွင်လည်း ပိုမိုရင်းနှီးစွာဆက်ဆံလာနိုင်မည်ကို မိမိတို့အနေနှင့် ယုံကြည်လျက် ရှိပါသည်။ တရုတ်မြန်မာ နှစ်နိုင်ငံပြည်သူများ အတွက် စစ်မှန်သည့် ဆွေမျိုးပေါက်ဖော် ဆက်ဆံရေး ပိုမိုခိုင်မာစွာ တည်ထောင်နိုင်မည့် နှစ်တနှစ် ဖြစ်ပါစေကြောင်း နှစ်သစ်ဆုမွန် ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
2023-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-22
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Description: "An alliance of pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar has congratulated Chinese leader Xi Jinping, saying it wants to work with China to restore peace in the country. The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) said it wanted to work with China for Myanmar and the region as a bedrock for the building of a community with a shared future. Formed after the military takeover last year, the NUCC represents hundreds of anti-junta forces, including the shadow National Unity Government (NUG)’s parliamentary wing, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, ethnic armed organizations, political parties, civil society bodies and other groups. The goal is to achieve a federal democratic union by building unity among the forces. The message congratulated the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people during the party’s 20th National Congress. “This [bilateral] community is particularly important as the people of Myanmar continue their own search for a path towards peace and prosperity, which can only be realized once the military returns to the barracks and a true federal government representing the people can emerge,” said the NUCC’s congratulatory message. China is a major investor and controls several strategic infrastructure projects in its southern neighbor, including energy pipelines and a proposed port that would give Beijing vital access to the Indian Ocean. China also has leverage over some ethnic armed organizations active near the border. It is one of the few powerful countries, along with Russia, which has engaged with the regime since the coup. Despite its engagement with the junta, China has said it wants to see stability in Myanmar. The NUG, which commands the loyalty of the vast majority of citizens, has committed itself to China’s goal of a shared future with Myanmar and repeatedly pushed China to engage with the civilian administration. It said if China continues to work with the regime, it will damage its international reputation and increase hostility from Myanmar’s population. China has had no official engagement with the NUG..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-10-17
Date of entry/update: 2022-10-17
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Description: "Veteran author and journalist Bertil Lintner has been reporting on Myanmar for decades. In this wide-ranging interview he talks to The Irrawaddy editor-in-chief Aung Zaw about China’s goals and strategy in Myanmar—including its relations with the National League for Democracy and the ethnic armed groups—the future of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the most likely scenarios for ending the military’s grip on the country. Aung Zaw: Thank you Bertil. I think we will have a long discussion. We’ve covered the peace process and ethnic states, the ethnic army EAOs [ethnic armed organizations]. Now I want you to talk about China, Burma’s powerful neighbor. I want to hear your thoughts on China’s political clout and geopolitical ambitions, because we often debate and talk about China’s roles in Myanmar’s internal affairs and internal conflicts; how China interferes in Myanmar’s domestic affairs and also China’s geopolitical ambitions and access to the Indian ocean. Bertil Lintner: Well, first of all, if you look at the map of China, it’s a huge inland empire with a comparatively short coastline for such a big country. And then China decided to change its economic system from socialism to capitalism—their development model was exports. The export industry was developed in order to give the country income and so on, and lift the living standard. And the coastal provinces took off immediately because, naturally, the ports were there. And that’s where the production was taking place. This was Guangdong, there was Fujian, and later on Shanghai. Whereas the landlocked inland provinces were lagging behind. And the difference in income between the coastal provinces and the landlocked inland provinces was becoming so severe that it could actually threaten the entire unity of the country. Because China is actually massive, it’s a continent.. it’s more than a country. It’s huge. And you have many different ethnic groups there as well. So back in the 1980s, the Chinese started to look at the possibilities for development, export-oriented development in the landlocked inland provinces. And this was published in the official Beijing Review in 1985, the official magazine. AZ: Yes, I have read that one. BL: Well, they mentioned that the three provinces were Sichuan, Yunnan and Guangzhou—with a combined population of 100 million people. There is no way they could develop an industry there and send goods to China’s own ports. They had to find an outlet through another country. If you look at the whole of China, the same thing applies. And there are only three countries which border China that have direct access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea and making it easier than promoting exports to China’s own ports. That’s Burma, India and Pakistan. India, forget about it. There is no way they’re going to help the Chinese…. AZ: No. BL: Pakistan, yes. There is a highway there, the Karakoram Highway. But it’s one of the most dangerous highways in the world. And then of course, you have all the political turmoil of Pakistan, which is, you know, can be quite frightening. So you see, there is actually only one country that provides easy and convenient access to the Indian Ocean for China, and that is… AZ: Burma. BL: Yes. So, therefore, China has long-term strategic interests in Burma, which other countries don’t have. The West can talk about human rights and democracy and this sort of thing, which is of course good, but it wouldn’t have any real impact on what’s happening in the country. And India is of course worried about Chinese influence; so far they haven’t been very successful in countering it. Whereas China has gone full speed ahead in developing relations with the country. Actually, regardless of who is in power, even when Aung San Suu Kyi was becoming State Counselor, the Chinese Embassy was the first to congratulate her on her election victory at that time. And it was sort of…. AZ: And she was invited to China even before the election in 2015, and she met with President Xi Jinping. BL: Absolutely. I think the Chinese, they would prefer to have a “stable” military government in power. AZ: But weak. BL: Yeah, but not too strong. AZ: Not democratic. BL: No, they wouldn’t like that. But even when Aung San Suu Kyi was… not running the country—it was still being run by the military, we have to remember that, but she was at least running the government—the Chinese made an effort to establish very close and cordial relations with her and the NLD as well. So, my only point is that if you look at China’s long-term strategic interest, they would prefer a government which they can deal with more easily, a non-democratic government; but if it’s a democratic government, they will deal with that too, in their own way of course. And China’s relations with the various EAOs follow the same kind of… AZ: Yes, that’s my next question. You know in the past communist China exported revolution to neighboring countries including Burma. But today China wants to export goods and wants to trade with neighboring countries, and we are part of the Belt and Road Initiative—gigantic projects. We have the China Myanmar Economic Corridor [CMEC] … China and Burma have signed an agreement to implement so many mega projects. Some of the projects have started in Shan State. There have been feasibility studies done as far as we understand and there are so many EAOs and militia active in Shan State. A lot of CMEC projects will start from Shan State and in these areas with EAOs like the Wa, Kokang, TNLA [Ta’ang National Liberation Army] and even the Arakan Army [AA]. China has been providing arms to support those groups; this northern part seems to be part of [a Chinese enclave]. So the last five years or six years we also saw China aggressively involved in the Myanmar peace process, can you tell us more on this subject and also I want to ask you a quick question: Can China be trusted? BL: Well, this question is very easy to answer. No. Trust in the sense that they are interested in the genuine peace of the country. They are not. Because it’s not in in their interests. If you look at the United Wa State Army, and Kokang as well… They are basically successors to the CPB, the Communist Party of Burma. They received massive support from China from the late ’60s, ’70s to until the 1980s. At that time, China was exporting revolution. Now they’re exporting consumer goods. But it would be foolish of the Chinese to give up the foothold they had inside the country to the CPB because of the 1989 mutiny. They probably have even better relations with some of the Wa leaders than they ever had with the CPB. Because they speak the same language, to begin with. And most of the Wa leaders speak Chinese as a second language, whereas very few of the CPB leaders ever did that. And if you look at the arms that the Wa have, they’re more sophisticated, they’re more heavily armed than the CPB ever was. And all of those guns are all coming from China. Period. There’s no discussion about that. Doesn’t matter how much China’s think tankers deny that. But then if you look at the broader picture; let’s say for argument’s sake that tomorrow all the ethnic groups sit down and they agree that, ‘Yes, we want to have a federation or a confederation that looks like this, sign an agreement, there is no more fighting in the country, there is peace, and all the armed groups will become local police forces or something else.’ Who would be the first to lose? China. It’s not in their interest to see that. China wants to have a certain degree… they don’t like total chaos because it would mean refugees coming into Yunnan and so on. But they are not interested in [total] stability either because they can’t control anything. And they want to have a certain degree of stability, over which they exercise some degree of control. And that is actually the situation now. AZ: They want to keep the forces against each other. BL: Yes, definitely. It’s not in their interest to see them give up the struggle. Not now. Maybe someday, in the future, you don’t know but certainly it’s not in their interest today. China is not interested in peace, it is interested in a kind of situation that makes the country… it shouldn’t be too stable because they can’t control it. And they have connections with everybody. But China has a very peculiar foreign policy. They differentiate between government-to-government relations, and party-to-party relations, and it’s quite ridiculous for the country where there is only one political party and that party controls the government in China. So, they have government-to-government relations with whoever is in power—in Yangon, previously, but now in Naypyitaw. But party-to-party relations—they can have that with anyone. So they have party-to-party relations with the Wa, the Kachin, with the NLD [National League for Democracy], with the USDP [Union Solidarity and Development Party], everyone. And they would say, ‘Oh this is different. This is party-to-party; not government-to-government.’ But of course, it’s all part of the government strategy mapped out by the party, which controls the government. AZ: This year in April, the Chinese Foreign Ministry invited the Myanmar foreign minister, Burmese foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, to China. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “No matter how the situation changes, China will support Myanmar in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; in exploring a development path suited to its national conditions.” But we were discussing, … how China was trying to control the forces inside the country, we talk about China’s enclavement and now China was promising the Burmese that they will respect their territorial integrity. BL: But they’ve never done that. First, it supported the CPB for 20 years. And they had relations with certain EAOs on the border. They’ve always been a player in domestic politics in Burma, especially when it comes to the various armed groups and organizations there. AZ: Then, what will happen to Burma, or Shan State in particular, where a lot of huge projects are coming in in the next 10-20 years, whether we like it or not? This is quite worrying, that the Chinese are coming, and even the Wa, known to be a proxy of China, are moving to the southern part of Shan State. Thailand is also looking at it with worry. BL: Well, I don’t think China wants to annex certain parts of the country. That is not the way they exercise influence and how they expand their spheres of influence. Actually, what China is doing in Burma today, the plan, predates the Belt and Road Initiative. In the ’80s, they were looking at the waterways, railways, roadways, through Burma, from Yunnan down to the Indian Ocean. They were talking about how it should be developed. And of course, that is interference. It’s not just help. They are not doing this out of the goodness of their heart. The have economic, and political and strategic interest in controlling the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as it is called today. And they are going to continue doing that. If you look at EAOs that.. but you always have to remember that even though they are very dependent on China—because they cannot exist without what they are getting from across the border—it doesn’t mean that they are necessarily pro-Chinese or pro-China, let’s put it that way. The Kachin, we know they are not. I mean, they are Christians and they don’t.. they are not trusted by the Chinese either, that’s why the Chinese are not giving them any weapons; and they are getting them from other sources. Even the Wa, they are not happy about the Chinese dominance. They are fiercely independent people. And they know how the Chinese central authorities treated the Wa in China in the 1950s. They haven’t forgotten that. AZ: China is not trusted—I got it. But today, the Chinese government seems to be backing and supporting the military regime in Burma, which the Burmese people hate and despise; the Burmese people loathe it. Last year we saw anti-China demonstrations taking place in Yangon and other cities. Chinese factories were attacked. Later, this year and last year we have seen local armed groups, opposition groups, make a threat against Chinese companies and a gas pipeline and copper mines inside the country. China is also trying to reach out to some opposition members as well as to the NUG [National Unity Government] government in exile asking them to protect Chinese interests and Chinese businesses in the country. And the Chinese have also asked the regime to protect [their interests] at all costs, to prevent any attacks on Chinese interests and Chinese business in Burma. BL: Well, it sort of underlines the whole thing that … the way the Chinese are reacting to this, that they even started talking to the National Unity Government and all the armed groups and this sort of thing—on a “party-to-party” basis though. But their long-term strategic interest remains the same. And there is a corridor, an outlet to the sea, the outlet to the Indian Ocean. And therefore, they have to play, they cannot afford to antagonize certain groups, because that will backfire. Back in the SLORC days, they actually put all the eggs in one basket, they supported only the military. And they had no link to the opposition at all, of course to some of the EAOs but they were sort of different. But even there, they showed a certain degree of flexibility—that they didn’t really want to antagonize, not even the NLD during its early days of its existence. And I can tell you an anecdote that reflects that, in a curious kind of way, a peculiar kind of way. After the 1988 uprising, everyone was at Aung San Suu Kyi’s compound at University Avenue. All the activists, the doctors, the lawyers, the politicians, the journalists—everybody. And the Western embassies went there to meet her and the NLD leaders. The Chinese diplomats did not. But one day, I can tell you the story now because it was Michael Aris, who was Aung San Suu Kyi’s late husband who told me. He’s gone now and I don’t think he would mind my telling this story. And he was there of course in the house in University Avenue. The Chinese diplomats never came to talk to Suu Kyi. But one day, they saw a car, a diplomatic number plate, the Chinese Embassy coming into University Avenue. And everyone was surprised. And then the junior officer from the embassy came with a big box full of books in Tibetan about Tibetan Buddhism. It was their way of indirectly saying that “We are careful but we are not, well, don’t look at us like we are some kind of enemy. It was not to Suu Kyi, it was to her husband. It’s about Tibetan Buddhism. But that gesture showed that everyone, I think, even at that time, the Chinese wanted to maintain a certain degree of flexibility. They didn’t even know if the military government was going to survive or not. What the future would look like. Because, again, their long-term interests remain the same. And they are playing various games accordingly. And that’s what happens. AZ: But in the last 30 years, since SLORC-SPDC came into power, we have seen massive exploitation of natural resources by the Chinese in the northern part of Myanmar. BL: Yes. In Wa State it is tin and rare earth metals. When we’re talking about Chinese exports of rare earth metals, it’s only half the truth. Most of it actually comes from the Wa Hills. The Chinese… they also have two rare earth mines up in Kachin State. Of course to export these kind of items makes it possible for these armed groups, like the KIO, the KIA and UWSA [Kachin Independence Organization, Kachin Independence Army and United Wa State Army] to maintain their organizations, to get more arms and run … whatever they have inside their respective areas. But so, they are dependent on each other in a way. But I would argue that if there was a central government in Myanmar with a more enlightened approach to people like the Wa, the problem could be solved. I think they would be happier staying with Myanmar than to be, you know, totally dependent on China. But so far, it is so easy to dismiss them as drug traffickers and, you know, whatnot. They are, I mean they used to trade in drugs. There is no doubt about that. But today, their sources of income have become more diversified and even if they get money from drugs, who hasn’t done that in Burma—including the government? AZ: Last year, a Chinese special envoy visited Burma twice after the coup. He reportedly asked coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing to allow him to meet with the detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. And he was denied [permission]. And again, we heard the news that the Chinese told the Burmese not to disband the National League for Democracy. Do you think China has political leverage over Burma, compared to other Western countries or Western governments? BL: Well, you’ll also have to remember that as you mentioned before, the Burmese military is fairly xenophobic. They haven’t forgotten the long and bitter war with the CPB. A lot of soldiers were killed, their boys were killed, with Chinese guns. And a retired officer once told me it’s like a scar in the heart. They cannot forget that. And then of course, you know, in the beginning, after the coup in ’88, they had to rebuild, or strengthen their armed forces. At that time, it was only China that was willing to sell them anything. But they became so dependent on China, so they had to look for alternatives. They didn’t want to have this heavy dependence on China. So they turned towards… Russia. Of course, it worked for a while, but it’s not going to work much longer, given what’s happening in Ukraine right now. So, they’re back in the Chinese camp, very reluctantly, and I don’t know how they would want to handle that. And they are not particularly happy about it either. And the Chinese of course, they know this. They know that the military doesn’t like them, they don’t trust them. But I think actually they find it easier to deal with Aung San Suu Kyi than Min Aung Hlaing, in a way—a very strange and peculiar way. So, there were even some reports before the 2015 elections that the Chinese wanted to see the NLD win rather than the USDP. Maybe because it would give the country a bit more, a degree of stability at that time. And instead of military rule, which would be resented by everyone. But the Chinese are playing all these different games at the same time, and it is very important to look at the bigger picture and see a pattern and see where it leads to. They don’t just sign with one particular actor or one particular group. And therefore, the Chinese policy towards Myanmar or Burma is very different from that of Western countries, which are more sort of ideologically motivated. AZ: Definitely, Burmese people, including the military, are Sinophobic. Burmese people in general are pro-Western, they are not pro-China. You know over the past decades we have seen the US politically invested in Burma promoting democracy, human rights and press freedom in Burma or Myanmar. Recently the US invited the foreign minister of the NUG to Washington DC while the US-ASEAN summit was taking place. Definitely there was competition between the US and China. I think there is competition, rivalries between the US and China. And this Cold War mentality is coming into the Indo-Pacific region including ASEAN. Burma is also one of the countries where the US and China are trying to gain influence. What are your thoughts? BL: Well, if the United States wants to get more influence in the country, they will also have to be more active than they are today. AZ: Like in Ukraine? BL: Well, maybe not to send all the weapons that they’ve been sending to Ukraine; maybe there is another way of doing it. But certainly, it seems to be that Burma is now on the backburner when it comes to American foreign policy. They are much more… entirely preoccupied with Ukraine, what’s happening in Europe. And therefore of course, the road is wide open for the Chinese to… AZ: What I remember was, in 2007-08, US policy was very consistent, engaging with Burma stakeholders and all sides, all forces. It was very active, and I would say that it was quite impressive. BL: If you look at America’s or Washington’s Burma policy, that was engaging everyone … It predates the 2015 election victory for the NLD. Even during Thein Sein, he was invited to the White House, and I think the Chinese, at that time, felt—and I have seen translations of articles in Chinese academic journals saying—that ‘We have lost Burma to the West’. That’s the way the Chinese felt. And therefore, they had to reestablish their influence in Burma. And they did so very cleverly really. They started taking to more so-called ‘stakeholders’—a term I really don’t like—in the country; not just the government. They started engaging the media, for instance. They’ve never done that before. They invited journalists to China, they started talking to journalists. The ambassador in Yangon suddenly answered the phone when journalists rang him and they went to talk to all the different political parties. Just to, in a way, to counter the spread of American influence. Economically of course, they were always much stronger than the Unites States when it comes to investments and so on. But when it comes to sort of people-to-people relations, they were way behind the Americans at that time. And they tried to reestablish some kind of—not reestablish because they never had any—but to establish some kind of better relationship with the public, the general public in Burma. If they succeeded or not? I’m not sure. I don’t really think so. But at least they tried; they realized that it was important. They couldn’t just “lose” Burma to the West, as some of their academics said at that time. AZ: I am curious. Do you think Aung San Suu Kyi still has a role in the future? She is now 77. BL: No, I mean she’s done her thing, and she’s meant a lot to the people of Burma. The role she has played cannot be denied by anybody. But she’s old and she’s tired. And many young people have even become critical about her because they think she could have handled things in a different way. KAZ: The mis-steps. BL: Yes, exactly. So, I think we’ll have to wait for the next generation. And the next generation—I mean, among the Burmans as well as among the other groups. Many of the ethnic leaders are also stuck in the past. Old visions, old ideas, they do not know how to move forward. AZ: And my last question. Any democratic transition would stall in any country unless the powerful armed forces are brought under civilian control in the context of a balance between executive power and legislative branches of government. Democracy can exist only where the soldiers are the servants, not the masters, of the state. The military in Burma is different, the Burmese army is unlikely to assume the servant role, so until it does, the prognosis for Burmese democracy cannot be good. Because the Myanmar military is going to stay in power indefinitely. BL: That’s what they want to do, yes. But you have to remember also when the military first seized power in 1962. It was at a time when there were military coups all over the world, in the so-called Third World. I mean Thailand had coups, a couple years later there was the turmoil in Indonesia, Africa, Latin America and so on. But in most countries, the military were content with seizing political power and they left economic power, running the economy, to other interests. Take Thailand for instance, there was a marriage of convenience between the military and the Sino-Thai plutocracy. And they let them run the business, and that’s why Thailand’s entirely prosperous today. Indonesia had a very similar kind of arrangement, and other countries too. But the 1962 coup in Burma was different because the military seized political as well as economic power. And that economic power was what they called the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’. In which everything was nationalized and placed under military-controlled—they would say state-controlled but it was mainly military-controlled—state corporations. […] Even when they started introducing new economic reforms after 1988, they’re dependent… the military is still a strong player. And the so-called cronies are entirely dependent on military support. And the relationships between the cronies and the military is not the same as between the rich Thai entrepreneurs and the government, with the military here [in Thailand]. Here they kind of let each other run their own thing. And then everyone benefits from it. Now the military is going after some of the cronies too. But how can you do that if you want to see the country develop? So, the power structure in Burma is so different from any other country I’m aware of really. You have a military which [holds] economic and political power – and wants to control everything. But if you can break that. Well, I don’t know how it is going to work … to be frank. But it can only happen from within the military. And the problem there is of course that if there is a serious split in the military, not just some defections, they you may have to see a very bloody civil war. AZ: Always great to talk to you, Bertil. Thank you so much..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-02
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Description: "Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will travel to Myanmar this weekend for a regional meeting in what will be Beijing’s highest-profile visit since the military seized power. Wang will attend a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism in the UNESCO World Heritage town Bagan in Mandalay Region. The Chinese foreign minister’s visit comes on the heels of the regime’s recent transfer of Myanmar’s detained State Counselor and democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to solitary confinement in a prison from house arrest. It also comes in the wake of attacks by anti-regime armed resistance groups on Chinese projects in the country for harboring regime soldiers, who have killed civilians and torched villages nearby. Recently, Chinese-owned Wanbao Mining Company in Sagaing Region was attacked with explosives and its power cables were blown up. The company condemned the attacks but didn’t comment on the sheltering of regime troops in its compound. Some armed resistance groups are now openly challenging Chinese projects in Myanmar and have condemned China’s support for the regime. Amid these attacks, there are reports that China wants to negotiate with the regime to send trained security guards to protect Chinese interests and mining projects in central Myanmar. Hundreds of Chinese nationals have reportedly entered Myanmar through two major checkpoints including Chinshwe-haw in Laukkaing Township, in Shan State’s Laukkaing District. Several ethnic armed groups based along the China-Myanmar border believe that the Chinese have negotiated with the regime to deploy more security guards at the targeted projects in Myanmar. The question now is whether Wang will meet coup leader Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing in Myanmar this time. If they meet, will Wang raise the issue of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who was transferred from house arrest to prison last week? Or it will their talks focus more on extracting assurances from the regime that it will protect Chinese interests and projects in Myanmar? After the coup, massive anti-China protests broke out in Myanmar and Chinese factories came under attack. The attacks on China-linked businesses and China’s natural gas pipelines prompted Beijing to request an emergency meeting with regime officials, at which the Chinese side urged the junta to tighten security measures. Wang is no stranger to Min Aung Hlaing or Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and last visited Myanmar in January 2021, just weeks before the coup. On that occasion he met with the country’s civilian President U Win Myint and the State Counselor, as well as military chief Min Aung Hlaing. Since the coup, with Western governments imposing sanctions in response to the junta’s violent crackdown on dissent, the regime has turned increasingly to allies including China and Russia. In April, current regime Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin was invited to visit China and received a warm welcome from Wang. Beijing said it would help safeguard Myanmar’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity “no matter how the situation changes”. Wang told his Myanmar counterpart that Beijing “has always placed Myanmar in an important position in its neighborly diplomacy” and wants to “deepen exchanges and cooperation.” Wang’s comments amounted to Beijing’s most unambiguous statement of support to date for the military regime. Last year, Yun Sun, an expert on Myanmar-China relations with the Stimson Center, a US think-tank, said, “I think the Chinese can see that this military coup is successful and is here to stay.” China is one of the top investors in Myanmar (as well as a major arms supplier) and has strategic infrastructure projects in the country, including energy pipelines that give Beijing a critical link to the Indian Ocean. For Beijing, ultimately the question boils down to: Who can protect its interests and geopolitical objectives in Myanmar? China insists it is sticking to its classic “non-interference” policy—one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that is core to its foreign policy. In reality, given China’s enormous overseas interests and global economic power, it will do what is necessary to protect its business interests and counter security threats. Myanmar is no exception. Therefore, China will need the regime’s assurance that it can protect its interests in Myanmar from those hostile ethnic armed groups and newly formed resistance groups that now pose immediate threats to Chinese projects. In contrast, in June, US State Department Counselor Derek Chollet, making a visit to Southeast Asia, said the military is suffering “serious losses” in its fight against its own people, who have been resisting military rule in the country. Given the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, Chollet said the regime was finding itself increasingly isolated, not just internationally but at home. “They’re not winning. They’re losing territory. Their military is taking serious losses,” he told The Irrawaddy in a recent interview. More than 2,000 people have been killed in the military’s crackdown on dissent since the coup, according to a local monitoring group. Thousands of villages have been burned down and activists and politicians have been locked up in prisons. Several politicians and activists have been taken away and next morning family members have been told to claim the dead bodies. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in February said it had stepped up its emergency response to assist hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people in Myanmar as their number crossed the 800,000 mark—a doubling since last year’s military coup. Myanmar citizens are well aware of China’s self-interest, and therefore Wang’s visit to Myanmar will be keenly monitored. Any endorsement of the regime and General Min Aung Hlaing will backfire. The threats to Chinese interests are real. It is about time China engaged with opposition forces in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-07-01
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-01
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Sub-title: Chongqing-Mandalay railway route is launched, saving 20-day delivery time
Description: "A new international railway route from Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality to Mandalay, southern Myanmar, has officially started operation, with the first freight train departing from Chongqing on Monday, which will arrive in Mandalay about 20 days earlier than what it takes on traditional routes. The new route is expected to strengthen Chongqing's connectivity with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) members, said Ba Chuanjiang, an official from Chongqing. The train loaded with 60 TEUs of machinery equipment, electronic components, auto parts, departed from the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing on Monday, which will head to Mandalay, passing through Lincang, in Southwest China's Yunnan Province, Chinese media outlet cnr.cn reported on Tuesday. The successful operation of the new route opens another logistics path for exports from Chongqing and neighboring regions, as products can reach Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia through the seaport of Mandalay, according to Yuxinou Logistics, a local rail logistics company operating the Yuxinou (Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe) Railway. Chongqing will further promote the integration and development of other transportation methods from the metropolis to Myanmar, while the returning train from Myanmar to Chongqing could be loaded with products of Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries, said Xi Dan, manager of Yuxinou Logistics. The total route is 2,000 kilometers starting from Chongqing, passing Lincang and the Mengding-Chinshwehaw border gate to Mandalay. The delivery time is 15 days, which is 20 days shorter than the traditional route and the logistics cost can be lowered by 20 percent. The route will shorten the transportation distance and time, while optimizing the international logistics model for transporting goods from the inland region of the western part of China to many ports in the Middle East and Europe. The new route comes as China and ASEAN members are bolstering logistics connectivity after the launch of the China-Laos Railway, a major project under the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, in December 2021. The railway has seen significant passenger and freight transportation, underscoring the booming trade between China and ASEAN. As of earlier this month, the China-Laos Railway had handled more than 2.7 million passenger trips and 2.9 million metric tons of cargo since it opened, according to official data..."
