ASEAN-Burma relations
Websites/Multiple Documents
Description:
Archive from March 2005
Source/publisher:
Various sources via "BurmaNet News"
Date of entry/update:
2012-04-17
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
About 186,000 results (August 2017)
Source/publisher:
Various sources via Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2017-08-22
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Description:
Treaties, economic, political, cultural, strategic interaction, home pages of ASEAN countries etc.
Date of entry/update:
2003-06-03
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Source/publisher:
ASEAN Secretariat
Date of entry/update:
2003-06-03
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"ASEAN Today" website
Source/publisher:
"ASEAN Today"
Date of publication:
2019-09-10
Date of entry/update:
2019-09-10
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
Articles on this category from BurmaNet News
Source/publisher:
BurmaNet News
Date of entry/update:
2016-03-01
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
International Relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"Burma is becoming a regional player in Southeast Asia.
Just a few years ago the suggestion that Burma might become a responsible stakeholder in the Southeast Asian community would have been derided and laughed off.
Yet 2014 sees Burma chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the first time. It is an unprecedented moment in the country?s history given its isolation from the international community for much of the last fifty years..."
Gareth Robinson
Source/publisher:
"New Mandala"
Date of publication:
2014-05-21
Date of entry/update:
2014-07-14
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"What can Myanmar?s chairmanship learn from the European Union members? divided position on external affairs, such as the deep, public disagreements associated with the Iraq war, the incapacity to produce collective action during the EU?s reaction to the 2011 Libyan crisis, and again the unwillingness to share a common initiative in response to the more recent developments in Mali? It is a discouraging question, particularly in the light of the EU High Representative?s apparent obsession with the ?reality of 27 member states who are sovereign, who believe passionately in their right to determine what they do?, as Ashton argued in 2011. As disagreements within the European Union have seriously damaged the relations among the member states as well as the political development of the EU as a whole, a major message from a European view lies in the conviction that divisions weaken any project of integration and the attempt to create a united community, which ASEAN plans to achieve by 2015..."
Ludovica Marchi
Source/publisher:
"New Mandala"
Date of publication:
2014-05-13
Date of entry/update:
2014-07-14
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
8,250 results (May 2005)
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Secretariat
Date of entry/update:
2005-05-23
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia is a peace treaty among Southeast Asian countries established by the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a geo-political and economic organization of 10 countries located in Southeast Asia." [Wikipedia]
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Secretariat
Date of publication:
1976-02-24
Date of entry/update:
2009-07-22
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Description:
"The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia is a peace treaty among Southeast Asian countries established by the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a geo-political and economic organization of 10 countries located in Southeast Asia."
Source/publisher:
Wikipedia
Date of entry/update:
2009-07-22
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
English
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Individual Documents
Description:
"This week, in Melbourne, the Australian government for the second time is hosting leaders for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia Special Summit.
It's been six years since the last summit on Australian soil.
While many countries in the region have seen economic growth during that time, repression and democratic backsliding has also been growing. The rights of people across the region are being trampled or ignored. The summit is an opportunity to put those issues, and the rights of south-east Asian people, front and center.
In 2018, Aung San Suu Kyi represented the government of Myanmar at the summit. Since then, the military has ousted the civilian-led government and has drawn the country into a spiraling human rights and humanitarian crisis.
The military has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity - Aung San Suu Kyi is among the tens of thousands arbitrarily detained. She is serving 27 years in prison under a slew of fabricated charges.
Six years ago, Hun Sen was Cambodia's leader posing for selfies at Sydney Harbor and brazenly threatening Cambodians who dared to protest that he would "beat them." Now his son Hun Manet is leader.
As Human Rights Watch has documented, physical assaults of opposition members have continued. The opposition leader Kem Sokha is serving a 27-year sentence confined to his home, and the main opposition party was banned from contesting the sham 2023 elections.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited last time and will attend the summit again, but his term is ending. Indonesia's democratic institutions meant to provide a check on power such as the Constitutional Court and Anti-Corruption Commission have been eroded, with a return to dynastic patronage politics.
His likely successor is currently the defence minister, Prabowo Subianto - implicated in massacres in East Timor in 1983, and the 1997-1998 kidnappings of activists in Java that led to his dismissal from the army.
The lesson is that when there is no proper accountability following a truth commission as in Timor-Leste, even notorious human rights abusers can go on to hold political power. Prabowo has the support of Widodo, who paired his son Gibran Raka to be Prabowo's vice-president.
Then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte skipped the last summit. Now it's Ferdinand Marcos jnr son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. His son is desperate to rehabilitate the family name and is being feted by Western leaders from Washington to Canberra.
While the Australian government may be relieved to have a non-volatile pro-West partner in Malacaang Palace, the summary killings of drug suspects still occur regularly because of the lack of accountability for police violence.
The government refuses to co-operate with the International Criminal Court's investigation into the "drug war" killings, and killings of leftist activists and trade unionists continue, fueled by the authorities' practice of "red-tagging" them as "communists."
Thailand's then-Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, who seized power in a 2014 military coup, attended the last summit. As in Myanmar, Thai generals had the foresight to shore up their continued domination of the political process through a constitutional and legal framework that enabled the military to determine who became prime minister.
So when the reformist Move Forward Party resoundingly won the most votes in the May 2023 election, entrenched interests had ways to prevent them from assuming power. Now Thailand is ruled by Srettha Thaivisin, a former businessman from the Pheu Thai party, while the former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is back home, on parole and holding court for ruling party politicians.
Malaysia's leader in attendance is Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who doggedly won the last election after years of trumped-up charges against him. As Anwar struggles to hold together a fragile coalition of parties, many of his promises for reform have gone unmet.
Vietnam and Laos both remain Communist Party states that don't even pretend to hold independent elections. Laos is chairing ASEAN this year. Vietnam is enjoying attention from Western capitals and companies looking to "de-risk" from China. Meanwhile, its crackdowns have intensified against activists, including environmental defenders.
This regional backsliding on democracy and human rights should be of immense concern to the Australian government and Australians. The government is rightly worried about the Chinese government's growing influence in the region. Across south-east Asia, Chinese companies as part of China's mass surveillance infrastructure are building "smart" city systems that collect massive amount of personal and other data without oversight.
Beijing is actively seeking to shore up support for votes from governments in the region to evade accountability at the United Nations and in the global arena.
And it is pressing south-east Asian governments to return dissidents and ethnic Uyghurs, sending a stark reminder to Chinese nationals that even if they have left the mainland, they are not truly safe.
Instead of taking bold steps to defend democracy and human rights, Australia and other democratic governments have shown less willingness to hold human rights abusers responsible if those abusers are strategic allies, trade partners in "de-risking," or otherwise considered helpful in containing China.
The approach is deemed "pragmatic" but involves passively monitoring the decline of human rights and democracy across the region or raising matters privately, where there is little chance of impact.
Meanwhile, civil society activists, government critics and journalists are facing intimidation, threats, harassment, and in some cases physical attacks.
ASEAN has proven woefully inadequate in addressing regional human rights crises - most starkly evident with its impotent and ineffectual response to atrocities in Myanmar.
This is hardly likely to improve now that Laos is the chair. Australia should use this summit to press for meaningful co-ordinated action on Myanmar.
Australia is right to forge greater trade and security ties and strengthen its relationships in the region.
But those ties alone will not be enough to stop the authoritarian slide. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus.
It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its domestic rights record.
This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up each other's human rights concerns..."
Source/publisher:
The Canberra Times via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Crimes Against Humanity, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Albanese, Southeast Asian Leaders Should Address Myanmar, Other Regional Crises
Description:
"Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders.
Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years, and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members.
Key concerns include the need for stronger sanctions against Myanmar and ending attacks on dissidents in Cambodia and Vietnam, and security forces’ targeting of activists in the Philippines.
(Sydney) – Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Albanese will host leaders from nine of the countries making up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit on March 4 to 6, 2024, in Melbourne.
The 60-page report, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia,” summarizes critical human rights issues that Albanese should raise at the summit. Human Rights Watch urged the Australian government to put its values as a rights-respecting democracy at the core of its relations with ASEAN countries. As the Australian government approaches the summit with the goal of removing blockages to regional economic cooperation, it should not bypass human rights concerns in the hopes that they will resolve themselves, because they will not.
“This high-level meeting would be a lost opportunity for Australia and the people of ASEAN countries if the Australian government were to gloss over human rights issues,” said Daniela Gavshon, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Australian government should send the message that human rights violations are a key foreign policy concern.”
It will be especially important for Australia to guide discussion toward human rights since the subject has been left off the summit agenda.
The summit marks 50 years of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations. Over the past five decades, successive Australian governments have pursued closer economic, security, and political partnerships with ASEAN countries. Australia continues to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asian countries to offset the shift in global power dynamics.
United States influence in the region is being challenged by the growing political, economic, and military clout of a more assertive China. To counter China’s threat to human rights and the rules-based international order, Australia should center its dialogue with ASEAN leaders on the rights of Southeast Asian people rather than just on strengthening friendly relations.
The anniversary presents a unique opportunity to reflect on human rights in the region and to reframe the next 50 years of Australia-ASEAN cooperation. Albanese has already projected the next half-century to be “even more successful than the last” for ASEAN-Australia relations, and pledged A$95.4 million (US$63.9 million) to kick-start Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040.
In a February letter, Human Rights Watch urged Prime Minister Albanese to press for commitments from individual countries at the summit, and raise specific human rights issues with individual governments.
“Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members,” Gavshon said. “Australia’s failure to directly address human rights concerns at the summit would be a propaganda coup for abusive leaders, and it will embolden new ASEAN leaders to continue the human rights abusing legacies of their predecessors.”
In its most serious human rights lapse, ASEAN has not dealt with the spiralling humanitarian and human rights crisis in Myanmar. The consequences have spilled over the borders of Thailand, India, and China, and contributed to the continued suffering of ethnic Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh. Tens of thousands have sought safety in neighboring countries since the 2021 coup by the Myanmar military. In addition, Rohingya who fled crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in 2017 cannot return. Given increasing insecurity and deteriorating conditions in the camps housing one million Rohingya in Bangladesh, 4,500 made the high-risk sea voyage to Indonesia or Malaysia in 2023, according to the United Nations refugee agency.
ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus – which Myanmar’s junta repudiated days after agreeing to it in April 2021 – is not a viable framework for dealing with a military that continues to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes. Australian and ASEAN governments should agree to enforce sanctions against Myanmar, including those newly imposed by Australia on banks and jet fuel suppliers, in their own jurisdictions. Together, Albanese and Southeast Asian leaders should commit to strengthening multilateral action at the UN Security Council.
Among other key rights issues to be addressed is the Thai and Cambodian governments’ cooperation to uncover, intimidate, and arrest Cambodian civil society activists in Thailand. In Vietnam, the government systematically suppresses freedom of expression and other basic liberties. In the Philippines, the security forces target activists, rights defenders, and journalists, often with deadly results.
State-sponsored discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia remains pervasive. On an institutional level, ASEAN purports to respect the human rights of its 685 million citizens. However, its Human Rights Declaration and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) have no real impact.
In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its own domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up allies’ human rights concerns, Human Rights Watch said.
“The 50th anniversary of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations marked at this summit could be a turning point,” Gavshon said. “Looking forward to 2040, the region will face environmental challenges, economic uncertainty, and strategic competition, but these challenges can be lessened if governments show respect for human rights and democracy.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"QUESTION
Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of the ongoing situation and the progress of implementing the “Five-Point Consensus” in Myanmar, what is the Ministry’s assessment of the impact on ASEAN’s unity and image.
REPLY
Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN has taken a firm and consistent approach to the situation in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup, which is reflected in the Five-Point Consensus. The ASEAN Leaders reviewed the situation at their Summits in 2022 and 2023 and agreed on a series of steps to send a clear signal to the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat last week, ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to the Five-Point Consensus as well as the Leaders’ decisions. There has been little progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and in fact the situation in Myanmar has become more dire of late. However, the rate limiting factor for progress is not ASEAN, but the Tatmadaw. Singapore will continue to work with ASEAN Chair Laos, fellow ASEAN Member States, and our external partners to press the Tatmadaw to cease violence and implement the Five-Point Consensus swiftly and fully.
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS
Question 1
Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: I thank the SMS for her answer. May I ask the SMS what alternate steps does ASEAN have if Myanmar refuses to implement the consensus plan?
REPLY:
Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN Leaders have reviewed the issue twice and remain committed to upholding the Five-Point Consensus.
Question 2
Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: Thank you, Speaker. I would like to ask the SMS, with the change of ASEAN Chair this year to Laos, does Singapore expect any change in the momentum of ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar? How does Singapore continue to expect itself to support the new ASEAN Chair in ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar regarding the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus? Thank you.
REPLY:
Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Let me address that supplementary question because I just returned last week from the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat. I would emphasise that the key word is “consistency”. ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Laos has expressed our clear intention to maintain that consistent position, and the paramount expression of that is the Five-Point Consensus. I would say as far as ASEAN is concerned, there is no change.
2 The unfortunate change which is happening is on the ground in Myanmar. If you would check with your contacts there, the security situation remains dire. It is almost tantamount to a civil war. Whilst the military has no intention of ceding power, their ability to maintain authority on the ground is being severely challenged by a variety of groups, both the ethnic armed organisations as well as the resistance from the Burmese majority within Myanmar itself.
3 The other point which we have all emphasised is that there is a need to continue humanitarian support. ASEAN is engaged on this, and we are also expecting that Thailand will do a bit more to enable or to facilitate the cross-border delivery of humanitarian assistance. I think our priority remains the welfare of the citizens, the people of Myanmar.
4 We should be under no illusions that ASEAN can magically resolve the problems. Ultimately, this is a political problem. This is a problem of leadership and the political leaders across the spectrum in Myanmar need to get together and reconcile their diverse positions. We still believe that there needs to be direct, face-to-face negotiations conducted in good faith amongst all the political leaders there. It is a complex situation, but we will continue to maintain our consistent position..."
. . . . .
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of publication:
2024-02-07
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"Secretary-General of ASEAN Dr. Kao Kim Hourn this afternoon participated in the ceremonial handover of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines’ financial assistance to help Myanmar in its recovery process in dealing with the aftermath of the post-tropical Cyclone Mocha that made landfall in Myanmar in May 2023. The ceremony was held at the ASEAN Secretariat, where both the Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to ASEAN Hjayceelyn M. Quintana and Dr. Kao delivered remarks. Dr. Kao has assumed the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN as the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator (SG-AHAC) to support for recovery activities in Cyclone-affected areas in Myanmar. The contribution of the Government of the Philippines and the roles of SG-AHAC shows that ASEAN stands in solidarity with the affected communities, and reaffirms ASEAN’s commitment to the implementation of the “One ASEAN One Response”, particularly in mobilising greater resources in ensuring ASEAN’s collective response to disasters..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
Date of publication:
2024-02-06
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Cyclones - regional, Natural Disasters - General, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The United States condemns yesterday’s attack by the Burma military regime on the Kachin State town of Munglai Hkyet, which hosts a camp for internally displaced persons, killing and injuring dozens, including women and children.
This latest attack by the Burma military regime is yet another example of its disregard for human life and underscores the need for the UN Security Council to act beyond Resolution 2669. We underline our commitment to using all tools at the Security Council’s disposal to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, a commitment affirmed by the vast majority of the Security Council.
We reiterate our call on the regime to cease all forms of violence, free all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with regard to the protection of civilians.
The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and the establishment of a path toward a genuine and inclusive democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN..."
Source/publisher:
United States Mission to the United Nations
Date of publication:
2023-10-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Bago, Myanmar
Event Date : Sun, 08 Oct 2023
AHADID : AHA-FL-2023-000892-MMR | GLIDE Number :
Impact Update Date : Sun, 08 Oct 2023 14:31:17
AFFECTED AREA/S
Bago, Mon, Yangon
DESCRIPTION
Due to the recorded rainfall of 200 mm in Bago Township of Bago Region on 8th October, the Bago River Water Level has exceeded 124 cm from its danger level. A riverine flood has been occurring in Bago Township and about 12000 people from over 2800 households were evacuated to the temporary camps (DDM).
DDM reported floods in Kyaikhto Township of Mon State due to the heavy rain of the Southwest Monsoon . The reports indicates about 55 people from 12 households had to move to the community shelters.
DDM also report a flooding events in Taikkyi Township of Yangon Region, and about 100 people displaced and 27 houses were flooded.
Necessary humanitarian assistance to the affected population has been timely provided by the State/ Region DDM Offices in the flood-affected area..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
Date of publication:
2023-10-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-10-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
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Description:
"The ASEAN summit is important for Southeast Asia because it engages with other states in the region. Over the years, the ASEAN summit decisions have fostered economic growth and development in the region, which has a combined population of over 650 million and a GDP of over $3 trillion. With that, the 2023 ASEAN Summit was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on September 5-7, 2023, under the theme “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth”. At this summit, ASEAN countries expanded their economic opportunities and partnerships.
However, the 2023 ASEAN summit was quite different from the previous one. During the 2023 summit, ASEAN countries showed concern about the civil strife and human rights violations in Myanmar. This was also the first time that ASEAN countries have combined to put diplomatic pressure on Myanmar’s junta. Indonesia has been the most active and vocal ASEAN member in addressing the Myanmar crisis. It proposed and hosted the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in April 2021, where the Five-Point Consensus was adopted. Indonesia urged the junta to stop the violence, release political prisoners, and engage in dialogue with all parties. It has also expressed support for a global arms embargo on Myanmar.
Malaysia has also been outspoken in criticizing the junta and calling for a peaceful resolution. It has also advocated for the protection of Rohingya refugees, who have fled from Myanmar to Malaysia and other countries. Singapore has taken a more pragmatic and balanced approach to the Myanmar crisis. Singapore has maintained its economic ties with Myanmar but has also suspended some military cooperation and imposed targeted sanctions on some junta officials. The Philippines has suspended defense engagements with Myanmar but has not imposed any sanctions or cut off trade relations.
Thailand has been more sympathetic and accommodating to the junta due to its close ties and shared interests with Myanmar. It has refrained from condemning the coup or calling it a coup and instead emphasized the need for stability and non-interference. It has also hosted an informal meeting with some ASEAN members and the junta’s foreign minister, which was seen as undermining ASEAN’s unity and credibility. Cambodia has also been supportive of the junta, citing its respect for Myanmar’s sovereignty. It has opposed any foreign intervention or pressure on Myanmar and called for dialogue within the framework of ASEAN. Laos has been relatively silent and passive in the Myanmar crisis, following its policy of neutrality.
Vietnam has taken a cautious and moderate position on the Myanmar crisis, balancing its interests and principles. It has also supported ASEAN’s role in finding a peaceful solution but has not interfered in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
The ASEAN 2023 summit was an important event for Myanmar, as it was the first time that the bloc discussed the situation in the country since the military coup in February 2021. However, the summit did not result in any significant breakthroughs or pressure on the junta to stop the violence and restore democracy. ASEAN operates on the principle of consensus, which means that all 10 member states have to agree on any decision or action.
ASEAN also adheres to the principle of non-interference, which means that it respects the sovereignty and internal affairs of each member state. This limits ASEAN’s ability to intervene in Myanmar’s crisis, as it does not want to be seen as meddling or imposing its will on Myanmar. ASEAN has no enforcement mechanism or sanctions power to compel Myanmar to comply with its demands or recommendations. The only leverage that ASEAN has is its moral authority and diplomatic influence, which are not enough to sway the junta, which has shown little regard for international opinion or pressure. ASEAN faces competition from other actors, such as China, India, Japan, and the United States, who have their interests and agendas in Myanmar. These actors may undermine ASEAN’s efforts by pursuing bilateral engagements with the junta or offering incentives or alternatives that are more appealing to Myanmar.
Currently, the trade value of Myanmar’s trade with the ASEAN countries has exceeded $10.3 billion in the nine months until December of the 2022–2023 fiscal year, according to the country’s Ministry of Commerce. Major ASEAN countries are Myanmar’s major trading partners, including Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The main export items are agricultural and fishery products and minerals. Myanmar’s trade with Indonesia recorded an estimated value of over $936.5 million, with Vietnam at over $609.47 million, the Philippines at over $122.74 million, Cambodia at over $25.7 million, trade with Laos at over $1.3 million, and Brunei at over $0.31 million. Therefore, it is unlikely that ASEAN can pressure Myanmar to stop the civil war with the junta government unless there is a significant change in the economic dynamics within Myanmar or among ASEAN members. ASEAN’s role may be more effective in facilitating dialogue and humanitarian assistance than imposing solutions or sanctions.
The inaction of ASEAN 2023 towards Myanmar has further complicated the situation for Rohingyas. The Rohingyas have endured decades of persecution and displacement at the hands of the military and are in a dire situation in Myanmar. The Rohingya have faced several waves of violence and ethnic cleansing by the Myanmar army and local mobs, especially since 2017, which have killed thousands and forced hundreds of thousands to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. The Rohingya who remain in Myanmar are confined to camps or villages, where they face severe restrictions on their movement, livelihoods, health care, and education. The Rohingya have received little support or protection from the international community, which has failed to hold the Myanmar authorities accountable for their crimes against humanity and genocide.
The 2021 military coup has further worsened the situation, as the junta has cracked down on all forms of dissent and opposition across the country. Therefore, the Rohingya people are in a desperate and hopeless situation, with no prospects of returning to their homes or obtaining justice. They are trapped in a cycle of violence, displacement, and deprivation, with no end in sight.
However, Myanmar has rejected the ASEAN 2023 summit statement condemning violence as one-sided. The junta claimed that the statement was not objective and biased, and it seized power in a coup in February 2021. Myanmar also complained that it was not represented at the ASEAN summit. Myanmar accused ASEAN nations of interfering in its internal affairs and ignoring its views and voices. Myanmar has further withdrawn from its scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN in 2026, which is a blow to its international legitimacy. Therefore, it is unlikely that ASEAN can address the issue of Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar effectively unless there is a significant change in the political dynamics within Myanmar or among ASEAN members. However, this also depends on the willingness and cooperation of the junta and other stakeholders in Myanmar.
In conclusion, ASEAN has no enforcement mechanism or sanctions power to compel Myanmar to comply with its demands or recommendations. The only leverage that ASEAN has is its moral authority and diplomatic influence, which are not enough to sway the junta, which has shown little regard for international opinion or pressure..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of publication:
2023-09-18
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
The Asean-India Summit of 2023, themed "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth," provided Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a platform to articulate his vision for strengthening India-Asean cooperation.
Description:
"While addressing various dimensions of this partnership, including digital transformation, trade, and economic engagement, Prime Minister Modi made it unequivocally clear that his paramount focus was on ensuring peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, he underscored the critical importance of addressing a pressing concern – maintaining peace and security along India's border with Myanmar. This commentary delves into how India can contribute to ensuring peace and security along its Myanmar border, thereby fostering stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Asean as a Central Pillar—India's "Act East Policy" has been central to its foreign policy approach in recent years, with Asean emerging as a pivotal partner in this endeavour. The Act East Policy aims to strengthen India's economic, strategic, and cultural ties with nations in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing the significance of the Indo-Pacific as a dynamic and vital area for India's growth and influence.
Prime Minister Modi's emphasis on peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region during the Asean-India Summit of 2023 underscores the region's growing strategic importance. The Indo-Pacific is not merely a hub of economic growth but also a theater of evolving geopolitical dynamics, marked by competing interests, territorial disputes, and emerging security challenges. In this context, ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is of paramount importance to India, with far-reaching implications for its economic interests, strategic objectives, and overall security. India's contribution to regional stability hinges on several key factors.
When considering diplomacy and strategic partnerships, it is suggested to play an active role in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, India must employ diplomatic means to forge stronger partnerships with Asean countries and other regional actors. Diplomatic engagement is the bedrock of conflict resolution, confidence-building, and creating an environment conducive to peaceful coexistence.
India's diplomatic engagement with Asean nations can serve as a cornerstone for regional stability. By fostering close ties and open lines of communication, India can facilitate dialogues, mediate disputes, and build trust among regional players. As a non-aligned nation with a history of diplomatic finesse, India is well-positioned to act as an impartial intermediary, promoting peaceful resolutions to conflicts in the Indo-Pacific.
In tandem with diplomacy, collaborative security measures are essential for deterring and addressing common security threats in the Indo-Pacific. This includes joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and the strengthening of defense ties with Asean nations. Building a robust security architecture within the region is critical to addressing emerging challenges effectively.
Engaging in joint military exercises and security drills with Asean countries can foster interoperability among armed forces and enhance the collective capacity to respond to security contingencies. Additionally, sharing intelligence and coordinating efforts can help identify and mitigate emerging threats promptly.
Territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, are significant drivers of instability in the Indo-Pacific. India can play a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms in the region. Given its non-aligned stance, India can serve as an honest broker, advocating for peaceful solutions to these disputes.
India's involvement in regional forums and multilateral organizations like the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) provides platforms for constructive dialogue and problem-solving. By actively participating in these forums, India can contribute to shaping a regional environment conducive to conflict resolution and cooperation.
While addressing border security or regional concerns, Prime Minister Modi also highlighted the critical need to ensure peace and security along India's border with Myanmar. This issue holds significant importance not only for bilateral relations but also for broader regional stability. India's approach to addressing this concern involves a multifaceted strategy.
Strengthening border infrastructure, surveillance capabilities, and patrolling along the India-Myanmar border is essential to curbing cross-border illegal activities. These activities, including smuggling and the movement of armed groups, pose security risks and hinder regional stability.
Improved border management can also facilitate better cooperation with Myanmar in addressing shared security challenges. By fortifying the border and enhancing security measures, India can deter potential threats and contribute to the stability of the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Engaging in sustained dialogue with the Myanmar government is crucial to addressing concerns and jointly working toward peace along the border. India's approach should encompass various aspects, including addressing issues related to insurgency, border demarcation, and the movement of refugees and displaced persons. By maintaining open channels of communication and diplomatic engagement with Myanmar, India can collaboratively address security challenges, foster trust, and promote regional stability.
Given the presence of insurgent groups along the India-Myanmar border, robust counterterrorism cooperation is essential. India can collaborate closely with Myanmar in intelligence sharing and coordinated efforts to combat these groups. Additionally, involving Asean countries in such counterterrorism efforts is critical, as some of these insurgent groups have transnational reach. By working collectively, India and Asean nations can effectively address this shared security concern, contributing to overall regional stability.
India can provide diplomatic support for Myanmar's internal peace process. A stable and peaceful Myanmar is not only in India's interest but also contributes to regional stability. By offering diplomatic backing, India can play a constructive role in encouraging Myanmar's efforts toward reconciliation and conflict resolution.
In a nutshell, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's emphasis on ensuring peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, as highlighted during the Asean-India Summit of 2023, underscores the critical importance of India's role in fostering stability in this dynamic and strategically significant area. India's "Act East Policy" has rightly recognized the Asean nations as central pillars in this endeavour, reflecting the region's pivotal role in India's economic growth, strategic interests, and overall security. To contribute effectively to regional stability, India must employ a multifaceted approach that combines diplomacy, collaborative security measures, and proactive engagement with its neighbours, particularly Myanmar. However, diplomacy remains the cornerstone of conflict resolution and trust-building, and India's history of diplomatic finesse positions it as an impartial intermediary in regional disputes. Collaborative security efforts, such as joint military exercises and intelligence sharing with Asean nations, are essential for addressing common security threats in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, India can play a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms in territorial disputes, like those in the South China Sea, promoting peaceful solutions.
Furthermore, India's commitment to ensuring peace and security along its border with Myanmar is not just a bilateral concern but also has far-reaching implications for regional stability. Strengthening border infrastructure, sustained dialogue, and counterterrorism cooperation are vital components of India's approach to addressing this concern. By pursuing these strategies and actively engaging with Myanmar, India can contribute to a more secure and stable Indo-Pacific region, aligning with the theme of the Asean-India Summit: "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth."..."
Source/publisher:
"The National" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-09-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"Justice For Myanmar calls on other ASEAN members to follow Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in refusing to attend the upcoming ASEAN Air Chiefs’ Conference (AACC), heeding the outcry from Myanmar and international civil society.
We call on ASEAN members to bar the illegal junta from all ASEAN defence activities, and failing that, to refuse to attend activities in which the junta participates.
The Myanmar junta’s air force head, Htun Aung, is the chair of AACC, and is currently commanding an indiscriminate campaign of aerial terror, slaughtering men, women and children, and destroying homes, schools, places of worship and whole villages.
According to reporting by AFP, the Thai air force chief is the only confirmed attendee of the 2023 AACC, while the air forces of Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam did not respond to questions.
Cambodia’s air force chief refused to comment to AFP on whether he will attend the meeting, which will be held in Naypyidaw from September 12-15.
Justice For Myanmar condemns ASEAN’s continued and direct support for the Myanmar air force, army and navy as it commits genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes with total impunity.
In August, Singapore was the only ASEAN member state that refused to attend a counter terrorism tabletop military exercise in Naypyidaw, chaired by the military junta with the Russian regime.
From September 25-30, the junta is scheduled to co-chair an ASEAN counter terrorism field training exercise in Russia, which ASEAN leaders must cancel, or refuse to attend if it goes ahead.
Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly denounced ASEAN’s defence cooperation with the illegal military junta, called for the junta’s exclusion from ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) activities, and urged countries to boycott defence activities that include the junta.
In an oral update to the UN Human Rights Council in July 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar slammed ASEAN’s appointment of Htun Aung as AACC chair, stating that “those responsible for these atrocities should not be serving in leadership positions in ASEAN. They should be serving sentences for their crimes.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The refusal of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to attend the AACC sends a clear and strong message to the military junta that it is losing support.
“It is untenable for a criminal junta that is committing atrocities with total impunity to chair a regional conference.
“Other ASEAN air force chiefs should follow the example of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and refuse to attend the AACC with the illegal junta.
“ASEAN must take a firm stand against the illegal junta and its aerial campaign of terror, led by the current AACC chair Htun Aung, who is a war criminal.
“ASEAN must stop providing legitimacy and support to the Myanmar military, which totally disregards and directly undermines its own commitments to resolve the crisis in Myanmar.
“We call on ASEAN members to bar the junta from defence meetings and activities, and refuse to attend when the junta participates.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-09-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-09-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"ASEAN is planning to hold a conference of air force chiefs in Naypyidaw from September 12-15, chaired by the commander-in-chief of the illegal Myanmar junta’s air force, according to a Justice For Myanmar source.
Justice For Myanmar demands ASEAN cancel the conference and strongly condemns the bloc’s continued and direct support for the Myanmar junta’s air force, army and navy as it wages a campaign of terror against the people, committing ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity.
The ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference (AACC) is currently chaired by the junta’s air force head, General Htun Aung, a war criminal who has commanded indiscriminate air strikes across Myanmar since his appointment in January 2022.
Evidence of Htun Aung’s direct commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity is extensive.
Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows that there were 930 airstrikes between January 10, 2022 and July 31, 2023, under Htun Aung’s command, killing close to 1,000 people.
Through an indiscriminate campaign of aerial terror, Htun Aung has commanded the slaughter of men, women and children, and destroyed homes, schools, places of worship and whole communities.
Htun Aung was in command for the aerial massacre on April 11, 2023 against a civilian gathering in Pazigyi village, Sagaing Region, murdering at least 168 people, including 40 children.
And in command for the aerial massacre on October 24, 2022 against those gathered for a concert in Hpakant, Kachin State, killing more than 80.
And in command for the aerial massacre on September 16, 2022 against a school in Let Yet Kone village, Sagaing Region, killing at least 12 people.
The ASEAN Chair issued a statement strongly condemning the junta's Pazigyi massacre. Yet it is now honouring one of the main perpetrators.
Htun Aung is currently sanctioned by the US, UK, EU and Canada.
ASEAN’s decision to appoint Htun Aung as the chair of AACC on November 4, 2022, and to allow him to convene a meeting of ASEAN air force commanders, is further evidence of the bloc knowingly supporting the junta’s international crimes.
ASEAN’s planned air force chiefs’ conference is part of its extensive program of defence and security cooperation in which the illegitimate junta plays a leading role. The junta currently heads ASEAN air force, navy, military counter terrorism and police cooperation.
In August, ASEAN held a counter terrorism military training exercise in Naypyidaw, and is now planning to hold a counter terrorism field training exercise in Russia from September 25-30, both co-chaired by the military junta.
In May, ASEAN appointed the junta’s navy head to chair the ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, and the junta is set to host a conference of ASEAN navy chiefs in 2024.
In March 2022, Myanmar junta police brigadier general Zaw Lin Tun was appointed executive director of the police cooperation body, ASEANPOL.
Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly denounced ASEAN’s defence cooperation with the illegal military junta, called for the junta’s exclusion from ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) activities, and urged countries to boycott ADMM activities that include the junta.
In an oral update to the UN Human Rights Council in July 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar slammed ASEAN’s appointment of Htun Aung as AACC chair, stating that “those responsible for these atrocities should not be serving in leadership positions in ASEAN. They should be serving sentences for their crimes.”
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “By proceeding with this air force conference and other military and police engagement with the junta, ASEAN and its member states are showing a callous disregard for the lives of Myanmar people and actively undermining its own commitments to resolve the crisis in Myanmar through the Five Point Consensus.
“ASEAN has tried to excuse military engagement with the junta by claiming it is technical and not political. This is insulting to the people of Myanmar who are victims of the junta’s daily attacks. It is an untenable position that in no way can excuse ASEAN’s support for the terrorist junta and complicity in its international crimes.
“There is no denying that ASEAN is legitimising and emboldening war criminals through its defence and security cooperation, endangering the lives of Myanmar people and worsening the crisis.
"Indonesia as the Chair of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting must immediately cancel the air chief’s meeting, the counter terrorism field training exercise and ban the junta from all activities.
“ASEAN members should boycott the air chiefs’ meeting if it goes ahead and refuse to attend all other ADMM activities that include the illegal junta.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
"US President Joe Biden’s decision to skip Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-related summits in the Indonesian capital Jakarta on Sept. 5-7 in favor of the G-20 leaders’ meeting in India just two days later has been greeted with howls of disappointment and criticism around Southeast Asian capitals and elsewhere that are concerned about America’s role in the region.
Biden’s unwillingness to show up is said to undermine “ASEAN centrality”, the notion that the bloc should be the main convening platform for promoting regional peace and security.
It would of course be ideal to have the American president take part in the ASEAN-US summit and the East Asia Summit—the latter a preeminent strategic dialogue which also includes Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and South Korea, apart from ASEAN member states.
But ASEAN centrality can no longer be taken for granted or simply assumed to hold. It increasingly has to be earned. First and foremost among ASEAN’s critical shortcomings is its inability to address the Myanmar coup that occurred in February 2021, and the raging and violent civil war that has ensued ever since.
It is common knowledge that ASEAN has been divided on both the United States-China competition and conflict, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Brunei, Laos and Cambodia appear to be in China’s orbit, whereas the rest more or less lean towards the US, especially the Philippines and Vietnam.
Myanmar is an outcast, while Thailand has been more inclined towards Beijing than it needs to be since the military coup in 2014. On the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Laos and Vietnam have abstained from key United Nations resolutions to condemn the aggression, with Thailand joining the abstainers on one of the resolutions. Singapore is at the opposite end, putting its money where its mouth is by imposing sanctions on Russia.
Notwithstanding these and other issues that have split ASEAN, such as human rights and China-Taiwan tensions, the most critical ASEAN divisiveness centers on Myanmar, because the war-torn country is a member state. If ASEAN cannot get its house in order with sufficient unity and common purpose, then it should not and cannot claim a central regional role to promote peace and security.
Indonesia’s chairmanship this year has fallen short in effecting dialogue and a way forward in Myanmar. The Indonesian government did try, however, and should not be blamed for the lack of concrete results, because Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the junta known as the State Administration Council, has been devious and intransigent.
He has taken ASEAN for a ride by agreeing to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), which he personally signed on to after it was brokered by Brunei in April 2021. The 5PC calls for the cessation of violence, inclusive dialogue, humanitarian assistance, an ASEAN envoy, and a delegation visit to promote compromise and a way out.
Yet the 5PC has floundered. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s apparent strategy is to exhaust and outlast other players in the mix. He has been instrumentally assisted by Thailand’s outgoing Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and his envoy for Myanmar, Pornpimol Kanchanalak. The pair have organised and facilitated “Track 1.5” policy-related meetings and even ministerial gatherings to lend legitimacy to the SAC.
Upholding the 5PC as the way to deal with Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have steadfastly refused to join the Thailand-hosted meetings. The Philippines falls in the same category, except Manila sent a mid-level diplomat to take part in one of the meetings.
Under Thailand’s newly elected government, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who has already stated his intention of restoring his country’s international standing, the ASEAN mix on Myanmar will likely be different. If the Philippines can stay the 5PC course, with Thailand’s recalibrated foreign policy posture and projection, including its approach towards the Myanmar junta, there will be a fundamental flip, whereby firm 5PC backers will be the five original founding members of ASEAN.
The alignment of the original ASEAN-5 can bring a lot of diplomatic heft to the table. This is the way to reboot and recover ASEAN momentum. In turn, the ASEAN-5 from August 1967 can pressure the SAC to implement the 5PC, which Gen. Min Aung Hlaing duplicitously agreed to. The ASEAN-5 should also engage the National Unity Government (NUG), especially if Myanmar’s civilian-led parallel administration can be revamped for greater effectiveness. Indonesia and Malaysia have already interacted with the NUG.
These two staunch ASEAN member states, along with Singapore, have maintained what’s left of ASEAN’s credibility and relevance by sticking to the 5PC and not recognizing the SAC and Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s legitimate government. If the Philippines and Thailand, both with democratically elected governments, can follow suit, ASEAN centrality will be given a big boost. Other ASEAN member states can come in as they see fit. But they should not be allowed to hold ASEAN hostage on the Myanmar impasse because the 5PC was signed by representatives from each of the 10 member states.
A newly configured regional grouping led by the ASEAN-5 will have the leverage and latitude to bring Gen. Min Aung Hlaing to heel because his military regime is losing in the country’s civil war. Reliable reports and datapoints suggest the ubiquitous People’s Defence Force units and ethnic armies are winning more territory and keeping Myanmar troops pinned down, and the latter are reluctant to fight without armour or air support. With a coup that has failed to consolidate and impose control over his territory and population, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing is vulnerable.
Getting its act together on Myanmar would enable ASEAN to be taken more seriously. Dissatisfaction with ASEAN centrality has manifested in other forms of “minilateral” cooperation among outside powers, including the Quad among Australia, India, Japan and the US, and Aukus, a security pact of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. If ASEAN wants to be back at the front and center in the region, it will need to regroup around the original core five states. The old ASEAN way of consensus and non-interference would need to be tweaked and nuanced correspondingly..."
Source/publisher:
"The Bangkok Post" via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
"Myanmar’s situation is becoming more protracted as violence between the military, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), and other ethnic armed groups continues. ASEAN is actively trying for an amicable solution to end the ongoing conflict and restore peace in Myanmar. The forum has voiced its support for a political solution to the crisis.
In the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Conference on July 12, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said that only a political solution could bring lasting peace to Myanmar. As the Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing is not interested in negotiating with the opposition, the five-point peace proposal given by ASEAN to restore peace in Myanmar has not yet been implemented. ASEAN calls on all member states to strongly condemn the on-going violence in Myanmar and also wants Myanmar’s conflicting parties to resume talks to reach a political settlement. Parliamentarians from ASEAN nations asked Thailand to sever ties with Myanmar’s junta-run government. They argued that no ASEAN member state should have friendly relations with Myanmar’s military because the force has turned Myanmar into a center of instability – threatening the entire region.
However, Thailand, a neighbor of Myanmar and a member of ASEAN, arranged a conference with Myanmar in December 2022 to talk about the current conflict there. Foreign Minister of Laos and Cambodia and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam along with Myanmar Junta representative were present in that meeting. Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore did not participate there. As ASEAN is divided over diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis of Myanmar, the alliance has failed to take a united stand. ASEAN is trying to bridge the divisions that have arisen among the member states over the Myanmar issue.
Chief of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Chalermpol Srisawat and Myanmar’s Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing, met on January to further strengthen mutual trust, understanding and friendly relations between the two-armed forces. Myanmar has more than 2,400 kilometers of border with Thailand. Cooperation between the two countries is needed on various issues, including human trafficking, drugs, and weapons. Millions of people displaced by Myanmar’s ongoing violence seek refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border, where they fear deportation because of their lack of legal protection. Besides, Thailand has corporate investment in Myanmar totaling more than $11 billion in 154 projects, which is 12.5% of all foreign investment in Myanmar and ranks Thailand third in terms of investment.
Junta Foreign Minister Than Swe said that Myanmar’s military is focusing its efforts on three of the five ASEAN consensus points. He told that, the regime is working to end the violence in the country, initiate dialogue between all parties and provide humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar. ASEAN welcomes any strategy, bilateral, trilateral or multilateral, based on ASEAN or non-ASEAN frameworks, to restore peace in Myanmar. At the same time, the National Unity Government (NUG) and other opposition coalitions in Myanmar along with the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) must unite and demonstrate that they have the strength and capability to lead and protect the nation. Gaining skills in local government structure, good governance and management of federal system and dialogue between NUG and various ethnic groups will play an important role in strengthening their position.
The military coup in Myanmar has led to a wave of civil protests and armed resistance by EAOs and civil defence forces. The junta government responded brutally with hundreds of air strikes, resulting in the destruction of tens of thousands of homes. According to a report issued on July 15 by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs, 1.9 million people have been displaced in Myanmar, including 1.6 million victims of the 2021 military coup, and more than 1 million people have abandoned their homes. The Rohingyas, who fled the nation and sought asylum in Bangladesh as a result of the Myanmar junta’s cruel persecution, are excluded from this estimate. The military junta has killed 3,800 citizens and imprisoned almost 20,000 since taking power. Military personnel have destroyed around 70,000 structures. Millions of people in the country are enduring food shortages, relocation, and economic devastation as a result of the armed conflict. The country has endured international isolation and sanctions, leading in decreased foreign investment and commerce, which has harmed the economy.
The people of Myanmar have resisted to get rid of this situation. The United Nations Human Rights Council established the Independent Investigation Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) to gather evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Myanmar. Their reports revealed the burning of entire villages, the deliberate bombing of civilian homes, and the massacre of civilians and captured combatants. After all these, the arms supply to Myanmar could not be stopped. A UN report notes that the junta government bought $1 billion worth of weapons and equipment after taking power. Many Southeast Asian countries, networks, and organizations are benefitting from the plight of the Myanmar people by supplying the junta with weapons and other equipment.
Myanmar’s junta government reneged on its promise to hold general elections in August this year, suspending the election process and extending the ongoing state of emergency for another six months. Junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing informed a top officials’ conference that the prevalence of terrorism in Myanmar has dropped as a result of ongoing actions by the military against the attacking groups. However, the country’s position has not yet returned to normal. By extending the state of emergency four times since assuming power, it is clear that the military does not have enough control over the people and most areas of the country.
The Election Commission of Myanmar removed the NLD from the list of political parties due to its failure to register with the Election Commission, making it ineligible to participate in the elections. Extending the state of emergency, according to the US, would plunge Myanmar into bloodshed and instability. Former Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi was imprisoned after being ousted in a military coup in 2021. Suu Kyi was sentenced to a total of 33 years in prison at the end of the 19-count trial. In five of these criminal cases, the term of imprisonment was reduced to six years by declaring amnesty. On July 28, Suu Kyi was released from prison and taken to a government building.
In 2017, under Suu Kyi’s rule, the Myanmar military’s crackdown on the Rohingya ethnic group forced nearly 1.1 million Rohingya to seek refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. Her inability to address the armed forces’ ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in Rakhine State sparked international outrage and criticism. Regardless, her efforts to build a democratic Myanmar are internationally acknowledged. On May 27 and June 4, Suu Kyi and senior military leaders held fruitful talks on the country’s armed conflict, public security and peace building. It is perceived that the current junta government wants to use Suu Kyi’s influence to end the armed struggle.
The international community must continue its support to restore peace and stability in Myanmar. Countries that have been helping Myanmar prolong the present conflict by providing weapons and other aid must withdraw from their positions and help fulfil the election promises made by the junta government. The UN, Western countries and donor agencies believe that a return to peace and democracy in Myanmar will accelerate Rohingya repatriation. As a neighbouring country, Bangladesh hopes for peace, progress and stability in Myanmar. Aside from the Rohingya issue, communication between the two countries can help both countries develop and progress. There is no doubt about ASEAN countries’ contribution to Myanmar’s economy. As a result, ASEAN should maintain its efforts to restore peace and stability in Myanmar. If ASEAN and other regional countries can restore peace in Myanmar, it will be a phenomenal success as well as recognition of the region’s ability to resolve crises locally..."
Source/publisher:
Eurasia Review
Date of publication:
2023-08-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"Justice For Myanmar condemns ASEAN’s move to organise a military exercise in Russia, co-chaired by the Myanmar military junta.
The exercise will provide the junta with improved military capabilities as it wages a campaign of terror against the people with indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, murder, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and the deliberate torching of homes, villages and crops.
The military exercise will take place from September 25-30 in Ussuriysk and Vladivostok, according to a recent update to ASEAN’s defence calendar.
Ussuriysk and Vladivostok are under Russia’s Eastern Military District, which is engaged in Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Vladivostok is the headquarters of Russia’s Pacific Fleet and Ussuriysk is the headquarters of the 5th Combined Arms Army.
The military exercise is part of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter Terrorism, which the Russian regime and illegal Myanmar junta are leading.
The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) platform is chaired by Indonesia’s defence minister, Prabowo Subianto.
Justice For Myanmar and other Myanmar and international civil society organisations have repeatedly called on ASEAN to bar the junta from ADMM, and for member states and dialogue partners to boycott ADMM activities that include the junta.
If it goes ahead, the upcoming field training in Russia will deepen ASEAN’s complicity in the junta’s ongoing commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people of Myanmar.
ASEAN tabletop military exercise fuels junta violence
In August, the junta hosted an ASEAN tabletop military exercise in Naypyidaw, which provided direct military support to junta troops as they slaughter Myanmar people.
In propaganda published after the tabletop exercise, the junta confirmed that ASEAN’s tabletop exercise supports operations against the legitimate National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) and People’s Defence Forces (PDF), which it has illegally designated as terrorist groups, stating that “Myanmar, where the attacks of NUG/PDF terrorists occur in recent political development, has gained invaluable experiences from the opportunity to work closely together with international community in the counter terrorism measures.”
In fact, the military junta is itself a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and as defined in international law.
The tabletop exercise involved the junta’s Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), elite troops trained for urban warfare. Unverified reports suggest SOTF was involved in the junta's bloody and brutal crackdown of peaceful protesters following the military’s illegal coup attempt. The ASEAN tabletop exercise featured a demonstration by SOTF, and the junta reported that the international participants “recognized the physical strength and mental toughness of male and female SOTF members who are well-disciplined and well-trained.”
Justice For Myanmar welcomes the decision of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and the USA to not attend the tabletop exercise, and condemns ASEAN, and countries that participated, which included all remaining ASEAN members and the dialogue partners China and India. The junta responded that refusal to attend the military exercise “infers the meaning of supporting terrorism and terrorist acts.”
The tabletop exercise was opened by the junta’s Chief of General Staff for the army, navy and air force, General Maung Maung Aye, who is sanctioned by the EU.
The EU noted that in addition to Maung Maung Aye’s direct responsibility for numerous human rights violations, he is involved in the purchase of Russian arms and “helps to strengthen the Myanmar Armed Forces international positioning through meetings with counterparts from other countries”.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “ASEAN’s decision to provide training for junta troops in counter terrorism tactics is abhorrent and untenable.
“ASEAN, its member states and dialogue partners know full well that the junta commits atrocities with total impunity, and that military training emboldens it and aids and abets its international crimes.
“ASEAN is not only failing to resolve the crisis in Myanmar through its Five Point Consensus but is actively undermining its own commitment to the consensus by backing the junta with military support and legitimacy, while also impeding international action.
"Indonesia as the Chair of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting must immediately cancel the exercise and ban the junta from all activities.
“ASEAN members and dialogue partners should boycott the exercise if it goes ahead and refuse to attend all other ADMM activities that include the illegal junta.
“ASEAN’s military training clearly shows that claims of ‘ASEAN centrality’ is a cover for business as usual with the terrorist junta, at the expense of the lives of Myanmar people.
