The Communist Party of Burma (CPB)

expand all
collapse all

Websites/Multiple Documents

Description: Mostly in Burmese. A few English articles, including "National Interest of Burma (A proposal of the Communists)"
Source/publisher: Communist Party of Burma
Date of entry/update: 2004-02-01
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ), English
more
expand all
collapse all

Individual Documents

Description: "While heavy fighting has been raging in Myanmar’s ethnic minority areas, and clashes between local resistance groups called People’s Defense Forces and the Myanmar military have occurred almost daily since last year’s coup, Rakhine State in the west of the country has been largely peaceful. The Arakan Army (AA), the state’s main rebel force, entered into an informal ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military several months before the February 1 coup and, so far, the truce seems to be holding. But much to the military’s chagrin the AA, or more specifically its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has used the peace to build up a separate administration in the state with its own judicial bodies, revenue department, public security branches and other governmental institutions. The military, on the other hand, is stretched on many fronts across Myanmar and can hardly afford to send the number of troops that would be required to re-establish control over Rakhine State. But it is a fragile ceasefire agreement and it is still a question of who would attack whom first and when. If the generals decide to open a new front in Rakhine State, they would be up against a formidable adversary. From humble beginnings in 2009, the AA has grown into one of Myanmar’s most potent rebel armies. It was originally formed by a group of youngish nationalists led by Twan Mrat Naing, then only 31, and recruits from the many ethnic Rakhine who work in the Hpakant jade mines in Kachin State. Initially trained by the Kachin Independence Army, they first saw combat in 2012 when the military launched a massive offensive against rebel bases along the Chinese border. Three years later, AA troops fought alongside soldiers from the Palaung militia, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in the Kokang area of Shan State in 2015. From then on, the AA grew rapidly and moved most of its operations to its home state of Rakhine. Thousands of young male as well as female nationalists flocked to join the AA, and bitter battles were fought with the Myanmar military. Twan Mrat Naing, now 43 and a Major-General, was born in the Rakhine capital Sittwe and studied law at university but left without getting a degree. In a recent interview with this correspondent, he emphasized the pride that many Rakhine feel for their state and its long and often turbulent history. Rakhine, formerly known as Arakan, was an independent Buddhist kingdom until it was invaded by the Burmese in late 1784 and then, the following year, annexed into the realm ruled by King Bodawpaya of the Konbaung Dynasty. Resistance against the occupation continued until the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824-1826. The Arakan region, along with Tenasserim [now part of Tanintharyi Region] in the southeast, became British possessions. Peace prevailed until World War II, when Myanmar was occupied by the Japanese — and that caused serious divisions within Arakan. Most Buddhist Arakanese sided with the Burma Independence Army — and hence the Japanese — while large segments of the Muslim population in northern Arakan remained loyal to Britain, the colonial power. Immense atrocities were committed by both sides, and those wounds have never completely healed. The departure of the British in 1948 led to a virtual civil war in Arakan. Muslim mujaheed guerrillas — they were then not yet called Rohingya — established bases along the border with East Pakistan and, originally wanted to join independent Pakistan. The Communist Party (Red Flag) (CP[RF]), led by Bonbauk, or “bomb thrower” Tha Gyaw, also battled government forces and so did U Sein Da, a former monk known as “the King of Arakan.” The main Communist Party of Burma (CPB) also established strongholds in Arakan, while breakaway militants from CP[RF] formed a separate Communist Party of Arakan (CPA) and wanted to establish their own people’s republic. Over the years, most of the insurgencies fizzled out. In 1961, the last 500 mujaheeds surrendered as the then U Nu government agreed to set up an autonomous area known as the Mayu Frontier Administration encompassing Maungdaw, Buthidaung and western Rathedaung townships, where Muslims are in a clear majority. General Ne Win’s coup d’etat in 1962 put an end to those efforts and some Muslims formed new groups, notably the Rohingya Independence Force which in 1975 became the Rohingya Patriotic Front. But those groups were small and their activities limited to publishing leaflets and newsletters from their offices in Chittagong, Bangladesh. “Bonbauk” Tha Gyaw had surrendered in 1955 and U Sein Da in 1958. The main CP(RF) leader Thakin Soe was captured in 1970 at his Than Chaung camp near the Arakan Yoma mountains. The CPB’s local leader Kyaw Mya left Arakan in 1979 and went to Bangladesh, where the Chinese embassy helped him to continue on to China and then down to the party’s main headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in Shan State. His successor as local leader of the CPB, Ye Tun, surrendered during a general amnesty in 1980, and so did CPA leader Kyaw Zan Rhee. On the Thai border, a small group called the Arakan Liberation Organization and Army had been formed in 1972, but it had only a handful of soldiers who were based at Kawmoorah, a Karen National Union stronghold north of Mae Sot. Peace seemed to prevail in Arakan, which was renamed Rakhine State in 1974, but then came the 1988 nationwide democracy uprising. Some of the old fighters, among them Kyaw Zan Rhee and “Bonbauk” Tha Gyaw, resurfaced, took part in the pro-democracy movement and formed an overground, legal party called the Arakan People’s United Organization. Another, and stronger, legal political party called the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) also emerged, and was led by Dr U Saw Mra Aung and the historian U Oo Tha Tun. The ALD took part in the 1990 general election but its MPs elect, like all the other elected politicians, were not allowed to take up their seats in Yangon. The elected National Assembly was never convened and instead a mainly military-appointed National Convention was convened to draft a new constitution. U Oo Tha Tun died in prison in 1991 and, in 1992, the ALD was banned. Against that backdrop — and given Arakan/Rakhine’s long history of resistance — it is hardly surprising that the new AA and the ULA have grown so fast and become what they are today. Or, as Myanmar specialist Martin Smith wrote in Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar’s Western Frontier, which was published by the Netherlands-based Transnational Institute in December 2019: “Among [the many Rakhine groups] only the ULA could be considered as new. But, as its supporters point out, the ULA includes members from other organizations and is the latest in a long line of armed Rakhine movements that date back to independence in 1948. As such, the ULA has quickly become the most powerful force in Rakhine nationalism in many decades.” But the armed wing, the AA, is also facing formidable challenges. The most obvious one is logistical: how to get guns and ammunition from rebel-held areas in Kachin and Shan State — where the main source of military supplies are — to Rakhine? During the fighting before the ceasefire agreement was struck, the AA showed that it had remarkable firepower and the Myanmar military suffered heavy casualties. But if fighting resumes, how can the AA’s troops be resupplied? The other issue would be how to relate to the state’s Muslim population. In recent years, an extremely militant group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has emerged. It launched several attacks on military and police outposts in 2016 and 2017 which, in turn, led to a massive counteroffensive and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to Bangladesh. ARSA should not be considered an indigenous group — it was formed by Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, a second-generation Rohingya. He was born in Karachi, Pakistan, and grew up in Saudi-Arabia, where he was