Source/publisher: "Global Times" (Beijing)
2022-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-24
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Description: "Myanmar’s parallel civilian National Unity Government (NUG) has warned China that any effort to build a partnership with the military regime would be rejected by Myanmar’s people and could seriously damage China’s international reputation. The warning was issued in a statement by the NUG’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his Myanmar regime-appointed counterpart Wunna Maung Lwin in Tunxi, Anhui Province on April 1. Wunna Maung Lwin was in China at Wang’s invitation. The NUG was formed by elected lawmakers of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) government, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, along with their ethnic allies to challenge the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Many in Myanmar take the NUG as their legitimate government and many Western countries have shown support for it, despite their reluctance to offer official recognition. During the meeting, the Chinese foreign minister said China was ready to work with Myanmar to deepen exchanges and cooperation in all areas, including people-to-people bonds, “no matter how the situation changes” to achieve the goal of building a China-Myanmar community with “a shared future.” Myanmar is currently ruled by a military regime that grabbed power from the country’s democratically elected government in February last year. The coup has so far killed more than 1,700 people and caused serious social and political instability, with many observers fearing that the country is now on the verge of being a failed state. While the regime is treated as an outcast by most Western democracies, China has been one of the few countries to engage with the junta, as it is one of Myanmar’s top investors and has a number of strategic infrastructure projects in its southern neighbor, including energy pipelines and a proposed port that would give Beijing a critical link to the Indian Ocean. On Monday, the NUG said in a statement that the shadow government was committed to China’s goal of a shared future. But any effort by China to build that future with the regime, it said, risks serious damage to the international reputation of the People’s Republic of China. “Equally important, the people of Myanmar will soundly reject any efforts by foreign governments to establish such a partnership with the illegitimate military regime,” it warned. China’s failure to condemn the coup has resulted in anti-China demonstrations in Myanmar, and factories owned and run by Chinese companies have been attacked. The anti-China sentiment cooled somewhat when China urged the regime last year not to dissolve the NLD. However, a Yangon-based observer of China-Myanmar relations said Wang’s affirmation that China was ready to work with the junta could see anti-Chinese demonstrations return, as anti-regime resistance is now at unprecedented levels and this could put Chinese gas pipeline, copper and nickel projects, among others, at risk. “Even though they want to do it for economic purposes, China would face strong popular rejection, especially in this time of political instability,” he said. The NUG also urged China to respect the will of the people of Myanmar and listen to the voices of the people by immediately compelling the military junta to stop all violence and restore civilian governance while working with the NUG and Myanmar’s diverse ethnic nationalities to deliver humanitarian assistance to end the suffering of the Myanmar people. “Such a move would help China and Myanmar secure a strong and robust … shared future,” it said. The NUG added that it was saddened to see the “pauk-phaw” (sibling) relations between China and Myanmar damaged by the regime. “The NUG stands ready to work with the Chinese government towards repairing this damage and building a new type of ‘pauk-phaw’ [relationship] in the future,” it said..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-04-05
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-05
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Description: "Stories from an Ancient Land: Perspectives on Wa History and Culture By Magnus Fiskesjö Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2021, 314 pages. US$145 (hardcover), US$33.03 (Kindle) The Wa, who live on both sides of the Myanmar-China border, are probably Southeast Asia’s most misunderstood—and often maligned—ethnic minority. Over the years, they have been described as wild headhunters, communist rebels, drug traffickers and puppets of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In Myanmar, many people seem to believe that they are a kind of Chinese when they are, in fact, a Mon-Khmer tribe related to the Palaung of northern and eastern Shan State. This book by US-based Swedish anthropologist Magnus Fiskesjö, therefore, is a very welcome contribution to a better understanding of the Wa. Although his field work was done almost exclusively on the Chinese side of the border, his accounts of Wa culture and history, and the group’s troubled relationship with the Chinese state, should be essential reading for anyone interested in peace along the common border. And that is especially important now, given the United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s position as the strongest and best-equipped ethnic armed group in the country at a time when Myanmar is descending into chaos. They have not, so far, played any direct role in domestic politics and they are not fighting the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. But several groups that are, among them the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army, and to a lesser extent the Kachin Independence Army, have benefited from arms, ammunition and other equipment supplied by the UWSA. The Wa in Myanmar have never been controlled by any central authority. During the British time, colonial presence consisted of little more than a few field officers on the outskirts of the hills, and occasional flag-marches up to the border to show the Chinese where their designated territory supposedly ended. After independence, the Wa Hills were ruled by local chieftains and warlords, and, in some parts, remnants of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, forces that had retreated across the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists during the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949. Then, in the early 1970s, the Wa Hills were taken over by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which established a base area covering most of the border mountains. In 1989, the rank-and-file of the CPB’s army, which included thousands of Wa fighters, mutinied against the ageing, staunchly Maoist leadership of the party, drove them into exile in China, and established their own army, the UWSA. Today, the 20,000-30,000-strong UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party, rules the Wa Hills without any central government interference. Their area is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. On the Chinese side, the situation has historically been equally complex. The emperors in Beijing had no jurisdiction over the Chinese Wa Hills, and contacts with the Wa were limited to some merchants who had dealings with them in opium, silver and salt. That changed after 1949, when the PLA moved into the Wa Hills to counter the Kuomintang’s attempts to reenter southern China from their clandestine bases in northeastern Shan State. As Fiskesjö explains, many Wa, who feared the Chinese, then fled into the Myanmar Wa Hills. But, by and large, the PLA treated the local population relatively well because they needed the Wa’s knowledge of terrain in order to secure the border areas, and depended on them for intelligence, even across the border into the Wa Hills of Myanmar, where the Kuomintang had bases. After a few years of comparative leniency, and as soon as the Kuomintang threat had been eliminated, the Chinese introduced a new, and unwelcome, social and political order. Weapons in the possession of Wa villagers, who were used to being armed because they depended on hunting, were confiscated and according to Fiskesjö all paraphernalia associated with head-hunting were destroyed. Drum houses, the main social institution in any Wa village, were torn down, their log drums were thrown out or burned and “the major rituals of the past were abandoned. Chief ritualists and other leaders were demoted, marginalized, or even prosecuted.” Wa elders Fiskesjö spoke to regarded 1958 as the key watershed, “since in that year the Chinese policy shifted from reconciliation to enforcement.” Even the Wa had to become Chinese communists and were herded into people’s communes. But what about head-hunting and opium? According to Fiskesjö, head-hunting as well as poppy appeared “in the Wa lands relatively recently.” Opium, Fiskesjö writes, “was seized upon as a new source of wealth…as a profitable but illicit crop, it could be grown with impunity only in these mountains, well away from the interference of states.” And that happened in the late 19th and early 20th century, presumably because there was then a huge demand for the drug in China. As for head-hunting, in the past bodies of dead tigers were placed outside villages to scare away potential enemies; but “after the wars of the mid-19th century, and with the spread of modern firearms [tigers] have now become scarce…[and] in a way humans replaced tigers as the most dangerous adversary of the land.” Long lines of posts, or a nog in Wa, with dry, whitened skulls on display lined the paths leading into villages and “served as a key Wa weapon of deterrence, legible as such by alien soldier-observers like the British and the Chinese.” The only place where Fiskesjö’s analysis goes astray is when he describes the arrival of the CPB in the Myanmar Wa Hills. He writes that “the Chinese-supported [CPB], equipped with modern weaponry, moved from central Burma into Wa country in the late 1960s.” In fact, the CPB takeover of the border areas came after more than a hundred Myanmar communists, who had been living in exile in China since the early 1950s, came across the border on January 1, 1968 accompanied by a few hundred Kachin, followers of the early rebel leader Naw Seng, who had retreated independently into China at about the same time—and thousands of heavily armed Red Guard volunteers from China who were sent to fight alongside their Myanmar comrades. The first incursion took place at Möng Ko in the north, far from the Wa Hills, and it was not until the early 1970s that the CPB, with Chinese assistance, took over the Wa Hills. The plan was to establish a “liberated area” along the border and from there push down to the Myanmar heartland, where poorly equipped CPB units were still holding out in places like the Pegu Yoma north of Yangon, and pockets in Sagaing Division, the Arakan Hills and Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi). That plan failed as the Tatmadaw realized that it could only contain, not defeat, the “new” CPB forces on the Chinese border—of whom the vast majority soon consisted of Wa conscripts—and, therefore, concentrated its efforts on wiping out the old strongholds in central Myanmar. That strategy proved to be successful and the last of the old major bases, those in the Pegu Yoma, were overrun in 1975. The number of Pegu Yoma survivors who made it to the new, northeastern base area was minimal. When I was at the then CPB headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in 1986-1987, I was able to meet only two such veterans. But Fiskesjö is correct in saying that the imposition of CPB rule over the Wa Hills led to the annihilation of “the long-standing Wa autonomy, or, more precisely, what remained of Wa autonomy after World War II, when parts of the Wa lands became the battleground of Chinese Kuomintang forces on the run from the lost cause of their civil war in China.” Fiskesjö goes on to explain how “the broad assault on Wa cultural and political traditions under the [CPB] in some ways was even more drastic than what occurred in Chinese-annexed Wa territory.” Indeed, the “new” CPB treated the Wa as little more than cannon fodder in their struggle to reach central Myanmar, where the party’s future, if any, would have lied. It is significant that the CPB chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin left his headquarters at Panghsang only to go to China, and, on a few occasions, to Möng Ko. He never even once visited a Wa village inside the CPB-controlled base area to talk to the people there. The outcome of the CPB’s failure to reach the Myanmar heartland was that it became isolated in a remote mountain area where they did not belong and had never intended to stay. That, in turn, led to the 1989 mutiny, in which the CPB’s Wa troops stormed Panghsang and the Myanmar communists, once again, had to seek refuge in China. But this time, China had changed its policy. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, the Myanmar communists were not allowed to engage in any kind of politics, and had to survive on pensions provided to them by Chinese authorities. In one of the most powerful chapters in the book, Fiskesjö describes how commercial entrepreneurs in modern times have built theme parks where supposed head-hunting paraphernalia are on display, and visitors can stay in newly-built huts and watch “wild Wa tribesmen” perform “exotic” dances which have no resemblance to Wa traditions. The much-promoted Wa “hair dance”, where young Wa women toss their long hair back and forth, is one such invention. One of those “China Folk Cultural Villages” in Shenzhen opposite Hong Kong is called “Windows of the World, where young Wa dancers also work — but they perform there as Africans, New Zealand Maoris, and American Indians.” It is no wonder many Wa feel exploited and resent being looked down upon by the Chinese—and that strained relationship, as well as the past Wa history of being oppressed by the Chinese Communist Party, is something most foreign observers have overlooked. The UWSA today may be heavily dependent on the Chinese for trade, and its vast and sophisticated arsenal made up almost entirely of weapons procured in China. But that does not mean that relations between China and the Wa in Myanmar are as smooth as people think. And drugs? Fiskesjö outlines the history of poppy cultivation in the Wa Hills but, as an anthropologist, does not dwell on today’s trade in narcotics. There is no doubt that the UWSA built up its now well-developed, autonomous area in Myanmar with profits from the trade in opium and heroin, and, more recently, methamphetamines. But it would also be fair to say that the organization’s relative wealth today is based on a number of other sources of income as well. Tin mining and the extraction of rare earth metals are believed to be more lucrative than the trade in narcotics. The price of the book, US$145, may make most people interested in the topic reluctant to buy it, but there is also a more affordable Kindle version of this groundbreaking study. Read it—it is well worth it. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-08
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Sub-title: The 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN relations was marked by the reiteration of the mutually beneficial relationship that both enjoy. Is this a shadow play by China is yet to known?
Description: "China and ASEAN held a special summit to commemorate the 30th anniversary of their dialogue partnership (DP) on 22 November 2021. It was co-chaired by the Sultan of Brunei, and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. It elevated the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The event was held virtually even though the 30th anniversary Foreign Ministers meeting was held physically in Chongqing, on 7 June. China made every effort to bring Myanmar to the Commemorative Summit. Ultimately, the ASEAN position to keep Myanmar’s leadership away from ASEAN summits till they kept their promises, prevailed. The joint statement recognises ASEAN-China relations amongst the most dynamic and mutually beneficial partnerships for ASEAN amongst all its DPs. The relationship is guided by the Joint Statement of 1997, the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership of 2003 and the vision of the strategic partnership for 2030 adopted in 2018.The preamble recognises ASEANs leading role in the regional security architecture and the inclusive principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The 31-paragraph joint statement covers overall the Chinese-ASEAN relations, political-security cooperation, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation. The main takeaway is that ASEAN centrality is maintained and cooperation in the four areas identified in the AOIP is pursued. The preamble recognises ASEANs leading role in the regional security architecture and the inclusive principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). ‘Mutually-beneficial cooperation with the BRI’ is included. Chinese support to the ASEAN comprehensive recovery framework is emphasised. It proposes to enhance defence exchanges A specific paragraph to preserve Southeast Asia free from nuclear weapons perhaps draws reference to AUKUS, with which some of the ASEAN countries have been uncomfortable. There is a long paragraph upholding international law, including UNCLOS. Enhancing mutual trust and maintaining peace in the SCS are reaffirmed; freedom of navigation and overflight and self-restraint in the conduct of activities without threat or use of force are written in. This is interesting because they also go on to talk about implementing the declaration on the Code of Conduct (COC) which is still in force and look forward to the early conclusion of an effective and substantive COC in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS within a mutually agreed but undefined timeline. The open multilateral trading system, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic partnership (RCEP) are welcomed. China’s support to the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 in correlation to the BRI is reiterated. Support from the AIIB is specifically mentioned. China’s support to the COVID-related public health processes and recovery and the positive role of the ASEAN-China centre in promoting socio-cultural and P2P exchanges are appreciated. The commitment to multilateralism and an inclusive regional framework by supporting ASEAN centrality are indeed important. Xi mentioned in his speech to abide by most of these principles and said that China would not be the neighbourhood bully or hegemonic. They will live in peace and tranquillity with their neighbours; the Philippines President complained about transgressions against their ships and territorial waters. “This does not speak well of the relations between our nations,” President Duterte said. China’s support to the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 in correlation to the BRI is reiterated. During the 30th year, China is invoking its economic capabilities to enhance the partnership while challenging the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which was designed to keep it out but instead the USA decided to leave! With ASEAN, it shows its policy of “Asia is where China must establish its prestige or “reputation for power.” It is important to note the growth in China-ASEAN relations over the last 30 years. Trade increased by 80 times from US $8 billion to US $680 billion. Since 2009, China is ASEANs largest trading partner. During the pandemic, ASEAN became China’s largest partner. In 2021, trade grew by 48 percent in the first six months. At US $140 billion, the ASEAN trade is 15 percent of China’s global trade. China’s imports from Vietnam and Indonesia increased significantly manifesting the growing regional supply chains. Electronics, specially integrated circuits, contributed to the increase. China imported US $14.9 billion of ICs in 2020. Chinese FDI into ASEAN increased 185 percent US $3.6 billion in 2010 to US $9.1 billion in 2019. This is 5.7 percent of ASEAN’s FDI inflows. In 2019, China was ASEAN’s fourth largest source of FDI, after the US, Japan, and the EU. People-to-people exchanges crossed 65 million before the pandemic, when there were nearly 4,500 weekly China-ASEAN flights. About 200 ASEAN cities have sister-city linkages with Chinese cities. 200,000 students participate in exchanges. 2017 was designated as the ASEAN-China Year of Tourism Cooperation and 2018 was the ASEAN-China Year of Innovation to enhance cooperation under the 4.0 Industrial Revolution. Similarly, 2019 was ASEAN-China Year of Media Exchanges and 2020 was designated as the ASEAN-China Year of Digital Economy Cooperation to promote digital transformation, infrastructure, AI, big data, smart cities and in using digital technologies to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak. 2017 was designated as the ASEAN-China Year of Tourism Cooperation and 2018 was the ASEAN-China Year of Innovation to enhance cooperation under the 4.0 Industrial Revolution. Chinese policy towards ASEAN currently can be seen working for a post pandemic world. Their ‘active cooperation and coalition building’ and ‘periphery diplomacy’ have become core policy. The world is certainly focusing on the Indo-Pacific, particularly the ASEAN. The Quad Summit Joint Statement is clear on this. The Chinese are much ahead of the curve in an organised manner. They have undertaken a broad four-pronged effort. Priority To ASEAN ASEAN is a priority in Chinese foreign policy. To maintain this, China promotes economic partnership with it. While prioritising ASEAN, China impresses upon them that their cooperation is practical and in mutual interest. China is using the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party to project leadership in creating a better development matrix by opening its markets and providing economic impetus for ASEAN. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership would enmesh ASEAN into a stronger matrix through BRI, COC, and the 50 partnerships they have with China. While China desires inclusive approaches, all its efforts are exclusive of others. It is up to ASEAN to have openness of the region rather than let China be the determinant for its future. The ASEAN often seems allergic to challenging the Chinese hegemony as it will upset the current ‘stability’! Spirit of partnership Tackling major challenges in a spirit of partnership. Dealing with the pandemic of COVID-19 is the latest in the disaster management support that China has provided ASEAN. China is perceived as an effective partner in the fight against COVID and a reliable friend. This is a gain for China, to receive such unequivocal faith from a region where it has grabbed several maritime resources including territory. It calls for Asian values to determine their relations. This allows acquiescence in coups in Thailand and Myanmar. ASEAN appears happy with the non-intrusive Chinese behaviour towards their domestic politics. For that they are often willing to sustain economic muscle flexing and rise in hidden debt. Benefits for trade and investment ASEAN believe that the China-ASEAN FTA and the emerging RCEP will benefit them. They don’t have apprehensions like India. ASEAN and China signed the ACFTA in 2002. They upgraded the ACFTA and developed linkages for value chains which can compete with the US and Europe. Today ASEAN countries attract RVCs related FDI for China-plus-one efforts from Quad partners too. The regional production bases that China envisages in ASEAN includes a joint production base for vaccines. Focusing on ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework, China pursues its objectives of 5G and beyond. China intends to keep ASEAN as the prime market for its digital technologies. The Quad intends to challenge this but China is quite ahead. Focusing on ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework, China pursues its objectives of 5G and beyond. China intends to keep ASEAN as the prime market for its digital technologies. Develop mutual respect The Chinese perception is that the aspiration of preserving regional peace and stability is shared. Despite China dragging its feet for years on the COC, ASEAN sees the situation as hopeful, rather than express frustration. This is a marvel. Despite several ASEAN members losing island territories to China and suffering IUU in their waters, they still remain optimistic. The longer that COC discussions prolong, the more satisfied ASEAN appears to be! Contrast this with the India-China border talks. China which is critical of the term Indo-Pacific and Quad policies, is benign in its view of the AOIP. Wang Yi told the media in 2019, after the ASEAN policy was enunciated, that it was part of regional cooperation and ‘adhering to ASEAN’s core positions’. China intends to use the expectation of the COC to temper ASEAN and avoid ‘unilateral actions’ by ASEANs other partners. Assessment The summit seems like a shadow play, to present a unified view in light of growing global dynamics. The ASEAN-China contradictions are papered over in the hope that they would be resolved sooner or later. For the long term, ASEAN interlocutors believe that this has set a tone for the diverse China-ASEAN partnership. This could become stronger. In the medium term, there is a sense of achievement within ASEAN that China has gone along with the AOIP and its principles. This is important, since China refrains from supporting references to the Indo-Pacific. An immediate concern to ASEAN was whether China would abide by its decision on Myanmar. Despite Chinese efforts ASEAN is satisfied that the absence of Myanmar was maintained..."