“The UN Security Council and governments need to urgently step up and take concrete steps to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-29
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, International Criminal Court, ASEAN-Burma relations
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165.05 KB 157.59 KB
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Sub-title:
The changing world order and the growing Chinese aggression in the SCS have compelled the ASEAN countries to increase their military expenditures
Description:
"With global dynamics changing due to big power rivalry, the Indo-Pacific region is challenging the traditional concept of the Asia-Pacific with ASEAN at its core. Several ASEAN-centric bodies provided the regional security architecture. The United States (US) and its Quad partners—India, Japan, and Australia—have decided to challenge China’s aggressive intent in the South China Sea (SCS) and in the larger Indo- Pacific. ASEAN worries that it may have to choose sides.
ASEAN integration with the Chinese economy is intense. Its defence engagement with China is constrained by China’s assertiveness in the SCS and claims over its ‘traditional rights’ as outlined by the nine-dash line. This brings it into conflict with five ASEAN countries, notably Vietnam and the Philippines; the contention with Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia is more muted.
The Quad, the AUKUS, the threat of a Taiwan conflict, and the Ukraine crisis cause anxiety to ASEAN. ASEAN’s traditional posture of a liberal construct to deal with security challenges is failing. The Chinese have upended the reality in the SCS while providing lip service to ASEAN’s efforts to have a Code of Conduct (CoC) since 2002.
There is enhanced threat perception and defence spending by ASEAN countries. It cannot be termed as an arms race because ASEAN members are generally not competing with each other, nor are they in a position to challenge China or other inimical powers. Yet, military acquisition is increasing as maritime security moves centre stage.
The Chinese have upended the reality in the SCS while providing lip service to ASEAN’s efforts to have a Code of Conduct (CoC) since 2002.
ASEAN countries have a modernisation process underway. This has several aspects to it. Some started a while ago, but the need to bolster defences and replace equipment has had a link to Chinese aggression since 2010. According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure database 2023, ASEAN’s military expenditure increased from US$20.3 billion in 2000 to US$43.2 billion in 2021. From 2002-2007, this was below US$30 billion annually. Since 2015, ASEAN countries spent US$41 billion or more, the highest being US$ 44.3 billion in 2020.
From 2012, Chinese aggression in the SCS grew, cleaving ASEAN and bringing Chinese ships to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), waters and shoals of five ASEAN countries. Notably, military expenditure increases began in 2013, when expenditures leapt from US $34 billion to US $38 billion and have been growing since. Among ASEAN countries, according to SIPRI, from 2002-2021, Singapore has had the largest defence budget, reaching US$11 billion. The next was Indonesia with US$8.2 billion in 2023 marginally lower than US$ 9.3 billion as seen in 2020. Since 2012, Indonesia increased its defence expenditure from US$ 6.5 billion to US$ 8.3 billion in 2013 and has maintained a steady level.
Thailand is another major importer of weaponry with a budget of US$ 6.6 billion though it had maintained US$7 billion per annum for the previous three years. Malaysia and the Philippines both crossed the threshold of US$3 billion per annum and maintained it for a decade. These are likely to rise.
SIPRI does not have reliable defence expenditure figures for Vietnam but places them around US$ 5.5 billion per annum. Vietnam ceased publishing its defence budget in 2018 when it was estimated at 2.36 percent of its GDP. In December 2022, Vietnam held its first Def Expo; 170 exhibitors from 30 countries participated, which is a sign that Vietnam, facing Chinese hostility consistently, aims to diversify its Russian defence base. JSC Rosoboronexport (Russia), Lockheed Martin (US), Airbus (Europe), BrahMos Aerospace (India) and Mitsubishi Electric (Japan) had participated. Chinese companies, though invited, were absent. Vietnam relied on Russia for 70 percent of its weaponry. Most of its large equipment is Russian. The dependence decreased to below 60 percent in 2021. The US lifted an embargo on weapon transfers to Vietnam in 2016. Since 2017, the US and South Korea became suppliers.
Chinese aggression in the SCS grew, cleaving ASEAN and bringing Chinese ships to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), waters and shoals of five ASEAN countries.
South Korea has enhanced its exports to ASEAN. Korean Aerospace Industries in February 2023 signed a US$910-million contract for 18 FA-50 fighters to Malaysia; they challenged the offer of India’s Tejas aircraft. While Malaysia is not among the major arms spenders, its engagement with South Korea and Türkiye is growing. According to SIPRI, between 2017 and 2021, South Korea sold over US $2 billion of defence equipment to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Malaysia.
Threat perceptions and its implications
The perceptions of threats among ASEAN member states and how they should confront them varies. Some are more comfortable in dealing with the US, Australia, and Japan who are Quad members; others are more circumspect. The difference is due to the threat perceptions. Vietnam and the Philippines, for instance, are the biggest victims of Chinese aggression in the SCS. China has occupied islands and challenged control by Vietnam and the Philippines over islets and shoals that were traditionally governed but not defended. The Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal with the Philippines and Johnson Reef with Vietnam have witnessed such aggression. Therefore, the expansion of Vietnamese and the Filipinos armed forces and equipment and capabilities are an important factor.
In cases where military coups have occurred, such as in Thailand and Myanmar, the expansion of the armed forces was faster and more sustained. Some equipment purchased by Myanmar and Thailand cannot be easily linked to direct threats because these countries are not engaged in direct confrontation with China in the SCS. They have no ostensible enemies except within; yet obtaining submarines like Thailand received from China in 2017 and Myanmar obtained from India as a gift looks odd. Myanmar is perhaps responding more to Bangladesh acquiring Chinese submarines. Submarine acquisitions by Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia are also noted in ASEAN.
China has occupied islands and challenged control by Vietnam and the Philippines over islets and shoals that were traditionally governed but not defended.
In several ASEAN countries, the ideology behind the defence of the realm has altered. While the control by the military in Thailand and Myanmar gives impetus to defence expenditure there, in Indonesia and the Philippines, the move away from military governments towards democracy goes in the other direction. Instead of large armies, intended for internal control, and dealing with counter-insurgencies, the emphasis shifts to understanding the maritime challenges and acquiring naval and air assets for developing maritime security capabilities.
In democratic societies, budgetary constraints often come in the way of purchasing new equipment. This requires the executive to coordinate with the legislature and the Treasury. This impacts the kind of weapon systems that are being acquired or have become lost opportunities. The ability to coordinate these internally led the Philippines to outrun Indonesia and Vietnam in ordering the BrahMos missiles from India. In Indonesia, the order has not materialised, because internal coordination between the government and Parliament is inconclusive.
It is not entirely clear why Vietnam, despite its interest in the Brahmos and placing orders for weapons from other sources, is hesitant, though it happily accepts a gift of a warship from India.
In the case of Indonesia, they ordered 42 Rafaeles from France. Meanwhile, they obtained 12 second-hand Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from Qatar for US$792 million. This is the impact of budgetary constraints.
The Philippines during the first Horizon (2013 to 2017) purchased military hardware for internal security. The second horizon (2017 to 2022) focused shifting from internal security to territorial defence. The Philippines allocated US$ 5.6 billion for Horizon 2 and US$ 4 billion for Horizon 3 (2022-2027).
The ability to coordinate these internally led the Philippines to outrun Indonesia and Vietnam in ordering the BrahMos missiles from India.
Thailand, in 2022, ordered armed reconnaissance AH-6 helicopters from the US and Hermes 900 drones from Israel to support maritime operations. Singapore’s 2023 defence budget is US$13.4 billion, witnessing a 10-percent increase over 2022. It will include buying 8 (STOVL)-capable Lockheed Martin F-35B fighter aircraft to replace its F16s. Malaysia, besides the Korean fighters, will acquire three unmanned aerial systems from Turkish Aerospace Industries, and two maritime patrol aircraft from Italian firm Leonardo. In Indonesia, new helicopters, aircraft, naval vessels and surface combatants, military rotorcraft, submarines, underwater and electronic warfare systems, are the key components for expansion,
SIPRI indicates that in 2021, ASEAN countries spent US$43 billion on defence, merely 2 percent of worldwide defence expenditures. Comparatively, the US spent US$ 827 billion (39 percent), Europe US $418 billion (20 percent). China spent US$ 292 billion (13 percent) and Japan and South Korea both spent US$ 46 billion (2.1 percent) each.
The surge started around 2010. Russia was quick to provide equipment particularly Sukhoi aircraft to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Submarines were also popular. The Ukraine crisis and US nudging led ASEAN to avoid Russian equipment. Between 2000 and 2020, Russia was the largest arms supplier to ASEAN with sales of US$11 billion compared to US$8.4 billion from the US. The cost factor, the non-interference by Russia in the internal matters of ASEAN countries, and sometimes the use of barter arrangements by payment in commodities helped Russia. The US sanctions on Russia reportedly led to the cancellation by Indonesia of the Sukhoi 35 fighter deal and reduced the Philippines’ interest in buying 16 military helicopters.
Due to the Ukraine war, Russia is constrained in supplying weaponry. Its diminished capacity leads ASEAN to buy new equipment from American, European, and other Asian countries. The biggest advantage is for South Korea. They provide good technology at competitive cost, with little interest in the domestic politics of ASEAN. Given the new impetus to military modernisation in ASEAN, the market serves a good opportunity for middle powers to expand their imprint especially India..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of publication:
2023-08-23
Date of entry/update:
2023-08-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia expressed their grave concern today that ASEAN countries are still scheduled to hold counter-terrorism military exercises with the Myanmar junta in August and September. They called on ASEAN to exclude the illegal junta from all joint military exercises held by the regional bloc.
“It would be utterly absurd for ASEAN countries to join the Myanmar junta in military exercises when the junta has consistently shown a lack of political will or interest in abiding by the Five-Point Consensus, notably ‘the immediate cessation of violence’,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today.
“It is especially galling that these exercises are purportedly for counter-terrorism purposes as the junta has branded the democratically-elected National Unity Government and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, as well as the People’s Defense Forces and various other pro-democracy entities, as terrorists,” said Barends.
According to statements from the Russian Ministry of Defense as well as documents from ASEAN’s website, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) Experts Working Group on Counter Terrorism is planning to hold a tabletop exercise in Myanmar in August as well as a field exercise in Russia in September. Myanmar and Russia have chaired this working group since 2021, following their appointment in 2020.
“These exercises would only serve to increase the junta’s capacity to continue its campaign of murder and terror against the people of Myanmar. ASEAN must be unified in their condemnation of the escalating human rights situation and take action which makes clear that the Myanmar junta’s atrocities are unacceptable. One way to do this is by canceling these exercises and excluding the junta from all future joint military exercises and defense meetings,” said Barends.
“If ASEAN as a bloc refuses to do this, then we call on ASEAN and ADMM+ countries to follow the example of the United States, Australia and New Zealand and boycott the training.”..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-07-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Sub-title:
From Myanmar’s crisis to China’s activities in the South China Sea to relations with Russia, the Southeast Asia bloc is at the center of many key global challenges.
Description:
"Foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathered last week in Jakarta, with a range of critical challenges to address. Chief among those issues was the crisis in member state Myanmar, which the bloc is divided on how to approach. China’s aggressive activities in the South China Sea were also a key topic at the summit, with Beijing and ASEAN pledging to reach an agreement on a long-stalled non-binding code of conduct.
ASEAN’s regional centrality means that the bloc is often thrust into broader geopolitical issues. At the ASEAN Regional Forum that took place alongside the foreign minister’s meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, continued discussions on thawing U.S.-China ties. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also attended the regional forum. ASEAN countries have largely condemned the invasion of Ukraine but have focused on their own interests in engagement with Moscow.
USIP’s Jason Tower, Brian Harding and Alex Stephenson discuss how ASEAN countries are approaching Myanmar’s crisis and relations with Russia, where negotiations with China on the South China Sea stand, and the meeting between the top U.S. and Chinese diplomats at the regional forum.
1. Differences over Myanmar persist.
Tower: ASEAN’s deliberations on Myanmar’s crisis demonstrated that divisions over how to address the military’s ongoing war against the Myanmar people are impacting the Southeast Asian grouping much more than ASEAN can influence the situation in Myanmar. As the current ASEAN chair, Indonesia has followed a low-key approach, attempting to build cautious dialogue with the country’s diverse resistance actors, including the National Unity Government (NUG) and several ethnic armed organizations. While this should be seen as a welcome step, China’s growing assertiveness and high-level engagements with the military regime since December 2022 have prompted Myanmar’s neighbors to introduce their own platform for engagement with the military regime, undercutting Indonesia as chair.
Dubbed the “track 1.5” on Myanmar, this platform began convening in March of 2023 in Thailand, bringing together representatives of the military junta with all of Myanmar’s neighbors and most other mainland Southeast Asian countries. In the four months leading up to the ASEAN summit, this platform convened three times, mounting a campaign to overrule ASEAN’s decision made back in 2021 to suspend Myanmar’s participation in high-level ASEAN meetings at the ministerial level and above. While ASEAN ultimately rejected this move — keeping the junta out of the foreign minister’s meeting — China sent a strong signal of its preferences by inviting the junta’s minister of science and technology, Myo Thein Kyaw, to join a ministerial level China-ASEAN meeting on technology transfer overlapping with the ASEAN meeting on July 12.
Further overshadowing Indonesia’s efforts as chair, Thailand’s outgoing foreign minister, Don Parmudwinal, revealed at the ASEAN summit that he had made a secret visit to Myanmar, where Min Aung Hlaing granted him access to the country’s imprisoned State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. This came as a considerable surprise given that repeated requests by the United Nations special envoy, subsequent ASEAN chairs, the United States, China and countless other governments and envoys had been rejected. Additionally, there was no effort made to coordinate the meeting with the ASEAN chair or with other stakeholders. The move was interpreted by the NUG as a form of “hostage diplomacy,” with the Myanmar army leveraging its close relationship with the outgoing government of Thailand to manipulate both international and domestic perceptions of Aung San Suu Kyi’s views about the situation in country. As NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung pointed out, the way in which the meeting took place amounted to “nothing more than … cornering her to answer questions in the interests of her captor.”
Many ASEAN states have voiced some level of agreement with the NUG in this regard. The joint communique from the foreign minister’s meeting indicated that “a number of ASEAN member states” viewed Thailand’s move as positive, implying that others do not share this view. Meanwhile, Singapore released its own statement demanding that the ASEAN chair be granted access to Aung San Suu Kyi, and pointing out that violence has only continued to escalate. China on the other hand seems not to share these concerns. On July 14, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a read out of Chinese foreign policy chief Wang Yi’s meeting with the Thai foreign minister on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, commending Thailand for its “positive contributions to addressing the Myanmar issue.”
2. ASEAN countries have a tricky balancing act to play with Russia.
Harding: ASEAN’s centrality in regional security architecture, with this year’s ASEAN chair hosting a series of major meetings, meant that Indonesia found itself at the center of geopolitics for the week, hosting Blinken, Wang and Lavrov, among others. ASEAN countries, which find themselves divided on many major geopolitical issues, have a range of views on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While no parties welcomed the invasion of Ukraine, they have mostly sought to avoid the topic and instead have advocated for their practical interests such as the export of grain and related food prices.
Indonesia, in its own unilateral capacity, has been the most active ASEAN member on the issue, with President Joko Widodo casting Indonesia as a potential “bridge for peace.” Jokowi visited Kyiv and Moscow ahead of Indonesia’s hosting of the 2020 G20 Summit and Defense Minister (and presidential candidate) Prabowo Subianto unveiled his own peace plan at the Shangri-La Dialogue, demonstrating Indonesia’s interest in playing a leadership role on the issue. This interest aligns with Indonesia’s longstanding “independent and active” foreign policy that is rooted in nonalignment and places Indonesia with a front-row seat in global affairs. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi notably took the opportunity to convene a trilateral meeting with Wang and Lavrov, visibly putting Indonesia at the center of the table and perhaps idealistically trying to shape how these two powers engage each other and the world.
3. A code of conduct for South China Sea remains elusive.
Harding: ASEAN and China have been negotiating a non-binding code of conduct for the South China Sea since 2002 and negotiations have been in a deep freeze since 2020. Last week, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN and China announced an agreement to accelerate negotiations with the creation of new “guidelines.” While the announcement puts a good face on the issue, which was important to ASEAN chair Indonesia to mark the 20th anniversary of China joining ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, negotiations remain intractable.
At issue is China’s ongoing, unlawful harassment of activities being conducted by Southeast Asian claimants in disputed waters ranging from fishing to energy exploration, and the freedom to conduct military activities. While ASEAN and China have agreed to another “reading” of a single draft, there are deep divisions about the contents, starting with basic issues of international law.
Regional political dynamics also suggest that substantive progress is highly unlikely to accelerate. The most notable recent change in ASEAN-China relations relates to the foreign policy disposition of the Philippines since the inauguration of President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. in July 2022. Whereas his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, discarded the Philippines’ victory in the Arbitral Tribunal under the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea at the Hague that declared China’s claims in the South China Sea unlawful in a gambit to warm relations with Beijing, Marcos has instead relentlessly shined light on China’s swarming of vessels within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and aggressive confrontations by China’s Coast Guard. With the Philippines again at the vanguard of ASEAN’s pushback against China’s activities in the South China Sea, an ASEAN-China agreement seems as unlikely as ever.
4. The high-level thaw in U.S.-China relations continues.
Stephenson: On the sidelines of the summit, Blinken met with Wang for the second time in less than a month. At a glance, the talks didn’t yield any breakthroughs. But assessing the meeting in isolation doesn’t do it justice. Regular and direct communication between a range of high-level officials will be necessary if any improvement is to be made in U.S.-China relations. To this end, Washington and Beijing have been building steady momentum, a trend which Blinken and Wang continued in Jakarta.
Blinken’s visit to China in June set the stage for Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change John Kerry to make similar trips only weeks later. Last week, Chinese Ambassador Xie Feng met with top American defense officials at the Pentagon, an important step towards the resumption of military talks, which have been frozen last August. This modest return to communication could help lower the risk of conflict at a volatile time in the relationship. Moreover, it will tee up a meeting between Biden and Xi later this year, which could expand opportunities for a greater “thaw” by providing the relationship with much needed direction.
Ultimately, the Blinken and Wang meeting was a small yet significant step forward on the long road to détente. But building peace often requires workable minimums, not impossible maximums. Even in the absence of a flashy breakthrough, Washington's and Beijing’s agreement to keep talking is a promising sign..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2023-07-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Sub-title:
The Thailand caretaker government’s decision to engage with the military junta in Myanmar has threatened ASEAN unity
Description:
"The outgoing caretaker government of Thailand hailed the Thailand-led informal meetings to engage Myanmar—joined by representatives of a few members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and neighbouring countries, namely Laos, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei, and Vietnam, as well as Myanmar—on 19 June as successful, amidst growing criticisms from several quarters. Only Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar had sent their Foreign Ministers for this meeting. The invitation sent from Thailand read, “ASEAN should fully reengage with Myanmar at the leaders’ level.” The Thai Foreign Ministry statement read, “informal dialogue would not amount to a formal ASEAN meeting, the ministry said, but would help support ASEAN’s efforts to end the violence in Myanmar.” The talks held in Pattaya were boycotted by significant regional countries such as Indonesia (the current ASEAN chair), Singapore, and Malaysia, leading to seeming divisions within the bloc.
Indonesia cited the lack of consensus among ASEAN members to engage with the regime leaders, while Singapore deemed it premature to engage with the junta at the summit level. The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers. They viewed it as a clear violation of ASEAN’s consensus agreement to exclude junta representatives from high-level meetings.
The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers.
Thailand’s decision to take the lead in organising these meetings signifies the caretaker government’s intent not to rely solely on the incoming government (that may change the current military policy towards Myanmar and align it with countries that support democracy) and ASEAN to address Myanmar-related issues. Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, justified this choice by emphasising the belief that efforts to tackle the crisis within Myanmar should be smooth, given they share one of the longest borders of around 2,416 km. The organisation of these talks aims to prioritise Thailand’s best interests, particularly considering the direct impact of the issue on the borders, trade, refugee conditions, and overall business activities.
Thailand’s bilateral approach towards Myanmar diverges from the position adopted by ASEAN. In November 2021, Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister publicly announced his visit to Myanmar, where he met with Min Aung Hlaing, the coup’s leader. On 22 December 2022, Thailand took the initiative to arrange a meeting with representatives from mainland Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Another meeting involving stakeholders from Thailand and Myanmar occurred in April 2023. Notably, both of these later meetings included the participation of ministers from Myanmar’s military government, the State Administration Council (SAC). These engagements contradict the ASEAN Five Point Consensus (5PC), which ASEAN member states agreed upon in April 2021. These actions by Thailand reflect its interests, concerns, and historical approach to its mainland neighbours to sort its bilateral position.
Thailand’s rationale for engaging with Myanmar
Thailand considers itself the most impacted ASEAN member state regarding the situation in Myanmar. According to reports, Thailand hosts more than 20,000 displaced people and illegal migrants from Myanmar. Similar to other Southeast Asian nations, Thailand has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, which means it does not have provisions to recognise or protect refugees according to international standards legally.
Furthermore, Thailand heavily depends on importing oil and primarily gas from the Yadana field located in the Andaman Sea off the coast of Myanmar. Following the 2021 coup, Thailand’s state-owned oil and gas company, PTT Exploration and Production, actively acquired the investments Chevron and Total divested from Myanmar.
The caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc.
Thailand’s reliance on Myanmar extends to the labour sector, with a significant dependence on both formal and informal workers from Myanmar in various industries, including agriculture and fisheries, construction and manufacturing, and the service sector. In 2021, Thailand stood as Myanmar’s largest trading partner, and Thai businesses have a substantial presence in Myanmar, particularly in the food and beverage and pharmaceutical sectors.
However, since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, border trade between Myanmar and Thailand has significantly declined due to the junta’s restrictions to prevent weapons from reaching resistance forces. According to Myanmar’s Ministry of Commerce, under the military generals, border trade has decreased from over US$4 billion in the 2019-2020 financial year to US$3.6 billion in the 2022-2023 financial year. Ongoing border conflicts frequently delay trade, while high taxes burden traders.
For nearly two years, Myanmar’s military generals have been barred from senior-level meetings of the ASEAN for not living up to the agreement to start talks with the ousted civilian government led by now-jailed Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, the caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc. Critics have pointed out “it risks legitimising Myanmar’s military government and is inappropriate because it is outside the official ASEAN peace initiative, known as the five-point consensus.” But the question is, does it really present ASEAN as a fractured and divided organisation in this scenario? Even though most countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore did not agree to participate in this gathering, the reason cited for not doing so was the same. All these countries wanted to stick to the decision taken at the ASEAN meetings of not engaging with the top leaders of the junta until the conditions laid down by the ASEAN are met, like the junta open to engaging with the civilian opposition government, scaling down the ongoing violence, among others.
Problems with the 5PC
The lack of progress of the five-point consensus (5PC) signed in an emergency meeting held in Jakarta in April 2021, two months after the coup, has led many to say that there is a need for the ASEAN to now look beyond the 5PC, but does that give Thailand (a fellow ASEAN member country) the pass for hosting these informal meetings and inviting the top officials like the Foreign Minister of the junta regime? This brings into question the unity and credibility of the ASEAN. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, professor of political science at Chulalongkorn University, has pointed out, “By riding roughshod over Indonesia’s leadership, Thailand is also undermining the ways that ASEAN works and the role of its chair.” Regardless of the fact (stated in the previous section) that Thailand appears to be the most affected country by the ongoing crises in Myanmar, given that Thailand itself is on the cusp of undergoing a change in government, with the new government (if it comes to power) having stated that they will be committed to the ASEAN’s 5PC, this move to engage with the military junta in Myanmar seems like a desperate attempt by the caretaker government to try and earn one last feather in its cap. Scholars like Zachary Abuza at the National War College in Washington, D.C., have stated, “Thailand’s caretaker government seems determined to continue advancing the political and economic interests of the Thai military and royalist elites.”
Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks.
This year’s ASEAN chair, Indonesia, already has a lot on its plate, like the ASEAN community-building project, tensions in the South China Sea, the impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war, the growing United States-China rivalry, promoting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and the planned accession of Timor Leste as ASEAN’s 11th member this year. But according to statements from the Indonesia Foreign Ministry, it is still “undertaking efforts with the office of the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar to achieve an inclusive dialogue with all parties in the conflict.” While it cannot be denied that the ASEAN mechanisms like the 5PC and the various summits and meetings about the Myanmar crisis have not come out with any substantive progress, it also does not seem plausible for individual member countries to organise such informal meetings by completely side-tracking the ASEAN platform.
Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks. If not all ASEAN countries are on board with such arrangements, that again raises a finger on the whole notion of unity within the ASEAN. At a time when ASEAN centrality is being championed in the debates centring on the evolving dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, and there are constant efforts by countries like Indonesia and Singapore to ensure that the ASEAN remains relevant amidst the mushrooming of the many mini-laterals and plurilaterals in the region, these ‘informal secretive meetings’ will only feed into the ongoing narrative of the ‘fading of the ASEAN unity’.
Critics of the ASEAN 5PC have said that alternate plans and drastic measures should be taken, like suspending Myanmar’s membership in the ASEAN or letting the United Nations deal with this issue. These measures seem overly severe, but if the ASEAN wants to implement any of these, the decision needs to be taken following the ASEAN way and the platform of the ASEAN itself to ensure the credibility of the ‘ASEAN centrality’ principle..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of publication:
2023-07-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-07-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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more
Description:
"Another batch of relief items from the people of ASEAN to the people of Myanmar affected by Tropical Cyclone MOCHA arrived in Yangon on 26 June 2023.
The items include emergency shelter tool kits and a manual water filtration system worth 37.8K USD in value. They were transported from Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) warehouse in Subang, Malaysia, by Indonesia’s military aircraft.
Last week, two batches of DELSA relief items, worth 393.4K USD, were also shipped from Subang to Yangon. One batch arrived on 21June 2023 and the other arrived on 28 June 2023.
Moving forward, ASEAN stands ready to continue supporting Myanmar, including in the transition from emergency response to recovery phase. Modality of support may be developed, among others, from the final ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) needs assessment report. ASEAN Secretary-General, in his capacity as the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator (SG-AHAC), will coordinate ASEAN's response.
Tropical Cyclone MOCHA’s devastating impact has affected millions in Myanmar and severely damaging 277,011 buildings including residential houses, schools, hospitals, and other public facilities.
To date, through ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre), ASEAN has mobilised 10 batches of humanitarian support for Myanmar with a total value of around 1.6M USD. The items were mobilised through commercial flight, sea freight, and military aircraft from Singapore and Indonesia. ASEAN Member States have also responded individually by providing humanitarian assistance support in the forms of financial aid, logistics, and tools/equipment..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication:
2023-06-30
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Cyclones - regional, Natural Disasters - General
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"As great power rivalry casts its long shadow over Southeast Asia, the imperative of regional unity grows more urgent. Yet diversity, divisions and disputes remain consequential features of the region that pose a significant threat to unity.
Differences in cultures, languages, religions, historical experiences, political systems and developmental pathways have shaped Southeast Asia as it stands today. Geopolitically, these differences make the challenge of forging unity a particularly onerous task.
During the Cold War, diversity manifested in the ideological division of Southeast Asia into communist and non-communist states. This division also assumed a geographical expression in terms of the divide between mainland (mostly communist) and maritime (non-communist) Southeast Asia.
Yet the picture that emerges on closer inspection is far more complex. Among the communist mainland states were Chinese and Soviet clients, at a time when the Sino–Soviet split was at its height. While relations among non-communist maritime states were more harmonious, they were still fraught with residual suspicion and mistrust, much of which took the form of sovereignty disputes stemming from decolonisation projects.
Since 2022, diversity has also manifested in regional states’ positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Regional powers such as Vietnam (because of longstanding ties with Russia) and Indonesia (because of its foreign policy non-alignment principle) have taken restrained positions, whereas Singapore has openly condemned the invasion and imposed unilateral sanctions.
Meanwhile, the military junta that seized power in Myanmar in February 2021 has unsurprisingly been one of Russia’s staunchest supporters. While other Southeast Asian states voted at the United Nations to condemn the invasion, they have avoided taking more robust stances.
Then come divisions. One of the most pressing challenges to ASEAN cohesion is the Myanmar crisis. While ASEAN has strained to maintain a semblance of unity in its efforts to pressure the junta leadership in Myanmar, differences between member states on the issue diminished the prospects of the organisation resolving the crisis.
In the lead-up to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jakarta in February 2023, Thailand departed from the organisation’s formal exclusion of the junta from regional talks by reaching out to it in different capacities. Thailand hosted an ‘open-ended informal consultation’ with the junta in December 2022 that involved several other mainland Southeast Asian states. In February 2023, Thailand invited Myanmar to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus meeting on maritime security that it co-chaired with the United States.
Thailand’s visibly accommodative posture contrasts to those of several other ASEAN member states who continue to pressure the Myanmar junta to abide by the five-point consensus agreed upon at the 2021 special summit. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim even reached out to his Thai counterpart on 10 February 2023, urging Bangkok to take a firmer stance against the junta. These divisions prevented ASEAN from issuing a joint statement on the second anniversary of the coup.
Persisting fault lines in Southeast Asia have periodically given rise to diplomatic disputes and even low-key conflicts. For instance, in 2013, militants from the Sulu archipelago of the Philippines landed in the East Malaysian state of Sabah to assert the sovereignty of the historic Sulu Sultanate over that territory. The situation served as a reminder that the Philippine claim to the Malaysian territory of Sabah remains unresolved.
On the Southeast Asian mainland, differences exist between Mekong riparian states over Laos’ unilateral move to build dams — with Chinese assistance — along sections of the river that pass Laotian territory. In maritime Southeast Asia, the Philippine move to submit their case against China over their South China Sea territorial disputes in 2013 to an international tribunal was described by a senior official from an ASEAN member state as an ‘unfortunate development’ and an ‘inconvenience to ASEAN’.
Detractors have often criticised ASEAN for its inability to resolve differences between member states. This criticism betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of ASEAN’s intended role and limitations. Since its creation, ASEAN’s primary purpose has been to create a more conducive environment for cooperation among Southeast Asian states. It also seeks to manage their differences such that these do not hamper broader aspirations to enhance cooperation. Though ASEAN’s success on this score has been patchy, it was never envisaged to be the panacea for all the region’s problems.
In that sense, it should be no surprise that member states have never used the mechanism of the High Council in Article 14 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Dispute resolutions involving Southeast Asian states have usually come in the form of third-party mediation and efforts of international institutions such as the International Court of Justice.
Southeast Asia has come a long way from the Cold War years when it was described as a ‘region of revolt’. Still, despite the attention on great power rivalry and its consequences for regional security, intramural conflicts persist.
Unless Southeast Asian states can get their regional house in order, the challenge of fostering much-needed regional unity in the face of sharpening great power rivalry will grow more acute — as will the consequences of their inability to do so..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2023-06-28
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
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"Myanmar has seen the back of the sixth Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations since 1995. Noeleen Heyzer resigned her position in recent weeks, earlier than planned from her appointment in October 2021 and assuming her role in December of that year.
What will be her legacy? Not much. A kind assessment could conclude she gave it the good old college try, but was reasoning with caged beasts. A realpolitik regard would argue she was doomed from the starting line, because those caged beasts cannot be reasoned with.
What can we learn from Heyzer’s 20 months in the position? There isn’t much to labor over. The military State Administration Council (SAC) wasn’t interested in any form of international engagement let alone mediation, and absolutely nothing to do with conflict resolution. The efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been stuck since the signing of the Five-Point Consensus in early 2021, yet remain the lodestar of international efforts regardless of how adrift, capsized or sunk they are. Heyzer didn’t have much to work with.
The entire “good offices” position of the envoy is mired in the past, with its mandate in the UN General Assembly, not completely with the Secretary General. There hasn’t been any serious reform of the role in close to 30 years, a point acknowledged by an in-depth study of the good offices mandate released by the International Peace Academy (IPI) over 10 years ago.
One of the concluding points of that study from 2012 could have been written today: “There is no doubt that the UN carries a legacy of resentment or disappointment among many sides within Myanmar who have felt, for different reasons, that the good offices in the past did not sufficiently consider their interests. In the international donor community, while some acknowledge the potentially important role the UN can play in Myanmar, few seem to want the world organization to actually take the lead in coordinating international assistance to the country.” The failure of the UN to gain access to Cyclone Mocha-affected communities in Rakhine State, or conflict-affected displaced in Sagaing Region, poses crucially important questions on the efficacy of the UN to remain in Myanmar.
With a weak and distracted Secretary General in António Guterres, a dysfunctional Permanent Five members of a divided Security Council (China, Russia, the United States, Britain and France), it’s a wonder Heyzer got any attention let alone the level of support she needed from her first day.
Early on, she was roundly criticized for suggesting a form of “power sharing” in a Channel News Asia interview. Whether she misspoke or considered it a serious proposal and was compelled to walk it back following the furor, the damage of an unforced error was already inflicted. Her one trip to call on Min Aung Hlaing in August 2022 was an unmitigated disaster, with the SAC releasing details of their conversation that were not completely congruent with what her post-visit statement said.
Following this envoy equivalent of road-kill, she was compelled to broaden her consultations to members of the resistance including the National Unity Government (NUG) and some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), although this was an uncommon development. From the August visit until her resignation, she was dogged by criticism from all sides, much of it perhaps unfair yet reflecting frustration at ongoing violence and the trap of diplomatic language that compelled her to express “deep concern” at incessant SAC mass atrocities.
Heyzer met with Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang on May 1, where he “stressed the need to act prudently and pragmatically to prevent the escalation of the conflict and spillover of the crisis, and expressed his hope that Madame Special Envoy will uphold an objective and fair position and play a role as a bridge.” Trips were also made to India, and all around Southeast Asia. Soon after the announcement of her stepping down, she visited with NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung: a photo of them hugging was both touching and, one hopes, cardiac arrest-inducing in Naypyitaw.
The Global New Light of Myanmar made its position on the UN clear in its June 16 opinion piece from Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris called “The Picture of Irrelevance.” It was vintage vitriol. While it may have been designed to condemn the UN system and international mediation efforts, it must also be seen as a good riddance to Heyzer and a glove slap to any replacement.
“What breakthrough do they have to prove in recent memory? Where have they brought lasting peace? Name one! Under their watch record number of people have been forcibly displaced or stateless. So, what have they done? Is the world becoming more peaceful? These people should be given no role in finding solutions for the problems Myanmar is facing. Solutions for Myanmar will come from within and with the help, cooperation and understanding of the neighbours (sic) and friendly countries.” As if to pour salt on the wound, the paper also carried a report on a meeting with acting UN Resident Coordinator Ramanathan Balakrishnan and colleagues with three SAC ministers in Sittwe, still struggling for official access to assist over a month after Cyclone Mocha.
What have we learned from the near three decades of special envoys? Precious little. The first, the polished Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto served from 1995 to 1999, which started optimistically with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release before dissolving into repressive military rule deadlock. He may have visited the country six times during his tenure, but he achieved little of note apart from the “concession” of meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on every visit.
De Soto’s contribution to Myanmar may be slight, but his legacy as a UNSG special envoy is instructive for Myanmar. Resigning from his envoy role in the Middle East peace process, his frustration at being hogtied to conditions that limited engagement with key actors was reflected in his leaked End of Mission memo in May 2007 following his resignation: “the UN should resist the natural temptation of almost every government and intergovernmental institution to throw a committee or a czar, or in this case, an envoy, at a problem…(w)e are not in the lead, and the role we play is subsidiary at best, dangerous at worst.” A similar end of mission memo from Heyzer should be encouraged.
Then the reptilian Razali Ismael from Malaysia (2000-2005) served at a relatively optimistic time following the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2002, but any optimism was dashed with the mass killing of her supporters at Depayin in May 2003, and then the purge of his erstwhile partner, Military Intelligence chief and Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt in October 2004. He refused to renew his position in early 2006 because he had been not permitted to visit the country in two years.
In a creepy two-step criticism of the then regime with pretension over his own performance, Razali said in an interview; “Progress has not been made towards any reconciliation. If there used to be any, that has now snapped with [Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s] continued house arrest… What possibility is there of further progress?… Still, there is no frustration as this was, after all, a noble effort… good at dodging things and stonewalling… We have been dealing with these [Myanmar military] people for a very long time now. We are familiar with their ways.” This wasn’t exactly an advertisement for institutional memory and adaptive engagement.
Next came the former Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Gambari. The then ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) should have recognized a kindred spirit in Gambari, after all he rebuffed the General Assembly when they condemned the execution of prominent environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogani people in late 1995. Gambari faced a genuine domestic political deadlock in 2006, then the popular protests and the brutal crackdown of September 2007, Cyclone Nargis and the desperate days of the UN seeking access to affected areas and the timely visit of Ban Ki-moon (who visited again in April, with great fanfare and no progress).
The Indian diplomat Vijay Nambiar enjoyed greater success, but he operated between 2010 and 2016 when the opening afforded him access, and even some EAOs welcomed his role in the peace process. Nambiar wasn’t completely astute: he asked Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to contribute Sit-Tat troops for UN peacekeeping operations in 2014 (a small number served in Liberia and South Sudan).
Christine Schraner Burgener was appointed in April 2018 following the carnage of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, was told by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to stay out of the peace process and stick to Rakhine, where she could do little. Her post-2021 performance was strident in condemning the SAC, her calls with Vice Senior General Soe Win unresponsive, and her plaintive calls to visit Myanmar rebuffed by the SAC, but also over-stating her importance: “Clearly, I can imagine that he [Min Aung Hlaing] would not like to see me now in Myanmar because the people know me… and they would probably be very encouraged by my presence.” Despite pushing a much stiffer and determined UN response for an envoy, she was also criticized in Myanmar for perceived moral equivalency in condemning violence by all sides (the trap of neutrality in vocalizing opposition to violence, even grossly asymmetric state violence and atrocity).
Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris summed up the past envoys in colorful fashion. “There have been appointments of those who were no longer wanted anymore close to the Ivory Tower in New York. Dump them all on Myanmar! There was one who was appointed so that frequent trips can be made to see family and relatives in a nearby country [likely Gambari]. Then, there was a lightweight who had no clues whatsoever about Myanmar [this could be any of them]. One promptly turned up at Davos soon after the appointment… Whether there is a need or not, they visit the country frequently and put out press statements just to show they are working hard and justify their employment. Attempts would be made to visit the country especially when their contract is up for extension.”
Like carrion birds, potential replacements are circling. But any future appointment will face not just the same blend of SAC stonewalling or UN dysfunction Heyzer endured, but a witches brew of competitive engagement initiatives from predatory actors from China, India, Thailand and Japan through the Nippon Foundation, along with the frozen efforts of ASEAN, and the rumors of attempts from Switzerland, Norway, Finland and other deluded European states looking to forge a breakthrough. The competing “Track 1.5” efforts of Thailand has annoyed Indonesia, received no support from the rest of ASEAN, and is but the latest data point of dysfunction. Many of these efforts have some bit-part Myanmar players who have highly questionable legitimacy and political cachet. All of this incoherence benefits the SAC, who chortle at foreigners competing for pole position to appease them.
For many in the international community have adopted a stance of mee-sa-ta-phet yay-mote-ta phet (holding the flame/torch in one hand and the firehouse in the other): effectively hedging their bets on who is going to “win” the conflict and be the side to ingratiate. There has been a plethora of post-coup shapeshifting amongst foreign actors, who prior to February 2021 sought to engage the Myanmar deep state and its many war criminals, and who—regardless of their affected ardor for the resistance now—will casually betray the revolution when the winds of opportunism shift.
If another envoy is going to be offloaded on Myanmar, it will likely be another seasoned diplomat with similar skills sets to Heyzer. The candidates will resemble archetypes of international servants, but to the SAC a bevy of min-laung (pretender kings, or more accurately “imminent kings”) and their cohorts of pontificating min-sayar (king’s teacher, or advisor). There will be no “innovation”, “off-ramping”, “nuance”, or that absolute pearl of statecraft thinking, “fresh approach.” It’s almost certainly going to be some soiled version of what came before.
But does it need to be? Is there a possibility of obviously needed reform? Ralph Waldo Emmerson wrote that “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, adored by little statesmen”, which could aptly describe the current cohort of Western diplomats and donors working on Myanmar all conjoined by a dearth of clear thinking.
There are four potential courses of action: in theory. In all likelihood the UN and P5 countries will shuffle on with an utter disregard for impact, progress or the interests of the people of Myanmar. But what if we entertain the potential for the self-straitjacketed global order to react differently, even with expectations on progress being as low as possible?
First, consider a completely different candidate. Heyzer was deemed suitable in late 2021 because she was a consummate UN insider, who had sidled up to the generals before, and being Singaporean could “read their minds” more acutely. Many observers thought then as now, these qualities worked against her. The same calculation holds true. If you find merely a “new Noeleen” then we’ll all be concluding similar bleak assessments of dashed expectations in three years as we are today. Six very different envoys from Africa, Southeast Asia, Switzerland and Latin America have confounded calculations on whether outsiders or Asians are most effective. No one who actually wants the job should be considered, especially if it’s former US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson or disgraced British politician Boris Johnson, should they put their hands up. A UN lifer obviously has little comparative advantage other than a more acute understanding of the UN’s internal defects, as Heyzer demonstrated (as did previous envoys). Former military officers elicit little respect either, as retired US general Wesley Clark found in 2010 when he co-chaired an Asia Society task force on engaging Myanmar, or most recently the lack of any discernable progress in engaging with the SAC from former Indonesian army general Agus Widjojo.
Second, rewire an entirely new approach, with a new mandate directly from the Secretary General and a closer rapport with the SG’s office. The need for reform has been apparent for many years, but even tinkering with structures in the UN is seen as disruptive. If Heyzer’s failure should spur anything, it is the necessity for a genuine reimagining of the role, and what its long-term utility could be for the UN’s assistance to Myanmar. One dimension could be the total restructuring of the UN’s presence in Myanmar, discarding half of the operational agencies and paring down presence and operations to address immediate humanitarian and development needs related to livelihoods, health, education and emergency relief. This would alleviate the funding gap for donors who have already invested in multi-donor funds. The current leadership under Ramanathan Balakrishan needs to be radically reconstituted, and a balance sought between operational realities and high-level mediation efforts.
Third, consider a collective effort of a contact group of multiple officials, expanding the team from a bare bones operation (although one I’m certain well remunerates the players regardless of their 1-0 scorecard) to multiple high-level actors. Nothing limply ineffectual like the “Group of Friends of Myanmar” that the UN tried before, following the 2007 demonstrations and crackdown, involving some 14 countries. However, this shouldn’t be a consortium of existing envoys or point people such as the Norwegian envoy, or Igor Driesmans, the European Union envoy, but a group of higher level officials who can interact with multiple actors.
These consultations must be broad and inclusive, especially the resistance actors in EAOs, the NUG and emerging political forces such as the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) and new configurations such as the Sagaing Forum. However, just the convening of such a forum within the constraints of the UN is devilishly difficult with protocol, egos and above all competing state interests. Look at one collection of “Group of Friends” meeting memos from 2009, which echoes the impasse of 2023, and face up to the hard facts that change in Myanmar didn’t come about from outside pressure or support.
Or, fourth, do nothing. Just inform the SAC that they’re not worth the trouble. Alleviate the diplomatic corps from having to expend energy on supporting labored interventions that have no chance of even minimal success. Clear the space for ASEAN to continue to fail. Stop investing in false hope in Myanmar; it might do the standing of the UN some good, but likely not.
The Heyzer maneuver of early departure should be a call for reform and reengagement, to clear a clogged diplomatic passage. But it won’t be.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights on Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-06-20
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"JAKARTA – Thailand Deputy Prime Minister Don Pramudwinai’s decision to push through with “informal” meetings with the illegal Myanmar military junta despite widespread criticism and condemnation is a betrayal of the Myanmar people and an affront to ASEAN unity, Southeast Asian lawmakers said today.
“The Thai government’s determination to hold these meetings, despite receiving rejections from the ASEAN chair, Indonesia, as well as Singapore and Malaysia, demonstrates its arrogant disregard for the unity of ASEAN, the human rights of the people of Myanmar, and even the will of its own citizens,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Co-chair Charles Santiago said today. “The current Thai government was overwhelmingly defeated in the recent general election and no longer has a mandate from the people; initiating such talks in spite of this is a slap in the face of the Thai voters.”
According to leaked documents, Pramudwinai sent a letter on 14 June inviting other ASEAN foreign ministers to an “informal discussion” on 18-19 June, with the aim of “fully [re-engaging] with Myanmar at the leaders’ level”. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi replied to the letter rejecting the invitation on 15 June, while the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement to the same effect on 18 June. Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said in a press conference during his visit to the United States on 17 June that it was “premature to re-engage with the junta at a summit level or even at a foreign minister level.” The Philippines has yet to release an official statement but reportedly will not attend.
Despite this, Pramudiwinai has insisted that the talks will go ahead on 19 June and the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that high-level representatives from Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei and Vietnam have confirmed their attendance. This meeting follows a previous “track 1.5 meeting” that was held in Thailand in March and was attended by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam along with China, India, Bangladesh and Japan.
“We are dismayed that Thailand and other countries are still willing to engage with the murderous Myanmar junta without any attempt to hold it accountable, despite the military’s continued atrocities that have already resulted in the deaths of thousands of its own people. The ‘Track 1.5’ meetings also weaken ASEAN’s credibility on their ability to resolve the many crises unfolding in Myanmar,” said Santiago.
“Indonesia as ASEAN chair, as well as the other ASEAN member states, must not let this meeting go unanswered: there must be an inquiry into Thailand’s blatant disregard and disrespect of the current Chair. While we appreciate their rejection of this ill-conceived meeting, it cannot stop there. ASEAN must work together to hold the military junta accountable, including by reforming the failed Five-Point Consensus which has yet to yield any results since its adoption in April 2021,” said Santiago..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-06-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
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"United States Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken: Vivian, Foreign Minister, it is wonderful to have you here at the State Department. We have actually worked closely together since the last time I was in government, and I value the conversations we have had over many years. One of the things that I can say very clearly is that every time I have an opportunity to spend time with (the) Foreign Minister, I learn something, and I am grateful for that. Singapore is for the United States, a true partner. Having the opportunity today to discuss so many issues that bring us together, regionally, bilaterally in the first instance, regionally but also globally, was very, very beneficial.
If I could, let me just begin with a few words about my upcoming visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC), since we are leaving tonight on that trip. We look forward to having a series of meetings with senior officials in Beijing, building on the engagements that we have had with the PRC since President Biden and President Xi met in Bali late last year.
To summarise it, the trip has three objectives. First, to establish open and empowered communications so that our two countries responsibly manage our relationship, including by discussing challenges, by addressing misperceptions and avoiding miscalculations. Second, to advance US interests and values, and those we share with allies and partners around the world, including speaking directly and candidly about our very real concerns on a range of issues. Third, to explore the potential for cooperation on transnational challenges, global economic stability, illicit synthetic drugs, climate, global health, where our countries’ interests intersect and the rest of the world expects us to cooperate. Intense competition requires sustained diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict. Again, that is what the world expects of both the United States and China.
Now, our friends in Singapore and Southeast Asia more broadly, are essential to realising what is a shared vision for a free and open, a prosperous, a secure, a connected, a resilient Indo-Pacific where people or goods or ideas can travel freely, where rules are applied fairly and transparently. Indeed, for six decades now, the strategic partnership between the United States and Singapore, rooted in respect for the rules based international order, has helped strengthen peace and stability in the region and around the world.
I reaffirmed to the Foreign Minister that ASEAN is at the heart of our Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States supports ASEAN centrality, and we see a considerable convergence between our own Indo-Pacific strategy and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, epitomised by a shared belief in inclusive economic growth, transparency and the rule of law. Vivian and I discussed Russia and the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Singapore has consistently stood up for Ukraine sovereignty, its territorial integrity, its independence, as well as the United Nations Charter in which those principles are embedded, and joined the United States and our allies and partners in enacting sanctions that are taking a toll on Russia's war machine. We will continue to support Ukraine as we work toward a just and lasting peace, one based on the principles that I laid out recently in Helsinki.
Respect for human rights and self-determination are also being challenged in Burma, where the military’s coup and the brutal crackdown continues to harm civilians, to deprive them of their right to choose their own path and threatens regional stability. We appreciate Singapore and ASEAN’s critical role in seeking a peaceful solution. United States will continue to impose strong sanctions against those perpetrating atrocities. We welcome Singapore's partnership in maintaining the necessary economic pressure.
