Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general

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Description: Archive to October 2016
Source/publisher: Various sources via "BurmaNet News"
Date of entry/update: 2012-04-18
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: "About 736,000 results" (4 December 2016)
Source/publisher: Google
Date of entry/update: 2016-12-04
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: About 110,000 results (August 2017); 138,000, October 2017)
Source/publisher: Various sources via Youtube
Date of entry/update: 2017-08-20
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Description: "... The Free Burma Rangers is an organization dedicated to freedom for the people of Burma. "De Oppresso Liber" is the motto of the Free Burma Rangers and we are dedicated in faith to the establishment of liberty, justice, equal rights and peace for all the people of Burma. The Free Burma Rangers support the restoration of democracy, ethnic rights and the implementation of the International Declaration of Human Rights in Burma. We stand with those who desire a nation where God's gifts of life, liberty, justice, pursuit of happiness and peace are ensured for all... MISSION: The mission of the Free Burma Rangers is to bring help, hope and love to the oppressed people of Burma. Its mission is also to help strengthen civil society, inspire and develop leadership that serves the people and act as a voice for the oppressed... ACTIONS: The Free Burma Rangers (FBR), conduct relief, advocacy, leadership development and unity missions among the people of Burma... Relief: ..."...FBR has issued some of the best documented reports on internal displacement/forced migration
Source/publisher: Free Burma Rangers
Date of entry/update: 2004-05-21
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Our Policies: "The Burmese military dictatorship spreads lies and misinformation about the KNU. We don?t recruit child soldiers, we don?t attack civilians and we are not trying to break up Burma. Read the truth about our policies here..."...Objectives: "The KNU Mission Statement is to establish a genuine Federal Union in cooperation with all the Karen and all the ethnic peoples in the country for harmony, peace, stability and prosperity for all. Read more here..."...Our Fallen Heroes: "Many brave Karen have given their lives in our struggle for freeedom. Find out more about them here..."...Our Leaders: "KNU leaders are democratically elected. Find out more here..."...Structure: "The KNU has a democratic structure, with regular elections. We also provide local services and administration in Karen State. Find out more about our structure and our democracy here..."...KNU History: "The Karen National Union is the leading political organisation representing the aspirations of the Karen people. The KNU was founded in 1947, its predecessor organisations date back to 1881..."
Source/publisher: Karen National Union
Date of entry/update: 2011-03-28
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Aims, statements, history etc. Last updated 1998
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Source/publisher: Federation of American Scientists
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Contains pages from the Shan Human Rights Foundation, Shan Herald Agency for News, Shan State Army, The Shan Democratic Union. Lots of historical and constitutional docs on the site
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Important papers on Burma/Myanmar including: Financing Dispossession; Ending Burma?s Conflict Cycle?; Conflict or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma; Burma?s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict; Ethnic Politics in Burma: The Time for Solutions; A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma?s 2010 Polls; Unlevel Playing Field: Burma?s Election Landscape; Burma?s 2010 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities; Burma in 2010: A Critical Year in Ethnic Politics...
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute
Date of entry/update: 2012-03-09
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Individual Documents

Description: "SG/SM/22167 The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres: The Secretary-General remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation and escalation of conflict in Myanmar. He condemns all forms of violence and reiterates his call for the protection of civilians including aid workers in accordance with international humanitarian law, for the cessation of hostilities, and humanitarian access. The expansion of conflict in Rakhine State is driving displacement and exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities and discrimination. The Secretary-General calls on all parties to prevent further incitement of communal tensions. He is alarmed by reports of ongoing airstrikes by the military, including today in Minbya township that reportedly killed and injured many civilians. He is concerned by reports of forcible detention and recruitment of youths, including Rohingya, and the potential impact of forced conscription on human rights and on the social fabric of communities in Myanmar. The Secretary-General calls for sustained international and regional attention to the crisis in Myanmar, including through strengthening regional refugee protection efforts and responsibility sharing with countries hosting those fleeing persecution and violence. Addressing the root causes of systemic discrimination in Myanmar and seeking accountability for serious violations of international law will be central to any lasting solution to the crisis. The United Nations is committed to staying and delivering in Myanmar and to working with all stakeholders, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional actors, to attain sustainable peace. For information media. Not an official record..."
Source/publisher: UN Secretary-General
2024-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-18
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Description: "Human Rights Council Fifty-fifth session 26 February–5 April 2024 Agenda item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Summary The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 50/3, in which the Council decided to hold, during its fifty-third session, a panel discussion on the measures necessary to find durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis and to end all forms of human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar. Also in that resolution, the Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to submit a report on the panel discussion to the Council at its fifty-fifth session. The present report contains a summary of the panel discussion, which was held on 21 June 2023. I. Introduction Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 50/3, the Council, during its fifty-third session, convened a panel discussion on the measures necessary to find durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis and to end all forms of human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar. The panel discussion, held on 21 June 2023, provided an opportunity for members and observers of the Human Rights Council, experts and other stakeholders, including representatives of the Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar, to discuss the situation of human rights of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar, and to identify potential measures and durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis, with a particular emphasis on ways to work towards the sustainable return of refugees in safety and dignity. The discussion was opened by the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights. The panellists were Yasmin Ullah, Chair of the Board of the Alternative Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Network on Burma; Chris Lewa, Founder of the Arakan Project; Kyaw Win, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network; and Mohshin Habib, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University (Ontario, Canada). II. Background Violations against ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar affect the entire spectrum of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. The Rohingya minority of Myanmar has, over generations, been subjected to institutionalized persecution, denial of identity and extreme discrimination that together have created a cycle of marginalization and led to serious violations of their human rights, which may amount to international crimes, including mass forced displacement. It continues to be deprived of citizenship and civil documentation, faces extreme restrictions on freedom of movement, has very limited access to health and education services, and to livelihood opportunities. Long-standing armed conflicts have also led to gross violations of the human rights of ethnic minorities in other States, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, forced labour, sexual and gender-based violence, and extensive forced displacement. Since the military coup of 1 February 2021, Myanmar has been caught in a downward spiral of violence, characterized by the widespread violations committed by the Myanmar military of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including the widespread use of indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery attacks in populated areas, the raiding and burning of villages, arbitrary arrests, the use of torture, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence. This catastrophic situation of human rights has also further affected the Rohingya and other minorities, causing further refugee movements to neighbouring countries and unprecedented internal displacement within Myanmar. The situation of human rights of the Rohingya and of other minorities in Myanmar has been extensively documented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in several recent reports submitted to the Human Rights Council2 as well as in the reports of successive holders of the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar3 and of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar.4 More recently, in June 2022, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 47/1, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) organized a panel discussion at the fiftieth session of the Council on the root causes of human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar. Participants in the panel discussion identified the lack of accountability for the human rights violations of the Rohingya and other minorities and the continuing impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military as the root causes of the current crisis.5 Addressing root causes of discrimination and human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar and ensuring accountability for serious crimes committed were essential to achieve durable peace and to build a society on the basis of the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Supporting long-term grass-roots initiatives aimed at strengthening intercommunity and interreligious dialogues, addressing hate speech and providing human rights education to young people were also essential. At the international level, efforts to ensure legal accountability are ongoing at the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. Meanwhile, steps to that end have also been taken at the national level in third States with relevant jurisdiction. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has been providing key support to such efforts. From August to November 2022, fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State further exposed the Rohingya community to grave risks and violations. Battles were fought in and around Rohingya villages, resulting in casualties and displacement. OHCHR had also received credible reports of the use of sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls by both parties. The Myanmar military had also imposed further restrictions on humanitarian access and on movement. Rohingyas were required to obtain temporary travel authorization for movement between townships in Rakhine State. Anyone – including children – caught undertaking unauthorized travel faced arrest and imprisonment. These had significantly affected the Rohingya community and exacerbated their protection risks and vulnerabilities. Since 2017, more than one million Rohingya in refugee camps in Bangladesh had been living in difficult conditions, facing serious security, economic and human rights challenges. Lack of adequate security in the camps had led to threats, beatings, kidnappings and numerous killings of Rohingya refugees. Owing to dwindling funding, food assistance had been reduced by 30 per cent, making life in the camps even more difficult. Gender-based violence remains high, with high rates of domestic violence and risks of trafficking in women and girls. As a result of the systemic discrimination, crippling restrictions and rising hardships, an increasing number of Rohingya had been taking immense risks to flee Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2022 alone, 3,545 Rohingya — a 360 per cent increase over the number in 2021 — attempted dangerous sea journeys to other countries in order to seek protection, security, family reunification and livelihoods, with 348 people believed to have died or gone missing at sea.6 Those intercepted at sea and returned to Myanmar faced imprisonment. The number of Rohingya arrested for unauthorized travel within Myanmar, namely seeking to travel outside Rakhine State, doubled in 2022 to around 2,000 cases. The gravity of the situation had also drawn the attention of the Security Council. At the end of 2022, while expressing concern at the recent developments in Myanmar and underlining the risks that the Rohingya situation poses for the wider region, the Council adopted resolution 2269 (2022), its first resolution on the situation in Myanmar, in which it underscored, among other things, the need to address the root causes of the crisis in Rakhine State and to create the conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. On 14 May 2023, Cyclone Mocha devastated Rakhine State, disproportionately affecting Rohingya communities, especially those who had been displaced. There were reports of disproportionate numbers of deaths of Rohingya and extensive damage to their dwellings. The dire consequences of the cyclone had been exacerbated by the actions of the Myanmar military directed at preventing humanitarian access to the affected areas and its failure, over the years, to create conditions conducive for sustainable returns. The military had suspended travel authorizations for all relief operations for several weeks and ordered that all disaster relief responses and supplies be directly managed by its own personnel. The military had not allowed the Rohingya to freely move to seek assistance, and also obstructed the relief efforts of local civil society groups through threats and arrests of those delivering aid or raising funds for relief efforts..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-01-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-19
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Description: "THREE YEARS OF POST-COUP ATROCITIES IN MYANMAR Tomorrow, 1 February, marks three years since the military in Myanmar (Burma) overthrew the civilian-led government. Since then, the people of Myanmar have endured war crimes and crimes against humanity as the military has imposed crackdowns on anti-coup protests and perpetrated an increasingly violent campaign in anti-junta strongholds across the country. The military has perpetrated mass detentions, indiscriminate bombardments and arson campaigns, targeted attacks on schools and religious buildings, rape and the weaponization of vital humanitarian aid. Since the coup, at least 4,400 people have been killed, including 1,600 in 2023 alone, and 2.6 million displaced while nearly 20,000 people remain detained. In October a group of ethnic revolutionary organizations – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance – launched Operation 1027, targeting the junta’s outposts and strongholds across the country. Operation 1027 – the most significant challenge to the junta since the coup – has galvanized other armed groups to launch attacks, with fighting now engulfing two thirds of the country. Fighting has particularly intensified in Rakhine State, where clashes on 26 January between the Arakan Army and the military in Hpon Nyo Leik village killed at least 12 Rohingya civilians. The military repeatedly shelled the village, destroying infrastructure. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Arakan Army allegedly positioned its troops in and around this Rohingya village in anticipation of the military’s attacks. Since October, at least 554 people have been killed and 800,000 newly displaced. On 30 January the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned, “As the military have suffered setback after setback on the battlefield, they have lashed out, launching waves of indiscriminate aerial bombardments and artillery strikes… Military tactics have consistently focused on the punishment of civilians who they view as supporting their enemies. As a result, the military has routinely targeted civilians and protected objects under international humanitarian law, especially medical facilities and schools.” Targeted attacks on civilians and civilian objects, the use of human shields and the indiscriminate bombardments of civilian-populated areas violate international humanitarian and human rights law and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Three years into the crisis, both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the UN Security Council are paralyzed by divisions and have made little progress on a coordinated response as civilians continue to endure atrocities. The Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Savita Pawnday, said, “In the three years since the military coup, populations across Myanmar have suffered from atrocities and daily abuses at the hands of the military who have been emboldened by impunity. The international community must collectively cut off the junta’s access to the jet fuel, funds and the legitimacy it needs to continue committing atrocities against civilians.”..."
Source/publisher: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "The Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the European Union, gave a statement marking three years since the military coup in Myanmar. Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the European Union, marking three years since the military coup in Myanmar: "Three years ago, on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected government, undoing a decade of progress. "Under the military regime, violence against civilians has escalated, with thousands jailed, tortured and killed. Airstrikes, shelling and arson have been used to destroy civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools, healthcare facilities and places of worship. Systematic discrimination against members of religious and ethnic groups, including Rohingya, is rife. Many are displaced and continue to face horrific conditions, and others have been forced to flee across Myanmar’s borders. The military’s actions have fuelled a growing humanitarian crisis with 2.6 million people displaced from their homes, and more than 18 million people in need. "We condemn in the strongest possible terms the military regime’s ongoing atrocities and human rights violations, such as sexual and gender-based violence, and the restriction of fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, through peaceful protests and the media. We reiterate our call for the Commander-in-Chief and the military to change course, immediately ceasing violence against civilians, releasing all unjustly detained political prisoners, allowing full humanitarian access and creating space for inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders. "We strongly encourage unified efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to resolve the crisis. We commend the constructive efforts of the ASEAN Chairs and Special Envoys. We call on the military regime to implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and engage meaningfully and positively with ASEAN representatives, in order for Myanmar to transition towards an inclusive democracy. "We continue to support the full implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and underline our support for UN Security Council activities to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. We call on the UN to strengthen its efforts on Myanmar including via the timely appointment of a Special Envoy and a Resident Coordinator and urge UN Member states to maintain their support to address urgent humanitarian needs in Myanmar. "We call on all members of the international community to support efforts to push the Myanmar military to cease violence, to bring about genuinely inclusive dialogue, in order to establish a credible, peaceful democratic future for Myanmar; to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of people in Myanmar and refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries, including its most vulnerable communities, and to cease providing the Myanmar military with the arms and equipment that are necessary for them to commit atrocities. "Three years on from the military coup, we continue to stand in solidarity with the Myanmar people and their desire for an inclusive and genuine democracy in Myanmar."..."