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Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2021-12-04
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-04
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Description: "The early 2000s saw a boom in the banana farming sector in southern China. By 2008, the fruit had become an increasingly popular target of investment, with low supply and soaring prices, and banana plantations were set up across China, as well as in Myanmar and Laos. In rural areas of Laos and Myanmar, farming bananas for export to China is a key avenue of employment: thousands of local people are employed in a business which spans thousands of hectares of land. A 2017 report from Plan International revealed that Chinese-owned banana plantations in northern Laos’s Bokeo Province alone cover more than 11,000 hectares, generate US$100 million in annual exports and make up 95 per cent of all exports in the region. At the same time, a Mekong Region Land Governance report stated that in 2019 northern Myanmar’s Kachin State was estimated to have 170,000 hectares of land converted into banana plantations. The Chinese-owned plantations in Southeast Asian countries use Chinese technology to make tissue-cultured bananas, green in color and bigger than the normal yellow fruit. Most of the plantation workers are aware of shoddy working conditions, yet choose to engage in this work because it pays more than other options. Banana exports bring in more money than any other crop. Despite this, individual workers continue to make an estimated US$200-300 per month, even as the industry rakes in over US$200 million annually. Landowners leasing their land to the Chinese-run plantations are aware of the many drawbacks associated with banana farming, but still rent out their land, or are sometimes deceived into doing so, because of the limited market for traditional crops as well as the high rents they receive. But the consequences of that appear quickly, as local people struggle with land, environmental and health issues. The plantations are run and overseen by Chinese employers and while the labor tending to the plantations are from Myanmar or Laos, they are often migrants from other parts of those countries. This is the preferred practice in Kachin State. The plantation owners would rather hire migrants than local residents, who are more likely to complain about problems. Migrants, on the other hand, get no help in the event of any disputes. They are largely underpaid, receiving an average 6000 kyats, or US$3.28 per day, but there is no one to help them with their problems. Working conditions are exceedingly poor, the plantations are rife with toxic chemicals used in farming the fruit, including Chlorpyrifos, which can cause serious health problems such as lung cancer and lead to death. Taking into account the dire environmental and health hazards, the government of Laos imposed a ban on new plantations and contract extensions in 2017. However, this ban was rescinded in 2018 following a hit to the country’s exports, with the plantations being asked to implement better management and comply with local laws relating to the use of agricultural chemicals. Despite these superficial attempts at reform, a study carried out in 2021 by the International Water Management Institute and the National Agriculture and Forest Research Institute in Laos found chemical contamination in soil and water resources, arising from the banana plantations in the northern parts of the country, which has a hazardous impact on the environment and people’s health. The chemicals used in the plantations end up in the surrounding water sources, contaminating the rivers and creeks. Workers have reported that while they used to drink the water from the streams and wash with it, they cannot do so anymore for fear of their health, as the contaminated water is pumped back to those sources. Polluted water has also adversely affected the local marine life, killing off fish stocks. Plantations often employ ‘worker couples’, a hired pair [sometimes, but not always, husband and wife] that live full-time on the plantations as laborers for months on end. Paid for the whole season, the worker couple can make up to four million kyats, or US$2,300. However, that is dependent on the harvest. If the crop is damaged before the harvest, workers are often left unpaid. The worker-couples have to put up with harrowing working and living conditions. From residing in ramshackle shelters without any showers or washrooms, to carrying up to 60kgs at the time of harvest, the laborers put in immense efforts. The living quarters for the workers consist of metal sheds with just enough space for a bed, with them having to go to the toilet outside and wash in streams which may well be contaminated. While children under the age of 16 are not allowed to work on the plantations, in practice that rule is often flouted with some plantations employing 14-year-olds. Previously, workers were not allowed to go home and were under threat of being fired if they left the plantation for more than a week. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to stricter rules, with workers not being allowed to leave even to buy food or other necessities. Instead, they are forced to buy them from Chinese-run stores at inflated prices. Following these increasingly exploitative practices, over 500 workers on a Chinese-owned plantation in central Laos quit their job, reports Radio Free Asia. Workers also complained of exhausting working hours, late or no pay, as well as exposure to toxic, banned chemicals which threatened their health. Despite two local men employed at a Chinese-owned plantation in central Laos’s Borikhamxay Province reportedly dying from exposure to toxic chemicals earlier this year, the employers have never made any provision to provide workers with healthcare if they fall sick, or to pay any compensation in case of death. There have been incidents where workers report being beaten up at the Chinese-owned plantations by employers for ending their work day early on account of exhaustion. Despite the dangerous working conditions, the lack of basic amenities, mistreatment and exploitation, there continues to be a slew of workers coming in to toil on these foreign-owned plantations, because they need jobs and lack other options to earn a good income. There are no checks in place to protect the interests of the workers and migrant laborers, and abuse and exploitation of the workers continues to take place. The themes of socialism and common prosperity that the ruling Chinese Communist Party holds so close to its heart do not seem to extend beyond the country’s own borders, with the Chinese-owned plantations unaccountable for the welfare of their workers and unwilling to take any responsibility when issues crop up. It remains to be seen if Chinese businesses in foreign countries will move towards making any efforts to secure the rights of their local workers, or if the system of oppression and inhuman work conditions remain in place for the foreseeable future. Yan Naing is a pseudonym for a keen observer of Myanmar-China affairs..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-11-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-23
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Description: "The decision of ASEAN to block coup-maker and junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from attending its ongoing summit, which started Tuesday and ends on Thursday, has taken the world by surprise. ASEAN does not normally make any decision that could be seen as “interference” in one of its 10 member states’ internal affairs. The military-appointed Foreign Ministry in Naypyitaw issued a statement saying that the decision “was done without consensus and was against the objectives of ASEAN.” Junta spokesman Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, not surprisingly, blamed foreign powers for the snub, claiming that the United States and the European Union had pressured ASEAN to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from the online meeting. But it may be much ado about nothing because the leaders of Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, are in the long run unlikely to pay much attention to what ASEAN does or doesn’t do. The generals’ decision to join the grouping in 1997 had more to do with finding allies in their altercations with critical Western powers than a desire to change their ways. There is, in fact, only one foreign power that has the power and the means to influence and manipulate the internal situation in Myanmar: the People’s Republic of China. China is also the only neighboring country that has fundamental strategic and economic interests in Myanmar—and it is prepared to do whatever it takes to protect those interests. We all know about the multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Described as a global infrastructure development strategy, it includes investments in nearly 70 countries worldwide as well as some international organizations, such as those engaged in protecting the environment and even wildlife. The aim is evidently to connect China with the outside world in a way that has never been done before and, ultimately, make China the world’s foremost superpower. But it is often forgotten that this policy of finding new outlets for trade with the outside world predates the BRI—and that it was first conceived in the 1980s in relation to Beijing’s plans to exert a new kind of influence in Myanmar. I have written a lot about this in the regional and international media, but it’s worth reminding readers of an article outlining those plans which I have quoted numerous times in the past. The article appeared, at the time almost unnoticed, in the Beijing Review as early as Sept. 2, 1985. Titled “Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,” it was written by the former Vice Minister of Communications Pan Qi and outlined, in detail, the possibilities of finding an outlet for trade from China, through Myanmar, to ports at the coast of the Indian Ocean. Pan mentioned the Myanmar railheads of Myitkyina in Kachin State and Lashio in northeastern Shan State as possible conduits for the export of Chinese goods. But he refrained from mentioning that all relevant border areas were then not under central Myanmar government control. At that time, nearly the entire, 2,192-km Sino-Myanmar frontier was actually controlled by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and other non-state armed groups who had ties―political, ethnic or both―to China. But by early 1987, the Tatmadaw had managed to recapture a few CPB strongholds along the frontier, including the booming border town of Panghsai, where the fabled “Burma Road” crosses into China at Wanding, east of the city of Ruili. At the same time, the Chinese, whose policies had changed dramatically since the Cultural Revolution, had already begun to penetrate local markets through an extensive economic intelligence reporting system within Myanmar. This network monitored the availability of domestically manufactured Myanmar products, as well as the nature and volume of illegal trade from other neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India. China could then respond to the market conditions by producing goods in its state sector factories. Before long, more than 2,000 carefully selected items were reported to be flooding the Myanmar market. Chinese-made consumer goods were not only made deliberately cheaper than those from other neighboring countries, but were also less expensive than local Myanmar products. Then, in March-April 1989, to the surprise of many, the hill tribe rank and file of the CPB’s army mutinied and drove the party’s Maoist leadership into exile in China. The mutiny came after years of simmering discontent between the hill tribe cannon fodder, who had been forcibly recruited into the CPB’s army, and the ageing Burman intellectuals who were still clinging to their orthodox Maoist ideals. The government in Yangon quickly and shrewdly exploited the mutiny: the leaders of the new forces that emerged from the ashes of the old CPB, primarily the United Wa State Army (UWSA), were promised that they could engage in any kind of business, if they agreed to a ceasefire with the government. The most potent military threat to the regime was neutralized, and, as a result, the cross-border trade flourished—and so did the newly won friendship between the leaders of two of Asia’s most repressive regimes. At the same time, China could, through its peculiar two-tier foreign policy, maintain government-to-government relations not only with the ruling military, but also party-to-party relations with Myanmar’s many ethnic armed groups, including the UWSA. In more recent years, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has established relations with both the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy. It is important for the leaders in Beijing not to put all their eggs in one basket because no one knows who will rule, or be influential, in Myanmar in the future. In the early 1990s, I was at Jiegao, a small enclave of Chinese territory on the south side of the Shweli River opposite Muse and saw a giant monument showing four figures wheeling a circular object between them, their determined faces pointing south. The Chinese characters on the base say “Unite, Blaze Paths, Forge Ahead!” Or, in more mundane terms: “Southeast Asia, here we come!” There was no doubt that the monument and the message on its base appeared provocative to people in Myanmar. In the early 1990s, there was little more than bamboo huts and rice fields in the Jiegao enclave. But today, 25 years later, Jiegao is full of high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, and stores selling all kinds of wares. There is also a huge jade market where buyers from all over China come to shop for the precious stone, which is found in its imperial green form only in northern Myanmar. Every morning—until the COVID-19 pandemic forced a closure of the border—caravans of trucks laden with Chinese consumer goods left Jiegao through a border gate for points beyond Muse: the towns of Lashio, Mandalay and Yangon, and even as far as Moreh on the Indian border. Not only Myanmar but also northeastern India was being flooded with cheap Chinese merchandise. And not far from Ruili are pipelines through which oil and gas are being transported from the Myanmar coast to Yunnan. It is not clear when the border will be open for trade again, but given the strategic importance of what’s now known as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Beijing is not likely to abandon its long-term plans for Myanmar and the region. Myanmar is the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to Indian Ocean ports, bypassing the contested South China Sea as well as the congested Malacca Strait. The CMEC is one of the most important pillars of Xi’s BRI; without it, China would not be able to fulfill its plans for global dominance. For that very reason, whatever government is in power in Naypyitaw, China would court it in order to safeguard those strategic interests. Beijing may prefer a like-minded authoritarian regime, but we also have to remember that it was State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who signed up to the BRI when she attended the Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017. But how—and where—do the ethnic armed groups, with which China also maintains close relations through its security services, fit into the picture? If we venture further back in history, and then before Pan Qi wrote his article for the Beijing Review, Myanmar was also of utmost strategic importance to Beijing, but then at a time when China wanted to export revolution, not consumer goods. The CPB’s 20,000-sq.-km base area along the Sino-Myanmar border was there not only to support the intended revolution in Myanmar, but also to serve as a springboard from where Maoist communism, the CPC hoped, would spread to other parts of Southeast Asia. The mastermind behind that plan was Kang Sheng, a dreaded hardliner who, during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s, worked for China’s internal security and intelligence apparatus—and was in charge of the CPC’s contacts with fraternal Maoist parties in Asia and beyond. The plan—and CPB Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin told me this when I interviewed him at the party’s Panghsang headquarters in 1987—was to link up with the Communist Party of Thailand’s (CPT) guerrillas; the Communist Party of Malaya, which was led by Chin Peng, a hero of the struggle against the Japanese during World War II; the Communist Party of North Kalimantan (the Malayan communists did not recognize the Malaysian Federation, so there was a separate communist party in Sarawak and Sabah); the once powerful Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI); and, eventually the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), actually a tiny Maoist party led by Edward Fowler Hill, a fairly prominent lawyer and barrister. Thakin Ba Thein Tin and Hill met in Beijing, relations with Chin Peng were maintained through intermediaries in Kunming, and CPT activist stayed in Panghsang until they returned to Thailand in 1983. When I was at Panghsang in 1986-87, I saw a concrete well with Thai writing on it, built by CPT cadre. When I was out in the field with the CPB’s troops, I heard numerous stories about “the Indonesian comrades” and their exploits. Among them were two daughters of PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, who was killed in Indonesia in 1965. The CPC had sent a dozen or so PKI militants, who happened to be in China in the 1960s, down to the CPB’s base area where they were going to learn guerrilla warfare. CPB leaders told me they were used as radio operators during battles with the Tatmadaw when messages could not be encrypted. The Tatmadaw interceptors did now know what they were saying—because they spoke in Bahasa Indonesia. The PKI militants had left when I was there, and I was told they had gone into exile in the Netherlands and Canada. Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s return to the political fold, China changed its policy towards the region. However, whether China wants to export revolution or expand and protect commercial interests, to safeguard and even control the “Myanmar corridor” has always been of vital importance to Beijing’s security planners. In the past, the epicenter for that policy was Panghsang. Today it is Jiegao. But the ethnic armed organizations are also important. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw. Significantly, when President’s Office Minister Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project at Letpadaung northwest of Mandalay, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China… we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.” Aung Min was right, but by “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, whose weaponry and vast quantities of ammunition had been supplied by the UWSA. The Kachin Independence Army has also benefited from some support from the UWSA, but not to the same extent as the other groups in what is usually referred to as the Northern Alliance. While the UWSA is not engaged in any fighting itself, it has become a major source of the weaponry that is being used in the war in northern Myanmar. The Chinese may be denying giving any material support to the UWSA and indirectly supporting its allies, but what the Wa have received from China is not the kind of equipment that “falls off the back of a truck”, or could be sent to them by some local officials in Yunnan. The deliveries were almost certainly directed from the highest level of China’s intelligence and military authorities in Beijing. And it is no secret that Chinese security officials have had several meetings with representatives of the Northern Alliance—and told them not to fight too close to the border or to damage the oil-and-gas pipelines. The CPC’s position above the government as well as the military, the People’s Liberation Army, in the Chinese hierarchy explains why China could publicly praise Myanmar’s now collapsed peace process while quietly providing the UWSA with heavy weaponry. Support for the UWSA and its allies serves as a “stick” in Beijing’s relationship with Myanmar, while diplomacy and promises of aid and investment are the “carrot.” In the official rhetoric in Beijing as well as Naypyitaw, relations between China and Myanmar have always been characterized by pauk-phaw, a Burmese word for siblings, but nothing could be falser than that cliché. Sino-Myanmar relations have always been anything but brotherly, and decades of history show us how China plays games with Myanmar to achieve whatever strategic goals the leaders in Beijing might have. Forget about ASEAN’s actions, statements and awkward attempts at exercising influence. It is China and its plans and strategic maneuvers that count. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-10-27
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-28
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Sub-title: China-Laos railway will open on December 2 but it's not clear the BRI-built line will extend anytime soon to wider SE Asia
Description: "Laos will never be the same again on December 2, the day the first high-speed train on the Belt and Road Initiative-built railroad is scheduled to roll into the capital Vientiane arriving from the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. Running for 414 kilometers from the border with China, the new line will transform Laos from a land-locked to land-linked country, as the Chinese state news agency Xinhua has trumpeted in several dispatches on the US$6 billion project. According to Xinhua, Laos’ underdeveloped economy will blossom as the new modern train speeds in Chinese tourists and businesspeople, facilitates faster and greater trade, and thus enhances Laos’ connectivity and post-pandemic economic recovery. Beijing is seeking to showcase the China-Lao train as a Belt and Road Initiative success story, one that encourages other Southeast Asian states to more firmly embrace the $1 trillion infrastructure-building scheme that has stalled on various fronts in the neighboring, resource-rich region. That includes stop-and-go progress on a similar rail line in Thailand and a port project in Myanmar, both of which are key to the BRI’s vision of a better-connected regional economic sphere with China at its powerful center. That trade-geared vision is all the more important to China’s economic security as tensions continue to rise with the US and its allies in contested sea lanes. There is no doubt that the China-Laos railroad is a remarkable feat of engineering. The deal between China and Laos was first struck in 2015 and work began in December 2016. Since then, Chinese engineers have built 75 tunnels, 165 bridges and 20 stations through some of the most mountainous terrain in all of Southeast Asia, according to a Chinese general manager of the Lao-China Railway Company (LCRC), the joint venture that will operate the railroad. The only railroad in Laos before the BRI-funded project was launched was a 3.5-kilometer Thai-built meter-track built in 2009 across the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge to Dongphosy village, 20 kilometers east of Vientiane, and a seven-kilometer, 600-millimeter narrow gauge line that was built in the late 19th century when Laos was a French colonial possession. The latter bypassed some waterfalls on the Mekong in the south, but was closed in the 1940s. Today, only some rusted locomotives remain on Don Khon island in the Mekong. The new, 21st-century project is only the beginning of a massive infrastructure drive that aims to transform all of mainland Southeast Asia. If all goes to plan, the railroad will continue from Vientiane across a planned new bridge on the Mekong River to Nong Khai in Thailand and then, eventually, all the way down to Singapore. But there are downsides to the grand plan which has put Laos heavily in debt to China. Around US$3.6 billion of the railway’s total $5.97 cost has been financed a loan from the Export-Import Bank of China and the remainder by the LCTC, which is comprised of three Chinese state-owned firms holding 70% and a Lao state-owned enterprise with 30%. But even the Lao share of the project’s expense is covered in part by loans from China. The bills are coming due while Laos’ $20 billion economy is weighed down by an estimated $12.6 billion in foreign debt, including US$5.9 billion owed to China for the railroad and other projects. Fitch Ratings described Laos’ external debt repayment profile as “challenging” in an August 9 report with around $422 million due over the remainder of 2021 “and an average of $1.16 billion due per annum between 2022 and 2025.” To fulfill those requirements without having to take out more loans, and then most likely from China, will be more than a “challenge”, the Fitch report said. Concerns are rising that Laos will soon be submerged in debts it can’t service and thus will fall victim to what critics of China’s lending practices call sovereignty-eroding “debt-traps.” Unable to make repayments in hard currency, Laos has already turned to repaying loans to China through debt to equity swaps. In September last year, Vientiane ceded majority control of the debt-ridden state utility Électricité du Laos to China Southern Power Grid Co to cover debts owed. Reports noted at the time that means Laos’ national power grid is now de facto controlled by a state-owned Chinese company. That erosion of sovereignty is no doubt