Our two countries are also seizing new opportunities to work together – from space and cyber, to supply chain resiliency, to clean energy. We spent some time talking about that. As part of the green shipping challenge launched at COP 27 last year, Singapore recently announced an MOU with the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to upgrade digital infrastructure and to reduce emissions. We are partnering to advance our clean energy across ASEAN, including the ASEAN power grid, which will facilitate renewable energy development, deployment throughout the region, and help Singapore transition to net zero emissions by 2050. And as part of our expanded US-Singapore Climate Change Partnership, we are announcing today, new and enhanced areas of cooperation from reducing deforestation to encouraging energy efficient buildings.
All this collaboration is rooted in one of our strongest bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific. American companies, we talked about this as well, are the largest source of foreign direct investment in Singapore. We are working to grow our economies even faster, and even fairer through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), of which Singapore was an early and enthusiastic supporter. Singapore is also a critical security partner, hosting American ships and aircraft, sending pilots to train in the skies above Arizona and Idaho.
For evidence of our robust people-to-people ties, one need look only for example at Singapore's Cabinet, where over half the ministers including Prime Minister Lee has studied in the United States. President (Halimah) Yacob is also a distinguished alum of the State Department's International Visitors Leadership Program, proving that we have a pretty good eye for talent.
Recently, the Prime Minister urged the people of Singapore “to think boldly, to aim high, to seek far”. Those are wise and powerful words, and I look forward to that spirit continuing to guide the close partnership between Singapore and the United States.
Minister Vivian Balakrishnan: Thank you, Tony. It is always special to meet you here. I think we have been meeting regularly for about seven years, including in different incarnations. So, I will confess to being biased, but I think the United States is very blessed to have the ultimate consummate diplomat in you, and more so at this very testing, trying and challenging times. It is an honour to be here and thank you for the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues just now.
We first reaffirmed the excellent, long-standing, close, stable relationship between the United States and Singapore, and I should add, our shared commitment to a rules-based international order, and the fact that it was the United States seven, eight decades ago, which envisioned, underwrote and supported this rules-based international order. Even now as we go through challenging times, I think we need to reaffirm the importance of such a system. We also covered a range of bilateral, regional and global issues. On the bilateral front, everyone knows that we have got a very robust economic relationship. We are in that special category which is defined as a Major Security Cooperation Partner of the United States. But we have not stood still. We are also expanding into new frontiers. You have just mentioned the updated United States-Singapore Climate Partnership, and this will focus on collaboration in five areas, including regional energy transition in Southeast Asia, and low and zero emission solutions. Watch this space, there is a lot happening. We are also working in other areas like cybersecurity, all the more pertinent now with the challenges that we are facing. We also signed the Artemis Accords last year – that is another whole new frontier for collaboration. I mentioned just now that in fact for 33 years, we have had a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the United States use of our facilities, both naval and aviation. Again, that has been a symbol of our belief that the United States’ strategic presence and contribution to our part of the world has provided stability, has provided opportunity and helped to underwrite the peace which we should never take for granted.
Singapore is home today to over 5,700 United States companies. I also made the point that the United States investments in Singapore exceed what the United States has invested in Japan, China and ROK (Republic of Korea) combined. If you consider how small Singapore is, that statistic becomes all the more remarkable. On the other side of that same equation, Singapore's investments into the United States and US exports to Singapore support more than 250,000 jobs in America itself. I know it is not just about trade for its own sake, but also in terms of jobs and opportunities for people on both sides.
I also wanted to commend the very active regional engagement by President Biden’s Administration, with your shepherding of the efforts in our part of the world. The fact that President Biden attended the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh last year, and the President also hosted the ASEAN-US Special Summit in Washington in May last year – that sent a very strong signal of engagement.
We also elevated the ASEAN-US relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year, and it is not just a form of words but the real substance, the real deal. We also look forward to working with you to align the US Indo-Pacific strategy with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and we hope that there will be further discussions hopefully, when the President and you can visit our part of the world for the ASEAN meetings, the East Asia Summit, (and) the ASEAN-US Summit as well either here or in our part of the world in the near future.
I think the point is, we do want to reaffirm the critical importance of the US anchoring your strategic engagement in our part of the world. I made the point that there is in fact a deep reservoir of goodwill and trust, and you have many partners in the Asia Pacific. Maybe others may not be as explicit as we are in saying how welcome you are, but I gave you the assurance that everyone wants to see you engage in our part of the world.
The IPEF, which we also discussed, is another strong reaffirmation of the US commitment to the economic agenda in Asia Pacific. We welcome the substantial conclusion of the negotiations on the second pillar of the IPEF, which focuses on supply chains. We hope that the remaining pillars of the IPEF will include meaningful provisions that will lead to concrete benefits, and even greater regional integration. Finally, I know you have got a big visit coming up. I believe you are leaving tonight. I wanted to say that we commend your efforts. This is a very important and critical moment, not just for the United States and China. The rest of the world will be watching. So, we hope and believe that you will be able to manage the differences, but more importantly, establish open channels of communication, build mutual trust and understanding. I wish you a smooth-sailing and successful visit. Thank you, again, for hosting me. Thank you for this chance to, as always, have very open and sincere discussions, and I wish you all the best.
Simon Lewis (Reuters): First to the Foreign Minister, Dr Balakrishnan. The Secretary mentioned that Myanmar came up in your discussions. I wondered if I could ask you for Singapore's position on an initiative by the caretaker government in Thailand to re-engage with Myanmar's military junta and reportedly inviting the junta back into ASEAN meetings. Is that something that Singapore would support? I would also be interested in your response to the recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, on human rights in Myanmar, who identified $254 million worth of goods that have come through Singaporean entities to the Myanmar military, so I am interested in your response to that.
And for the Secretary, I am also interested in your view on whether ASEAN nations including Singapore, also Thailand, should be doing more to stop the violence in Myanmar. And specifically on Thailand, I wonder if we could get your view on efforts to form a new government there. Are you concerned about the Thai military trying to cling onto power despite the pretty clear results of the election? And just an additional one because it is breaking news. President Putin has said that tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed to Belarus. Secretary, what is the US response to that, and are there consequences for Russia and Belarus? Thank you.
Minister: Well, thank you. I think I counted at least three questions. Let me get back to first principles. We condemn the coup in Myanmar, and the ongoing violence against civilians, the instability in the country, the setback to national reconciliation and the enormous impact on the economy. Unfortunately, it is now more than two years. We have not seen any signs of improvement. From an ASEAN perspective, we have the Five-Point Consensus and we haven’t seen any significant progress in fulfilling the Five-Point Consensus. So we believe it would be premature to re-engage with the junta at the Summit level or even at the Foreign Minister level and in fact, our leaders at the recent ASEAN Summit reaffirmed this position.
Having said that, the ASEAN Chair Indonesia is engaging across a wide spectrum of stakeholders and the key point is this – you do need everyone, ultimately, to sit down and negotiate. I do not know how long it will take. The last time, it took 25 years for some form of democratic transition to occur in Myanmar. I hope it will not take that long. But it is very important for the rest of us. Whilst we are in favour of reconciliation and more dialogue, we obviously want to make sure that the level of violence goes down. And certainly, from Singapore's perspective, our policy is that we should all do our best to make sure arms, or even dual-use items which can be used to inflict harm and injury on civilians, should be proscribed. I noted Tom Andrews’ report, and one line in it is worth quoting. He said that “there are no indications that the government of Singapore has approved or is involved in the shipment of arms and associate materials to the Myanmar military”. But more importantly, we are also engaging Tom Andrews because any specific information which he has access to and which we can use for investigations or, if need be, to prosecute companies or entities which are breaching our laws and our policies on arms and dual-use – rest assured, we will get to the bottom of it. But the bigger question is, when will peace come back? Tony, I am afraid I remain pessimistic.
Secretary Blinken: You can sign my name onto every word of what Foreign Minister just said, including unfortunately, the pessimism that he expressed at the end, which we share. But everything that Minister said, I ascribe to as well. We are very focused on supporting ASEAN efforts to move forward towards a resolution that ends the violence, that frees people in jail, that puts Burma back on a democratic path. The Five-Point Consensus that the junta signed onto, has not been, to state the obvious, advanced, much less met. And it is very important that we continue, all of us, to sustain the appropriate pressure on the junta and look for ways to engage the opposition in Burma and find every possible avenue to advance Burma’s return to the democratic path, to an end of the violence, to the freedom of people who have been unjustly imprisoned. And in all of these efforts, we are working, the United States and Singapore, very closely together both through ASEAN and on a bilateral basis.
With regard to Thailand. I simply say that our full expectation is that the government will be formed pursuant to the laws of Thailand. That is our expectation. That is the expectation of people in Thailand as well.
With regard to the reports about Belarus, we have seen comments that were made in the last few hours. We will continue to monitor the situation very closely and very carefully. We have no reason to adjust our own nuclear posture. We do not see any indications that Russia is preparing to use their nuclear weapon. President (Biden) said again this week that we remain committed to the defence of NATO - every inch of its territory. That is our north star. We are very focused on that. I would just note that one of President Putin’s claims for starting his brutal invasion of Ukraine, one of the many rationales he gave at various points, was ostensibly to prevent the threat of Ukraine reacquiring the nuclear weapons that it gave up when the Soviet Union dissolved, and Ukraine voluntarily gave up the weapons they inherited, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan. It would be rather ironic, among many other things for President Putin to now be talking about putting nuclear weapons on the territory of a neighbouring state again, including a state that gave up the nuclear weapons that it inherited when the Soviet Union dissolved. As for Belarus itself, this is just another example of Lukashenko making irresponsible, provocative choices to cede control of Belarus’ sovereignty against the will of the Belarusian people.
Nirmal Ghosh (Straits Times): Minister, you have spoken about new frontiers in relationship with the United States. Could you elaborate a bit on that? You have mentioned the Climate Partnership, cybersecurity and so forth - a few more specifics if you could share. Secondly, as have been mentioned, a lot of the world is watching the Secretary's forthcoming visit to China. I wonder if you could give us a Singapore and/or a Southeast Asian view of US-China relations. Mr Secretary, could you also speak to that latter part about ASEAN centrality and how it all fits into the Indo Pacific strategy?
Minister: Thank you Nirmal. I used to be the Minister of Environment before this incarnation. So, I was heavily involved with the final negotiations for the Paris Agreement. One observation which I will make is that we would not have arrived at the agreement in Paris if it had not been for the confluence of strategic and environmental interests of the United States and China. I can tell you that from direct experience. That is why tonight's trip is so important, because there are many global planetary issues - climate pandemics, even cybersecurity, which require the United States and China to work off the same page and be key pillars for a global system which will help increase resilience to threats to welfare, health, and prosperity for people all over the world. So you (Blinken) go with our full support. But having said that, speaking now as a diplomat, I want to make this plea. Please do not put too much weight on poor Tony's shoulders. The fact is diplomats need time and space and sometimes just some quiet time to engage in some honest-to-goodness conversations without having to put out a tweet every hour or two. The trip is essential, but not sufficient. There are fundamental differences in outlook, in values, and it takes time for mutual respect and strategic trust to be built. So, it is important, but I am also making the plea. I hope people do not have excessive expectations on that front.
On your question about the new frontiers, I already mentioned the Climate Partnership, and there are five focal areas under that partnership which include the regional energy transition. Second, low- and zero-emission technologies and solutions. Third, nature-based solutions and carbon markets. And lastly, urban decarbonisation resilience and capacity building. And even in all these areas, you can see that there are obvious opportunities for synergy and cooperation between the United States and Singapore not just for our own sake, but in our region as well. I mentioned the Artemis Accords, so outer space is certainly another frontier. And of course, we have been working very closely, especially in last couple of years on cybersecurity, because that is a clear and present frontier where there is both risk and opportunity. So, watch this space.
Secretary Blinken: I think the Foreign Minister has captured it very, very well on all fronts. With regard to ASEAN, I simply want to note and emphasise something I noted before. If you look at our own Indo-Pacific Strategy, and you then look at the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the coincidence of these approaches, these strategies, these visions are very, very strong, and very, very high. And that speaks to why we do put a premium on ASEAN Centrality, and why as Vivian pointed out, starting with President Biden, we have had significant re-engagement with ASEAN over the last two and a half years. Economic growth, inclusive economic growth, transparency, the rule of law. We also work on discrete issues in areas that have a real impact on the lives of people in the region, as well as in the United States, whether it is climate, whether it is energy, whether it is global health. All of these are front and centre in what we are doing and one of the things that we talked about today is Burma. And of course, in ASEAN meetings and US-ASEAN engagement maybe that tends to get the headlines, and it is usually important. But if you look at the agenda that we are actually pursuing, both at the meetings that we have in the day in, day out, it is a very broad universe of issues of subjects, all of which go to the needs, the aspirations, the hopes of people in the ASEAN region and in the United States.
Minister: So, watch what we do, not just what we say, and you will see that there is a full range of activities for the United States and its engagement with ASEAN.
Jennifer Hansler (Cable News Network): Thank you. Mr Secretary, on Iran, how would you characterise the ongoing inter-talks with Tehran? Would you say that you are optimistic that an understanding can be reached between the two sides on constraining Iran's growing nuclear program? And the Omani Foreign Minister said earlier this week that he believes the two sides are close on a deal for the detainees? Do you agree with that characterisation?
Moving on to the China detainee issue are you committed to raising the case of Kai Li, Mark Swidan, and David Lin in your meetings in Beijing? More broadly, to both you Mr Secretary and Mr Foreign Minister, given what you said about this not being sufficient, are you optimistic that this will lead the way to continued meetings, continued dialogues between the US and China, including on the military-to-military front? Thank you.
Secretary Blinken: With regard to Iran, some of the reports that we have seen about an agreement on nuclear matters or for that matter on detainees are simply not accurate and not true. On the nuclear side of the equation, we are determined to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. We remain convinced that the best way to do that is through diplomacy. We have not taken any option off the table – you have heard that clearly from the President. But we continue to believe that diplomacy would be the most effective path forward but there is no agreement, and reports to the contrary, are simply inaccurate. When it comes to our detained citizens in Iran, nothing would please me more than to be able to say that we have an agreement that secures their release, but that too, would not be accurate. It is something we continue to work on, intensely on a regular basis. And that is separate and apart from the conversations we have on nuclear matters, but I am not in a position to say that we have an agreement.
With regard to the visit - two things. One, yes, I will be raising the detainees. This has been an ongoing conversation with the PRC, and something that for me is always at the top of my list - that is, looking out for the security and wellbeing of Americans around the world, including those who are being detained in one way or another, including arbitrarily. More broadly, what we are working to do on this trip is to really carry forward what President Biden and President Xi agreed to in Bali at the end of last year, which was to establish sustained, regular lines of communication at senior levels across our governments, precisely so that we can make sure that we are communicating as clearly as possible to avoid as best possible misunderstandings and miscommunications. Because if we want to make sure, as we do, that the competition that we have with China does not veer into conflict, the place you start is with communicating. So, we will see what comes from this visit but this is directly in response to what the two Presidents agreed in Bali last November.
As to what comes next, let us see how the visit goes. I think Vivian said it very well. This is an important, but insufficient step because there is a lot of work to be done. I note as well, that even as we are trying to make sure, through better communications, that the competition does not veer into conflict, we are also looking at areas where we might cooperate in the interests of the American people, in the interests of China and its people but also in the interests of people around the world. One of the clear demand signals that that we get, including from our close friends and partners, is that both the United States and the PRC will responsibly manage this relationship and look for areas where our cooperation might produce results that benefit not only our own people, but people around the world, including in the region, so we will be looking at that as well.
Minister: Well, the only thing I can add there is perhaps a perspective from Southeast Asia. First, if you look a hundred years down the road, we see both China and the United States being a clear presence for the century and beyond. Second, we see the United States remaining a Pacific partner and power and stakeholder. We do not want you to go away.
Secretary Blinken: And we are not.
Minister: Third, if you look at the challenges confronting the world right now, and we have enumerated - climate, pandemics, cyber, opportunities in outer space - we will need, even as the world transits into a multipolar world, now more than ever, a rules-based multilateral system with institutions and processes fit for purpose and updated where necessary. This requires the United States and China to achieve a modus vivendi. So, this trip is important, it is essential, but it does not stop there.
I think Tony knows the views for all of us in Southeast Asia. The more you travel and engage, the better. As I said, I am biased because he is a friend, and I can think of no better diplomat at this point in time. His cool, rational, emollient way to deal with some very fundamental differences, because China and the US are not going to converge and become one identical entity. The challenge for all of us, both mentally, emotionally, and diplomatically, is to hold sometimes contrarian thoughts in one mind. And this is the challenge of the century. Fifty years ago, when Henry Kissinger went to Beijing, it completely reordered the strategic furniture in the globe. We are coming close to a point when this will be necessary again. So, we all watch with interest and concern and some optimism, because we all have to be optimistic, otherwise you will not keep trying. So, let us support these efforts. And let us see where you will take it.
Benji Hyer (Channel News Asia): We have heard Washington and Singapore's position on US-China relations. I wanted to ask your perspective on ties between Russia and China. How much is what they call the “friendship with no limits” between Moscow and Beijing a concern for the US Secretary of State and Foreign Minister for the Indo-Pacific and ASEAN?
Secretary Blinken: You have heard us speak to this on a number of occasions in recent months, and it entirely depends on the practical manifestations of that partnership, with that friendship. I will let China and Russia address how they view their partnership. But we have been very clear, for example, about the importance of countries not providing Russia with the kind of assistance that it can use to advance its aggression in Ukraine. Equally, we have been open and welcoming of efforts and initiatives of countries including, for example, China, to try to play a positive role in diplomacy that can advance a just and durable peace in Ukraine. As it happens right now, there are, I think, representatives from six or seven African countries who are in Ukraine also trying to advance that proposition. I would note the terrible irony of the fact that while they were in Kyiv, more missiles from Russia rained down on the Ukrainian capital, but I will leave that to others to underscore that particular irony. But as with many countries, we want to ensure that no one is adding fuel to this fire Russia is making and if countries by the same token can play a positive, productive role, including China, in trying to find a path to a just and durable peace, that is something we welcome as well.
Minister: Well, Singapore is a tiny city state. We have only been independent for almost 58 years. So, I hope you understand, from our perspective, the UN Charter, international law and the precepts of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are sacrosanct for us. We have no other alternative. And therefore, for us, this invasion is something which we have to take a stand on and we have. That is expressed in our votes at the General Assembly and in some specific sanctions that we have taken against Russia. It is something which we do not do routinely or lightly, but it is an expression of how strongly we feel on this matter. I cannot speak for China, but I would say that, at least in their interactions with us and in their public statements, China has affirmed the importance of territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty. Like Tony, I hope that their efforts will bear fruit. You really have to pray for peace, because we know that at the end of the day, you will end up at the negotiating table. But right now, blood is being shed and lives are being lost for perhaps, marginal leverage on the negotiating table, and as humanitarians, all of us must feel the pain and the tragedy of this situation. I think we all want peace. When it will be achieved, I do not know, but we all want peace..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Date of publication:
2023-06-17
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has mobilized humanitarian response to support the emergency relief efforts in Myanmar due to the severe impact of Cyclone MOCHA. As of 2 June 2023, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) has handed over relief items for the affected communities in the townships of Sittwe, Rathedaung, KyaukTaw, and Ponnagyun. ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) has also concluded their initial needs assessment in the affected areas in Myanmar on 30 May 2023.
The AHA Centre will mobilize the final two batches of relief items on 16 and 22 June 2023 by sea. The final batches, consist of non-food items and water and sanitation hygiene kits, are expected to arrive in Myanmar on 20 and 27 June 2023. ASEAN has also commenced internal discussion on possible ASEAN’s supports for recovery phase based on assessment from ASEAN ERAT Team.
ASEAN’s first batch of humanitarian response arrived in Myanmar on 21 May 2023 and was among the first emergency support received by the affected communities. Relief items mobilized to Myanmar from the Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) warehouse in Subang, Malaysia, include non-food items such as shelter tools and kits and water sanitation and hygiene with a total worth of 1.64 million USD.
The humanitarian assistance for Cyclone MOCHA reflects solidarity of ASEAN to the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication:
2023-06-06
Date of entry/update:
2023-06-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Cyclones - regional, Natural Disasters - General, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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"The National Unity Government of Myanmar calls today on the Chair of ASEAN, Republic of Indonesia and member states of ASEAN to withdraw the invitation that has been issued to Thet Khaing Win, a minister of State Administration Council (SAC) of Myanmar, to attend meetings with ASEAN Health Ministers.
Since his appointment by the military council, Thet Khaing Win has presided over the complete collapse of Myanmar's healthcare system. He is placing all our children, the future of the country at high risk by aiding and abetting and advising the military junta to block immunization program and delivery of medications to millions of children throughout the country.
An entire population of people with health needs – from children needing vaccines to adults with chronic and emergency health conditions - is being starved of the international help they need. He is directly responsible by his acts and his omissions for immense human suffering. The military council of which he is a cabinet member has continued to target hospitals and medical professionals. Hospitals have been attacked from the air and patients have been slaughtered in their beds. Eighty-eight health workers have been murdered for seeking to fulfil their vocations since February 2021. Many now languish in prisons.
Attacks on healthcare violate international humanitarian law and article 19 of Geneva Convention. Thet Khaing Win is an abuser of human rights, actively denying healthcare to the people of his country.
Thet Khaing Win is under sanction from the United States, the European Union, Switzerland and other countries.
The invitation issued to Thet Khaing Win to attend the ASEAN Finance and Health Ministers Meetings in Jakarta on 24-25 August will bring shame upon ASEAN, and will diminish ASEAN's repeated commitments to support human rights in Myanmar.
The people of Myanmar look to ASEAN to uphold their right to health, and not to give comfort to a man who is stripping this right from them.
He has no place amongst ASEAN's health leaders and must be excluded from these meetings..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-08-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"The 42nd ASEAN Summit and Related Meetings in Indonesia remain the most critical crossroads for the immediate and long term relevance and fate of ASEAN’s role in the region and beyond.
It exposes the most consequential crossroads with the lingering Myanmar debacle that bears the futility of ASEAN’s approach, unchecked tensions in the South China Sea, futile efforts for conflict prevention mechanisms, growing autocratic trends and disregard for human rights and other structural economic and geopolitical challenges, both cumulatively and further erode ASEAN’s relevance and expose its deep lying systemic weaknesses.
ASEAN was born out of a common fear of communism and external threat, and it remains the same for now. However, the capacity to stand up to external threats from a collective joint deterrence and capacity point of view remains lost.
Indonesia will want to be seen as the ever strong ASEAN leader and will want to take lead in solving the Myanmar issue and in providing a clear platform and guidelines for South China Sea stability through fast tracked Code of Conduct (CoC) and a flurry of backdoor diplomacy for Myanmar.
It races against time and pressure to be seen as the most important regional and ASEAN leader, fresh from its G20 and global diplomatic success, and would want to set the right tone before handing over to Laos, knowing well that by then, momentum might drop due to entrenched affiliation with Beijing and the potential pressure applied, as happened previously.
The Myanmar crisis and the growing tensions in the South China Sea are just two of the main indicators highlighting the failed approach of ASEAN in being limited by its inability to exert credible and solid measures. Jakarta realizes this, and so do other member states. However, decades of stable status quo benefit derivation have created a common reluctance for significant shifts that would alter regime and regional security.
Historical regional cohesiveness in the region is primarily tied by trade and economic relativity and common yearning for security assurances.
The region is primarily shaped by economic and security importance, and openings for value based and normative moral high ground for strong value driven developmental essence are inadequate, unlike the EU.The region remains trapped by its own ignorance and utopian belief of its decades old ASEAN Way approach and de-escalation of conflict through idealistic dependence on non-confrontational approach and conflict prevention mechanisms through its different tiers and channels of dialogues.
Fears and wariness on China’s ambitions for the region, the quest to deny the West’s containment foothold in the region, the agenda in the South China Sea and the fallout of a full blown Taiwan conflict, all create a perfect firestorm for both a declining impact of dialogue building efforts and the efficacy of confidence building measures.
The West sees ASEAN as a lost cause in standing up against China and containment measures, while China wants ASEAN to remain in its status quo of neutrality, which means a freer option for China to expand its grip and reign and a denial of space for the West.
ASEAN has repeatedly yearned for stability and status quo, in fear of a repeat of the Cold War divide and has created a flurry of mechanisms from the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and SEANWFZ,among others, but has been futile and toothless in getting the required stability in the SCS with a toothless response to Beijing’s coercive tactics.
The desired stability and peace has failed to materialise and the efforts have been threatened by the growing security dilemma and eventual arms race in the scramble for survival.
It cannot shed its trap of its founding principles, and cannot afford to intimidate Beijing, while at the same time cannot solicit greater Western assurances either. It remains trapped in its own worst game.
ASEAN has no capacity in hard or soft power to push for greater deterrence in order to secure its aim of stability in the region, and will need external involvement and support. Ironically, this will also break its own yearning for neutrality.
Years of ASEAN and regional strategic ambiguity and strategic status quo maintenance have only provided a three pronged result. Firstly, it gives ASEAN the weakest returns and makes it even weaker with its trapped dogma and inability to provide credible solutions apart from the futile preventive mechanisms and confidence building measures. Secondly, it denies the full space needed for the West to galvanise collective regional cohesion and unity in creating a more able and credible shield and deterrent effectiveness. Thirdly, it gives Beijing the biggest space and green light to further deepen its hard power postures and build on the increasing pie of influence and dominance in the South China Sea and the region. The divide is apparent and growing as a result, in the continental state grip (Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) and the archipelago states (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines)
The region and ASEAN bask in the false sense of security from its avoidance of the hard truth and in refraining from directly challenging the risks in the region, while hoping for tacit Western counterbalancing act especially in direct economic and trade support. While the region has no qualms in being quick to embrace RCEP, the BRI and direct economic overtures from Beijing, it faces a reluctant move to quickly embrace the IPEF. The Indo Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF) is no match for its Chinese counterparts in terms of capital and trade capacity, and it does come with the moral high ground values of labour standards, climate initiatives, normative democratic adherence and human rights. All these are as unappealing to the region as a carrot to a lion.
The SEANWFZ is a futile effort from the start, as none of the big nuclear powers has signed and that China would use this as an opening to state its soft power push by having the narrative that it has the nuclear and global responsibility to sign unlike the West, all the while knowing that it can always have the option to ignore the agreement should push comes to shove, just like what it did in the 2016 arbitration ruling on the SCS.
The same goes for the CoC, the same opening exploited by Beijing to portray its diplomatic clout and to buy support, but knowing full well that it still can dictate the same moves should they be warranted.
Declining deterrence impact will only worsen the depth of the arms race, and further weaken the region’s collective resolve. There is only so much the returns from Track I and II diplomacy can do, if policymakers are reluctant to initiate bold changes to the set-up.
Hypocrisy and self-trap are laid bare, from the chastising of Washington for doing so little for ASEAN financially and economically but continued to yearn for its defensive support, to pushing for deeper Washington trade commitment but boasting of its strict neutrality approach.
ASEAN needed external capacity to effectively enforce binding agreements in the future CoC or to keep UNCLOS adherence, but cannot afford to directly solicit these hard power deterrence and to maintain ASEAN’s concept.
AUKUS is actually serving as the most effective deterrent, and ASEAN knows it will help, but cannot welcome it due to its self limitation.
Direct bilateral defence engagement and overtures and agreements with the West as can be seen now in the Philippines and increasingly others, are meant to secure individual states but also will give the region needed assurance and credible hard power deterrence.
ASEAN needs to change its principles and be bold in calling out law defying behaviours by external parties, especially China, to ensure that it walks the talk of maintaining regional stability. Failure to address the current systemic shortcomings will see it fade into irrelevance.
For it to be relevant in the future, changes in its orientations and non interference stand are a must. It will have to adopt a more EU-like common policy on defence and re-enact movements of the old SEATO concept with the help of the West with a regional NATO like framework. This remains the realistic and needed framework in dealing with both Beijing’s increasing bellicosity and continuous strategy in the region and in ensuring ASEAN’s strength and relevance.
The founding principles of non interference and consensus decision making have what held member states together, forming a platform for the autocrats, monarchs, democracies. These principles assured the regime survival and security from the prying interference and influence by external parties and ASEAN. These also serve as the needed assurance against third party and external influencing factors and the need to cede sovereignty in certain segments to a supranational entity like the EU. However, the negative implications have been proven to serve more towards regional short term interests and individual internal regime security more than future long term collective interests.
Mutual distrusts and mistrusts, economic disparity, intra trade deficiencies, redundancy, internal peer competition – these are some of the many structural deficiencies affecting ASEAN.
The returns from ASEAN affiliation as a grouping are dwindling in the long term, as member states seek external support individually to safeguard their survival.
External moves on individual states including Japan’s OSA, upcoming potential JAPHUS alliance , individual direct bilateral engagement by external powers and others, all reflect the failed efficacy of ASEAN.
It has also given rise to various mini lateral engagements, each with a specific tailor made agenda in upping the survival interests of states.
Erosion of trust and stability in expectations and predictions of behaviours have further pushed member states to seek their own survival and assurances and gave rise to arms race and perpetual security dilemma.
ASEAN remains ill equipped to handle the fallout from South China Sea or the potentiality of a full blown Taiwanese conflict. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific offers nothing more than the usual parameters of safe play and continuous dependence on futile past efforts.
By harping on diplomatic moves through quiet and backdoor approaches and expanded dialogue mechanisms, these only provide temporary cooling off measures without tackling the root causes of regional security dilemma, arms race and prisoner’s dilemma.
ASEAN now faces critical crossroads and tough choice to make, it has been trapped between a rock and a hard place for decades, but lack the audacity to implement significant changes.It wanted to remain neutral and hoping that this will prevent the worst outcome and will bring desired stability, but has persistently failed.
ASEAN members will prioritise their own national survival and interests above the interests of the region and the grouping, with little interest to commit more than desired especially regarding the political survival of the ruling regimes and governments. Little incentivisation efforts can be seen in chasing the regional standard of imposing greater rules, criteria and norms in setting the high standards and concepts of regionalism as in the case of the EU. Lacking a rewarding, resilient and sustainable future and returns from the regional grouping in the long term projection, member states find better stature and assurances from the existing external power that provides these lifelines and assurances.
The time is now for ASEAN leaders to be fully committed and open to admitting the mistakes of the past, and for them to chart their own legacy to enact credible changes that will ensure the region’s future sustainability and survival. It will not be their legacy alone, as it will provide lasting assurances and legacies for the nations..."
Source/publisher:
"Eurasia Review"
Date of publication:
2023-05-19
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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more
Description:
"11 May 2023: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders must identify the military junta as the primary source of violence in Myanmar and actively support international justice efforts if they are genuine about wanting to end the crisis and see perpetrators of alleged violations of international law in Myanmar held to account, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
In a statement issued on 10 May 2023, ASEAN Leaders condemned an attack on a humanitarian and diplomatic convoy in Myanmar and underlined that the perpetrators must be held accountable.
The Leaders were referring to an attack on a convoy of vehicles transporting officials from the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and ASEAN Monitoring Team, including diplomats from Indonesia and Singapore. The team came under fire while under military escort on 7 May 2023 in Taunggyi District, Shan State, eastern Myanmar.
Accountability and an end to impunity are essential to resolving the crisis in Myanmar. The military is alleged to have committed the most serious crimes under international law in Myanmar over many decades, including possible genocide against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017, and crimes against humanity and war crimes following its attempted coup of February 2021, including the Pazigyi massacre of 11 April 2023. All signs indicate that the military junta itself is responsible for the attack on the ASEAN convoy this week.
The ASEAN Leaders’ words are no more than empty rhetoric if they fail to identify the junta as the cause of violence and suffering in Myanmar and are not backed-up by action from ASEAN Member States to pursue justice through international mechanisms, as accountability in Myanmar is not possible under the current conditions.
Myanmar’s courts are under the control of the military and as such are not independent, and justice and the rule of law are non-existent. Courts in areas of Myanmar controlled by the National Unity Government (NUG), Ethnic Resistance Organisations and other resistance authorities are under-resourced and face capacity and other constraints due to the military’s constant attacks against the population.
ASEAN Member States should provide diplomatic support to the NUG and its efforts to advance international justice including through the International Criminal Court (ICC). They should urge the United Nations (UN) Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC, or, if the Security Council fails to act, then pursue the establishment of a special court for Myanmar.
The military junta’s atrocities against the people of Myanmar escalated throughout 2022 and have escalated further still in the first half of 2023. International leaders are failing in their responsibilities to the Myanmar people if they continue to hide behind meaningless words. It is long past time they act against the military junta to end its violence and protect the Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-05-11
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, International Criminal Court (Myanmar), Crimes Against Humanity
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Description:
"We were deeply concerned with ongoing violence in Myanmar and urged the immediate cessation of all forms of violence and the use of force to create a conducive environment for the safe and timely delivery of humanitarian assistance and inclusive national dialogues.
We supported the statement of the President of the Republic of Indonesia as the Chair of ASEAN on 8 May 2023 in response to the recent attack on a convoy of the AHA Center and the ASEAN Monitoring Team in Myanmar. We condemned the attack and underlined that the perpetrators must be held accountable.
We supported the efforts of the Chair of ASEAN, including its continued engagements with all stakeholders in Myanmar, to encourage progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication:
2023-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
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"Mr Christopher de Souza: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs what is the ASEAN leadership intending to do in light of continued and increasing violence and human rights violations in Myanmar.
REPLY
ASEAN Chair Indonesia has strongly condemned the recent airstrikes by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, in Sagaing Region, Myanmar on 11 April 2023. Singapore supports this statement. Any attack on civilians is reprehensible and cannot be condoned. Such acts of violence contradict the Five-Point Consensus formulated by the ASEAN Leaders and accepted by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing at their meeting on 24 April 2021 in Jakarta. Given the limited progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, the Leaders, at the ASEAN Summits in November 2022, agreed on a series of steps to send a clear signal to the Tatmadaw.
Indonesia has been engaging stakeholders to encourage inclusive dialogue in Myanmar. It has called for the cessation of violence and taken steps to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar. Myanmar’s neighbours outside of ASEAN and our external partners, including the UN, also have important roles to play in working with ASEAN to address the crisis and facilitate national reconciliation in Myanmar. Nevertheless, the rate limiting factor for progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus is not ASEAN or our external partners, but the stakeholders within Myanmar, especially the Tatmadaw. We should continue to press the Tatmadaw to cease violence and implement the Five-Point Consensus swiftly and fully..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of publication:
2023-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"We are deeply concerned by reports that unknown assailants in Burma shot at an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) convoy under military escort. Just ahead of the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit, these attacks in Shan State come as the regime’s violence and disregard for the rule of law have led to greater instability on the ground, all while the regime has continued to neglect its commitments under the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, including ceasing its violence and enabling unhindered humanitarian access.
The United States calls on Burma’s military regime to meaningfully implement the Five-Point Consensus and respect the democratic aspirations of the people who have demonstrated they do not want to live another day under the military’s tyranny. The military regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including rules on the protection of diplomatic personnel and civilians. The United States will continue to work with ASEAN and our allies and partners across the international community to support Burma on the path to long-term inclusive, democratic governance..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of publication:
2023-05-08
Date of entry/update:
2023-05-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"The IHF is an issue for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Summit in Jakarta on May 5-12 and one of the main concerns is the involvement of ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center on Disaster Management (AHA) in the delivery of aid in Myanmar.
It is clear that it has neither the experience nor the capacity to deliver the aid, and most importantly, it includes representatives of the junta and is inevitably going to work with the State Administration Council (SAC). This means that not only will aid be inefficiently delivered, but the SAC will also weaponize aid and use it for its own strategic and political advantage whilst depriving the majority of the country, which is controlled by the resistance, from receiving aid.
I have heard that United Nations Organization for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA) and Indonesia want the AHA to take the lead. The National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in the IHF strongly disagree with AHA involvement.
The objective of the IHF, which was proposed by the NUG and EAOs, is to find new channels to deliver aid to those seriously affected by the war including those in NUG and EAO controlled areas. This will not happen if the aid is channeled through the AHA or the UN. The situation on the ground is that aid is urgently needed where the vast majority of those in need, such as IDPs, are located and if this doesn’t happen then it will have dire consequences for the whole region. As the UN has demonstrated, aid cannot be delivered to the neediest in non-junta-controlled areas. This is blatantly obvious and should not even need to be stated but the UN continues doing this.
I believe the IHF has identified three options, of which only the third makes any sense. The first is that the SAC agrees to a humanitarian pause and allows free passage of aid in NUG and EAO areas via the IHF. This is of course ridiculous and about as likely as a no-fly zone with a US aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal. Another option stated is that there is an agreement with donors and countries bordering Myanmar for cross border aid to EAO and NUG areas. This is not quite as ridiculous as the first option but bordering countries would not formally agree to this. India, China and Thailand have, so far, demonstrated their support for the junta. The final option discussed is the only feasible one, namely donors agree to an upscale aid delivered through local networks with a lot more flexibility concerning fund transfers, reporting and any other adaption of existing systems to ensure aid reaches the most in need in EAO and NUG areas quickly and without large overheads.
In the IHF the obvious seems to be supported by the NUG, EAOs and CSOs but not by Indonesia and OCHA, who still want the AHA involved and taking the lead. One suspects this may be because of personal rather than humanitarian interests.
Paul Greening is an ex-UN senior staff member with over 20 years’ experience in six Asian countries working for six UN agencies and four INGOs. He worked in Sittwe, Rakhine State for the IOM from 2017 to 2020 and since then has been involved in advocacy against the illegal attempted coup and supporting those who have suffered from it..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2023-04-26
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
If Indonesia ends up the steward of ASEAN’s failure over Myanmar, Laos – the next chair – will be the gravedigger.
Description:
"There are two ways of looking at Indonesia’s handling of the Myanmar crisis during its once-a-decade stint as ASEAN chair. Either Indonesia has been ASEAN chairman for only a few months so shouldn’t be blamed for having, so far, not come up with a meaningful policy on the Myanmar crisis. Or it only has eight months left as the chair and if it fails to devise a policy, the entire ASEAN-led response could crumble when it hands over the chairmanship next year to Laos, which is sure to steer the regional bloc down the path of greater acceptance of Myanmar’s military junta.
Upon the handover, Jakarta needs to have in place more than something resembling a coherent policy toward Myanmar. There needs to be a gift-wrapped policy on which there’s so much accord among member states that Laos cannot walk it back. ASEAN’s policy must be able to sustain itself even when in the hands of the disinterested.
Jakarta’s burden is considerable. Create a policy too tough on the junta and some other ASEAN states, who want the bloc to have nothing to do with the Myanmar crisis, won’t be on board. A policy that is too forceful also risks being jettisoned once Indonesian diplomats are no longer in charge. One too weak, though, would be meaningless.
After a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in early February, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said they “reiterated the united approach” on Myanmar. Shayna Bauchner and Andreas Harsono of Human Rights Watch deemed this “a misguided cover falsely equating a diversified approach with weakness.” So far, it seems that Jakarta is favoring silent, backroom diplomacy, and could possibly unveil something later this year.
It’s safe to assume that Laos, which takes up the regional chairmanship next year, is not in the least bit interested in democracy in Myanmar. The one-party, communist-run state is hermetic and parochial. It fundamentally believes in the principle of non-involvement in another member state’s affairs. Along with like-minded Thailand, Laos has been engaging with Myanmar’s military junta – formally titled the State Administration Council (SAC) – for some time.
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Laos will be the first immediate neighbor of Myanmar to hold the chair since the coup in early 2021. Vientiane is aware that the conflict next door could impact economic activity on their shared Mekong River, a hydropower bonanza for Laos. It knows an uptick in crime at home, which is causing political problems, stems from an explosion of drug activity in Myanmar. As such, Vientiane has every domestic reason to favor an end to the crisis next door (not necessarily the case for the past ASEAN chairs) and the easiest option, it probably reasons, is to help normalize the junta’s rule.
In the aftermath of the military coup in February 2021, Vientiane made the blandest of bland statements. Speaking at a United Nations General Assembly session last September, Saleumxay Kommasith, Laos’ foreign minister, said his country “considers the role played by ASEAN as crucial in creating an environment conducive to a return to normalcy in Myanmar and we should continue to engage Myanmar so as to ensure the continuation of delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar and to explore ways and means to ensure Myanmar’s full and effective implementation of the Five-Point Consensus towards tangible outcomes.” One imagines that Saleumxay will become ASEAN’s special envoy to Myanmar next year, as the role tends to change hands along with the chair position – unless Indonesia can make the newly-created “special envoy office” a permanent fitting in Jakarta.
Laos sits squarely in the engage-with-the-junta camp. On April 7, for instance, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone held a three-way meeting with Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s junta leader, about cross-border haze pollution. Laos took part in the Thai-led “informal” meeting with junta officials last December. And it reportedly participated in the (again) Thai-led then led “1.5 track dialogue” with Bangladesh, India, and junta representatives in March. A junta official represented Myanmar at the latest Mekong River Commission (MRC) summit in Vientiane this month.
The latest “State of Southeast Asia” report, a survey of “elite” opinion published annually by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, posed several questions about how ASEAN should move forward on the Myanmar crisis. Just 1.9 percent of Loatian elites wanted the bloc “to utilize harder methods to effectively curtail the SAC,” well below the regional average of 18 percent. Some 2.8 percent of Laotian elites said Myanmar should be expelled from ASEAN, again the lowest in the region. The majority (43 percent) said ASEAN shouldn’t interfere, well above the regional average.
Vientiane will also be influenced by its main partners. China, its main economic patron, is increasingly siding with the junta in Myanmar. Vietnam, another economic partner, wants to have nothing to do with this crisis. Thailand has shown that it prefers close engagement with the junta, although that might change after a general election next month. Laos has improved ties with Russia over the past year or so, and Moscow is firmly on the side of the junta.
Also worth mentioning, Laos is rather distant from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, the regional states that purportedly want to develop a more robust ASEAN approach to the crisis. And it is arguably the Southeast Asian state with the least developed ties to Western democracies, which will limit their ability to lobby ASEAN for a response that focuses on democracy and human rights.
It’s inconceivable that the junta in Naypyidaw hasn’t partly factored Laos’ chairmanship of ASEAN into its thinking. After all, Laos has already held two national steering committee meetings to prepare for the handover, and spoke about it with Chinese officials on Saleumxay’s recent visit to Beijing. If the junta goes ahead with its plans to hold “elections” this year (which may or may not happen) that would exert even more pressure on Laos, once ASEAN chair, to accept the military’s rule as fait accompli. There cannot be another wasted year; waiting until Malaysia takes the chair in 2025 will be too late.
That ought to focus minds in Jakarta, as well as in the rest of the world. It’s the next eight months or nothing. If nothing, Indonesia will be the steward of ASEAN’s failure. Laos will be the gravedigger..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2023-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Media Release: Ban Ki-moon meets military leaders in Myanmar and calls for an immediate cessation of violence and implementation of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus
Ban Ki-moon, Deputy Chair of The Elders and former Secretary-General of the United Nations, visited Myanmar on 23-24 April 2023, to find a path to an end to violence and establishing a peaceful, democratic, inclusive and legitimate government.
He met Myanmar’s military leaders and former President Thein Sein to discuss the situation, and emphasised the importance of all parties playing a role in securing a lasting solution, including the National Unity Government.
"I came to Myanmar to urge the military to adopt an immediate cessation of violence, and start constructive dialogue among all parties concerned,” Ban Ki-moon said.
“My meetings were exploratory. I will do all I can to help the people of Myanmar secure the peace, prosperity and freedom they deserve.”
The visit was at the invitation of the Myanmar military. In his meetings in Naypyidaw, Ban Ki-moon stressed the urgency of making progress on implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus and last December’s United Nations Security Council Resolution 2669. He supported the international community’s calls for the immediate release by the Myanmar military of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, for constructive dialogue, and for utmost restraint from all parties.
Ban Ki-moon reiterated the strong international condemnation of the recent military air strike in Sagaing region, which is estimated to have killed more than 160 civilians, including women and children.
He warned that elections must only be held when conditions are in place for them to be free and fair. Holding elections under current conditions risks further violence and division, and the results not being recognised by the people of Myanmar, ASEAN and the wider international community.
Support for a full transition to democracy and civilian rule has been a feature of The Elders’ engagement with Myanmar over the past decade, and Ban Ki-moon has a personal history of supporting Myanmar’s progress when UN Secretary-General.
"
“ASEAN Member States and the wider international community need to show unity and resolve in their commitment to peace and democracy in Myanmar, which is a source of serious international concern. With patient determination, I believe a way forward can be found out of the current crisis. The military must take the first steps”, Ban Ki-moon said...
Source/publisher:
The Elders
Date of publication:
2023-04-25
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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327.36 KB 335.06 KB
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"On the two-year anniversary of the Five-Point Consensus, lawmakers from Southeast Asia call on ASEAN to acknowledge that the Consensus signed in April 2021 has failed miserably and that the Myanmar junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing should not to be trusted to fulfill the obligations outlined in the proposed agreement.
“The recent airstrikes in the Sagaing region, which killed hundreds of civilians, including children, are further evidence that the Myanmar junta is completely unwilling and incapable of adhering to the Five-Point Consensus,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Chair and member of the Indonesian House of Representatives Mercy Barends said today. “If ASEAN insists on sticking to an agreement that has proven to be utterly ineffective then it is complicit in the ongoing crimes and atrocities of the junta.”
On April 24, 2021, the leaders of nine ASEAN member states and Myanmar junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed to the following five points: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and the special envoy’s visit to Myanmar to meet with all parties.
The International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the Myanmar coup (IPI), which was organized by APHR, indicated in its final report in November 2022, “it is clear that the FIve-Point Consensus has failed, and a new mode of engagement is needed in its place.” As one witness noted in their testimony to the IPI, from the start, it was “thoroughly clear that Min Aung Hlaing was insincere in signing it and had no intention of following it.”
The Consensus’ first point on the cessation of violence has been blatantly ignored by the junta, as evidenced by the ongoing airstrikes and malicious attacks against unarmed civilians. Meanwhile, ASEAN’s intention to provide humanitarian aid, as noted in the IPI report, has been “stymied by a lack of resources and genuine commitment.” The ASEAN Special Envoy position has also proven to be ineffective, especially since it changes along with the ASEAN chair.
“ASEAN’s weak-willed approach toward the junta is a complete disgrace. Even after it finally criticized the junta’s airstrikes in Sagaing, the ASEAN Secretary-General still met with the junta’s permanent representative to ASEAN, making any statement of condemnation little more than lip service,” said APHR Co-chair and former Malaysian member of parliament Charles Santiago. “Indonesia’s ‘soft-diplomacy’ approach as ASEAN chair has also yet to yield results and must be urgently reevaluated. Indonesia must take a stronger stance and be transparent on how they are addressing the Myanmar crisis, especially given the limited amount of time left in their chairmanship.”
In a roundtable discussion at the Indonesian House of Representatives in Jakarta on March 3, dozens of parliamentarians from several Southeast Asian countries urged ASEAN and the international community at large to take swift and concrete action against the illegal military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and provide real assistance to the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar, including by recognizing the National Unity Government (NUG) and having open and public negotiations that include the NUG, ethnic groups, and other pro-democracy forces.
“ASEAN needs to live up to its role as a regional mediator and it needs to do so immediately, starting with Indonesia as chair. Closed-door and informal meetings are no longer enough,” said Santiago. “It is clear that ASEAN needs to negotiate a new agreement that includes the National Unity Government and the representatives of ethnic minorities while providing clear enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the agreement is upheld.”..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2023-04-24
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-24
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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185.85 KB
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"ASEAN strongly condemns the reported recent air strikes carried out by the Myanmar Armed Forces in Pa Zi Gyi Village, Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region of Myanmar, that claimed the lives of at least dozens of civilians.
All forms of violence must end immediately, particularly the use of force against civilians.
This would be the only way to create a conducive environment for an inclusive national dialogue to find a sustainable peaceful solution in Myanmar.
We reiterate ASEAN’s commitment to continue assisting Myanmar in seeking a workable and durable solution to the ongoing crisis through promoting the full implementation of the Five-Point Consensus..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Secretariat
Date of publication:
2023-04-13
Date of entry/update:
2023-04-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Two years ago, following Myanmar’s military coup on February 1, 2021, Indonesia called an emergency summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta. “The development of the situation in Myanmar is unacceptable and must not continue,” President Joko Widodo announced. On April 24, 2021, the nine ASEAN leaders and Myanmar junta chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, committed to a five-point consensus intended to chart a path toward dialogue and de-escalation of the crisis.
Within days, the junta repudiated the agreement, going on to unleash a reign of atrocities against the Myanmar people that continues today, massacring, torturing, and starving its perceived opposition.