Source/publisher: European Union, Government of Australia, Government of Canada, Government of New Zealand, Government of Norway, Government of Switzerland, Government of the Republic of Korea, Government of the United Kingdom, US Department of State
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "excerpts 22.We discussed the developments in Myanmar and reaffirmed our united position that the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) remains our main reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar, with the sole objective of restoring peace, stability, and a Myanmar-owned and led comprehensive political resolution. We welcomed the ASEAN Leaders’ Reviews and Decisions on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus adopted at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits in 2022 and the 43rd ASEAN Summit in 2023. We reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to assisting Myanmar in finding a peaceful, comprehensive, and durable solution to the ongoing crisis, as Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN. We reaffirmed ASEAN unity and reiterated that any effort should support, in line with the 5PC and in coordination with the Chair of ASEAN. 23.ASEAN Member States welcomed the appointment of H.E. Mr. Alounkeo KITTIKHOUN, former Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office of the Lao PDR as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar for 2024 as we continue our efforts to promote progress in the implementation of the 5PC in its entirety. We appreciated his efforts thus far in reaching out to parties concerned and are confident in his resolve to help the people of Myanmar find a Myanmar-owned and led solution towards a peaceful, stable and unified Myanmar contributing to peace and prosperity of the region. 24.We welcomed progress on the delivery of the ASEAN humanitarian assistance to Myanmar under Phase 2 by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Management (AHA Centre), in particular the distribution of humanitarian assistance in January 2024 to the displaced and vulnerable people in Nyaung Shwe and Hsihseng township, Southern Shan State. We appreciated the resources contributed by ASEAN Member States, external partners, and the private sector thus far, and called for further support towards the more effective implementation of Phase 2. We urged for immediate cessation of violence by all parties in Myanmar to create a safe and conducive environment for ensuring the timely, unhindered, and safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need in Myanmar without discrimination. We urged all parties to exercise utmost restraint, uphold international humanitarian law and take all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of all civilians. 25.We welcomed the initiative between Thailand and Myanmar to scale up humanitarian assistance along the border through the Red Cross Societies of two countries to provide effective, credible, and transparent delivery of basic needs to those in need without discrimination. We look forward to engaging AHA Centre in joining the monitoring of the distribution of humanitarian assistance, as this initiative can contribute to ASEAN’s collective efforts in implementing the 5PC..."
Source/publisher: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
2024-01-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Fighting has intensified greatly in Myanmar in recent weeks. Having started in northern Shan State, it is now spreading elsewhere. As Crisis Group expert Richard Horsey explains in this Q&A, the military is under significant pressure on the battlefield, with worrying humanitarian implications. What happened? On 27 October, an alliance of ethnic armed groups launched a coordinated offensive against regime forces in the north of Myanmar’s Shan State, seizing several towns, severing important overland trade routes to China and overrunning dozens of military outposts. Dubbed Operation 1027 after the date they began, these attacks involved several thousand experienced, well-armed fighters attacking multiple locations simultaneously. They represent the biggest battlefield challenge to the military since its February 2021 coup. Sensing that the regime may be at its weakest point yet, several other armed groups have gone on the march in other parts of the country, threatening to overstretch the junta’s military capacity. Operation 1027 was spearheaded by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which comprises three ethnic armed groups active in northern Shan State: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (or MNDAA, a predominantly Kokang group), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (or TNLA, a mainly Ta’ang group) and the Arakan Army (or AA, a mostly Rakhine group). Several resistance forces that first emerged after the coup also participated in the attacks, bringing the fighting closer to the country’s second largest city, Mandalay, and ambushing reinforcements the military is sending to Shan State. On 13 November, the AA then launched a fresh offensive in Rakhine State, in the west, breaking the informal ceasefire that has been in place for a year. The operation has proceeded rapidly, with outnumbered regime forces abandoning or surrendering scores of military outposts and bases. The junta has been slow to respond to the initial losses. While the military immediately launched airstrikes and long-range artillery barrages, these have so far not been effective in countering Operation 1027. They have, however, caused civilian casualties and the displacement of some 60,000 people in Shan and 200,000 nationwide, according to the UN, bringing the total number of civilians displaced since the coup to over two million. At a cabinet meeting on 2 November, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing vowed to undertake a counter-attack. Six days later, almost two weeks after the initial assault, he convened the first unscheduled meeting of the National Defence and Security Council since the coup, at which the regime-installed president warned that the country could splinter and Min Aung Hlaing committed to “taking the required actions to counter acts of terror”. The regime has since imposed martial law in eight affected townships of northern Shan State. But the military is having trouble deploying its mobile strike divisions because of the opposition’s ambushes on the main roads and destruction of several key bridges. Nor can it rely heavily on air transport given its limited capacity in that regard. What triggered this new fighting? The escalation began in Shan State, on the border with China, which until October had been less affected by post-coup conflict than many other parts of the country. The groups that make up the Three Brotherhood Alliance have all emerged as significant threats to the military in the last decade or so. Both the MNDAA and TNLA have long aimed to establish territorial control in different parts of the state’s north. They took advantage of the military’s preoccupation with battles elsewhere to launch the attacks. The MNDAA is seeking to right what it sees as a historical wrong as well as to regain lucrative assets. The group is made up mostly of ethnic Kokang – a Han Chinese minority – which used to control a sizeable enclave on the Chinese border known as the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, and its capital Laukkaing, a hub for unregulated gambling and other illicit industries. In 2009, it defied an order by the military regime of the time stating that all armed groups that had agreed to ceasefires must convert into border guard force units under military command. The military decided to make an example of the MNDAA, expelling it from the Zone and installing border guards from a rival Kokang faction in its place. The operation was led on the ground by none other than Min Aung Hlaing, who later became the military’s commander-in-chief before orchestrating the February 2021 coup and assuming his current role atop the junta. Since its 2009 expulsion, the MNDAA has operated as an insurgency from remote hills, with the objective of wresting back control of the Zone. It made a failed attempt in 2015, with clashes inflicting serious casualties on the military and sending more than 30,000 refugees fleeing into China. The [MNDAA and the TNLA] thus have overlapping interests, giving them an incentive to launch a joint operation. As for the TNLA, as a recent Crisis Group report documented in detail, the group is seeking to consolidate its control of an autonomous ethnic Ta’ang (Palaung) homeland. It also wants to connect this territory to the Chinese border, for both strategic and economic reasons. The area on which it is focused is adjacent to the Kokang district that the MNDAA wants to take back. The two groups thus have overlapping interests, giving them an incentive to launch a joint operation. By contrast, the AA does not have territorial ambitions in Shan State, and has played more of a supporting role in the operation. Still, participation in the Three Brotherhood Alliance is important for the group. Its leadership operates from nearby rebel-held lands on the Chinese border; it also gets most of its weapons from the area and it has vital economic interests there. In its initial communiqué on 27 October, the alliance stated that in addition to its strategic objectives in northern Shan, it was committed to “eradicating the oppressive military dictatorship, a shared aspiration of the entire Myanmar populace”. The articulation of this goal may be more for rhetorical than substantive effect, however, as the three ethnic armed groups involved have stayed mostly aloof from the country’s post-coup convulsions, focusing on asserting their territorial aims. Still, the alliance’s salvo at the junta has been consequential, attracting the participation of post-coup resistance forces in the operation and reigniting hope among the broader anti-regime movement that armed revolution might succeed in toppling the regime. How serious is the challenge to the regime? The situation for the regime has quickly turned from a concerning problem in one part of the country into a multi-front threat that constitutes the biggest battlefield challenge it has faced since the February 2021 coup. The Three Brotherhood Alliance attacks in northern Shan alone dealt a major blow to the military. Some units have lost significant weaponry to their opponents, who have seized tanks, armoured personnel carriers, multiple-launch rocket systems, a howitzer, trucks and anti-aircraft heavy machine guns. The attackers also laid their hands on large quantities of light arms and ammunition. It is not clear whether the military can effectively respond to these challenges. Unless it can mount a counteroffensive, the regime may have to accept losing control of strategic border areas for the medium term. That outcome would not just be discomfiting for the junta; it would also alter the balance of power in the area. The Three Brotherhood Alliance has also taken over sections of the two highways connecting Myanmar and China through northern Shan, leading to an interruption in cross-border trade. Long-term obstruction would be a serious setback for the regime, but it is not especially likely, as informal taxes on this commerce are also a key source of revenue for the TNLA. A short-term blockade is not a serious threat to regime finances or to Myanmar’s overall economy. The military’s failures are on display for all to see, emboldening opposition groups outside the alliance to seize on this moment of weakness. Taking a broader view, while the situation in northern Shan does not by itself represent an existential threat to the regime, it encompasses a series of failures and embarrassments of the sort that could prove perilous. The military’s failures are on display for all to see, emboldening opposition groups outside the alliance to seize on this moment of weakness by launching their own attacks elsewhere in the country. Such attacks have already happened in several places. First, in early November, a few days after Operation 1027 began, one of the country’s largest ethnic armed groups, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), led an assault on the north-western town of Kawlin in Sagaing Region. The town, an important administrative centre, fell after several days of fighting. As Kawlin lies in the lowlands, far from Kachin-populated areas in the mountains where the KIO normally operates, the attack was conducted under the banner of a local people’s defence force allied with the opposition National Unity Government; the KIO has long provided equipment and military training to the force. Secondly, on 7 November, resistance forces in Kayah State kicked off what they called Operation 1107, first attacking Myanmar military targets in the south of the state and then, on 11 November, the state capital Loikaw. They claim to have shot down an air force jet (the regime says mechanical failure caused the crash). Thirdly, and even more significantly, the AA – an alliance member – has seized the moment to press its advantage. On 13 November, the AA, which over recent years has become one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups, launched a series of attacks in Rakhine State, ending the period of calm that followed its agreement to an informal ceasefire in November 2022. Tensions had resurfaced over the last few months, and both sides knew that fighting could resume at any time. The regime kept sizeable forces deployed in the state for that eventuality. But with the conflict landscape evolving quickly elsewhere, and new hotspots to address, the regime can ill afford to get bogged down in fighting on another front. It also will not welcome the idea of renewed conflict with the AA, which it has struggled to overcome even when other parts of Myanmar were quiet, back in 2019-2020. How has China reacted to the fighting on its border? China has longstanding relations with the ethnic armed groups operating along its Shan State border, dating back to the Cultural Revolution period of the 1960s and 1970s, when most of them were part of a communist insurgency. Beijing has since maintained close ties to these groups, allowing them to integrate their enclaves into China’s rapidly growing economy, and directly and indirectly arming them to deter the Myanmar military from attacking these areas. This is part of the “border management” approach that China has long adopted in its relations with Myanmar in order to maintain stability along its frontier. While it would not be averse to a durable peace, it has mostly assessed that that is unlikely, preferring to support the quasi-peaceful status quo, while recognising that it will find itself helping to manage periodic flare-ups when they occur. That said, these flare-ups can cause outcomes that Beijing clearly wishes to avoid. For example, China has always been sensitive to the prospect of refugee flows or war spilling into its territory. It will want to avoid a repeat of what happened in 2015, when MNDAA attacks on the Kokang border guard force sent tens of thousands of refugees fleeing across its border. While Beijing has called publicly for a halt to the fighting, its response has been limited. But while Beijing has called publicly for a halt to the fighting, its response has been limited, and for the most part it appears to be waiting to see how events play out. This approach stems partly from its hope that the alliance will help rein in online scam centres in the Kokang zone. Run by criminal outfits, these centres hire or entrap often vulnerable individuals, whose job is to perpetrate internet fraud and theft. Thousands of Chinese nationals are being held against their will in these centres and forced to carry out scams, many of them targeting Chinese nationals. With such illicit operations proliferating across South East Asia in recent years, curbing these activities has become an important priority for Beijing. It has been using its leverage over groups such as the United Wa State Army to close the scam operations in areas under their control. But its biggest problem has been in Kokang, which as noted is controlled by a border guard force allied with the Myanmar military. Laukkaing and other parts of the region have emerged as key scam centre locations. The Three Brotherhood Alliance is well aware of Beijing’s growing impatience with the scam industry and has used its own willingness to take on the scammers in order to manage the risk of Chinese backlash in response to its operations. To make clear its intentions, the alliance flagged to China at the end of its initial statement on Operation 1027 that “our commitment extends to” cracking down on the online scam industry. At least in the short term, a desire to make inroads against the scam centres seems to have trumped China’s traditional border security concerns. Given its frustration that the Myanmar regime and Kokang border guard force were doing little to rein in the scam centres, Beijing will have been pleased to see the border guard force under siege and scam bosses fleeing the area. Moreover, given its long-term relationship with the MNDAA, and significant influence it wields with the group, China may well see advantages in the group’s success. That said, Beijing is not entirely in watching mode. As the situation in Laukkaing becomes chaotic – with most routes out of town blocked by fighting and food in short supply – there are reports that Chinese police and other forces have entered the city with regime permission. They are likely there to evacuate thousands of trapped Chinese citizens and possibly to detain members of Kokang crime syndicates who have been indicted in China in recent days on charges of running scam centres and murdering Chinese citizens. The alleged victims reportedly include a group held captive at a scam centre who were gunned down by security guards during an escape attempt on 20 October. In addition to the Chinese, hundreds of citizens of other countries are stuck in Laukkaing, including Thai and Vietnamese nationals. What happens next? The fast-moving situation, and the potential for fighting to erupt on other fronts, makes developments hard to predict. Much will depend on whether the military is able to regain the initiative in parts of the country or to deter its opponents with punishing air attacks. How the situation evolves with the AA in Rakhine State will be very important, as large-scale fighting there would mean the military would be stretched even more thinly elsewhere. A likely scenario at this point is that, for the first time in decades, the Myanmar military will have to fight numerous, determined and well-armed opponents at the same time in multiple theatres. But while this challenge will be huge, the military can be expected to show some resiliency. It is a well-trained and well-equipped force, which has been continuously battling various insurgencies since World War II, sometimes against worse odds. Its staying power should not be underestimated. Nor should the regime’s resolve to fight on at all costs. While anti-junta forces are understandably enthusiastic following the dramatic early successes of Operation 1027, military collapse or regime capitulation seem far off. More likely is that the regime will double down on brutal efforts to gain the upper hand on the battlefield, including scorched-earth tactics and indiscriminate bombing and shelling. The result could be that the country settles into a new, even more violent equilibrium, with civilians inevitably paying a heavy price. Another thing to watch will be China’s reaction as events in northern Shan State continue to unfold. While so far Beijing has largely allowed the fighting to take its course, that posture may not last. If the MNDAA succeeds in taking Laukkaing and routing the border guard force – or if it fails to do so and the conflict drags on – China may then intervene with both the regime and the Three Brotherhood Alliance to end hostilities. More broadly, China will be uncomfortable if the post-coup resistance movement, which Beijing perceives as Western-leaning and unfriendly to its interests, seems to be gaining too much momentum. It may then move to bolster the regime. Finally, Operation 1027 could increase inter-ethnic tensions and conflict. The shifting balance of power in northern Shan State is alarming Shan communities and armed groups, who see their ethnic rivals such as the Ta’ang and Kokang gaining strength and expanding their territory into ethnic Shan areas. Ta’ang and Shan fighters have already clashed in recent months, including in deadly confrontations on 7 November. The clashes could easily escalate into something more serious. How should outside actors respond? China has much more influence over events on its border with Myanmar than any other international actor. If it comes off the sidelines, it would likely have enough leverage to press both the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the military regime to end the fighting. As noted, it could well intercede in this manner should the MNDAA manage to secure control of Laukkaing and the rest of the Kokang zone, or if the conflict drags on and threatens an extended period of instability on its border. But back-room deals that freeze the conflict without addressing its underlying drivers are only going to paper over thwarted ethnic aspirations and set the stage for continued instability and new rounds of fighting in the future. In fairness to Beijing, a grand solution that brings peace to the border region is hard to envisage. As noted above, one reason China has settled into a pattern of short-term fixes, is that the alternative to such crisis management – that is, a more holistic set of solutions to the post-coup situation – are beyond the ability of any external actor to impose. Essentially, the problem is one of an illegitimate regime and brutal military that have neither the imagination nor the will to craft a peaceful outcome for what is, at its root, a long-term failure of state building. Nevertheless, Beijing can and should do more than twist arms to bring about a temporary calm. It should do more to transform the political economy of the area, by encouraging and supporting legitimate sources of income in armed group-controlled enclaves along its border, while at the same time pushing for an end to illicit activities across the board – rather than targeting only those criminal activities that are hurting China, as it is doing with scam centres. Foreign actors have limited influence over the various groups involved in the fighting, but they can at least offer humanitarian support. Beyond China, foreign actors have limited influence over the various groups involved in the fighting, but they can at least offer humanitarian support. They should work with both international and local relief organisations as appropriate to ensure the quick distribution of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected communities. In particular, funding is urgently needed for organisations providing support to tens of thousands of civilians displaced by the fighting in northern Shan and elsewhere. (Crisis Group has previously made recommendations about how to give more sustained support as post-coup conflicts drag on.) Moreover, as fighting spreads, the number of displaced people is likely to keep growing. If there is a sustained uptick in conflict in Myanmar, as now seems likely, neighbouring countries – particularly Thailand and India – should prepare for potential refugee flows, ensuring that people fleeing conflict and persecution are given safety and treated with dignity. Donors should provide timely support to these refugee populations and, as necessary, host communities. Finally, given the scale of fighting, it is more important than ever to have accurate information about what is happening on the ground. The regime’s targeting of journalists since the coup means that much of the information emerging from conflict zones comes directly from opposition armed groups themselves, raising obvious questions about its reliability. The work of independent journalists is all the more important because it helps inform a wide range of policy decisions confronting international actors – from where humanitarian aid is most needed to which regime cronies are appropriate targets for sanctions. It is therefore essential to give media outlets and organisations monitoring and analysing the fighting the resources they need to verify that information and provide balanced, independent assessments. Unfortunately, funding for independent Myanmar media, including ethnic media, has been steadily declining since the coup. This latest outbreak of fighting is a reminder of the pressing need for donors to increase their support..."