ringing alarms in other Southeast Asian nations – not least Thailand – that Beijing is pressing to more fully commit to its BRI. Thailand already has an extensive railroad network but with one-meter gauge tracks while the China-Lao high-speed trains will roll on a standard 1,435-millimeter. That means that an entirely new railroad would have to be built on the Thai side and beyond. Even Malaysia and Singapore have meter-gauge railroads that would not be suitable for China’s high-speed trains. Whether China’s plans will materialize in the foreseeable future is an open question. Strict Covid-19 travel restrictions in China and much of Southeast Asia have raised new questions about the desirability and feasibility of the BRI’s vision of fast and open borders. Thailand seems more interested in connecting Bangkok with Nakhon Ratchasima in the northeast, Chiang Mai in the north, and to beach resorts like Pattaya and Hua Hin, than being part of some broader Chinese scheme for the entire region. Most of those plans, despite Bangkok’s years of repeated assurances to Beijing the plan is on track, remain on the drawing board. The only visible progress so far is the construction of a new railroad hub at Bang Sue, a northern Bangkok suburb, which will replace the old, downtown Hualampong Central Station. From Bang Sue, new railroads will branch out to different destinations in Thailand. In Malaysia, tentative agreements for the construction of high-speed railroads involving Chinese partners were allowed to lapse in May. That leaves Myanmar as the only reasonably secure outlet for China to connect its railroad networks with Southeast Asian markets other than little landlocked Laos. That route, dubbed the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, forms a vital part of the BRI as it would provide the Chinese with direct access to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean ports. A railroad has been built from China’s Yunnan province capital of Kunming to Ruili, a border town opposite Muse in the far north of Myanmar’s Shan state. Another newly-built line, ceremonially opened on August 25, stretches from Sichuan’s provincial Chengdu to Lincang in Yunnan, with a road connection to the border at Chinshwehaw in northeastern Shan state. But ever since those Chinese-side projects were launched more than a decade ago, skeptics have pointed out that widespread insurgencies across the border in Myanmar would make it difficult, if not impossible, to extend those lines through northern Shan state to the central city of Mandalay. From there a new railroad was planned down to the old capital Yangon and, more importantly, the deep seaport at Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state. On October 22, 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a railroad from the border to Mandalay was signed between the now-ousted Myanmar government and China Railways. Another MoU for the route from Mandalay to Kyaukphyu was signed on January 10 this year. The China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group has carried out some feasibility studies along the route from the border to Mandalay but little, if any, concrete progress has been made on the ground. The Covid-19 pandemic is now running rampant in Myanmar, prompting China to close the border. And the insurgencies in northern and northeastern Myanmar have only intensified since the MoUs were signed less than a month before Myanmar’s destabilizing February 1 coup. The railroad to Vientiane could thus be the beginning and end of China’s lofty BRI plans for the region, particularly as China starts to turn inward and the economy shows new signs of overleveraged weakness. In the end, China may not achieve the access to Southeast Asian ports it has so long desired while Laos is stuck with a hefty bill for infrastructure that is of marginal use and questionable commercial viability without wider connections..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-10-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-04
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Sub-title: Three other Myanmar political parties, including the NLD’s military-backed rival, will also attend
Description: "The National League for Democracy (NLD) will attend an online meeting organized by the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Thursday, according to a senior party member. Four parties from Myanmar have been invited to the meeting on “Political Parties’ Cooperation in Joint Pursuit of Economic Development,” which will bring together parties from across South and Southeast Asia. The Union Solidarity and Development Party—the NLD’s main, military-backed rival—and the Arakan National Party are also expected to attend. It was not clear at the time of reporting which other Myanmar party would be present. NLD lawmaker Bo Bo Oo posted on social media on Wednesday that the NLD would be attending the meeting. A senior party member later told Myanmar Now that Bo Bo Oo, who handles the party’s communications with China, would also be taking part. The NLD was Myanmar’s ruling party until it was ousted by the military on February 1, despite winning a landslide victory in last year’s election. China is one of the few countries that recognize the coup regime led by Myanmar’s top general, Min Aung Hlaing. But it has also reportedly expressed concern over the military’s plan to dissolve the NLD, according to media reports. The invitation to Thursday’s online meeting was not the first time that China has publicly signalled its ongoing relationship with the NLD since it was ousted from power. In July, the CPC sent a letter to the NLD’s central executive committee thanking it for sending congratulations on the occasion of the CPC’s centenary. Also, during a week-long visit to Myanmar in late August, China’s special envoy for Asian affairs, Sun Guoxiang, reportedly requested a meeting with NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The request was denied. While the Myanmar junta has been tight-lipped about the visit, China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported that it was part of Beijing’s effort to help Myanmar “restore social stability and resume democratic transformation at an early date.” China, which has long been seen as an ally of successive military regimes in Myanmar, was the target of protests and boycotts around the country in the wake of the coup..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2021-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-09
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Description: "On August 18, 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone conversation with Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Myanmar and Bruneian Second Minister of Foreign Affairs Erywan bin Pehin Yusof at request. Wang Yi expressed his appreciation for Brunei's contribution to the development of China-ASEAN relations as the rotating chair of ASEAN, and thanked Brunei for its support in elevating the positioning of China-ASEAN relations. He hopes that Brunei will continue to play a positive role to ensure that a commemorative meeting marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of dialogue relations between China and ASEAN will be successful and achieve more important results. Noting that September marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Brunei, Wang Yi expressed his hope that the two sides will take this opportunity to carry forward traditional friendship, deepen the Belt and Road cooperation, and push for the new development of China-Brunei strategic cooperative partnership. Anti-pandemic cooperation remains a top priority currently, China attaches great importance to the needs of Brunei, and will send a batch of vaccines to Brunei and deliver them as soon as possible, and lend a helping hand to Brunei when the country needs it most. After listening to Erywan's views on the current situation in Myanmar, Wang Yi said that both China and ASEAN countries are friends of Myanmar and all hope that Myanmar will achieve peace and stability. China welcomes the appointment of you as ASEAN's special envoy to Myanmar, and I believe that you can uphold the ASEAN way and play a unique role in accordance with ASEAN's five-point consensus on Myanmar to help different parties in Myanmar find a political solution within the constitutional framework through dialogue. China has the following suggestions. First, deal with all parties in Myanmar in a rational and pragmatic manner and gradually build trust; second, give top priority to helping Myanmar in its fight against COVID-19, and ensure the accessibility and effectiveness of the anti-pandemic assistance; third, remain patient and determined, stick to the direction of promoting peace through talks, return state power to the people in an orderly manner and restart the democratic process, which not only serves the interests of Myanmar but also meets the expectations of the international community; fourth, stay vigilant against and oppose interference in Myanmar's internal affairs by extraterritorial forces, and earnestly respect Myanmar's sovereignty and the choice of its people. Wang Yi stressed that China's friendly policy toward Myanmar is always for all the people of Myanmar. We will provide urgently-needed help to Myanmar through various channels. China will fully support ASEAN's special envoy in performing his duties and is willing to continue to play a constructive role in promoting a political settlement of the Myanmar issue. Erywan thanked China for its continuous assistance of medical supplies and vaccines to Brunei when Brunei is confronting a new wave of COVID-19 pandemic. He hopes that the two countries can mark the 30th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties as a milestone, to give full play to the role of the China-Brunei intergovernmental joint steering committee, and further deepen cooperation in various fields, such as energy, agriculture and fishery. Erywan said Myanmar is an important member of the big ASEAN family. As ASEAN's special envoy to Myanmar, I will be dedicated to pushing forward the implementation of the five-point consensus, advancing dialogue among relevant parties in the ASEAN way, stopping violence, promoting inclusiveness, and helping Myanmar better fulfill its commitments to the international community. ASEAN appreciates and supports China's continuous crucial role in the Myanmar issue, and is willing to strengthen coordination and carry out cooperation with China..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China
2021-08-18
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-19
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Description: "Last week, a newly formed Shan political organization known as the Shan State Front for Federal (SSFF) and a Shan political party, the Shan State Liberation Party (SSLP), called for a united front against the military dictatorship and urged reconciliation and a truce between two rival Shan armed groups. It is reported that this new political group comprises Shan youth and intellectuals who want to see unity in Shan State. They claim to fight for democracy, federalism, ethnic states’ rights and the right to self-determination. The group made its announcement on July 7. A few days later, on July 11, it declared war on the State Administration Council (SAC), the governing body established by the military after its coup in February. However, the newly formed Shan group remains something of a mystery, and it is not yet clear how much support it commands. Meanwhile, the two rival ethnic Shan armed groups, the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), have been fighting over a territorial dispute for a month in the mountains of Kyethi Township, southern Shan State. The war has forced thousands of villagers to flee their homes. Influential Shan monks have been trying to stop the conflict. On July 8, the RCSS issued a statement in English and Chinese calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict in northern Shan State. The statement also said that a combined force of SSPP and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) troops has been attacking military camps and strongholds of the RCSS in Namtu and Kyaukme townships. “These prolonged armed conflicts have been causing great difficulties for the local populations,” it reads. But behind both the recent and past armed clashes, Shan analysts suspect that the powerful Wa armed group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), is behind the SSPP and TNLA. This time, according to Shan observers, the SSPP and TNLA are deploying heavy artillery, suggesting some ethnic forces might have been involved in assisting the SSPP. Both the Wa and the TNLA have denied claims the former is backing the latter. Commenting on the ongoing conflict, Sao Pha, the general secretary of the SSFF, told The Irrawaddy that the group is unhappy to see armed clashes between the RCSS and SSPP and said that Shan people want reconciliation between the two Shan groups. In Shan State, he said, the RCSS and SSPP are at loggerheads and engaged in a protracted armed conflict. The Shan are frustrated as two ethnic Shan armed groups are in conflict instead of targeting the Myanmar military. In fact, these two major Shan forces have been fighting each other in northern Shan State since 2016-17. In recent years, the RCSS expanded its territory into northern Shan State, which shares a border with China. Notably, this conflict has worsened since the RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government of former President U Thein Sein in October 2015. Soon after, it expanded its forces to the north, resulting in clashes with the TNLA.
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-07-13
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China supports the implementation of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) engagement with Myanmar and hopes for the restoration of peace and stability, said its ambassador to Myanmar during a meeting with the junta leader. Ambassador Chen Hai met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on Saturday in Naypyitaw, before Sunday’s special China-ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting to commemorate 30 years of relations between Beijing and the regional bloc. The meeting, which is co-chaired by Myanmar and China, is due to run until Tuesday in the Chinese city of Chongqing. The junta-appointed foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin reportedly attended Sunday’s meetings. The Chinese embassy posted on Facebook that Chen stressed, as Myanmar’s neighbor, China “will continue to play a constructive role”. Its statement said: “China sincerely hopes for the earlier restoration of peace and stability in Myanmar and supports the implementation of consensus by ASEAN and Myanmar.” A diplomatic source said the Chongqing meetings kicked off several days ago with SME (small- and medium-sized enterprises) and media forums. Myanmar attended both forums “in a low-profile way”, according to the source. On Friday, Asean’s Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi from Brunei and Brunei’s foreign affairs minister Erywan Yusof met the senior general in Naypyitaw to discuss the special summit held in late April in Jakarta. The non-democratic, oil-rich state currently chairs ASEAN. But Myanmar’s parallel civilian National Unity Government says it has lost faith in the regional bloc as it has failed to engage with both sides, ignoring the NUG’s approaches and only engaging with the junta. Following the ASEAN summit on April 24, which was attended by Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing, China proposed this month’s meeting in China with working-level talks on the crisis. Chen has reportedly held several informal, secret meetings with junta leaders ahead of Saturday’s talks in Naypyitaw. Military-control newspapers said on Sunday that meetings focused on “bilateral cooperation” and “stability” along the border, which extends over 2,000 kilometers, and the presence of numerous powerful ethnic minority armed groups along the frontier. China’s state-controlled Global Times said Myanmar’s authorities are willing to maintain communications with China. The newspaper posted on Facebook: “Myanmar is willing to work with ASEAN to maintain the domestic stability and coordinate implementation of relevant consensus, said Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing.” The reference to “Myanmar leader” angered many social media users. One user said the military chief is not the country’s leader and does not represent the people. Another comment read: “We don’t believe in ASEAN. It is not working for Myanmar’s people but for the terrorist junta.” Anti-regime protesters have been calling on the international community not to recognize the junta and its governing body, State Administrative Council. However, China has not denounced the coup and prevented United Nations Security Council intervention while looking to influence ASEAN, according to observers..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-06-06
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Description: "Abstract: Myanmar’s liberalizing reforms since late 2010 have effectively shed the country’s decades-long “pariah state” status. This article evaluates competing explanations for why Myanmar’s leaders made the strategic decision to pursue reform and opening. We examine whether the strategic decision was motivated by fears of sudden regime change, by socialization into the norms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or by the geopolitics of overreliance on China. Drawing on newly available materials and recent field interviews in Myanmar, we demonstrate how difficult it is for international actors to persuade a pariah state through sanctions or engagement, given the pariah regime’s intense focus on maintaining power. However, reliance on a more powerful neighbour can reach a point where costs to national autonomy become unacceptable, motivating reforms for the sake of economic and diplomatic diversification.....Acknowledgments: We gratefully acknowledge the participation of interviewees in Yangon, Naypyidaw, Seoul, and Washington, DC. Research assistance was provided by Andrew Choi, Esther Pau Sann Cing, Li Xuan, Li Zimeng, Wang Qichao, Wu Shangwei, Zhang Xiaorui, and Zhou Xin. We also wish to thank the editor, three anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2014 Murdoch-Macau Colloquium on Political Change and Governance in Asia, whose comments greatly improved this article. We thank the Asan Institute for Policy Studies for supporting Leif-Eric Easley’s research travel to Myanmar in 2014. Research for this article was funded in part by a grant from the University of Macau (SRG2013-00057-FSS). For over two decades, Myanmar suffered the reputation of an international pariah. After the 1988 coup that inaugurated 22 years of military rule under the State Law and Order Restoration Council / State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC),1 Myanmar incurred international condemnation and sanctions for human rights violations, including annulling the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) electoral victory in 1990; detaining opposition leaders, including NLD General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi; killing civilians during military campaigns against armed ethnic minority groups; violently suppressing civil protests in the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”; and muzzling free speech and the press.2 The junta appeared unmoved by sanctions and international exhortations to pursue reform and opening. Its apparent steps toward ending military rule under the 2003 “Roadmap to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy” were often marred by process irregularities, lack of inclusiveness and transparency, and restrictions on and sometimes violent repression of opposition parties. Though the SPDC held landmark elections for a civilian government in November 2010, supporters of democracy were not encouraged when the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) swept the polls and elevated Prime Minister Gen. Thein Sein to the presidency. Many were surprised, however, when Thein Sein initiated extensive reforms in 2011: releasing political prisoners, loosening media and civil society restrictions, and allowing Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition members to run for parliament. Myanmar’s pariah status quickly abated as a parade of foreign leaders visited the country and eased sanctions. In November 2015, Myanmar’s first general election under nominally civilian rule saw the NLD defeat the USDP in a landslide, marking a new era in Myanmar’s politics.3 The manner in which Myanmar pursued transformative reforms raises important questions. Why did the SPDC pursue reform and opening when it did? What motivated the strategic decision to pursue transformative policies? Several scholars have argued that domestic factors drove Myanmar’s reforms. Jones maintains that the junta’s co-optation of ethnic militias allowed it to resume a democratization process it had begun and aborted in 1990 and again in 1996.4 Bünte, along with Croissant and Kamerling, emphasizes the aging SPDC leaders’ desire to manage succession politics through institutionalization.5 Roger Lee Huang argues that the junta sought to retain political control but did not foresee the extent of reforms under Thein Sein, an assessment shared by MacDonald.6 Other scholarship emphasizes international factors as primary catalysts for reform. One argument is that Myanmar’s leaders implemented domestic reforms to pursue rapprochement with the European Union, the United States, and other sanctions-imposing countries, and to counterbalance China’s growing political and economic influence.7 Another possible factor behind Myanmar’s transition is the socializing role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and more generally, Myanmar’s desire for international prestige.8 While more than one of these factors may have motivated Myanmar’s reforms, an “all of the above” answer leaves the country’s political transformation over-determined and under-examined. This article weighs the theoretical logic and empirical evidence for three competing explanations for Myanmar’s strategic decision to pursue transformative policies: first, junta leaders’ desire to maintain power and avoid sudden regime change; second, socialization into ASEAN norms; and third, the desire to reduce China’s political and economic influence over Myanmar.9 We base our research on numerous interviews with key informants in or engaged with Myanmar, as well as on primary documents. We find that while multiple factors motivated Myanmar’s strategic decision, the most important driver was concern about China’s growing influence. To frame the analysis, the next section defines pariah states and what it means to make a strategic decision to pursue transformative policies and exit pariahdom. We then briefly outline our interview methodology before discussing the timing of Myanmar’s transformative reforms. Subsequent sections review theoretical bases and empirical support for each of the three competing explanations. In the conclusion, we summarize our findings and discuss possible implications for other pariah states and for Myanmar’s political future..."
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Source/publisher: Pacific Affairs (Canada)
2016-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-28
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Description: "The UN Security Council failed to agree Friday on a joint statement on the crisis in Myanmar after a closed-door meeting, with diplomats blaming Beijing -- the junta's main backer -- and Russia for raising objections and putting forward their own competing text. The session was convened by Vietnam to present the conclusions of a recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Indonesia. ASEAN is to appoint an envoy to help resolve the crisis sparked by the February 1 coup by the Myanmar military. During the meeting, the UN Special Envoy to Myanmar, Christine Schraner Burgener, who is currently touring the region, gave a report on her long meeting with Myanmar junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing, held on the sidelines of the ASEAN meeting. Diplomats said the envoy, who is currently based in Bangkok, once again had her request for a visit to Myanmar denied. During the meeting, Brunei, which currently holds the presidency of ASEAN, floated the idea of a joint visit to Myanmar by the UN envoy and her future ASEAN counterpart. A draft Security Council declaration, drawn up by Britain, failed to win full endorsement as it stood. A copy obtained by AFP showed that it planned to give "full support for the central role of ASEAN" and to encourage a visit to Myanmar by Schraner Burgener "as soon as possible." It said that members of the Security Council "once again strongly condemned violence against peaceful protestors" and "reiterated their call on the military to exercise utmost restraint." But diplomats said China and Russia objected to the British draft and proposed their own short competing text, which proved unacceptable to the majority of the Security Council. Discussions were still underway for a merger of the two draft statements on Friday, diplomats said. Nearly 760 civilians have been killed by police and soldiers in the past three months, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). The junta puts the death toll at 258 dead by April 15, calling the demonstrators "rioters" who engaged in "acts of terrorism".