Meanwhile, the international community has put ASEAN in the driver’s seat, endlessly reiterating, as in the December UN Security Council resolution on Myanmar, “its full support for ASEAN’s central role in facilitating a peaceful solution.” But with no clear tools or leverage to move forward, ASEAN has been left effectively holding the bag for Myanmar’s descent toward becoming a failed state.
“Indonesia is deeply concerned by the military’s lack of commitment to implement the Five-Points Consensus,” Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi told the UN General Assembly in September 2022, following the junta’s execution of four pro-democracy activists. The next month, she reported that the situation was “deteriorating and worsening.”
The foreign minister’s frankness suggested Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023 would bring about a stronger regional response, following Cambodia’s self-admitted foundering last year.
But as it wraps up its first quarter as ASEAN chair, Indonesia has fallen short.
The chair’s statement at the February Foreign Ministers’ Retreat contained only meek language on Myanmar, toothlessly urging the junta to implement the five-point consensus, which called for an immediate end to violence and constructive dialogue, among other points. Jakarta has offered no clarity on what action will be taken against a member that has grievously violated not only the joint agreement, but the binding ASEAN Charter, which enshrines the principles of democracy, rule of law, and human rights.
Behind closed doors, Marsudi reportedly presented a plan to make progress on the consensus at a UN Security Council briefing in March, an outcome of the November 2022 ASEAN Leaders Summit that called for “an implementation plan that outlines concrete, practical and measurable indicators with specific timeline to support the Five-Point Consensus.”
But putting any meaningful plan into effect will require a timeline with tangible consequences for the junta’s violations, which should include the threat of suspending Myanmar under article 20 of the ASEAN Charter, covering noncompliance and serious breaches of the Charter. Indonesia should formalize the proposal made by Jokowi at the November summit to expand the ban on junta representatives at ASEAN meetings.
Rather than appointing an individual as special envoy to Myanmar, like the previous two chairs, Indonesia has established a special envoy’s office headed by Foreign Minister Marsudi, working alongside longtime diplomat Ngurah Swajaya. The office has been operating “in a low key manner,” a spokesperson told Frontier Myanmar. “Not all diplomatic activities need to be disclosed to the public.” Reported plans for a military envoy have not yet materialized.
Grappling with the Myanmar junta’s intransigence has exposed fault lines within the regional bloc. Indonesia and Malaysia, often alongside Singapore and the Philippines, have favored a more vocal approach to Myanmar that has been stymied by Thailand and Cambodia’s expressed reluctance to isolate the junta. The result is a lowest common denominator strategy presented under the guise of “consensus.”
Marsudi reported that at their February meeting, the foreign ministers “reiterated the united approach” on Myanmar – a misguided cover falsely equating a diversified approach with weakness.
In December, Thailand hosted an “informal” meeting on the crisis with junta officials, attended by Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, which the other ASEAN members sat out. An opaque Thai-led “1.5 track dialogue” with Laos, Bangladesh, India, and junta representatives followed in mid-March. If Bangkok has no qualms charting its own course without the sign-off of all ASEAN members, why should Indonesia handcuff itself as chair to protect a “consensus” approach that’s serving no one?
Indonesia should instead be capitalizing on its leadership role by helping build a coalition of concerned governments, including regional powers as well as Western countries that have hidden behind “ASEAN centrality,” to create pressure that’s layered yet complementary. Gaining buy-in from many if not all ASEAN states as well as Japan and South Korea would strengthen both diplomatic and punitive actions.
Jakarta should encourage other governments to toughen sanctions on the junta’s revenues – first and foremost from oil and gas – and to enhance their enforcement of existing measures. It should welcome more concrete action by the Security Council, with steps toward a resolution imposing a global arms embargo, targeted sanctions against the military, and a referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court. Indonesia cannot present itself as a broker or envoy between junta authorities and the outside world unless the punitive actions that the world is imposing are serious enough to get the junta’s attention.
“The interests of the Myanmar people must always be the priority,” Jokowi said at the emergency summit in Jakarta two years ago.
But the junta’s generals serve neither the country nor its people. Indonesia should be engaging, formally and consistently, with those who do – Myanmar civil society activists and the opposition National Unity Government, among others. Local groups are also key for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) to deliver aid effectively, one of the tasks of the five-point consensus, rather than relying on junta authorities who have misused and weaponized humanitarian assistance.
“The criticisms shouldn’t be aimed at ASEAN,” Marsudi said in November. “They should be aimed at the junta.… We did our part.”
Certainly, the junta is directly responsible for the crimes against humanity and war crimes it’s committing across the country.
But for the millions of people brutally oppressed by the junta, ASEAN has not done its part. Not when there is so much more that Jakarta could be doing, and so much more that needs to be done..."
Source/publisher:
Coconuts Jakarta via "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2023-03-31
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Indonesia and Australia have different but equally critical roles in bringing the junta to the negotiating table.
Description:
"Since the military coup in February 2022, the people of Myanmar have been subjected to unrelenting violence including indiscriminate airstrikes, mass burning of villages, arbitrary arrests, killings, torture and forced disappearances, among other egregious human rights violations.
Reflecting the gravity of the crisis, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made an unprecedented divergence from its founding principle of non-interference. In April 2021, ASEAN leaders negotiated a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, committing among other things to a cessation of violence and the commencement of “constructive dialogue”. In November 2022, ASEAN acknowledged that “little progress [had been] achieved”. ASEAN resolved that there was a “need for an implementation plan”, and called for support from ASEAN’s “external partners”.
ASEAN’s engagement in the Myanmar crisis thus far is due to the leadership of Indonesia and Malaysia, at times supported by Singapore and the Philippines. Other ASEAN states are more loath to intervene. Singapore’s foreign minister recently stated that “disapprov[al] of the coup … does not give ASEAN a licence to interfere”. With this in mind, if ASEAN has one chance at a political solution to the Myanmar crisis, it is with Indonesia as ASEAN Chair in 2023.
Indonesia has said that ASEAN “must deal” with the crisis in Myanmar, and that as ASEAN Chair it will “spare no effort” to encourage an “inclusive national dialogue”. Bearing in mind ASEAN’s internal constraints and divisions, however, Indonesia faces an uphill battle. As former Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman observed recently, “much is expected from ASEAN, and therein lies the problem”. Darusman has advised that “if there is going to be any change in Myanmar, it will need to come from outside”. This is reflected in ASEAN’s unusual request in November 2022 for external support.
Australia has a critical role to play in this context. Australia is one of ASEAN and Indonesia’s most important supporters. It has a comprehensive strategic partnership with Indonesia, enshrining a commitment to work together to resolve regional challenges. Australia has explicitly expressed support for the role of the ASEAN Chair in addressing the Myanmar crisis.
The situation in Myanmar tests this cooperation. As a member of the ASEAN family, Indonesia is subject to constraints that Australia is not. From outside the ASEAN family, Australia can lend critical support for Indonesia in its ambition for a political dialogue on Myanmar. There are three steps, in particular, that Australia can take.
The first concerns the setting of the ground for negotiations. As Darusman has stated, this requires a “level playing field” – one on which all political stakeholders, including Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), are recognised and accorded equal footing. Assuming the negotiations are to be ASEAN-led, this requires ASEAN and all other major players to recognise the NUG as legitimately representing the aspirations of the people of Myanmar.
As one of ASEAN’s most important partners, Australia can help the NUG along the road to international recognition. Australia has said it is “open to engagement with the NUG”, but has stopped short of making an explicit statement of recognition or publicly engaging with high-level NUG officials. The European Parliament, by contrast, has formally recognised the NUG. In light of its explicit support for Indonesia’s ambitions as ASEAN Chair, Australia should be at the forefront of coordinated international efforts to boost the NUG’s legitimacy, not lagging behind.
Second, even with a stage set for dialogue, the Myanmar military junta will likely need to be coerced to the negotiating table. Already, the situation is opportune – the junta is losing ground, and the democratic resistance movement is consolidating – but further pressure is required. It is often remarked that the junta is impervious to international isolation, but with access to hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from oil and gas alone, this has scarcely been put to the test.
Australia currently sanctions just two entities that benefit the junta. Canada, by way of contrast, sanctions 63, the European Union sanctions 18, the United Kingdom sanctions 28 and the United States sanctions 32.
The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has called on states to “form a working group of governments to develop and implement a coordinated strategy” to deny the junta access to weapons and resources. Australia should be leading this initiative – sanctioning companies that supply fuel and parts to Myanmar’s air force, arms to the junta, and goods to state-owned enterprises in the minerals and energy sectors, and lobbying other states to do the same – with a view of ultimately forcing the junta to ASEAN’s negotiating table.
Finally, recalling ASEAN’s request for external support, Australia could work behind the scenes to urge the United Nations to step up support for ASEAN-led mediation – just as the United Nations has supported regionally led mediation in other parts of the world. Such support could be prompted by a request from ASEAN to the Secretary-General, or alternatively by a Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-General provide his “good offices”, and strengthening the mandate of his Special Envoy on Myanmar.
Australia likes to say it punches above its weight in global affairs. It has a proud history of peacekeeping and diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. The political crisis in Myanmar presents an opportunity and an imperative for Australia to demonstrate its diplomatic prowess, and it should not be lost..."
Source/publisher:
"The Interpreter"
Date of publication:
2023-03-22
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-22
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
"Indonesia has a limited window of opportunity to achieve progress on Myanmar while it chairs ASEAN but that window is already growing smaller. Regional and international support for ASEAN is needed to impose time-bound consequences for Min Aung Hlaing should he continue to flout the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC), Indonesia is best placed to lead the initiative. ASEAN has insisted so far on treating the crisis in Myanmar as if it were a humanitarian disaster, one that can be ameliorated and contained neatly within Myanmar’s borders through cooperation with the junta. This is, at best, delusional. At worst it makes ASEAN complicit in the mass suffering being inflicted on the Myanmar people by Min Aung Hlaing’s junta. Min Aung Hlaing’s one and only goal is to establish his own rule, heading the junta, in Myanmar, an objective he is prepared to pursue no matter how much destruction he inflicts on the country or how many people he kills. This has been clear from the outset, making ASEAN’s futile fixation with expecting him to suddenly adhere to the 5PC he agreed to two years ago all the more perverse.
The junta has only one strategy: to terrorize the population though the widespread, systematic commission of atrocities. So far, the strategy seems to be failing. In spite of the immense suffering, the people’s support for the revolution is entrenched, and nationwide armed resistance is steadily escalating in response to the junta’s savagery. The junta’s increasing reliance on devastating airstrikes to bomb civilian targets reflects its hemorrhaging of control on the ground. But the scale of the suffering caused by the junta is alarming. Conservative estimates count the number of people in Myanmar who will need humanitarian assistance this year at 17.6 million, while 15.2 million are food insecure. At least 1.5 million people are now internally displaced with thousands more seeking refuge across Myanmar’s borders in neighboring Thailand and India each day. And there are still more than a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. For two long years, the Myanmar people have pleaded for support from the international com-munity and protection from the junta’s violence. They feel totally betrayed.
Indonesia cannot allow this disgraceful injustice to continue. Ending the junta’s violence is a bare minimum expectation, yet ASEAN does not seem to have the necessary leverage over Min Aung Hlaing. Indonesia should lead a regional response that extends beyond ASEAN member states to include democratic allies Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand as well as Myanmar’s immediate neighbor Bangladesh.
China and India’s participation should also be sought but may not be possible, with both countries continuing to supply Min Aung Hlaing’s forces with the weapons it uses to carry out its atrocities. The immediate focus of this ASEAN-Plus initiative should be on ending the junta violence, with clear benchmarks for the junta and time-bound con-sequences if not met. At the same time, ASEAN must begin formal engagement with all stakeholders, primarily the National Unity Government (NUG) as the legitimate government of Myanmar, its allied ethnic revolutionary organizations, Myanmar civil society, and others in the democratic movement. Furthermore, it is critical that ASEAN – and the UN – urgently coordinate humanitarian assistance directly with local actors inside Myanmar, many in resistance-controlled areas including those along the border with Thailand, already providing aid and support to millions of people in dire need. This is the only way to get aid to areas of the country where Min Aung Hlaing is deliberately restricting access as a means of inflicting yet more suffering on the population. If ASEAN and the UN continue giving the junta total control over aid delivery, they are quite simply enabling Min Aung Hlaing’s atrocity strategy. Should ASEAN fail to make concrete progress on Myanmar by the end of the year, it should refer the situation to the UN Security Council, which in December passed its first ever resolution on Myanmar. The Security Council must then use all measures at its disposal, including those un-der Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to act to protect the people of Myanmar from the junta.
Less than 10 short months remain in Indonesia’s term as ASEAN chair before the seat is passed on to Laos. The clock is ticking..."
Source/publisher:
The Jakarta Post
Date of publication:
2023-03-14
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
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Description:
"Representatives of the illegal Myanmar military junta have been invited to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Workshop on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism this week, according to a Justice For Myanmar source.
The workshop is set to take place in Bali, Indonesia from March 8 to 10, 2023 and will be co-chaired by the European Union, Indonesia and Laos, with apparent financial support from the German development agency, GIZ. As part of the workshop, the EU is hosting a welcome dinner on March 8.
The ASEAN Regional Forum’s secretariat invited representatives of the Myanmar junta via its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which then invited the junta’s Ministry of Home Affairs and Central Bank of Myanmar. The Ministry of Home Affairs houses the junta’s police force and prisons department and is directly responsible for ongoing crimes against humanity.
The EU has sanctioned the junta’s home affairs minister and deputy home affairs minister, as well as the junta’s State Administration Council.
The workshop aims to build knowledge and capacity to address the security risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, focussing on the prevention of the financing of terrorism by non-profit organisations related to the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 8.
FATF blacklisted Myanmar in October 2022 over serious deficiencies in countering money laundering, urging countries to conduct enhanced due diligence against the risks emanating from Myanmar.
A group of former United Nations experts, the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, have established that the Myanmar military junta is a terrorist organisation under Myanmar law and as defined in international law, and it should be treated as such by the international community.
In 2021, the junta illegally declared the National Unity Government (NUG), which is the legitimate government of Myanmar, as a terrorist group. It also designated the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) as terrorist organisations.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, the junta has created a state of terror, committing deliberate killings, arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, rape and torture, using counter-terrorism as a pretext. The junta has killed more than 3,100 people, and arbitrarily arrested over 20,000.
As part of its attempt to gain control, the junta illegally introduced an organisation registration law in October 2022 to force non-profits to register with the junta, and disclose funding sources and details about their operations, under threat of imprisonment.
Analysis by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) found that the junta’s organisation registration law is “wholly incompliant” with international law and standards, violating the right to freedom of association, assembly, opinion, expression, and political participation.
The junta has also increased surveillance of the financial sector. An August 2022 directive by the junta’s Central Bank of Myanmar to mobile money businesses requires users to register a photo of their face, their ID card and phone number, increasing the grave risks of retaliation by the junta to those making payments to the NUG, CRPH, PDFs, civil society and other forces successfully resisting the military’s attempted coup and providing humanitarian aid and basic services to the people.
Justice For Myanmar wrote to the co-chairs of the ARF workshop to express dismay at the invitation of illegal military junta members, to urge that they are disinvited and that an invite is instead extended to the National Unity Government, and to seek clarification on funding arrangements.
A representative of the EU denied responsibility for the Myanmar junta’s participation, saying that invitations for ARF activities are distributed through the ARF Secretariat, and clarified that the EU is not funding the participation of representatives from Myanmar. GIZ responded that they are not financially supporting participants to attend the workshop.
Meanwhile, no response was received from Indonesia or Laos.
Justice For Myanmar requests the co-chairs of the workshop to immediately disinvite the Myanmar military junta and to ban the junta from this and all future ASEAN Regional Forum workshops and events.
Instead, these invitations should be extended to the National Unity Government.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is nonsensical for ARF to invite representatives of the Myanmar junta, a terrorist organisation, to a workshop on countering the financing of terrorism. The invite not only legitimises the junta but also provides it with an opportunity to improve their understanding of measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, which may help them to better circumvent these measures as part of their organised, criminal activities.
“By providing the junta with capacity to regulate the transactions of non-profit organisations, ARF is in effect supporting the junta’s crackdown on freedom of association, assembly, opinion, expression, and political participation, which violates international law.
“The invite also undermines the integrity of ARF’s important work to address the security and economic risks linked to money laundering and terrorist financing activities.
“The Myanmar junta is systemically corrupt and uses a vast network of business to fund its ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity against the people. ARF should treat the junta as a threat to regional economies and security, rather than as a partner.
“JFM calls on ARF to immediately revoke the invite to the military junta, and instead extend an invite to the National Unity Government.
“The EU should use its leverage as a co-host to urge the exclusion of the junta in the upcoming workshop, the EU hosted welcome dinner and all other international meetings and events the EU is part of. Instead, the EU should support and recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-03-07
Date of entry/update:
2023-03-07
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Business and the Military, Sanctions, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
Statement on The Honourable Prime Minister Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s "The Future of ASEAN" address on 10 February 2023
Description:
"The National Unity Government welcomes The Honourable Prime Minister Dato' Seri Anwar
Ibrahim’s remarks on Myanmar during his "The Future of ASEAN" keynote address on 10
February 2023.
The Malaysian Prime Minister spoke with conviction and authority in calling for a “strong
consensus in giving a strong message to the Myanmar regime" to end its discrimination,
marginalisation, intimidation and perpetration of violence against the people of Myanmar.
Prime Minister Anwar also issued a clear call to action in pressing for new ASEAN
mechanisms to end the junta’s atrocities against the people. This process must see direct
engagement with the National Unity Government, ethnic organisations and Myanmar civil
society, and further pressure piled on the junta including by blocking its representatives from
all ASEAN meetings and forums.
The National Unity Government extends its continued partnership to ASEAN and its full
support to Indonesia as ASEAN Chair. We also express our deep gratitude to Prime Minister
Anwar and to H.E. Dato' Seri Diraja Dr. Zambry Abd. Kadir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Malaysia, for their abiding solidarity with the Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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23.91 KB
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Description:
"The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat was convened on 4 February 2023 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Retreat was the first major meeting under Indonesia’s Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023 with the theme “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth. The meeting was preceded by the 32nd ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) Meeting under Indonesia’s Chairmanship on 3 February 2023.
The meetings were also attended by Timor-Leste, signifying its first participation as part of the ASEAN Family, which in principle, is an 11th member of ASEAN, with the status of observer. ASEAN further welcomed Timor-Leste in embracing the path of ASEAN Community Building and reiterated the mutual interests and interdependence among the peoples of ASEAN, which are bound by geography, common objectives, and shared destiny..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of publication:
2023-02-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
247.11 KB
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Description:
"Minister: Good afternoon, everyone. We have just concluded the first ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting for this year, chaired by Indonesia. I will start off by making remarks on three themes. First, on Timor-Leste; second, Myanmar; and then more specific details on the ASEAN agenda itself.
First, what made this meeting different was the participation, for the first time, of Timor-Leste as an observer. You may recall that our leaders gave in-principle approval for Timor-Leste’s (ASEAN) membership, and they are in the process of transiting through an objective, criteria-based roadmap. On a bilateral basis, I reassured the foreign minister of Timor-Leste that Singapore stands in full support. In particular, we have got an ASEAN Readiness Support package for Timor-Leste, basically to help them enhance their capability, human resource development, as well as both diplomatic and economic tools so that Timor-Leste eventually can participate fully in all the responsibilities and obligations of ASEAN membership. Their presence at this first meeting was important. I think they were very pleased to have this chance.
The next topic, which consumed a fair amount of bandwidth, obviously is the situation in Myanmar. Unfortunately, it is not getting better. In fact, our ground reports indicated that the situation may actually be worsening. Within ASEAN itself, we reaffirmed the importance (of) the centrality of the Five-Point Consensus that our leaders agreed upon, in April 2021, here in Jakarta in this very building. I think it is worth emphasising that there will be no resolution unless there is an honest to goodness attempt at national reconciliation. The violence must stop, political detainees need to be released. In particular, President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi need to be released. That is an essential prerequisite for national reconciliation to occur amongst all the stakeholders. On the part of ASEAN, Indonesia is Chair and now taking over as Special Envoy. It is committed to continue to try to engage all stakeholders. I think this is critical. Without the participation and active engagement of all stakeholders, you are not going to get peace, you are not going to get national reconciliation. So, we will have to wait and see. One key point which we all emphasised is that the rate limiting factor for progress is not ASEAN – it is really the stakeholders within Myanmar itself. So, we will have to wait and see. But on our part, ASEAN will do our best to facilitate, encourage, promote, and also in the meantime, do our best to deliver humanitarian assistance because we know that many people in Myanmar are actually suffering.
The next area that we focused on is ASEAN itself. We start first from an optimistic position. This is a bustling, dynamic region – 661 million people, (and) 60% of us in ASEAN are below the age of 35. The combined GDP is at US$ 3 trillion but in fact, it is set to double within the next two decades. If we succeed in that, ASEAN, as a whole, will become the fourth largest economy in the world. We start with great potential.
The more specific pillars which we are focusing on – first, the digital pillar. We are looking at advancing negotiations on the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework (Agreement). What this means is internally, first, enhancing digital literacy in our population. Next, improving digital connectivity between our countries. Further, to enable cross-border flows of data because that is an essential element of a digital economy. The purpose of all these ultimately, is to integrate our digital economies to enhance opportunities in an inclusive way for both big and small businesses, as well as our external partners who want to participate in harvesting the many bountiful opportunities that the digital economy provides for Southeast Asia. Ultimately, what we should see as part of digital integration is further interoperability of our systems. For instance, digital payment systems, trade facilitation, customs clearance, and all the other elements and ultimately, (to) also create within ASEAN, an atmosphere that promotes start-ups, entrepreneurship, and innovation. On digital economy, there is a lot going on, and it is an area replete with opportunities.
The next pillar that we looked at within ASEAN is the green economy. All of us need to decarbonise or at least reduce the carbon footprint of all our economies, and in particular, to help facilitate the transition towards renewable energy. One particular project, the power integration project (involving) Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, which has already begun – we really hope that this will be a pathfinder, ultimately, to an ASEAN energy grid. If we look at Southeast Asia as a whole, there is more than enough energy resources, and in particular, renewable energy. But getting the connectivity, getting policy frameworks, getting the bilateral and multilateral arrangements that will bring us across the threshold into a vibrant green economy for ASEAN – it is a very tantalising prospect.
The other area which we are looking at is what we call the blue economy. This is about the sustainable, resilient approach to using, conserving, and developing our maritime resources. This is important because so much of Southeast Asia has a great maritime heritage and resource, and developing this in an inclusive, fair, sustainable, and resilient way is crucial. It is another engine, another area replete with opportunities. So, looking at the digital, green economy and blue economy – our homework is set for us.
We of course, also reviewed developments beyond our region. In particular, the fact that the hot war in Europe, in Ukraine is still on, (and) the superpower rivalry between (the) US and China still continues. Our pitch to the larger world and to ASEAN’s external partners is – look at ASEAN, look at Southeast Asia, on our own merits and not just as another proxy arena for contest, but on our merits.
In particular, in Southeast Asia, what we are interested in is trade and investment. We hope that all our external partners that I have named: US, China, Europe and beyond look to Southeast Asia as an arena where they can invest, where they can trade and in a non-binary, non-exclusive manner; because our organising principle is overlapping circle of friends.
It has been a very useful first meeting to kick off the year. We will see how things develop. There will always be surprises in the way the events unfold.
Hariz Baharudin (ST): My question is on Timor-Leste: you mentioned it earlier, but I wanted to ask you a bit more about it. This has been the first meeting they are attending, and the first they have been attending after they have been granted observer status. Your thoughts about their presence in these ASEAN meetings and what this means for the bloc? Also, what the reaction has been from the other ASEAN ministers, your counterparts, and how Timor-Leste has added onto ASEAN?
Minister: It is significant that they are here, participating as an Observer and having full access to all the ASEAN discussions and topics of interest. Just that presence is important.
Second, in terms of reception, I think everyone is fully supportive of their full participation. We look forward ultimately to their full membership. But membership of ASEAN carries with it heavy responsibilities and obligations. I think Timor-Leste is also now getting a better and deeper appreciation of just how heavy that load of responsibilities and obligations will be. I would say that everyone is welcoming them, but we know that it is quite a steep climb up that hill. Certainly, in the case of Singapore, we are fully committed to helping Timor-Leste climb that hill, and to have the capacity to fulfill all the obligations and responsibilities.
Tan Min-Wei (Mothership): We were wanting to ask whether the crisis in Myanmar was affecting ASEAN unity, particularly with a fear that there might be different opinions on how to handle the situation, and whether blocs might emerge from that?
Minister: Let me address that head-on. I think all of us are acutely aware of the need to maintain ASEAN unity. I would start off by saying that the way the crisis unfolds in Myanmar, and the impact. For instance, if things get far worse and you get heavy flows of refugees, obviously it affects the immediate neighbours more than it affects those who are further away. To say that there are different levels of anxiety and concern is a fair statement. Having said that, and I can tell you that I can tell you that we discussed this quite directly amongst each other, (and) we also agreed that there is a need to maintain ASEAN unity and certain common purpose. What we agreed on is that that we all double down on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. We are all completely united in our calls for cessation of violence, for national reconciliation, for the need to engage all stakeholders, and on the need to continue to support people of Myanmar through the delivery of humanitarian assistance. To summarise, there may be different emphasis on concerns, but there is certainly unity, and a common purpose in affirming and in fulfilling and implementing the ASEAN leaders Five-Point Consensus.
Leong Wai Kit (CNA): You mentioned that neighbouring countries may be concerned about the overflow of refugees. And this is quite in line with what UN Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzer has said. She has been rallying for ASEAN to do something together to give them better protection. Can I ask Minister, what do you think Singapore can do in that respect? She also mentioned that within that framework, there is also a possibility of a violence monitoring system. How do you envision such a system to be such that it can reduce the violence there?
Minister: I would take a step back and say the most important thing is to stop the violence internally, to begin the process of national reconciliation, for everyone within Myanmar to sit at the same table as equals and to have sincere dialogue. Let us not lose sight of the critical importance of that. If that can be achieved, or at least make progress starting that process, I think that will lower the temperature, it will lower the level of violence and certainly lower the probability of outflow of refugees. That must still be our focus. Having said that, I do not know how long it will take before we reach that. We do need to be acutely aware of the humanitarian (aspect) and to the extent that we can deliver the assistance within Myanmar in a fair, open, transparent and inclusive way also will help to ensure that people do not need to leave Myanmar to seek safety, security and the necessities of life. These are areas in which ASEAN can help in concrete ways and we will continue to look for opportunities. But I must emphasise we do need the military authorities to cooperate in this process as well. It is an area of ongoing work.
Yun Zhou (LHZB): I would like to draw your attention to the broader region which ASEAN is situated. Just yesterday, Secretary Blinken announced that that he will be postponing his visit to Beijing after the US detected a Chinese surveillance balloon in their airspace. I would like to get your thoughts on what bearing will these developments have for Sino-US relations and for ASEAN, how does it see itself maintaining agency and centrality between the two superpowers?
Minister: I think it is a pity that this long-anticipated visit by Secretary Blinken to Beijing has been postponed. It illustrates how easy it is for unexpected incidents – in this case, it was a balloon that was drifting across continental United States – how easy it is for unexpected incidents to derail scheduled occasions for meetings and engagement. And this is why ASEAN is paying such close attention to the fraught relationship between the US and China. Speaking from a Southeast Asian perspective, the more they engage, the more they meet, the more open lines of communications, the better. It reduces misunderstanding.
Hopefully both sides exercise sufficient self-restraint and reduce the prospects of such incidents. Even as we saw in December, two aircrafts the J11 aircraft from the Chinese Air Force and the US reconnaissance – the RC135 came within 6 metres of each other. The less there are of such incidents, which bring with them risks – both known risks and unknown risks – the better. We need less of them. We hope that in the medium term, at least, the US and China can achieve a modus vivendi.
From a Southeast Asian perspective, not only do we hope that they achieve a modus vivendi, we want them to engage us on our own merits and not through the prism of rivalry between the two superpowers. Our clear and consistent message to both the US and China is that trade and investment is strategy in Southeast Asia. That is what we are looking for. Southeast Asia is replete with opportunities for more trade (and) more investments by both China and the US. This is not a zero-sum game. It is one in which, the more both sides and Europe are engaged with Southeast Asia, the more opportunities – truly a win-win formulation for everyone. That is the message which we are trying to convey, and of course, our hope that they do achieve a modus vivendi and overcome this current danger of actions – sometimes deliberate, sometimes unintended, leading into an escalatory spiral of action, reaction, and unnecessarily raising temperature.
Again, it is just a reminder that the world is not in a settled, calm condition. There are still many things that can go wrong in the course of the next year or two. We all need to be vigilant, careful, and to focus both on dealing with immediate problems, whilst also expanding opportunities for the medium and long term.
All in all, ASEAN remains relevant. ASEAN maintaining unity and centrality is crucial. I would say, from this meeting at least, the sense of the interactions with my colleagues, is that everyone recognises this, and that is positive. But bear in mind the fact that globally, we are still living in a dangerous world and there are many things that can go wrong – collisions and bumps in the night. You just need to be careful. But remember that there are great prospects for growth in Southeast Asia..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Date of publication:
2023-02-04
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-04
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"We send our year-end salutations to all people in Myanmar, in particular the resistance forces who are standing up to the murderous military regime run by bullying criminals.
One of the first things we learned in 2022 is that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing share a tendency to underestimate the public and their opponents. Ukraine did not fall to Russia and its defenders did not run away. To the surprise of the West and the international community as a whole, the Ukrainians stood and fought back. Putin was wrong.
Similarly, the people of Myanmar have refused to accept the military coup. This has been clear since last year, when thousands took to the streets to protest the illegal power grab. Using social media and other digital platforms they made it known that the coup maker can never win. Since then, Gen Z and their older compatriots have joined forces in the ethnic territories to fight the murderous regime.
In 2022 we saw jet fighters and helicopters fly over the country and conduct air raids, dropping bombs and killing anyone in their path in an effort to suppress the anti-coup movement. The brutal offensive against the civilian population and resistance forces intensified but did not succeed.
Thousands of villages were burned to the ground. Many thousands of people fled their homes and millions have lost their futures, hopes and dreams. The damage that the coup has done to the country’s economy is so extreme that Myanmar is now backsliding socially and economically into the sorry state it endured in the late 1990s, when people had electricity for a few hours a day. Lawlessness is rampant, even in the major cities including commercial hub Yangon.
For the citizens of countries across the region, it is as if they woke up one day to find that their neighbor Myanmar was on fire. A decade ago, after years of darkness, we saw “flickers of progress” in once isolated Myanmar. Once again, however, the flames signal strife and the spread of war. Southeast Asia has not seen a regime this bad since the Khmer Rouge.
Darkness has returned to Myanmar. But the people are not giving up.
Medics, artists, professors, activists and army and police officers have joined the Spring Revolution. More importantly, major ethnic forces fighting for a federal union and equality have provided refuge and assistance to the movement. Without them, it would be difficult to sustain the fight and maintain momentum.
In this movement we find a sense of hope and dynamism. Two years after the Myanmar military staged a coup to oust the elected government led by President U Win Myint and State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, its attempt to take control of the country has failed.
The Myanmar people’s resilience, fighting spirit and heroism have thwarted the will of the coup leaders, a group of thugs and criminals who act like a foreign invading force in their country of birth.
In 2022, our newsroom—now up and running offshore, like those of several independent Myanmar media outlets—was kept busy with stories of air raids, bombings, shootings of children, the hangings of activists and a lawmaker, political detainees being tortured to death in gulags, and extreme violence committed daily against regime opponents and the civilian population. Day by day throughout the year we reported Myanmar’s descent into its new status as the “Syria of Southeast Asia”. We have had little rest—our fate is linked to the political changes in Myanmar.
Myanmar people have demonstrated resilience and heroism in standing up to bullies. They have found ingenious and resourceful ways to challenge the illegitimate regime, sustain the fight and grow the resistance at home and abroad.
The international community, the UN, governments around the region, and global heavyweights China, India, the US and Russia have reacted in various ways to Myanmar’s deepening crisis and civil war.
That response has been slow, frustrating and often disappointing, but it is important to note that, for the most part, the regime’s efforts to win legitimacy and international recognition this year failed.
It is true that Russia and China continued to supply arms and hardware, and India has befriended the regime, but their decision to do so has not come without cost—all have been roundly condemned by the Myanmar people.
The US and other Western governments condemned the regime and imposed limited sanctions on the generals and their cronies but many other potential sanctions targets—some obscure, others prominent and operating in plain sight—remain at large and untouched. The message is out there, however: associating with the regime comes at a price.
In the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decided to suspend Myanmar’s participation at its annual meetings and summits. Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing and his puppet foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin have been barred from attending all such gatherings. By the standards of the regional bloc, which has historically adhered to policies of non-interference and consensus, this is relatively strong stuff. And the regime is not pleased about it, either.
The year ended with some encouraging news that has strengthened the spirit of the opposition movement.
The US Congress passed defense legislation that authorizes non-military assistance for and engagement with Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the resistance forces collectively known as the People’s Defense Force (PDF).
In short, the so-called Burma Act serves as a description of US policy toward Myanmar as the country struggles for democracy, human rights and justice. It aims to help return civilian governance to Myanmar and to pursue accountability for human rights violations, as well as to support anti-junta forces including EAOs and PDFs.
The bill also commits the US to push for greater action at the United Nations against the military regime, and calls for holding Russia and China accountable for their support of the junta.
This was followed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s adoption of a resolution in late December denouncing the regime’s rights violations since the Feb. 1, 2021 coup.
The passage of the landmark resolution with 12 yes votes and three abstentions reflects the Myanmar junta’s growing isolation due to the ongoing abuses by its security forces, which amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The resolution condemns the military’s execution of pro-democracy activists, urges the military to “immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners,” and demands an “immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country.”
But promises of support need to be followed up with action. Material support should come soon, and it should be in a form that helps the Myanmar resistance achieve its mission of bringing down the regime.
It is worth pausing for a moment and reflecting on why the Myanmar people are willing to take deadly risks to defy a regime that is murderous and armed with fighter jets. The Myanmar people have said “enough is enough”.
For decades they lived under brutal, selfish dictators and saw their country plundered and driven into bankruptcy by the military. Then, as the country began opening up in 2012, they got a taste of freedom and hope, and started to sense opportunities.
Now the future looks bleak again, with power stolen back by thugs and criminals.
If they don’t win, the Myanmar people know they will forever be slaves.
Their fight is far from over. A tough year lies ahead for the Myanmar people, but they have not given up on their dream of creating a new federal and democratic Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-12-30
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-30
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"On 22 December 2022, His Excellency PRAK Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia attended a
ministerial Informal Consultation on the situation in Myanmar hosted by His
Excellency Don Pramudwinai, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Thailand. The Meeting was also attended by Foreign Minister of Laos PDR, and
Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam. Also present from Myanmar were Union
Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Investment
and Foreign Economic Relations.
The Consultation was very much in line with Point 14 of the ASEAN Leaders' Review
and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, that underlines
the importance of exploring other approaches that could support ASEAN's collective
efforts to help Myanmar bring about a peaceful solution to the current crisis.
The open-ended Informal Consultation provided a good opportunity for Ministers and
representative to have an open, frank and meaningful discussion, and receive
updates from Myanmar on its efforts to implement the Five-Point Consensus.
Importantly, they also exchanged views on practical approaches that could expedite
the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus including an exit strategy that could
help return normalcy and peace to Myanmar the soonest possible.
The Meeting also commended Cambodia's efforts and the works of the Special Envoy
of the ASEAN Chair in facilitating the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, in
particular the provision of humanitarian assistance to those most in need. Cambodia
will render full support to Indonesia, as the incoming ASEAN Chair, and its Special
Envoy in helping Myanmar find a peaceful political settlement and return to a democratic path for the interests of its people and ASEAN as a whole.
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-12-23
Date of entry/update:
2022-12-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"At a special summit in April 2021, Myanmar military junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing and the nine ASEAN leaders agreed to a set of five initiatives for Myanmar to return to peace and stability amid the unrest that followed the coup launched in February that year. During the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh in November 2022, leaders reaffirmed this ’five-point consensus’ and affirmed the need for concrete, practical and measurable indicators set within a specific timeframe.
Before the Phnom Penh summit, there were predictions that the five-point consensus may be revised, or that Myanmar could be expelled from ASEAN. Myanmar’s junta rejected the ASEAN leaders’ decision to enforce the consensus, but the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) welcomed it.
The five points include an immediate end to violence in Myanmar, dialogue among all parties to seek a peaceful solution, the appointment and visit of a special envoy to Myanmar and humanitarian assistance from ASEAN. But ASEAN’s five-point consensus has not stopped the junta’s violence and its implementation has not led to any significant progress.
In the past, Myanmar’s military junta has regularly launched air strikes on civilians in ethnic areas and central Myanmar, where armed struggles against its rule often break out. On 23 October 2022, the military launched an airstrike on a music concert in Kachin that killed at least 60 people and injured 100. Military helicopters also attacked a school in Let Yet Kone village in north-central Myanmar on 16 September. At least 11 children died in the air strike and around 15 are still missing, according to a statement by the United Nations Children’s Fund.
This is the situation in Myanmar despite the adoption of ASEAN’s five-point consensus. The NUG alleges that the junta has killed more than 3000 people over the past 11 months, while the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners has counted 2338 civilian deaths since the coup. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 986,500 internally displaced persons due to the coup. Data from the Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar indicates that the junta and armed conflicts have damaged over 36,000 homes and buildings.
The junta’s airstrikes on ethnic areas, the killing of unarmed civilians and the rejection of dialogue with opposition forces has led to the assumption that the junta will only engage militarily and not through political dialogue. The junta’s refusal to let the ASEAN special envoy meet with opposition leaders fuels this assumption.
Ongoing political turmoil, mass displacement and economic collapse are pushing Myanmar towards a humanitarian crisis. More than 1.1 million people have been displaced since the military coup and 15.2 million people are facing food insecurity.
ASEAN leaders’ five-point consensus included the provision of humanitarian assistance without discrimination. Though political turmoil and armed conflict in Myanmar may be a barrier to delivering this, ASEAN has great potential to respond to the refugee crisis since refugees from Myanmar are now sheltering in its member states. Thousands of refugees are sheltering in Thailand, but they lack support from ASEAN.
Engaging all stakeholders to solve Myanmar’s political turmoil — an important aspect of ASEAN’s charter — needs concrete and strong implementation.
In April 2021, when the ASEAN consensus was established, it was practical to recognise the junta as the main stakeholder in resolving the political turmoil as the junta controlled major regions of Myanmar. But this is no longer the case. Now only 17 per cent of Myanmar is under the junta’s total control — the NUG and other opponents effectively control over 52 per cent of the territory.
In the one and a half years since the consensus was established, democratic opponents have established the NUG and People’s Defense Force, launching a ‘people’s defensive war’ against the military junta. The area that they now control is jointly governed by the NUG and allied ethnic armed organisations and is coordinated through the National Unity Consultative Council. The NUG and its allies provide healthcare, education and humanitarian assistance — operating as functional governments in their territories.
ASEAN should exclude the military junta from political dialogue until they stop their acts of violence and brutal crackdowns. It should also impose severe and targeted sanctions on the junta. ASEAN’s sanctions on the junta may have more impact than Western sanctions as Southeast Asian countries are the largest sources of foreign investment in Myanmar. Recognising the NUG as the main stakeholder and removing the junta from the political dialogue is a more practical way to resolve Myanmar’s political turmoil than expelling it altogether..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2022-11-29
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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Description:
"When leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met at the regional summit last week, there appeared to be progress regarding how they would handle the Myanmar crisis. The bloc released an assessment recognizing the need for an “implementation plan” to support the Five-Point Consensus, along with “concrete, practical and measurable indicators with specific timeline”. A few days after ASEAN’s assessment, the Myanmar military junta granted amnesty to 6,000 prisoners including some prominent political figures and high-profile foreigners such as Australian economist Sean Turnell and former British Ambassador Vicky Bowman.
While it may be taken as a diplomatic success for ASEAN and the international community, ASEAN needs to use caution, as the Myanmar junta has used this go-to strategy of delaying and defusing ASEAN and international efforts to resolve political crises since back in the 1990s. The recent release of some political prisoners will do little to resolve the ongoing crisis, as thousands of political prisoners remain detained, hundreds of thousands of people have lost their homes, and innocent civilians remain at risk of being killed by air strikes. On the other hand, this kind of defusing of international pressure benefits the junta by allowing it to not only buy time but also remain focused on crushing the resistance and maintaining its tight grip on power, while the suffering of millions of Myanmar people continues. Myanmar people have learned from the past that this is just the junta’s attempt to defuse pressure. Thus, the release of some political dissidents will have little impact on people’s strong resistance against military rule and more importantly on the suffering of the Myanmar people.
Upholding its non-interference policy, ASEAN faces limitations in dealing with the Myanmar crisis. Thus, many criticisms of ASEAN from the international community may be undue. However, the exasperation of the Myanmar people towards the regional bloc is largely different. Myanmar people have done everything they could within their means to show their rejection of military rule, from voting for civilian politicians in the 1990, 2012, 2015 and 2020 general elections, to nationwide peaceful protests against military rule in 1988, 2007 and 2021. When decades of peaceful means still did not produce the outcomes that they strongly desired, they finally resorted to the current armed struggle, joining forces with ethnic armed resistance organizations who have been fighting for self-determination and freedom from the military’s ultra-nationalistic rule for many decades. Myanmar people have very few expectations when it comes to international support, as we know, for the most part, that we must fight our battle on our own. However, what Myanmar people are really hoping and crying out loud for, is for our neighboring countries to not enable further or inadvertently embolden the Myanmar military to continue to commit their horrific crimes with impunity.
Myanmar people have every reason to fear history repeating – any de facto recognition of the current military rule by ASEAN is expected to result in more decades of military rule and suffering, which are the Myanmar people’s worst fears. Under ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy with the Myanmar military, which dates to the 1990s, the then-military regime was admitted to the bloc in 1997. The admission to ASEAN not only let the Myanmar generals get away with their horrific human rights violations with impunity, but also shielded them from pressure from the international community. ASEAN’s constructive engagement was also taken as an example to follow by Western democracies, since Myanmar was viewed as moving in the right direction when the political transition of the 2010s seemed initially to go smoothly.
The coup in 2021 has proved that when it comes to the military, neither ASEAN’s constructive engagement nor the Myanmar political elite’s appeasement and reconciliation policy of the 2010s will work. It only confirmed that the Myanmar military never had any intention to retreat from politics or to let go of its political power and economic privileges. The continued violent and horrific crackdown on the resistance by the military has only made people more determined to end military rule once and for all. However, the people’s strong resistance and rejection of military rule appear to be misjudged by outside observers and some ASEAN leaders. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan recently described the Myanmar conflict as “a fight for the heart of the Bamar majority, between the Tatmadaw [Myanmar’s military] on one hand and the National League for Democracy led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.”
While ASEAN may see military rule as the norm in politically complex Myanmar, resistance leaders, Myanmar analysts, and ordinary Myanmar people immediately knew, as soon as the coup occurred, that the truly barbaric nature and intentions of the generals would soon be revealed. With the recent release of political prisoners, ASEAN may still hope that the Myanmar military can be convinced to bring stability and peace. However, over the past about 18 months since the agreement on the Five-Point Consensus laid out by ASEAN leaders, the Myanmar junta has had no qualms about continuing its extreme violence against its own citizens. Just a week before the 55th ASEAN ministerial summit, the Myanmar military executed four political activists. In the midst of ASEAN’s continuous calls for the utmost restraint and the end of all violence, the Myanmar military continues with its campaign of terror including recent air strikes on a school in Sagaing Region and on a concert in Kachin State.....
Options for ASEAN...ASEAN’s current assessment shows that in order to remain relevant, the bloc will need to show unity and leadership in the Myanmar crisis. After giving the benefit of the doubt to the military council for the past 18 months, the bloc now has an opportunity to take on fresh outlooks and approaches to develop the implementation plan. The regional bloc is now at a critical juncture – with a lot at stake, amid the continued deepening of the suffering of the Myanmar people, it has a chance to be on the right side of history, and save its reputation and relevance. ASEAN has three very different options: 1) maintain its old approach of constructive engagement with the Myanmar military; 2) take a politically neutral approach with effective support on humanitarian assistance; and 3) take a new direction, and listen to the people of Myanmar for a change.
The first option, constructive engagement with the junta, has been a default option for the bloc. It has raised the question of the relevance of the bloc and had a negative impact on ASEAN’s unity and leadership. To the people of Myanmar, such engagement only emboldens the junta and inadvertently sharpens the weapons that kill innocent Myanmar citizens and deepen their suffering. And the worst nightmare would be the regional bloc’s de facto recognition of the junta after its sham elections in 2023.
The second option, politically neutral support on humanitarian assistance, as also mentioned in the recent assessment, if taken cautiously, might be able to deliver urgently needed humanitarian assistance. ASEAN may be able to take a politically neutral approach, without directly engaging with the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) or the National Unity Government (NUG). However, this humanitarian assistance could only achieve so much, considering the pace and intensity of atrocities that the junta continues to commit. This in a way only prolongs the people’s suffering with occasional relief provided along the way.
The third option is to take a completely new direction, an unprecedented one for ASEAN, by listening to the people of Myanmar for a change. It also means listening to the people’s representatives—those whom the people of Myanmar have chosen to lead their desperate attempt to overthrow the military. This includes the leadership of the NUG, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
Myanmar has already experienced the harsh reality of military rule under generations of generals from the same institution for half a century. The military has a record of failing the country as a key driver of conflict and division, and mismanaging the economy resulting in poverty for the majority of the population. The junta’s atrocities since the coup have opened all the old wounds and caused fresh suffering.
None of the options will be easy for ASEAN. It will be even more difficult for the Myanmar people to comprehend if ASEAN continues falling for the junta’s ploy while our lives are at stake—the lives of Myanmar people who are also a part of the ASEAN community. And the sad reality is that there are only very limited options for Myanmar people: to live under military rule, be killed and impoverished, or remove the military from the political sphere once and for all. People have learned the hard way that there is a price to pay for peace, stability and prosperity. That’s all Myanmar people are trying to achieve today and all they are fighting for. That is the very reason why the recent military coup has only made the people more determined to break this vicious cycle of military coups and end the military’s attempts to deceive the people and the world as “transitioning to a disciplined democracy.”
It is therefore more important than ever that ASEAN not fall for the junta’s ploy whenever the generals try to defuse the pressure for a short term so that they can remain in power as long as they wish. With a more informed approach to handling the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN could still have a positive impact or even a monumental chance to be on the right side of history. That would not only save Myanmar but also reclaim the bloc’s unity and leadership role in the region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-11-21
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-21
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"JAKARTA – Southeast Asian countries must do more to truly guarantee freedom of religion, protect minorities, and stop using “public order” and “harmony” as justifications for imposing unwarranted restrictions on this fundamental right, a new report from ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) found.
“This report shows that many laws that inhibit, restrict, and repress religious freedoms remain on the books and are implemented throughout Southeast Asia. This report is a reminder that, despite all achievements to maintain coexistence in a plural Southeast Asia, there are still many problems that remain to be solved and situations that should be improved,” said APHR member and Indonesian MP Taufik Basari.
The report, titled “Restricting Diversity: Mapping Legislation on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Southeast Asia,” was launched on 7 November 2022 and provides an overview of the laws and regulations regarding the right to freedom of religion or belief in the region. One of the key findings in the report is that, while many of the constitutions of Southeast Asian countries formally guarantee the right to freedom of religion, in practice the laws related to religion contain ambiguities and restrictions that do not conform with international standards.
National security and public order, for instance, have often been used to justify restricting the freedom of religious minorities, including Ahmadiyah, Shia, Jehovah’s Witnesses and others. Meanwhile, blasphemy laws are often used to criminalize certain religious groups that are critical to the state, government or the religious establishment of the majority, in flagrant violation of international human rights standards.
“I hope we can have more dialogues in the future and more innovative methods to promote and protect FoRB in the Southeast Asian countries. The law must serve as a tool in creating peace and balance for the community, so it should be formulated properly in order to bring justice in society.”” said APHR member and Timor-Leste MP Isabel Ximenes.
Parliamentarians can play a crucial role in working towards fully guaranteeing freedom of religion or belief in Southeast Asia by repealing and amending laws that violate such freedom, and pass new laws where necessary.