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Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
2023-11-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-11-17
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Sub-title: The Time for Reflection and New Solutions
Description: "15 October 2023 marks the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which the State Administration Council and few remaining ethnic armed organisations in the accord are honouring in Nay Pyi Taw. Although the NCA process did involve a lot of theatre, the SAC’s true commemoration of the NCA occurred in the middle of the night earlier this week, when the military bombed the Kachin internally displaced persons’ camp of Munglai Hkyet, near the border with China. The attack killed at least 29 persons, including young children, with 56 more injured. Throughout the NCA negotiation and attempted implementation periods, fighting and human rights violations raged on, especially in the country’s north. The Myanmar military and government blocked humanitarian assistance then, as the SAC continues now. The international community responded at times with statements of concern and other assistance, but lacked coherent approaches to curtail the killing or ensure compliance with agreements. On this anniversary, the NCA’s vestigial institutions remain without public legitimacy, manipulated as part of the SAC’s strategy to divide, confuse, and manipulate national and international actors. The NCA’s basic principles remain valued by various actors, but would be more likely to be practised through new and different approaches and processes. Drawn from an analysis of the NCA published by TNI earlier this year, this summary highlights how the accord was never inclusive, effectively developed or truly implemented and is not fit for purpose in a political and conflict landscape greatly changed since the 2021 coup.* During the past three decades, the term ‘peace process’ has been commonly used in Myanmar to describe endeavours to end the country’s long-running political and ethnic conflicts. In reality, the Myanmar peace process has always been one of the most labyrinthine in the world. Dating back to 1989, a diversity of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral processes has been underway. In recent years, they were held together by the aspirations of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and 21st Century Panglong Conference. These two initiatives came to an abrupt halt with the military coup on 1 February 2021. To date, there has been no ‘peace process’ breakthrough that has led to national reconciliation and meaningful reform. The country remains far from the achievement of peace that reaches to all peoples, and Myanmar is currently in the midst of one of its most violent and conflict-divided periods of history since independence in 1948. The peace process – as reconfigured by government after 2011 – no longer exists. The present breakdown, however, should not be a time of resignation and despair. In the determination of young people and re-imagining of national politics since the coup, there are hopes that a new realism has entered the peace and reform vocabulary which will ultimately lead to effective solutions. For this to happen, it is vital that lessons are learned from the injustices and experiences of the past. Far from being new, the NCA was the latest in a long line of peace process failures, and it repeated many of the inequalities and inconsistencies that undermined peace efforts during previous cycles of government. Despite its high profile, the NCA never marked a moment of national breakthrough. Rather, conflict spread in several parts of the country from the time of its signing, pre-shadowing the state of ethno-political collapse which exists today. For these reasons, the NCA’s journey demands close examination. A Backdrop of Failure Many problems can be identified in the failure to build a nationwide process for peace. These were evident even before the 2021coup and renewed spread of civil war. Following the NCA’s 2015 signing, a catalogue of errors quickly built up. The treaty was initiated under the quasi-civilian administration of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). But the difficulties continued after the National League for Democracy (NLD) came to government office in 2016. Problems and weaknesses in the NCA were not acknowledged; the peace process was not inclusive; the hand of the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat) was never far away; and initiatives to address the reform impasse too often ended in stagnation, political regression and increased conflict. Ultimately, over many years of meetings, the NCA did not bring the key stakeholders and conflict actors to the same table. Underpinning these failures, the complex nature of the NCA process led to procedural breakdowns and a build-up of disagreements over technical issues. Restructuring the peace process and addressing technical problems was undoubtedly necessary. But the challenges at the root of conflict and failure in negotiations have always been political. Technical fixes alone were never likely to bridge the political divides that exist on such scale. The outcome was the prioritisation of process over delivery, meaning that many commitments were never fulfilled. In part, these failures stemmed from very different perspectives among NCA signatories over the role of the agreement as a process towards ending armed conflict, protecting the human rights of war-affected communities and negotiating reform. For their part, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – both those party to the NCA and those outside the agreement – focused on the need for trust-building and substantive agreements first. In contrast, government and Tatmadaw leaders insisted on resuming formal meetings or signing agreements before addressing concerns about trust, substance and the implementation of ceasefires. Meanwhile, despite the promise of Panglong-21, NLD leaders focused on electoral politics rather than the peace process as the instrument for reform once in office. In consequence, fundamental differences in interests and needs were never addressed, and the parliamentary and peace processes were never brought on to the same track. These proved errors of historic proportions. The NCA never acted as a catalyst for building ethnic peace and national unity. Instead, dysfunction and instability grew at the heart of the peace negotiation process. National politics remained dominated by the ethnic Bamar (Burman) majority; the NLD and Defence Services were uneasy partners in government under the 2008 constitution; the Tatmadaw maintained a controlling role in many aspects of political, economic and security affairs (including selecting dialogue partners); ethnic armed movements were represented by a diverse array of ceasefire and non-ceasefire organisations; ethnic political parties and civil society organisations were never effectively included in the NCA or wider peace process; and the Tatmadaw continued to back a multitude of local militia groups and Border Guard Forces that play a key role in their efforts to manage conflict in the ethnic borderlands. Warning signings were persistently ignored. After the NCA was signed, frustration with the peace process tangibly grew in many ethnic states and regions. Continued fighting, land expropriation, the internal displacement of civilians, natural resource exploitation and the acceleration of business deals with outside investors all sustained an impression that the peace process was being used as a delaying device to constrain ethnic demands while the social, legal, political and economic landscape was reshaped to the government’s agenda and advantage. Too often, renewed conflicts in different parts of the country (including anti-Rohingya violence) were regarded by NCA donors and supporters as exceptions rather than evidence of urgent and systemic failings that need to be addressed. Rather than aiming towards peace, many political actors came to view the process as a continuation of war by other means. In consequence, the NCA never gained the momentum of countrywide support. Among many failings, the most outstanding was the continuing launch of military operations by the Defence Services. Even while the NCA and peace talks continued, further militarization and the build-up of Tatmadaw forces took place in both ceasefire and non-ceasefire territories of the country. While new ceasefires were agreed in areas that had seen decades of fighting, old ceasefires broke down in places where armed conflict had been mostly absent for 15 years. For communities living in these areas, the words ‘peace process’ sounded very hollow. Military security – not human security – appeared to be the main priority of the central authorities, raising serious questions about the intentions of both the government and Tatmadaw leaders. For all these reasons, contemporary judgments will be harsh. Despite many fine words, there were no fundamental changes in the conflict landscape before or after the NCA signing. Rather than charting a political roadmap for inclusive peace, the NCA process all too frequently appeared to be a vehicle for asserting and increasing Tatmadaw control. All the major challenges in conflict resolution remained, most of which exacerbated over time, and no political endgame ever came in view. Once the NCA had been signed, there was little momentum towards improving the functioning of ceasefires, deepening the reform basis of dialogue or making the process work. As these failures continued, key elements in the NCA architecture either fell by the way side or were never fully implemented. Major omissions and weaknesses included the inadequacies or lack of national-level dialogue meetings, interim arrangements, security sector reform and new processes for political negotiation and agreement. Warnings were constantly flagged up. But ameliorative steps were never sufficiently taken. Instead, from the beginning of 2020 both the NCA and national landscape were dominated by two new imperatives: Covid-19 and the November general election. Hopes that they might produce reflective shifts in the transitional landscape swiftly evaporated. The opportunity to use political and health responses as a means to promote cooperation and understanding between EAOs and government departments was missed by the NLD-led administration. Continued fighting, NCA neglect and the conduct of polling amidst a global pandemic only exacerbated ethno-political concerns. In reality, long before the 2021 coup it was clear that the NCA was malfunctioning as a process for national reform. The Lack of International Focus and Cohesion As these events unfolded, the actions of the international community also reflected different, and often divergent, aspects of Myanmar’s conflict impasse. A decade of international support for the peace process and political transition ultimately came to count for very little. Many decisions came out of self-interest rather than informed understanding of the diverse and complex challenges on the ground. A coherent peace programme never emerged, and there were many inconsistencies in the international response. There was no shortage of international actions. Egregious human rights violations became the subject of investigation by the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. At the same time, political and business actors in China, India, Japan and various Western states were in rivalry for influence over the country’s political and economic direction. All affirmed support for the NCA and peace process as an essential step in political transition. But there was no consensus on policies or priorities to pursue. There was a failure to recognise Tatmadaw stratagems and the inherent weaknesses of the Myanmar state, opportunities were lost, and the manifest problems within the NCA were never addressed. Adding to the difficulties, while Western actors mainly focused their peace efforts on engagement with the Myanmar government and ethnic armed organisations based in the southeastern borderlands with Thailand, the prism of Chinese officials and businesses – always a key influence in the country – was mainly through the Myanmar government, Tatmadaw and EAOs based along its Yunnan border. Neither Western nor Chinese actors seemed willing and able to engage with all relevant groups. Rather, both apparently failed to understand that leaving out key groups in the peace process would be a major obstacle to achieving lasting solutions. Ultimately, these exclusions were never addressed. The SAC Coup: a New Cycle of Conflict and Division For the moment, the 1 February 2021 coup by the military State Administration Council (SAC) has consigned the NCA as a potential and inclusive model for political negotiation and peace-building to history. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and leaders of the NLD which won the 2020 general election are in prison, and peaceful protests have been brutally suppressed. To all intents and purposes, the tentative moves during the past decade towards a new system of federalism and democracy, brought about by negotiation and peace-building, have been brought to an end. By seizing power, Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing may have thought it easy to return the political clock back to the Tatmadaw-controlled past. Instead, the country is faced with a scale of repression, violence and humanitarian emergency that echoes the worst times of civil war since independence in 1948. Protest and resistance against the regime has spread among the Bamar-majority population; ceasefires – including by three NCA signatories – have broken down in different parts of Chin, Karen, Kayah, Mon and Rakhine States; existing conflicts have escalated in Kachin and northern Shan States; and new armed struggles have developed in Magway, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and other regions as well as urban areas. The consequences have been profound. The NCA and broader peace process have been subsumed into a very different ethno-political landscape from the context in which they developed. The structures and divisions in conflict have significantly changed. Amidst a diversity of new movements and alignments, there are two rival governments claiming legitimacy in the country: the SAC and National Unity Government (NUG). In this new battleground, a host of resistance groups – generally known as People’s Defence Forces – have proliferated across the country, and their roles in any future process of political negotiation and peace-building are very uncertain. Reflecting the scale of violence, the nature of warfare has also changed. Anti-regime forces seek to launch urban attacks, while the SAC has increasingly relied on aerial attacks targeting civilian populations and created new Pyu Saw Hti and other local militia forces as it loses control on the ground. Many communities and civilians are caught in the crossfire, with it dangerous to publicly express political opinions or allegiances. SAC leaders, in the meantime, have been using the empty language of a new general election and the NCA as a theatre to try and divide opponents and deceive credulous outsiders. Since the coup, there has been no peace process or political roadmap of real prospect underway. If the NCA did not achieve breakthroughs under an NLD-led administration, it is improbable that this could happen under a regime headed by the Tatmadaw which, even before the coup, was the most disruptive actor in the implementation of the accord, consistently escalating violence and negating its own agreements. In the propaganda struggle, there have been intermittent meetings by the SAC with some of the remaining EAO NCA-signatories that have agreed to talks since the coup. But they are mostly among the smallest and weakest in the country. Such parties, several of which are breakaway or remnant factions, can never be regarded as representative of political opinion in the country at large while civil war continues and most of the leading voices for political change are excluded. The same lack of credibility awaits any future general election held by the military while major pro-democracy parties are repressed and during ongoing suppression of freedom of expression. Looking forward, discussions continue in political circles – framed around the vision of federal democracy – about how a successful peace roadmap might be achieved. Although a single unifying platform may be difficult to achieve, the significance of the challenging work on coordination, relationship-building and practical governance across ethnic and pro-democracy forces should not be underestimated. It is urgent that these efforts be strengthened if military rule and state failure are to come to an end. As experience warns, national peace processes in Myanmar over the past three decades have only led to assimilation into systems designed by the Tatmadaw. They are not platforms for negotiation, demilitarisation and reform. Indeed the further proliferation in local militia and paramilitaries under Tatmadaw authority since the coup pushes even further into the future the prospect of a peace process that answers the root causes of conflict by political dialogue and democratic reform. After sixty years in power, the Tatmadaw strategy of ‘managing’ rather than ‘resolving’ conflict still continues. The post-coup landscape also compounds the challenges of engagement for the international community. Currently, the SAC is one of the