Source/publisher: Agence France-Presse (Paris) via "France24" ( Paris)
2021-05-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Illegal rare earth mining has surged in northern Kachin State on the Chinese border following Myanmar’s Feb. 1 coup in areas controlled by a junta-sponsored militia. Environmental groups say mining has increased at least five times in Pangwa and Chipwi townships amid Myanmar’s political turmoil, with a rapid influx of Chinese workers. “Before the coup, we only saw one or two trucks per day. Now there is no proper inspection we are seeing 10 to 15,” an activist in Chipwi told The Irrawaddy. He said the trucks are loaded with ammonium sulphate fertilizer bags filled at illegal mines. “The Chinese authorities have tightened border security for imports from Myanmar due to COVID-19. But materials for the mining move across the border easily,” he added. Myanmar is China’s largest rare earth source, accounting for over half of its supplies. In 2016, Chinese mining companies entered Pangwa looking for rare earth as Beijing cracked down on illegal mining within China. According to Chinese customs data, China is heavily dependent on medium and heavy rare earth from Myanmar. Myanmar became China’s largest importer in 2018. In 2020, rare earth imports from Myanmar rose by 23 percent year on year to around 35,500 tons, accounting for 74 percent of imports, according to the Global Times government mouthpiece. Ja Hkaw Lu of the Transparency and Accountability Network Kachin (TANK) told The Irrawaddy: “Under the civilian government, if we complained about illegal rare earth mining, officials immediately visited and investigated. [Illegal miners] stayed away but now it is totally out of control.” She added: “Currently, vehicles carrying heavy rare earth leave day and night. The situation is getting worse. There has been an influx of Chinese miners.” Heavy rare earth from Kachin State is exported to China for refining and processing and then sold around the globe, according to environmental protection groups. According to TANK, around 10 rare earth mines have opened near the border in Zam Nau, which is controlled by the military-affiliated New Democratic Army Kachin (NDAK). Kachin environmental groups estimate that there are over 100 rare earth mines in Pangwa and Chipwe townships controlled by the militia and Chinese investors. The Chinese media has reported that some Chinese companies are facing rising logistical costs exporting rare earth from Myanmar since the military takeover. But Chinese buyers have not seen any significant decline in imports since the coup, the Chinese media reported. According to the Kachin State Mining Department, only the union administration can give permission for rare earth mining in Pangwa and Chipwi. The department said it found several illegal mines and Chinese workers in 2019 and 2020 after a series of inspections. The department has said the involvement of armed groups makes regulating the industry challenging. Brang Awng of the Kachin State Working Conservation Group told The Irrawaddy that the mines cause environmental destruction, polluting waterways and groundwater. “Illegal digging is on the rampage since there are no checks by government officials since the military coup. More digging will further damage the environment,” he said. The group said more than 20 villages were suffering from polluted soil and water from rare earth mining. In 2020 and 2019, the Chipwe river twice turned red due to mining waste, according to environmental groups..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-04-26
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Senior Chinese diplomat Wang Yi said on Thursday that China hoped the upcoming ASEAN summit on member Myanmar would pave the way for a “soft landing”. The in-person summit in Jakarta on Saturday is the first concerted international effort to ease the crisis in Myanmar, where security forces have killed hundreds of pro-democracy protesters since a Feb. 1 coup. The meeting is also a test for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which traditionally refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of a member state, and operates by consensus. "The Chinese side expects the meeting to lead to a good start towards helping realise a 'soft landing' for the Myanmar situation," said Wang, China's State Councillor and Foreign Minister. He was speaking with Thailand and Brunei's foreign ministers, the current and incoming ASEAN chairs, respectively. China is not a member of ASEAN, but is included in ASEAN Plus Three, along with Japan and South Korea. It was not immediately clear whether China will be attending Saturday's meeting in Jakarta. "Inappropriate intervention" from outside the region should be avoided, a statement from the Chinese foreign ministry cited Wang as saying. "Practice has proved that blindly exerting strong pressure by foreign forces will not help resolve a country's internal problems, but will bring turbulence or even deterioration to the situation, which will affect and destabilise the region," Wang said. The United States has been imposing punitive sanctions on Myanmar after the country’s military coup. Washington has said it would take further action. "China calls on the international community to take an objective and fair attitude and do more to help ease the tension in Myanmar, rather than the opposite," Wang said. "China will maintain close communication with ASEAN, and continue to handle any work related to Myanmar in its own way."..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-04-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Violations of religious freedom are increasing and persecution takes place in more than 25 countries, with China and Myanmar among those that have the worst records, according to a report by a Vatican-backed charity. The Religious Freedom in the World Report, covering 2019-2020 and issued on Tuesday, said that in some countries, such as Niger, Turkey and Pakistan, prejudices against religious minorities led local residents to blame them for the COVID-19 pandemic and denial of access to medical aid. The 800-page report was prepared by Aid to the Church in Need International (ACN), a worldwide Catholic charity that studies violations of freedoms of all religions. The latest report put 26 countries in a "red" category denoting the existence of persecution, compared to 21 countries at the time of the last report two years ago. It put 36 countries in the "orange" category denoting discrimination, compared to 17 two years ago. The report describes discrimination as when laws or rules apply to a particular group and not to all, and persecution as when there is an active programme to subjugate people based on religion. "There has been a significant increase in the severity of religiously-motivated persecution and oppression," the report said. It was particularly scathing about China and Myanmar. "The apparatus of repression constructed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in recent years is ... fine-tuned, pervasive, and technologically sophisticated," the report said. The most egregious violations were against Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang "where the atrocities have reached such a scale that a growing number of experts describe them as genocide", it said..... HARASSMENT AND ARREST": In February, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden endorsed a last-minute determination by the Trump administration that China has committed genocide in Xinjiang and has said the United States must be prepared to impose costs on China. China says the complexes it set up in Xinjiang provide vocational training to help stamp out Islamist extremism and separatism. The Chinese foreign ministry has called allegations of forced labour and human rights violations "groundless rumour and slander". The ACN report said Catholic hierarchy in China "continue to suffer harassment and arrest" despite a landmark deal signed in 2018 between Bejing and the Vatican on the appointment of bishops on the mainland. Reuters reported last year that two nuns who work at the Vatican mission in Hong Kong were arrested when they went home to the mainland for a visit. China was increasing the use of facial recognition on worshippers of various religions, it said. In Myanmar, the report said Rohingya Muslims "have been the victims of the most egregious violations of human rights in recent memory". Last year, the International Court of Justice ordered Myanmar to take urgent measures to protect Rohingya from genocide. The government has denied accusations of genocide. The ACN report said the military coup on Feb. 1 was "likely to make things worse for all religious minorities" in Myanmar, where about 8% of the population is Christian. Africa would be "the next battleground against Islamic militants," the report said. Militant groups were causing havoc in countries including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, northern Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Mozambique, it said..."
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Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-04-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China is willing to engage with “all parties” to ease the crisis in neighbouring Myanmar and is not taking sides, the Chinese government’s top diplomat, State Councillor Wang Yi, said on Sunday. Beijing has said the situation in Myanmar, where the military seized power last month, was “absolutely not what China wants to see” and has dismissed social media rumours of Chinese involvement in the coup as nonsense. “China is ... willing to contact and communicate with all parties on the basis of respecting Myanmar’s sovereignty and the will of the people, so as to play a constructive role in easing tensions,” Wang told a news conference on the sidelines of China’s annual gathering of parliament. While Western countries have strongly condemned the Feb. 1 coup, China has been more cautious, emphasising the importance of stability. China nonetheless agreed to a United Nations Security Council statement that called for the release of elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other detainees and voiced concern over the state of emergency. “China has long-term friendly exchanges with all parties and factions in Myanmar, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), and friendship with China has always been the consensus of all sectors in Myanmar,” Wang said. The NLD is Suu Kyi’s party. Its landslide November victory in national elections has been ignored by the junta. “No matter how the situation in Myanmar changes, China’s determination to promote China-Myanmar relations will not waver, and China’s direction of promoting China-Myanmar friendly cooperation will not change,” Wang said. On Saturday, an Israeli-Canadian lobbyist hired by Myanmar’s junta told Reuters that the generals are keen to leave politics after their coup and seek to improve relations with the United States and distance themselves from China. Some of the protests against the coup, which have drawn hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets, have taken place outside the Chinese embassy in Yangon, with protesters accusing Beijing of supporting the junta..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-03-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-03-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Amid the worsening domestic COVID-19 situation, Myanmar’s election in November 2020 brought a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite voting restrictions in parts of Rakhine and Shan states, the election was overall a step in the right direction, and the NLD increased its majority in the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) and Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house). The show of support at the ballot box for the NLD indicates the domestic popularity of Aung San Suu Kyi. Her defence of Myanmar’s handling of the Rohingya crisis at the International Court of Justice — and in many other international venues — was dubbed a betrayal of democracy and human rights by Western media, but it boosted her domestic aura as a defender of Myanmar. The priorities for the NLD government are no doubt domestic. The COVID-19 pandemic ransacked Myanmar’s economy and the domestic poverty rate skyrocketed. High on the government’s agenda is creating employment for millions of Myanmar workers who lost their jobs during the pandemic. The country still faces one of the worst humanitarian crises with the Rohingya issue which battered its international image and led to economic sanctions. Myanmar’s domestic peace process has also stalled and militarised conflicts in the north of the country have no end in sight. To deal with these issues, China is the most indispensable country for Aung San Suu Kyi and her government. As one of the manufacturers of COVID-19 vaccines and with a promise to contribute to the accessibility and affordability of vaccines in developing countries, Myanmar needs to work with China to vaccinate its population. Vaccine diplomacy was high on the agenda during a visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Myanmar in early January 2021, despite Naypyidaw making the first order of 30 million doses from India. As the largest trading partner and second largest FDI source for Myanmar, the continued economic growth and opening up of the Chinese market will also have positive reverberations. Although Myanmar society overall holds anti-Chinese sentiments, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government still sees the benefits of engaging in close economic cooperation with China. Initiatives such as the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor aim to further connect the two economies. With the recent signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Myanmar is also set to benefit from further relaxing of trade restrictions among its major trading partners. The government is optimistic that participating in RCEP will help Myanmar gain access to a large market for its exports, and that there will also be opportunities for responsible, high-quality investment inflows. While Myanmar faces tremendous pressure from the West on the Rohingya issue, Myanmar’s Asian neighbours are hesitant to jump on the bandwagon. Only Malaysia and Indonesia — as the two Muslim-majority countries in ASEAN — have been more vocal. China is Myanmar’s strongest supporter on the Rohingya issue and is actively involved in facilitating negotiations between the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh. The protection China offers to Myanmar at international institutions is crucial. A quid pro quo is evident between the two countries with Myanmar offering support for China at the United Nations on Xinjiang and Hong Kong. This cooperative relationship will likely continue as both face similar pressure from the West..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2021-01-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China promised to continue to support Myanmar’s peace talks with ethnic minority groups and to boost its coronavirus aid on the first stop of the foreign minister’s six-day tour of Southeast Asia. During Monday’s meetings with President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, Wang Yi also urged Myanmar to speed up construction work on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor – a key element of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative. “China will support the new Myanmar government in revitalising the economy, improving people’s livelihoods and accelerating the industrialisation process. We hope that both sides will work together to effectively implement the agreement on building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and promote connectivity at the western, northern and eastern ends of the corridor,” Wang told the president, according to a report by state news agency Xinhua. China shares more than 2,100km (1,300 miles) of border with Myanmar’s north, an area that has long been troubled by the fighting between government and ethnic minority rebel groups, making China a crucial player in peace talks between the government armies and ethnic armed groups. Wang said Beijing would do whatever it could to support the peace negotiations, adding: “China supports Myanmar government’s commitment to national reconciliation in the country … and will continue to provide assistance within its capabilities, as well as upholding justice and safeguarding Myanmar’s legitimate rights and interests in the international arena.” In response, Win Myint told Wang that Myanmar was keen to cooperate with China on vaccine distribution and would continue to support Beijing’s positions on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, according to Xinhua..."
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2021-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Infrastructure is high on China’s agenda in Myanmar, but it is also making headway in other important sectors.
Description: "A year after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to Myanmar, Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to arrive in the capital Naypyidaw today for a two-day official visit. The trip to Myanmar follows an African tour that has taken Wang to Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana, Tanzania, and the Seychelles. The agenda of his Myanmar trip is yet to be confirmed, but the ongoing progress of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), along with COVID-19 diplomacy, is very likely to be high on the list. First signed between China and Myanmar in 2018, the CMEC envisions the construction of a network of railways, roads, ports, and new cities running overland from China’s Yunnan province to the sea. Although numerous memorandum of agreements related to CMEC and Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have been in place for years, progress has lagged considerably. Indeed, progress on the CMEC seems to have been slowed further by Beijing’s pandemic-induced belt-tightening and the unprofitable nature of many of the infrastructure projects that fell under its aegis. This had prompted Beijing to adopt an alternative model of engagement in Myanmar: one that is more economically feasible, and that leverages its strategic assets, innovation, and technology to expand its sphere of influence, rather than focusing on infrastructure alone. This is consistent with China’s recently announced Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), which signaled a significant shift in China’s economic and development strategy toward increased domestic consumption. This shift has been prompted by its trade tensions with the United States and the opportunities and challenges offered by a post-COVID-19-world. This re-calibration may impact Beijing’s ability to realize the CMEC as it is currently envisioned..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Beijing will "pressingly" deliver COVID-19 vaccines to Myanmar to help its Asian neighbor control the pandemic, according to Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Monday. Just on Sunday alone, Myanmar's Ministry of Health and Sports reported 555 more COVID-19 cases, bringing the tally to 130,604. "I believe the friendship between China and Myanmar will deepen further through test of the COVID-19 pandemic," Wang told Myanmar President U Win Myint in Nay Pyi Taw, capital of Myanmar. The Chinese diplomat has just embarked on his six-day Southeast Asia tour, just a day after his Africa visit. On his part, the Myanmar president first spoke highly of the relationship between the two countries. "Although in time of a global pandemic, [Wang] still came visit as one of the first [diplomats]," he said. He also vowed to deepen the ties and is willing to cooperate with Beijing in sectors including COVID-19 vaccine, culture and tourism..."
Source/publisher: CGTN (China)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Steady Continued cooperation on regional integration between China and Myanmar gave a sharp contrast to India, which turned a blind eye toward such development trend and let go opportunties, a Chinese analyst said on Monday. The comments came after China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on Sunday to conduct feasibility study of a 650-kilometer-long railway linking Mandalay, the country's second largest city in Myanmar's central region, with Kyaukphyu, the major town in Myanmar's Rakhine state. Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told the Global Times that the signing of the MoU is an important step toward a very significant project under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. When the concept of the corridor was first introduced in 2013, India was initially involved in the regional integration project, only to withdraw further into the process. The continued development of the Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railway shows that regional integration is moving forward even as India, which could play a major part in the program, has chosen not to participate, Zhao said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Global Times" (China)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to arrive in Myanmar on Monday on a critical two-day visit. It is intended to further strengthen Chinese influence in the country, in light of the changing international dynamics in the region, amid fears that China's sway is beginning to wane. Beijing is increasingly concerned with a plethora of issues, including recent Indian and Japanese initiatives with Myanmar, which Beijing fears may prove to be to their detriment, but also to take stock of the continued economic cooperation, strengthen its support for the peace process and to boost China's support for Myanmar's battle to control the Covid pandemic. Mr Wang's primary purpose on this visit is to show China's unswerving support for the country and its civilian leader, the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi -- and to congratulate the National League for Democracy (NLD) on its landslide electoral victory. He will be the first international diplomat to visit Nay Pyi Taw in person since the elections last November. The visit seems to have been arranged at short notice -- and tagged onto Mr Wang's current trip to Africa. It is low-key and being handled discreetly, according to Myanmar government sources. Foreign diplomats believe this may reflect some discomfort on the part of Nay Pyi Taw at the visit, and what is seen as "vaccine diplomacy"..."
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Source/publisher: Bangkok Post (Thailand)
2021-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A long-running war and COVID-19 muddle development in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar.
Description: "Kyi Kyi Hnin sits beneath a fan on a bright morning in her village along the coast of Kyaukphyu, a township in Myanmar’s Rakhine State on the edge of the Indian Ocean. “The government just signs laws, but they are committing violations,” she says. “The government should consider the communities’ desires and interests.” Kyi Kyi Hnin is a local community organizer and her speech is quick and resolute: She knows the challenges facing Kyaukphyu and spends her days working to support local residents. Kyaukphyu is home to a cluster of busy fishing towns and villages. But in the past few years, the township has been thrown into the center of geopolitics, armed conflict and, more recently, Myanmar’s struggle against COVID-19. For months, the country recorded relatively few cases of the virus, until a new outbreak began in August with Rakhine at the epicenter. After the state capital, Sittwe, Kyaukphyu has recorded the most cases of any township in Rakhine for much of the outbreak..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-12-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Union government has unbundled a controversial Chinese-backed multibillion-dollar new city project across the Yangon River from Myanmar’s commercial hub and is finalizing the hiring of an international consultant to assist in the selection of a developer for the newly compartmentalized project. Known as the New Yangon City project, it is an element of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The CMEC will connect Yunnan province in China to Mandalay in central Myanmar, Yangon New City in the south and the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone in the west. The Yangon regional government-backed New Yangon Development Company (NYDC) initially signed a US$1.5-billion (2.03-trillion-kyat) framework agreement in 2018 with Beijing-based China Communications Construction Company, Ltd. (CCCC) to draw up a proposal for the infrastructure project. The 20,000-acre (nearly 8,100-hectare) New Yangon City project is slated to include five resettlement areas, two bridges, an industrial estate, and commercial and residential areas as well as related infrastructure. The Yangon government’s 2019 guidebook listing the city’s projects—the Yangon Project Bank— estimates the New Yangon City project’s total cost at $8 billion. However, the project has been a source of controversy due to its flood-prone location as well as CCCC’s involvement. The Hong Kong-listed, Chinese state-owned company has been accused of engaging in corruption and bribery relating to development deals in at least 10 countries in Africa and Asia. Since its formation, the NYDC has said that while CCCC was the frontrunner for the project, the selection process to find the developer would follow the so-called “Swiss Challenge” model, in which other candidate firms would be invited to beat CCCC’s bid. However, the huge amount of the initial investment required has all but deterred other investors. On Wednesday, a senior official familiar with the project told The Irrawaddy that the $1.5-billion project has been unbundled by the Union government due to the sheer scale of the mega-investment required, making it possible for other companies to join the Swiss Challenge..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The “Association of South-East Asian Nations” or “ASEAN” was formed from the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok on 8th August 1967 (as a successor to the Association of South-East Asia, “ASA” in 1961), and is just four years younger than the EEC (now the EU). ASEAN is now a grouping of ten geographically, culturally and politically diverse countries, although initially consisted only of those countries which avoided any socialist experimentation: Singapore/Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia. Most of the Mekong countries joined later: Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. ASEAN has 651 million people and a land mass of 4.5 million sq kms (50% larger than India and one-half the size of China), and a nominal GDP of US$ 3 trillion (on a PPP basis 4x higher at $13 trillion) and US$ 4,600 nominal GDP per capita. By comparison, the EU has twenty-eight countries, 513 million people, and an almost identical land area of 4.48 million sq kms, but it has a nominal GDP that is 7X higher than ASEAN at US$ 19 trillion (or $23 trillion translating to just 2X on a PPP basis), and a US$ 37,300 nominal GDP per capita. The likelihood is that ASEAN will narrow the gap between its nominal and PPP GDP over the next few years, generating substantial gains for investors. What is common to all ASEAN countries is the agricultural economic base (except for Singapore & Brunei) and their consequently more manageable workforces, their Chinese (mostly Fujian) diaspora business culture, and their Japanese/Taiwanese/Korean led industrial investment. The Mekong countries share a common Buddhist heritage, but are a mixture quasi-democratic, and factional 1-Party States. The oldest cultures in ASEAN, the Mekong countries are the least developed, due to their proximity to China and its socialist sphere of influence from 1950-1980. That proximity is now a positive as China embarks on its “Belt & Road” initiative and its manufacturers rush to avoid rising labour costs and US/China trade friction, diversifying production to Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Currently the former closed countries, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos, “continental ASEAN” or the old Indochina, are now leading ASEAN in growth from their lower economic bases, and after a temporary lapse in 2020, are all expected to be back to 6-7% growth rates in 2021..."
Source/publisher: "The Asia First Newsletter''
2020-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In the meetings, President Xi focussed on three main projects under the Belt and Initiative and part of the CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor). These were the New Yangon Project, the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port with the SEZ (the latter only to sweeten the deal and keep the Myanmar side interested) and the China-Myanmar Border Cooperation Zone. China in the mean time had already completed an oil pipeline project from Kunming to Kyaukpyu and also a gas pipe line between the two ports. The Gas pipe line was started in 2013 and the Oil Pipe line started functioning fro April 2017. The projects were rushed through despite local objections. The Gas and Oil pipe lines together with the Kyaukpyu deep sea port are ostensibly meant to develop the south western hinterland of China, but the real reasons were strategic. The Port would help China avoid the vulnerable straits of Malacca. The ongoing spat with United States and the countries in the region looking for strategic alliances like India with Australia, the need for an alternate route for safety and security of supplies to the Chinese hinterland has become critical to China. While the Chinese side initially pushed for a large project with an investment of over 7 Billion Dollars, the Myanmar side in its negotiations reduced the project to 1.3 billion and also increased Myanmar’s stake in the project to 30 percent. Even this amount is too big a sum for Myanmar and there were always fears that Myanmar by borrowing from Chinese Banks may get into a debt trap as it happened to Sri Lanka vis a vis Hambantota. While the deep Sea Port will only help China and not Myanmar, the deal was sweetened with a parallel project of a special economic Zone for which the stakes for the two sides are yet to be finalised. At that point of time, Myanmar was not aware of the possible spread of the deadly Virus unleashed by China. With the rapid spread of the Virus in other countries and the possibility of its economy being very adversely affected, Myanmar launched an Economy Relief Plan on April 27, 2020. It was an effort to meet the exigencies that surfaced in Myanmar after the Covid-19 (Wuhan Virus) was officially (though delayed) declared by WHO. The Plan consisted of 7 objectives or Goals, 10 Strategies, 30 Action Plans, and 76 Actions. Without going into full details of all actions contemplated we shall restrict ourselves to the seven goals. These included..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Sri Lanka Guardian" (Sri Lankan)
2020-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Artisans in Sagyin have carved out a living from marble for generations but some fear the dust that cloaks the village.
Description: "The fine white dust that shrouds much of his northern Myanmar village also covers sculptor Chin Win as he leans over a half-finished Buddha statue. "We are blessed to carve Buddha," he said at his stone workshop surrounded by the seven white hills that give Sagyin village its name, which means "marble" in Burmese. For generations, artisans in this part of Buddhist-majority Myanmar have carved out a living from the marble, fashioning mostly colossal Buddha statues to be sold in the nearby city of Mandalay or exported to neighbouring China and Thailand. Many of the several thousand villagers here earn a modest living from the marble mines, hauling the slabs down the hill, carving them into statues, or exporting them overseas. Burmese marble, which ranges from pure white to bluish grey, is prized for its hardness and texture. A 45-tonne slab can sell for $40,000. In Sagyin, specks of the stone are used for everything from brushing teeth to washing clothes. "We grew up breathing the dust," said Chin Win, 35, who has been carving statues since he was 11 years old. "We use it as toothpaste, for soap powder, lipstick." The stone used to be chiselled by hand. Now, much of the work is done with machines. "I was born in this village and for generations, this is what we have done: the men work on marble carving and the women work in the marble mines or polish the marble statues," said 25-year-old Mya Lay, in a house fashioned from dry bamboo sheets, with a floor made of marble chippings..."