“I think that, at the end of the day, we must have a firm commitment from parliamentarians or both sides, whether in government or in parliament, to have the same understanding about human rights. If you do not speak the language of human rights, then you are the problem,” said Dr. Ahmad Farouk Musa, Founder and Director of Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF), Malaysia, and surgery professor at Monash University..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Title: Report of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar to the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits.
Description:
"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. On 01 February 2021, the Myanmar’s miliary launched a coup against the civilian government, arresting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint, along with other senior leaders of the ruling National League for Democracy, and declaring the results of the November 2020 general election invalid. What started as violence between the Tatmadaw and demonstrators quickly turned into brutal fighting in many parts of the country between the State Administration Council (SAC) and armed groups such as the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing the People’s Defence Force (PDF).
2. Cognizant of the far-reaching implications of Myanmar’s crisis on its own people and the region as a whole, ASEAN Leaders met on 24 April 2021 in Jakarta to discuss about the situation in Myanmar, and reached the Five-Point Consensus (5PC). To ensure full and effective implementation of the 5PC, Samdech Prime Minister went to Nay Pyi Taw on 7 January 2021 to meet with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and soon afterward, had two videoconferences to follow up on the outcomes of the visit. Moreover, he extensively consulted with his ASEAN colleagues and other world leaders, and also received calls and briefings from the international organizations including the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy (UNSG SE).
3. Guided by the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN’s principles, the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair (SEAC) paid two working visits to Myanmar to carry out his mandate as stipulated in the 5PC. Prior to each working visit, the SEAC always shared with his colleagues what he plans to do, and also sought their views on the best course of action to make progress. Moreover, the SEAC also had numerous meetings with external partners, the UNSG SE, Japan’s Special Envoy, UN Specialized Agencies, and other international organizations to receive updates and exchange views on how ASEAN and its partners can promote synergy and cooperation, especially in the area of humanitarian assistance.
4. Despite the complexity and difficulty of Myanmar’s political crisis, it is fair to say that the SEAC has managed to make some positive progress in the implementation of the 5PC, though not all points are moving at the same pace and scale. Since the beginning, Cambodia as the present ASEAN Chair and her Special Envoy prioritize immediate cessation of violence and ceasefire, and in all the engagements with the SAC, Samdech Prime Minister always urged for utmost restraint, and dialogue to start without delay. During the working visits, the SEAC extended this call to all armed groups including the NUG/PDF, because everyone has a share in inflicting harms and suffering on innocent people.
5. Given the SAC being the most powerful actor, the SEAC reminded his counterparts to double the efforts to end the violence, and suggested that they should deploy police instead of armed forces to maintain law and order, especially when civilians are involved. The SEAC also appealed to the EAOs and the political parties to commit to non-violent principle, and actively participate in ceasefire negotiation. In response, the SAC, the EAOs and the political parties have promised to do their utmost ability to achieve full cessation of violence, and they also shared that it was heartbroken to see this tragedy unfolding in their country. Besides heavy human costs, the SEAC emphasized that violence also undermines any efforts to begin a dialogue or even to deliver humanitarian assistance to those most in need.
6. The commencement of the political dialogue is the most difficult among the five points, and even Myanmar’s key actors themselves also thought that it is not yet the right time to bring everyone to the table. During the second working visit, the SEAC pressed Lieutenant General Yar Pyae on the possibility of a dialogue with the opposition, and he responded that it may happen but with 3 preconditions: (1) they do not seek to destroy the SAC, (2) they do not seek to replace the SAC, and (3) they agree to use the 2008 Constitution as the basis for talks. After months of intense shuttle diplomacy, the SEAC has finally managed to open a small window for dialogue.
7. The SEAC then tasked his office to share these preconditions with the NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, and she responded by rejecting them, and offered her own preconditions, which aim to put the Tatmadaw under civilian control and send Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to prison. The differences between the SAC and the NUG are gulf apart, making any dialogue impossible, even at the technical level. However, the SEAC has not been discouraged by this lack of political will, and he continues to commence the dialogue process as soon as possible. Moreover, he has encouraged the SAC to engage with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and not to dissolve her party, without which any democratic solutions will face credibility question.
8. As stated in the 5PC, the SEAC has always involved the Secretary-General of ASEAN in every important activity including his working visits to Myanmar, and has also been in regular contact with the Secretary-General of ASEAN to seek his view on a wide range of issues and to receive his updates on the progress of the humanitarian assistance to Myanmar. In facilitating mediation of the dialogue process, the SEAC met with 7 EAOs, who are the signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, to underscore the need for all concerned parties to participate in peace talks. In response, they were strongly supportive of the SEAC’s views, and also pledged to make a dialogue work in the interests of their people.
9. Moreover, the SEAC also had meetings with 8 political parties, 7 of which won votes during the 2020 general election, and he shared with them that he is always ready to facilitate a dialogue among concerned parties, if requested. These political parties pledged their full support to the SEAC, and took turn to offer their perspectives on the current situations in Myanmar and how to solve them. Acknowledging the critical role of external partners, especially Myanmar’s immediate neighbours, the SEAC has often provided them with updates of his efforts, sought their view on the situation on the ground, and listened to their recommendations when applicable.
3
10. Humanitarian assistance has always been at the heart of Cambodia’s approach to address the political crisis in Myanmar because peace talk can take time, but saving life cannot wait. Even before taking over the ASEAN Chairmanship, Cambodia already provided the people of Myanmar with medical supplies, financial resources, and vaccines bilaterally and through ASEAN mechanism. The SEAC has also made a lot of efforts to mobilize additional supports for Myanmar, and as a result, 3 million doses of vaccines together with many other medical supplies were donated by external partners. Despite not being clearly specified in the 5PC, the SEAC has worked tirelessly to facilitate, coordinate and support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Myanmar.
11. In May 2022, he co-chaired with the Secretary-General of ASEAN the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar, bringing together a wide range of stakeholders and leading to the adoption of two important frameworks, namely Joint Ministry of Health-Partners Vaccines Administration Framework and Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework. The SEAC has also managed to secure commitments from the SAC in addressing operational challenges facing the AHA Centre and other international organizations, and expanding access to more states and regions. Moreover, he has also facilitated the conduct of the Joint Needs Assessment, especially in pushing for the inclusion of areas requested by the AHA Centre, and representatives of the UN OCHA and WFP as observers.
12. Meeting all concerned parties is also one of the SEAC’s top priorities. During the working visit to Myanmar, besides his engagements with senior representatives of the SAC, he also met with 7 EAOs that remain signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and 8 political parties, 7 of which won votes during the 2020 general election. The SEAC has also demanded to engage with the EAOs that are now fighting the SAC, and 4 political parties that are now under the inspection of the Union Election Commission. The request to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Win Myint has always been on the agenda of the SEAC, but the SAC has taken strong position on this matter, suggesting that it can only be considered upon the completion of their legal proceedings.
13. Benefiting from numerous meetings and conversations with many interlocutors inside and outside of Myanmar, and for the purpose of facilitating and supporting the works of the incoming Special Envoy, the SEAC wish to make 7-point suggestions: (1) the 5PC should be accompanied by a concrete implementation plan, (2) conditions applied to the SAC should also be applied to all concerned parties, (3) ASEAN needs to press the SAC, the NUG and other parties to compromise on their preconditions, (4) concerned parties need to be clearly identified and defined, (5) restoring normal engagements with Myanmar should be based on the progress of the implementation of the 5PC, not on other factors that are outside this framework, (6) the roles of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair in humanitarian assistance should be added to the 5PC or the implementation plan, and (7) the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the AHA Centre should be empowered with an appropriate degree of autonomy for a specific period of time..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-11-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"14 November 2022: The United Nations (UN) must respond decisively to a call made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for support in implementing the stalled Five-Point Consensus (5PC) on Myanmar by adopting complementary mechanisms and ensuring no participation of military representatives throughout the UN system.
ASEAN leaders announced a decision on implementation of the 5PC on Friday 11 November 2022, following a review as part of the ASEAN Summit. The leaders of ASEAN member states identified the Myanmar military as responsible for the failure in implementing the 5PC to date, announced additional measures to advance implementation and called on the UN to support ASEAN’s efforts.
“The frustration of ASEAN leaders with Min Aung Hlaing’s intransigence is evident as his military continues to threaten the security and stability of the region with utter contempt for all efforts made to appeal to him,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The UN must respond to ASEAN’s calls by using enforceable mechanisms to advance accountability for Myanmar and exert all possible pressure on the junta. ASEAN cannot deal with the junta alone.”
ASEAN has still not engaged with the National Unity Government of Myanmar and the renewed actions announced by the leaders do little to move ASEAN beyond the 5PC agreed to almost two years ago. The ASEAN leaders resolved to maintain a ban on representatives of the military from participating in ASEAN Summits and Foreign Minister’s meetings, but as yet failed to extend the ban throughout the ASEAN system.
“The most decisive step ASEAN has taken to date has been to ban the junta from high-level meetings. That decision has been maintained and it must not be undermined by UN bodies or representatives,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “ASEAN has expressly denied the junta recognition and the international community must follow. Min Aung Hlaing is the leader of a brutal murderous armed force and nothing more – ASEAN has made that clear. Junta representatives must be banned from all ASEAN meetings.”
The responsibility of all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need without discrimination was also highlighted by the ASEAN leaders in the announcement. However, the renewed actions allow representatives of the junta to remain on the governing board of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), while junta forces are deliberately depriving entire communities in Myanmar of basic humanitarian needs as part of a long-standing military strategy of collective punishment.
“ASEAN must urgently recognise that the junta simply cannot be given any involvement in the means and methods of humanitarian assistance to Myanmar to alleviate a humanitarian crisis that the junta itself has caused and continues to deliberately exacerbate for political and military gain,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “The approach taken by UN agencies must also be reviewed accordingly. The role of the National Unity Government, Ethnic Resistance Organisations and local actors in delivering essential services to people across the country must be recognised and empowered.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-11-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, National Unity Government (NUG)
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232 KB
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"The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar notes the ‘ASEAN Leaders’ Review and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus’ at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits in Cambodia.
The National Unity Government agrees that the lack of progress on Five-Point Consensus (5PC) implementation requires that other options be explored. The 5PC is ill-fit for purpose and must be reframed or expanded, with engagement with the National Unity Government built in, before an implementation plan and useful indicators can be developed. The National Unity Government stands ready to work with ASEAN Foreign Ministers and the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar to shape this process.
The National Unity Government is also ready to partner with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the AHA Centre to deliver humanitarian assistance to all Myanmar communities in need using flexible approaches.
Furthermore, the National Unity Government welcomes ASEAN Leaders’ calls for UN support, for junta restraint, and for accountability. Decisive Security Council action on Myanmar would be complementary to and reinforcing of ASEAN’s efforts.
Finally, while ASEAN Leaders could have taken the decision themselves to bar representatives of the illegal junta from all ASEAN meetings, the National Unity Government is confident that the ASEAN Coordinating Council will adopt this stance..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-11-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
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Size:
31 KB
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"1. During the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits, the Leaders assessed the
implementation of the Five-Point Consensus as agreed at the ASEAN Leaders'
Meeting in April 2021. We took note of the recommendations of the 55th ASEAN
Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 3 August 2022 and Special ASEAN Foreign
Ministers on 27 October 2022.
REVIEW
2. We reaffirmed that Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN;
3. We considered Articles 7 and 20 of the ASEAN Charter and recalled our 38th and
39th Summits;
4. Considering that the situation in Myanmar remains critical and fragile, with
growing violence as a major concern which affects not only Myanmar but also
ASEAN's Community-building efforts, ASEAN is committed to assist Myanmar
in finding a peaceful and durable solution to the current crisis;
5. With little progress achieved in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus,
it is therefore incumbent on the Myanmar Armed Forces to comply with its
commitments to the ASEAN Leaders;
DECISION
6. The Five-Point Consensus shall remain our valid reference and should be
implemented in its entirety;
7. There is a need for an implementation plan that outlines concrete, practical and
measurable indicators with specific timeline to support the Five-Point Consensus
and, therefore, shall be developed. We tasked the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to
develop the implementation plan; 8. To seek all parties concerned to adhere to and implement the Five-Point
Consensus and for ASEAN to engage all stakeholders soon. Engagement would
be done in a flexible and informal manner, primarily undertaken by the Special
Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar due to the neutrality that is inherent in
his/her mandate, with the sole objective of restoring peace and stability in the
country in accordance with the Five-Point Consensus;
9. Whilst maintaining Myanmar's non-political representation to the ASEAN
Summits and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, we tasked the ASEAN
Coordinating Council to further review Myanmar's representation at ASEAN
meetings, if the situation so requires;
10. We reaffirmed that ASEAN Summit is the supreme decision-making body and
will make the final decision on the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus,
including when consensus cannot be achieved, in line with the ASEAN Charter;
11. To urge all parties concerned to de-escalate tensions and exercise utmost restraints
and all parties concerned that bear arms should be fairly held accountable and
condemned for violence, noting that the Myanmar Armed Force is the single
largest military forces in Myanmar;
12. Calls all parties in Myanmar to facilitate the work of the Secretary General of
ASEAN and AHA Centre in delivering humanitarian assistance in Myanmar to
all in need without discrimination. The Secretary-General of ASEAN and the
AHA Centre should be empowered with some degree of autonomy to facilitate
the humanitarian assistance in Myanmar;
13. ASEAN is to call the UN and our external partners to support us in our efforts in
the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus;
14. ASEAN shall consider exploring other approaches that could support the
implementation of the Five-Point Consensus;
15. We shall review the above decision at our future sessions and mandate the Foreign
Ministers to monitor progress and report to the ASEAN Summit..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-11-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Excellencies,
On the occasion o f the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits and Related Summits in
Cambodia, the Republic o f the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity
Government (NUG), urges you as ASEAN leaders to prioritise the security, wellbeing, and
democratic will and interests o f the people o f Myanmar as you determine ASEAN's way forward
on Myanmar.
While you convene, the illegal military junta continues to escalate its indiscriminate
attacks on civilians. Its bombing of schools and torching of villages has been joined by extreme
atrocities that include beheadings and the burning to death o f women and children. Even ASEAN
appeals held no sway in stopping the extrajudicial execution o f pro-democracy activists. The
junta’s detention o f foreign nationals as a form of hostage-taking comprises yet another example
of its terrorism.
In the midst o f a humanitarian crisis that has seen one million civilians displaced, the
junta' s acts o f aggression - which include cross-border incursions — also constitute a clear threat
to the peace and security o f the region and to the populations o f ASEAN Member States.
At the same time, the National Unity Government and its ethnic and civic partners have
achieved an historic convergence. We exercise control over more than half of the territory of
Myanmar and are delivering public services including healthcare, humanitarian relief and
education. Under the leadership of the representative National Unity Consultative Council
(NUCC) and the democratically-constituted Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
(CRPH), Myanmar is crafting a new federal democratic framework to address the grievances and
to ensure the full inclusion of our ethnic and minority communities including the Rohingya. We
also remain committed to international justice and to securing accountability for all crimes.
Where the NUG stands committed to partnership with ASEAN Members, the lack of
progress on the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) necessitates a fresh approach. We therefore urge
you as ASEAN leaders to take the following actions:
1. Replace or expand the 5PC with a new framework that establishes formal
mechanisms for engagement with the NUG as the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people. This should include NUG attendance at future ASEAN meetings
and summits.
2. Prioritise the urgent delivery of cross-border humanitarian assistance to all
communities in need. This should see engagement with the NUG, Ethnic Resistance
Organisations (EROs) and Myanmar civil society, and see the ASEAN AHA Centre
endorse the joint humanitarian track agreed between the NUG's Ministry of
Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MOHADM) and EROs.
3. Expand the provision of support to Myanmar nationals who have been forced to flee
the country by junta operations and atrocities, including by respecting the principle
of non-refoulement.
4. Convene dialogues on humanitarian issues affecting Myanmar with the Friends of
ASEAN (China, India, United Kingdom, and the United States).
5. Support a long-term people-centered political solution to the multiple junta-induced
crises in Myanmar. This must include constitutional and structural reform that is *
guided by the democratic will of the people of Myanmar and that involves the
genuine participation of all Myanmar groups and communities. Under no
circumstances should sham junta-led elections be permitted.
6. Support action on Myanmar by the United Nations Security Council and the
General Assembly, which would prove complementary to and reinforcing of
ASEAN's efforts.
While the Myanmar people face a supremely dark moment in their history, we also see a
brighter future. We remain united and determined to shape a renewed nation founded on peace,
justice, equality, inclusion, human rights, and the protection of minorities. We also remain
hopeful that with political will and creativity, ASEAN can help break the decades-long cycle o f
military atrocities and help us to secure sustainable and pcoplc-centcrcd political solutions.
Please accept, Excellencies, the assurances of my highest consideration.....ကမ္ဘောဒီယားနိုင်ငံမှာ ကျင်းပလျက်ရှိတဲ့ ၄၀ နဲ့ ၄၁ ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဆီယံထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးသို့ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့
နိုဝင်ဘာ ၁၁ ၊ ၂၀၂၂
နိုဝင်ဘာ ၁၀ ရက် ၂၀၂၂ ကနေ ၁၃ ရက်နေ့အထိ ကမ္ဘောဒီယားနိုင်ငံမှာ ကျင်းပလျက်ရှိတဲ့ ၄၀ နဲ့ ၄၁ ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဆီယံထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးသို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနက နိုဝင်ဘာ ၈ ရက် ရက်စွဲနဲ့ သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့ခဲ့ပါတယ်။ သဝဏ်လွှာထဲမှာ အာဆီယံ ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးတွေနဲ့ ဆက်စပ်အစည်းအဝေးတွေမှာ အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်တွေ အနေနဲ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲ့ ပြည်သူ လူထူ လုံခြုံရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေး၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီဆန္ဒနှင့် အကျိုးစီးပွားများအား ဦးစားပေးဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်စေရန် တိုက်တွန်းတယ်ဆိုပြီးတော့ ဖော်ပြထားပါတယ်။
အာဆီယံက ထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးတွေကျင်းပနေဆဲ ကာလမှာပဲ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက အရပ်သားပြည်သူတွေအပေါ် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုတွေ ကို အရှိန်မြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်နေပြီး၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းတွေကို ဗုံးခွဲတိုက်ခိုက်တာ၊ ကျေးရွာတွေမှာ ရွာလုံးကျွတ် မီးရှို့ဖျက်ဆီးတာ၊ ခေါင်းဖြတ်သတ်တာ အပါအဝင် အမျိုးသမီးတွေနဲ့ ကလေးသူငယ်တွေကို မီးရှိုသတ်ဖြတ်တာ အစရှိတဲ့ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုတွေကို လူသားမဆန်စွာနဲ့ ပြုလုပ်နေတယ်လို့ ဖော်ပြထားပါတယ်။ ဒါ့အပြင် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး တက်ကြွလှုပ်ရှားသူတွေကို ကွပ်မျက်တာတွေ မပြုလုပ်ဖို့အတွက် အာဆီယံက တိုက်တွန်းခဲ့ပေမဲ့ လည်း အဲဒီပန်ကြားချက်ကို မျက်ကွယ်ပြုပြီးတော့ လူမဆန်တဲ့ ရက်စက်မှုတွေကို ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့တယ်လို့ ဆိုထားပါတယ်။ အဲဒီလိုပဲ နိုင်ငံခြားသားတွေကို မတရားဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းတာတွေ ပြုလုပ်နေတာကလည်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုရဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်ဝါဒတွေ ကို ပေါ်လွင်စေတဲ့ ပြယုဂ်တွေ ဖြစ်တယ်လို့ ထောက်ပြထားပါတယ်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေနဲ့ မိတ်ဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းတွေ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူလူထုအနေနဲ့ သမိုင်းဝင် ပေါင်းစည်းညီညွတ်ရေး ကို အောင်မြင်စွာဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်တယ် ဆိုတာနဲ့ လက်ရှိမှာလည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲ့ နယ်မြေတဝက်ကျော်ကို ထိန်းချုပ်ထားနိုင်ပြီး ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုတွေ၊ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ကယ်ဆယ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဥ်တွေနဲ့ ပညာရေးအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူ့ဝန်ဆောင်မှုတွေကိုလည်း ပြုလုပ်ပေးနေပြီလို့ သဝဏ်လွှာထဲမှာ ဖော်ြပထားပါတယ်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေနဲ့ အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်တွေကို အချက် ၆ ချက် တောင်းဆိုထား တာလည်း တွေ့ရပါတယ်။
အဲဒီတောင်းဆိုချက်တွေထဲမှာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရဲ့ တရားဝင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ်နဲ့ ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံဖို့နဲ့ အာဆီယံမူငါးချက်ကို တရားဝင်မူဘောင်အသစ်တွေ အစားထိုးချမှတ်တာ ဒါမှမဟုတ် ချဲ့ထွင်တာ၊ နယ်စပ် ဒေသတွေမှာ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီတွေ လိုအပ်နေတဲ့ ရပ်ရွာတွေ အားလုံးကို အကူအညီပေးပို့တာ၊ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုရဲ့ စစ်ဆင်ရေးတွေနဲ့ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုတွေကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတွင်းက ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်လာခဲ့ကြရတဲ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားတွေကို အတင်းအကြပ် ပြန်မပို့တာနဲ့ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုတွေ တိုးချဲ့လုပ်ဆောင်ပေးတာ၊ တရုတ်၊ အိန္ဒိယ၊ အင်္ဂလန်နိုင် ငံနဲ့ အမေရိကန်နိုင်ငံတို့အပါအဝင် အာဆီယံရဲ့ မိတ်ဖက်နိုင်ငံတွေနဲ့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံကို ထိခိုက်စေတဲ့ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ ကိစ္စရပ်တွေအတွက် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးတာ၊ ရေရှည်လူထုဗဟိုပြု နိုင်ငံရေးနည်းနဲ့ အကျပ်အတည်းတွေကို ဖြေရှင်းဖို့ ပံ့ပိုးကူညီတာ တွေအပါအဝင် အာဆီယံရဲ့ ကြိုးပမ်းမှုကို အားဖြည့်ပေးနိုင်မယ့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီနဲ့ အထွေထွေညီလာခံရဲ့ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံအပေါ် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နေတာတွေကို ကူညီထောက်ပံ့တာတွေ ပြုလုပ်ပေးဖို့ ဖော်ပြထားပါတယ်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-11-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
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Sub-title:
Leaked ASEAN document reveals proposal to appease Myanmar junta, “maintain status quo”
Description:
"“ASEAN leaders need to get real—the junta is the cause of the crisis in Myanmar, not the solution,” said Patrick Phongsathorn, Human Rights Advocacy Specialist at Fortify Rights. “Efforts like this to appease the junta will only prolong its commission of international crimes, the suffering of the Myanmar people, and the negative impacts of this crisis on the wider region. The junta poses a threat to international peace and security and should be treated as such.”
Fortify Rights received the leaked internal ASEAN document from a well-placed source close to negotiations between ASEAN member states on the Myanmar crisis. The office of the ASEAN chair—Cambodia—reportedly prepared the undated document following an emergency meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta, Indonesia on October 27, 2022. The document includes 11 numbered points, including equivocal assessments of the situation in Myanmar (e.g., “growing violence from all armed groups is a major concern”) as well as general directives and recommendations for ways forward. It makes no mention of the junta’s ongoing coup d’état, it’s more than 12,000 political prisoners, or the junta’s well-documented nationwide attack on the civilian population.
Myanmar coup-leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing will not attend the ASEAN Summit. ASEAN has agreed to exclude representatives of the Myanmar junta from ASEAN Summits and foreign minister’s meetings, accepting only “non-political” representatives from Myanmar. The leaked document obtained by Fortify Rights acknowledges, at point four, that this policy will remain; however, the document clarifies that “other ministerial meetings shall maintain the status quo,” meaning that junta representatives will be welcomed at those meetings.
Point two in the document clarifies that ASEAN’s “Five-Point Consensus shall be retained” and that the ASEAN Secretariat will be tasked “to draft the implementation plan.”
Point eight in the document, which may have been proposed by a single foreign minister, refers to a “strategic reverse implementation approach,” which is defined in the document as ASEAN “try[ing] to find converging points between the two separate parallel tracks of the 5-Point Consensus and 5-Point Roadmap.”
The Myanmar junta proposed the Five Point Road Map in August 2021 as a rival plan to ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus, which the junta itself had agreed to three months earlier, on April 24, 2021, in Jakarta, Indonesia. The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus calls for end to violence, constructive dialogue among all parties, the appointment of an ASEAN Special Envoy to facilitate dialogue, humanitarian aid, and a visit to Myanmar by the Special Envoy. Following its adoption, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing almost immediately flouted the agreement, which is widely viewed as an abject failure.
The junta’s Five Point Road Map has as one of its objectives “free and fair multiparty democratic elections” following the lifting of the junta-imposed state of emergency.
Since the military putsch of February 2021, the Myanmar junta has sought to systematically annihilate all opposition to its rule. In the first six months after the coup, Fortify Rights and the Schell Center at Yale Law School documented crimes against humanity perpetrated by the military and police in Myanmar, including murder, imprisonment, torture, persecution, and enforced disappearances. In a concerted effort to solidify its rule, the junta has systematically arrested more than 16,000 people since the coup, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), with more than 12,000 remaining behind bars at the time of writing. Political prisoners include opinion leaders, members of civil society, key political figures, health workers, and civil servants formerly involved in the administration of elections. Fortify Rights and the Schell Center documented the imprisonment of Union Election Commissioners, journalists, and civil society leaders, and the imprisonment and enforced disappearance of National League for Democracy (NLD) officials.
According to media reports, as of July 2022, the junta killed almost 50 NLD members, including at least three members of parliament, and arrested nearly 900 members of the party since the coup. On July 25, ending a decades-long moratorium on the use of the death penalty, the Myanmar military junta executed four political prisoners, including NLD lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw and veteran democracy activist U Kyaw Min Yu, popularly known as Ko Jimmy.
The U.N. reports that more than 1.1 million people are displaced in Myanmar and more than 30,000 civilian properties have been razed since the coup on February 1, 2021.
“The junta’s plans to conduct elections next year are a complete farce and should be treated as such by the entire international community,” Patrick Phongsathorn said. “ASEAN leaders must reject any plans to continue to appease the junta, which is committing a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population of Myanmar.”
In another sign of discord within ASEAN, the original two-page Chair’s Statement that resulted from the emergency foreign ministers meeting on October 27, 2022 has subsequently been removed from the ASEAN website and replaced with a much shorter, three-paragraph text. The revised statement no longer makes reference to “concrete, practical and time-bound actions” to strengthen implementation of the Five Point Consensus, as was noted in the original Chair’s Statement, and fails to provide details on other key issues such as the delivery of humanitarian aid.
In line with its apparent policy of appeasement, on November 4, ASEAN appointed the Myanmar junta as chair of the ASEAN Air Chiefs Conference, as revealed in the junta-run Global New Light of Myanmar and reported by the organization Justice for Myanmar, despite the fact that the junta’s air force is responsible for ongoing airstrikes against civilian populations. The Air Chiefs Conference involves coordination between air forces within the region.
ASEAN should suspend the Myanmar junta’s participation in meetings throughout the entire ASEAN system, scrap the failed five-point consensus, and enact emergency measures to protect the country’s civilian population, said Fortify Rights today.
Such emergency measures should include an agreement on protecting Myanmar refugees, authorizing cross-border humanitarian aid, and coordinating with other U.N. member states to deprive the Myanmar military junta of weapons, dual-use technology, aviation fuel, revenue, and political recognition. ASEAN must now publicly engage the National Unity Government—Myanmar’s legitimate representative on the international stage.
“The Myanmar junta has undermined ASEAN’s efforts at every stage of this crisis,” said Patrick Phongsathorn. “The Myanmar people can’t wait any longer. ASEAN needs to take concrete emergency action now.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Fortify Rights"
Date of publication:
2022-11-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"International actors should help Myanmar to put an end to the violence and human rights violations perpetrated by the military junta since the coup in February 2021, put the country’s military under civilian control, and establish a federal democratic system, argued the International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response response to the crisis in Myanmar (IPI) in its final report, published today.
The report, titled “Time is not on our side”: The Failed International Response to the Myanmar Coup, contains an analysis of the situation in Myanmar since the military takeover, as well as the reaction of international actors. Finding that the global response to the crisis has fallen woefully short of international obligations and standards, the IPI offers a set of recommendations to move forward and help the Myanmar people in their struggle against military dictatorship.
“It is imperative that the international community changes course on Myanmar as soon as possible, and those countries claiming to support democracy and human rights in the country live up to their stated commitments. They should begin with recognizing the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) as what it is: the legitimate authority in the country; impose effective and coordinated sanctions on the junta, and address the terrible humanitarian crisis afflicting Myanmar,” said Heidi Hautala, Vice President of the European Parliament and IPI Chair.
The IPI is an initiative launched by ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) in June 2022. Its Committee is formed by eight parliamentarians from seven different countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe who are appalled by the situation in Myanmar since the military takeover.
Since the coup, the Myanmar military has committed acts which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may amount to “crimes against humanity and war crimes” in order to consolidate its power against widespread popular resistance to its rule, throwing the country into chaos, and leading it to the brink of becoming a failed state.
The IPI Committee has held a total of six public oral hearings online, as well as several private hearings, with dozens of stakeholders and experts, and has received dozens of written submissions. Two of its members conducted a fact-finding mission to the Thai-Myanmar border in August 2022.
The Inquiry has analyzed the response to the crisis in Myanmar of a wide variety of international actors, but has paid particular attention to the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which Myanmar is a member. In April 2021, ASEAN member states and the Myanmar junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, signed the Five-Point Consensus to put an end to the violence, seek a negotiated solution to the conflict and address the humanitarian crisis. Since then, many countries have expressed their support for the agreement and largely deferred to ASEAN to solve the crisis.
“It has become abundantly clear that the Five Point Consensus has been an utter failure. General Min Aung Hlaing has shown an absolute contempt for the agreement he signed and for ASEAN’s member states, and the regional group has been unable to adopt a stance to put pressure on the Junta. Meanwhile, most of the international community has hidden behind ASEAN in order to avoid doing anything meaningful. It is past time that ASEAN ditches the Five Point Consensus and urgently rethinks its approach to the crisis in Myanmar,” said Charles Santiago, former Member of Parliament (MP) in Malaysia, APHR Chairperson and IPI Committee Member.
In the latest meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers on Myanmar, held on 27 October, the regional group agreed to “reaffirmed the importance and relevance of the Five-Point Consensus” while underscoring “the need to further strengthen its implementation through concrete, practical and time-bound actions.”
“ASEAN is not acting with the urgency that the situation in Myanmar demands. The group should have started to put real pressure on the junta and engage the NUG long ago. It is unacceptable that ASEAN continue to shirk their responsibilities to the people of Myanmar, and continue adopting half-hearted measures that only serve to embolden Min Aung Hlaing and his junta,” added Santiago.
International passivity has encouraged a sense of impunity within the Myanmar military, which most recently launched an airstrike on a multitude attending a music festival in Kachin state, killing at least 60 civilians. By the most conservative estimates, the junta has killed at least 2,404 Myanmar citizens, and arrested over 16,000 people.
The violence has also displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes, and the number of internally displaced people in the country now has reached 1.3 million, a terrible record in Myanmar’s history. Many interviewees during the IPI oral hearings described in vivid detail the humanitarian catastrophe afflicting the Myanmar people, as well as how the military junta is hijacking and weaponizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
“Myanmar is suffering a tragedy words cannot describe. The global community should urgently step up the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and it should work with local civil society organizations that know the terrain well, have ample experience and are trusted by the population. Millions of Myanmar citizens suffering the most grievous hardships cannot wait for long. International actors should leave politics aside and help the Myanmar people immediately,” said Mercy Barends, APHR Board Member and IPI Committee Member..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-11-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-02
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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2.42 MB 184.71 KB 134.17 KB 155.09 KB
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2022-11-02-IPI-APHR-final-report-Time-is-not-on-our-side-the-failed-international-response-to-the-Myanmar-coup-en.pdf- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-bu.pdf
- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-indo.pdf
- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-malay.pdf
- 2022-11-02- APHR_IPI_the report’s-Executive-Summary-and-Recommendations-thai.pdf
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Sub-title:
Concerned Governments Should Support Targeted Sanctions, Arms Embargo
Description:
"(New York) – Governments attending summits in Asia in November 2022 should support tougher sanctions and other measures to address widespread abuses by Myanmar’s military, Human Rights Watch said today. Governments should agree on new measures to cut off the Myanmar junta’s foreign currency revenues and impose embargos on arms and aviation fuel.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will meet November 10-13 in Cambodia for the ASEAN Summit and side meetings with the United States, the European Union, Japan, and other dialogue partners. The summit will be followed by a G20 leaders meeting in Indonesia and a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group the following week.
“Myanmar’s military is committing atrocities while ASEAN countries and others just stand on the sidelines,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “It’s not enough to condemn the junta and hope it will change its conduct or move toward democracy: stronger actions are needed.”
Human Rights Watch has found that the junta’s widespread and systematic abuses since the February 2021 coup – including extrajudicial killings, torture, and wrongful imprisonment – amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Junta authorities have also severely cracked down on the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.
ASEAN members and like-minded G20 and APEC leaders should agree on a stronger message to send to the Myanmar junta on consequences for ongoing rights violations. Sanctions should be tied to clear benchmarks, including the release of political prisoners, a cessation of attacks on civilians, and steps toward the establishment of civilian democratic rule, among other actions.
At a previous summit in Jakarta on April 24, 2021, nine ASEAN leaders and Myanmar’s junta chief, Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, agreed to a “five point consensus”: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy; humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and a visit by the special envoy to Myanmar to meet with all parties. Days later, the junta called the consensus “suggestions” and in the year and a half since, Min Aung Hlaing has defied almost every point in the agreement while overseeing a brutal nationwide crackdown aimed at suppressing the millions of people in Myanmar who oppose military rule.
An October European Parliament resolution noted that “the Five-Point Consensus has not led to any results and calls on ASEAN to acknowledge that Min Aung Hlaing’s junta is not a reliable partner; urges ASEAN and its members to negotiate a new agreement on the crisis in Myanmar with the NUG [National Unity Government, a civilian structure] and to provide that new agreement with enforcement mechanisms, with a view to achieving a sustainable, democratic resolution of the crisis in the future.”
Several ASEAN countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, have acknowledged the failure of the agreement. Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob, in an address before the UN General Assembly in September, noted that “Malaysia is disappointed that there is no meaningful progress in the implementation of the ASEAN ‘Five Point Consensus’ … In its current form, the ASEAN ‘Five Point Consensus’ cannot continue any longer.” A new “refined” agreement, he said, should be reached “based on a clearer framework, timeframe and end goal.”
Like-minded ASEAN members should lead the bloc toward an overhaul of its approach, Human Rights Watch said. ASEAN has already barred junta representatives from high-level meetings, noting at the August Foreign Ministers’ Meeting that they were “deeply disappointed by the limited progress in and lack of commitment of the Nay Pyi Taw authorities.”
The ministers committed to assessing Myanmar’s progress on the consensus to guide the bloc’s next steps, “consistent with Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter,” which provides for serious breaches of the Charter or noncompliance. As part of its review, ASEAN should consider suspending Myanmar to uphold the bloc’s commitment to a “people-oriented, people-centered ASEAN,” Human Rights Watch said.
ASEAN leaders should also signal their support for a UN Security Council resolution imposing a global arms embargo on Myanmar, which purchases weapons from both China and Russia.
ASEAN should also signal support for stronger enforcement of economic measures targeting the junta’s revenues, much of which are paid or held in US, British, and EU currencies.
Since the coup, the US, EU, and several other governments have imposed rounds of targeted sanctions on the Myanmar military and military-owned businesses. In February, the EU adopted new sanctions against Myanmar’s military-owned Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), but the US and United Kingdom have not followed suit.
The US and UK governments have also not pursued stronger actions at the UN. In October, the UK government began distributing drafts of a resolution on Myanmar among members of the UN Security Council, but they and other supportive members have not advanced debate on it in the face of certain opposition by the governments of Russia and China. Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia three times since the coup and Russia has increased exports to Myanmar of military aircraft, fuel, and weapons.
Some foreign officials have contended in meetings with Human Rights Watch that US and EU sanctions on the military are ineffectual and have not affected the junta’s actions. But the sanctions imposed so far have primarily targeted domestic businesses controlled by the junta inside the country and revenues collected and held in Myanmar banks, which are beyond the reach of outside sanctions. Hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign revenues from natural gas and mining continue to flow into the junta’s bank accounts, including from Thailand and China and via companies in Malaysia, Singapore, and other ASEAN countries.
Chinese companies in particular, including state-owned companies, have continued to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars of gas, metals, and precious stones and gems. The junta can use these foreign revenues to buy arms, materiel, and aviation fuel to carry out unlawful attacks during military operations.
ASEAN governments should support the sanctions, help enforce them, and use their interactions with the junta to communicate the steps they need to take to have them eased. Thailand’s government, which is closer to Myanmar diplomatically and economically, is especially important in this regard. ASEAN and its dialogue partners, as well as G20 members meeting after ASEAN, should also agree to enforce other economic restrictions more rigorously, including anti-money laundering laws, on bank accounts controlled by the junta. Myanmar military-controlled entities hold foreign currency accounts in banks in Singapore and Thailand, among other locations.
“The effectiveness of sanctions against Myanmar’s junta shouldn’t be judged until strong international sanctions are in place,” Pearson said. “Concerned governments need to cut off the junta from all funds being used to commit human rights abuses.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-11-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
"The question confronting us today – “Is ASEAN still relevant?” is not new and I suspect it will continue to be asked in the years to come. So do not view this question as an episode of existential angst, but view it as a perennial, evergreen question that confronts ASEAN. ASEAN is now 55 years old. I think to understand where it fits, we need to delve back into a little bit of world history.
First, I will bring you back to the Thirty Years’ War, which ended with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This was a war in Germany, fought on religious lines, and in 30 years, if the accounts are to be believed, perhaps resulted in up to 30% of the German population being killed or injured. The Treaty of Westphalia basically created the concept of nation states and in particular, the concept of sovereign equality and respect for territory. This was a philosophy that was aimed at keeping the peace, and in particular, avoiding interference in internal matters, and particularly on the use of religion as an organising force of societies and the potential bloodshed that it can cause. So, keep that idea in mind.
Next historical concept – 1914, the beginning of the First World War. I have actually been spending quite a lot of sleepless nights wondering whether they were about to replicate certain narratives which prevailed at the beginning of the First World War. I think you will know that at the beginning of the First World War, in Europe, there were four empires. There was the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and of course, the Romanovs were in charge in Russia. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand Franz, who would have been the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne set off events, which nobody set out deliberately to start the First World War. Nevertheless, the political and strategic logic led to action, reaction and escalatory spiral. We had the First World War, with more than 14 million people dying. The First World War did not end with its end. There were consequences, apart from the destruction of these four empires. Perhaps the not-completely-satisfactory outcomes of the Treaty of Versailles. It in fact, set the stage for the Second World War – again beginning in Europe, and unfortunately, beginning in a sense in Germany, with the rise of Nazism, which in turn was a reaction in my view, to the uncompleted agenda of the First World War. In turn, those two world wars also set up anti-colonial movements which we saw in the Middle East. In Southeast Asia, particularly, we saw it in Vietnam. Therefore, after the end of the Second World War, the typical political polemic then was the Cold War, communism versus liberal economy. We saw wars in Korea and in Vietnam. But I would dare say in Vietnam, it was not just about communism versus liberal economics, it was actually part of the anti-colonial battle.
I have taken this detour in history, because it sets the context for why ASEAN was created 55 years ago. It gives us some philosophical and historical analogies for the question of what is happening in the world today. First, ASEAN came about in 1967, basically as a grouping of non-Communist Southeast Asian independent nations, which actually had a lot of unfinished business with each other. There were territorial disputes. Singapore had just become independent through ejection from Malaysia. Konfrontasi had just ended a couple of years before. Malaysia and the Philippines had, and arguably continued to have, overlapping claims, including even in the South China Sea, maybe at that point in time. But the organising principle for ASEAN in 1967 was we either hang together or we will hang separately.
Now, let us fast forward to today and what is the global geostrategic environment for ASEAN today, which has included the countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar in the second phase? What is the geostrategic environment in which we find ourselves? I would say the first guiding force is the nature of the evolving relationship between the US and China. These are the two superpowers of our time, and obviously, their relationship is the most consequential, not only for the two of them, but for all of us. It affects all of us, especially so in Asia. Now, without getting into all the details, my view is that at the heart of the problem of their relationship, is the lack of strategic trust. And this colours, it shades, the way both the US and China view each other, engage each other, compete or maybe have a conflict. My worry about a scenario where you have two superpowers with a lack of strategic trust is that both sides, perhaps out of precaution, will view each other by assuming the worst of each other. If you think through the logic of that, it means there is a very high risk, in fact, high probability of an escalatory spiral, for whatever one or the other or both does. And that is even in the best of times – an escalatory spiral. We also witness increasingly the acceleration of a technological bifurcation. We also see the beginning of the splitting of global supply chains. Even worse, all these can very easily lead to miscalculation, mishaps, accidents, collisions in the air and sea, and unintended consequences. So you see how the stage is almost pre-set, if we are not careful, for a repeat of 1914. It will be a huge setback for both the US and China and the world, and especially for us in Southeast Asia, already grappling with the headwinds of the economic downturn, inflation, stagflation and still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. The US and China are both crucial partners for all of us in Southeast Asia. China is ASEAN’s top trading partner. The US remains our largest foreign direct investor by a long way. ASEAN established a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China last year, and we are similarly looking forward to elevating relations with the US at the ASEAN Summits next week. ASEAN Member States, including Singapore, want to maintain good relations with both Washington and Beijing. In our view, a more stable and constructive and peaceful configuration is for both the US and China to have overlapping circles of friends.
This concept of overlapping circles of friends bears elaboration. If you think about Europe after the Second World War, the question is, where was that line? There was an Iron Curtain, but when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the question of where is that line actually did not go away. At the risk of gross oversimplification, even the war in Ukraine now is another example of that question – where is that dividing line in Europe? In particular, what is Russia’s strategic position in Europe? Or another way of expressing it (is) what is the strategic architecture for Europe? In Asia, given what we have gone through in the last century – anti-colonial recovery, proxy wars during the Cold War, I hope you all understand that we are not interested in dividing lines in Asia. And that is why we offer the concept of overlapping circles of friends, and why we tell both the Americans and the Chinese do not make us choose. We will refuse to choose.
Speaking of Russia brings me to my second point. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a direct, frontal assault on the rules-based multilateral system which emerged post-Second World War, and has been a recipe for peace, coexistence, and prosperity. The invasion of Ukraine is also a direct affront to the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and international law. Consequently, in the case of Singapore – a tiny city-state with a very short history, we had to take a strong stand on the basis of principles. Because this invasion represents a threat to the heart of the UN Charter and a brutal frontal assault on the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence, we had to take a stand. Not take a side, but take a stand, on the basis that there were principles which needed to be defended.
There are in fact, salutary lessons for ASEAN. First, we can never take sovereignty and independence for granted. If you bear in mind the diversity of the ten member states of ASEAN, we must continue to uphold the sovereign equality of all states. Second, we need to pursue a model of regional integration where we can all integrate amongst the ten of us and construct positive relations with all – the super powers and middle powers – around us, and do so on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit.
The third immediate challenge is the question of Myanmar. Myanmar, in fact, was one of the leading nations in Southeast Asia, if you go back seventy-five years or eighty years. (With) the quality of the education, the quality of the people, the enormous natural resources, it was, and in fact, should have been, ahead of the pack. But Myanmar unfortunately, never quite achieved national unity (and) never quite bridged the differences between the variety of ethnic groups. What is happening now is not just a replay of the ethnic armed conflict. What is happening today is a fight for the heart of the Bamar majority, between the Tatmadaw on one hand and the National League for Democracy led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who won the election in 2020. So this is qualitatively and strategically different. Now, unfortunately, we continue to see escalation of violence, we continue to see the situation in Myanmar worsening. Three things that we have been hoping for have not happened. First, violence has not stopped. Second, there has been no release of the key leaders of the civilian leadership – President Win Myint and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Third, and obviously, there has been no dialogue between the key leaders at the heart of the Bamar majority. How long will this take? If you look at Burmese history, they (the Tatmadaw) in fact have a very high tolerance for pain, very high tolerance for isolation. I have been saying – whilst, I hope I am wrong – that this could take decades to resolve. Nevertheless, so long as Myanmar continues to be tortured by its internal conflict, it remains a key point of danger and a challenge to ASEAN’s ability to get on with the agenda of confronting the future.
Singapore remains strongly committed to supporting ASEAN to assist Myanmar in a constructive way. The nine ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Jakarta last week to discuss this issue. It is a difficult conversation. We are still considering what further steps we can take collectively as ASEAN – to take steps which will be constructive and helpful, and not just performative. Our priority remains to alleviate the suffering of the people of Myanmar. I am afraid it is time for ASEAN to make some difficult decisions. So let us see what happens over the next two weeks.
Having gone through this tour of history, this description of the strategic alignment and architecture of the world since the Second World War, and some of the fear in present regional challenges for ASEAN, let me come back to the question you posed today on ASEAN’s relevance. We believe ASEAN remains relevant. It remains relevant as an open platform for external partners to engage our region on our own basis, not as proxies, not as vassals, not as colonies, but on our own merits. ASEAN continues to have convening power. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August saw the participation of Foreign Ministers from all of ASEAN’s partners, including Russia, China, the US. I expect to see Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba at the ASEAN Summits next week. This shows that the ASEAN-led open, inclusive, rules based regional architecture is still relevant and still allows us to play an important role in fostering dialogue within our region and beyond our region.
ASEAN continues also to demonstrate value and relevance to all our external partners. Last year, we welcomed the United Kingdom as ASEAN’s first new Dialogue Partner in 30 years. We announced two new Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with Australia and China. This year, apart from the US, we are also looking to upgrade our relationship with India at the upcoming Summits. ASEAN also signed the world’s first block-to-block Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement with the EU last month.
ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, continue to bring together all the major powers in our region for dialogue on strategic, political and economic issues. We should continue to capitalise on ASEAN’s convening power, and seize the opportunities to strengthen our ties beyond our region. Therefore, our relevance, our credibility will continue to hinge on the political will of all ASEAN Member States to maintain our sense of unity and to underscore ASEAN Centrality. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is a good example of how ASEAN has outlined our own perspective on how external partners should engage and cooperate with our region on our own merits.
Next, let me touch on ASEAN’s growth potential. We believe we have got the economic winds on our side, with a population of 661 million and a combined economy of three trillion US dollars. We expect this to double, and hopefully quadruple, over the next one and two decades. If we succeed in this, ASEAN will become the fourth largest economy in the world by then. Do not forget that our region has a positive demographic dividend to harvest, because 60 percent of our population is under the age of 35. If you look at the demographics in Europe, China, Northeast Asia, you will realise that this demographic tailwind is a significant strategic advantage for all of us in the next two decades.
We are also stepping up our efforts to enhance regional economic integration through ASEAN-led frameworks and FTAs. For example, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which (Choi) Shing Kwok mentioned just now, which came into effect at the start of this year, eliminates tariffs for about 92% of goods traded amongst the signatories. The signatories are the ten ASEAN countries and China, Japan, (Republic of Korea), Australia and New Zealand – I should add that the door remains open for India. ASEAN is also pursuing Free Trade Agreements with new partners such as Canada, and we are upgrading existing free trade agreements between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand, and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, to ensure that these agreements remain relevant and fit-for-purpose in the post economic recovery.
ASEAN is also exploring opportunities to harness digital technologies to transform our economies. ASEAN is ready to commence negotiations on a Digital Economy Framework Agreement, which we hope will create a seamless digital trade ecosystem across our entire region. Similarly, we welcome external partners to deepen their cooperation with us through the ASEAN Smart Cities Network, particularly in areas including sustainability, digitalisation, intellectual property rights, and of course, energy transformation and green economy.
To summarise, the point I am trying to make is that the question is not new. Even the geostrategic narratives are not completely new. The actors may change, but the driving forces and dangers have not changed. But I hope I have given you enough of a sense of the great potential for ASEAN. Not to lose our heads, not to lose our wits, not to panic. To maintain our flexible bamboo-like ability to absorb stresses and strains, but nevertheless, maintain integrity, unity and Centrality, and harvest the enormous opportunities. Similarly, to also show that in fact our agenda is full. So therefore, there is only one conclusion – ASEAN remains relevant. Thank you all very much..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of publication:
2022-11-01
Date of entry/update:
2022-11-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
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"31st October 2022 – Yangon/London -- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states should scrap the failed 'Five-Point Consensus’ and implement measures to protect Myanmar’s civilian population, Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) said today.