most criticised armed actors in the world. This is evidenced by repeated condemnation by the Office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Independent Investigate Mechanism for Myanmar and other international bodies. Since the coup, impoverishment, the loss of life and civilian displacement due to conflict have only increased. Currently, there are counts of over three million refugees and IDPs, more than 19,000 political prisoners still in jail, 4,150 civilians killed by the security forces, and estimates of over 20,000 people, including combatants, killed in the conflict zones. Clearly, eight years after its signing, the NCA is effectively null and void. Recommendations and Lessons for the Future Given the scale of crisis, it is vital that a united response is developed which supports national healing rather than exacerbates division. It is for Myanmar’s peoples to determine their political future. But, in support of this, human rights protections are essential, and the perpetrators of violations on all sides must be held accountable if lasting peace and justice are to be achieved. In any conflict resolution path, accountability must be at the heart of peace-building. This has been demonstrably missing until now. To date, however, there is little indication of lessons learned. Despite the depth of humanitarian emergency, there has been no indication of a cohesive strategy to address the challenges of national breakdown, whether by the United Nations, ASEAN or other governments and international institutions. The same imperatives are also essential in any international efforts to build a future peace process. While peace is required, a new process may well be considered inappropriate in the circumstances of coup d'état and repression. New realities should be explored, including those that reflect the role of youth and social dynamics driving elite-level political change, the momentum supporting federal democratic reform, and agreements among stakeholder parties that go beyond the agenda of the 21st Century Panglong Conference. After decades of conflict and military rule, it needs to be recognised that fundamental mistakes were made in support for the NCA in the hopes for rapid change after the accord was signed. Manifestly, a different and broad-based approach has long been overdue. Since the coup, however, different international representatives have already sought to initiate talks between select groupings, including between the SAC and preferred EAOs, as if this will be enough to build a peace process that is just and equitable for the country. It is critical that such errors are not repeated once again. Simply continuing the same ceasefire practices, tinkering with accord guidelines and mechanisms, or changing faces around the NCA or other peace talk tables will never be sufficient. Most importantly, talks that exclude current major stakeholders or that primarily serve to reduce national and international pressure on the SAC to accede to the public’s demands for meaningful political change will never be enough, and indeed may instead further postpone the time when nationwide peace could become achievable. In this respect, Myanmar is not unique. After the ending of the Cold War, aid became a Western response to conflict. But this, in itself, does not provide the platform for peace and reform. Rather, it may entrench division and an unrepresentative elite in power. Too often the word ‘transition’ has been invoked as a panacea during the last three decades without understanding the political context and causes of state failure. At best, peace processes in Myanmar have frozen conflicts without opening the way to political solutions. Sustainable peace requires political agreement and compromise. In contrast, approaches that only serve to strengthen the state and existing security apparatus will cause resistance among the wider population, feed community grievances and delay the opportunity for meaningful change. In Myanmar, a legacy of failure has built up during the past decade that overshadows the NCA and peace process in five key areas: military dominance, non-inclusion, lack of implementation, lack of accomplishment, and lack of political will. After decades of conflict, all sides must take responsibility for their actions. But standing at the centre of these obstacles has always been the Tatmadaw. All too often, international actors have fallen for the illusion of a ‘normative’ state, which can be reformed, without recognising that the Tatmadaw has continued to dominate central government for more than half a century, claiming ‘prerogative’ powers for itself and intruding into every aspect of national life.** In the aftermath of the 2021 coup, the evidence is clear. Under the 2008 constitution, the Defence Services already enjoyed sweeping powers. But Tatmadaw leaders operate well beyond these parameters, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, land seizures, resource exploitation, paramilitary deployments, and political manipulation in favour of its own party, the USDP. As long as these practices continue, the NCA or any similar peace process can never be an instrument for national reconciliation and democratic reform. Transparency, inclusion, understanding, compromise and dialogue have always been essential steps in any meaningful process towards political transformation and lasting peace. On a cautionary note, precedent warns that the Tatmadaw leadership may continue to employ an ad hoc mixture of stratagems of political repression and ethnic ceasefires – bilateral, unilateral and NCA – as means to try and maintain central authority. In essence, the NCA, which had been used as a process to extend state control, is now being used to attempt to cling on to power – not as a gateway to political reform. As history has repeatedly shown, military-imposed systems will never achieve inclusive, just or sustainable solutions in the country. If the government does not represent the people, why should the people support it? Headed by a hermetic clique of ruling generals, the Tatmadaw leadership represents a Bamar-centric elite and a narrow nationalist view of the world. The question, then, remains for how much longer they can continue to find, persuade or coerce sufficient support to maintain such dominant position without long-needed reform. Myanmar today is a land in grave suffering and civil war. A decade after a new peace process began, the NCA did not lead to conflict resolution; it did not build the foundations for peace; and it did not lead to agreement for genuine political reforms to address the root causes of conflict and national instability. At the same time, the political landscape is far from static, and the polarisations in politics and society run deep. While military rule continues in Nay Pyi Taw, a diversity of ethnic armed movements remains in control of extensive territories, presenting very different visions for the future of the country. Adding to the complexity, there are a further cast of conflict actors in the wake of the new divisions created by the coup, claiming the right to be in the seat of government. These are presently symbolised by the SAC, NLD and NUG, while EAOs – in a number of alliances and positions – also demand that their voices are included if solutions are to be achieved. In any new peace process, these contested dynamics must be taken on board. A critical moment in post-colonial history has been reached. Hopes for better change still remain, and the struggle to shape Myanmar’s destiny is far from over. Shaken by the 2021 coup, there is a willingness among diverse parties to look at the challenges of conflict resolution anew, and there is a resolve that young people today will be the first generation to enjoy nationwide peace. The needs for reform are greater than simply regime change, requiring a federal democratic system of governance which, as the 1947 Panglong Agreement set out, is based upon the equality and union of all peoples. A political process towards peace, taking account of experiences in the past, can be a key element in such change. But to achieve this, the politics of exclusion must end and a fundamental change in political mind-set are essential. Political transformation, including sustainable and inclusive peace, are urgently required today. * Martin Smith and Jason Gelbort, The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar: Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control? (Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, April 2023). ** In Ernst Fraenkel’s theory of the ‘dual state’ (developed in the 1930s), the ‘normative’ state co-exists with the ‘prerogative’ state whereby authoritarian parties or actors employ unlimited, arbitrary powers and violence unchecked by legal protections: see, Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford University Press, 2017)..."
Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2023-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Three of Myanmar’s armed groups say they will not hold talks with the regime until violence against civilians ends. The Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, which all signed the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), said they will snub Sunday’s ceremony in Naypyitaw to mark eight years since the deal was agreed. The three organizations, who are fighting the regime alongside resistance groups, said the 2021 coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA and nullified the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. A joint statement said the junta’s repeated attacks on civilians violated international humanitarian law. “This reinforces our position that the NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to resolve problems,” it said. In establishing a federal democratic union and sustainable peace, the three groups said they had laid out common objects and positions, including toppling the regime and ending military involvement in politics. They agreed to reform and reorganize the military fully under civilian control, draft a new constitution based on federalism and democracy and seek justice for the victims of the conflict. The revolutionary groups said talks would not be held without the regime ending violence against civilians and accepting the common objectives. “We demand a system change, not a change within the regime. Changing one military regime to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable,” said the armed groups. A new constitution and electoral system will create future governments based on a nation-unity model with a transitional authority agreed by all stakeholders, the statement said. It called on the public, the other NCA signatories and the international community to boycott the regime’s activities. Since the 2021 coup, the KNU has provided military training to several thousand anti-regime activists who have joined resistance groups. It is fighting with its allies in Karen and Mon states, Bago and Tanintharyi regions and the capital, Naypyitaw. The CNF’s armed allies are fighting the regime along with the Chinland Defense Forces in Chin State and neighboring Sagaing and Magwe regions..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
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Description: "Coup leader Min Aung Hlaing is planning to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Naypyitaw on Sunday, even though some of the signatories have been fighting the Myanmar military since the 2021 coup, saying the accord is no longer valid. To his embarrassment, three signatories—the Karen National Union, Chin National Front and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front—said on Thursday that any attempt by the regime to base the peace process on the NCA would just “deepen the country’s crisis and prolong armed conflict” as the military takeover violated the peace agreement’s principles and aims. What is the NCA and who signed it? The NCA was signed on Oct. 15, 2015 between the Myanmar military, the nominally civilian government of President Thein Sein and eight ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). They are: Quitting the NCA Since the 2021 takeover, the KNU, CNF and ABSDF have denounced the coup and resumed fighting the military, saying the NCA was rendered void by the putsch. They have been joined in fighting the regime by non-signatories including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). All are not only fighting against the regime, but also arming and providing military training for anti-regime forces known as People’s Defense Forces. Who is still engaging with the regime’s peace talks? Faced with growing pressure and diplomatic isolation, Min Aung Hlaing invited EAOs, including non-signatories, to peace talks in April 2022 in an attempt to revive the NCA. The KNU, CNF and ABSDF rejected the invitation, saying the talks were not genuine efforts at seeking peace. The remaining signatories joined the talks. Three NCA non-signatories—the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)—also joined the talks. Despite the KNU’s rejection of the NCA, former KNU chairman Saw Mutu Say Poe, who led the KNU when it signed the NCA in 2015, recently met with Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw for what the regime described as peace talks. The KNU has distanced itself from the meeting and reaffirmed its commitment to Myanmar’s revolution. Observers said those EAOs that have agreed to participate in peace talks with the regime all have their own reasons for doing so. Most need to avoid conflict with the Myanmar military either to protect or promote their interests, while a few are small in size and poorly armed. RCSS leader Yawd Serk even said the PDFs would become armed robbers if not properly controlled by the NUG. Min Aung Hlaing has conferred honorary Wunna Kyawhtin titles on the leaders of the seven NCA signatories that are still engaging in peace talks with his regime. Some were conferred posthumously..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
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Description: "We, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), Chin National Front (CNF) and Karen National Union (KNU), signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), express our common position regarding the coup makers’ commemoration of the 8th anniversary of the NCA signing and the fake peace talks supposedly based on the NCA as follows: 1. The aim of the NCA was to resolve the deep-rooted political crisis that had not been resolved by successive governments for more than 70 years. We wanted to build a federal democratic Union by amending the 2008 Constitution according to the results of an extra-parliamentary political dialogue in order to achieve sustainable peace. 2. The military coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA as well as nullified the 2008 Constitution. Therefore, the implementation of the NCA and the NCA-based political dialogue process came to a halt. 3. The military's repeated vicious attacks that target civilians by using its Army, Air Force and Navy are a flagrant violation of International Humanitarian Law. This reinforces our position that the NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to resolve political problems. 4. SAC’s use of the NCA to pressure NCA signatories, the fake implementation of the NCA through sham peace talks, the pretended activities of proposing to amend the invalid 2008 constitution and preparing to hold sham elections will deepen the crisis and push the country into protracted conflict. 5. ABSDF, CNF and KNU, the revolutionary organizations that signed the NCA, have laid down the following common political objectives and common political positions for the establishment of a federal democratic union to achieve sustainable peace. Common Political Objectives 5.1. To remove the coup makers and end the military's involvement in politics. 5.2. To reform and reorganize the military and place it fully under the administration of an elected civilian government. 5.3. To draft and ratify a new constitution based on federalism and democracy that is acceptable to all stakeholders. 5.4. To implement a process of transitional justice and seek justice for victims of conflict. 5.5. To agree on international involvement in facilitation, technical and financial support, monitoring, witnessing, observing, etc. at all stages of the implementation of the process. Common Political Positions 5.6. Dialogue will not be held unless SAC ends all violence against the people and accepts the above common political objectives. 5.7. We desire a system change, not just a regime change. Changing one military regime to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable. 5.8. Power-sharing between politically privileged groups at the expense of the people will not be accepted. 5.9. Resolution of the Myanmar crisis will require a constitution and an electoral system that will create future governments of Myanmar that are based on a ‘national unity’ model. 5.10. SAC is the main conflict partner. It is not an interim authority. A transition period requires a genuine transitional authority agreed upon by all stakeholders. 5.11. New elections can be held in Myanmar only after all the above steps are successful. 6. We urge the international governments and the entire people of the country, including the NCA signatories, to support the implementation process of our proposed political objectives without participating in the activities of the military that prolong the military dictatorship..."