groomed by Islamic fundamentalists. Ataullah has unleashed his fury even on what are supposed to be his own countrymen, among them Mohib Ullah, a Rohingya moderate and human rights activist, who was killed by ARSA in a refugee camp in Bangladesh on September 29, 2021. In a recent video, a visibly angry and agitated Ataullah exhorts his followers to “burn down” the dwellings of Rakhine Buddhists and “strike hard” against them. It may be easy for the AA to distance itself from ARSA, but the Rohingya question is bound to create controversies. While the AA and other Rakhine nationalists accept the fact that Muslims have been living in the area for centuries, and that many more settled in Arakan during the colonial era, they argue that most Rakhine consider the very name ‘Rohingya’ offensive and refuse to use it. According to their line of argument, it gives the impression that the Muslims are not a religious community but a distinct ethnic group, and, as some of the Rohingya claim, that they are the original inhabitants of the land. Rather offensively, nearly all political movements among the Rohingya also have a map of the entire Rakhine State in their emblems. Rakhine nationalists also argue that the name Rohingya was not used by anyone until the 1950s. Those who argue that there is separate Rohingya identity based in history usually quote a 1799 study by Scottish physician and geographer Francis Buchanan-Hamilton, who never went to Arakan but met some Muslims in the then capital Amarapura. He mentions that they referred to themselves as “Rooinga, or natives of Arakan” and then said little more. But, as Martin Smith points out: “After annexation [in 1826], the British do not appear to have used this name again. Muslims in Arakan were instead referred to by such terms as Arakanese Mohammedan, Bengali Muslim, Chittagonian, Kaman and Zerbadi…[and] it would be difficult to imagine a situation in modern-day Europe where discussions of citizenship or identity become based around the writings of an Asian traveler two centuries ago.” Be that as it may, but there are few questions in Myanmar today which are more than contested — and often heated — than disputes over the origin of the name Rohingya, and who and what they are. Internationally, the name Rohingya and their identity as such is almost universally accepted. But it’s an entirely different story in Myanmar, and then not only among the Rakhine. On this issue, most Burmans would be on the same side as the Rakhine nationalists. This year and next may reveal what the future holds for the new nationalist movement in Rakhine State. A lot depends on what happens in the rest of the country. On the one hand, the junta has not managed to consolidate its grip on the country and its coup last year may go down in history as the most unsuccessful attempt to seize power in modern Asian history. That works to the advantage of the ULA and its parallel administration as well as the resistance elsewhere in Myanmar. But, on the other hand, future developments depend on the extent to which the country’s abundance of resistance forces can coordinate their movements — and despite some alliances being forged — there is so far little evidence of that happening..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-01-20
Date of entry/update: 2022-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description: "Stories from an Ancient Land: Perspectives on Wa History and Culture By Magnus Fiskesjö Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2021, 314 pages. US$145 (hardcover), US$33.03 (Kindle) The Wa, who live on both sides of the Myanmar-China border, are probably Southeast Asia’s most misunderstood—and often maligned—ethnic minority. Over the years, they have been described as wild headhunters, communist rebels, drug traffickers and puppets of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In Myanmar, many people seem to believe that they are a kind of Chinese when they are, in fact, a Mon-Khmer tribe related to the Palaung of northern and eastern Shan State. This book by US-based Swedish anthropologist Magnus Fiskesjö, therefore, is a very welcome contribution to a better understanding of the Wa. Although his field work was done almost exclusively on the Chinese side of the border, his accounts of Wa culture and history, and the group’s troubled relationship with the Chinese state, should be essential reading for anyone interested in peace along the common border. And that is especially important now, given the United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s position as the strongest and best-equipped ethnic armed group in the country at a time when Myanmar is descending into chaos. They have not, so far, played any direct role in domestic politics and they are not fighting the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. But several groups that are, among them the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army, and to a lesser extent the Kachin Independence Army, have benefited from arms, ammunition and other equipment supplied by the UWSA. The Wa in Myanmar have never been controlled by any central authority. During the British time, colonial presence consisted of little more than a few field officers on the outskirts of the hills, and occasional flag-marches up to the border to show the Chinese where their designated territory supposedly ended. After independence, the Wa Hills were ruled by local chieftains and warlords, and, in some parts, remnants of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, forces that had retreated across the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists during the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949. Then, in the early 1970s, the Wa Hills were taken over by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which established a base area covering most of the border mountains. In 1989, the rank-and-file of the CPB’s army, which included thousands of Wa fighters, mutinied against the ageing, staunchly Maoist leadership of the party, drove them into exile in China, and established their own army, the UWSA. Today, the 20,000-30,000-strong UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party, rules the Wa Hills without any central government interference. Their area is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. On the Chinese side, the situation has historically been equally complex. The emperors in Beijing had no jurisdiction over the Chinese Wa Hills, and contacts with the Wa were limited to some merchants who had dealings with them in opium, silver and salt. That changed after 1949, when the PLA moved into the Wa Hills to counter the Kuomintang’s attempts to reenter southern China from their clandestine bases in northeastern Shan State. As Fiskesjö explains, many Wa, who feared the Chinese, then fled into the Myanmar Wa Hills. But, by and large, the PLA treated the local population relatively well because they needed the Wa’s knowledge of terrain in order to secure the border areas, and depended on them for intelligence, even across the border into the Wa Hills of Myanmar, where the Kuomintang had bases. After a few years of comparative leniency, and as soon as the Kuomintang threat had been eliminated, the Chinese introduced a new, and unwelcome, social and political order. Weapons in the possession of Wa villagers, who were used to being armed because they depended on hunting, were confiscated and according to Fiskesjö all paraphernalia associated with head-hunting were destroyed. Drum houses, the main social institution in any Wa village, were torn down, their log drums were thrown out or burned and “the major rituals of the past were abandoned. Chief ritualists and other leaders were demoted, marginalized, or even prosecuted.” Wa elders Fiskesjö spoke to regarded 1958 as the key watershed, “since in that year the Chinese policy shifted from reconciliation to enforcement.” Even the Wa had to become Chinese communists and were herded into people’s communes. But what about head-hunting and opium? According to Fiskesjö, head-hunting as well as poppy appeared “in the Wa lands relatively recently.” Opium, Fiskesjö writes, “was seized upon as a new source of wealth…as a profitable but illicit crop, it could be grown with impunity only in these mountains, well away from the interference of states.” And that happened in the late 19th and early 20th century, presumably because there was then a huge demand for the drug in