Last Thursday, Foreign ministers from member countries of the ASEAN met to discuss the implementation of the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus, a plan brokered with the Myanmar military junta in April 2021 which aimed at putting the nation back on a path to peace following the February 2021 military coup. The consensus plan includes provisions for the “immediate cessation of violence” and a commitment for all parties to exercise “utmost restraint.”
“ASEAN policies are currently emboldening the junta to continue to commit atrocities against the Myanmar people,” said Kyaw Win, Executive Director of BHRN.
In the 18 months since the plan was agreed, the junta has not only failed to abide by any of the provisions laid out in the plan but has intensified its brutality against the civilian population. Junta violations since the coup include mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Most recently, the junta air force bombed an outdoor concert being held in a village near Hpakant, Kachin State, killing at least 80 men, women, and children.
In the face of the continuing atrocities, the Burma Human Rights Network calls on ASEAN to scrap its failed five-point consensus and immediately adopt a more robust course of action to protect Myanmar’s civilian population. This should include concrete actions to ensure the protection of Myanmar refugees by immediately ceasing forced returns of asylum seekers and ensuring refugees receive access to aid and international protection procedures. ASEAN should facilitate emergency cross-border humanitarian aid. ASEAN should coordinate with other U.N. member states to deprive the Myanmar military junta of weapons, dual-use technology, aviation fuel, revenue, and political recognition. Efforts to develop and implement these actions should be done in coordination with the National Unity Government, Myanmar civil society, and ethnic resistance organizations.
Organisation’s Background
BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma/Myanmar working for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in the country. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders..."
Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of publication:
2022-10-31
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
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Description:
"ASEAN Foreign Ministers convened a Special Meeting on Thursday, 27 October 2022
in Jakarta, Indonesia, to discuss the way forward on ASEAN's efforts to address the
situation in Myanmar, namely with regard to the implementation of the Five-Point
Consensus. YB Dato' Sri Saifuddin Abdullah, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was
represented by His Excellency Norman Mohamad, Deputy Secretary-General for
Bilateral Affairs of the Ministry.
In this Special Meeting, Malaysia reiterated its position that ASEAN needs to have a
Framework, to facilitate the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, with a clear
endgame for a Myanmar that is democratic, inclusive and just, peaceful and
harmonious, as well as prosperous where civil and political rights are guaranteed by
the Constitution. A transition plan would be required for this Framework. Malaysia also
re-emphasised that, aside from the ASEAN Summits, no political representative from
Myanmar should be invited to any ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.
Towards encouraging constructive dialogue among all parties concerned, Malaysia
proposed for ASEAN to engage the National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity
Consultative Council (NUCC) and other stakeholders.
To improve humanitarian efforts, Malaysia recommended ASEAN to consider the
Inclusive Humanitarian Donor Forum proposed by the NUG to support ASEAN’s
efforts on humanitarian assistance. In addition, Malaysia suggested for ASEAN to
review the current cooperation with the Myanmar Humanitarian Task Force to include
cooperation with local, international and UN bodies, NGOs and CSOs.
There were various proposals made at the meeting. The meeting agreed to study
these proposals and meet again in November to come up with recommendations to
be submitted for the consideration of the ASEAN Leaders at the 40th and 41st ASEAN
Summits, scheduled on 11 November 2022 in Phnom Penh..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia
Date of publication:
2022-10-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations
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pdf
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"On the morning of 27 October 2022, His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister PRAK
Sokhonn. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, chaired the Special
ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting at the ASEAN Secretariat to deliberate on ways to
better implement the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) endorsed by the ASEAN Leaders'
Meeting on 24 April 2021 and to propose recommendations the ASEAN Leaders'
consideration at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits. A non-political representative from
Myanmar was invited to the Meeting; however, the invitation was met with no positive
response.
The Meeting exchanged extensive views on how to further strengthen the implementation
of the 5PC to help solve Myanmar's crisis, the need to resume Myanmar's full and
normal engagements with ASEAN, the importance of continuing ASEAN community
building efforts without disruption, and the ways to facilitate and expedite the delivery of
the humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar and the early conclusion of the
Joint Needs Assessment led by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian
Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre).
While reaffirming the importance of the 5PC, which emphasized ASEAN Centrality and
ASEAN's leading role in returning peace and normalcy for the people of Myanmar, the
Ministers and representatives reiterated full support for the tireless efforts of Cambodia
as the Chair of ASEAN and H.E. Deputy Prime Minister as the Special Envoy of the
ASEAN Chair on Myanmar in carrying out the mandate over the past ten months.
The Meeting also recalled the ice-breaking visit of Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei
Techo Hun Sen. Prime Minister of Cambodia, to Myanmar, which paved the way for the
two subsequent visits of the Special Envoy. H.E. Deputy Prime Minister stressed that he
remains strongly committed to advance the three priorities that Cambodia has set out
since the beginning of her Chairmanship, namely (1) end or reduce violence, (2) facilitate
humanitarian assistance delivery and (3) create an enabling environment for political
dialogue among all parties concerned.
Undoubtedly, the situation on the ground remains critical and fragile, and this is not due
to the lack of commitments and efforts on the part of ASEAN and the Special Envoy, but
because of the complexity and difficulty of Myanmar's decades-long protracted conflicts,
which has been further exacerbated by the current political crisis. Despite these great
challenges, the Meeting agreed that ASEAN should not be discouraged, but even more
determined to help Myanmar to bring about a peaceful solution the soonest possible.
Furthermore, the Meeting unanimously agreed that decision-making in ASEAN shall be
based on consultation and consensus, and the fundamental principles stipulated in the
ASEAN Charter shall guide ASEAN's collective efforts to address the situation in Myanmar.
Foreign Ministers and Representatives also reaffirmed the importance and relevance of
the 5PC, and underscored the need to further strengthen its implementation through
concrete, practical and time-bound actions.
H.E. Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that the time to act is now, and ASEAN needs
to act together with respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and the interests of
the people of Myanmar at the core. The Meeting also acknowledged that all concerned
parties in Myanmar have a stake in ending or worsening the current political crisis that
has caused the loss of many lives, severe destruction to the country, and long-lasting effects
on the economy, and it is of utmost necessity and urgency that a dialogue process shall
commence the soonest possible.
In order to ensure full and effective implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and an
early conclusion of the current political crisis in Myanmar, the Meeting has also discussed
about key recommendations to be submitted for the consideration of the ASEAN Leaders
at the upcoming 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits in November 2022..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-10-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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Sub-title:
Region’s Leaders Should Commit to Protecting Asylum Seekers
Description:
"Southeast Asian foreign ministers are meeting today in Jakarta, Indonesia, to discuss the most pressing crisis facing the region: Myanmar.
Last April, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a “five-point consensus” in response to the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, an ASEAN member. Since then, Myanmar junta chief Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has defied each point while overseeing crimes against humanity and war crimes by security forces. Just this week, a junta airstrike unlawfully killed at least 60 people at a music concert in Kachin State.
Today’s discussion, taking place ahead of the ASEAN summit in November, should address how the bloc can revamp its approach to support international efforts to restrict the junta’s access to foreign revenue and arms.
In August, the ASEAN ministers noted they were “deeply disappointed by the limited progress in and lack of commitment” of junta authorities and committed to assessing next steps “consistent with Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter,” which covers serious breaches of the charter or noncompliance.
But the foreign ministers should also look beyond influencing the crisis within Myanmar’s borders. As military atrocities continue, growing numbers of Myanmar refugees are seeking asylum throughout the region. An estimated 70,000 have fled to neighboring countries since the coup. Yet rather than protecting asylum seekers from the junta’s violence and persecution, regional actors are forcing Myanmar refugees and other nationals back into harm’s way.
Malaysian authorities have accelerated deportations to Myanmar, returning over 2,000 people since April without allowing the United Nations refugee agency to assess their asylum claims. Thai authorities have similarly pushed asylum seekers back across the Myanmar border without verifying their protection needs. And last week at the 90th General Assembly of Interpol, the international criminal police organization, the junta’s police chief requested that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand hand over any “terrorists” – its label for all opponents of military rule.
The ASEAN chair noted in a statement yesterday that “ASEAN is gravely concerned over the recent escalation of violence in Myanmar” and “deeply saddened by the … immense suffering that ordinary people in Myanmar have endured.”
Recognizing the grave abuses the junta has unleashed on Myanmar’s people is only step one. Southeast Asian leaders also need to ensure their own governments don’t force people back to suffer under the brutality they managed to flee..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-10-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"ASEAN is gravely concerned over the recent escalation of violence in Myanmar, including
the bombing at Insein prison, hostilities in Karen State, and the most recent report of an
air strike in Kachin State, which hit a civilian gathering, killing and injuring many people.
We are deeply saddened by the growing casualties, and the immense suffering that
ordinary people in Myanmar have endured.
We observe with alarm the latest intensified fighting which has not only resulted in
worsening the humanitarian situation throughout Myanmar, but also goes against the spirit
of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus and undermining effort of the Special Envoy of ASEAN
Chair on Myanmar to bring progress in its implementation.
We, therefore, strongly urge utmost restraint and immediate cessation of violence. We
urgently call on all parties concerned, in particular one with significant power on the
ground, to take concrete actions to enable a process of inclusive and constructive dialogue
and to seek a peaceful solution and national reconciliation in Myanmar, and for the sake
of peace, security and stability in the region..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-10-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations
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Description:
"A former admiral’s son who used a UNESCO-funded regional media forum to attack Myanmar’s democracy movement is believed to have penned an article published pseudonymously in pro-regime media urging the country’s junta to be more assertive in dealing with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the West, while calling China, Russia and India “very good allies.”
Appearing in the Friday edition of the Myanmar junta’s English mouthpiece The Global New Light of Myanmar, “Myanmar and ASEAN”, credited simply to “U AC”, is basically an attack on the regional grouping. It says the bloc is doing as much as possible to embarrass the Myanmar regime while some member states are “contributing significantly to the instability and insecurity in Myanmar” and that ASEAN seems to be “acting as a lapdog for the US.”
“The country must move from a position of defence to a more offensive position. Because there are some people out there, who would bully us and talk bad about us, regardless of how well we do and how good our intentions are,” the author claims.
The publication of the article comes at a time when the relationship between the junta and the 10-member bloc, of which Myanmar is a member, has turned sour. ASEAN has barred the junta leadership from at least five meetings, including summits, since last year due to the regime’s failure to honor the group’s peace plan for the country, which has been ravaged by conflicts sparked by the military coup last year.
The article states that the current relationship between ASEAN and Myanmar seems to be based on the fundamental belief that the Myanmar military is good for nothing, ruthless and killing innocents, and that the current “government” is doing nothing good for the country.
It continues that the West and ASEAN are indirectly supporting the killing of innocent people and targeted assassinations in Myanmar, referring to anti-regime resistance groups’ attacks on junta targets.
Normally, whenever it is sidelined by ASEAN, the regime issues statements denouncing the bloc’s decision to exclude it.
But the opinion piece goes further by saying that “the time to appease everyone all over the world is over. We have to do what is right for Myanmar.”
It’s not clear whether the author is suggesting that Myanmar should quit ASEAN or the other way round. However, he describes Russia, China and India as “three very good allies” and encourages more engagement with them.
As the piece appears in the junta’s mouthpiece paper, it’s safe to say that the opinion stated in the story reflects the regime’s jittery view on ASEAN.
So who is behind the nom guerre U AC?
It is likely that the letters stand for a Myanmar name spelt in English. It could be U Aye Cho or U Aung Chan or U Aye Chan, among other names.
However, the excessive use of exclamation marks, sloppy arguments, and raising of unnecessary questions in the story make it possible to make an educated guess that the person behind the pen name U AC is Aye Chan, who joined last month’s UNESCO-funded Dili Dialogue Forum 2022 as a member of the regime’s press council to attack Myanmar’s democracy movement and independent journalists while defending the military’s 2021 coup. He is the son of ex-admiral and former minister Soe Thane, who in 2012 helped Myanmar’s then quasi-civilian administration fool the world into believing that the country’s military dictatorship was at an end, and is now a pro-regime hardliner.
Nobody familiar with Aye Chan’s presentation on Myanmar media at the Dili forum would argue that Aye Chan and U AC aren’t one and the same. Evidence can be found in shared sound bites such as “more than 90 percent of NLD [National League for Democracy] ministers are now in jail for corruption”, the duplicated coinage “NNCP”—created from the first letters of National Unity Government (or NUG, Myanmar’s shadow civilian government), NLD, CRPH (the NUG’s parliamentary wing) and PDF (its armed wing)—and the repeated accusation of vote-rigging against the NLD, a major feature of Aye Chan’s Dili presentation.
Any lingering doubts will be dispelled once you have read this story, which attempts to discredit Myanmar’s ongoing anti-junta movement under the name Aye Chan. It bears some striking similarities to the recent story on ASEAN, right down to the rhythm of its sentences and style of presenting information, not to mention its staunch defense of last year’s military takeover. Another similarity between U AC and Aye Chan is their penchant for peppering articles with quotations from famous figures like Bill Gates, Lee Kuan Yew and even Sun Tzu to support their lame arguments.
Demonstrating loyalty to the junta, in the story, U AC blasts Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as ASEAN’s “anti-Myanmar” wing, pointing to Singapore’s rejection of the regime; Malaysia’s meeting with representatives of the NUG, which the regime has branded a terrorist group; and Indonesia’s parliament for seeking to put the regime on trial. He also laments ASEAN’s serial exclusions of the regime leadership from group summits. The US, according to U AC, continues to push ASEAN, especially Singapore, to prevent the Myanmar “government” from accessing state funds from its banks, with the sole objective, the author writes, of bringing the regime down.
It’s noteworthy that the story appeared ahead of the ASEAN summit next month. With the bloc’s envoy to Myanmar having canceled his third trip to the country due the lack of positive engagement from Naypyitaw, the regime has been barred from the upcoming summit—another blow for the legitimacy-craving junta.
In that context, “Myanmar and ASEAN” by U AC can be viewed as nothing but a desperate howl from a pro-junta stooge looking to badmouth the regional grouping for its repeated exclusions of the junta leadership..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-10-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-10-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
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Sub-title:
There is a growing consensus that the world should engage directly with the opposition National Unity Government.
Description:
"Ever since Myanmar’s military seized power and ousted an elected government, international efforts to negotiate a clear way out have focused on dealing with a military that month by month becomes more belligerent, more violent, and less capable.
The assumption was that “the military now controls Myanmar and has all the guns” and that talks – however unpalatable – must proceed. To a large extent, the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) was simply relegated and has struggled to get a hearing on the diplomatic front.
But a briefing paper by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) challenges such assumptions and says that the military junta in Myanmar simply does not have effective control of the country to warrant its engagement with the international community.
The paper applied international standards in determining which side in the conflict best meets the criteria used to establish control of a state and found the NUG and resistance groups had “effective control” over 52 percent of the country.
Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and his generals are being actively contested by opposition forces in a further 23 percent of Myanmar and therefore the Tatmadaw, as the military is known, can only claim to have stable control over 17 percent of the country’s territory.
According to the SAC-M, the “trajectory of the conflict favors the resistance, and the junta is losing what control it does have at an increasing rate despite the continued use of mass atrocities by junta forces.”
That correlates with dispatches from inside Myanmar that say independent ethnic-based rebels are increasingly working together and have emerged from the jungles and are taking out military posts in the villages and pushing the fight to the outskirts of provincial cities.
This was a turning point noted at the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh when this year’s host Cambodia admitted negotiations with the junta had failed and the prospect of opening direct talks with NUG became real.
As Bart Edes, a Professor of Practice at McGill University, noted: “ASEAN countries are sensing the weakness behind the regime. They are facing an armed opposition from many different corners within the country. Their status quo can not last.”
This notion is finding much support amid a growing body of evidence that the junta is losing its grip on large parts of the country.
“Armed resistance to the junta has now saturated wide swathes of townships across most states and regions in Myanmar, demonstrating the strength of the population’s rejection of the military playing any further role in the nation’s politics,” the SAC-M added.
Others have noted the world is running out of excuses not to recognize the NUG and the United States is pushing Myanmar up the foreign policy agenda after its plight was raised by President Joe Biden in the United Nations General Assembly last week.
To date, talks with Tatmadaw have proved insipid, at best. And the execution of the four pro-democracy activists on the eve of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was as tragic as it was stupid and warrants Myanmar’s expulsion, or at least suspension, from ASEAN.
The removal of the Tatmadaw from the negotiating table would enable Indonesia, with backing from Malaysia and Brunei, to deliver on earnest talks with the NUG when Jakarta assumes control of ASEAN’s rotating chair in 2023.
The SAC-M briefing paper also found that the military had forced Myanmar’s former central administration to the brink of collapse, adding the junta is unable to govern and has been reduced to an occupying military force with a diminishing territorial base.
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“The world needs to wake up to the reality that a new Myanmar is already taking shape,” Yanghee Lee, a SAC-M founding member, said.
“The NUG is not a shadow government or government in exile. It is the representative of the people’s revolution and resistance to the military junta, the combined of which control the majority of the country,” he added..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2022-09-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
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Description:
"NEW YORK – A delegation of parliamentarians from Southeast Asia and Europe urged officials at the United Nations, U.S. State Department, and U.S. Congress to support the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar in its struggle against the brutal military junta established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing after the illegal coup on 1 February 2021.
The delegation traveled to New York and Washington, D.C., and presented to a variety of stakeholders the preliminary findings and recommendations of the International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar, organized by ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).
The delegation included Heidi Hautala, Vice President of the European Parliament and Chairperson of the IPI; Charles Santiago, Malaysian MP and Chairperson of APHR; and APHR Board Members Mercy Chriesty Barends, member of the Indonesian House of Representatives, U Shwe Maung, former Myanmar Member of Parliament, and Tom Villarin, former Congressman from the Philippines.
“We have impressed upon the stakeholders we have met the necessity for governments committed to supporting democracy in Myanmar to acknowledge the National Unity Government (NUG) as the legitimate authority in the country, increase and coordinate pressure on the junta, launch initiatives of capacity building for the NUG and other pro-democracy forces, and scale up humanitarian aid channeled it through civil society organizations,” said Charles Santiago.
The APHR-IPI delegation held meetings with the Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ilze Brands Kehris, as well as officials from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR). In New York, the delegation also took part in a meeting hosted by the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Dato Sri Saifuddin Abdullah, with several members of the NUG.
In Washington, the delegation met with members of Congress, including Representative Ilhan Omar, also a member of the IPI, as well as officials from the State Department.
“The United States has an important role to play in exerting pressure on the junta and supporting the pro-democracy forces. We called for the imposition of sanctions on the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), one of the main sources of funding for the Myanmar military, as the European Union has already done. We believe that those governments and international institutions that claim to support democracy in Myanmar should cut the flow of funds to the junta and do so in a coordinated and consistent manner,” said Heidi Hautala.
As the Myanmar military continues to engage in acts which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has said may amount to “crimes against humanity and war crimes.” It is throwing the country into chaos, and the international community’s response has fallen woefully short, despite repeated expressions of concern.
In order to analyze this failure and offer solutions to the impasse, APHR decided to launch the IPI in June. The IPI has held a total of six public hearings, as well as two special and three confidential hearings, with experts, diplomats, politicians, and activists from Myanmar and other countries. IPI committee members also conducted a fact-finding mission to the Thai-Myanmar border, where they met with over dozen civil society organizations and other stakeholders. The IPI will release a report with its full findings and recommendations in early November..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-09-25
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-25
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"NEW YORK – The Malaysian Foreign Minister, Dato Sri Saifuddin Abdullah, parliamentarians from Europe and Asia, and members of the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar have urged the global community to take stronger action to tackle the crisis triggered in Myanmar by last year’s illegal coup d’état.
Minister Abdullah hosted a meeting focused on Myanmar today at the Malaysian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, which is taking place this week.
“There should be an inclusive and fair consultation with all stakeholders in Myanmar, including the NUG and NUCC. Then there should be a framework with a clear endgame, which includes a return to democracy in Myanmar,” Abdullah said.
Abdullah is the only ASEAN minister who has publicly met with members of the NUG, the legitimate government in Myanmar, which represents the democratic aspirations of the country’s people. The meeting was attended by the NUG Minister for Human Rights, U Aung Myo Min; the NUG Minister of Communications, Information and Technology, as well as its spokesperson, U Htin Linn Aung; the permanent representative of Myanmar to the UN, Kyaw Moe Tun; as well as representatives of other Myanmar pro-democracy organizations.
“The Myanmar people deserve to have their true representatives at the table where regional decisions are being made,” said Htin Linn Aung.
The meeting was attended by Heidi Hautala, Vice President of the European Parliament and Chair of the International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar; Charles Santiago, Malaysian MP and Chairman of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR); Mercy Chriesty Barends, member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and APHR Board Member; U Shwe Maung, former Myanmar Member of Parliament, and APHR Board Member; and Tom Villarin, former congressman from the Philippines, and APHR Board Member.
Since the coup d’état on 1 February 2021, Myanmar has been plunged into a deep crisis, as the military junta led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing engages in an all-out war against its population in order to cement its power. A massive civil disobedience movement has demonstrated that the vast majority of the country’s population does not wish to live under military rule and has valiantly resisted the power grab. Meanwhile, international attention has largely shifted to crises elsewhere.
“Nineteen months after the coup, the international allies of the junta have shown a commitment to supporting Min Aung Hlaing which surpasses that of those countries claiming to support the pro-democracy movement. Simply put, the latter are not doing enough to help the Myanmar people, as countries like Russia or China actively support the military, engage the junta and give it the recognition it so keenly craves. It is high time for those governments that claim to support democracy in Myanmar to act forcefully,” said Charles Santiago.
In order to assess the global response to the crisis in Myanmar and offer recommendations on what international actors should do to support democracy and human rights in the country, APHR launched the International Parliamentary Inquiry on Myanmar in June. Chaired by Heidi Hautala, Vice President of the European Parliament, the IPI Committee is formed by eight parliamentarians from seven countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe.
The IPI has held a total of six public oral hearings, as well as two special and three confidential oral hearings, with experts, diplomats, politicians, and activists from Myanmar and other countries. IPI committee members also conducted a fact-finding mission to the Thai-Myanmar border in August, where they met with over a dozen civil society organizations and other stakeholders. On the occasion of the UN General Assembly, the IPI has sent a delegation to New York and Washington, in order to present its preliminary findings. The IPI final report will be released in November.
The IPI members are presenting a position paper to a variety a stakeholders in New York and Washington, in which they assert that the coup has failed in the face of widespread popular opposition. Myanmar has been plunged into a civil war between the military and the pro-democracy movement, which is bound to be long and protracted.
“As the conflict in Myanmar remains undecided, and the coup is triggering a humanitarian crisis of an enormous scale, what international actors do, or fail to do, may tip the scale in favor of military dictatorship or democracy. We urge the global community to scale up humanitarian aid, to increase the pressure on the junta through improved coordination on sanctions and diplomatic isolation. We further urge international actors to fully acknowledge the NUG as what it is, the legitimate government of Myanmar, and support it accordingly with funding, capacity building initiatives, and diplomatic recognition,” said Heidi Hautala..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-09-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) to what extent has the ongoing crisis in Myanmar affected the credibility of ASEAN in promoting peace and stability in the region; and (b) whether ASEAN is considering a joint effort to engage the Myanmar leadership at the highest levels.
Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of the Myanmar military government’s failure to implement the Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar reached with ASEAN in 2021, whether Singapore plans to work with ASEAN to (i) implement targeted sanctions on Myanmar’s military, including an arms embargo and imposing travel restrictions on members of the military and (ii) establish contact with, and provide assistance, to the National Unity Government.
REPLY
The coup in Myanmar was launched by the Myanmar military or the Tatmadaw on 1 February 2021. Since then, the tragic consequences arising from the coup, which include large scale civilian deaths and injuries, have continued with no sign of abatement. The situation remains dire. The primary responsibility for the ongoing crisis in Myanmar lies with the Tatmadaw.
2 The Five-Point Consensus was formulated by the ASEAN Leaders and accepted by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing at their meeting on 24 April 2021 in Jakarta. However, Singapore and ASEAN are deeply disappointed that there has been little progress in its implementation. This is despite efforts by successive Special Envoys of the ASEAN Chair – Brunei and Cambodia – and direct entreaties by current ASEAN Chair, Cambodia. Instead, aerial bombings of opposition-controlled areas and the execution of opposition activists have occurred. The timings of these actions by the Tatmadaw underscore their disregard for both ASEAN and the Five-Point Consensus.
3 Myanmar’s peace, security and stability is not only in its own interest but also for the whole region. However, without political reconciliation and dialogue in good faith by all stakeholders, the necessary political solution cannot be found. The setbacks to ASEAN’s efforts are not a matter of ASEAN credibility, but rather of the Tatmadaw’s intransigence. The ASEAN Leaders will have to assess the progress in the Five-Point Consensus’ implementation at the ASEAN Summits this November. Depending on how the situation evolves, they will have to make some difficult decisions to guide ASEAN’s next steps.
4 Singapore voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/75/287 “The Situation in Myanmar” in June 2021, which calls on UN Member States to “prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar”. Since April 2022, Singapore has not authorised the transfer of items assessed to have potential military application to Myanmar, where there is a serious risk that the item may be used to inflict violence against unarmed civilians. This is in line with our firm commitment to measures that will facilitate the de-escalation of violence in Myanmar and support efforts by ASEAN and the UN to achieve a negotiated political solution..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of publication:
2022-09-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
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Description:
"2022 has not exactly been a banner year for democracy in Southeast Asia, which has regressed in the past two decades from an example of a democratizing developing region into one of extreme democratic regression (the only exception: tiny Timor-Leste). The Myanmar junta remains in power in that benighted country, overseeing a failed state. The junta has resorted to rising brutality and abandoned all pretense of interest in global opinion by jailing a former UK ambassador, executing four activists, and handing Aung San Suu Kyi a long prison and hard labor sentence. Former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte continued to oversee a crackdown on the media and civil society, as well as a brutal drug war, until the end of his term in June 2022. Thailand’s pro-military parliamentary coalition remains in power becau
se of a flawed 2019 election, the banning of opposition parties, and the fact that Thai judges are beholden to the military and its allies. The Thai king, who is supposed to stay above politics, increasingly involves himself in both politics and business, and has expressed some interest in returning the country to an absolute monarchy. Cambodia has cracked down on a broad range of opposition activists. Malaysia, while jailing former prime minister Najib tun Razak for his crimes—an important step towards curbing impunity—retains a ruling coalition dominated by Najib's party, which ruled Malaysia autocratically for decades. In Indonesia, President Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) has done little as the military accrues power and rights are curtailed for LGBTQ+ citizens and others.
But 2023 is likely to be worse for democracy in Southeast Asia. Jokowi will increasingly become a lame duck, and Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, who has signaled his disdain for democracy and desire to rule as a strongman, has accepted his party's nomination to run for president in 2024. With Jokowi term-limited, Prabowo will be a strong candidate; he is already amassing allies and endorsements from other key political players in the country.
Prabowo also has a terrible rights record from his tenure as head of Indonesian special forces in the Suharto era. He was banned from obtaining a U.S. visa for years for his alleged role in the killings of rights activists and other crimes during the bloodshed in East Timor, then a province of Indonesia (in the waning days of the Trump administration, the U.S. granted Prabowo a visa to visit Washington after he became defense minister).
With Prabowo as president, Indonesia could easily lose its status, along with Timor-Leste, as one of the few still-solid democracies in the region. Indeed, Prabowo has already suggested he sees little value in democracy. If he were to win the presidency, he could cancel the many local and regional elections that have become the lifeblood of Indonesia's highly successful program of democratic decentralization to consolidate power in himself and a small circle of advisors.
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, there is little evidence that the new president Ferdinand Marcos Jr will be any more democratic than Duterte. He has continued Duterte's crackdown on the media and civil society—prominent activist Walden Bello was arrested shortly after Marcos Jr's inauguration—and is protecting Duterte from any investigations into the former president's massive rights abuses. Prominent opposition leader Senator Leila de Lima remains in jail.
In Thailand, another major Southeast Asian state, elections must be held in 2023. The population has likely tired of the government, led by a military-aligned party that has been in power since 2019 through unfair elections (following a military coup in 2014, those same leaders also ran the country for five years under intense repression). In all likelihood, Thais will vote in large numbers for opposition, pro-democracy parties, but these parties will be prevented from taking office, as the pro-military parties and their allies maneuver to keep the opposition out of power.
Malaysia also must hold general elections in 2023, and there will be plenty of maneuvering, horse-trading, and other shenanigans in advance of the elections. Although new parties will be contesting, it seems highly possible that UMNO, the party that has dominated the country, often by employing semi-autocratic means and staggering gerrymandering, will win. The economy has been relatively strong, the opposition is fractured, and UMNO and its allies seem in strong shape to win.
In smaller regional countries, the situation does not look much better. Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen, who has ruled for three decades, will likely heighten his campaign against the remaining semi-free press and civil society even further, as he maneuvers to eventually install his son, Hun Manet, as his successor. Vietnam also continues in a more authoritarian direction. While debt crises and economic problems have caused some ferment in Laos, this highly unusual protest is unlikely to have much impact on the ruling regime, which remains in full control of the country and represses even the slightest demonstrations.
Myanmar will likely continue to descend into ever-more-brutal conflict, including in major urban areas. The ruling junta may be losing ground to anti-government guerillas and ethnic armed organizations, but dislodging the military regime, even if it happens, will take time—and leave an unsure future for the country.
In sum, 2023 promises to be another horrible year for democracy in Southeast Asia. There are potential bright spots—perhaps the pro-democracy opposition will win in Thailand and their victory will be respected, or perhaps there will be real progress in Myanmar—but overall, the outlook is grim..."
Source/publisher:
Council on Foreign Relations
Date of publication:
2022-09-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-12
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Description:
"The UN Special envoy on Myanmar has warned of a “multidimensional catastrophe” if the regional and international communities don’t make a serious effort to support the Southeast Asian country, which has descended into conflict since last year’s military coup.
Myanmar has been politically and economically devastated since the coup. Far from bringing the whole country under its control, the regime is still struggling with nationwide popular armed resistance against its rule. The economy has been in a downward spiral, with fuel in short supply and foreign reserves dwindling.
“We cannot wait. A multidimensional catastrophe will emerge in the heart of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] unless we as a regional and international community come together to seriously find new ways to support this Myanmar-led process towards an inclusive society and democratic future,” said the envoy, Noeleen Heyzer, in her remarks at a seminar at the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore on Monday. Myanmar is an ASEAN member.
The warning came after her controversial mission to Myanmar last month during which she met with regime chief Min Aung Hlaing in an attempt to mediate the crisis, including calling for an immediate end to the junta’s violence against the Myanmar people. However, after receiving a low-grade reception from the junta she made no breakthrough. Instead, it became another failed UN mission in Myanmar, used by the regime to promote its legitimacy as well as to express its displeasure over the UN’s actions against it.
However, the envoy insisted that her visit was part of the UN’s broader efforts to support an effective and peaceful Myanmar-led political pathway to return to civilian rule based on the will of the people, saying, “My mandate as an impartial actor [is] to engage with all stakeholders in Myanmar, the region and globally, consistent with the principles of the United Nations.”
In her remarks at the seminar on Monday, the envoy said there was no clear path out of the crisis and that there would be no easy solutions. During her visit to Myanmar, she wasn’t allowed to meet detained popular leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and she said on Monday that “If I ever visit Myanmar again, it will only be if I can meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.”
She also admitted that in the case of Myanmar, the limitations of the United Nations and the international community are also clear, adding that continued differences in the positions among member states of the UN was also a factor, according to highlights of the seminar released by the envoy’s office.
“Thus, I will continue to appeal to all governments, regional organizations and other key stakeholders, to listen to the will of [the] people and be guided by that will,” she said.
Despite its condemnation of the coup and the regime’s killing of more than 2,000 people so far, the UN has still failed to take serious action against the Myanmar junta. The UN Security Council still hasn’t been able to pass any resolutions due to resistance from China and Russia, the junta’s major allies.
At the regional level, ASEAN has tried to mediate the Myanmar crisis since last year with its peace plan, which includes an immediate cessation of violence against civilians. However, the junta ignored the plan.
At the same time, both the UN and ASEAN have failed to “officially engage” with Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), which was formed by the elected lawmakers of the ousted National League for Democracy and their ethnic allies, and commands the loyalty of the vast majority of Myanmar people.
Following the envoy’s meeting with Min Aung Hlaing , the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), a group of former UN experts on the country, urged Heyzer to engage with the NUG instead.
The NUG also called on the envoy to publicly strengthen partnerships with it, as well as with ethnic armed organizations and civil society, and to truly listen to and respect the aspirations of the Myanmar people..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-09-05
Date of entry/update:
2022-09-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Description:
"Malaysia’s foreign minister on Wednesday urged member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to engage directly with the Myanmar junta’s opponents, and to bring other countries into efforts to bring peace to the military-ruled country.
During a visit to Thailand, Saifuddin Abdullah said it was of the “utmost importance” that ASEAN members morally support Myanmar’s people and engage with opposition groups formed after the coup, including the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government that has been designated as a terrorist group by the regime.
Since the military coup last year, Myanmar has been in social and political turmoil due to the regime’s brutal crackdowns on the opposition and popular armed resistance against military rule.
ASEAN has been trying to mediate peace in the country since then by engaging only with the junta. The bloc’s efforts, however, have been criticized for making little progress. The regime has killed more than 2,000 people so far.
“Now it is one-sided, we are only engaging the junta,” said the Malaysian foreign minister.
Saifuddin said ASEAN foreign ministers discussed last week the possibility of seeking support from third-party states to help with the the bloc-led peace process.
“Some of us brought it to the table that if ASEAN cannot do it alone then we will probably have to engage some of our ASEAN dialogue partners,” he said, without naming any countries.
Among the 10 ASEAN states, Malaysia is one of the few that has been critical of the regime.
In May, Saifuddin proposed that the regional grouping, which admitted Myanmar as a member under a previous military regime in 1997, consider informal engagement with the NUG, especially in the area of humanitarian relief.
The junta’s Foreign Ministry condemned Saifuddin’s suggestion, calling it “irresponsible and reckless.”
He met his NUG counterpart Daw Zin Mar Aung on the sidelines of the US-ASEAN special summit, becoming the first minister from the bloc to meet an official from Myanmar’s shadow government publicly.
The Myanmar issue also dominated last week’s ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. In a statement following the meeting, the ministers showed their disappointment at the military junta’s lack of commitment to implementing the bloc’s peace plan, known as the Five-Point Consensus. Adopted last year, the plan calls on the regime to halt all violence in the country immediately and meet with all stakeholders to discuss ways of finding peace.
Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said there is a real danger that the political crisis in Myanmar could turn into a civil war, given the lack of progress on peace plans that the country has agreed with ASEAN.
“I have to be very frank. It’s very dire. I think there is a real danger that the coup is sliding into a civil war. There’s been no progress on the Asean Five-Point Consensus,” Dr. Balakrishnan said..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-08-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
National Unity Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs STATEMENT (15/2022) - အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၅/၂၀၂၂)
Description:
"1. The National Unity Government o f the Republic o f the Union o f Myanmar
welcomes the discussion on Myanmar at the 55th ASEAN Foreign
Ministers' Meeting in Cambodia on 3 August 2022, and the address of
Myanmar in the corresponding Joint Communique.
2. ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their deep disappointment at the illegal
military junta’s ' lack of commitment' in implementing the Five-Point
Consensus. Yet the Ministers are well aware that this ' limited progress' is in
fact a deliberate junta strategy by Min Aung Hlaing and his junta to sabotage
ASEAN's efforts - including those o f its Chair, H.E. Hun Sen and its Special
Envoy on Myanmar, H.E. Prak Sokhonn.
3. The National Unity Government is therefore deeply disappointed at the
Foreign Ministers' decision to delay concrete action on Myanmar until
ASEAN convenes for its annual Summit in November. This reprieve offers
the junta an atrocity window, during which it will continue to escalate its war
crimes, crimes against humanity and its acts o f terror. The decision also
follows ASEAN's public condemnation1 o f the junta's extrajudicial
execution of four political prisoners, martyred for their commitment to a free
and democratic Myanmar. While murder is a junta hallmark, these were the
first executions under the facade o f legal process in over three decades, an
issue that ASEAN in its own words said that it ' takes seriously'.
4. The Joint Communique reiterates ASEAN’s ' commitment to peace and
stability in the region'. This demands direct action against Min Aung Hlaing
and the illegal military junta, which comprise a clear threat to peace and
security. The ASEAN Summit must therefore include the National Unity
Government, as the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people, to help
solve the multiple junta-induced crises wreaking havoc on the region.
ASEAN must at the same time listen to Myanmar’s Ethnic Resistance
Organizations and to the voices of the Myanmar people, while taking active
steps to sideline die junta in earnest.
5. ASEAN continues to have a dedicated partner in the National Unity
Government. Consistent with the Joint Communique's call, the National
Unity Government will meet with Special Envoy Sokhonn at the earliest
opportunity.....ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
=======================
၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ အစည်းအဝေးရလဒ်များအပေါ် ထုတ်ပြန် ကြေညာချက်
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၅/၂၀၂၂)
ဩဂုတ်လ ၉ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်
=======================
၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဩဂုတ်လ ၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကမ္ဘောဒီးယားနိုင်ငံ၌ ကျင်းပခဲ့သည့် ၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများ အစည်းအဝေးတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် အာဆီယံပူးတွဲကြေညာချက်တွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား ထည့်သွင်းခဲ့ခြင်းအပေါ် ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။
၂။ အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အာဆီယံဘုံသဘော တူညီချက်ငါးရပ်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရာတွင် 'ကတိကဝတ်မရှိခြင်း' အပေါ် အလွန်စိတ်ပျက် မိကြောင်း ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ သို့သော်လည်း ယခုကဲ့သို့ 'ကန့်သတ်ခံထားရသော အခြေအနေ' သည် လက်တွေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်နှင့် ၎င်း၏ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုတို့၏ အာဆီယံ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုများကို ဖျက်ဆီးရန် တမင်ရည်ရွယ်သော နည်းဗျူဟာတစ်ခုဖြစ်ကြောင်း အာဆီယံဥက္ကဋ္ဌ မစ္စတာ H.E. Hun Sen၊ အာဆီယံ၏ အထူးသံတမန် H.E. Prak Sokhonn အပါအဝင် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးများအနေဖြင့် ကောင်းစွာ သဘောပေါက် မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။
၃။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ် ခိုင်မာသော အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများချမှတ်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အာဆီယံ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်မချမီ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်ငါးရပ်ကို အကောင် အထည်ဖော်ခြင်းနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ တိုးတက်မှုကို ပြန်လည်အကဲဖြတ်ရန် လာမည့် နိုဝင်ဘာလတွင် ကျင်းပမည့် အာဆီယံထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးအထိ စောင့်ဆိုင်းရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အပေါ် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် လွန်စွာစိုးရိမ်ပူပန်မိပါသည်။ ယင်းဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်တို့အား ၎င်းတို့၏တရားမ၀င်အုပ်ချုပ်မှုကို စဉ်ဆက်မပြတ် ငြင်းပယ်တွန်းလှန် လျက်ရှိသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအတိုက်အခံများနှင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအပေါ် စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများ၊ လူသား မျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏ အကြမ်းဖက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကို ဆက်လက် ကျူးလွန်နိုင်စေရန် ခွင့်ပြုပေးလိုက်ခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ပြင် ယခုဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် လွတ်လပ်ပြီး ဒီမိုကရေစီထွန်းကားသော အနာဂတ်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် ရည်ရွယ်၍ ၎င်းတို့၏ အသက်ပင် ပဓာနမထားဘဲ စွန့်လွှတ်အနစ်နာခံခဲ့ကြသည့် နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသားလေးဦးတို့အား အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက မတရားကွပ်မျက်ခဲ့ခြင်းအပေါ် အာဆီယံက လူသိရှင်ကြား ရှုတ်ချပြီး သည့်နောက် ထွက်ပေါ်လာခြင်းလည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်လူသတ်မှုသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ် အုပ်စု၏ တံဆိပ်ခပ်နှိပ်ထားသည့် အမှတ်အသားတစ်ခုပင်ဖြစ်သော်လည်း ၎င်းတို့သည် ဆယ်စုနှစ် သုံးခုကျော်အတွင်း တရားရေးလုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ဆိုသည့် မှန်ကန်တရားမျှတခြင်းမရှိသည့် မျက်နှာစာ အောက်တွင် ပထမဆုံး ကွပ်မျက်ခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပြီး အာဆီယံအနေဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ကိုယ်ပိုင်စကားလုံးဖြင့် 'အလေးအနက်ထားရမည်' ဟု ထုတ်ဖော်ပြောကြားခဲ့သည့်ကိစ္စလည်းဖြစ်သည်။
၄။ အာဆီယံ၏ ပူးတွဲကြေညာချက်တွင် အာဆီယံ၏ 'ဒေသတွင်း ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် တည်ငြိမ် ရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကတိကဝတ်' ကို ထပ်လောင်း ကတိပြုသည်ဟု ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။ အဆိုပါဖော်ပြ ချက်အရ ဒေသတွင်းငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနဲ့ လုံခြုံရေးကို ထင်ရှားပြတ်သားစွာ ခြိမ်းခြောက်လျက်ရှိသည့် တရားမဝင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မင်းအောင်လှိုင်နှင့် ၎င်း၏ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအား တုံ့ဆိုင်းခြင်းအလျဉ်းမရှိဘဲ တိုက်ရိုက် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်ရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏တရားဝင်အစိုးရအဖြစ် ရွေးကောက်တင်မြောက်ခြင်းခံထားရသည့် အမျိုးသား ညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အာဆီယံထိပ်သီးအစည်းအဝေးတွင် ပါဝင်တက်ရောက်ကာ အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များ၏ လှုံ့ဆော်လျက်ရှိသည့် ဒေသတွင်း ယိုယွင်းပျက်စီးနေသော အကျပ်အတည်း အခြေအနေများကို ဖြေရှင်းရာတွင် ပါဝင်ကူညီပေးရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် အာဆီယံသည် မြန်မာ့တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် မြန်မာလူထု၏ အသံများကို နားထောင်လျက် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုကို ဖယ်ရှားရန် ထင်ရှားပြတ်သားသည့် ခြေလှမ်းများကို လျှောက်လှမ်းရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၅။ အာဆီယံသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ အရေးပါသည့် မိတ်ဖက်အဖြစ် ဆက်လက် တည်ရှိနေပြီး အာဆီယံပူးတွဲကြေညာချက်၏ တောင်းဆိုချက်နှင့်အညီ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရသည် အာဆီယံ၏ အထူးသံတမန် H.E. Prak Sokhonn နှင့် အမြန်ဆုံး တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးနိုင်မည်ဟု ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2022-08-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-09
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"As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) marks its 55th anniversary today, Amnesty International urges the regional bloc to acknowledge the failure of its five-point plan published in April 2021 to end the violence and increasing human rights violations in Myanmar.
“ASEAN must prove it is not a toothless body but acts decisively to hold the Myanmar military to account for its atrocious human rights violations. The military has decades of blood on its hands and will continue to trample on the lives and rights of millions of people in Myanmar if it is not made to face the consequences of its crimes,” said Ming Yu Hah, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Campaigns.
“In the face of the continuing atrocities – including executions following unfair trials, extrajudicial killings and torture committed by the Myanmar military – ASEAN must swiftly adopt a more robust course of action so that military leaders end the escalating violent repression they have unleashed since the February 2021 coup.”
To reinforce this message, Amnesty International projected the words “ASEAN must act now!” onto the building of the ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta on Monday.
Since February 2021, the Myanmar military has systematically cracked down on tens of thousands of peaceful protesters nationwide, forcing 700,000 people from their homes, killing over 2,000 people and arresting almost 15,000 individuals.
“For ASEAN to retain its credibility, it must change its approach to help end the country-wide bloodshed in Myanmar. ASEAN, collectively as a bloc and as individual member states, must also push for justice and accountability in Myanmar. It is imperative that ASEAN plays a constructive rather than obstructionist role and encourages other members of the international community to maximize pressure on the Myanmar military,” Ming Yu Hah said.
“We urge ASEAN to demand immediate action from the Myanmar military, including the release of all those who are arbitrarily detained. ASEAN must also address other urgent needs, including committing to the non-refoulement of refugees or anybody else fleeing violence in Myanmar, facilitating desperately needed humanitarian assistance, and adding its voice to calls for a global arms embargo.”
Amnesty International’s Indonesia office was joined by a number of Indonesian civil society groups on Monday as the message to ASEAN was projected onto the organization’s Jakarta HQ.
During an ASEAN summit in Jakarta in 2021, Amnesty International reminded Indonesia of its obligation under international law to investigate Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other Myanmar military officials on credible allegations of responsibility for crimes against humanity in Myanmar.
“Myanmar’s military has made a mockery of ASEAN’s ‘Five-Point Consensus’ to reduce violence following the country’s military coup in 2021,” Ming Yu Hah said.
“Instead of implementing the agreement, Myanmar’s military has continued to perpetrate grave human rights violations against the population of 54 million.”
In the latest example of its abusive treatment of the Myanmar people, the military executed four men in July after grossly unfair trails – the first executions since the 1980s – with more than 70 people on death row post-coup.
In research published in April, Amnesty International recorded increasing state repression in Myanmar, including shootings and beatings against many peaceful protesters. Testimonies indicated that plainclothes police officers are disguising themselves as fruit sellers and trishaw drivers to spy on anyone daring to express dissent. In retaliation against activists, the military has raided their homes and arrested their family members.
A report by Amnesty International published in July showed that the Myanmar military is committing war crimes by laying antipersonnel landmines on a massive scale in and around villages in Kayah (Karenni) State.
A further report published by Amnesty International on 2 August documented the Myanmar military’s use of torture tactics in detention, including inflicting sexual and gender-based violence and psychological torture. Amnesty’s investigation found that the Myanmar military also committed enforced disappearances and subjected detainees to torture and other ill-treatment in detention centres..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-08-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-08
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Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"6 August 2022: The next annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders’ Summit in November is critical for the escalating crisis in Myanmar and ASEAN’s response to it, following the outcome of this week’s ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
Foreign Ministers from nine of the ten ASEAN Member States concluded a three-day meeting in Phnom Penh on Friday 5th August. No representative for Myanmar was present at the meeting. The representative of the illegal military junta in Myanmar was barred from attending the meeting, while ASEAN has not yet recognised the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG).
The Foreign Ministers agreed in a Joint Communiqué issued after the meeting to recommend that the ASEAN Summit in November decide on next steps to be taken by ASEAN to address the crisis. Decisions can be made by the ASEAN Summit in situations where consensus between the ten ASEAN Member States cannot be achieved, according to Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter.
“The outcome of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting has put the ball firmly in the court of the ASEAN Leaders in November,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The Summit must be the turning point for ASEAN. The longer ASEAN does nothing the greater the pain and suffering of the Myanmar people. At an absolute minimum, the violence must stop. There must be consequences for the junta’s actions and all eyes will be on the Summit to act.”
The Foreign Ministers called on ASEAN Leaders to assess progress towards the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus by the junta between now and the November meeting to guide decision-making. The Five-Point Consensus was reached between junta-leader Min Aung Hlaing and ASEAN Leaders in April 2021. Until now, Min Aung Hlaing has failed to adhere to a single point of the agreement and continues to flout the consensus with impunity. The junta leader has repeatedly and deliberately instrumentalized any attempt by the bloc and its current chair, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, to push forward on the consensus to mislead the international community as to the reality of the situation in Myanmar.
“ASEAN needs to come up with a new formula as the Five-Point Consensus clearly has not worked,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “ASEAN leaders need to stop waiting in vain for Min Aung Hlaing. His coup failed, his forces are being defeated everywhere across the country, and he has no strategy other than the commission of mass atrocities.”
The NUG, People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and allied Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) hold more of Myanmar’s territory than Min Aung Hlaing’s military junta and are gaining more ground where junta forces are being pushed back.
The NUG has repeatedly expressed its commitment to working with counterparts in ASEAN towards finding a durable solution to the military junta-crisis.