Source/publisher: All Burma Students' Democratic Front, Chin National Front, Karen National Union
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-12
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Description: "Seventy-eighth session Item 73(c) of the provisional agenda* Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives Summary The people of Myanmar continue to suffer from a deteriorating human rights and humanitarian crisis. An illegitimate military junta would like the world to believe that only it can restore peace and stability to the country. The opposite is true. The coup of February 2021 has been followed by ever greater levels of human rights violations, violence, oppression, lawlessness, and poverty. Junta forces have responded to losses on the ground with a widespread campaign of violence against civilians that includes an escalation of airstrikes on villages and the burning of tens of thousands of homes. Displacement and human suffering continue on a massive scale, exacerbated by the landfall of Cyclone Mocha and the junta’s shameless restrictions on humanitarian aid. Nearly 20,000 political prisoners are now behind bars where many endure torture and appalling conditions. Rohingya continue to face systematic human rights violations in Myanmar and rapidly deteriorating conditions in refugee camps in Bangladesh. In this report, the Special Rapporteur describes conditions in Myanmar that should be of grave concern to Member States. However, he also describes developments that offer a path forward for a more effective international approach to the crisis. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights recently made a public call for “new thinking” to address the crisis in Myanmar. This report cites timely examples of new thinking and new action, including the sanctioning of jet fuel and key financial institutions relied on by the junta. The Special Rapporteur makes a series of recommendations and urges Member States to continue to strengthen and coordinate actions to support the people of Myanmar, who have demonstrated remarkable courage and tenacity to defend human rights and seek an end to this crisis..."
Source/publisher: UN General Assembly
2023-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-12
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Description: "Advance unedited version Distr.: General, 19 September 2023 Original: English Human Rights Council Fifty-fourth session 11 September --6 October 2023 Agenda items 2 and 4 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Human rights situations that require the Council's attention Summary Prepared pursuant to A/HRC/RES/50/3, this report identifies trends and patterns of human rights violations that occurred in Myanmar between 1 April 2022 and 31 July 2023. This report documents incidents affecting the civilian population with particular focus on military airstrikes, ground operations, and arson, and also covers acts of violence by anti-military armed groups. It further addresses human rights concerns of the Rohingya community. Recommendations are made to the military, the National Unity Government, and the international community. Introduction and methodology In resolution A/HRC/RES/49/23, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor and assess the overall situation of human rights in Myanmar, with a particular focus on accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and to make recommendations on additional steps necessary to address the current crisis. It also requested presentation of a comprehensive report at its 54th session. This report presents findings from monitoring and verification activities conducted remotely by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) between 1 April 2022 and 31 July 2023. It examines trends and patterns in violations of international human rights law and, where applicable, of international humanitarian law, and examines where some of these violations may amount to crimes under international law. Paramount among these violations are killing of civilians, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian assistance, and extreme and systematic discrimination against the Rohingya by the Myanmar military. This report is based on 161 interviews conducted during the reporting period with primary and secondary sources, including victims and witnesses, regular consultations and collaboration with local and international organizations, United Nations entities, thematic experts, and other actors. Analysis of other primary sources, such as satellite images and official documents, and systematic monitoring of media and social media, contributed to the findings of this report. OHCHR submitted questionnaires to military authorities, the National Unity Government, and key ethnic armed organizations. Given the serious protection concerns of individuals reporting on violations occurring in Myanmar, this report prioritized full respect of the “do no harm” principle over any other consideration. Factual determinations of incidents and patterns were made where there were reasonable grounds to believe that relevant incidents had occurred. Figures of deaths likely represent an underestimation of realities on the ground. For purposes of this report, a mass killing is considered an alleged incident in which at least 10 civilians or persons hors de combat were killed. This report gives particular focus to key human rights and protection concerns deriving from the systematic use of indiscriminate attacks and attacks directed against the civilian population including, airstrikes, mass killings, and burning of villages. It also demonstrates that the intensity and brutality of military actions against the civilian population have increased over time, with complete impunity. Military actions have also resulted in interconnected humanitarian, political, and economic crises. imposing an unbearable toll on the people in Myanmar. Additionally, the report presents findings on the human rights situation of the Rohingya community, reiterating the lack of progress on the root causes of systemic discrimination, including on accountability, safety, citizenship, and fundamental freedoms. A seemingly endless spiral of military violence has engulfed all aspects of life in Myanmar. Since the coup, OHCHR has consistently investigated and reported the evolution of Myanmar’s human rights crisis and the military’s absolute disregard for international law and protection of civilians. Analysing the use of violence by the military against individuals opposing their power and the civilian population at large, clear patterns emerged demonstrating a continuous escalation in terms of number, type, intensity, and brutality of attacks. Shortly after the coup, the military unilaterally amended and instrumentalized the legal framework to stifle free expression, justify arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and deny thousands of activists, journalists, and human rights defenders due process and fair trial rights. Their tactics quickly evolved into systematic targeted killings and mass arrests, with torture and ill-treatment causing numerous deaths in custody. Increasingly, the military resorted to brutal campaigns against any perceived opponent. They increasingly rely on air and artillery strikes on villages and other populated areas, burning of villages, executions and killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, forced displacement, denial of humanitarian access, and persecution. Depending on the circumstances, some of these acts may constitute crimes against humanity and/or war crimes. Amid a surge in the military’s reliance on fighter jets and helicopter gunships, violence has continued to escalate, as epitomized in April 2023 through multiple airstrikes on Pa Zi Gyi village, Sagaing, resulting in the largest mass casualty incident recorded since February 2021. The military’s increasing use of air power and munitions exhibited the military’s growing reliance on heavy weapons and materiel that can only be purchased from foreign sources. To do so, they rely on access to foreign currency to purchase such military hardware, support services, and aviation fuel. Thus far, targeted measures have shown some limited success in degrading the military’s offensive capacity, suggesting that more comprehensive, concrete, and meaningful international sanctions of this sort are urgently needed to curtail the military’s capacity for continuing its campaign of violence and repression. Concerns arise also with regard to violations and abuses by anti-military armed groups and elements. While not comparable to the military’s violence in scale, proportion, or scope, such abuses exacerbate protection concerns of the civilian population. This situation requires decisive actions by the National Unity Government and relevant armed groups to ensure accountability and prevent impunity for human rights abuses by respective forces under their control..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-09-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-26
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Description: "With Myanmar’s military fighting on other fronts, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army is firming up its foothold in the country’s north. Clashes with other ethnic armed groups are possible. The Ta’ang group should focus on improving governance in its areas, in conjunction with civil society. What’s new? The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has used Myanmar’s post-2021 coup crisis to expand its territory in northern Shan State, recruit fighters and strengthen its parallel administration. Although it has quietly supported anti-coup resistance forces, it has clashed with the military only rarely and has met with regime representatives. Why does it matter? The TNLA’s expansion has created tensions with other ethnic armed groups and non-Ta’ang communities in northern Shan State. The group’s ambiguous political positioning since the coup reflects the complex environment in which ethnic armed groups operate. It also helps explain why building a countrywide anti-regime alliance has proven so difficult. What should be done? The TNLA, which seeks greater autonomy, should focus on caring for the people under its control through improved self-administration rather than expanding its territory further. It should also reform its recruitment practices. Foreign donors should increase funding for local civil society organisations delivering services in Shan State. I. Overview Since the February 2021 coup in Myanmar, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups – has strengthened its control of a swathe of territory in northern Shan State. In conjunction with Ta’ang civil society organisations, it is working to maintain the rule of law, deliver health and education services, and improve the local economy. Unlike some of Myanmar’s other ethnic armed groups, it has mostly avoided confronting the military since the coup. Instead, it has provided only covert support to anti-junta forces and engaged indirectly with new opposition political institutions. The group’s ambiguous post-coup positioning reflects its long-term ambition to achieve autonomy. As it assumes the role of a quasi-state, the TNLA should focus on supporting the population in its areas and avoiding military adventurism that might provoke conflict with other ethnic armed groups or the military; it should also cease coerced and underage recruitment for its armed forces. Outside actors should support the provision of services in Shan State, working through local civil society. Since its inception in 2009, the TNLA has slowly acquired more strength and territory. It garnered popular supportamong the Ta’ang by pushing a strict anti-drug use policy and bringing together disparate communities under a common ethnic identity. Other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar – including the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and, more recently, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which is the largest such group and controls an autonomous region in Shan State – provided the training and weapons the TNLA needed to build up its armed forces. Over the past decade, it gradually expanded its geographical footprint. For much of that time, it regularly clashed with the Myanmar military and its allied militias, as well as the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), a rival ethnic armed group. The 2021 coup has further strengthened the TNLA’s hand. Busy fighting on other fronts, the Myanmar military has largely withdrawn from the northern Shan State battlefield, enabling the group and its allies to gain territory and expel the RCSS from the area. The TNLA, which counts an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 personnel, can now project power into nearby towns. The military’s withdrawal has also enabled the TNLA to assert authority in places it controls and govern in a way that advances its goal of building a robust, autonomous Ta’ang nation. Working in partnership with Ta’ang civil society organisations, it has followed the lead of larger armed groups and created an incipient “Ta’ang State”, complete with courts, schools and health facilities. This quasi-state is very much a work in progress, but since the coup the group and its civil society partners, many of which are women-led, have moved well down the road toward creating a de facto autonomous governing body. To focus on consolidating control, the TNLA has staked out a middle ground in Myanmar’s post-coup conflict. It now tries to steer clear of clashes with the military. Although the Ta’ang group has been an important source of training and weapons for new forces resisting the junta, it has avoided publicising this support. It has also kept informal its engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) – a parallel administration set up by lawmakers ousted by the coup – instead allowing Ta’ang civil society groups and politicians to lead the way in building these relationships. The TNLA has also maintained contact with the junta. Along with two other ethnic armed groups, it recently had a rare meeting with regime negotiators tasked with striking ceasefire deals. It did so under pressure from Beijing. China has longstanding ties to Myanmar, with which it shares a 2,160km border, and since the late 1980s has invested heavily in its neighbour, in part through its Belt and Road Initiative. In order to protect its economic interests, China is particularly keen to keep the southern border it shares with Shan State stable. The TNLA’s positioning helps explain why building an anti-military coalition in Myanmar has proven so difficult. Most ethnic armed groups are hostile to the military regime, but they also see little prospect of it collapsing, making them reluctant to cement alliances with the NUG or armed resistance. Chinese pressures further push these groups away from overt confrontation. At the same time, the TNLA and other ethnic armed groups are influenced by their communities, civil society organisations, and the broader domestic and even international public. They thus have to balance various demands when determining the best pathway to achieving their objectives – in the TNLA’s case, a de facto autonomous Ta’ang State. The group’s expansion in recent years also reflects a broader fragmentation within Myanmar’s national borders that has accelerated since the 2021 coup. With the central administration unable to operate normally, non-state armed groups such as the TNLA or civil society organisations working in the areas they control are the purveyors of public services to millions of people. Together, the TNLA and Ta’ang civil society organisations run schools, provide health care, collect taxes and administer justice systems. The TNLA’s rise is not without risk to it or the people under its control. Further expansion could provoke conflict with either other ethnic armed groups or the military. Even absent TNLA growth, the military may at some point seek to recapture some of the lost territory. Non-Ta’ang people in Shan State feel threatened by the TNLA’s gathering might, fanning inter-communal tensions. The high costs associated with maintaining a large armed force and system of governance also mean that the TNLA runs the risk of overreach. The need to raise revenue already appears to be pushing it into competition with other ethnic armed groups and pro-military militias, which could lead to sharpening hostilities. Given the reality of state fragmentation in Myanmar, the people of northern Shan State will be best served through a combined effort by the TNLA, civil society and donors to manage conflict risk, improve governance and deliver services. The TNLA should refrain from further expansion, which would risk renewed conflict, and take greater care to avoid provoking other ethnic minorities living in its territory. It should reform its recruitment policies, including by ending conscription – often enforced through violence or threats thereof – and cracking down on recruitment of child soldiers. Meanwhile, donors should expand support for civil society organisations in northern Shan State, including not only Ta’ang groups but also those run by other ethnic minorities. Strengthening civil society would not only allow these groups to provide more services to civilians, but it would also afford them a degree of moderating influence over the leadership of armed groups, particularly when it comes to maintaining peaceful inter-ethnic relations in this corner of war-torn Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
2023-09-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Seventy-eighth session Item 73 (c) of the provisional agenda* Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives Summary The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 77/227 and covers the period from 15 August 2022 to 14 August 2023. In addition to the human rights situation of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities, the report focuses on the continued deterioration of the political, humanitarian and security situation in Myanmar following the military takeover in February 2021, including further restrictions of human rights and the worsening of socioeconomic conditions. There is an urgent need for safe, full and unhindered humanitarian access to vulnerable communities in line with international principles. That urgency has been compounded by the devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha in May 2023. The report highlights the continued brutal repression by the military. Thousands have been killed since February 2021, including children, with reports of increased sexual and gender-based violence committed by the military while civic space continues to shrink. The multifaceted crisis in Myanmar continues to yield serious regional implications, including displacement and the proliferation of illicit activities. Since February 2021, more than 64,000 people have fled and remain outside of Myanmar. More than 1.6 million people have been internally displaced. Rohingya people remained displaced domestically and abroad, including nearly 1 million Rohingya in Bangladesh. While peaceful opposition to the military persisted, armed resistance expanded, adding to an already precarious situation. There has been no meaningful action by the military to address the root causes that led to the forced displacement of the Rohingya population. The United Nations will continue to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar and to support their democratic aspirations for an inclusive, peaceful and just society and the protection of all communities, including the Rohingya. As part of this effort, the Organization will seek to further strengthen cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations towards de-escalating the violence and reaching a sustainable political solution in line with relevant General Assembly resolutions and Security Council resolution 2669 (2022). I. Introduction 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 77/227, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices and pursue discussions relating to Myanmar, involving all relevant stakeholders, and to offer assistance to Myanmar, and to submit a report to the General Assembly on all relevant issues addressed in the resolution at its seventy-eighth session. The present report covers the period from 15 August 2022 to 14 August 2023. 2. During the reporting period, the political, security, humanitarian and human rights situation in Myanmar deteriorated further, and socioeconomic conditions worsened, affecting regional stability, in particular in terms of increased illicit activities. Armed conflict and violence continued to intensify, displacing communities across Myanmar, with many seeking asylum across borders. The devastation caused by Cyclone Mocha in May 2023 and access constraints compounded multiple vulnerabilities in conflict-affected areas. 3. Myanmar remains extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, including cyclones, flooding, extreme temperatures and droughts, disproportionately affecting the most vulnerable. The collapse of many rule of law and regulatory safeguards since the military takeover has also resulted in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. 