China. As for head-hunting, in the past bodies of dead tigers were placed outside villages to scare away potential enemies; but “after the wars of the mid-19th century, and with the spread of modern firearms [tigers] have now become scarce…[and] in a way humans replaced tigers as the most dangerous adversary of the land.” Long lines of posts, or a nog in Wa, with dry, whitened skulls on display lined the paths leading into villages and “served as a key Wa weapon of deterrence, legible as such by alien soldier-observers like the British and the Chinese.” The only place where Fiskesjö’s analysis goes astray is when he describes the arrival of the CPB in the Myanmar Wa Hills. He writes that “the Chinese-supported [CPB], equipped with modern weaponry, moved from central Burma into Wa country in the late 1960s.” In fact, the CPB takeover of the border areas came after more than a hundred Myanmar communists, who had been living in exile in China since the early 1950s, came across the border on January 1, 1968 accompanied by a few hundred Kachin, followers of the early rebel leader Naw Seng, who had retreated independently into China at about the same time—and thousands of heavily armed Red Guard volunteers from China who were sent to fight alongside their Myanmar comrades. The first incursion took place at Möng Ko in the north, far from the Wa Hills, and it was not until the early 1970s that the CPB, with Chinese assistance, took over the Wa Hills. The plan was to establish a “liberated area” along the border and from there push down to the Myanmar heartland, where poorly equipped CPB units were still holding out in places like the Pegu Yoma north of Yangon, and pockets in Sagaing Division, the Arakan Hills and Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi). That plan failed as the Tatmadaw realized that it could only contain, not defeat, the “new” CPB forces on the Chinese border—of whom the vast majority soon consisted of Wa conscripts—and, therefore, concentrated its efforts on wiping out the old strongholds in central Myanmar. That strategy proved to be successful and the last of the old major bases, those in the Pegu Yoma, were overrun in 1975. The number of Pegu Yoma survivors who made it to the new, northeastern base area was minimal. When I was at the then CPB headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in 1986-1987, I was able to meet only two such veterans. But Fiskesjö is correct in saying that the imposition of CPB rule over the Wa Hills led to the annihilation of “the long-standing Wa autonomy, or, more precisely, what remained of Wa autonomy after World War II, when parts of the Wa lands became the battleground of Chinese Kuomintang forces on the run from the lost cause of their civil war in China.” Fiskesjö goes on to explain how “the broad assault on Wa cultural and political traditions under the [CPB] in some ways was even more drastic than what occurred in Chinese-annexed Wa territory.” Indeed, the “new” CPB treated the Wa as little more than cannon fodder in their struggle to reach central Myanmar, where the party’s future, if any, would have lied. It is significant that the CPB chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin left his headquarters at Panghsang only to go to China, and, on a few occasions, to Möng Ko. He never even once visited a Wa village inside the CPB-controlled base area to talk to the people there. The outcome of the CPB’s failure to reach the Myanmar heartland was that it became isolated in a remote mountain area where they did not belong and had never intended to stay. That, in turn, led to the 1989 mutiny, in which the CPB’s Wa troops stormed Panghsang and the Myanmar communists, once again, had to seek refuge in China. But this time, China had changed its policy. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, the Myanmar communists were not allowed to engage in any kind of politics, and had to survive on pensions provided to them by Chinese authorities. In one of the most powerful chapters in the book, Fiskesjö describes how commercial entrepreneurs in modern times have built theme parks where supposed head-hunting paraphernalia are on display, and visitors can stay in newly-built huts and watch “wild Wa tribesmen” perform “exotic” dances which have no resemblance to Wa traditions. The much-promoted Wa “hair dance”, where young Wa women toss their long hair back and forth, is one such invention. One of those “China Folk Cultural Villages” in Shenzhen opposite Hong Kong is called “Windows of the World, where young Wa dancers also work — but they perform there as Africans, New Zealand Maoris, and American Indians.” It is no wonder many Wa feel exploited and resent being looked down upon by the Chinese—and that strained relationship, as well as the past Wa history of being oppressed by the Chinese Communist Party, is something most foreign observers have overlooked. The UWSA today may be heavily dependent on the Chinese for trade, and its vast and sophisticated arsenal made up almost entirely of weapons procured in China. But that does not mean that relations between China and the Wa in Myanmar are as smooth as people think. And drugs? Fiskesjö outlines the history of poppy cultivation in the Wa Hills but, as an anthropologist, does not dwell on today’s trade in narcotics. There is no doubt that the UWSA built up its now well-developed, autonomous area in Myanmar with profits from the trade in opium and heroin, and, more recently, methamphetamines. But it would also be fair to say that the organization’s relative wealth today is based on a number of other sources of income as well. Tin mining and the extraction of rare earth metals are believed to be more lucrative than the trade in narcotics. The price of the book, US$145, may make most people interested in the topic reluctant to buy it, but there is also a more affordable Kindle version of this groundbreaking study. Read it—it is well worth it. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description: "Bomb blasts not only in major cities like Yangon, Mandalay and Naypyitaw, but also in smaller upcountry towns, ambushes on army convoys, gun battles in Magwe and Sagaing regions, and, across the country, assassinations of suspected military informants. While it is too early to describe the violence that has broken out in the Myanmar heartland since the Feb. 1 coup as a full-scale civil war, the military, known as the Tatmadaw, has for the first time in decades had to fight armed rebels in areas far away from the country’s traditional trouble spots in the ethnic-minority-inhabited frontiers. It is an entirely new kind of conflict that the Tatmadaw is not used to fighting and, therefore, incapable of containing. It is, for instance, doubtful whether its intended attacks on the rebel forces—which amount to indiscriminate firing into inhabited areas because the soldiers are unable to locate them—will have any effect other than further alienating and radicalizing a population that previously only demonstrated peacefully against the coup. Myanmar’s new kind of armed conflict differs also in many other respects from the old wars against ethnic rebels in the border areas, as well as the fighting in the heartland in the years immediately after independence from Britain in 1948. Myanmar’s ethnic insurgents have always been organized along strict military lines, which makes them unique in a global perspective. Unlike rebels in other countries, they are dressed in distinct uniforms with insignia showing their ranks. Myanmar’s ethnic rebels look more like regular armies and control and administer areas, and have camps complete with barracks, parade grounds and makeshift office buildings. The Burman militants who after independence resorted to armed struggle against central authorities were not that well-organized. But they also established huge base areas which they governed and from there launched attacks on government positions. That applied to smaller groups like militants from the People’s Volunteer Organization, a paramilitary force formed by General Aung San after World War II that rebelled after independence, and various bands of mutineers from the Tatmadaw—but mainly to the once powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Communist strongholds attacked Soon after the outbreak of the civil war in 1948—and at that time, it was an all-out civil war—the CPB established strongholds in the Pegu Yoma mountains north of Yangon, in the Irrawaddy