“ASEAN does not need the consent of Min Aung Hlaing to seek a new solution to the crisis in November, that much is very clear,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M. “But ASEAN needs to work with the NUG. The NUG is the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people, increasingly the de facto authority in the country as well as the de jure government, and the proper party for ASEAN to be engaging with.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-08-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"JAKARTA – As the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meet in Phnom Penh this week, they should take the opportunity to reach an agreement on strong and coordinated measures to put pressure on Myanmar’s military junta, parliamentarians from the region have urged.
Over fifteen months after ASEAN members and the chief of the military junta, General Min Aung Hlaing, signed a Five-Point Consensus to address the political and humanitarian crisis triggered by the illegal coup d’état on 1 February 2021, the situation in Myanmar has continued to deteriorate. The self-styled State Administration Council (SAC) is still hijacking humanitarian assistance, has not taken steps towards initiating a political dialogue, and continues waging a brutal campaign of repression against the population at large in order to stamp out widespread opposition to military rule.
“ASEAN member states must recognize that the Myanmar military has become a criminal organization that is holding hostage the whole of the country’s population. Min Aung Hlaing has been given too much time to comply with the Five-Point Consensus, yet he has only shown that he respects neither the agreement nor ASEAN itself. It is time for him and his henchmen to pay the consequences,” said Eva Sundari, former member of the House of Representatives in Indonesia and Board Member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).
ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers are meeting less than two weeks after the Junta executed four political prisoners sentenced to death, Phyo Zeya Thaw, former lawmaker for the National League for Democracy (NLD); the prominent activist Kyaw Min Yu, widely known as ‘Ko Jimmy’; Aung Thura Zaw; and Hla Myo Aung.
Those are the first known judicial executions in Myanmar since 1988, according to Amnesty International, and were carried out secretly, after trials conducted by military tribunals without any respect for due process, as APHR has denounced. There are currently 76 prisoners in Myanmar sentenced to death, including two children, who could be executed at any moment, while 41 people have been given the death penalty in absentia.
The junta went on with the executions despite international pleas not to carry them out. Even Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, current ASEAN Chair, made a plea for the prisoners to be spared, despite the leniency that his government has shown towards the junta this year. As ASEAN Chair, Cambodia has undone a great deal of the work that other member states had been doing to isolate the Myanmar generals, thus granting them a legitimacy they do not deserve.
“After those barbaric executions, Cambodia should stop pandering to the generals, and ASEAN foreign ministers should make their meeting in Phnom Penh a turning point to lift the Myanmar people out of their suffering. ASEAN’s timidity and the absence of leadership has contributed to fostering the impunity for these executions and other atrocities to take place. The junta believes it can get away with its crimes and ignore the international condemnation, because up to now it has not led to any concrete consequences,” said Sundari.
ASEAN should put in place enforcement mechanisms in order for the Five Point Consensus to work. Starting with imposing targeted sanctions and travel bans in the region on Min Aung Hlaing and his men. The regional group should also publicly engage and recognize the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), which is leading the pro-democracy forces and represents the Myanmar people’s aspirations for democracy, as well as ethnic organizations. Also, ASEAN should start working with humanitarian organizations and civil society organizations to deliver aid to those who need it the most, as APHR has been advocating.
“A coordinated, collective and clear response is required for the sake of ASEAN’s own credibility. Its half-hearted attitude degrades ASEAN itself. This indecisiveness is unbefitting of the main regional organization in a strategically crucial part of the world that should be an engine of peace and stability, as well as sustainable economic growth, not a haven for murderous dictators like Min Aung Hlaing,” said Sundari..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-08-02
Date of entry/update:
2022-08-02
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"The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Ronaldo Costa Filho (Brazil):
The members of the Security Council condemned the Myanmar military’s execution of opposition activists over the weekend. They recalled the Secretary-General’s statement of 25 July 2022 and echoed his call for the immediate release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.
The members of the Security Council also recalled the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Chair’s Statement of 25 July 2022, which expressed ASEAN’s denunciation and strong disappointment at the execution despite the appeals of the ASEAN Chair and some ASEAN member States for the sentences to be reconsidered. They noted ASEAN’s view that implementation of the death sentences was highly reprehensible and presented a gross lack of will to support the efforts of the ASEAN Chair in expediting progress on the implementation of the Five Point Consensus. They noted ASEAN’s call for utmost restraint, patience and efforts to avoid escalating the situation, and for all parties concerned to desist from taking actions that would only further aggravate the crisis.
The members of the Security Council reiterated their strong support to ASEAN and the efforts of the ASEAN Chair and echoed ASEAN’s call for concrete actions to effectively and fully implement the Five Point Consensus. They underlined the important role of the United Nations Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar and encouraged close coordination with the ASEAN Special Envoy to ensure synergy.
The members of the Security Council called for the pursuance of dialogue with all parties concerned and reconciliation in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar. They also called for an immediate cessation of all forms of violence, including attacks on infrastructure, health and education facilities, for full respect for human rights and the rule of law, and for full, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to all those in need. They reiterated their full support for Myanmar’s democratic transition and their strong commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations
Date of publication:
2022-07-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, UN Security Council, Human Rights and international relations
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"KUALA LUMPUR – During her two-day mission to Kuala Lumpur at the invitation of His Excellency Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer expressed her appreciation to the people and Government of Malaysia as host of the largest Rohingya refugee population in ASEAN.
Special Envoy Heyzer had very productive discussions with His Excellency Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob and the Foreign Minister on the situation in Myanmar. The Special Envoy echoed the United Nations Secretary-General’s strong condemnation of the executions of pro-democracy leaders by the military as a blatant violation to the right to life, liberty and security of person. The discussions touched on the setback of the executions on ASEAN’s efforts, including the Five-Point Consensus, and also focused on concrete areas of cooperation with the United Nations Special Envoy, as requested by the ASEAN Heads of State and Foreign Ministers. Moving forward, the urgency for inclusive engagement was stressed.
During her meeting with the Foreign Minister, the Special Envoy focused on education to prevent a “lost generation” of Rohingya refugees and other displaced persons from Myanmar and the importance of legal employment and protection for Myanmar migrant workers and refugees in Malaysia.
Nearly five years after the mass forced displacement of Rohingya and other communities from Rakhine State in Myanmar, the Special Envoy highlighted the need for innovative thinking to break the impasse and strengthen support for the Rohingya and host communities from countries in the region and across the international community. She stressed that ultimately it was Myanmar’s responsibility to address underlying issues affecting the Rohingya and establish durable solutions for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of all refugees and forcibly displaced persons.
The Special Envoy recognized Malaysia’s major role within ASEAN, as a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and in the Vice Presidency of the 77th Session of the General Assembly. Ahead of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in early August, the Special Envoy also acknowledges the important role of the ASEAN Secretary-General as part of the regional bloc’s commitment on Rakhine. She called for ASEAN Foreign Ministers to keep the Rohingya issue high on the ASEAN agenda and to support the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State.
Ahead of her visit to Bangladesh in late August, the Special Envoy also highlighted the important cooperation with His Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh A. K. Abdul Momen, reflected in his recent visits to Cambodia as chair of ASEAN as well as to Indonesia. Special Envoy Heyzer acknowledged the challenges faced by host countries compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and global economic conditions, with Bangladesh as host of 1.2 million refugees bearing a disproportionate burden that the international community regionally and abroad has a responsibility to help to alleviate, including through support for quality and inclusive education for refugees and host communities.
“As the UN Secretary-General has said, education is a pre-eminent public good,” Special Envoy Heyzer said. Quality and inclusive education, including vocational training and lifelong learning, has the potential to transform people’s lives and lifelong opportunities as well as to enable them to build societies to become more just, peaceful and prosperous for all.
Ahead of the Transforming Education Summit in New York on 19 September 2022, the Special Envoy emphasized that education was a fundamental right of Rohingya people with long-term ramifications for the region. “As I discussed recently with Permanent Representatives of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Contact Group on the Rohingya crisis and highlighted in my briefing to the General Assembly on 13 June, we need swift measures to prevent a lost generation by providing Rohingya and others education opportunities, including abroad,” she said.
In line with her role to maintain communication and engage intensively with all relevant parties in Myanmar, the Special Envoy continues to consult directly with affected Rohingya communities and their representatives. She is engaging with a wide range of diverse groups currently residing in Malaysia who had been forcibly displaced from Myanmar to hear their perspectives and ways forward to improve the situation. Recognizing women’s crucial role in communities and the gendered dimension of the conflict, Special Envoy Heyzer is encouraged by the resilience of women leaders in her engagement to ensure that Myanmar-led solutions include women’s voices and concerns.
Amid halting progress over the past five years, the desperate situation continues to drive Rohingya people to undertake perilous sea and land journeys, including refugees and people still facing hardship in Rakhine State, despite some community efforts to build social cohesion. There is an urgent need for innovative strategies and concrete pathways aligned with the needs and will of the Rohingya people. The region and the world must renew solidarity to ensure that the Rohingya remain high on the ASEAN and international agenda, provide support for host communities, and continue to work towards durable solutions based on voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation.
“We must not allow the Rohingya people’s sense of being forgotten and abandoned to take root,” Special Envoy Heyzer said. “Their right to live in dignity as human beings must be supported and safeguarded by all, including the international community.”..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-07-26
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-26
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Rakhine (Arakanese) periodicals, Discrimination against the Rohingya
Language:
more
Description:
"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia are urging the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair to Myanmar, the Cambodian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Prak Sokhonn, to meet representatives of the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar, after his recent trip to the country, in which he met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other members of the military junta that continues to try to rule the country after its illegal coup d’état of February last year.
Formed by MPs elected before the military takeover and widely respected leaders from civil society and the ethnic minorities, the NUG was established in April 2022 to oppose the self-styled State Administration Council (SAC) led by Min Aung Hlaing. The NUG is supported by the vast majority of the Myanmar people.
“Most Myanmar citizens see the NUG as their legitimate government, and that is how the international community at large, and ASEAN in particular, should regard it. If Mr. Sokhonn is serious about implementing ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, he should publicly engage the NUG, rather than limit himself to meet the leaders of an illegal junta that is committing all kinds of international crimes and throwing the country into chaos while attempting to cement its power,” said Tom Villarin, former MP from the Philippines and Board Member of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR).
The Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar was signed on 24 April 2021 by all ASEAN leaders and Min Aung Hlaing. The Consensus prescribes the delivery of humanitarian aid, and calls for an immediate cessation of violence, as well as the commencement of a dialogue process between all the parties involved in the conflict, to be facilitated by the ASEAN Special Envoy appointed by the group’s rotatory Chair.
Since Cambodia assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN this year, its leaders have met Min Aung Hlaing and other representatives of the SAC on several occasions, including a visit by the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, to Myanmar in January; but has never met with any member of the NUG, most of whom are in hiding or exiled. As Chair of ASEAN this year, Cambodia should hold conversations with the democratic leaders of Myanmar, by inviting them to meet outside Myanmar or online if necessary, given the challenges involved in meeting them in their own country, APHR said.
The SAC has utterly failed to implement any of the five points included in the consensus and the situation has steadily deteriorated in Myanmar. With at least 2,088 people killed by the junta; over 11,000 political prisoners, a record number in Myanmar’s history; and over one million internally displaced people in the country, Min Aung Hlaing and his men are responsible for “systematic and widespread human rights violations and abuses” that may amount to “war crimes and crimes against humanity,” according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
“We at APHR have repeatedly called on ASEAN to hold Min Aung Hlaing and his criminal junta accountable for their crimes and for not abiding to the Consensus they signed to. The military is the main source of Myanmar’s woes and instability, and ASEAN member states should not accept its illegal rule as a fait accompli. Instead, they should engage and support the NUG and Myanmar’s civil society if they truly want to put the country back on the path towards democracy and prevent it from becoming a failed state at their doorstep,” said Villarin..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-07-18
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-18
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title:
It has the capacity to negotiate with Myanmar
Description:
"While addressing the 54th ASEAN Day event organised virtually, Bangladesh's foreign minister urged ASEAN member states to intervene and help in the Rohingya repatriation process. The foreign minister reminded the member states of the economic, environmental and socio-political costs that Bangladesh has had to bear by sheltering about a million Myanmar nationals who fled a military crackdown in Rakhine state in 2017. Given that Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN and has continued to become isolated on the international stage ever since the military coup of February 2021, ASEAN is well-placed to intervene in the matter.
The foreign minister during his address brought up an excellent point. The continued limbo that the Rohingya are stuck in and its ramifications threaten not only Bangladesh's security, but that of the whole region as well. We have seen how the violence inside Myanmar has forced Rohingya refugees to flee to other ASEAN states such as Thailand and Malaysia. How long will the ASEAN states—as well as other regional countries—continue to overlook this? When Myanmar has consistently ignored the calls from ASEAN member states as well as its neighbours to stop persecuting its own citizens and has showed a complete lack of good faith in negotiating and repatriating the Rohingya from Bangladesh, how long can the member states afford to allow Myanmar such leeway to change its way of its own accord?
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel.
So far, the ASEAN member states have issued some statements from time to time, urging the authorities in Myanmar to facilitate the return of the Rohingya from Bangladesh to Rakhine. However, the ASEAN as a whole has not publicly recognised the underlying causes that have led to the Rohingya refugee crisis, neither has it condemned the Myanmar military's human rights violations against the Rohingya strongly enough. Without exerting any strong pressure, it would be unwise to expect the Myanmar authorities to act any differently from the past—that much is clear.
We hope the ASEAN member states recognise this reality. The need for a concrete plan for addressing the crisis that the Rohingya are facing inside Myanmar, as well as abroad, has never been more acute. And ASEAN has never been better-placed to play a key role in solving the issue. Not only will the Rohingya community and Bangladesh be greatly appreciative of such attempts, but it will also demonstrate ASEAN's commitment to protecting human rights and maintaining stability in the region..."
Source/publisher:
"The Daily Star" (London)
Date of publication:
2022-07-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Discrimination against the Rohingya, Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Description:
"After Special Envoy Prak Sokhonn's second visit to Myanmar, it is clear that the
military junta is intent on making a mockery of ASEAN.
Despite his earnest efforts — and with five months now left on his term — Special
Envoy Sokhonn was again handed empty assurances. This follows a firmly
established pattern in which the junta rebuffs each ASEAN entreaty and frustrates
all effort s to implement the Five-Point Consensus.
ASEAN Chair Hun Sen received this treatment when he visited Myanmar straight
after assuming the role of ASEAN chair. Later he publicly called on the junta to
release Sean Turaell and to drop its plans to execute political prisoners. On both
occasions, his initiatives were rebuffed. And Special Envoy Sokhonn. having
repeatedly requested to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. was forced to watch the
junta transfer the State Counsellor to solitary confinement in prison immediately
before his visit.
Each added insult diminishes ASEAN's political capital, and with it the influence
of its nations' leaders while the generals of the Myanmar junta watch on.
"How many indignities can ASEAN leaders tolerate from an aspiring tyrant before
correcting course?" asked Daw Zin Mar Aung. Myanmar's Minister of Foreign
Affairs, while welcoming the Special Envoy's continuing efforts.
"Malaysia's Foreign Minister Dato' Sri Saifuddin Abdullah has rightly called on
ASEAN to move from a policy of non-interference to one of non-indifference on
Myanmar. This applies equally to ASEAN’s own reputation," Minister Aung
continued.
"Unable to address an escalating threat to peace and security in its own backyard,
ASEAN’s inaction must force the UN Security Council's hand. When it comes to
the military junta. ASEAN knows what it must do. It must cut the head off the
snake."
At the same time. ASEAN has a dedicated partner in the National Unity
Government, the legitimate representative of the Myanmar people. The NUG
remains committed to working with ASEAN Members inside Myanmar and
through ASEAN forums to solve the multiple junta-induced crises wreaking havoc
on the region.
"Recognising and partnering with the NUG is not only a moral imperative, but it is
also a politically astute move. It is in ASEAN’s own best interests," added the
Foreign Minister. “We continue to extend our full cooperation to Special Envoy
Sokhonn.".....ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ
နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန
=======================
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အာဆီယံ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ ခရီးစဉ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်
ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၃/၂၀၂၂)
ဇူလိုင်လ ၈ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်
=======================
အာဆီယံ၏ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် Prak Sokhonn ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ လာရောက်သော ဒုတိယအကြိမ် ခရီးစဉ်အပြီးတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များသည် အာဆီယံအား ပြက်ရယ်ပြုရန်အတွက်သာ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိကြောင်းကို ရှင်းလင်းသိသာစွာ ကောက်ချက်ချနိုင်ပါသည်။
အာဆီယံ၏ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် Prak Sokhonn အနေဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ ခရီးစဉ်အတွင်း စိတ်အားထက်သန်စွာ ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သော်လည်း၊ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်၏ သက်တမ်းမှာ ယခုအချိန်တွင် ငါးလခန့်သာကျန်ရှိတော့သည့်အတွက် အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အနေဖြင့် လက်ဆုပ်လက်ကိုင်ပြစရာ မရှိဘဲ လက်ချည်းဗလာဖြစ်ခဲ့ရပါသည်။ အဆိုပါအချက်သည် အာဆီယံ၏ တောင်းဆိုချက်တစ်ခုစီတိုင်းကို ပယ်ချကာ အာဆီယံ၏ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက် ၅ ရပ်ကို အကောင်အထည်ဖော်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုအားလုံးကို စိတ်ပျက်စေရန် ရည်ရွယ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ပုံဖော်ထားသည့် ပုံစံအတိုင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။
အာဆီယံ၏ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌတာဝန်အား လွှဲပြောင်းရယူပြီးနောက် လက်ရှိအာဆီယံ၏ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌဖြစ်သူ Hun Sen ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ လာရောက်သော ခရီးစဉ်အတွင်း၌လည်း ယခုကဲ့သို့ပြုမူဆက်ဆံခြင်းကိုပင်ခံခဲ့ရပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့နောက်တွင် အာဆီယံ၏ ဥက္ကဋ္ဌအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုထံ Sean Turnell အား ပြန်လွှတ်ပေးရန်နှင့် နိုင်ငံရေး အကျဉ်းသားများကို ကွပ်မျက်မည့် အစီအစဉ်များအား ဖျက်သိမ်းရန် လူသိရှင်ကြား တောင်းဆိုခဲ့သော်လည်း ၎င်း၏တောင်းဆိုမှုများသည် နှစ်ကြိမ်စလုံးတွင် ငြင်းပယ်ခံခဲ့ရပါသည်။ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် Prak Sokhonn သည် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်နှင့် တွေ့ဆုံရန် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုထံ အကြိမ်ကြိမ် တောင်းဆိုခဲ့သော်လည်း၊ ၎င်း၏ခရီးစဥ်မတိုင်မီကပင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက နိုင်ငံတော်၏အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ်အား အကျဥ်းထောင်တွင်းသို့ ပို့ဆောင် ချုပ်နှောင်ထားခြင်းကိုသာ မဖြစ်မနေတွေ့မြင်ခဲ့ရပြီးဖြစ်သည်။
ထိုကဲ့သို့သော ထပ်ခါတလဲလဲစော်ကားသော အပြုအမူတိုင်းသည် အာဆီယံ၏ နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ စွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်မှု အရင်းအမြစ် နှင့် အာဆီယံနိုင်ငံခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ သြဇာလွှမ်းမိုးမှုကို ကျဆင်းစေပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက ယင်းကဲ့သို့ အခြေအနေများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်လာခြင်းကို စောင့်ကြည့်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
“လမ်းကြောင်းမှန်ပြင်ဆင်ချမှတ်နိုင်ခြင်း မပြုသေးခင်တွင် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်လှသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စု၏ အာဆီယံခေါင်းဆောင်များအပေါ် ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာချခြင်းလုပ်ရပ်များအား မည်မျှအထိ သည်းခံကြမည်နည်း။” ဟု မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်က အာဆီယံ အထူးကို ယ်စားလှယ်၏ ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို ကြိုဆိုရင်း မေးခွန်းထုတ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
“မလေးရှားနိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး Dato’ Sri Saifuddin Abdullah က မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ်တွင် “ဝင်ရောက်မစွက်ဖက်ရေး” မူဝါဒမှ “ဥပေက္ခာမပြုရေး” မူဝါဒတစ်ခုသို့ ပြောင်းလဲကျင့်သုံးရန် အာဆီယံထံ မှန်ကန်စွာ တောင်းဆိုခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုတောင်းဆိုမှုသည် အာဆီယံ၏ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာနှင့် အညီဖြစ်သည်ဟု မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်ကလည်း ထပ်လောင်းပြောဆိုခဲ့ပါသည်။
“အာဆီယံ၏ အနောက်ဧရိယာတွင် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနဲ့ လုံခြုံရေးအပေါ် ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုများ ပြင်းထန်တိုးပွားလာခြင်းကို မဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ဘဲ ပျက်ကွက်နေခြင်းသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီထံသို့ ရောက်ရှိစေရန် တွန်းပို့နေခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အာဆီယံက မည်သို့လုပ်ဆောင်ရမည်ဆိုသည်ကို သိရှိပြီးသည့်အလျောက် မြွေ၏ဦးခေါင်းကို ဖြတ်ပစ်သည့် နည်းလမ်းအား လက်တွေ့ကျင့်သုံးရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။”
တစ်ချိန်တည်းမှာပင် အာဆီယံ၏ မိတ်ဖက်အဖြစ် ဟန်ချက်ညီညီ လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်မည့် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုက တရားဝင်ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ တည်ရှိနေပြီးဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စု၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်လှသော အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်များကြောင့် ပေါ်ပေါက်လာရပြီး ဒေသအတွင်း၌ အန္တရာယ်ဖြစ်စေနိုင်သည့် များပြားလှသော အကျပ်အတည်းပြဿနာများကို အတူအတွ ကြိုးပမ်းဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန်အတွက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းတွင်ဖြစ်စေ၊ အာဆီယံဖိုရမ်များမှတစ်ဆင့်ဖြစ်စေ အာဆီယံအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများနှင့်အတူ ပူးပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် ကတိကဝတ်ပြုထားပါသည်။
“ အာဆီယံအနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အသိအမှတ်ပြုခြင်းသည် ကျင့်၀တ်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာ မရှိမဖြစ်လိုအပ်ချက်တစ်ရပ်ဖြစ်ရုံသာမက နိုင်ငံရေးအရ လိမ္မာပါးနပ်သော လုပ်ဆောင်မှုတစ်ရပ်လည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းသည် အာဆီယံ၏ အကောင်းဆုံးသော အကျိုးစီးပွားလည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်” ဟု မြန်မာ့နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးက ပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့အပြင် အာဆီယံ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ် Prak Sokhonn နှင့် အပြည့်အဝပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုကို ဆက်လက် တိုးချဲ့လုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်းကိုလည်း ထပ်လောင်းပြောကြားခဲ့ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication:
2022-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-08
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Individual Documents
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National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
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"1. We sadly learnt that on July 5, 2022 at around one o'clock in the afternoon, two Indian citizens Mr. P. Mohan (28) and Mr Aiyanar (35) were brutally shot dead by members of the Pyu Saw Htee, a pillar of the terrorist Military Council in Saw Bwar Ward, Tamu town, near the Basic Education School No. (4). In addition, their bodies were cremated in Tamu on the same day without being returned to their families, by the administrative bodies under the Military Council.
2. According to reports from responsible People’s Organizations in the township, the above killings were executed by the members of Pyu Saw Htee Phoe Sein and Zaw Ye, under the direction of Maung Lay Win, a leader of Pyu Saw Htee in Tamu. Kathey Indian insurgents who are part of Pyu Saw Htee are also reportedly behind this killing at behest of the Military Council. There were previous incidences that Kathey have been keep helping the Military Council to kill pro- democracy groups.
3. The victims were Tamils living in Moreh, and their identities can easily be investigated. However, the fact that the murder of the two foreigners was not properly investigated and the immediate cremation and disposal of bodies on the same day without informing the government of the Republic of India by the Military Council’s own administration suggest that the Military Council’s administration is behind this massacre.
4. Although the residents of Tamu and Moreh know that the perpetrators were Pyu Saw Htee members, Zaw Min Tun, a spokesman for the Military Council, publicly denied and accused that the perpetrators of this killing being members of the People's Defense Forces at the Press Conference held on 7/7/2022.
5. Members of the Military Council including Pyu Saw Htee and the police force under the Military Council have carried out arbitrary arrests and inhumane acts of torture and killing towards the civilians across the country. We are in possession of strong records of such cases.
6. This case is clearly one of the many issues that highlight the fact that Myanmar issue is not just an internal affair but a safeguard for all, which threatens the security and peace of the countries in the region, including neighbouring countries and the security of the entire human race. We extend our deepest condolences to the bereaved families of Mr. P. Mohan and Mr Aiyanar, and we are ready to cooperate with relevant authorities to bring justice for them..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-07-08
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Right to Life: reports of violations in Burma, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"On 30 June-02 July 2022, H.E. PRAK Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of Cambodia, conducted his second working visit to Myanmar in his capacity as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar. He was accompanied by H.E. Ekkaphab PHANTHAVONG, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), who represented H.E. Dato LIM Jock Hoi, Secretary General of ASEAN; members of the Office of Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair; and representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).
The working visit aimed to move forward the progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), notably on the expediting of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and joint vaccination program, which were endorsed at the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 06 May 2022 in Phnom Penh, and the engendering of a conducive environment for an inclusive political dialogue.
Starting off the visit, on 30 June 2022, His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister attended the handover ceremony of Chinese government’s contribution of two million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to ASEAN for Myanmar, which was presented by His Excellency CHEN Hai, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Myanmar in Yangon.
Later on, in the afternoon, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister paid a courtesy call on H.E. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), in Nay Pyi Taw. With the ASEAN Leaders’ Five Point Consensus as an overarching guide, both sides exchanged views on situational updates and challenges in implementing this key document, and also followed up on the three previous meetings between Samdech Techo Prime Minister HUN Sen and the Senior General, as well as the outcomes of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar. The Senior General shared with H.E. Deputy Prime Minister the current security situation, including violence, brutality, and intimidation against civilians. The Senior General informed of the improvement of security for the people and his willingness to engage directly in the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). He also reassured the Special Envoy of his full support to the fulfilling of the latter’s mandate. The Special Envoy also took the opportunity to urge the SAC to explore ways to work with the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, so that we can further enhance synergy between our works within the framework of cooperation between ASEAN and the UN.
H.E. Deputy Prime Minister also met his counterpart Foreign Minister H.E. U Wunna Maung Lwin to discuss ASEAN-related matters. H.E. Deputy Prime Minister recalled the recent two communications on death sentence and the request to return Daw Aung San Suu Kyi into house detention. In the same tone of consistency, the Special Envoy reiterated his call for the cessation of violence, and requested the SAC to support a safe, timely and impartial delivery of humanitarian assistance to hard-to-reach areas, the release of prisoners, and for meetings with several non-SAC individuals, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Daw Su Su Lwin. He was informed that due to health condition, Daw Su Su Lwin was unable to meet the Special Envoy while the case of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains under judicial procedure.
H.E. PRAK Sokhonn also met the Myanmar Task Force on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance, headed by H.E.U Ko Ko Hlaing. Expediting the delivery of humanitarian assistance in a safe, timely and impartial manner was the key topic for discussion. The Meeting also deliberated on how the UN Specialized Agencies and international non-Later on, in the afternoon, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister paid a courtesy call on H.E. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), in Nay Pyi Taw. With the ASEAN Leaders’ Five Point Consensus as an overarching guide, both sides exchanged views on situational updates and challenges in implementing this key document, and also followed up on the three previous meetings between Samdech Techo Prime Minister HUN Sen and the Senior General, as well as the outcomes of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar. The Senior General shared with H.E. Deputy Prime Minister the current security situation, including violence, brutality, and intimidation against civilians. The Senior General informed of the improvement of security for the people and his willingness to engage directly in the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). He also reassured the Special Envoy of his full support to the fulfilling of the latter’s mandate. The Special Envoy also took the opportunity to urge the SAC to explore ways to work with the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, so that we can further enhance synergy between our works within the framework of cooperation between ASEAN and the UN.
H.E. Deputy Prime Minister also met his counterpart Foreign Minister H.E. U Wunna Maung Lwin to discuss ASEAN-related matters. H.E. Deputy Prime Minister recalled the recent two communications on death sentence and the request to return Daw Aung San Suu Kyi into house detention. In the same tone of consistency, the Special Envoy reiterated his call for the cessation of violence, and requested the SAC to support a safe, timely and impartial delivery of humanitarian assistance to hard-to-reach areas, the release of prisoners, and for meetings with several non-SAC individuals, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Daw Su Su Lwin. He was informed that due to health condition, Daw Su Su Lwin was unable to meet the Special Envoy while the case of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains under judicial procedure.
H.E. PRAK Sokhonn also met the Myanmar Task Force on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance, headed by H.E.U Ko Ko Hlaing. Expediting the delivery of humanitarian assistance in a safe, timely and impartial manner was the key topic for discussion. The Meeting also deliberated on how the UN Specialized Agencies and international non-government organizations can engage in Myanmar-led humanitarian works, including the Joint Need Assessment in the hard-to-reach areas
. The request was raised to the Myanmar Task Force in facilitating and simplifying procedures while Myanmar side called for more cooperation with local authorities and avoid political distancing from the side of international organizations and partners. The Special Envoy conveyed the willingness of Samdech Techo Prime Minister to dispatch Cambodia’s voluntary health personnel to help administer vaccines in those areas, which was strongly welcomed by the Myanmar Task Force.
On 01 July 2022, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister had a meeting with H.E. Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, Chairman of National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiation Committee (NSPNC). The meeting focused on various agendas, including approaches to further engage with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and the role of the Committee in humanitarian assistance operation and vaccination campaign to the people of Myanmar. H.E. Lieutenant General Yar Pyae expressed his willingness to cooperate with and welcome the participation of all parties concerned in Myanmar to become the signatories of the existing NCA. The Special Envoy shared with the Committee Cambodia's experiences in succesffully implementing the Win-Win policy of Samdech Techo Prime Minister Hun Sen, which has brought about peace and stability, and unity of the national army.
H.E. PRAK Sokhonn and accompanying delegates, then, held talks with the representatives of seven EAOs, who have signed the NCA with the SAC. The main topic of dicussion, among others, was on the challenges to end this decades-long conflict and how to advance peace talks for the benefit of all people in the country. The Special Envoy, once again, emphasized on how Cambodia brought about today’s peace, stability and development through the Win-Win Policy, initiated by Samdech Techno Prime Minister. Calling Cambodia as a friend in need, the EAOs commended Cambodia’s experience on national reconciliation and Win-Win Policy and appreciated the good office of the Special Envoy to help bring Myanmar back to normalcy. On the last day of the visit, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister met with representatives of seven political parties in Myanmar, who won seats at the 2020 election. The political parties briefed the Special Envoy on the developments of political and humanitarian situation on the ground in each state and region. They all shared great concern on the severe impacts of violence on civilians, including the burning of villages, without clear responsible organizations. They also shared common desire for peace and non-violence, and some political parties also informed of how they have helped support the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) coming from other regions. They called for early delivery of humanitarian assitance to their respective regions. The Special Envoy updated the Meeting on the progress of the the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) and the follow-up to agreement reached at the Consultative Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar, and expressed his commitment to help expedite the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to create conducive environment for political dialogue to start.
Before concluding his mission, the Special Envoy held a fruitful discussion with H.E. Christian Lechervy, Ambassador of the French Republic; H.E. Thomas L. Vajda, Ambassador of the United States of America; H.E. Ranieri Sabatucci, Ambassador of the European Union; and Mrs. Angela Corcoran, Chargé d’Affaires of the Australian Embassy. They exchanged views on the progress of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) and their assessments on political, economic and social situation in Myanmar and have commended the role played by Cambodia in humanitarian aspect, especially the recent two communications on death sentence and request for transfer of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi back to house detension..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-07-04
Date of entry/update:
2022-07-04
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"His Excellency Prak Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation, and Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, has
conveyed to the State Administrative Council (SAC ) of the Union of Myanmar the
"deep concern expressed by ASEAN colleagues" with regard to the report on the
transfer of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from the home to a jail in Nay Pyi Taw and urged the
SAC to facilitate her return to the home where she was originally detained.
"I have no doubt that the same concern resonates beyond ASEAN, considering that
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is regarded internationally and by many in Myanmar as
having a critical role in your country's return to normalcy and national reconciliation
through a peaceful political solution," wrote Deputy PM Prak Sokhonn in his recent
letter to H.E. Wunna Maung Lwin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar.
In my capacity as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, he continued,
"I would like to echo the voice of our ASEAN colleagues in urging the State
Administrative Council of Myanmar to exercise compassion and facilitate the return
of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to the home where she was originally detained, in
consideration of her fragile health and well-being, as well as fair and judicious
practice of the rule of law."
"We all share the view that a peaceful national reconciliation cannot be expected
when one party to the conflict is taken out of the resolution equation," said the ASEAN
Chair Special Envoy, underlining that 'Therefore, all our ASEAN colleagues strongly
encourage the State Administrative Council of Myanmar to begin an inclusive process
of national reconciliation without further delay". A peaceful political resolution to a
conflict, no matter how complex it is, must involve the sharing of political space by
all involved, he added..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-06-27
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-27
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Individual Documents
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"Since August 2017, rampant persecution and violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state has pushed hundreds of thousands of Muslim minority people, known as ‘Rohingyas,’ to abandon their homes and seek sanctuary in Bangladesh. According to UN estimates, 200,000 Myanmarese civilians have already sought refuge in Bangladesh following prior displacements. Many more have travelled to Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, frequently with the assistance of human traffickers.
In Myanmar, civilian and military authorities deny targeting Muslims in Rakhine and suggest that the international world is misrepresenting the severity of the violence, a viewpoint shared by extreme nationalists.
The number of individuals living in Bangladeshi camps has risen to over 1.1 million, leading ASEAN to consider a meaningful reaction. The safe and voluntary return of refugees currently residing in Bangladeshi displacement camps was a topic of discussion during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in January 2019. They finalized preparations for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) to analyze Rakhine’s needs. This would enable them to have a better understanding of the areas of collaboration that ASEAN may help in the repatriation process in order to increase refugee confidence and trust in returning home.
ASEAN is working to create a secure and sustainable environment for refugees to return home. Cambodia’s Asean Chairmanship a great opportunity for Rohingya repatriation. Cambodian Chairmanship of Asean provides a great opportunity to facilitate safe and dignified return of the Rohingyas, now sheltered in Bangladesh, to Myanmar.There are a potential security risks to Bangladesh, Myanmar and to the greater region if the Rohingya crisis is left festering for a much longer period of time and vulnerability of the displaced people to radicalism, extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes, etc. As chair and an active member of Asean, Cambodia can help resolve this crisis by being a mediator. Cambodia can play a holistic, significant and strategic role. It can raise the issue within the Asean platform. Cambodia can negotiate with Myanmar diplomatically and bilaterally as it has good relations with Myanmar.
However, ASEAN was compelled to postpone the AHA Centre needs assessment due to recent escalation of hostilities between Myanmar’s government armed forces and the banned Arakan Army, an insurgent organization in Rakhine. At the 33rd ASEAN Summit in Singapore, ASEAN issued a statement expressing profound concern over the worsening humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar.
This is a great start toward acknowledging that Myanmar’s humanitarian catastrophe necessitates immediate regional response and informing Myanmar’s administration that more needs to be done. To address the Rakhine situation, ASEAN must exhibit its inventive spirit and practical problem-solving abilities.
Member states must be prepared to collaborate bilaterally and via ASEAN with the afflicted nations. They can also interact with the UN and other foreign organizations working in Bangladeshi refugee camps independently. The safety of their families and their livelihoods were the two main concerns raised by refugees during Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s (Singapore’s Foreign Minister) visit to a refugee camp in November 2018. By continuing to engage Myanmar and encouraging conversations on long-term peace options, ASEAN can address these issues. It is vital that solutions not only address the concerns of individuals returning to Rakhine from displacement camps, but also those of minority communities who are now living in deplorable conditions in the state.
To ensure long-term peace and security in Rakhine, ASEAN can provide direct assistance in some sectors. Building schools, vocational training, and community healthcare facilities are all possible approaches.
To alleviate suspicion, anxiety, and hostility among diverse groups, a reconciliation process must be implemented. Reconciliation is a long and laborious process, as seen in numerous countries with internal conflicts. Although there have been no systematic reconciliation efforts, the Myanmar government has established an Independent Commission of Inquiry. It remains to be seen if the process will be conducted professionally and fairly, and whether those guilty for the violence will be held accountable.
Setting up a judicial redress system, akin to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which was set up to pursue the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, might be very helpful in the reconciliation process. A nation or organization that has not been involved in the war, such as ASEAN, may be seen as a reliable partner in establishing such a tribunal.
ASEAN may begin this process by compiling lessons learned from the war, forming support groups on the ground to better understand the problems of the state’s residents, and bringing diverse communities and the government together to transcend the past.
ASEAN’s devotion to the principle of non-interference is its most significant impediment to taking a more active role in Rakhine. It comes up anytime ASEAN tries to talk about a significant issue in one of its member states. The importance of the non-interference rule in crisis situations has to be re-calibrated for ASEAN to work more successfully.
A revision of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response would be the clearest indication of ASEAN’s willingness to help (AADMER). AADMER only authorizes ASEAN to intervene in a humanitarian crisis if the afflicted member state requests it.
Because Africa has endured several guerrilla wars and pandemics such as the Ebola outbreak, African experiences might be beneficial in establishing systems to deal with complicated humanitarian situations.
Because ASEAN is Southeast Asia’s only regional organization, leaders cannot turn a blind eye to any sort of human misery. The task of establishing a strong and obvious humanitarian mandate under the AADMER will only get more difficult in the future..."
Source/publisher:
Eurasia Review
Date of publication:
2022-06-15
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Rohingya (cultural, political etc.), Internal displacement/forced migration of Rohingyas, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia are alarmed by the announcement by the Myanmar junta that it will carry out the death sentences handed down to four political prisoners, including prominent former member of Parliament, Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, and well-known pro-democracy activist, Kyaw Min Yu, better known as “Ko Jimmy”, both convicted on charges of terrorism.
These death sentences would be the first known judicial executions in the country since 1988, according to Amnesty International, which considers Myanmar as “Abolitionist in Practice”, as it retains the death penalty in law, but has not applied it for decades. Ever since the coup in February last year that ousted the democratically elected government, Myanmar has seen a drastic surge in the number of people sentenced to death with at least 86 people, including minors who were under 18 at the time.
“ASEAN and the international community must use every means at their disposal to prevent these executions from taking place. If they are carried out they will be nothing less than cold blooded political assassination. These executions would further contribute to prevent the already remote possibility of a sustainable political dialogue, as prescribed over one year ago in the Five-Point Consensus agreed by ASEAN member states and Min Aung Hlaing’s junta, which has not made any effort whatsoever in that direction,” said Charles Santiago, Member of Parliament from Malaysia, and APHR Chairperson.
The Myanmar military has killed at least 1,887 protesters since the coup, but it is attempting to give a veneer of legality to the execution of the four men. Yet it is abundantly clear that, as in dozens of sentences handed by military tribunals, there was no respect for fair trial rights.
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) unreservedly supports the recent United Nations Secretary General’s statement reminding Myanmar’s military that the death sentences are a blatant violation of the right to life, liberty and security of the person, as per Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We also join him in emphasizing that the Declaration also enshrines the principles of equality before the law, the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, and all of the guarantees necessary for a person’s defense.
“This announcement should be viewed in the context of the increasingly brazen atrocities being committed by the Myanmar military in order to consolidate its power in the face of widespread popular resistance. The junta is killing, torturing and arbitrarily arresting Myanmar people with an impunity that owes a great deal to the failure of the international community to hold it accountable for its crimes,” said Santiago.
APHR calls on each and every member state of ASEAN, as well as its Dialogue Partners, to urgently demand an unconditional and immediate stay of execution and release of the four detainees by the self-declared State Administration Council. They must individually and collectively make a stand before it is too late, not only for these four, but for all those currently arbitrarily detained who should be immediately and unconditionally released..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-06-06
Date of entry/update:
2022-06-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Political prisoners and other violations in Burma - reports
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"At the invitation of Her Excellency Linda Thomas-Greenfield, President of the United Nations
Security Council for May 2022, His Excellency PRAK Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in his capacity as the Special Envoy of the
ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, addressed a closed-session briefing for the Council’s Members via
videoconference on 27 May 2022 at 09:00 pm (Cambodia time) on the implementation of the
Five-point Consensus.
During the Meeting, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister shared updates on what Cambodia has done
thus far, including the outcome of his first visit as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair to
Myanmar from 21-23 March 2022, and the result of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN
Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6 May 2022.
On the outcomes of his first visit to Myanmar, H.E. Deputy Prime Minister apprised the Council
of digests from meeting the four different prominent groups in Myanmar, namely the State
Administration Council (SAC), non-SAC actors, diplomatic corps, and UN Specialized Agencies.
The meetings provided the Special Envoy and his team with opportunities to listen, discuss,
and extend the good offices to Myanmar on how ASEAN could help Myanmar to manifest more
progress in the 5PC implementation. H.E. Deputy Prime Minister highlighted that these actors
shared the same aspirations, which are for Myanmar to return to normalcy and for
humanitarian issues on the ground to be addressed, all of which are in the interest of the
people of Myanmar. He shared his view that the different political actors in Myanmar have to
be more open to constructive dialogue so as to build mutual understanding, trust, and
confidence, conducive to an inclusive and credible peace process in Myanmar. In this regard,
the Special Envoy reaffirmed Cambodia’s readiness and commitment to be a keen listener and
sincere facilitator for Myanmar.
With regard to the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6
May 2022 held in a hybrid format in Phnom Penh, the Special Envoy accentuated three key
points, namely: (1) ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework, (2)
addressing operational challenges of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and (3)
Framework for COVID-19 Vaccine Administration in Myanmar.
On ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework, the Meeting
agreed that the AHA Centre, in close consultation with the Myanmar Task Force, will
identify states and regions for the implementation of this Framework. These states and
regions include Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Saigang, Bago, Shan and Rakhine.
On the need to address the operational challenges, we obtained the agreement from
the SAC to expedite the delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitate administrative
and legal requirements. The SAC also pledged to offer full cooperation and support to
the ASEAN Monitoring Team for it to be able to fulfill its roles in accordance with the
executive paper adopted at the 54th AMM.
- Concerning the Framework for COVID-19 Vaccine Administration in Myanmar, the AHA
Centre and the Ministry of Health of Myanmar (MOH) agreed to implement the Joint
MOH-Partners Vaccination to Hard-to-Reach Areas Framework, through which the
operational teams of 50:50 distribution between the MOH and partners will be
deployed to administer vaccines in the communities in need.
The Special Envoy underlined that the immediate priority would be to roll out what has been
agreed upon at the recent Consultative Meeting, especially the effort to timely deliver
humanitarian assistance to those most in need without any discrimination.
H.E. Deputy Prime Minister also informed the Council that he and his team are now working
on the preparation for his second visit to Myanmar in order to further advance the progress
in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. During this upcoming visit, the Special
Envoy hopes to meet as many relevant stakeholders as possible in addition to those he met
during the first visit..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia
Date of publication:
2022-05-28
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-28
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma
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"Cambodia is planning to invite the Myanmar junta’s defense minister to next month’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defense ministers meeting in Phnom Penh, according to Cambodian media.
Regime representatives were present at a recent three-day meeting of senior ASEAN defense officials from all ten member states. The junta sent Zaw Zaw Soe, the Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Defense’s Department of International Affairs. He expressed his thanks to Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense for convening the important meetings.
General Nem Sowath, Director-General of Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense’s General Department of Policy and Foreign Affairs, who chaired the meeting, said that the meeting was a preparatory event ahead of next month’s ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting.
However, the presence of a junta-appointed defense official has caused concern.
Kin Phea, director general of the Royal Academy of Cambodia’s International Relations Institute, described the regime official as a “non-political representative”.
“I think the Myanmar defense official has the right to attend meetings in Cambodia because he is not a politician, or at the political level, but at the technical level. The participation of the Myanmar delegation is important to contributing to moving the ASEAN mechanism forward,” said Kin Phea.
In March, Cambodia, the current chair of ASEAN, welcomed some of the generals overseeing the Myanmar military’s atrocities against its own people, who reject military rule.
Lieutenant General Ye Win Oo, Myanmar’s Chief of Military Security Affairs, attended the 19th ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting in Phnom Penh on Tuesday, according to junta-run media. The meeting discussed the exchange of visits between ASEAN intelligence officers and the establishment of the ASEAN Military Intelligence Community.
Moreover, the regime’s Chief of the General Staff General Maung Maung Aye, Chief of Staff (Army) Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun and Lt-Gen Ye Win Oo joined the 19th ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Meeting. These key leaders of the military regime are believed to be involved in mass killings and applying scorched-earth tactics — such as the razing of entire villages — against both civilians and the growing resistance movement.
Since last year’s coup, the Myanmar military has been condemned for committing widespread and systematic abuses against civilians that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, according to a March report by the United Nations’s (UN) Human Rights Office, the first comprehensive rights report since the military takeover.
The UN warned that the military regime has shown “flagrant disregard for human life” and has deliberately targeted civilians since seizing power on 1 February 2021..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-19
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-19
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"A year on, the Myanmar junta has shown no willingness to implement or cooperate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s peace plan for Myanmar, known as the Five-Point Consensus, despite agreeing to it at a meeting with the leaders of the regional grouping’s member states.
Far from honoring the agreement made in April last year, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing and his associates have ramped up a brutal nationwide crackdown to suppress widespread public opposition to its rule.
The five steps the regime agreed with the ASEAN leaders are: an immediate end to violence in the country; dialogue among all parties concerned; the appointment of a special envoy; provision of humanitarian assistance by ASEAN; and a visit by the bloc’s special envoy to Myanmar to meet with all parties.
Here is a brief summary of how the junta has disregarded its commitments to ASEAN over the past 12 months and how the plan has failed to make any progress.
Sharp rise in violence against civilians
Rather than immediately ceasing violence as called for, the junta has continued to commit atrocities across the country with further killings, bombings, mass arbitrary arrests and ongoing violence.
The number of innocent civilians killed by the junta rose to over 1,800 this month. More than 1,075 of those killings occurred after the consensus agreement was issued.
Those killed include more than 130 children, old people, youths, peaceful protesters, politicians, medics and activists.
More than 13,000 people have been detained by the junta, which in recent months has increasingly resorted to taking family members and relatives of wanted activists hostage, in order to blackmail them into turning themselves in.
Further violating the call to exercise restraint, the junta has continued its indiscriminate bombing campaign and burned civilian houses in resistance strongholds including ethnic minority areas, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee, and killing civilians including children.
According to independent research group Data for Myanmar, more than 11,000 civilian houses were burned down by junta forces from May last year to April this year.
In December, The Irrawaddy recorded some of the regime’s worst attacks against the people of Myanmar.
Call for dialogue with all parties rejected
The junta has also rejected ASEAN’s call for constructive dialogue among all parties concerned in order to seek a peaceful solution.
To the contrary, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has ruled out negotiations with regime opponents.
In a speech on Armed Forces Day in March, he vowed to annihilate all opposition to his rule. The regime has declared major resistance groups including the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) formed in the wake of the coup, and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), as terrorist organizations.
Refusing to talk to either group, Min Aung Hlaing has invited ethnic armed organizations for peace talks but the major groups, which are engaged in heavy fighting with junta troops, have rejected his offer, demanding the NUG and PDF be included in any negotiations.
Refusing access to detained elected leaders
Breaching a commitment it made under the consensus, the junta has continuously rejected all demands—not only from the regional bloc, the United Nations and the West, but also from China—to meet Myanmar’s detained leaders State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint.
A planned visit to the country by ASEAN’s first special envoy, appointed to implement the consensus commitment, was canceled when the junta denied him access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders.
Humanitarian assistance
It was only last week that ASEAN’s current chair, Cambodia, hosted a consultative meeting on ASEAN humanitarian assistance for Myanmar with the junta and international aid organizations, announcing a plan to deliver aid via the regime.
The decision has attracted widespread condemnation both locally and internationally, with critics pointing out that it breaches ASEAN’s own Five-Point Consensus.
“It was a one-sided meeting that only engaged with the regime and its outcome is meaningless. ASEAN should hold a multi-stakeholder dialogue in accordance with the Five-Point Consensus and take action according to the outcome of such dialogue. Now ASEAN itself has violated the Consensus,” said the deputy executive director of the Chin Human Rights Organization, Salai Za Uk Ling.