Source/publisher: "Al Jazeera" (Qatar)
2020-07-07
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is the key to China's fast development and its increasingly important role in the world economy, a renowned Myanmar expert has said. Under CPC's leadership, China has become the world's second largest economy and successfully transformed from a planned economy to a socialist market one, Monywa Aung Shin, member of the Central Committee of Myanmar's ruling National League for Democracy and editor-in-chief of D-wave Journal, told Xinhua in a recent interview. "As far as I see, China plays a growing role in the world economy and becomes a fastest growing country, thanks to the leadership of the party," said Aung Shin. Highlighting the concerted efforts of the party's leadership and the Chinese people in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Aung Shin said he is in favor of the CPC's political practice, namely the "people-centered governance." During the pandemic, the Chinese government has presented a prompt response and strenuous efforts by sending health personnel to the frontlines and building make-shift hospitals, said Aung Shin. "As the people trusted and strictly followed the guidance of the government, the epidemic was contained in a short time, which portrayed the unity of the people," he said. With the notion of "a community with a shared future," China shared its firsthand experience and provided medical assistance to neighboring countries during the pandemic, which makes the idea more meaningful, Aung Shin said. Aung Shin also expressed his belief that China will achieve its goal of poverty elimination. "Since poverty, somehow, relates to education, health, social development and employment opportunities, China has been making endeavors to fight for poverty eradication not only in China but also in its neighboring countries including Myanmar," the expert said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Belt & Road Initiative, Shweli River
Sub-title: The waters of the Shweli river in northeastern Myanmar have turned red, prompting concerns about pollution along a major corridor of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Residents and politicians blame Chinese factories upstream, raising questions about accountability for the impacts of cross-border development.
Topic: Belt & Road Initiative, Shweli River
Description: "Local reports say a river that forms part of the China-Myanmar border has turned red, prompting major concerns about pollution and accountability along a key trade route for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure and industry plan. The Shan Herald reported that the Shweli river, on the border between Myanmar’s Shan State and China’s Yunnan province, changed color around June 10. Local residents suspect the change is due to factories upstream in China dumping waste into the river. “We have never seen water color changes like this before. This is the first time I have ever seen the water red. I don’t know what China has done,” said local resident Sai Aye, who lives on the bank of the river in the border town of Muse. The Chinese portion of the Shweli river, known as the Ruili river in Chinese and Nam Mao in indigenous Shan, is lined with factories that process sugar, paper, fish for canning and meat. The Shweli is a tributary of the Irrawaddy river, the largest river in Myanmar and the source of irrigation for much of the country’s agriculture. “I think a factory in China dumped polluted water into the river. We have already sent an opposition letter to China’s external affairs department in Shweli [Ruili] city in Yunnan province,” Sai Kyaw Thein, a Shan State parliamentarian for Muse, told the Shan Herald. “We already sent a water sample from the Shweli river to a laboratory in Mandalay.” Though the cause of the red color hasn’t been found, the possible pollution raises major questions about environmental regulations and accountability around the BRI in Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "ASEAN Today" (Singapore)
2020-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Police in southwest China's Yunnan Province cracked a drug trafficking case, apprehending eight suspects and seizing more than 166 kg of drugs, local authorities said Wednesday. On May 21, local police nabbed the first six suspects in the city of Baoshan, situated along the China-Myanmar border. Later, two other suspects were caught. Further investigation is underway. Yunnan is a major front in China's battle against drug crime, as it borders the Golden Triangle known for its rampant drug production and trafficking..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The draft bill is a step in the right direction, but falls short on screening the export of fossil fuel technologies.
Description: "In May, China’s energy authority announced a public consultation for a draft energy law, setting the agenda for “green, low-carbon” production and a “safe and efficient” energy system. The draft law, which has been 13 years in the making, is an omnibus bill that seeks to unify China’s diverse laws governing coal, renewables and energy conservation. Five years after the signing of the Paris Agreement, references in the bill that position it as a “response to climate change” are welcome. Unfortunately, the proposed legislation also specifies the need for further exploration of fossil fuel energy sources such as coal, oil and natural gas. This matters because under the Paris Agreement, China committed to peak carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 or earlier if possible. China is the largest public financer of fossil fuels, providing US$20.2 billion a year for oil and gas and US$4.4 billion for coal, according to a recent report on G20 financing. China also ranks as the world’s largest producer and investor in clean energy and while coal still occupies the top spot in the country’s energy mix, its share is declining. However, the country’s effort to reduce emissions is being undermined by a relaxation of coal-power restrictions, which has led to approximately 10 gigawatts of new approvals at home and the financing of coal projects overseas..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eco-Business" (Singapore)
2020-06-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A Chinese company is applying to conduct feasibility studies for a high-speed railway between Mandalay-Kyaukphyu, said U Nyi Nyi Swe, general manager of Myanma Railways.
Description: "The railway is part of a larger railway project connecting Muse to Mandalay. A memorandum of understanding for the railway was signed between the Myanmar government and China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group Co Ltd (CREEG) on October 22, 2018. “The Muse-Mandalay MoU includes applying for permission to conduct feasibility studies to build the railway from Mandalay to Kyaukphyu. The feasibility study takes two or three years,” U Nyi Nyi Swe said. The Chinese want to connect Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, where they will be developing an industrial zone and deepsea port, with Kunming in China via the Muse border town by building Kunming-Muse-Kyaukphyu express railroad. The route will also connect Mandalay with Yangon. U Ba Myint, managing director of Myanma Railways, said the project is expected to bring benefits in the form of increased border trade. He said the 431-km Muse-Mandalay high-speed railroad project, which will be built for trains to run at speeds of up to 160 km per hour, will cost around US$8.9 billion to build. The project is not expected to interfere with residents who live along the railway route, U Win Khant, permanent secretary of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, said during a recent press conference..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-06-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The strategically vital Mekong subregion has been gaining salience in Beijing’s strategic calculations as China faces growing pushback from the US and other countries. The global pandemic appears to be consolidating a few trends in China’s ties with the Mekong nations. In this emerging scenario, it is likely that China will keep its focus on the Mekong subregion in the post-COVID-19 period. Cooperative partnerships with some countries have been further deepening, while China’s “mask diplomacy” has raised concern among citizens who want their governments to adopt a more cautious approach and there have been new factors that have been added to existing difficult relationships often viewed through the confrontational lens. Apart from China-ASEAN cooperation in engaging with the Mekong subregion, Beijing has been using the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)–––a subregional cooperation mechanism jointly established by Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam–––in engaging with the subregion in the fight against the global pandemic. In February, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Vientiane, Laos, to participate in the fifth LMC foreign ministers’ meeting where he called for “concerted efforts” to fight against the COVID-19 epidemic. The global pandemic provided Cambodia and China to further consolidate their cooperative partnership. During Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit to China in early February at a time when “anti-Chinese sentiments” were rising has been interpreted as demonstrating “solidarity” and China-Cambodia relations has described as “a model” for neighbourhood diplomacy..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)" (India)
2020-06-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "President Xi Jinping has called for efforts to continue the tough fight against drugs and make new progress in drug control. Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, said that drug problems at home and abroad, as well as related crimes, both online and offline, pose serious threats to people's lives and health and to social stability, therefore, unremitting, decisive and thorough anti-drug efforts should be continued. Noting the nation's tough stance against drugs, he ordered Party committees and governments at all levels to adhere to the concept of people-centered development, improve the governance system on drug control and deepen international anti-drug cooperation to make greater contributions to maintaining social harmony and stability and protecting the people and their livelihoods. Xi gave the instructions to a conference held on Tuesday to commend organizations and individuals engaged in the nation's anti-drug work. The conference, which was held in Beijing via video and teleconference, recognized the prominent contributions of 100 organizations and 100 individuals to drug control in China since 2015. It was held ahead of the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, which falls annually on June 26..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Chinadaily" (China)
2020-06-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When Myanmar announced its seven-point economic relief plan to mitigate the economic impact of COVID-19 in late April, one item immediately raised eyebrows among China analysts in the country. The initiative’s third main objective is stated as “Easing the Impacts on Laborers and Workers”, and one of the ways the government intends to achieve this is putting laid-off laborers and returning migrants to work on “Implementation of Labor-Intensive Community Infrastructure Projects” before the end of this year. At first glance, it seems a worthy goal, as it aims to benefit workers affected by the coronavirus pandemic. However, with several megaprojects in the planning stages as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), experts are concerned that the COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP)’s emphasis on reviving the economy will see Myanmar push ahead with the implementation of BRI projects without properly assessing their risks in terms of conflict sensibility, potential for incurring unsustainable debt and commercial viability, among other criteria. Adding to their worries, shortly after the plan was unveiled, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai and Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung met to discuss how to move forward on the development of China’s ambitious projects in Myanmar in the context of the CERP. The New Yangon City; Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and Industrial Zone; and China-Myanmar Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone projects—all of which were agreed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January—were among those discussed at the meeting..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "New Delhi: Myanmar government’s discomfort with China is on the rise. After Myanmar’s auditor general in a startling announcement cautioned government officials about continued reliance on Chinese loans, the Myanmar government has formed a tribunal to investigate irregularities surrounding a controversial China-backed city development project near the Thai border in Karen State. The project has been criticised due to a lack of transparency, land confiscations, confusion over the scale of construction and the growing influx of Chinese money as well as suspected illicit activity and local concerns about the social impacts of casino businesses, according to a report in leading Myanmar English media The Irrawaddy. “The planned mega resort and city expansion project is controlled by the Karen State Border Guard Force, a Myanmar military-backed armed group led by Colonel Chit Thu and formerly known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA),” according to the media report..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Topic: casinos, China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs, Colonel Chit Thu, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Development, Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), Karen State, Karen State Border Guard Force, Land Rights, Myanmar Yatai Company, Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko, U Tin Myint, Yatai International Holding Group (IHG)
Topic: casinos, China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs, Colonel Chit Thu, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Development, Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), Karen State, Karen State Border Guard Force, Land Rights, Myanmar Yatai Company, Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko, U Tin Myint, Yatai International Holding Group (IHG)
Description: "The Myanmar government has formed a tribunal to investigate irregularities surrounding a controversial China-backed city development project near the Thai border in Karen State. The planned mega resort and city expansion project is controlled by the Karen State Border Guard Force, a Myanmar military-backed armed group led by Colonel Chit Thu and formerly known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The project is a collaboration between a Hong Kong-based company called Yatai International Holding Group (IHG) and Col. Chit Thu, officially dubbed the “Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone.” The project has sparked criticisms due to a lack of transparency, land confiscations, confusion over the scale of construction and the growing influx of Chinese money as well as suspected illicit activity and local concerns about the social impacts of casino businesses. At a press conference in Naypyitaw on Monday, Union government office Deputy Minister U Tin Myint said he has been selected as chair of an investigative tribunal for the Shwe Kokko project. U Tin Myint said that the team has yet to make a site visit due to COVID-19, but he has instructed officials from the Karen State government, the General Administration Department and the Settlement and Land Records Department to inspect conditions of the project on the ground..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Beijing also terms Huawei executive’s detention ‘serious political incident’ after release of Canadian spy agency report
Description: "China said Monday it has resumed work on bilateral projects with Myanmar as the two nations move past the novel coronavirus pandemic. “China and Myanmar have launched a fast lane to facilitate essential travel and resume work and production,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lijian Zhao, addressing a news conference in Beijing. China had closed its borders with Myanmar in April amid the coronavirus pandemic. The closure was scheduled to last for two months until June 24. “Personnel at critical posts at oil and gas, electricity and infrastructure projects have already traveled both ways and resumed work,” Lijian said. The coronavirus was first detected in China’s Wuhan city last December, from where it spread to at least 188 countries and regions and has affected more than 7.96 million people worldwide. Over 3.8 million people have recovered so far, according to figures compiled by US-based Johns Hopkins University. The pandemic has so far claimed more than 434,000 lives. The US, Brazil, Russia and India are currently the worst-hit countries. Meanwhile, slamming the case against Chinese telecom giant Huawei’s chief financial officer as a “serious political incident,” Zhao urged Canada “to release Meng Wanzhou at once.” Referring to a two-page report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Lijian said: “It fully reveals the political intention of the US to deliberately oppress Chinese high-tech companies like Huawei, and Canada is acting as an accomplice.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Anadolu Agency" (Ankara)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s Ministry of Construction has unveiled four projects to be implemented under China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including expressways, a bridge and a tunnel, which will form crucial links in trade routes with China. Speaking at a press conference on Monday in Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw, Deputy Construction Minister U Kyaw Lin said the government had agreed with China to implement the four “early-harvest projects” as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a key component of the BRI. The four projects were not among those announced when the two countries drew up their initial agreements on implementing BRI projects. During the 2nd BRI Forum in Beijing last year, which was attended by Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar and China signed a document referring to nine early-harvest infrastructure projects under the CMEC. However, the only details released by the government at that time concerned three economic cooperation zones in Kachin and Shan states and the Muse-Mandalay railway project. Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China establishing the CMEC in 2018. The 1,700-kilometer-long corridor will connect Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province, with Myanmar’s major economic hubs, linking first to Mandalay in central Myanmar before branching east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukphyu SEZ in Rakhine State. The ministry said it plans to construct an expressway connecting Muse in Shan State with Mandalay via Tigyaing in eastern Sagaing Region. Muse, which sits across the border from Yunnan province, is the largest trade portal between the two nations. Mandalay is central Myanmar’s commercial center and the country’s second-largest city. The expressway is envisioned as another lifeline for China-Myanmar border trade. China earlier announced plans to implement the 431-km-long Muse-Mandalay Railway, which would connect with China’s rail network in Ruili, Yunnan province across the border from Muse. The railway is also expected to be a key part of the economic corridor..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar have opened a "fast-track lane" for essential personnel exchanges, a foreign ministry spokesperson said here on Monday. Zhao Lijian said at a press briefing that a number of necessary personnel in oil and gas, power, and infrastructure projects will be exchanged between the countries in a two-way, return-to-work initiative known as a "fast-track lane". This is in line with the aim of building a China-Myanmar community with a shared future and conducive to promoting construction of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and economic and social development of the two countries, he said. China and Myanmar share a common border of more than 2,200 kilometers. Zhao said that since the COVID-19 outbreak, the two sides have strictly implemented epidemic prevention and controls, and cooperated closely in fighting the epidemic. This followed the consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries in mapping out the characteristics of bilateral relations. "The two sides have established joint prevention and control mechanisms between border provinces and up until now, the two-way zero exchange of the epidemic has been maintained," Zhao said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A health worker at the checkpoint in Lwe Je on the Chinese border in Kachin State tested positive for COVID-19 on Thursday and nearly 150 people who had contact with her have been traced, according to health officials. On Thursday, 12 positive cases were reported and the 24-year-old midwife from Kachin State, who had no travel history or reported contact with coronavirus patients, was among them, the Ministry of Health and Sports said. According to Kachin State’s COVID-19 control and emergency response committee, the midwife was part of the health team at Lwe Je border in May and early June to perform medical checkups for returnees from China. “We think she was infected by someone returning from China as she has no history of travel or contact with a known patient. Currently, she is in good health and was taken to the general hospital in Bhamo Township,” said U Tint Naing, the deputy director of the committee. Swabs from 20 health workers at the border were sent for lab tests on June 4 with the midwife testing positive on June 11. Now 21 health, administration and immigration staff who worked with her at the border are being held in quarantine. The midwife is from Wein Kham village in Momauk Township in Kachin State. She has also vaccinated children in the village and went to Momauk hospital for training. Since she worked at Lwe Je checkpoint – through which over 10,000 migrant workers have returned from China since April – it is suspected the midwife was infected by a silent carrier. The committee said approximately 150 people in contact with her were being traced and 71 swabs were being taken on Friday. “Swabs were already taken from 71 people and more will come. We will send swabs to the Yangon lab. Home quarantine for the children and her family in Wein Kham and Momauk has already been ordered,” U Tint Naing added..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-12
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar government says it is receiving help from a Swiss company to scrutinize a China-backed study on Beijing’s ambitious railway project to connect Mandalay with Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province in southwestern China. At a press conference in Naypyitaw on Wednesday, Myanma Railways Managing Director U Ba Myint said the Swiss company has already stepped in as a third party to review the feasibility study for the Muse-Mandalay Electric Railway, submitted by China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEG). The managing director did not disclose the name of the Swiss company, but said the company will cover all their own expenses for the review. The US$8.9 billion Muse-Mandalay Railway project is part of the backbone of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is itself part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s grand Asia-Pacific infrastructure plan. The Muse-Mandalay Railway is expected to be a key part of the economic corridor and connect with the Chinese rail network at the Chinese border town of Ruili in Yunnan Province. The railway an initial part of the strategic China-Myanmar High Speed Railway, which aims to connect Kyaukphyu in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State with Kunming via Muse, in Shan State. In 2011, Beijing and Naypyitaw first signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to build a railway from Ruili to Kyaukphyu via Muse. The entire rail line was to run 810 km. However, the government of then-president U Thein Sein suspended the project due to strong local objections and concerns about unfair terms, including interest rates and revenue sharing as well as security. The agreement expired in 2014..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s auditor general in a startling announcement has cautioned government officials about continued reliance on Chinese loans both pre-BRI and BRI loans that come with high rates of interest. Myanmar's current national debt stands at about $10 billion, of which $ 4 billion is owed to China, Auditor General Maw Than told a news conference in Naypyidaw on Monday. This can push Myanmar to debt trap like Sri Lanka and some African states. "The truth is the loans from China come at higher interest rates compared to loans from financial institutions like the World Bank or the IMF [International Monetary Fund]," he said. "So, I would like to remind the government ministries to be more restrained in using Chinese loans." The country has to repay as much as $500 million annually to China in both principal and interest. Analysts have pointed out that Myanmar’s involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) meant that it continued to take new debts to finance its huge infrastructure projects..."
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-06-13
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Chinese government has donated the fourth batch of medical supplies to Myanmar to assist in the fight against COVID-19, according to a release from the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar. The medical supplies, including disposable masks, N95 masks, googles and personal protective equipment (PPEs), were handed over to the Myanmar side on Monday. Noting that Monday marked the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Myanmar, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai said he hoped that the donation could support Myanmar's efforts in fighting against the disease, adding that China is willing to strengthen anti-pandemic cooperation and other pragmatic cooperation with Myanmar to benefit peoples of the two countries. During the handover ceremony, Myanmar's Union Minister for Health and Sports Myint Htwe expressed gratitude for the Chinese government for donating medical supplies as well as sending medical expert teams earlier to help Myanmar in the prevention, treatment and control of the COVID-19 pandemic. As of Tuesday morning, Myanmar has reported 244 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with six deaths, according to latest figures released by the Health and Sports Ministry..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-09
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar is planning to build new high-quality oil refineries so as to reduce reliance on the oversea market and to fulfill the local demands for oil products, an official from the Ministry of Electricity and Energy said on Monday. "Medium oil refineries will be built in Myanmar's central region through China-Myanmar crude oil pipeline and new Integrated Refinery and Petrochemical Complex will be constructed near Yangon region under joint venture (JV) and public-private partnership (PPP) system," said Tin Maung Oo, permanent secretary of the ministry, at a press briefing. Plans are underway to provide technical assistance and issue temporary licenses to the current operating mini oil refineries with daily production of 3,000 to 30,000 gallons of crude oil for the production of high-quality oil products, he said. The ministry has already issued operating licenses to 170 private businessmen and also allowed 521 oil refineries to operate so far, he added. Myanmar's crude oil production recorded 4.297 million barrels in FY 2016-17 and 3.168 million barrels have been produced so far in FY 2019-20 while natural gas production registered 7.67 trillion cubic feet in FY 2016-17 and 670 billion cubic feet have been manufactured so far in FY 2019-20..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Xi said he is ready to work with Win Myint to steer the bilateral relationship forward along the path of building a China-Myanmar community with a shared future and allow the two peoples to be good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good "Paukphaw" forever.
Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping said Monday that relations between China and Myanmar now stand at a key juncture that inherits the past and ushers in the future as the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century. In an exchange of congratulatory messages with his Myanmar counterpart, U Win Myint, to celebrate the 70th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties, Xi said he attaches great importance to the development of China-Myanmar relations. Xi said he is ready to work with Win Myint to steer the bilateral relationship forward along the path of building a China-Myanmar community with a shared future and allow the two peoples to be good neighbors, good friends, good partners and good "Paukphaw" forever. He suggested that the two sides enhance bilateral high-level exchanges, consolidate political mutual trust, deepen practical cooperation in various fields, and strengthen coordination and cooperation within multilateral frameworks..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar Union Minister for International Cooperation U Kyaw Tin has extended his support for China's national security legislation for Hong Kong, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar said earlier this week. In a recent teleconference with Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai, U Kyaw Tin said that Myanmar has strictly adhered to the one-China principle and consistently supported the "one country, two systems" principle, holding that Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China, according to a statement released by the embassy on Monday. A sovereign state has the right to take necessary preventive measures such as proper legislation to safeguard its sovereignty, peace, stability and security, the minister said. U Kyaw Tin expressed his confidence that under the "one country, two systems" principle, the people of Hong Kong will continue to enjoy peace, stability and prosperity. Chinese lawmakers voted overwhelmingly at the 13th National People's Congress, China's top legislature, last week to approve the decision on establishing and improving the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to safeguard national security..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-06-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Export through Lweje and Kampaiti borders to restart, having previously been confined to Muse border
Description: "Trade restrictions between Myanmar and China are gradually being lifted, with Global New Light of Myanmar reporting the Lweje and Kampaiti borders have been reopened for export, after they were temporarily closed to avoid the risk of spreading Covid-19. In the midst of the restrictions, the Muse border remained open for the export of watermelon, muskmelon, mango and plum, however it was inundated with growers wanting to gain access, which reportedly caused lengthy delays, reducing fruit quality and resulting in higher costs overall. China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine has provided clearance for the export of mangosteen, rambutan and lychee to commence, in addition to existing exports. Myanmar’s Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation has also sent information on tissue-culture bananas, limes, pineapples, avocados, and pomelos to China for trade access. Asiafruit is now available to read on your phone or tablet via our new app. Download it today via the App Store or Google Play and receive a two-week free trial along with access to previous editions..."