4. The Secretary-General and his Special Envoy continued to condemn all forms of violence and reiterated calls for the military to respect the will of the people, to refrain from repression and to act in the greater interest of peace and stability in Myanmar and the region. In a statement ahead of 1 February 2023, which marked two years since the military takeover, the Secretary-General expressed his ongoing solidarity with the people of Myanmar in support of their democratic aspirations for an inclusive, peaceful and just society and the protection of all communities, including the Rohingya. He called for the release of all those arbitrarily detained, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. 5. The Secretary-General has called for neighbouring countries and other Member States to leverage their influence over the military leadership. The Secretary-General drew global attention to Myanmar as the multifaceted crisis continued to unfold, including through his strong condemnation of large-scale aerial attacks by the military and his expression of deep concern about the ongoing political repression. 6. On 21 December 2022, the Security Council adopted resolution 2669 (2022), in which it demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country and urged restraint and de-escalation of tensions, while acknowledging the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including its five -point consensus on Myanmar. The Council further urged the military to immediately release all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and reiterated its call to uphold democratic institutions and processes and to pursue constructive dialogue and reconciliation in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar. The Council also requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the ASEAN Special Envoy, to report orally to the Council by 15 March 2023. The Council convened a private meeting on 13 March 2023 and heard briefings from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, in her capacity as the representative of the ASEAN Chair, and from the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General. The Council also met twice in closed consultations to consider the situation in Myanmar during the reporting period. 8. On 15 December 2022, the annual General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 77/227 on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar. 9. The Special Envoy briefed the General Assembly on 25 October 2022 and 16 March 2023, and called for regional unity and international coherence in support of a process led by Myanmar to end the violence and return to the path of democracy. The Special Envoy also emphasized the need for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through all available channels and the protection of civilians. 10. The Special Envoy visited Myanmar from 16 to 18 August 2022 and met with the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, to press for full and unimpeded humanitarian access and stress that progress depended on an end to the violence and visible and significant improvements in the lives of the people of Myanmar. Following the execution of pro-democracy activists in late July 2022, which the Secretary-General strongly condemned, the Special Envoy urged the Senior General to impose a moratorium on executions. She also reiterated the call of the Secretary-General for the release of all political prisoners. The Special Envoy further highlighted the responsibility of Myanmar to create conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees. Her visit was preceded by consultations with a range of stakeholders, including the National Unity Government and key ethnic armed organizations. 11. The Special Envoy visited Bangladesh from 22 to 26 August 2022 to engage with refugees in Cox’s Bazar and highlight the need for greater responsibility-sharing, while recognizing the continued generosity of that country. On 21 and 22 February 2023, the Special Envoy visited Saudi Arabia to discuss potential cooperation with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on educational opportunities for Rohingya refugees. The Special Envoy also visited Indonesia from 4 to 6 April to strengthen cooperation with the ASEAN Chair and the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar. She visited China and India from 1 to 3 May and on 9 and 10 May, respectively, to call for strengthened regional unity to respond to the crisis in Myanmar. 12. The Secretary-General and his Special Envoy repeatedly cautioned against proceeding with any electoral process without a genuine, inclusive political dial ogue and conditions that permitted citizens to freely exercise their political rights without fear or intimidation, as this risked further exacerbating violence and instability. 13. On 11 November 2022, ASEAN leaders attending the fortieth and forty-first ASEAN Summits reaffirmed the need to implement the five-point consensus “in its entirety” and requested ASEAN foreign ministers to develop “an implementation plan that outlines concrete, practical and measurable indicators with a specific timeline”. In his address to ASEAN leaders, the Secretary-General reiterated his support for ASEAN playing a vital role in contributing to multilateral solutions to respond to the political, security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Myanmar. 14. ASEAN leaders met again from 9 to 11 May 2023 and, in a statement by the Chair, reiterated their “unified position” that the ASEAN five-point consensus remained their “main reference” in addressing developments in Myanmar, and supported the Chair’s continued engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar to find a peaceful and durable solution. In a statement following their meeting of 11 and 12 July 2023, ASEAN foreign ministers “urged all parties involved to take concrete action to immediately halt indiscriminate violence, denounce any escalation, and create a conducive environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and inclusive national dialogue”. 15. The United Nations is committed to staying in Myanmar and addressing the multiple vulnerabilities arising from the actions of the military since February 2021. Humanitarian and community resilience needs increased significantly during the reporting period, while the United Nations and other operational partners faced greater constraints and risks in delivering assistance. Despite these factors, the United Nations continued to deliver support to the people of Myanmar and scaled up the response, reaching 4.4 million people in 2022 and a further 1.8 million people in the first six months of 2023. The State Administration Council continued to limit access to affected populations in many parts of the country, including in the wake of Cyclone Mocha, which caused significant damage in many parts of Myanmar. In May, unidentified assailants attacked an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management convoy under military escort, underscoring the challenges in delivering assistance in a complex security environment. Since February 2021, the military has enacted numerous measures, including an extension of the state of emergency and the introduction of martial law in 47 townships as of the end of February 2023, alongside Internet shutdowns in over 20 townships, eroding civic space and restricting the exercise of human rights, such as the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association. During the reporting period, the introduction of an organization registration law established new, cumbersome administrative steps to register and re-register civil society organizations and international non-governmental organizations, and imposed severe criminal penalties for non-compliance, including prison sentences. 16. Elections initiated by the State Administration Council appear unlikely to occur this year. The military had pledged elections as part of its five-point road map, but the efforts of the State Administration Council to consolidate control included revisions to the election law that led to the dissolution of some of the most popularly supported political parties, including the ousted National League for Democracy. The extension of the state of emergency, and the sustained offensive against the resistance, including ongoing aerial bombardment in civilian populated areas, continued to drive conflict and violence throughout the country. 17. The State Administration Council continued its engagement with select ethnic armed organizations signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, inviting their leaders to what it described as peace talks in Nay Pyi Taw. Key ethnic armed organizations, especially those engaged in active conflict, including several signatories to the Agreement, declined to participate. The State Administration Council has excluded key resistance movements, including the National Unity Government, as well as the National Unity Consultative Council and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, foreclosing the opportunity for genuine and inclusive dialogue. The State Administration Council continues to designate the National Unity Government, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and the People’s Defence Forces as “terrorist organizations”. 18. Ethnic states in border areas, as well as central Myanmar regions, including Sagaing and Magway, remain among the most affected by armed conflict, refl ecting sustained opposition to the Myanmar military. Resistance forces, including selfdeclared People’s Defence Forces in these areas, have increased their collaboration with established ethnic armed organizations, and some of these forces have grown increasingly sophisticated, utilizing new technologies and accessing regional arms markets. Some resistance groups are also carrying out attacks on targets they perceive as pro-military as the State Administration Council continues to support and reportedly increasingly rely on militias that work alongside security forces. Such groups include the Pyu Saw Htee militia, which includes military veterans and supporters active in Sagaing and Magwe, as well as several other militias allegedly responsible for targeted killings, notably of civilians, elsewhere in the country. 19. Despite efforts by the Myanmar armed forces to assert control, popular support for the resistance persisted, which also affected key allies, including the Border Guard Forces. In June, armed personnel from the military-aligned Border Guard Forces in Kayah State broke ranks and fought alongside resistance forces against military targets. The defection, assessed by some as the first substantial defection from the Border Guard Forces since the military takeover, reflected the competing pressures faced by some allies of the Myanmar armed forces. 20. Throughout the reporting period, there continued to be credible reports of aerial bombardments, large-scale burning of villages, killings of civilians, and sexual and gender-based violence by the Myanmar armed forces. There were also reports of resistance groups using violence and committing human rights abuses. The Secretary - General has called on all sides to exercise maximum restraint and to desist from any form of violence and focus on reducing the suffering of the people as a prerequisite for sustainable peace. 21. Reflective of growing social cohesion across ethnic and political party lines, several key ethnic armed organizations, the National Unity Government and civil society organizations articulated several proposals aimed at fostering domestic political coherence and responding to the increasing humanitarian and protection needs of the most vulnerable communities, including by working with the Un ited Nations, ASEAN and neighbouring countries. 22. For example, National Unity Government and National Unity Consultative Council members, including representatives of women’s groups, labour groups and ethnic armed organizations, formed a joint coordination committee on humanitarian assistance to coordinate policy in relation to the delivery of aid to communities affected by human-made and natural disasters. The National Unity Government and several key ethnic armed organizations, including the Chin National Front, the Karen National Union and the Karenni National Progressive Party, conducted a joint humanitarian assessment of the most vulnerable areas of Myanmar and shared it with international actors. This group, together with humanitarian civil society organizations, continued to promote an inclusive humanitarian forum led by Myanmar aimed at addressing vulnerabilities through all channels, including credible, locally led organizations. 23. In Rakhine State, there was some incremental improvement in freedom of movement for the Rohingya owing to improved intercommunal relations in certain areas. However, no discernible efforts were noted on the part of the military to address the structural issues that impede the peace and prosperity of Rakhine State and that disproportionately affect Rohingya communities. 24. Civil and citizenship documentation remained inaccessible for the vast majority of the Rohingya owing to complicated and lengthy procedures, as well as prohibitive costs. Citizenship application remains contingent on possessing the National Verification Card or Identity Card for National Verification, which continue to designate Rohingya as “Bengali”. Rohingya communities continued to face significant challenges in registering the births of their children and updating household lists, which affects their freedom of movement, access to services, school enrolment and civil and other key documentation, including with regard to housing, land and property. 25. Cyclone Mocha caused significant damage in Rakhine State, with Rohingya in internally displaced persons camps among the worst affected. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that almost 5.4 million people were in the cyclone’s path in Rakhine and north-west Myanmar. In response, humanitarian partners issued a flash appeal to assist 1.6 million people in the affected areas, including 1.1 million already targeted as part of the Myanmar humanitarian response plan for 2023. The combined humanitarian response plan and flash appeal for 2023 would assist 5 million people and require $887 million. As at 14 August 2023, the combined response plan was only 25 per cent funded. 26. The retraction by the State Administration Council of initial approval for the cyclone-related distribution and transportation plans of the United Nations and the temporary suspension of travel authorizations for humanitarian organizations in Rakhine impeded the humanitarian response and compounded the already dire living conditions of the cyclone-affected population. Despite restrictions, humanitarians reached almost 607,000 people with food assistance in Rakhine, and more than 274,000 people with shelter support, while support was provided in other areas, including health care, nutrition, and short- and long-term recovery and communitybased resilience support. The Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim for Myanmar called on the State Administration Council to urgently reconsider its decision to deny access. 27. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer, concluded her assignment on 12 June 2023. The Secretary-General is thankful to Ms. Heyzer for her tireless efforts on behalf of peace and the people of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: UN General Assembly
2023-08-14
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-31
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Description: ""Importantly, those involved in conflict need to know how to cultivate and foster peace for our future." Jesua Lynn The military coup in Myanmar has heavily affected young people, who represent more than 30 per cent of the population. The military regime has brutally killed more than 3,000 innocent civilians and made more than 20,000 arrests, and young people have been leading the resistance since day one. Young people have been active in protests and have employed different disobedience tactics, including social media campaigns, fundraising with gamification and click-to-donate. The oppressive rules limiting the rights and freedom of young people have even led many of them to take up arms to fight for their rights, as well as to defend their families and reclaim democracy. But many groups of young people also spread the awareness of social cohesion, cultural diversity and conflict resolution, to help equip their peers as a foundation for future nation and state-building. One youth-led platform in particular is still committed to peacebuilding and nation-building in the future. It is the School of Federalism and Peace Studies, Spring University Myanmar, founded and led by the younger generations of Myanmar. This pioneer academic platform offers three main activities: short courses, diploma courses and debate classes, with the theme of federalism and peace studies. This platform for young individuals aims to educate and equip their peers, younger generations and the wider public with the necessary knowledge to comprehend the ongoing conflicts in Myanmar from both practical and academic perspectives. "We train the young people to understand the transitional justice and genocide studies to apply in their relevant works and put efforts to avoid such ugly crimes against humanity in the future" Teaching peace The curriculum includes courses such as ‘Peace, Conflict, and Society’ and ‘Human Rights and Peacebuilding’, designed to foster an interdisciplinary understanding of present conflict patterns, violence, and human rights violations within society. Additionally, modules on genocide studies, humanitarian intervention, and the role of media in peacebuilding are incorporated to train young people to analyse current conflicts and encourage their involvement in conflict prevention, management, and action against the crimes committed against humanity in Myanmar. The module on ‘Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice’ seeks to raise awareness among young individuals about the importance of transitional justice. It encourages them to exert more effort in promoting justice at the community and national levels. A School representative said, “Young people are actively involved in revolutionary movements for the restoration of democracy and claiming the peaceful federal state. On the other hand, our younger generations need to access the understanding of important ingredients of future peacebuilding. That is what we are doing. We train the young people to understand the transitional justice and genocide studies to apply in their relevant works and put efforts to avoid such ugly crimes against humanity in the future.” After the military coup, there has been significantly increased hate speech and polarisation within the society due to the different political beliefs and affiliations. There also has been spread of misinformation and ethno-religious divides, which have been used by the military to divide the public. To contribute to combating this, the School’s training equips young people to recognising and undermining these manipulated narratives of hate within the community. The School offers a training programme focusing on dialogue and debate to enhance critical thinking and foster an authentic community dialogue culture. It is worth noting that the international community has consistently emphasised the importance of dialogue, but the military regime has often manipulated these dialogue arrangements, resulting in negative responses from the younger generations and the people. Therefore, it is crucial to educate the younger generations on the true essence and purpose of authentic dialogue and its potential applications. Looking to the future Given the political situation in Myanmar, the areas beyond any government control have been expanding, leaving the local people to decide how to deal with the conflicts in their areas in their own ways. Dialogue can serve as a viable pathway for progress in these circumstances. To achieve the desired peaceful, democratic, and federal nation, internal cohesion is critical. Dialogue can enhance social cohesion within the community to have a common goal and objective for future nation and state-building. To prepare the younger generations for involvement in nation and state-building, they need to be equipped with essential skills such as critical thinking, research, presentation, and debate. This school platform can be considered a pioneering space where young people can learn the skills and competencies to actively participate in conflict resolution, monitoring, social cohesion, and future nation and state-building. While much attention is often directed towards resistance and revolution, this group of young people focuses on the future of Myanmar, dedicating their efforts to peacebuilding and preparing their peers for the challenges ahead. Currently, this school platform is under-resourced and ask for the cooperation and any assistance for the sustainability. These kinds of works should have more access to resources and support. “Those in the conflict need to understand peace and how to build peace. If they do not know how to make or build peace, there will always be problem-solving through violence, even in the future,” said a representative from the School. Jesua Lynn is an independent research and training consultant. He has been working in the field of peacebuilding, social cohesion, and youth activism of Myanmar for more than five years. He also writes the articles and stories in Asia Democracy Chronicles, as a regular contributor from Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: Peace Direct