Delta, the Arakan Yoma, Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi), and upper Sagaing Division (now region). It was also active in and around Pyinmana, where the party organized farmers in struggles and strikes against landlords and moneylenders. At one stage, the cabinet of the then prime minister, U Nu, was referred to as “the Yangon government” because it did not control much more than the then capital itself. Karen rebels battled in the eastern mountains and in the Irrawaddy Delta for independence. In northern Arakan (now Rakhine State), Muslim rebels known as mujaheeds fought for accession to Pakistan (Bangladesh was then the eastern part of Pakistan.) Smaller groups of Karenni and Mon rebels had their own armed bands in areas near the Thai border. Nationalist Chinese, or Kuomintang, forces that had been defeated by the communists in the Chinese civil war, had bases in northern and eastern Shan State from where they tried, unsuccessfully, to re-enter China and foment an uprising against Mao Zedong’s government. In the late 1950s, a rebellion broke out among the Shan and, in the early 1960s, the Kachin organized one of the strongest ethnic resistance armies in Myanmar. While the Tatmadaw never managed to defeat the ethnic rebels in the border areas, it was more successful fighting the CPB. By the late 1950s, the CPB’s forces had been more or less contained to the Pegu Yoma with smaller units holding out in the mountains of northwestern Arakan, the jungles of Tenasserim, and the Pinlebu area in upper Sagaing. The Kuomintang, meanwhile, had been driven across the border to Thailand and no longer poses any serious threat to national security. Myanmar’s communist insurgency would also have been over—had it not been for the People’s Republic of China. In 1968, CPB soldiers, of whom many were Chinese Red Guard volunteers accompanied by Burman political commissars, poured across the border with China into northern Shan State. They soon recruited local tribesmen to fight for them and, within a couple of years, a new and very different CPB base area had been established. It encompassed more than 20,000 square kilometers of territory adjacent to China, stretching from Panghsai and Mong Ko in northernmost Shan State, to Kokang and the Wa Hills, and down to the mountains north of Kengtung. The “new” CPB had its own administration in those areas—and was much better armed than the “old” CPB. During the decade 1968-1978, China poured in more arms, ammunition and other supplies to the CPB than to any other foreign communist resistance movement outside Indochina. But the CPB never intended to stay in the wild mountains on the Chinese frontier. The plan was to push down to the Pegu Yoma and other strongholds in central Myanmar and, eventually, take over Yangon. The Tatmadaw realized that, and also concluded that it would not be able to defeat the new, well-equipped forces. Hence, the Tatmadaw decided to contain the CPB in the northeast — and to wipe out what remained of the CPB in central Myanmar. In that way, the CPB would never be able to seize power. That strategy was clever and it worked. The Irrawaddy Delta region and some smaller strongholds were “pacified” in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A massive offensive was then launched against the Pegu Yoma. The CPB camps there were overrun in 1975 and the civilian population in and around the mountain range was resettled in other parts of central Myanmar. After that, there was no more fighting in the Myanmar heartland against the CPB. Karen rebels who had also been active in the Pegu Yoma and the Irrawaddy Delta lost their bases there as well, and the survivors retreated to the Thai border. It was only in 1991 that the Karen National Union (KNU) managed to send some troops to re-enter a Karen-inhabited area in the Irrawaddy Delta. Unexpectedly for the Tatmadaw, Karen rebels, who had come from the Thai border, were seen digging trenches and stockpiling guns in the Bogalay area only some 140 km southwest of Yangon. The Tatmadaw responded with fury using newly acquired Chinese aircraft and gunboats. The then commander of the Tatmadaw’s infantry, General Than Shwe, led the campaign, which was codenamed Operation Storm and led to the KNU troops in the area being eliminated—but at a heavy price for the civilian population, who suffered badly during the onslaught on the rebels. Villages were bombed and, among those killed, most were ordinary villagers, not insurgents. Ceasefire with the Wa After the fall of the Pegu Yoma, insignificant CPB units managed to hold out in northern Arakan and in Tenasserim, but the party had become isolated in its base area in the northeast, where it did not belong and never had any intention of staying. That, in turn, led to a mutiny within the non-Burman, mainly Wa but also Kokang, rank-and-file of the CPB’s army in 1989. The old CPB leadership was driven into exile in China while its former forces were reorganized into ethnic armies, the strongest of which became the United Wa State Army (UWSA). But rather than fighting, it entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw soon after the mutiny. Since then, rather curiously, the UWSA has become stronger and better equipped than the CPB ever was—and its guns and other supplies have been obtained from China. While the UWSA is not doing any fighting on its own, it has shared some of its weaponry with other ethnic armies such as the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and, to a lesser extent, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Those armies are fighting the Tatmadaw, but the powerful Arakan Army (AA), which has also benefited from UWSA arms supplies, has distanced itself from all other resistance armies in Myanmar. The AA says it wants to regain the independence the old Arakan kingdom lost to the Burman kings when they occupied the area in 1785. With that aim in mind, the AA has not established any liberated areas but, instead, built up a parallel administration in Rakhine State. That, briefly, was the situation until the Feb. 1 coup. The new Burman resistance fighters are supposed to be organized into a loose alliance called the People’s Defense Force (PDF). That umbrella organization is considered the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), which was set up by ousted MPs and other politicians after the Tatmadaw staged its coup and formed a junta called the State Administration Council (SAC). But it is uncertain how much coordination there is between the different PDFs and, in addition to those, there is an abundance of other local resistance forces that operate independently. But all in all, the anti-SAC resistance is active mainly in Magwe, Sagaing, Ayeyarwady, Mandalay and Tanintharyi regions, where there has been no heavy fighting for decades. Fighting has also flared up in Chin and Kayah (Karenni) states, ethnic areas which before the coup were the scene of only low-intensity conflicts. PDF/ethnic alliance The PDFs in the far north are allied with the KIA, whose soldiers have even accompanied groups of Burman resistance fighters in raids outside the boundaries of Kachin State. By doing so, the KIA is hoping to draw Tatmadaw units away from its besieged bases in Kachin State, a military strategy that seems to have had the desired effect. The Tatmadaw now appears to be gearing up for major offensives in Magwe Region and Chin State, not in the far north. The outcome of the fight against the PDF is uncertain, as the Tatmadaw cannot employ the same tactics as it did against the CPB. The new-era rebels, unlike the CPB in central Myanmar in the old days, do not have any “liberated areas” with camps that can be overrun. And they cannot be contained in the border areas because those are controlled by the KIA and other ethnic armies. In rural areas, it is a hit-and-run game while, in the towns, Myanmar is for the first time in history facing urban guerrillas—and the Tatmadaw has zero experience of that kind of warfare. It is also a question of what kind of resources the Tatmadaw can throw into battling this new kind resistance. An offensive in one part of the country could lead to more rebel activity, ethnic as well as Burman, in other states and regions. The Tatmadaw will be stretched thin on many battlefronts at a time when the morale of its troops is already low. Constant ambushes and bomb attacks along roads which only a year ago were considered safe have taken their toll on the soldiers’ willingness to fight—and that applies to all corners of the country. According to local, non-partisan civil organization workers, Tatmadaw units in Karen State have even resorted to reporting phantom battles to their high command in Naypyitaw. They claim that they have captured Karen rebel camps and outposts when no such attacks occurred, and to have been engaged in battles that never took place. It is impossible to say what the extremely complex situation that the coup has caused will lead to. In the worst-case scenario, it could cause a fragmentation of Myanmar with no one able to hold the country reasonably well together. Dissent within the ranks of the Tatmadaw could also led to coups or coup attempts with extremely uncertain outcomes, even a repeat of the mutinies and chaos that prevailed in the wake of independence in 1948. But gone is the cautious optimism that many, falsely it turned out, felt after the Tatmadaw decided to open up the country in 2011. False hopes on the part of the Tatmadaw because it had not expected the massive rebirth of the National League for Democracy—and a development that was misinterpreted by mostly foreign pundits who seemed to believe that the generals had gone through some democratic awakening experience. In the end, it was inevitable that the Tatmadaw would intervene and try to reassert power. We are now experiencing the disastrous consequences of that fateful decision. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-10-18
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description: "The shadow National Unity Government’s (NUG) declaration of war earlier this week against the military regime has echoes of 1949, when armed organizations rebelled against the government, occupied half the country and fought the Myanmar military. With NUG Acting President Duwa Lashila calling on civilian resistance fighters to target the junta and its assets and for ethnic armed organizations to join the fight against the regime, the NUG is hoping to unify anti-coup forces to fight the junta in more effective fashion. But just a few months after Myanmar gained its independence in 1948, several armed organizations took up arms against the then Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government over ideological conflicts and racial tensions. At that time Myanmar’s population was 17 million, compared to around 54 million today. The Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the then armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) – which was established before independence – rebelled against the government after their demand to be allowed to secede from the Union was denied. The KNU was also at odds with the government over the Karen peoples’ territorial boundaries within the Union. Two Karen battalions from the Myanmar military – one based in Pyay and the other in Taungoo in today’s Bago Region – as well as ethnic Karen police joined the KNDO. Other leftist units in Myanmar’s military including Battalions 1 and 3, based respectively in Thayet in today’s Magwe Region and Mingalardon in Yangon, and some Bago-based units also rebelled against the government. The military-published history of internal insurgency in Myanmar said that there were only around 2,000 officers and men left in Myanmar’s military at the time. Anti-government groups, which also included different factions of communists, were stronger than the Myanmar military because they had weapons left behind after World War II and also because the defecting units took their arms with them when they joined the revolt. Troops from the Communist Party of Burma, which had a force of between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters, occupied towns in today’s Ayeyarwady, Bago, Mandalay and Magwe regions, including Hinthada, Pyinmana, Yamethin, Myingyan and Pakokku. Meanwhile, the white-band faction of the People’s Volunteer Organization, which was formed by independence hero General Aung San from war veterans as his own paramilitary force for the independence struggle, occupied towns in central Myanmar. The KNDO, which was believed to have at least 10,000 soldiers, occupied Mawlamyine and Thaton in Mon State, in collaboration with the Mon National Defence Organisation. By early 1949, the KNDO had taken control of Mandalay, Pyin Oo Lwin, Taungoo, Pathein, Meiktila and several other towns before its troops reached and occupied Insein Township in the north of Yangon. Between February 1 and May 22 in 1949, the KNDO was able to retain control of Insein, posing a great threat to the central government in Yangon. Amid the chaos, government employees went on strike across the country, which was ultimately counterproductive as it gave the government a breathing space. “At the time, the Union government was completely broke. Fortunately, government employees came out on strike across the country. We didn’t even have the money to pay their salaries,” said the then Prime Minister U Nu. Yangon was surrounded by the vanguards of armed groups. The government was unable to control the rebellion around the country and was struggling to hold Yangon. Some international newspapers even started referring to the U Nu government as the ‘Yangon Government’. “The Union of Myanmar (then Burma) was rocked violently throughout 1948 and until April 1949,” wrote U Thant, a civil servant in the U Nu government who would later become United Nations Secretary-General, in his book Journey to Pyithawthar. As Myanmar’s military units were short of weapons, U Nu had to fly to New Delhi to seek help from his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru. Only after Nehru provided arms was the AFPFL government able to start reoccupying the towns taken by the rebels. U Nu’s government was also helped by the fact that the different armed groups were no longer collaborating because of their different political objectives. By 1950, the government had retaken control of most of the occupied towns. But more armed groups would later emerge and, over the next 70 years, Myanmar would continue to suffer from insurgencies until today’s civil war..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Description: "Ethnic conflict has dominated the political landscape of Burma (Myanmar) since independence from Great Britain in 1948. In the process, countless lives have been lost, many communities dislocated from their homes, and a country that was deemed to have the brightest future of any of its Asian neighbors at independence has stagnated to become one of the world’s poorest. In such state failures, tragedy is interwoven with irony. Burma, indeed, is the land where the anthropologist Edmund Leach carried out his ground-breaking studies into patterns of cultural inter-change among peoples. In essence, Leach concluded that ethnic and political identities are neither innate nor inflexible, but develop on the basis of understandings and cultural exchanges between different societies. Since this time, ethnic field research in Burma has come to a virtual halt. The world of Asian studies thus owes a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Josef Silverstein. Since the 1950s, his writings on ethnic questions have stood out as a persistent – and often lone – beacon of concerned but independent analysis. At the beginning of the 21st century, his works are as pertinent as when he first began. Not only has he crystallized complex issues in understandable form, but he has done this in a language that has become common currency in many international understandings of the country and its challenges. A particular issue in Burmese politics over the past 60 years has been the lack of common forums or platforms where different parties and nationalities might equally work together. As Prof. Silverstein has described, underpinning these failures is the ‘dilemma of national unity’.1 Important ethnic questions date back to the pre-colonial past. But, in general, the modern roots of many problems can be found in the political divisions of Burma, under a diarchic system, between ‘Ministerial Burma’ and the ethnic minority ‘Frontier Areas Administration’ during British rule. Inter-communal relations were then exacerbated by conflict during the Second World War, and the challenge of national unity has remained evident in all political eras since Burma’s independence in 1948..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Burma Studies Group, Association of Asian Studies Conference (Washington D.C.)