Source/publisher: "Fruitnet"
2020-06-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When Myanmar’s military regime began opening up the country politically and economically in 2010, one motive was to alleviate the country’s overreliance on China. Ten years down the road, in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the threat of new Western sanctions triggered by human rights violations against the Muslim Rohingya minority, China’s influence appears hardly diminished. When the quasi-civilian government under former president Thein Sein took over from the military junta in 2011, it launched a plethora of reforms to liberalise Myanmar’s economy and its political system. Driven partly by the desire of rapprochement with the West, the new administration introduced free elections, restored civic and political rights and released political prisoners. In response, Western nations started to re-engage with Myanmar — lifting sanctions, writing off debt and disbursing development aid again. On the economic front, signature reforms included the Foreign Investment Law of 2012, which facilitated the flow of foreign capital into Myanmar. The state’s monopoly in the telecom sector was ended and licenses issued to three foreign providers. In 2014, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law was introduced to spearhead business environment improvements. The government also liberalised international trade by lifting state controls, easing licensing requirements and opening previously closed sectors to private sector trading. The economic reform momentum slowed down when a new government led by the former opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), took over in 2016. Under the leadership of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, its initial focus was on peace, national reconciliation and cementing the democratic transition. In October 2016, the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State pushed economic policy-making further to the back seat, disenchanting the business community..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2020-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: With the economy taking a battering, Myanmar will have less room to negotiate over big infrastructure projects
Description: "The economic blow dealt by the coronavirus pandemic may put Myanmar in a weaker position as it negotiates with China over a series of large infrastructure projects, analysts have said. Myanmar plays a key role in China’s global Belt and Road project, a strategy to deepen trade and economic ties with over 60 countries by building railways, ports, bridges, roads and other infrastructure. Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke with President Win Myint by phone this week about pushing ahead with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which will link China’s landlocked Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal via a deep sea port in Rakhine state. Some observers believe the call signals that China intends to exploit the coming economic slowdown to push ahead with projects on its own terms. “Myanmar was very cautious about dealing with these projects before,” said Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, a China analyst at the Yangon-based Institute for Strategy and Policy. “But Covid-19 has compromised that and the projects are going to get momentum here because there aren’t a lot of options,” she added. Myanmar’s GDP is likely to drop by 2-3% as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, with the poor set to be hardest hit, the World Bank warned..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2020-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: " Xie Jian left Myanmar more than a month ago, but still gets messages from his peers in the Southeast Asian country asking about the prevention and control of COVID-19. "I get inquiries about how to enhance prevention and control and how to apply traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) in the fight against COVID-19," the TCM expert who went to Myanmar to fight the epidemic said. Xie was part of a group of 12 medics from China who were sent to the neighboring country to help deal with the outbreak in April. During their 15-day stay there, the medics held more than 60 training sessions in more than 40 hospitals and laboratories, interacting with experts and local medical staff. One of the major responsibilities of Xie, a doctor with the Yunnan Provincial Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medicine in southwest China's Yunnan Province, was to share his experience in the fight against coronavirus through TCM. "Through training and communication, we showed how to fight the epidemic with TCM and its effects," he said, adding that officials and medics were quite interested in how TCM battles the disease. "Experts in Myanmar believe that traditional medicine in Myanmar is similar to TCM, which could prevent or eradicate illnesses," Xie, the only TCM practitioner in the Chinese team, said. During the stay, the TCM medication he was carrying became quite popular, he said. Though a busy doctor, Xie did not hesitate to join the team when he heard China was sending medics to Myanmar. "Though my family was a little worried about the epidemic, they were quite supportive," Xie said. "It was an honor to join the team." Xie lauds relations between China and Myanmar. After the epidemic broke out in China, people from Myanmar sent help. When confirmed cases were reported in Myanmar, China increased support to the country. "As the two countries fight together, we can protect our people from the impact of COVID-19," he said. China donated a nucleic testing lab to Myanmar, the equipment for which was taken by the medical team to the country. China has so far donated more than 160,000 nucleic testing kits, over 3.97 million surgical masks and about 50,000 protective suits to Myanmar. After the epidemic broke out, authorities from Yunnan's Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture that borders Myanmar held a series of meetings with their counterparts in the neighboring country to discuss ways to battle the outbreak. They also donated medical supplies to Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-05-26
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Suu Kyi is now close to old adversary China while long-ruling military is skeptical of Beijing's intent ahead of pivotal polls
Description: "Elections are scheduled for November in Myanmar, and there is no indication so far that the polls will be postponed due to the Covid-19 crisis. Neither is there much doubt about the outcome. Most political observers believe that State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will win again, though not in the same landslide fashion as in 2015 as recent by-elections show she and her party have lost significant support in ethnic areas. But the bigger electoral question is how her party’s delicate relationship with the autonomous military will play out and in that context how her government’s ties to its powerful northern neighbor China will be portrayed and potentially politicized on the campaign trail. An entirely new paradigm has emerged in Myanmar, one where Suu Kyi is now seen as a trusted ally of Beijing and the military as a nationalistic bulwark against China’s strong advances. That’s a significant reversal, one that could have implications for stability in the lead-up to polls. When Suu Kyi was under house arrest during military rule or active in non-parliamentary politics, China viewed the long-time pro-democracy icon with suspicion. That was at least in part because her late British husband, a Tibetologist, maintained ties with many Tibetans in exile..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-05-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Burma Road (Chinese: 滇缅公路) was a road linking Burma with the southwest of China. Its terminals were Kunming, Yunnan, and Lashio, Burma. It was built while Burma was a British colony in order to convey supplies to China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Preventing the flow of supplies on the road helped motivate the occupation of Burma by the Empire of Japan in 1942. Use of the road was restored to the Allies in 1945 after the completion of the Ledo Road. Some parts of the old road are still visible today. The road is 717 miles (1,154 km) long and runs through rough mountain country.[2] The sections from Kunming to the Burmese border were built by 200,000 Burmese and Chinese laborers during the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and completed by 1938.[3][4] It had a role in World War II, when the British used the Burma Road to transport materiel to China before Japan was at war with the British. Supplies would be landed at Rangoon (now Yangon) and moved by rail to Lashio, where the road started in Burma. In July 1940, the British government yielded, for a period of three months, to Japanese diplomatic pressure to close down the Burma Road to supplies to China.[5]:299 After the Japanese overran Burma in 1942, the Allies were forced to supply Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalist Chinese by air. United States Army Air Force cargo planes, mainly Curtiss C-46s, flew these supplies from airfields in Assam, India, over "the hump", the eastern end of the Himalaya uplift.Under British command Indian, British, Chinese, and American forces, the latter led by General Joseph Stilwell, defeated a Japanese attempt to capture Assam and recaptured northern Burma. In this area they built a new road, the Ledo Road which ran from Ledo Assam, through Myitkyina and connected to the old Burma Road at Wandingzhen, Yunnan, China. The first trucks reached the Chinese frontier by this route on January 28, 1945..."
Source/publisher: YouTube via Way Back
2017-09-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Faced with the threat of a coronavirus pandemic which could have devastating effects in a country with poor health infrastructure, Myanmar’s government and many ethnic armed organisations have taken steps to put aside their ongoing conflict to fight a common enemy. Myanmar has so far tested more than 17,000 people for Covid-19 and identified 199 confirmed cases out of a population of 54 million. Along the country’s northeastern border with China, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), one of dozens of organisations which have been engaged in on-off conflict with the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) for decades, started making preparations against the coronavirus in February. It established a Covid-19 prevention committee, started importing test kits from Singapore and China, initiated social distancing policies and public health campaigns, and built handwashing stations and quarantine facilities. No cases have yet been reported in KIO-controlled areas but if they arise, patients will be sent to the KIO hospital in its headquarters of Laiza, which has 50 ICU beds and 10 ventilators. The KIO and Myanmar officials had no formal communication relating to Covid-19 response planning until April 27, when the government announced a committee to engage with certain ethnic armed organisations including the KIO to fight the pandemic..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar and Chinese authorities say traders are incurring losses due to restrictions at border gates and that field visits will be used to attempt to resolve the issues. Myanmar Trade Department Director General (DG) Min Min said, “Their Yunnan Province Commerce Department DG met with our Consul General in Kunming. They said that they would investigate this case through field visits. And also our ambassador to China said that they agreed to resolve this case through negotiations as soon as possible by meeting with the government departments concerned.” Minister of Economy and Commerce Dr. Than Myint met Chinese ambassador Mr Chan Hia on May 21 through a video conference call to resolve the issue of great losses suffered by Myanmar traders due to traffic jams at border trade posts. Similarly Myanmar consul general in Kunming, China reportedly met Yunnan Province Economy and Commerce Department DG in an attempt to resolve this issue. Currently three border trade posts are open for trade operations on Sino-Myanmar border but the Chinese side does not allow Myanmar drivers to enter their country so that the Chinese drivers have to replace them in driving into their country which caused delays in trade activities and difficulties in goods flow into China..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed hope that Myanmar will speed up cooperation with China to implement its ambitious infrastructure projects in the country during a recent call with Myanmar President U Win Myint. In the phone conversation on Wednesday, Xi said that he is expecting the two sides will cooperate closely and speed up the implementation of projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that were agreed to during his visit to Myanmar earlier this year. During Xi’s visit to Myanmar, both sides agreed to speed up the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) backbone projects including the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in western Rakhine State, New Yangon City in Myanmar’s commercial capital and Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zones in Shan and Kachin states. He branded all three projects as crucial pillars of the CMEC that are needed to deepen “result-oriented BRI cooperation” and move from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” of building the CMEC. In January, the two sides inked a concession agreement and shareholders’ agreement for Kyaukphyu SEZ, a letter of intent on the development of Yangon City and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to accelerate negotiations around the Ruili-Muse Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone. Among the backbone projects, the Kyaukphyu SEZ is crucial for China, as it is expected to boost development in China’s landlocked Yunnan Province and provide China with direct access to the Indian Ocean, allowing its oil imports to bypass the Strait of Malacca. The two sides signed an agreement on CMEC in 2018 and the corridor is part of the BRI, Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy project. Unveiled in 2013, the international plan is also known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The project aims to build a network of roads, railroads and shipping lanes linking at least 70 countries from China to Europe, passing through Central Asia, the Middle East and Russia and fostering trade and investment..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping said Wednesday that China stands ready to work with Myanmar and other countries to continue to support the World Health Organization (WHO) playing a leading role in the global battle against the COVID-19 pandemic. In a phone conversation with his Myanmar counterpart, U Win Myint, Xi also called for concerted efforts to firmly uphold international fairness and justice as well as the basic norms in international relations, and jointly win the battle for global public health. Recalling that after the coronavirus disease broke out in China, the Myanmar government and all sections of society extended a helping hand to the Chinese side, Xi said the outbreak in Myanmar is pulling at the heartstrings of the Chinese people. The Chinese side has donated multiple batches of anti-epidemic supplies to Myanmar and sent two groups of medical experts to fight side by side with Myanmar medical workers, he added. That, he pointed out, has fully demonstrated the "Paukphaw" (fraternal) friendship of standing together and helping each other between the people of the two countries, and vividly illustrated the spirit of a community with a shared future that features China and Myanmar sticking together through thick and thin. China will continue to provide firm support and as much assistance as its capacity allows for the Asian neighbor in line with the latter's needs, Xi said, adding that he is confident that the Myanmar people will eventually overcome the epidemic..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-05-21
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-22
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Description: "China will continue to support Myanmar and Bangladesh to fight the COVID-19 pandemic at its best in terms of medical supplies and teams of medics based on their needs, Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Wednesday during separate phone calls with Myanmar's President U Win Myint and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Xi pointed out that the government of Myanmar and various sectors of its society have supported China during the most crucial time of China's fighting against the COVID-19 pandemic. China has also donated a number of anti-epidemic medical materials to Myanmar and sent two batches of medical experts to fight side by side with Myanmar's medical staff, and China will continue to provide firm support and help within its capabilities based on Myanmar's needs. Xi stressed that this year marks the 70th anniversary of China and Myanmar's diplomatic relations, noting that he visited Myanmar in January and hopes that these two countries can work closely to implement the results of the visit..."
Source/publisher: "CCTV" (China)
2020-05-21
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: At present, fears that China is using the pandemic to exert excessive pressure and push through BRI projects in Myanmar are exaggerated.
Description: "With the COVID-19 pandemic past its peak in China, attention has turned to the Chinese government’s deployment of “COVID diplomacy.” This term frames how China’s government is sending medical supplies and personnel across the world — including to Myanmar — to build goodwill and show global leadership in fighting the pandemic. Some Southeast Asian observers say it is an overt propaganda campaign, with others going further and warning of the region’s acceptance of Chinese government soft power. For Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partners, some view China’s government are using such soft power to push through projects that may not be in the recipient’s best interests. In Myanmar, some saw Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai’s May 6 meeting with Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung regarding the implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project — which falls under the BRI — as an attempt to push such projects through. The discussions took place soon after Myanmar released its COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP), which was published on April 27. The CERP details the country’s short- and medium-term plan to deal with the economic impact of the pandemic and includes stipulations to expedite the solicitation of strategic infrastructure projects, as well as approve and disclose large investments by reputable international firms that are experiencing delays. For the time being in Myanmar, however, fears that China’s government is using the pandemic to exert excessive pressure and push through BRI projects are exaggerated. The suspicion surrounding Chen Hai’s meeting is questionable given that discussions were on projects for which MoUs had been signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January this year, the first such visit by a Chinese leader in 19 years. Indeed, the acceleration of the BRI in Myanmar was already underway before the global ramifications of the COVID-19 outbreak were known. Ahead of his arrival in Myanmar in January, Xi called for the “deepening of results-oriented Belt and Road cooperation and [to move projects] from a conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation in building the CMEC.” During Xi’s visit, the Kyaukphyu SEZ and deep-sea port, Myanmar-China border economic zones, and New Yangon City developments were described as the “three pillars” of the CMEC. These were the three projects reportedly discussed during Chen Hai’s May 6 meeting. Certainly, the Chinese government will be hoping to improve its image to ease BRI project implementation. Projects may be accelerated to mitigate the expected economic downturn in Myanmar. Yet, there has been no major shift in BRI project implementation because of the pandemic. Given the scale of BRI projects and importance to Myanmar’s economy, it would have been astonishing if such a meeting had not taken place soon after the CERP was released..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-05-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-21
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Description: "FOUR years ago I wrote a story about the Myanmar cattle industry with the heading “Myanmar’s Enigmatic Beef Cattle Industry: Please ring back in 2026.” I have just spent two weeks in Myanmar (formerly Burma) in mid-January 2020 and must review my predictions for the future of the cattle industry as a lot has happened in the last four years. In my first article I presented the following summary of the main problems that needed resolution before the live cattle trade with China could commence in earnest: Solve all the ethnic disputes across Myanmar to ensure free movement of people and trade goods throughout the country and across national borders; Eradicate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) which is endemic in Myanmar; Mechanise Burmese agriculture so that diesel hand tractors take the place of draft cattle; Convince the new Burmese government and general population that after their 54 year bitter struggle for democracy, embracing Chinese offers of trade and infrastructure will not automatically lead to a new form of domination by the overwhelming commercial and political muscle of China. You can put a line through the barriers listed above as they are all now resolved to a point where trade has already commenced in significant volumes. I was told by a number of sources that during the period of three months prior to our visit in January 2020 that the average daily live exports into China through the Shan state border crossing of Muse were in the order of 1000 slaughter cattle per day..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Beef Central"
2020-05-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-15
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Description: "Chinese authorities handed over 260 Myanmar workers returning from Wuhan and other provinces across China as well as detainees, said Thurein, administrator of Muse Township and chairman of the Township Covid-19 Prevention and Control Committee. “The returnees also included detainees. They have health certificates so we can roughly assume that they are free from disease. We will conduct necessary checks. For their quarantine, relevant townships will take responsibility. We will send them to respective townships if they are in good health with no body temperature,” he said. Chinese health authorities reportedly conducted health checks three times a day on the Myanmar nationals due to return home. Some were housed at detention centres and some at hotels or guesthouses. There are still a lot of Myanmar workers in China. “I went to China on August 31, 2019. I lived in Santon. In October I went to Hanchan. I arrived in Wuhan on November 11. The pandemic came not long after I started working there. So the factory had to close. Police arrived and I was arrested. They knew I was a Myanmar citizen. They took me to a police station and I had to have a blood test. In April, they took me to a detention centre. I was under detention for about a month. They came to me to conduct health checks three times a day. I didn’t hear Myanmar citizens were infected with the virus. There are still a lot of Myanmar nationals there. They have difficulty making money. They all want to go back home,” Aye Mar Khaing who worked at an air-conditioner factory..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
2020-05-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar inked dozens of deals on Saturday to speed up infrastructure projects in the Southeast Asian nation, as Beijing seeks to cement its hold over a neighbor increasingly isolated by the West. But no major new projects were agreed during the two-day visit by President Xi Jinping, the first of any Chinese leader in 19 years. Analysts said Myanmar was generally cautious of investments by Beijing and was also being careful ahead of elections later this year. Still, Xi and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements shoring up key projects that are part of the flagship Belt and Road Initiative, China’s vision of new trade routes described as a “21st century silk road”. They agreed to hasten implementation of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, a giant infrastructure scheme worth billions of dollars, with agreements on railways linking southwestern China to the Indian Ocean, a deep sea-port in conflict-riven Rakhine state, a special economic zone on the border, and a new city project in the commercial capital of Yangon. They did not address a controversial $3.6 billion Beijing-backed mega dam, where work has been stalled since 2011, reflecting the contentiousness of Chinese investment in Myanmar, where many are uncomfortable with the sway Beijing has over its smaller neighbor..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-29
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Sub-title: Since 2010, China has been casting its eyes on Myanmar’s rich natural resources for commercial exploitation.
Description: "The Chinese “project of the century” — the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is a transcontinental network of roads, railways and ports, covering dams, mines and pipelines is causing major environmental deterioration in Myanmar. The BRI has profound consequences, involving soil contamination and erosion, air pollution, water pollution, habitat and wildlife loss. Some projects have been stalled due to local opposition, however it won’t be for long before China resumes these projects. Local activists in few instances have also been arrested and suppressed by the central government of Myanmar. Myanmar, also known as Suvarnabhumi in Sanskrit (Golden Land), has been famous for its natural resources since ancient times. The raw materials include oil, gas, minerals, timber, forest products and hydropower potential. China since 2010 has been casting its eyes on Myanmar’s rich natural resources for commercial exploitation. The issues of Myitsone dam project, Letpadaung copper mine project and Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar have been elaborated in detail below, highlighting China’s continuous defence of its wrongdoings in Naypyidaw..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)" (India)
2020-04-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe on Friday spoke over phone with Myanmar's defense minister Sein Win on COVID-19 prevention and control. Wei said China has passed through the most difficult period of the fight against the epidemic with arduous efforts and has further consolidated the positive trend in its epidemic prevention and control situation. The Chinese military is willing to strengthen anti-epidemic cooperation and border control with Myanmar to jointly curb the spread of the epidemic in the border areas, Wei said. Sein Win expressed gratitude to China for its support and assistance, saying that Myanmar highly appreciates and sincerely thanks China for effectively curbing the spread of the epidemic to its surrounding areas. Myanmar is willing to continue to maintain communication with China and further strengthen cooperation in epidemic prevention and control, he said..."
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-04-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A team of medical personnel from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Friday arrived in Myanmar's Yangon to assist the country in fighting against the COVID-19. Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai expressed his belief that the arrival of the Chinese military medics will assist in Myanmar's fight against COVID-19 and strengthen the bilateral friendship and cooperation between the two countries' militaries. Yangon Region Commander Maj-Gen Thet Pon told media that "we do believe that we could fight the disease through collaborations with the Chinese medical personnel in the fields of diagnosis and treatment for COVID-19." The Chinese military medics will join Myanmar's military medical personnel at the 1,000-bedded Defence Services General Hospital in Mingaladon township of Yangon, he said. Along with the team, a batch of medical supplies donated by China including medical masks, N95 and KN95 masks and laboratory equipment also arrived in Yangon on Friday. A 12-member medical expert team from China's Yunnan Province arrived in Myanmar as the first batch of medical assistance from China on April 8 and carried out collaborations with Myanmar's health authorities for two weeks, drawing on their frontline experiences in China..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-04-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar is ill-equipped to handle growing COVID-19 caseload on its own — it requires external help.