2023-08-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Advance unedited version Distr.: General 28 June 2023 Original: English Human Rights Council Fifty-third session 19 June–14 July 2023 Agenda items 2 and 4 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2021 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* Summary The present report, prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/49/23, identifies trends and patterns of human rights violations in Myanmar between 1 February 2021 and 30 April 2023 with a focus on the human rights impact of the denial of humanitarian access. The report analyzes actions by all duty-bearers and finds that the Myanmar military is most responsible for the negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights and on delivery of humanitarian action. The report documents that the military has established an all-encompassing system of control based on instrumentalization of the legal and administrative spheres in Myanmar. Urgent and concrete steps are needed to ensure essential needs of all people are met, including food and healthcare, and to respect, protect and fulfil peoples’ fundamental rights. This report concludes with recommendations to all parties, including the military authorities, the National Unity Government’, and the international community. The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments. I. Introduction and methodology In resolution A/HRC/49/23, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor and assess the overall situation of human rights in Myanmar, with a particular focus on accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law and to make recommendations on additional steps necessary to address the current crisis and to present a written update at its 53rd session. This report presents findings from monitoring and documentation activities conducted remotely by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) between 1 February 2021 and 30 April 2023, examining trends and patterns in violations of international human rights law and, where applicable, of international humanitarian and criminal law. Paramount among these violations are the Myanmar military’s targeting of civilians, including by restricting access to humanitarian assistance for communities impacted by violence, armed conflict, and systematic discrimination against Rohingya, other minorities and perceived opponents of the regime. As denial of humanitarian access results in loss of civilian lives during violence and conflicts, as well as in long-term human rights consequences such as food insecurity and lack of medical assistance, this report is based on a holistic approach to civilian protection involving both immediate and direct harm from violence and conflicts, and medium- to long-term negative impacts on the ability of people to exercise their fundamental rights. Further affirming the critical importance of strengthening civilian protection and guarantees for meaningful humanitarian access, the United Nations Security Council in its resolution S/RES/2669(2022) of December 2022 on the situation in Myanmar reiterated “the necessity for full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” while underlying “the need for scaled up humanitarian assistance to all people in need in Myanmar and to ensure the full protection, safety and security of humanitarian and medical personnel”. Furthermore, to address its concerns at the deteriorating humanitarian situation as compounded by increasingly challenging humanitarian access and attacks on humanitarian personnel, the Human Rights Council called on the military to exercise utmost restraint and ensure full protection of human rights of all persons in Myanmar. Similarly, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) repeatedly called on Myanmar authorities to implement the Five-Point Consensus, cease violence, and ensure safe and timely delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, confirming findings from previous reports, the military has shown complete disregard for these attempts at addressing the human rights, humanitarian, and political crises flowing from the coup of February 2021 and the subsequent violent suppression of opposing voices. Additionally, the centrality of protection of human rights as a key priority in humanitarian action is highlighted in several key UN policy documents. These include the Secretary-General’s Call to Action for Human Rights and his Common Agenda which reiterated that the achievement of the goals of justice, peace, prevention, equality, and leaving no one behind are grounded in a system that has at its core the protection and promotion of human rights To ensure wide collection of data and verified information and support the participation and representation of different actors, OHCHR strived to engage as many interlocutors as feasible. It collected testimonies and information from primary sources, including victims and witnesses, and verifiable secondary sources – all of which underwent credibility assessment in accordance with OHCHR’s standard methodology. A total of 53 interviews with primary sources were conducted along with 43 formal consultations with partners and organizations through secure communication platforms. Moreover, OHCHR sought to gather information and data through the United Nations system and its existing mechanisms. It also submitted questionnaires to the Myanmar military, the National Unity Government, ethnic armed organizations, and relevant private companies. Throughout the documentation process, interlocutors consistently raised protection concerns confirming that fear of retaliation by the military for the peaceful exercise of fundamental rights permeates every aspect of life within and outside Myanmar. Widespread and systematic violations perpetrated by the military have created an environment where both Myanmar’s people and representatives of international organizations believe they are at risk of becoming targets for expressing opinions opposing military rule, sharing information, assisting people in need, and operating without military-issued authorizations, among others. For these reasons, and in full respect of the “do no harm” principle, this report does not present details that may lead to the identification of interlocutors, unless expressly authorized. Similarly, whenever necessary, geographical references are limited to the states and regions of Myanmar as identification of townships may result in retaliatory acts against individuals concerned. National and international interlocutors nonetheless provided a wealth of knowledge and information, although on numerous occasions cautioned OHCHR from publicly using them to avoid further military reprisals. Similarly, this sense of fear also extended to areas under the control of other duty-bearers from which only anecdotal information was received, not meeting the necessary standards for verification and inclusion in the report. Additional documentation efforts on denial of humanitarian access in areas outside military control are therefore necessary. The complexity of Myanmar’s humanitarian environment is characterized by the multiple needs of diverse communities in the various States and Regions, and the presence of multiple types of actors inside and outside Myanmar. For each individual situation and actor, there are different levels of access, challenges, and concerns. Rather than focusing on localized specificities, the report seeks to support accountability efforts by analysing broader patterns of actions and omissions by duty-bearers affecting the rights of people-in-need of life-saving assistance and essential services..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-06-30
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
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Description: "Panel discussion on durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis and to end human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar 53rd session of the Human Rights Council Statement by Nada Al-Nashif, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Mr President, Distinguished Panelists, Excellencies, Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar have endured decades of persecution and systematic discrimination. Today, eleven years after the 2012 violence in Rakhine State, and six years after the 2017 military operations that killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, more than one million languish in refugee camps in Bangladesh. An estimated 600,000 remain in Myanmar where they continue to be deprived of their basic rights. Meanwhile other ethnic and religious minorities, who had pinned their hopes on ceasefire agreements and the promise of a federal and democratic future for Myanmar, are now once again the victims of a new cycle of conflict. The military coup of February 2021 and violent repression in many parts of Myanmar have inflicted more suffering on minority communities, including Rohingya Muslims. In addition, last month Cyclone Mocha – the most powerful storm to hit the region in a decade – raged through the country. More than 100 Rohingya died while thousands had their homes shattered and their lives upended, rendering them even more vulnerable. The Myanmar military has the unequivocal obligation to provide full, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to all persons in need. Instead, the military has put in place a system of physical and administrative restrictions on the conduct of humanitarian operations, including in assessing casualties and needs on the ground. People are reportedly living in forests and improvised shelters without any access to life-saving services, such as medicines and at times, food. Alarmed by the gravity of the worsening situation at the end of last year the Security Council adopted its first resolution on Myanmar in which it underscored the need to create conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. Sadly, those conditions do not yet exist on the ground. To achieve an inclusive future, the authorities in Myanmar must ensure a fully democratic, representative and accountable political system, repeal all discriminatory legislation, undertake inclusive and constructive dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, and implement measures that ensure the respect and protection of the human rights and dignity of each and every person without discrimination. A fundamental step is the full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation, allowing for the full and equal access to basic services, including education and health, economic opportunity, and freedom of movement. Needless to say, any dialogue and deliberation about the future of the Rohingya – including any possibility for their return to Myanmar - must include their full, effective and meaningful participation, in all their diversity. Sustainable returns in line with international standards are impossible unless the human rights, freedoms and security of the Rohingya community are guaranteed. In the meantime, a large number of Rohingya continue to flee to safer countries, often taking immense risks, including dangerous sea crossings. According to UNHCR, more than 3,500 Rohingya attempted deadly sea crossings last year, 2022 – a 360 per cent increase compared to 2021. At least, 348 Rohingya died while making these sea crossings in 2022. I take this opportunity to express our solidarity with and support to Bangladesh for stepping up to provide refuge to more than 1 million Rohingya refugees through this protracted crisis. I also commend countries in the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand for allowing safe disembarkation and provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to Rohingya who arrived by boat and I hope that would continue. I also acknowledge the significant pressure placed on these countries, notably Bangladesh, in their humanitarian efforts as well on humanitarian actors, in ensuring delivery of services to the camps in Bangladesh. Since March of this year, due to shortfalls in funding, the World Food Programme has had to sharply reduce food rations in the camps – twice – which has further compounded the refugees’ hardship. The 2023 Joint Response Plan for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis in Bangladesh is severely underfunded. I call upon the international community to provide robust and sustained support to Rohingya refugees. We must continue to build their** resilience and self-reliance**, which is fundamental. Ensuring access to education, lifelong learning, skills development and livelihoods in the camps is critical if the refugees are to move away from total dependency on humanitarian assistance, in order to be prepared to rebuild their lives in Myanmar, once they can return in dignity. In the face of the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military for past and present violations against the Rohingya, we fully support the ongoing accountability efforts at the international level. The application brought by the Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice is an important step in this direction, as is the continuing investigation of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. I hope the Human Rights Council will redouble its support in the direction of accountability initiatives. To conclude, I urge the Council to give careful attention to the views expressed by the panel and to work collectively on a roadmap towards durable solutions – solutions that are anchored in the hopes and the human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
2023-06-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
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Description: "UN expert urges coordinated action by Indonesia and other nations to address Myanmar crisis JAKARTA (21 June 2023) – The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews wrapped up a nine-day mission to Indonesia today by calling for coordinated action by Indonesia and others to address the deepening crisis in Myanmar. He expressed his appreciation to Indonesia for its support to the people of Myanmar and urged the country to play a bigger role in resolving the crisis both as current Chair of ASEAN and as a leader in Southeast Asia and on the world stage. “I came to Indonesia because the human rights situation in Myanmar is dire and getting worse, and because I believe that Indonesia is positioned to play a critical role in the resolution of this crisis,” Andrews said in a statement released today at a news conference in Jakarta. “I’m worried that the deepening crisis in Myanmar has become invisible to much of the world, and that some governments are beginning to think that the junta’s tyranny is inevitable. This narrative is exactly what the junta wants and needs to prevail,” he said. In meetings with Indonesian and ASEAN officials during his visit, Andrews noted that the world was looking to Indonesia and ASEAN for leadership in resolving the Myanmar crisis. “There are two different time zones when it comes to ASEAN and the crisis in Myanmar: one being the reality of the people of Myanmar who face daily attacks by junta forces and rapidly deteriorating conditions. The other is the world of ASEAN officials who caution that progress could take years, even decades,” the Special Rapporteur said. “The people of Myanmar do not have decades nor years – some do not even have days – for the junta to be held accountable,” he said. Andrews called on Indonesia to show continued leadership on Myanmar not only for the remainder of its ASEAN chairmanship, but beyond. “It is time to consider alternative options to break the deadly stalemate. I urge ASEAN to take measures to hold the junta accountable for its grave human rights violations and blatant disregard for implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. Even if ASEAN remains deadlocked, Indonesia should work with allies to isolate the junta and reduce its capacity to attack the people of Myanmar,” the expert said. During his mission, Andrews traveled to Aceh Province and visited a Rohingya refugee camp in Pidie District, where he heard directly from Rohingya who undertook dangerous boat journeys across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea and disembarked in Indonesia. “What was overwhelmingly apparent is the extreme vulnerability of refugees with whom I met. Fleeing atrocity crimes in Myanmar, and facing increasingly dire conditions in Bangladesh, they carry with them deep trauma. They want and deserve a safer, more peaceful life.” “The Rohingya refugees recounted their harrowing experiences at sea. A woman told me that over 20 persons died on her boat and that they had to throw the bodies overboard. Another woman cried as she recalled the lack of food and water, and how she had to give her child seawater to drink,” Andrews recalled. The expert said he was inspired by the widespread empathy for Rohingya among Acehnese fishermen, local civil society groups providing aid and services, and UN staff working with the refugees. Andrews cautioned, however, that there remain many challenges for Rohingya refugees in Indonesia and the region. “Responsibility for the rights of the Rohingya, including their right to redress as survivors of atrocity crimes, rests primarily with Myanmar. But it also extends to the countries where they seek refuge and to the broader international community,” said Andrews. He emphasised that Indonesia is well-positioned to play a global leadership role to defend and support the Rohingya. ENDSMr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide. The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-06-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This report examines why digital infrastructures are crucial to the work and survival of independent media, particularly in Majority World countries, and why the current infrastructures are a serious threat to press freedom, access to information and democracy. It also presents inspiration, examples and recommendations to what a broad range of factors can do to create alternative public interest infrastructure and explains why media is a crucial actor to include in these processes. First, a timeline introduces the key shifts in media and information distribution throughout time. The first chapter, Digital infrastructure that serves the public interest, outlines basic elements of what public interest infrastructure is and why the scale of our current problems in the digital space forces us to focus more on locally anchored alternatives. It is based on a range of interviews and public events over the past year and a half with leading journalists and tech experts, including IMS partners, from around the world. Moving closer to the local context, Online risks and social resilience in Myanmar analyses the advantages and dangers of current digital infrastructures in Myanmar, particularly regarding social media and messaging tools. The analysis looks into how digital platforms have increased trust levels and direct communication, but also concludes that the price of these developments has been very high, and that the services posed a threat to the public’s safety after the military coup on 1 February 2021. Building on leading academic research, Who controls the internet in Myanmar presents a mapping and analysis of the ownership and control of Myanmar’s digital infrastructure, from cell towers and undersea cables to apps, and its consequences for local media and the public. The researchers conclude that the military is in a prime position to turn the country into a digital dictatorship. The last chapter, How to get there: reimagine, build and scale in the public interest, analyses and proposes what steps independent media, the media development community, global and local communities, governments and donors can take towards creating digital infrastructures that better serve the public interest locally and globally, while introducing solutions that excites us – like local, slow-moving social media platforms and a tool to measure the public interest value of an organisation’s current and future tech procurements. Finally, the report rounds off with a list of recommendations to catalyse the ambitious work towards the vision of public interest infrastructure. These reflect that we need to join, form and support coalitions with diverse skills and a shared vision at local, regional and global levels..."