2002-04-05
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 39.22 KB (10 pages)
more
Description: "It is hardly surprising that the ethnic rebellions in states like those inhabited by the Kachin and Karen have flared anew since the military seized absolute power in Myanmar on Feb. 1, and that Bamar dissidents from cities and towns have sought refuge in areas controlled by ethnic rebels in the north and east. That happened after the military crushed a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988 as well. But this time, the sound of gunfire and bomb blasts can be heard in Yangon, Mandalay and other cities and towns in the country’s heartland. And, in the ethnic areas, some of the heaviest fighting has raged in Chin and Kayah states, which for decades have not seen any widespread insurgencies. Even there, it is a new type of rebellion. Myanmar’s older ethnic rebel armies, who have been battling for self-rule and autonomy for decades, are dressed up in uniforms with insignia, the officers have ranks, they are based in camps and are organized along the lines of regular armies anywhere in the world. The “new rebels” in Chin and Kayah states have none of that, and, unlike the ethnic rebel armies, are not equipped with automatic rifles but hunting guns, homemade weapons and bombs they have assembled themselves. Even so, if reports on social media sites are to be believed, they have managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. Dozens of soldiers have been killed in ambushes and by roadside bombs—which, in turn, has provoked a massive and brutal response from the Tatmadaw. Heavy artillery and airpower have been used, but since the Tatmadaw is facing a largely invisible enemy, the firing into villages suspected of harboring the rebels has been indiscriminate, houses have been torched and even places of worship, like churches in predominantly Christian areas of Kayah State, have been damaged. As a result, according to a June 24 statement by Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for UN Secretary General António Guterres, “an estimated 230,000 people have been displaced because of violence, fights and insecurity.” According to local sources in Demoso, Kayah State quoted by The Irrawaddy, Tatmadaw troops have also looted shops and entered homes and taken whatever they feel like. With all of that comes widespread anger at central military authorities—and the possibility of strengthening older, centrifugal forces on the periphery, which would be a challenge to anyone who wants to keep the country together. Kayah State is inhabited by several ethnic groups of whom the Karenni, or Kayah, are the predominant among the state’s population of approximately 286,000. Originally Animist, many of them were converted to Christianity, mainly by Baptist missionaries, in the 19th century. But the Mong Pai (Mobye in Burmese) area on the Shan State border—where more than a dozen Tatmadaw soldiers were killed by local rebels in May—is where the Kayan, or Padaung, people live. They are predominantly Roman Catholic and their women are famous for wearing brass neck rings, which make their necks seem longer. There is an old rebel army in Kayah State, the Karenni Army (KA), which is the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) but has been engaged only in sporadic fighting since it was formed in the 1970s. But Kayah State has a very different administrative history from other Myanmar states. Although Animist or Christian, its people adopted at an early stage in history Shan political culture and established their own principalities. Following the advent of British colonial power in the 19th century, central Burma, as it was then called, became a colony, while the 40-or-so Shan states achieved a status similar to that of being protectorates. The Karenni states, on the other hand, were recognized as “independent” under an agreement signed in 1875 by T.D. Forsyth for the British crown and Kinwun Mingyi U Kaung, the representative of the king in Mandalay: “It is hereby agreed that the Burmese and British Governments that the states of Western Karenni shall remain separate and independent and that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be claimed or exercised over that State.” Consequently, the Karenni states of Kyebogyi, Kantarawaddy and Bawlake were marked as “independent” on maps throughout the colonial era although, in reality, they enjoyed the same status as the Shan principalities. But British presence was light, and there was little interference in the internal affairs of the Karenni states. The Karenni and Shan states were the only states which, according to the 1947 constitution, had the right to secede from the then proposed Union of Burma after 10 years of independence. The Kachin and Karen states, which were to be formed after independence, did not have that right. But the Karenni rose in rebellion as early as 1946 in anticipation of the formation of the Union. The United Karenni Independent States were proclaimed to safeguard the “independence” of the area. An armed wing called the United Karenni States Independence Army was formed in 1948 but the rebellion petered out after the arrest of the main leader, Saw Maw Reh, in 1949. He was released in 1953 and was among those who formed the KNPP in 1957. The KA was set up in 1974, but like its mother organization the KNPP, it was based mainly on the Thai border opposite Mae Hong Son, where it benefited from the black-market trade between the two countries. A smaller faction broke away and formed an alliance with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), but its presence in Kayah State was very limited. When Saw Maw Reh died in 1994, the KNPP/KA lost most of its remaining strength and the movement slipped more or less into oblivion—until now. The Kayan formed their own organization called the Kayan Newland Party (KNLP). Set up in 1964, it was for years led by Shwe Aye, aka Naing Hlu Ta, a former university student, who allied the movement with the CPB. In 1994, the KNLP was one of many rebel groups that made peace with the then military government. Local conflicts with rival groups and government demands for total surrender have decimated the group and it is now no longer active. The recent surge of fighting in Kayah State, therefore, appears to be unconnected with older insurrections. The Chin, like the other hill peoples, including their distant relatives the Kachin, were also Animists before the arrival of the Christian missionaries. But unlike the Kachin they never managed to establish a formidable rebel army. One reason is that—again unlike the Kachin, among whom the Jinghpaw dialect became the lingua franca—the Chin remained divided by more than 30 (according to some counts, 44) different, mutually unintelligible dialects. In the 1970s, the Kachin Independence Army made an attempt to raise an allied force in Chin State—the Chin Independence Army, with the unfortunate abbreviation of CIA—but it soon vanished from the scene. The Chin are more closely related to the Mizo (or Lushai, as they were called during the colonial era) of northeastern India, and cross-border contacts have always been strong and frequent. The establishment of Mizoram, a separate state for the Mizo, in India in 1987 also had repercussions in Chin State. Much to the embarrassment of the Indian government, the Indian flag was hoisted in several towns in Chin State in 1988. It was followed by a demand by local leaders that Chin State should secede from Myanmar and join newly formed Mizoram. A smaller rebel group called the Chin National Front (CNF) with the Chin National Army (CNA) as its armed wing was formed when a number of Chin students went underground after the 1988 uprising. They did get some support from across the border in India, where the Research and Analysis Wing (India’s external intelligence agency) used them to collect intelligence. They were also unofficially allowed to set up a base in a remote part of southern Mizoram. It was known as the Victoria Camp and named after Mount Victoria (Nat Ma Taung in Burmese), the highest mountain in Chin State. But it was abandoned in 2005 and the CNF remained an insignificant group—until ex-general U Thein Sein launched his so-called “peace process” after assuming the presidency in 2011. In 