Development and the civil war
|Title:|| ||We Will Manage Our Own Natural Resources
|Date of publication:|| ||2016|
|Description/subject:|| ||"... This piece of community initiated action research reveals a number of lessons we can learn. The authors try to reflect the challenges of and opportunities for community based natural resources management in a seemingly forgotten Karen controlled area of southern Myanmar. The paper examines a number of case studies including the construction of a local water supply system, the establishment of fish conservation zones and community-driven forest conservation. An evolutionary development of community based networks such as CSLD (Community Sustainable Livelihood and Development), IRIP-NET (Tenasserim River and Indigenous People Network) and RKIP (Rays of Kamoethway Indigenous People and Nature) and their collaborative action to address emerging Natural Resources Management issues in their land are well illustrated in the paper..."|
|Source/publisher:|| ||Tenasserim River & Indigenous People Networks (TRIP NET), Rays of Kamoethway Indigenous People and Nature (RKIPN)|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (3.1MB)|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||18 April 2016|
|Title:|| ||Agrarian Transitions in Two Agroecosystems of Kayah State, Myanmar
|Date of publication:|| ||November 2013|
|Description/subject:|| ||"... Located on Myanmar’s eastern border with Thailand, Kayah State has long been isolated because of conflicts between the minority groups there and the Burmese army; as a result, little is known about its agricultural systems. As a preliminary to NGO agricultural development projects, an agrarian diagnosis of two major types of agroecosystems in the state—lowlands alluvial plains and uplands—was conducted. The objective was to identify recent agrarian changes leading to the current presence of different types of farmers in each area and understand their development potential.
Both agroecosystems have followed very different evolutionary trajectories, mainly because of politico-historical factors. In the lowlands, farmers with irrigated plots are administratively obliged to grow irrigated rice, while others who are forced to grow flooded rice but unable to irrigate can diversify into vegetable growing. In the uplands, communications infrastructures allowing access to the market are a source of differentiation between villages. Farmers who have this access are growing cash crops such as maize and pigeon peas, while those who do not have access continue with upland rice-based systems.
The introduction of perennial crops such as rubber, non-perishable food production in the uplands, and horticultural diversification in the lowlands are waiting for future policies at the national level..."|
|Author/creator:|| ||Audrey Aldebert & Gauvain Meulle|
|Source/publisher:|| ||Mercy Corps|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (1.3MB)|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||12 April 2016|
|Title:|| ||Why ceasefires fail in Myanmar
|Date of publication:|| ||18 May 2012|
|Description/subject:|| ||"In northern Myanmar, government troops continue to push into the heartland of the ethnic Kachin armed opposition. Next month, the renewed conflict will mark its first birthday, and while protracted fighting has eased in other areas of the ethnically diverse country, the battle for Kachin State rages on.
The limited gains made by government negotiators with at least six ethnic rebel groups over the past year make the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) something of an anomaly. Lower House member of parliament Aung Thaung, whose hawkish persona was seen as ripe for the recalcitrant group, was recently retired from his post as peace broker. More than five high-level meetings with Kachin officials failed to net a result, and as additional battalions are deployed to the frontline, the prospect of a ceasefire anytime soon seems unlikely.
The narrative runs that the Kachin distrust the government, which they fear could renege on an agreement and rekindle the conflict at any time. But their reluctance to sign a ceasefire runs deeper; indeed it is their experience with the recent era of "peace" that makes the three-point roadmap demanded by Aung Thaung - entailing a ceasefire and then economic development before cementing a political solution - so objectionable.