Engaging the wrong party
Yanghee Lee, a former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, recently pointed out that ASEAN’s consensus had failed because the bloc was engaging with the wrong party, referring to its decision to deal with the regime instead of the NUG.
The member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) also said the NUG represents Myanmar and is the proper party to lead engagement with ASEAN.
“The NUG has demonstrated that it is the constructive partner that ASEAN needs to make any progress towards resolving the crisis,” she added.
NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung also urged ASEAN member states and leaders to engage with different stakeholders in line with the Five-Point Consensus, in a recent interview with Radio Free Asia.
After a year of being ignored by the junta and seeing no willingness on its part to cooperate and abide by the consensus, some ASEAN member states have begun to engage with the NUG.
Malaysia’s foreign minister met with his counterpart from the NUG on Saturday in Washington, where ASEAN leaders were gathered for a special summit between the US and the bloc. Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah became the first minister from an ASEAN member country to personally and publicly meet a NUG minister.
In the interview, Daw Zin Mar Aung also called on ASEAN to move beyond the current non-workable solution.
“We very much support the Five-Point Consensus. It needs to be implemented. But the problem is that there is no accountability mechanism. Now it is time for ASEAN to move forward, whether the coup leaders implement it properly or not. If not, what happens next? This is the question for the ASEAN leadership,” she told RFA.
However, ASEAN and the rest of the world continue to treat the consensus, which has proved a failure for over a year, as a roadmap for Myanmar.
In a joint statement released after the summit, the US and ASEAN leaders reiterated their support for the failed consensus on the issue of Myanmar, and called for “timely and complete implementation” of the plan.
Unless this failed approach is abandoned and stronger action adopted, there will be no progress toward pressing the junta to end its violence against civilians.
And the junta’s brutality will continue unabated..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-17
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-17
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"Since it seized power in February 2021, Myanmar’s military regime has ignored international calls to end its use of violence, release political prisoners and negotiate with its opponents. Some Western nations have applied sanctions, while powerful neighbors India and China have largely sought to protect their own interests. Regional bloc ASEAN has been split, with some members seeking to engage the junta and others calling for contact with the shadow National Unity Government. The Irrawaddy spoke to Scot Marciel, former United States ambassador to Myanmar (2016-20) and currently a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, about the current state of regional and international efforts to tackle the Myanmar crisis.
The Irrawaddy: There have been many tragic stories in Myanmar since the coup. It is not enough to just pressure the regime to change its behavior or to make concessions. Can you talk about how the international community and regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should assist the Myanmar people?
Marciel: I would offer two thoughts. First, I don’t think you can expect ASEAN to solve this problem, certainly not by itself. The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, while it’s done with very good intentions, not only are the points not being implemented, they are actually not appropriate for the situation in Myanmar in my view. So it is a mistake to dwell on the Five-Point Consensus. I don’t really blame ASEAN too much for that because the junta is refusing to be reasonable at all and make any kind of concessions. Second, as Malaysia’s foreign minister has suggested publicly, more engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) and other figures opposed to the junta is really important. I am pleased to see that [US] Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with Zin Mar Aung [the NUG foreign minister, on Aug. 12] in Washington. I think there needs to be more engagement with the NUG and other actors, recognizing that trying to convince the generals to hold talks with those who oppose them is not really a very useful way of going about things.
The Irrawaddy: Do you think the NUG is the best option, aside from Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and other stakeholders, in terms of whom the US and ASEAN should be engaging with?
Marciel: I know some people have not been fully satisfied with the NUG. I understand that, but it’s certainly one important actor that has a lot more legitimacy than the junta for sure. I think it is useful to engage with the NUG, but also with actors who are seeking to return the country to a democratic and peaceful path.
The Irrawaddy: When we talk about ASEAN there are some criticisms, because so far the Five-Point Consensus as you said is going nowhere, but people keep talking about it. We, ourselves, have become the hostages of the consensus. Beyond ASEAN, there has also been some criticism that the US and other Western countries are outsourcing the Myanmar crisis to ASEAN. We know that ASEAN is toothless and powerless, and so far has achieved little on Myanmar. Why has the West outsourced the problem to ASEAN?
Marciel: To be fair, at least for the United States, I don’t think the United States is necessarily expecting ASEAN by itself to solve the problem. The truth is I don’t know any outside player that can solve the problem. ASEAN can help. This goes back to, among other things, the Five-Point Consensus. It’s not just that the points aren’t being implemented, they really aren’t appropriate for the situation. A ceasefire… OK If the military stops all violence and allows peaceful protests, that would be useful. But does anyone really think that is going to happen? Second, dialogue, my sense is, again I can’t speak for the Myanmar people, but it seems people aren’t interested in negotiating and compromising with the military junta. They want them out of power. And I think the international community should be supporting those efforts, rather than proposing and calling for some kind of dialogue that is completely unrealistic, at least at this time.
The Irrawaddy: In the past, the US has played a major role in promoting democracy, freedom and federal union in Myanmar. You know in 2008-09, we had Kurt Campbell, one of the key architects of the pivot to Asia and of course specific Myanmar policies of principled engagement, and the carrot-and-stick approach, where sanctions were imposed but also with the incentive that if reforms took place, the sanctions would be eased. There was very consistent and intense communication with the then regime and the opposition in Myanmar. Do you think that, in coordination with ASEAN, the US can work on Myanmar issues with the same vigor and energy as it did in the late 2000s?
Marciel: It’s a good question. It’s very clear that the US and the Biden administration remain very supportive of efforts to help the country go back to democracy and peace and federal union. But my sense is that it’s hard to figure out what they can actually do to make that happen. There’s not a lot of easy choices, whether it’s the United States or ASEAN, because the generals do not seem interested in doing anything positive, they are just holding onto power. We’ve seen what they are willing to do to their own people for the sake of holding power. And it narrows the space for diplomacy, certainly. I would have a very hard time if I were still in the government saying we should engage with the junta and try to create incentives for them because I think there is no chance, absent them feeling much more pressure, that they are willing to seriously consider changing their approach.
The Irrawaddy: Do you think there should be more sanctions, more pressure, including maybe an arms embargo? What about ASEAN and other countries like China, Thailand and India?
Marciel: There is no great option right now. I don’t believe there is, at this point at least, any opportunity for dialogue that will return the country to a democratic path or democratic federalism. I don’t think the military can restore stability and govern the country effectively. So the best possible scenario is for the military to face so much pressure, that they then begin to look for a way out. So yes, I think maximum pressure, both internally and externally, on the military whether it’s by sanctions or other means is the best chance of achieving progress, though it won’t be easy.
The Irrawaddy: We have a powerful neighbor, China, which shares a long border with Myanmar. We also have our neighbor Thailand, which is absorbing refugees and migrant workers and asylum seekers. Because of the crisis, they are also sharing the burden. Obviously, China is always supportive of those in power, whether it is the regime or a democratic government. If China and Thailand don’t make any moves, don’t apply any external pressure, it is hard to see any policy of maximizing pressure on the regime working. Do you agree?
Marciel: I agree that there are limits in terms of external pressure. That’s why there is no easy answer. It seems that China is willing to support the junta even though nearly the entire population of Myanmar opposes that. I don’t think that is likely to change. On Thailand, I hope that the Thai authorities will see that the longer the military is in power, the more problems there are going to be across the border, including refugees and instability. And the Thais, I think, will have an interest in pressing in their own way, pressing the military to look for a way out, because otherwise this crisis is going to continue and Thailand’s going to suffer from some of these cross-border challenges, including very serious humanitarian issues.
The Irrawaddy: We have heard that the regime is not happy with the idea of—the wording is quite sensitive—a humanitarian corridor. But Thailand will have to play a key role if cross-border assistance and humanitarian assistance are to reach a large number of Myanmar people. What are your thoughts on that, as the US has made at least four high-ranking official visits to Thailand since the coup? Should the Biden administration engage and cooperate with the Thai government to provide assistance?
Scot: There is a lot of discussion between the US and Thai officials on this. I don’t know the substance of those discussions. I am not sure what exactly has been said. But to me the United States and Thailand, even if we may have somewhat different views on the coup and the junta, we should try to find a way to work together at a minimum to address the serious humanitarian need right along the Thai border and just across the border. You know it is not easy for Thailand as a neighbor of Myanmar having to deal with the junta. But I think there are ways that this could be done carefully and I assume that these discussions are happening between the United States and Thailand. I hope that they lead to greater and more successful efforts to get humanitarian assistance to the border and across the border on behalf of Myanmar people.
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2022-05-16
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-16
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Description:
"We remain deeply concerned over the crisis in Myanmar. We highlight Myanmar’s commitment to the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus during the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on 24 April 2021 and urge the timely and complete implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We will continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to facilitate a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar, including through the work of the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar,in building confidence and trust with full access to all parties concerned, and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar, including those who are the most in need, without discrimination. We reiterate our commitment to peace and stability in the region and continue to call for the immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and for the release of allpolitical detainees, including foreigners. We will redouble our collective efforts towards a peaceful solution in Myanmar that also reflects a continued commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, as outlined in the ASEAN Charter. We welcome close coordination between the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar and the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar to ensure synergy in this important endeavor.
With regard to Ukraine, as for all nations, we continue to reaffirm our respect for sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. We reiterate our call for compliance with the UN Charter and international law. We underline the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities and creating an enabling environment for peaceful resolution. We support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General in the search for a peaceful solution. We also call for the facilitation of rapid, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance for those in need in Ukraine, and for the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel, and persons in vulnerable situations.
As we proceed with implementation of this ambitious agenda in the coming months and years, we look forward to reaching a new level of cooperation and partnership and task our Ministers to coordinate the implementation of this Joint Vision Statement..."
Source/publisher:
The White House (Washington, D.C.)
Date of publication:
2022-05-13
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Description:
"1. National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) issued a statement followingthe
People’s Assembly held on 27-29 January 2022 with the participation of the
members of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), political
parties, Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs), state/federal-unit/ethnic-
based councils, members of National Unity Government (NUG) and other
Spring revolutionary forces.
2. The announcement strongly called on the international communities including
United Nations to establish Internationally Guaranteed Civilians Protection
- Safe Zones for the civilian populations who are under the massacre
through land and air operations with excessive forces deployed by the military
junta especially in Kayin, Karenni, Chin, Magway and Sagaing.
3. In accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter, a Joint Coordination
Committee on Humanitarian Assistance was formed with the members of
National Unity Consultative Committee and National Unity Government on
29 March 2022 to coordinate and cooperate more effectively in the course of
humanitarian delivery.
4. At the present, many foreign countries are offering the humanitarian aid
channelizing the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
on Disaster Management (the AHA Centre) to Myanmar people who are suffering
internal displacement, loss of houses and properties, personal insecurity,
socio-economic hardships, loss of livelihood opportunities and many
others due to the military’s brutal repression and unlawful acts following the
illegal coup.
5. Regarding this, a consultative meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance
to Myanmar was conducted on 6 May 2022 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and
the meeting agreed that the AHA Centre in collaboration with other in-country
partner organizations will be implementing ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance
Delivery Arrangement Framework in Karenni, Kayin, Magway, Sagaing
and Bago.
6. Even though the Consultative Meeting was convened as part of the implementation
of the Five-Point Consensus, the meeting failed to consult with
other key stakeholders, and this directly contradicts the essence of Five-
Point Consensus. In addition, the Myanmar Task Force is composed of the representatives from the junta-controlled ministries and organizations, and
it is reaffirmed that the junta-led taskforce absolutely does not represent
Myanmar and Myanmar people.
7. Moreover, the Meeting also come to an agreement that the Junta led Myanmar
Task Force will work with the National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiations
Committee in delivering humanitarian assistance to communities
in Myanmar, including Ethnic Resistance Organizations areas. As such,
it is announced that the National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiations
Committee is not representing the ethnic organizations and people either.
8. In this case, the AHA Centre and in-country United Nations Organizations will
be providing humanitarian aid including COVID-10 vaccination with the approval
of the Myanma r Task Force, and this clearly ignores the military’s continued
violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws.
9. Due to the fact that international communities have relied on the reputation
and credibility of the AHA Centre, and humanitarian assistance are offered
through the AHA Centre. However, ASEAN’s decision to provide humanitarian
assistance with the control of the military, which is committing various
atrocities against the people and which Myanmar people are consistently
opposing, completely disregards the international communities as well as
Myanmar people and supports the various atrocities of the military junta
against the innocent people.
10. In reality, humanitarian aid will not be able to reach to the most needy people
without the equal treatment and wider consultation with the key stakeholders
as per Five-Point Consensus.
11. In this regard, the National Unity Consultative Council protests the decision
of ASEAN, the AHA Centre and other international organizations to implement
ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Arrangement Framework in
collaboration with the military junta which is committing various crimes
against humanity and ruining the lives of the people with an unprecedented
scale. S ubsequently, the National Unity Consultative Counc il announces that
delivery of humanitarian provisions needs to be made only through the direct
support to the organizations that truly represent the local communities
for ensuring to reach the affected people who are in need of humanitarian
assistance in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of publication:
2022-05-14
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-14
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Language:
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Sub-title:
Zin Mar Aung has high-level meetings in Washington but still waits for the ASEAN envoy to call.
Description:
"Zin Mar Aung is the foreign minister of the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, that represents the civilian administration that was ousted in last year’s military takeover in Myanmar. The former democracy activist and political prisoner is in Washington, D.C., for meetings on the sidelines of the summit of U.S. and Southeast Asian leaders, seeking greater diplomatic recognition for the NUG. She spoke Thursday to RFA’s Managing Editor for Southeast Asia Matthew Pennington about the need for the United States to support democracy forces against the Myanmar junta, and for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to step up engagement with the NUG.
Zin Mar Aung spent 11 years as a political prisoner under a previous military regime in Myanmar, including years in solitary confinement. She was released in 2009. She was elected in 2015 as a member of the House of Representatives for Yankin township, Yangon, for the National League for Democracy – a position she lost in the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: Can I ask you first about your meetings with Biden administration officials? Do you have any more confidence now that the United States might consider giving formal diplomatic recognition to the National Unity Government?
Zin Mar Aung: Yes, I feel that because, you know, the way the Biden administration has engaged with me and the way they treat me is really very good and very much welcome and very much supportive. Very friendly discussions. This trip is really encouraging to me.
RFA: So who have you met from the administration?
ZMA: I met this morning with the Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, and (State Department Counselor) Derek Chollet and also the president's adviser for human rights.
RFA: Have you asked them directly whether they are going to recognize the National Unity Government as being the rightful government of Myanmar?
ZMA:So this trip, you know, I didn't directly address them (on this), but we usually ask them to recognize and engage and to support our struggle. So today what they have said is that by welcoming us to Washington, D.C., they are very much consistent, you know, supporting our struggles and they appreciate what the NUG is doing and and also our commitment. So they are also showing their commitment to support us.
RFA: What's the single most important thing you think for the United States to do, to support what you're trying to do in Myanmar?
ZMA: The United States as a leading, powerful and democratic country, has not just this time, but also previously, continuously supported our struggle (against military rule), whether Democrats or Republicans ... And it's very important, as by getting support from the United States, with its allies, it is very encouraging for our movement, both diplomatically and politically and in terms of, for example, economic sanctions. (The United States) has a lot of allies.
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, National Unity Government (NUG), ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Bloc nations were urged to sideline the junta, while US officials met with the shadow government.
Description:
"The ongoing upheaval in Myanmar took center stage on the first day of a U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Washington, as fellow bloc member Malaysia slammed the junta for refusing to engage with the country’s shadow government.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders held a lunch meeting with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers at the U.S. Capitol on Thursday to kick off two days of top-level meetings, which President Joe Biden hopes will bolster Washington’s ties with the bloc and increase its influence in the region.
Eight of ASEAN’s leaders made the trip to the U.S. for the summit, which marks the first time the White House extended an invitation to the group of nations in more than four decades. The Philippines declined to attend as it wraps up a presidential election this week, while Myanmar’s junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, was barred from the summit amid a brutal crackdown on opponents of his military’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup that rights groups say has claimed the lives of at least 1,835 civilians.
U.S. State Department officials instead met with the foreign minister of the National Unity Government, Myanmar’s shadow government of deposed leaders and other junta critics working to take back control of the country.
The lunch event on Capitol Hill was closed to the press, but the situation in Myanmar was front and center on Thursday, after Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah called out junta officials in a series of tweets for failing to honor their commitment to end violence in the country. Specifically, he referred to the military regime’s refusal to allow the United Nations special envoy to the country, Noeleen Heyzer, to attend an ASEAN meeting last week to coordinate humanitarian aid to Myanmar.
“We regret that the [junta] has not allowed the U.N. Secretary General's Special Envoy on Myanmar to participate in the processes,” Saifuddin tweeted.
“We should not allow [the junta to be] dictating who to be invited for related meetings.”
Saifuddin said he made clear at an informal meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers on Wednesday that Malaysia fully supports Prak Sokhonn, the special envoy of ASEAN Chair Cambodia, “in fulfilling his mandate on [the] 5-Point Consensus” — an agreement formed by the bloc in April 2021 that requires the junta to meet with all of Myanmar’s stakeholders to find a solution to the political crisis.
He said he called on the ASEAN envoy to “engage all stakeholders, including [shadow National Unity Government] NUG and [National Unity Consultative Council] NUCC representatives,” both of which are recognized by the junta as “terrorist groups.”
Saifuddin’s comments came a day after he told the RFA-affiliated BenarNews agency that he welcomed the idea of engaging informally with the NUG and NUCC via video conference calls and other means if the junta prohibits such meetings in-person.
The Malaysian foreign minister said he plans to meet with NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung in Washington on Saturday to solicit her opinion on how the people of Myanmar can move on.
As ASEAN leaders lunched with lawmakers on Thursday, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman held a meeting with Zin Mar Aung and other NUG representatives in Washington during which she underscored the Biden administration’s support for the people of Myanmar during the crackdown and for those working to restore the country to democracy, according to a statement by spokesperson Ned Price.
“Noting the many Southeast Asian leaders in Washington for the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, the deputy secretary highlighted that the United States would continue to work closely with ASEAN and other partners in pressing for a just and peaceful resolution to the crisis in Burma,” Price said, using the former name of Myanmar.
“They also condemned the escalating regime violence that has led to a humanitarian crisis and called for unhindered humanitarian access to assist all those in need in Burma.”
Other events
Following Thursday’s working lunch, ASEAN leaders met with Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, as well as other leaders of the business community, to discuss economic cooperation.
In the evening, they joined Biden for dinner at the White House to discuss ASEAN’s future and how the U.S. can play a part, according to media reports, which quoted senior administration officials as saying that each leader would be given time to meet with the president one-on-one.
On Friday, leaders will meet with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken for a working lunch to discuss issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the global climate, and maritime security, before meeting with Biden for a second time.
While some ASEAN leaders have been more outspoken in their condemnation of the junta, others —including Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is also the bloc’s chair — have done little to hold it to account for the situation in Myanmar.
In January, Hun Sen became the first foreign leader to visit Myanmar since the military coup — a trip widely viewed as conferring legitimacy on the junta.
Hun Sen is no stranger to global condemnation, however. The Cambodian strongman brooks no criticism at home and has jailed his opponents on what observers say are politically motivated charges in a bid to bar them from mounting a challenge his nearly 40-year rule.
This week’s summit marks Hun Sen’s fourth visit to the U.S., following trips to attend his son’s graduation from West Point in 1999, the 2016 U.S.-ASEAN Summit with President Barack Obama at the Sunnylands Retreat in California, and a meeting at the United Nations in New York in 2018. Thursday’s dinner with Biden will be his first visit to the White House.
Prior to Thursday’s dinner, during a photo session with leaders on the South Lawn, Biden committed to spending U.S. $150 million on COVID-19 prevention, security, and infrastructure in Southeast Asia as part of a package his administration hopes will contain China’s growing influence in the region.
A U.S. Coast Guard ship will also be deployed to the region to patrol waters ASEAN nations say are illegally fished by Chinese vessels.
The U.S. commitment is a drop in the bucket compared to Beijing’s spending in the region. China earmarked 10 times as much in development assistance to ASEAN nations in November alone..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-13
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"he following is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:
Deputy Secretary Sherman met today in Washington with NUG representatives, including Zin Mar Aung. The Deputy Secretary underscored robust U.S. support for the people of Burma in the face of the regime’s brutal crackdown and pledged to continue providing support to all those working peacefully toward the restoration of Burma’s path to inclusive democracy. Noting the many Southeast Asian leaders in Washington for the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, the Deputy Secretary highlighted that the United States would continue to work closely with ASEAN and other partners in pressing for a just and peaceful resolution to the crisis in Burma. They also condemned the escalating regime violence that has led to a humanitarian crisis and called for unhindered humanitarian access to assist all those in need in Burma. The Deputy Secretary thanked Zin Mar Aung for her courage and dedication to the people of Burma and offered U.S. support for an inclusive, peaceful, and prosperous democracy for all..."
Source/publisher:
United States Department of State
Date of publication:
2022-05-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, National Unity Government (NUG)
Language:
more
Description:
"As leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meet in the United States for a two-day summit, Amnesty International urges them to spotlight the violence and human rights violations in Myanmar.
“The Five-Point Consensus is a failure and did not stop the Myanmar military from perpetrating more human rights violations against the Myanmar people following the 2021 military coup,” Emerlynne Gil, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for Research, said.
“The ASEAN must concede that the human rights violations in Myanmar have now become a regional concern. The Myanmar military’s violence against its own people has not only made people feel unsafe but it has also led to the deterioration of the country’s economy. Right now, thousands of people are fleeing or attempting to flee to neighboring countries like Thailand and Malaysia not only to seek safety, but also to find work and feed their families.
“ASEAN Member States should formulate a more detailed blueprint to hold Myanmar’s military accountable for human rights violations and address urgent needs, including committing to non-refoulement of refugees fleeing violence, facilitating desperately needed humanitarian assistance, and adding their voices to calls for a global arms embargo. ASEAN Member States should also act bilaterally to achieve these goals if consensus within the bloc cannot be reached.
“As host of the summit, the Biden administration should center discussions on the ongoing human rights violations in Myanmar and in the region more broadly. The regional trends we’ve seen in recent years – escalating repression, constraints on civil society, and intolerance for political dissent – are antithetical to the free and open Indo-Pacific to which the US government is purportedly committed to supporting and will never be realized if human rights are ignored.”
Background:
Almost all leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are expected to attend the 12-13 May summit in Washington, which will mark 45 years of US-ASEAN relations.
Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing, who seized power in the 1 February, 2021 coup, was not invited as part of efforts to distance the bloc from the senior general, who has not implemented the Five-Point Consensus he agreed to in April 2021.
The Consensus was mainly aimed at stopping the violence against protesters, supplying humanitarian aid, and increasing dialogue. Since it was adopted, the situation in Myanmar has further spiraled out of control. Since the start of this coup, Myanmar’s military has killed more than 1,800 people, according to one monitoring group, and detained more than 10,000.
Armed resistance groups have also sprung up in response to the bloody crackdown, while peaceful protests, though much smaller than at the beginning of the coup, have continued despite grave risks.
Myanmar’s civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was ousted in the pre-dawn hours of the coup, has been hit with an array of bogus charges and convictions, as have many of her allies..."
Source/publisher:
Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication:
2022-04-12
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations, Amnesty International reports on Burma/Myanmar, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"In hindsight, perhaps ASEAN was too optimistic about the Biden presidency. Who could blame them? After four years of the Trump administration, the region was more than ready to return to deeper engagement with the United States. A survey of regional elites showed that confidence that the United States would increase its engagement jumped from 9.9 per cent in 2020 under Trump to 68.6 per cent under Biden.
That optimism has dissipated amid COVID-19, the Myanmar crisis, the Ukraine war, supply chain disruptions, fears of stagflation and increasing food and energy insecurity.
This is the context in which eight ASEAN leaders, with the exception of Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, will meet President Joe Biden in a US–ASEAN Summit this week. This will only be ASEAN’s second in-person special summit with the United States since 2017 — and a symbolically important one, because its leaders met with Xi Jinping last year in a special 30th commemorative summit of ASEAN–China relations.
ASEAN countries’ divergent positions on Ukraine and Russia, Myanmar and the South China Sea (and by extension, China’s behaviour) will make for challenging conversations with their US host.
On Ukraine, it will be difficult for the summit to find language that expresses a common understanding of the problem. ASEAN is in a bind, unable to go beyond the two joint statements it issued in March 2022. As if they expected to face pressure during in Washington to disinvite Russia, the current chairs of ASEAN (Cambodia), the G20 (Indonesia) and APEC (Thailand) pre-emptively issued a tripartite statement stating their determination to ‘work with all’ on their shared agendas.
Then there’s the Myanmar crisis, where the lack of progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus will be a pain point for ASEAN. The recent consultative meeting on humanitarian assistance to Myanmar (one element in the Consensus deal) will be followed by an impromptu meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers, called by Malaysia for the day before the White House summit. ASEAN Special Envoy Prak Sokhonn’s attempts to advance the other points of the Consensus, including repeated requests to meet detained National League for Democracy leaders, have been rejected by the military junta.
On the South China Sea, the spotlight is on sweeping and competing claims made by claimant states, the risks of armed confrontation and progress in the negotiations on a Code of Conduct. These issues are by now a permanent feature in ASEAN meetings, and the usual expressions of support for upholding international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the pursuit of peaceful resolution of disputes will likely form the key messages emerging from the summit on this issue.
Questions about ASEAN’s role in the US Indo-Pacific strategy and whether ASEAN (in part or in whole) will engage in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework hang over the meeting. The Biden administration’s success in more closely aligning its Indo-Pacific strategy with ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific will be critical to reassuring ASEAN of US respect for its centrality in the regional security architecture.
Meanwhile, US withdrawal from the CPTPP and its absence from RCEP has left a vacuum in the region. The hope is that the administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework will provide a counterweight to China’s growing economic influence, but the lack of political appetite in the United States to engage economically is certain to disadvantage it strategically. There is only moderate appeal in some pillars of the Framework on creating fair and resilient trade, improving supply chain resilience, driving infrastructure investment, assisting with decarbonisation and addressing tax and anticorruption, not all.
ASEAN countries are primarily looking for increased market access for exports — but the Biden administration has on more than one occasion said that its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework will not be designed in such a way that requires Congressional approval. This means that increased market access and commitments are off the table, but ASEAN should still exercise creativity in economic discussions by suggesting inclusive work-arounds in areas like digital trade.
With the summit coinciding with the 45th anniversary of ASEAN–US relations, the United States is expected to seek to elevate its current Strategic Partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Such status was accorded to China and Australia in 2021, but it is unlikely that ASEAN will immediately accede to the upgrade for a number of reasons. First, a process of consultation had to be undertaken with China over two years and with Australia for over a year before that status was granted. The same process must be followed with the United States, at least for reasons of optical parity.
Second and more importantly, a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership cannot simply be old wine in new skins. An upgrade is expected to show greater strategic alignment between the two partners and intensified cooperation in new and emerging areas.
With complex and divergent positions, both within ASEAN, and between ASEAN and the United States — on China, on Russia, on Myanmar, on trade — such alignment appears elusive for now..."
Source/publisher:
"East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication:
2022-05-11
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, USA-Burma relations
Language:
more
Sub-title:
President Biden Should Raise Key Issues with Regional Leaders
Description:
"(Washington, DC) – The United States-ASEAN Special Summit on May 12, 2022 will embolden autocratic leaders unless it directly confronts the region’s worsening environment for human rights and democracy, Human Rights Watch said today in a letter to the summit’s host, US President Joseph Biden. Leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should also acknowledge the bloc’s failure to achieve progress in addressing the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar since the February 2021 military coup.
“The Biden administration will need to convince ASEAN’s autocrats at the summit that the alliance’s ultimate future depends on democratic reform,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “The US-ASEAN relationship needs to honestly and directly address the region’s deteriorating human rights situation and democratic backsliding.”
The growth of autocratic rule in the ASEAN region is occurring amid increasing Chinese government efforts to undermine human rights protections, Human Rights Watch said.
US officials should speak openly, forthrightly, and publicly about specific concerns in bilateral meetings with ASEAN members and in statements to the media about the summit, Human Rights Watch said. The Biden administration can do so most credibly and effectively by focusing on factual situations in each country, while acknowledging the many deficiencies in the US rights record and the US government’s efforts and challenges in taking corrective actions to address them.
Human rights abuses have increased in ASEAN countries in recent years, Human Rights Watch said. The Myanmar military has committed mass atrocities against Rohingya Muslims and other ethnic groups, and anti-coup demonstrators. Outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs” has resulted in thousands of extrajudicial executions. The one-party Vietnamese government has intensified an ongoing crackdown and imprisoned over 150 dissidents. The Cambodian authorities are conducting mass trials, many in absentia, of opposition political figures.
The US should press ASEAN members to abandon their failed “five point consensus” approach to Myanmar’s crisis. Like-minded ASEAN members, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, should join a coordinated international effort to steer the junta toward reform, including increasing restrictions on its foreign currency revenues and weapons purchases. The US and these ASEAN countries should develop a clear, time-bound approach to pressure the junta to end its abuses, including signaling support for additional sanctions on oil and gas revenues and a Security Council resolution instituting a global arms embargo.
“Discussing regional human rights concerns at the US-ASEAN summit will send the message that human rights and the promotion of democracy are critical in forging a multilateral response to the Chinese government’s assaults on the international human rights system,” Sifton said..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Language:
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Description:
"Through ongoing defence and military cooperation, it is likely that ASEAN is aiding and abetting the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes, a Justice For Myanmar investigation has concluded.
ASEAN’s defence program, detailed by Justice For Myanmar, has allowed the Myanmar military to participate in meetings, training, intelligence exchanges, arms production, R&D, cyber security, and education, under the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) umbrella.
The Myanmar military’s involvement in ADMM has supported it to build its capabilities, access arms, find sources of revenue, seek international legitimacy, develop content for propaganda purposes, and forge bilateral military ties with ASEAN members and regional powers.
ASEAN has been engaging with the Myanmar military, knowing that it has repeatedly violated international human rights and humanitarian law.
Since the Myanmar military began an illegal attempted coup on February 1, 2021, ASEAN has allowed it to join defence sector activities, including as co-chair of the bloc’s ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter Terrorism with the Russian regime.
As the region’s key intergovernmental organisation, ASEAN could help prevent the Myanmar military’s commission of atrocity crimes. Yet it has not only repeatedly failed to take action, but is complicit in those crimes by providing support and legitimacy to the Myanmar military.
The central role ASEAN plays in the Indo-Pacific region has also impeded coordinated international action to stop the Myanmar military’s international crimes, and facilitated the illegitimate junta’s defence engagement with regional democracies Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and the USA, through ADMM-Plus.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “ASEAN has utterly failed to uphold international human rights and humanitarian law.
“ASEAN knows full well that the Myanmar military committed genocide against the Rohingya, continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, and staged an attempted coup.
“ASEAN cannot plead ignorance about the crimes that the military is committing, its undermining of democracy and brutal attack on the people of Myanmar.
“Yet its response has been to provide practical assistance, encouragement and support to the military as it terrorises the people of Myanmar.
“ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus has not only utterly failed to resolve Myanmar crisis but enabled the bloc’s status quo of complicity with the terrorist junta who created the crisis.
“Justice For Myanmar calls on ASEAN to immediately change course, exclude the illegal Myanmar and work with the NUG to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
“ADMM-Plus countries must stop hiding behind ASEAN and take immediate steps to end the bloc’s complicity in the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes.
“As the US hosts the US-ASEAN Special Summit, it must commit to end its multilateral engagement with the terrorist junta and demand ASEAN stop aiding and abetting the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes.
“We call on the US to boycott ASEAN events that include the illegal junta, including the defence maritime security working group that it co-chairs.”
Justice For Myanmar calls for the following urgent action:
ASEAN
Exclude the Myanmar military junta from all meetings and activities.
Recognise the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar, and work with it to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Take concrete action to end the Myanmar military’s violence against the Myanmar people.
Create an ASEAN sanctions framework, and encourage ASEAN members to impose an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on the Myanmar military and its business interests.
Cooperate with UN Member States to impose a global arms embargo on Myanmar and to refer the Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court through the UN Security Council.
ADMM-Plus countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the USA):
Call on ASEAN to exclude the Myanmar military junta from all meetings and activities, and end the Myanmar military’s violence against the Myanmar people.
Recognise and support the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar, and work with it to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Urge ASEAN to recognise the National Unity Government and work with it to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
Boycott ASEAN meetings and activities that include the Myanmar military junta.
Impose an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against the Myanmar military and its business interests.
Cooperate with UN Member States to impose a global arms embargo on Myanmar and to refer the Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court through the UN Security Council..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Business and the Military, Sanctions, The Burmese military's role in the economy, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
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130.6 KB
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Description:
"The United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, welcomes the convening of the Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on 6 May and strongly urges ASEAN leaders and donors to prioritise principled engagement with diverse local humanitarian networks to effectively deliver aid to all communities in need.
Over the past few months, the Special Envoy has held extensive engagements with some of Myanmar’s civil society organisations and local humanitarian networks who have been at the frontline in addressing the widening crisis amid escalating violence and increasing displaced populations. These groups have called for unhindered and safe humanitarian access to facilitate delivery of assistance without discrimination. The key messages from local humanitarian networks are clear: there is a need for the utmost respect of international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles; urgently needed humanitarian aid must not be instrumentalised for political purposes; military infrastructure must not be legitimised through aid delivery; and there is a need not only for more donor funding but also for donor flexibility to support local humanitarian actors and networks with access to hard-to-reach conflict affected areas, including internally displaced people, border communities and civilians affected by conflict, including in urban areas.
In Myanmar’s currently violent, unstable and insecure context, effective delivery of humanitarian aid requires firm commitment by all aid actors to adhere to international humanitarian law. Given the complexity of Myanmar’s conflict it is imperative that humanitarian assistance is delivered through a diverse range of channels, without discrimination or favour, and reaches the most vulnerable in every part of the country. Safe and unimpeded access for all aid actors is non-negotiable. It is imperative that we build strong, effective and equal partnerships with local and informal humanitarian networks, who have unique access, local knowledge and established trust on the ground, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people, especially in the hardest-to-reach areas, including through cross border assistance.
We must recognise the current conflict has a disproportionate impact on women and children. The Special Envoy's consultations with women community leaders have highlighted the urgent need for humanitarian support and protection for women and children, capacity building to address gender-based violence and stronger connection to regional and global women leaders. The Special Envoy urges the global community to give women a key role in any humanitarian consultation, as women can help identify the most vulnerable and help monitor effective delivery along humanitarian principles. Reflective of the Secretary-General's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, we must actively engage women to fully address the humanitarian and protection needs of the people and amplify their voices for a future federal democratic union of peace, stability and shared prosperity..."
Source/publisher:
United Nations Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-03
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
more
Sub-title:
Amid the Ukraine war, Washington is demonstrating its commitment to ASEAN, which seeks to expand economic ties and cooperate on transnational challenges.
Description:
"The White House will host this week the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for a U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit. With the Russia-Ukraine war dominating international attention, the Biden administration has said the summit demonstrates its “enduring commitment” to ASEAN and that the Indo-Pacific region is a U.S. national security priority. China’s influence and power projection in Southeast Asia will figure prominently into the summit, but the two-day meeting also offers the opportunity to deepen economic relations with ASEAN, a bloc of 10 countries that combined make up the seventh largest economy in the world. A host of other critical issues — from COVID to climate change to the crisis in Myanmar — will also be on the table.
President Biden at a virtual U.S.-ASEAN Summit in 2021. Engagement with the bloc has been hampered by COVID, but this week’s Special Summit demonstrates the U.S. is committed to deepening ties with ASEAN. (Stefani Reynolds/The New York Times)
USIP’s Brian Harding explains how ASEAN factors into the Biden administration’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” what ASEAN countries want from Washington, and how the war in Ukraine and deteriorating situation in Myanmar will be addressed at the summit.
Where does ASEAN sit in the administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific?
The White House’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in February, states that the United States seeks to “advance a free and open Indo-Pacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.” The strategy calls an “empowered ASEAN” an important ingredient for success alongside modernized alliances like the Quad (i.e., the United States, Australia, India and Japan), renewed U.S. commitment and resources, and other means. While competition with China is at the heart of the United States’ regional strategy, support for a cohesive and resilient ASEAN is one of the critical means for advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific.
An empowered ASEAN will not be easy to achieve, however. ASEAN is an extremely diverse group of 10 countries that operates by consensus, meaning it is rarely nimble nor bold, even on its best day. With one of its members, Myanmar, in crisis, an empowered ASEAN seems more unlikely than ever.
Yet, despite their differences, including as it relates to Myanmar, one area of clear agreement among its members is that only ASEAN can be the central building block for Indo-Pacific regionalism. The United States and its allies — and China to some extent — have bought into this vision, recognizing that it is untenable for the great powers to guide the regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, it is strongly in the U.S. interest to invest in its relationship with ASEAN and to do what it can to support ASEAN’s centrality in regional affairs.
However, the United States has also been clear that bilateral — and increasingly trilateral and quadrilateral — cooperation with key allies and partners is fundamental to U.S. engagement and strength in the region. The Biden administration’s emphasis on the Quad, in particular, has brought into question the premise of whether ASEAN remains in the driver’s seat of regionalism, a role it had seemed to have consolidated only a few years ago, and what the United States means by its rhetorical support for ASEAN centrality. The Indo-Pacific Strategy recognizes this sensitivity, noting that the United States “will explore opportunities for the Quad to work with ASEAN.”
During the Biden administrations’ first year, engagement with Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN as a whole proved to be unusually difficult due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions and the rupture within ASEAN caused by Myanmar’s February 2021 coup. This Special Summit seeks to help make up for lost time and clearly demonstrates the United States’ interest in and commitment to deepening ties with ASEAN and its constituent members.
What are ASEAN countries looking for from Washington? How can Washington work with the bloc to empower and strengthen ASEAN resilience?
ASEAN countries are highly alert to the fact that relations between the United States and China have important implications for themselves. Despite their diversity, ASEAN countries all want an engaged and present United States in Southeast Asia to balance China’s potentially overwhelming influence. They also seek to have Japan, India, Australia and other external powers as engaged as possible to create a balance of power in the region, or, as former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has called it more positively, a dynamic equilibrium. What they do not want is to be forced to choose between the United States and China.
Southeast Asian countries also seek Washington’s buy-in for ASEAN-based multilateral institutions, such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, which the bloc seeks to position at the center of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture.
Beyond being present, the region wants the United States to be a stronger economic partner and many members are eagerly anticipating the details of the administration’s proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. ASEAN is also looking to partner on transnational challenges ranging from climate change to pandemic preparedness to transnational crime. U.S. support for ASEAN-based multilateralism empowers the bloc and strengthens its resilience, especially in the face of Chinese efforts to divide it, which it has repeatedly done to blunt ASEAN’s ability to push back against Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.
How will the Ukraine war factor into the summit?
That President Biden is hosting the ASEAN leaders is a demonstration of its commitment to maintaining focus on the Indo-Pacific region despite the crisis in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Ukraine will be impossible to escape. First, U.S. officials will make the case that Russia’s invasion demonstrates the fragility of the international system and, second, they will highlight China’s tacit support for the invasion to make a contrast with the United States’ principled stance.
Southeast Asian countries in general would rather keep their heads down and avoid the issue rather than getting in the middle of a dispute between major powers. Singapore, however, has been an outlier with its vocal criticism and the sanctions it has enacted in coordination with the United States and Europe. While Ukraine will not be a major focus of the summit, the issue will likely come up in the context of Russia’s participation in the G-20 summit, East Asia Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders meeting to be hosted later this year in Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand, respectively.
Do you expect the Biden administration to press the bloc to do more to address the deteriorating situation in Myanmar?
While much of the summit agenda will focus on apolitical areas ripe for closer U.S.-ASEAN cooperation, such as clean energy, health security and the digital economy, the deteriorating situation in Myanmar will also be addressed. Biden will find many of his counterparts to be as frustrated with the situation as himself, but he will also find deep divisions in the lengths his ASEAN counterparts are willing to go to isolate or pressure the junta, largely due to longstanding norms within ASEAN to avoid interfering in the affairs of other members.
However, Biden will find common cause with leaders from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, who are increasingly frustrated by the junta’s intransigence and are open to isolating Myanmar’s leaders and engaging the National Unity Government. With Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, he will encounter reluctance. With the likelihood of a diplomatic breakthrough dim, Biden will likely look for incremental progress on enhancing engagement with the National Unity Government and establishing a framework for delivering humanitarian assistance to Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication:
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-10
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"9 May 2022: The plans of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for humanitarian assistance to Myanmar flout fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and will advance the military objectives of the Myanmar military junta, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). The plans were announced by the current ASEAN Chair, Cambodia, following a consultative meeting on Friday.
The outcomes of the consultative meeting include plans for the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) to deliver aid to areas identified by the Myanmar military junta and in coordination with the junta.
“The areas singled out for humanitarian assistance by the military junta under ASEAN’s plan are the very areas where the junta has been relentlessly attacking civilians with airstrikes and scorched-earth campaigns for months on end,” said Marzuki Darusman of SAC-M. “The junta has no power in those areas and its attempt to control ASEAN’s delivery of aid to them is nothing more than a strategy designed to advance its military agenda.”
“ASEAN aid personnel working in areas under attack from the junta could become unwitting ‘human-shields’ for the junta’s ulterior motives,” Marzuki Darusman added.
There are 14 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Myanmar, while an estimated 800,000 people are displaced inside the country. Most are seeking refuge from the junta’s attacks in territory along Myanmar’s borders outside the junta’s control. The junta refuses to permit cross-border aid into these areas.
“Under no circumstances should ASEAN be hailed for colluding with the junta to develop a military-controlled plan for humanitarian assistance, more than one year into the crisis, when it has failed to get support to the cross-border networks of local civil society, community and faith-based groups and ethnic service providers that have been working tirelessly to keep people alive,” said Yanghee Lee of SAC-M. “It is inhumane for ASEAN’s own member states that neighbour Myanmar to keep their borders closed just to please the junta, which is the cause of Myanmar’s suffering. “
“Myanmar’s neighbouring countries must not forget their international obligation to assist in delivering humanitarian aid through their borders,” Yanghee Lee added.
The consultative meeting was held less than a week before an important summit between the United States (US) and ASEAN, due to take place on 12 and 13 May in Washington DC. ASEAN has been criticised for failing to make any progress towards resolving the junta-made crises in Myanmar. Myanmar junta-leader Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly humiliated Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia in his misguided efforts to engage the junta.
“ASEAN’s plans for humanitarian assistance to Myanmar are clearly a vain attempt to have something to show the US. ASEAN claims to have the central role in Southeast Asia but its Five Point Failure shows its irrelevance. The outcomes of the consultative meeting are an outrage,” said Chris Sidoti of SAC-M.
The Cambodian Foreign Minister tried to implicate the United Nations (UN) Special Envoy to Myanmar in this plan by saying she had participated in the meeting. In fact, her attendance had been blocked by the junta. She was invited and then disinvited. At this point, ASEAN’s credibility is hanging by a thread, says SAC-M.
SAC-M is calling on ASEAN to abide by the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. ASEAN must secure the immediate opening of cross-border humanitarian corridors into Myanmar and coordinate with all relevant parties, including the National Unity Government, the National Unity Consultative Council, Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations and local actors to finally deliver the aid it promised the people of Myanmar more than one year ago. If it fails, it must get out of the way of others who are far more willing to act..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
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Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
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"JAKARTA – Parliamentarians from Southeast Asia urge the United States of America and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to take the opportunity of their upcoming summit in Washington to increase their pressure on the Myanmar military junta, which staged a coup d’état in February last year and has thrown the country into a state of chaos ever since.
The leaders of ASEAN and the United States have declared that they intend to enhance their strategic partnership for the mutual benefit of the peoples of ASEAN and the United States. In that spirit, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) advises that they should take concrete steps to address the inherent threat to peace, economic development and human security in Southeast Asia posed by the crisis in Myanmar.
“Let this 45th anniversary of US-ASEAN relations be the occasion for the US and ASEAN governments to begin a new phase in their relations that truly benefits the people and puts human rights and the prevention of atrocities, in Myanmar and elsewhere, at the top of the agenda. They can no longer ignore the threat that the junta in Myanmar poses to the security of millions of people at the heart of Southeast Asia,” said Charles Santiago, Member of Parliament from Malaysia, and APHR Chairperson.
The current crisis is wholly and solely caused by the junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, which overthrew the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February 2021. The Myanmar population has valiantly resisted the coup and, in order to impose its rule on the country, the military has committed widespread atrocities. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, these may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Over the last year, Myanmar’s military has completely ignored the ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus on Myanmar, which was agreed on in April 2021 and was also supported by the US. Violence continues unabated, there is no dialogue between the junta and forces resisting military rule, and humanitarian aid is not reaching the Myanmar people.
The Special Summit provides the perfect opportunity for the allies to work on coordinated measures to make Min Aung Hlaing and his junta pay the price for their failure to abide by an agreement they claimed to accept.
“Humanity is our common thread across the Pacific and across the world. We must stand together in the face of these atrocities, Asians and Americans, as we share the same concern for the people of Myanmar. Now is the time for ASEAN and the US to make their historic alliance truly meaningful to people in desperate need,” said Mercy Barends, MP in Indonesia and an APHR Board Member.
We urge the US and ASEAN to adopt much stronger measures than those taken so far, including the suspension of Myanmar’s membership in the group, travel bans in the region for Min Aung Hlaing and his generals, and targeted sanctions against the leaders of the coup. The US has already imposed some sanctions since the coup, but it should reinforce them and include the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a state conglomerate that has given 1.5 billion dollars in gas revenues to the junta.
We also urge the US and ASEAN governments to publicly meet with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), which represents the democratically elected government and receives support from the majority of the Myanmar people.
Lastly, we call on the United States and ASEAN to work together to urgently deliver the life-saving humanitarian aid that the Myanmar people need. This aid should be channeled as much as possible through Myanmar’s community-based and civil society organizations, to effectively reach those that need it the most. The United States and ASEAN member states, especially Thailand, should also welcome the people of Myanmar who are fleeing persecution and violence, and give them asylum.
APHR stands ready to assist the US and ASEAN as they formulate and carry out their policies to address this crisis, and will remain vigilant to ensure that the steps taken by the US and ASEAN truly serve to support the Myanmar people’s aspirations for human rights, peace and democracy..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication:
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
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"The National Unity Government (NUG) is deeply disappointed and concerned about the outcome of the
Consultative Meeting on ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance to Myanmar on May 6, 2022, in Phnom
Pehn, Cambodia.
The NUG has repeatedly reached out to the ASEAN chair and the ASEAN Special Envoy to convey our
openness to engage and discuss ways forward; however, our previous communication has not been
reciprocated until now. The NUG and other crucial stakeholders of Myanmar such as the Ethnic
Resistance Groups (EROs) and local humanitarian organizations have been deliberately excluded from
the consultative meeting. The outcome of the meeting has put the Myanmar Taskforce led by State
Administration Council (SAC) Ko Ko Hlaing at the center of ASEAN humanitarian response. This
effectively allows SAC arbitrarily to select regions and states and implementing partners to implement
the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Delivery Framework. This process poses a high risk of failure in
the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance without discrimination, legitimizing the SAC's
infrastructure, and politicizing humanitarian response by coercing Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)
to engage with SAC's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiations Committee.
The people of Myanmar continued to reject the SAC's illegitimate authoritarian rule and continuously
called for restoring democracy and civilian government. The exclusion of the NUG, EAOs, and local
humanitarian organizations in the consultative meeting fundamentally contradicts the principle and
conditions set out in the ASEAN Five Point Consensus. The SAC troops have continuously terrorised communities leading to continuous displacement; arbitrarily detaining civilians, activists and leaders of
democracy movements; and committing atrocities and war crimes.
The conditions on the ground and the people's trust deficit in the SAC will continue to hamper urgent
and effective delivery of humanitarian aid. With this, the NUG calls on the ASEAN leaders and donors
to utilize cross-border networks to deliver humanitarian assistance urgently in a manner not dependent
on the SAC's approval. This is the only way and has been the only way deliver aid to "hard-to-reach"
areas since the failed Coup. Furthermore, the NUG calls on the ASEAN leaders and donors to reconsider
the UN Special Envoys to Myanmar's recommendation to prioritize principled engagement with diverse
local humanitarian networks to effectively deliver aid to all communities in need without discrimination..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication:
2022-05-07
Date of entry/update:
2022-05-07
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Individual Documents
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110.92 KB 357.73 KB
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