2015 the CNF became one of the eight original signatories of U Thein Sein’s “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement”, but it was then so small and insignificant that it was awarded an area in Chin State where it could set up a headquarters, also called Victoria Camp. It was seen as important that the so-called “signatories” were credible forces, although only two of them, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Karen National Union, had any actual armed forces. Photos of uniformed CNA troops began to appear on social media sites, but their weaponry seems to consist almost exclusively of wooden cutouts. The CNA does not appear to have taken an active role in the recent fighting in Chin State, where in May a local force calling itself the Chinland Defense Force (CDF) seized control of a town called Mindat and, according to local sources, killed more than 30 Tatmadaw soldiers before being forced out after heavy bombardment from the air and by artillery fire. The CDF has also launched attacks near the Chin State capital Hakha and other places in the area. But on May 28, the CNF, perhaps because it did not want to be overtaken by events, declared that it had forged an alliance with the National Unity Government (NUG), which consists of elected MPs who were ousted on Feb. 1 and other pro-democracy individuals. It is also worth noting that the main spokesman of the NUG, Dr. Sasa, is a Chin who is among the thousands of Chin who fled to India after the coup and the subsequent flare-up of fighting in the home areas. Some sources put the number of refugees in India at more than 20,000, nearly all of them from Chin State and adjacent lowland areas. A smaller number of refugees are in Manipur, the Indian state north of Mizoram. It is too early to say whether the new rebellions that the coup has ignited will have any significant, long-term impact. The initial success of their ambushes could not have been carried out without widespread popular support, but in order to fight an insurgency, they would need more sophisticated weaponry than they presently have at their disposal. In the past, Thailand had a huge gray weapons market where many Myanmar rebel armies bought their guns. But that is no longer the case and China, the only other possible source of military hardware, would provide only the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and, indirectly, the allied forces of that group with weapons. None of the new rebel armies would fall into that category. The UWSA has also shown through its inactivity that it wants to be aloof of the post-coup anti-Tatmadaw movement, and will remain uninvolved. It is also not possible that the new rebels will have access to safe havens in neighboring countries, which they would need in order to survive and expand. The Thais are not even willing to let the thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Myanmar cross the border, and those who did manage to escape to Mizoram can, at most, expect humanitarian assistance from their fellow Mizo. And then there is the issue of ethnic identity. Is there any coordination between the new rebel groups in ethnic areas and urban guerrillas carrying out attacks in cities and towns? Will the new armies in ethnic areas, in the end, join kindred rebels fighting for autonomy or, in some cases, secession from an oppressive, Bamar-dominated central power? The only thing that can be said with certainty is that junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing probably had no idea of the forces he and his henchmen would unleash when, nearly five months ago, they decided to launch a coup, a move that has thrown the country into turmoil, causing immense suffering and tearing the country apart..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
more
Sub-title: While the world gasps at the Myanmar military's brutal crackdown, there is little hope for a soldier-led mutiny or countercoup
Description: "A military coup that overthrows a democratically elected government and sparks three months of nationwide protests and strikes. More than 700 people including children as young as five shot and killed as security forces fire into crowds of anti-military demonstrators. Thousands of people, among them not only politicians, activists and journalists but also some of the nation’s best-known singers, movie stars and celebrities arrested on various trumped-up charges. An economy on its knees with non-performing banks and foreign investors running for the exits. Such a litany would normally be enough to bring down any coup-installed government through a counter-coup or some other action by a military’s top brass who could see the self-defeatism of trying to cling to power when nearly the entire population is opposed to your takeover and rule. But not in Myanmar. Instead, the military and its controlled police seem prepared to do whatever it takes to preserve its democracy-suspending power grab. So far, there have been no signs of substantial cracks or divisions within the security establishment apart from a handful of policemen who have fled to rebel-held territories near the Thai border or across the border into neighboring northeastern India. But is Myanmar’s military truly full of spineless, mindless yes-men, or is there something else that holds the institution together in the face of massive local resistance and rising international condemnation? The simplistic explanation, put forth mostly by foreign security analysts, is that the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, is a battle-hardened force that has been fighting against an array of political and ethnic rebels continuously for more than 70 years. Myanmar’s civil wars broke out shortly after independence was achieved from Britain in 1948. Before that, an army founded by independence hero Aung San had fought alongside the Japanese military against the British and then, at the end of World War II, allied themselves with the British and turned against the Japanese. Consequently, the Tatmadaw sees itself as the true defender of the nation’s independence and the only force that can hold the ethnically diverse and politically divided country together. But that analysis misses the enigma of military power in Myanmar. Although Aung San’s daughter and coup-toppled democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi once referred to the Tatmadaw as “my father’s army”, the military force which fought during World War II had little in common with the army that emerged after independence. Because of post-war agreements with the British, most of the old fighters were demobilized and turned into a militia known as the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO) which, in turn, resorted to armed struggle against the government because it saw independence as a sham that perpetuated colonial rule. By then, Aung San had been assassinated and of the legendary “Thirty Comrades” who had followed him to Japan to receive military training before the Japanese invasion of Myanmar in 1942, only three remained in the Tatmadaw in the 1950s, including army chief General Ne Win, who eventually seized power in a 1962 coup, the first absolute military-takeover in Myanmar, then known as Burma. By the 1950s, Myanmar’s civil wars were more or less over, with the rebel Karen National Union (KNU) and Communist Party of Burma (CPB) pushed back into remote areas. Persistent internal political turmoil, though, led to the formation of a caretaker government led by Ne Win, which was in power from 1958 to 1960. Rather than fighting the rebels, Ne Win and his 4th Burma Rifles spent the latter part of the 1950s building up a power base — and a business empire that in many ways endures today — centered around their regiment. In 1958, it published a document called “The National Ideology of the Defense Services” which strikingly resembles the dwifungsi, or dual function, doctrine of the Indonesian army that stated that the military has both a defense and social-political role. Ne Win also established an entity called the Defense Services Institute. (DSI), which soon controlled vital sectors of Myanmar’s economy. It had its own retail stores in Yangon and elsewhere it controlled the lucrative importation of coal for the railroads, electric supplies and inland water