Among Kachin civilians, the 1994 ceasefire deal was seen to facilitate the rapacious development of the state, which 33 years of insurgency had somewhat stifled. The inflow of investment came with alarming levels of environmental degradation, particularly around areas rich in minerals, timber and hydropower potential. While the abuses associated with fighting lessened, including forced portering and rape, the number of people displaced by the development drive may well have taken a heavier toll than the years of conflict..."|
|Author/creator:|| ||Francis Wade|
|Source/publisher:|| ||"Asia Times Online"|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||17 May 2012|
|Title:|| ||Lessons from the Kachin “development” experience (Kachin, English, Burmese ျမန္မာဘာသာ)
|Date of publication:|| ||May 2012|
|Description/subject:|| ||"Burma’s government is using the promise of development as a key component in its current peace negotiations with armed ethnic organizations, proposing ceasefire first, then development, and finally a national political agreement. This process has been tried before in Kachin State with disastrous consequences.
This report summarizes findings from seven years of research and demonstrates that the Kachin experience should serve as a warning to other ethnic groups attempting peace through a similar process. Without a political resolution first, there can be no just or sustainable development of Burma..."|
|Language:|| ||English, Kachin, Burmese (ျမန္မာဘာသာ)|
|Source/publisher:|| ||Kachin Development Networking Group (KDNG)|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (1MB-English; 770K-Burmese; 873K-Kachin)|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://www.kdng.org/publication/236-lessons-from-the-kachin-development-experience.html
|Date of entry/update:|| ||17 May 2012|
|Title:|| ||Rural development and displacement: SPDC abuses in Toungoo District
|Date of publication:|| ||13 January 2009|
|Description/subject:|| ||"The SPDC has continued to militarise larger and larger swaths of Toungoo District under the false banner of 'development', subjecting local villagers to forced labour and extortion and forcing others to flee into hiding. Life is hard for villagers both under and outside of SPDC control: villagers living within SPDC-controlled areas are often forced to work for the SPDC rather than focus on their own livelihoods while villagers in hiding continue to struggle with a shortage of food. Ultimately, many residents of Toungoo face a mounting food crisis that is a direct result of SPDC policy. This report discusses incidents that occurred between May and September 2008..."|
|Source/publisher:|| ||Karen Human Rights Group Field Reports (KHRG #2009-F1)|
|Format/size:|| ||html, pdf (850 KB)|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://www.khrg.org/sites/default/files/khrg09f1.pdf|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||31 October 2009|
|Title:|| ||SPDC road construction plans creating problems for civilians
|Date of publication:|| ||27 January 2006|
|Description/subject:|| ||"In the opinion of one KHRG field researcher, “The SPDC’s road construction plans are related to the Salween dam project.” The dam itself, however, is partly a weapon to extend the regime’s control. The SPDC and its predecessors have tried to military crush all resistance in the Karen hills for over 50 years already without success, so development projects’ like roads and dams are a new tactic for penetrating areas where resistance forces are strong and forcing villagers out of the hills to settle in state-controlled areas.
The first to suffer from the road construction are the villagers living under SPDC control, who have to secure the road construction, carry loads, act as messengers and provide food and materials. Many will also have their fields or irrigation systems destroyed and their livelihoods undermined. Then will come the effects on displaced villagers living beyond SPDC control, whose mobility and security will be threatened by the roads and increased militarisation, undermining their food security, physical security, and their children’s access to education. The SPDC forces would like these people to go and live under their control, but the villagers know that if they stay under SPDC control they will have to do forced labour as porters, carrying loads, and as messengers, and will face extortion and looting of their money, livestock and belongings.
There is some speculation that the dam project itself, by threatening the territory and supply lines of resistance forces, could also lead to intensified armed conflict, and villagers in the area would be the first to suffer from this. Dozens of villages and huge areas of forest and farmland would be inundated, most likely with no compensation offered to villagers except the option of moving to an SPDC-controlled village where they would be landless labourers, regularly exploited for forced labour. The future is therefore very uncertain for the thousands of Karen villagers living in this region."|
|Source/publisher:|| ||Karen Human Rights Group Orders Reports (KHRG #2006-B1)|
|Format/size:|| ||pdf (338 KB)|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://www.khrg.org/khrg2006/khrg06b1.html
|Date of entry/update:|| ||28 January 2006|