Description: "As the entire world is struggling with the COVID-19 crisis, Myanmar too is feeling the heat with 41 cases, including two cases reported on 13 April morning. Myanmar reported its first case sometime back around 24 March amidst growing scepticism about it’s apparent lack of cases despite sharing a 2,220-kilometer-long border with China. As may be recalled, China is where the pandemic emerged with the toll put at 83,305. Incidentally, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar while the virus containment initiatives were ongoing, back home. The visit was aimed at cementing bilateral relations further. However, amidst the current crisis, it’s important to re-assess how the relationship may unfold in the days to come. Till a week back, Myanmar had reported only a handful of cases with no trace of the virus migrating from China. This may be partly since the Hubei province, where the pandemic epicentre Wuhan is located, does not border Myanmar. Also, both the regions have less business dealings. However, a constant factor that stands tall amidst this humongous crisis is not to offend or annoy the heavy-weighted neighbour while it was facing its critical period. This move has been quite visible while receiving President Xi in Naypyidaw on 18 January. Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi consciously avoided the topic of the new virus so as not to put her guest in an embarrassing position..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)" (India)
2020-04-14
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A global research agency believed increasing pressure from the west on Myanmar’s alleged rights violations would push the country’s political and economic allegiance towards China, even if Myanmar seeks diversification of trade relations.
Description: "Fitch Solutions, a unit of the UK Fitch Group, said China looks likely to be the dominant foreign influence over the coming years with its already entrenched interests over Myanmar coupled with the possibility of news sanctions from the West due to human rights abuses. “The government’s inaction and repeated equivocation of the alleged abuses risks Myanmar becoming even more isolated on the international stage and also sanctions being expanded to include civilians and the economy,” said Fitch Solutions in its latest Outlook for Myanmar report released last week. The atrocities committed against the northern Rakhine Muslims has once again caught the international attention recently as the International Court of Justice in January imposed emergency “provisional measures” on Myanmar, ordering the country to preserve evidence of crimes and report to the court on measures taken to prevent genocide. The case derived from the military crackdown that resulted in more than 740,000 northern Rakhine Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh. The EU Commission’s decision in early February to partially withdraw Cambodia’s trade preference under the Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences initiative renewed worries about the EU removing Myanmar’s privileged status..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A total of 154 Myanmar citizens have so far returned from China with the help of the Myanmar embassy in Beijing following the spread of the coronavirus, the embassy reported. Some Myanmar citizens working in China made contact with the embassy saying that they wanted to return home in fear of COVID-19. The embassy sent 64 Myanmar citizens in the first batch to Chinshwehaw border gate on the Myanmar-China border on March 1. The group included 12 pregnant women and their husbands and those with poor health. Again, 59 people were sent in the second batch on March 2. Among them were 15 Chin nationals. The third batch was also sent on the same day. They were sent in accompany with two Chinese doctors and 14 police officers. The returnees will be handed over to Myanmar authorities after medical checkups, citizenship scrutiny, and other checks..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
2020-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping likes to travel big. His visit to Myanmar in January — the first for a Chinese leader in almost two decades — was no exception, capped off with no less than 33 bilateral agreements. However, the number alone overstates things. Some of the "agreements" merely saw Xi's entourage hand over feasibility studies for proposed projects. Many are not new. The number does, however, underscore the ever-tighter orbit Myanmar has been tracing around its giant neighbor since a detente with the West hit reverse over a massacre of the country's Muslim Rohingya minority in 2017. Crucially, a few of the deals advance China's plans to turn Myanmar into a secure new route to the Indian Ocean, valuable to Beijing for strategic and economic reasons. Whether China's coming spending splurge spells boom or bust for threadbare Myanmar — and peace or more war for its restive fringes — remains a worry. A pair of Chinese-built oil and gas pipelines already bisect Myanmar, from Kyaukphyu on the country's Bay of Bengal coastline to its border with China's landlocked Yunnan province. As part of Xi's signature Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor would add a rail link to the route, an industrial park along their shared border and — most critically, and controversially — a deep sea port at Kyaukphyu to anchor it all..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
2020-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Most of deals meant to speed ambitious Chinese plan to connect Asia with Africa, Europe via land and maritime networks
Description: "Myanmar and China on Saturday signed scores of deals, most of them set to spur China’s landmark Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious project to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks to boost trade and stimulate economic growth. On his first visit to China’s Southeast Asian neighbor, President Xi Jinping met Myanmar President Win Myint, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, and military chief Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing. Xi and Suu Kyi witnessed the signing of 33 agreements, protocols, and memoranda of understanding of infrastructure projects. The pacts include a concessional agreement for a deep sea port project in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state, giving Beijing strategic access to the Indian Ocean and cutting its reliance on maritime trade on the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. China also handed Myanmar a feasibility study for a high-speed railroad line connecting Kumin, China to the Rakhine port. The agreements also include developing a special economic zone along the two countries’ shared border and a new city next to Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city. Most of the deals are to strengthen the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a plan to connect China's Yunnan Province with Myanmar's second-largest city Mandalay, leading to Yangon and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. It is widely seen as a strategic economic corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Anadolu Agency" (Ankara)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Xi’s recent voyage to Myanmar spotlighted the broader question about whether some key regional states are getting more cautious in responding to Beijing’s initiative.
Description: "One of the storylines that ran throughout Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Myanmar in his current capacity was the inroads Beijing was hoping to make with respect to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the focus itself was not surprising, it nonetheless raised a broader question at play in the wider region: are key states getting more cautious in how they engage the BRI? Since China’s BRI first took off, there has been a near endless focus on the mix of opportunities and challenges it presents for various countries as well as how other major powers are responding to it But as I’ve argued before, a key part of that conversation, beyond what China wants or what the United States thinks and does, is how key regional states themselves are responding to the BRI. Getting a sense of regional reactions is challenging given the diversify of responses we have seen, the evolution of the BRI itself, which remains quite amorphous in some senses amid the periodic reports we see, and the relative availability of alternatives offered by other countries such as Japan. Indeed, regional engagement with the BRI is best seen not as a linear process, but a more dynamic one in response to changes in these variables and more..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The Belt and Road Initiative, hailed for promoting development, is coming under fire as debt burdens grow, reflecting a growing wariness of Beijing’s posturing as a global leader-in-waiting on an international stage that seeks to promote debate rather than censor it
Description: "A good way to measure China’s appeal for the rest of the world is to gauge the success of its Belt and Road Initiative. As of last September, Beijing had signed more than 190 cooperation documents with more than 160 countries and international organisations in support of the trade initiative to link economies into a China-centred trading network. Its cumulative investment has exceeded US$100 billion, with construction projects valued at a staggering US$720 billion. Yet the initiative had begun slowing by 2018. This was due, in part, to a decline in Chinese funds available for investment. Chinese state banks had become more cautious about lending as the trade war with the United States commenced. Chinese state-owned enterprises were still moving car and steel capacity overseas, and building highways and cement plants in developing economies, but on a much smaller scale compared to their 2016 investment peak. Some countries (such as Myanmar, Sierra Leone and Tanzania) had become hesitant about continuing to borrowing large sums for fear of a debt trap..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is nothing if not vague. Is it a blanket term for all Chinese overseas economic, social and political activities? Is it a specific set of coordinated policy that’s exclusive to Beijing-led international endeavors? What projects are officially Belt and Road? Where do the corridors actually go? What countries are truly participating? Nearly seven years into the initiative, we are still asking these questions as Beijing attempts to wrangle back its message from private firms and enterprising governments that have unscrupulously been using the Belt and Road brand for their own gains, dragging its reputation through the proverbial mud and putting the future of the initiative in jeopardy. The Belt and Road was announced in 2013 as an economic development initiative that would create new trade corridors across Asia, Europe and Africa, positioning China at the top of the geo-economic food chain, while providing mutual benefit to participants all the way down the line. Beyond that vague rendering, the rest was left to conjecture, with a large degree of meaning lost between China’s struggles to explain the initiative and the West’s inability to comprehend it.“I think the difference among policy makers is one of the biggest challenges of the Belt and Road,” said Moritz Rudolf, a China researcher, lawyer, and founder of Eurasia Bridges. “For the Chinese side it's unclear why the West doesn’t understand what they are doing and from the Western side it's ‘this is nothing because it doesn't follow our procedures that we know about.’”..."
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Source/publisher: "Forbes" (USA)
2020-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: " The Myanmar-China Friendship Association has offered scholarships to 106 Myanmar outstanding students in need. The students given scholarships this year included those who are studying in medical and engineering field as well as the postgraduates, Chairman Sein Win Aung of the association told the event on Saturday. "Financial assistance from my parents who are farmers wasn't enough to cover all the expenses including tuition fees before. I really appreciate the assistance from the association as it means a lot for me," Oak Soe Paing, a freshman medical student, told Xinhua. The program was handed over to the association from Su Xiuyu (Daw Zin Khine) Foundation, a Chinese educational foundation which has been extending scholarships to Myanmar students across the country since 2013. So far this year, it has granted assistance to a total of 644 outstanding needy students from the country's states and regions..."
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-03-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "More than 1,000 Burmese workers in China have contacted the Myanmar embassy for help returning home, an official at the Myanmar embassy in Beijing told Myanmar Now. Factory closures in response to the coronavirus outbreak have left large numbers of Myanmar migrants out of work, with some sleeping rough besides highways and in bushes, according to one charity. The Moe Ma Kha Foundation, which is helping the stranded Myanmar migrants, has urged the embassy to prioritise over 200 factory workers who are sleeping rough in forests in Shandong and Guangdong provinces. They include pregnant women and children, and the workers there are running low on food because they have so little money, the foundation said. But the embassy said no one would be prioritised, and that the order of returns would be based on addresses and other credentials..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2020-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar is exported over 45,000 tons of rice and broken rice in second week of February and it is less than 3,000 tons in compared with last week export, according to Ministry of Commerce. It exported US$1.071 million worth of about 3,900 tons of rice and US$0.298 million worth of about 1,250 tons of broken rice from border trade centers along Myanmar-China border from February 8 to 14. Myanmar exported 2,700 tons of rice and 1,200 tons of broken rice from Muse 105-mile border trade center, about 620 tons of rice and 0.05 ton of broken rice from Chinshwehaw border trade center and about 520 tons of rice and 50 tons of broken rice from Lweje border trade center in that period. It exported US$8.231 million worth of over 25,000 tons of rice and US$0.401 million worth of over 15,000 tons of broken rice from maritime trade in that period. Myanmar exported about 15,000 tons of rice and over 1,000 tons of broken rice to Asia, 5,800 tons of rice and about 4,800 tons of broken rice to Africa and about 4,900 tons of rice and about 10,000 tons of broken rice to EU in that period..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
2020-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The government called on China on Tuesday to ensure the health of 63 Myanmar sailors detained in Chinese prisons for illegal trading of goods.
Description: "The Myanmar Embassy in Beijing issued the appeal amid reports that several inmates in some prisons across China have been infected with the deadly COVID-19 disease that has killed over 2600 people on the mainland. The government asked the Chinese government to amnesty the Myanmar prisoners on humanitarian grounds. Chinese authorities said that more than 500 inmates in five prisons in Hubei, Xiangdong and Jiejiang districts were infected with the new coronavirus as of last Thursday. In a letter sent to China’s Foreign Ministry, the government urged Beijing to take care of the 63 Myanmar inmates and resolve their cases as soon as possible. The Myanmar Embassy in Beijing said that so far, the 63 sailors are free of the virus and have been placed in separate cells to minimise the possibility of infection..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Two townships in northern Myanmar’s Kachin state face shortages of food staples, including rice, and rising prices, after China shut down border checkpoints in an effort to contain its coronavirus outbreak, a local lawmaker said Tuesday. More than 20,000 residents of Chipwi and Hsawlaw townships will face shortages from now until China opens the border crossings, closed until the annual monsoon season begins in late May, said Khaw Marwu, a legislator from the Lisu National Development Party who represents the Hsawlaw constituency. The two cold, mountainous regions along with Kawnglanghpu township lie in remote areas that are difficult to access as roads are rare, he said. Residents earn their living by farming, hunting, and selling forestry products. The Myanmar military and a number of armed groups are present in the region, including the rebel Kachin Independence Army (KIA); the National Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), an armed group that was converted into a Border Guard Force under Myanmar military command; and the Lisu and Rawang militias..." ..
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "More than 130 Myanmar citizens working at a brick making site in China’s province of Yunnan have returned home as they fear the coronavirus, according to a statement released by anti-human trafficking police on February 24. Those Myanmar workers are 50 men and 88 women including those from Myakaing village, Kyauktan Township, Yangon Region. As the workers no longer wanted to work in China for fear of the coronavirus, they contacted the consul general’s office for help. Then, the office contacted the Yunnan Province government for further action. The authorities then sent the Myanmar workers to Chinshwehaw, a border checkpoint between Myanmar and China. The statement said that arrangements were made to send them home after they had received medical checkups at Hopan People’s Hospital..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A Chinese-owned bag factory in Yangon abruptly announced its shutdown on Monday due to a lack of raw materials caused by the COVID-19 epidemic in China.
Description: "The Lucky Sky Bags factory in Mya Sein Yaung industrial zone in Hlaing Tharyar township gave no notice to its workers, some of whom were on strike, before shutting down on Monday. U Myo Zaw Htay, one of the leaders of the strike, called for the factory’s licence to be revoked and its 20 Chinese employees deported. "They got a seven-year tax exemption for investing in Mya Sein Yaung industrial zone,” he said, “but it operated for just 11 months.” The factory, which has 642 workers, makes leather bags for export to Europe. The workers went on strike from January 31 to February 11 to protest against unfair labour practices, which made it difficult for the factory to meet export deadlines and resulted in a decline in orders, according to the workers. After reaching an agreement with the factory on February 11 the workers returned to work. But 10 days later, the labour union's secretary was fired for no reason, so the workers protested and the factory shut down, U Myo Zaw Htay said. The factory management vowed to pay the workers compensation. Lucky Sky Bags was the third Chinese-owned company to shut down in the past three weeks due to the COVID-19 outbreak that has infected over 79,000 people globally..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Bilateral border trade between Myanmar and China declined by US$209 million from Jan. 23 to Feb. 18 compared to the same period last year due to the spread of coronavirus, according to U Khin Maung Lwin, assistant permanent secretary for the Ministry of Commerce. The value of border trade through the Muse, Chinshwehaw, Lweje and Kanpiketi border trade zones totaled over $270 million—a decline from $479 million in the same period last year. “It was mainly because of the COVID-19 outbreak and Chinese New Year holidays. The holidays started on January 23 and normally end in early February,” U Khin Maung Lwin told The Irrawaddy. Before the coronavirus outbreak, the value of daily trade through the border trade zones was between $10 million and $14 million. Since the outbreak, it has dropped to between $1 and $2 million per day, according to the Ministry of Commerce. “Border trade has recovered slightly since trade resumed after February 13, but travel restrictions are still in force and watermelons are therefore not selling,” said U Khin Maung Lwin. “Around 40 trucks of honeydew melon have been exported to China as some Chinese supermarkets have bought them online. Also, only limited volumes of marine products are being exported as airlines have not yet resumed flights in the area.”..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar's military donated protective equipment to help China in its battle against the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak on Tuesday. The donation including 90,000 pieces of surgical masks, 90,000 pieces of N-95 respirators and 90,000 pairs of safety goggles were handed over to Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai at the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport. "The donation is as part of humanitarian assistance to portray closer military cooperation with China," said General Mya Tun Oo, chief of general staff of Myanmar Army, Navy and Airforce, extending wishes for speedy recovery from the epidemic in China. Ambassador Chen said it is a critically important moment for China in fighting against the virus now and expressed his belief that China will win the battle against the COVID-19 soon. A military aircraft loaded with the protective gears left Myanmar's airport to Kunming, capital of southwest China's Yunnan province, on Tuesday after the donation ceremony..."
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Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: " Myanmar's Yangon Region Investment Committee (YRIC) recently approved 16 foreign investment businesses for the region, according to the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA) late Saturday. A total of 28.507 million U.S. dollars of foreign investments from China, Seychelles and Estonia as well as 3 billion Kyats (2 million U.S. dollars) from one local enterprise engaged the region's manufacturing sector and other services, creating over 8,900 job opportunities for local citizens. Yangon region absorbs 60 percent of country's investment from both home and abroad, followed by Mandalay region with 30 percent and the rest flows into other regions and states. Myanmar attracted over 20.8 billion U.S. dollars' foreign investments as of Jan 31, the first four months of the current fiscal year 2019-2020, according to the DICA's figures. The new Myanmar Companies Law which started to enforce on Aug. 1, 2018 allows foreign investors to take up 35 percent in local companies. Under the new companies law, investment with capital not exceeding 5 million U.S. dollars can be permitted by regional and states authorities of the DICA..."
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Exports of watermelon and marine products on Myanmar-China border have declined by 209 million US dollars due to the spreading of coronoavirus (COVID-19), said Union Commerce Minister Dr. Than Myint, on 22 February. “Till 14 February of 2018-2019 fiscal year, the total trade value reached 14.595 billion US dollars, up 2.147 billion US dollars compared with the same period this year. The export value increased by 1.053 billion US dollars. The border trade sees a decline due to the Chinese New Year holidays and the spreading of coronavirus,” he said. “During the holidays from 23 January to 18 February, Myanmar-China border trade declined by 209 million US dollars—exports of 152 million US dollars and imports of 57 million US dollars, compared with the same period last year. It has an impact on water melon, sweet melon, perishable goods and marine products,” Dr. Than Myint continued. As a measure to solve this problem, Yangon Region Government helps merchants to get the places for the sale of water melon and sweet melon in Yangon market, in cooperation with Yangon City Development Committee..."
Source/publisher: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
2020-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association (MGMA) says it fears that half the garment factories in the country may have to shut down temporarily as soon as March, due to a shortage of raw materials from China.
Description: "The association announced this during a press conference at the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries (UMFCCI) headquarters in Yangon last Friday. According to the association, garment manufacturers in the country may be forced to take such action due to a shortage of raw materials from China. Some 90 percent of the raw materials such as fabrics, textiles, and zips used by garment factories in Myanmar come from China, and supplies have been curtailed due to the coronavirus outbreak in China. Much of China had been shut down for the week-long Lunar New Year holiday at the end of January, but the government extended it into early February as part of efforts to curb the spread of the outbreak. Even though the extended holiday is now over, factories in China only just started up operations last week. However, with many workers quarantined and travel restrictions in place, production is only restarting slowly. Garment factories in Myanmar are already feeling the heat and have been coping since the start of the outbreak by reducing their operations and work hours, said Some factories have already started feeling the heat with reduction in operations and running hours, MGMA members said..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: China looks to Irrawaddy River as alternative trade route as high-speed rail plan stalls on security concerns
Description: "Ethnic wars, security concerns and official foot-dragging have all conspired to stall China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan to build a high-speed railroad from its southwest down through Myanmar’s volatile northern regions to the Indian Ocean. But Beijing has an emerging alternate plan: Develop a safer trade route via Myanmar’s Irrawaddy River – a 2,200-kilometer waterway which flows north to south through the length of a nation known for its lack of modern roads and rail links. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a BRI-driven plan to link China and Myanmar via trains, roads and ports, aims to give Beijing an alternative route for fuel and other shipments through the congested Malacca Strait and the contested South China Sea, both potential conflict areas with the United States. That has made Myanmar a crucial cog in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature BRI, a US$1-trillion global infrastructure-building scheme that aims ultimately to put China at the center of a new global trade and security order..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Louise was living from hand to mouth while helping her aunt sell noodle soup in the Laos capital of Vientiane, which sits on a curve of the Mekong River. Their lives were mostly untouched by the increasing Chinese investment in their country that in recent years has built billion-dollar dams, bridges and railways. Louise* was in her early 20s and had few professional prospects when she was approached by a woman who told her there were great opportunities in China, the country’s northern neighbour seen as a land of technological breakthroughs and booming cities. The woman said her relatives had been successful in China and she offered to take Louise there, too. Louise did not know then that this was her first step to being trapped in an abusive marriage with a Chinese man who felt he owned her. “I wanted to support my parents … I am poor and I was very curious to see China. I thought it would bring me a better life,” Louise recalls. Soon she was in a van with nine other Laotian women, travelling from Vientiane to the border with Thailand, and from there to Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport, where they boarded a flight to Guangzhou in southern China. Louise is among thousands of young girls and women, mostly from Asian countries, who have been trafficked into marriages with Chinese men. She has since been rescued, but many others have not been so lucky...'
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Yangon Region government ethnic Karen Affairs Minister Naw Pan Thinzar Myo said that entry into Myanmar by Chinese tourists fell by about 30% after some of the Chinese flights were banned at Yangon International Airport after the coronavirus (Covid-19) outbreak. She was speaking at a press conference on Friday held by the Yangon Region Legislative Assembly, Tourism Affairs Committee. Minister Naw Pan Thinzar Myo said, “Most of the Chinese tourists came to Myanmar in Yangon-Ngwesaung 3-night, 4-day tours. Each of them spent an average of 200,000 kyats. So we lost this income earning from them but this is the global crisis. If we let them enter our country to avoid income loss we will have the risk of being infected with this virus.” During the five days before the banning of Chinese airlines entering Myanmar, over 6,200 tourists visited Myanmar but this number fell to just over 3,900 during five days after the banning of these airlines, according to the Yangon Region Government. Before the outbreak of coronavirus in China, two Myanmar airlines and 14 Chinese airlines were regularly operating between the two countries. Currently only four airlines coming from four cities namely Kunming, Shanghai, Mansi and Guangzhou are permitted to continue their flight operations..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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