transport. DSI even established an external shipping line, the Five Star Line, and took over an English-owned bank and renamed it the Ava Bank. A newspaper, the Guardian, and a publishing house were also controlled by DSI. Meanwhile, the once-tiny Myanmar Army, perhaps as few as 2,000 men in 1949, grew steadily in strength and importance. By the late 1950s, Ne Win had more than 40,000 soldiers under his command. The army was becoming a state within the state, but few Myanmars, the vast majority of whom had faith in the nation’s then democratic system, constitution and rule of law, paid much attention until New Win seized power in 1962. Significantly, the junta that overthrew a democratically elected government introduced a new economic system called “the Burmese Way to Socialism.” But rather than establishing a socialist regime reminiscent of those in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or China, Ne Win’s rendition meant that everything was nationalized and taken over by 23 military-run state corporations. Military coups were not uncommon in Asia at that time, but the difference in Myanmar was that the military seized not only political but also economic power. While the economies of Thailand and Indonesia, for instance, blossomed because the military entered into marriages of convenience with indigenous plutocracies, Ne Win took Myanmar in a completely different direction. The old business community, which was mainly of Indian and Chinese origin, had their properties and assets seized by the military, driving hundreds of thousands out of Myanmar into India, Southeast Asia or Taiwan. But if the 1962 coup had been meant to squash what was left of the insurgents, it turned out to be counterproductive. A rebellion broke out among the Kachin in 1961 in areas of northern Shan state. After 1962, it spread to Kachin state and the Kachin Independence Army took over most of the state. An even smaller rebellion among the Shan, which broke out in 1958, escalated into full-scale war as several bands grouped together to form the Shan State Army in 1964. The Burmese Way to Socialism had, hardly surprisingly, led to economic collapse — and a flourishing black market with neighboring Thailand. The KNU, which controlled the border areas, collected taxes on that trade, and was able to buy modern guns from the Thai black market. And, most devastatingly, China decided to give all-out support to the CPB, including modern, sophisticated weaponry of kinds that the old forces in central Myanmar never possessed. Thus, the new power structure that emerged in Myanmar after 1962 had more to do with preserving an order that hugely privileged the military in an otherwise collapsing society than the fact that officers had seen fierce combat. That new order had a very narrow base, consisting of men from Ne Win’s own regiment, the 4th Burma Rifles. And Ne Win himself was probably the least battle-hardened senior officer in the Tatmadaw as he arguably spent more time gambling at horse races than on the battlefield. Actually, the country’s most battle-hardened officers – among them the popular Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, who was purged in the late 1950s, later joined the CPB and ended his life in exile in China, and General Tin Oo, who fought in several frontier areas and in 1988 became one of the leaders of the then newly-established National League for Democracy (NLD) – did not become killers of civilians. Rather, it was Ne Win loyalists who opened fire on demonstrating students in 1962, on students and workers in the mid-1970s, and then the massacres in 1988, when thousands of pro-democracy protesters were gunned down in the streets of Yangon and elsewhere. Ne Win and his men from the 4th Burma Rifles remained in power until after the events of 1988, when somewhat younger officers took over. Ne Win’s legacy was finally dismantled in 2002, when he died and his relatives were purged allegedly for plotting against the then-military government. But the system he created lives on today. The military became the ruling class, which enjoyed privileges denied ordinary citizens. It had its own schools and hospitals and it was rare for someone who did not come from a military family to get a job in the government. The new army that emerged after 1962 also included a series of Light Infantry Divisions, which became notorious for their brutality when fighting rebels and suppressing civil movements in urban areas, as they did in 1988 and are doing once again in the wake of the February 1 coup. The Burmese Way to Socialism was abolished after the 1988 uprising, but the military retained an important role in the semi-capitalist system that succeeded it. While Ne Win had his DSI, Myanmar’s new military leaders established powerful companies like the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, which currently have vast holdings across the economy. As such, the very concept of the 1958 declaration and the 1962 coup has not been abandoned but rather reshaped: the military should have a defense function as well as playing social, political and economic roles. Whether Suu Kyi and her NLD aimed to roll back those roles and holdings in a second elected term is an open and important question. Suu Kyi largely refrained from challenging the Tatmadaw’s political and economic power in her first term, but the NLD’s overwhelming election win last November – which coup-makers claim without evidence was fraudulent – gave her a strong mandate to push for more democratic change. Top brass leaders also likely feared the risk of retribution for their many crimes. All senior Tatmadaw officers know where the skeletons are buried of past atrocities, both in ethnic minority areas and now also in urban centers home to the middle class. The current commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is now widely loathed across the population for his regime’s ruthless post-coup clampdown. He and his associates know by now that they either maintain power or land in prison — or worse. But it is a combination of those fears, deeply entrenched economic interests and a dual-function ideology that holds the Tatmadaw so tightly together, not some underlying sense of patriotism or because officers have been hardened through battles in the field. And that explains why no cracks have or are likely to emerge in the Tatmadaw, despite the brutal, irrational and seemingly self-defeating orders being handed down by officers and carried out by unswervingly obedient foot soldiers..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 452.72 KB
more
Description: PROBLEMS OF BURMA?S C.P. "For over forty years, the Communist Party of Burma has engaged in armed struggle, supplied and backed by China. But now, as Martin Smith reports, China is more interested in cultivating friendship with the Rangoon regime. Is this the end of the road for the CPB?.."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Inside Asia" February-March 1986
1986-03-00
Date of entry/update: 2018-02-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 423.34 KB
more
Description: How communists played a shadowy role in Burma?s 1988 pro-democracy uprising
Creator/author: Aung Zaw
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 16, No. 8
2008-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2008-08-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
more
Description: Special Press Conference held on 5th August 1989... State Law and Order Restoration Council Secretary (1) Brig-Gen Khin Nyunt held a special press conference with the local and foreign journalists at the Guest House No. 2 of the Ministry of Defence at 9 am on 5th August 1989... Secretary (1) Brig-Gen Khin Nyunt explained in detail, with pictures, charts and documents, how the National Intelligence Bureau had exposed and arrested those connected with the underground work of the Burma Communist Party, the attempt made by the underground BCP members to seize State power by causing disturbances in the country and the infiltration of BCP underground members into the respective political parties and their seizing of positions in them..."
Source/publisher: SLORC press conference
1989-08-05
Date of entry/update: 2004-08-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : htm
Size: 306.19 KB
Local URL:
more