Source/publisher: International Media Support (Denmark)
2023-03-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 9.05 MB (52 pages) - Original version
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Description: "NEW DELHI, 11 May 2023 – The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer today reinforced that a unified regional approach supporting Myanmar-led solutions, in accordance with the will and needs of the people, can make tangible progress on the ground, urgently address the suffering of the people and prevent a catastrophe in the heart of Asia. In her first visit to New Delhi as UN Special Envoy from 9 to 10 May, the Special Envoy held discussions with Minister of External Affairs of India H.E. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra and Joint Secretary (Bangladesh-Myanmar) Smita Pant. Underlining that India as a neighbouring country has been particularly impacted by the situation in Myanmar, Indian officials emphasized the need for immediate cessation of violence by all sides and fostering dialogue for return of peace, stability and democracy in Myanmar. Indian officials also reiterated their support to the efforts of the UN and ASEAN. Special Envoy Heyzer highlighted India’s key role in the United Nations and as a leader of the Global South holding the current presidency of the G20. She appreciated India’s constructive efforts towards peaceful resolution of the situation in Myanmar and also expressed the United Nations’ gratitude to the Government and people of India for generously hosting over 53,000 people from Myanmar, acknowledging the major challenges facing Myanmar’s neighbouring countries affected by the escalating conflict and violence. In this context, the Special Envoy reinforced the need for concrete steps to resolve the crisis and build the foundation for sustainable peace and a return to civilian rule based on the will of the people, such as cessation of violence, immediate release of all political prisoners, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance through all available channels reaching the most vulnerable in areas of active conflict. Guided by both the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Special Envoy Heyzer continues to closely cooperate with the ASEAN Special Envoy to create a conducive environment for inclusive dialogue and a political solution to the Myanmar crisis..."
Source/publisher: UN Secretary-General
2023-05-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-11
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Description: "BEIJING – During her first visit to Beijing as Special Envoy this week, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer reinforced the key role of regional countries in addressing the multidimensional crisis in Myanmar. During the visit from 1 to 2 May, Special Envoy Heyzer held discussions with State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Qin Gang and Special Envoy for Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Deng Xijun. The State Councillor underscored the international community must act prudently and pragmatically to prevent the intensification of the Myanmar conflict and its spillover in the region. He stressed appreciation for the Special Envoy's effective implementation of her mandate and China’s strong support to her role. The Special Envoy emphasized China’s important role in the United Nations including as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its continued support for ASEAN’s centrality in facilitating a peaceful resolution in the interests of the people of Myanmar, constructive dialogue among all parties as well as the provision of humanitarian assistance. Special Envoy Heyzer stressed that a robust international response to the ongoing crisis in Myanmar required a unified regional effort involving neighbouring countries that can leverage influence towards cessation of violence, civilian protection and stability in Myanmar. In line with the Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) on Myanmar, the Special Envoy continues to closely cooperate with the ASEAN Special Envoy to seek a peaceful and inclusive process towards de-escalating the violence and reaching a sustainable political solution guided by the will and needs of the people..."
Source/publisher: United Nations
2023-05-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-05-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Promoting Ethnic Peace or Strengthening State Control?
Description: "The ethnic ‘peace process’ in Myanmar is one of the most labyrinthine in the modern world. Dating back to 1989, a variety of bilateral, multilateral and unilateral initiatives have been underway. In recent years, they were linked by the aspirations of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and 21st Century Panglong Conference. None of these processes have led to inclusive political dialogue or sustainable peace, and both came to a halt with the military coup on 1 February 2021. Since this time, national breakdown has further ensued, and a new cycle of armed conflicts has begun, including in both rural and urban areas that have not seen fighting and displacement in many years. Myanmar today is among the most war-torn lands in both Asia and the world. Using the NCA as a spectrum, this new report by TNI seeks to analyse the most significant attempt to resolve ethnic conflict by negotiation since independence in 1948. Critical issues include the challenges in the negotiation of ceasefires; the failure to implement the NCA, including military violations; endeavours to overcome peace obstacles while the National League for Democracy was in government office; and analysis of how conflict parameters have changed in the fall-out from the 2021 coup. The NCA, though, did not occur in a vacuum. Over the years, a host of other challenges came to overshadow implementation and focus, undermining peace progress on the ground. Key issues include conflict regression in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, people’s militia and Border Guard Forces, economic opportunism and exploitation in the ethnic borderlands, and the divergent and ineffective responses by different international actors. Such factors are integral elements in Myanmar’s conflict landscape. Ultimately, there was no single reason why the NCA failed. The lack of inclusion, implementation, political will and political accomplishment are outstanding. Positioned at the heart of these failures is the Tatmadaw or Sit-Tat. After decades in government, the country’s military leaders sought to use the NCA as a mechanism for state control rather than a gateway to ethnic peace and reform. Myanmar was never at peace following the NCA’s 2015 inception. Myanmar is currently in its deepest state of civil war in several decades. Repression, political violence and humanitarian emergency are sweeping every state and region. All the peoples are suffering. It is thus vital that lessons are learned from the bitter experiences of peace failure in the past in order to build a better path to reform and reconciliation in the future. Any new process to address such challenges must be equitable, inclusive, just and sincere among all parties in order to contribute to this essential task..."
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Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2023-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-04-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 8.27 MB (160 pages) - Original version
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Description: 'SG/SM/21754 30 MARCH 2023 The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres: The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by reports that the Union Election Commission, appointed by the military in Myanmar, has dissolved 40 opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Any attempts to undermine democratic institutions and processes will only deepen the crisis and delay the return to a fully democratic and inclusive Myanmar. The Secretary-General renews his call on neighbouring countries and other Member States to urge the military leadership to adhere to inclusive political processes. The Secretary-General reiterates his call for the immediate release of all arbitrarily detained prisoners, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi..."
Source/publisher: UN Secretary-General
2023-03-30
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Council Fifty-second session 27 February–31 March 2023 Conference room paper of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Summary Having failed to secure control of Myanmar and recognition by most Member States as legitimate, the military junta, or State Administrative Council (SAC), of Myanmar finds itself at a turning point two years after launching an illegal military coup. As widespread public opposition continues and attacks by its forces on villages intensify, the SAC will step up its efforts to advance its false claim to legitimacy in 2023, including by orchestrating a sham “election.” Its goal is to reverse its international isolation abroad and portray as inevitable its claim as the government of Myanmar to audiences at home, rendering continued popular opposition both dangerous and futile. Member States of the UN have an important responsibility and role to play in determining whether Myanmar’s military junta will succeed in achieving its goal of being accepted as legitimate and gaining control of a nation in revolt. This conference room paper is presented to Member States as a resource to meeting this responsibility. The paper addresses the claims of the SAC to be a legitimate government by both examining its claim that its coup was legal under a constitution that it drafted and put into place in 2008 and by applying international standards as established by two core doctrines that have informed the recognition of governments since World War II. The conclusion of this analysis is clear – the SAC’s military coup was illegal and its claim as Myanmar’s government is illegitimate. The core leadership of the administrative and legislative elements of Myanmar’s democratic government that the SAC prevented from forming have reconstituted in opposition to the SAC. The National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) were created to represent the will of Myanmar’s people, with the NUG forming the administrative side of government in this transitional period. The NUG provides the international community with a credible alternative to the SAC. Applying the same international standards of legitimacy used to examine the legitimacy claims of the SAC, this paper finds that the NUG has a far stronger claim to legitimacy. The paper also examines in detail Member States’ interactions with the SAC, highlighting those actions that have delegitimized or withheld recognition to the SAC, and those actions by Member States that have created the appearance of legitimacy. The Special Rapporteur urges that Member States who support human rights, democracy, and the aspirations of the people of Myanmar publicly reject the SAC’s false claim as a legitimate government and instead recognize the NUG as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar. He also urges Member States to reject the sham elections the SAC is planning to hold by August 2023. Finally, the Special Rapporteur reiterates his recommendation that the Member States who stand with the people of Myanmar immediately form a working group of governments to develop and implement a coordinated strategy that can deny the SAC the weapons and resources that it requires, while supporting the people of Myanmar with humanitarian and other forms of non-lethal aid..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-10
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Description: "Human Rights Council Fifty-second session 28 February–31 March 2023 Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Situation of human rights in Myanmar Summary Two years after Myanmar’s military launched an unconstitutional coup d’état and formed the State Administration Council, the country is in freefall. As opposition groups gain strength and the SAC’s control over territory and the people of Myanmar erodes, the military has doubled down on its brutal tactics, sowing violence and chaos across an everwidening sphere of conflict. In recent months, the military has stepped up aerial attacks, bombing villages, schools, medical facilities, and encampments for internally displaced persons. The SAC’s campaign of mass arson continues, with roughly 58,000 homes and civilian structures burned since the coup. More than 1.3 million people have been displaced in the past two years, and more than 3,000 civilians have been killed. The SAC continues to suppress all forms of dissent as it attempts to impose a militarydominated future on the people of Myanmar. More than 16,000 political prisoners are now behind bars. The SAC has sought to legitimize its efforts to crush civic space and control local and international organizations by establishing a draconian Organization Registration Law. Despite extending a nationwide state of emergency through July 2023, the junta continues to make plans to hold sham elections in a desperate attempt to claim legitimacy and gain international recognition. The humanitarian and human rights crisis in Myanmar has had a destabilizing effect on the region. Since the coup, hundreds of thousands of people have fled to neighboring countries in search of safety and opportunity. Countries and communities hosting refugees from Myanmar deserve credit for offering shelter and support to people who, in many cases, have been literally forced to run for their lives. However, considered in its entirety, the international community’s treatment of those fleeing Myanmar has been wholly inadequate. Myanmar nationals in neighboring countries enjoy few legal protections and face the risk of arrest, detention, deportation, pushbacks at land and sea, and obstruction of their access to UNHCR, refugee status determination, and resettlement. Higher income countries have failed to share responsibility for the crisis, offering paltry resettlement quotas and inadequate contributions to humanitarian relief programs. In this report, the Special Rapporteur calls on Member States to fulfil their obligations toward people from Myanmar by offering shelter and support, refraining from acts that endanger their human rights, and working towards durable solutions for refugees and other Myanmar nationals outside their country..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-10
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Description: "EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The current conflict in Myanmar began with the 2021 coup d’état. The conflict between the ruling junta and pro-democracry movement has accelerated environmental degradation and hurt Myanmar’s economic standing. Demographic stress has also worsened both from the junta’s lack of attention to urban infrastructure and its targeting of rural villages, increasing the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The return to military rule has caused a worsening trend for most indicators used to determine the degree of conflict. This diagnostic uses the methodology created by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy to establish possible short-term scenarios based on indicators of conflict determining trend lines and degree of risk. The military coup has destabilized the country which has resulted in a return to military rule causing a worsening conflict trend and making any peaceful settlement unlikely in the near future.....
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Source/publisher: Carleton University
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-06
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Description: "Mr President, Excellencies, Colleagues, Friends Myanmar is a country close to my heart – one that I have travelled to often. At the time of the elections in 2015, I witnessed the complex process of opening to the world that the nation had embarked on, and I was inspired by the hope and optimism that we saw at that time as part of the nation-building process. The people of Myanmar knew that they faced many challenges. Decades of isolation. Protracted repression. Ethnic nationalism – and particularly severe discrimination, structural exclusion and violence against the Rohingya, many of whom I've met over many years. Lost educational opportunities. Poverty. It was never going to be simple, but there was sincere, whole-hearted hope. But hope is rare now in Myanmar. As the country enters the third year of the crisis generated by military rule, its people continue to suffer profound human rights harms; an expanding humanitarian emergency; continuing impunity of the military authorities; and a deepening economic crisis. Armed conflict has continued to grow in scope and intensity, with attacks on civilians reminiscent of those in 2017, when the military attacked Rohingya communities in Rakhine State. However, military operations now increasingly involve the use of airstrikes, artillery shelling and heavy weaponry against civilian communities across the country. Our latest report (A/HRC/52/21) details a number of incidents, investigated by my staff, in which hundreds of houses were burned and dozens of people – including children – killed by shelling and military raids. Overall, the military increased airstrikes against civilian locations by 141% in the second year of the military takeover. Its artillery shelling of communities, including hospitals, schools and places of worship, increased by over 100%. Despite official claims that such tactics are aimed at anti-military armed groups, in numerous cases, testimony gathered by my Office has not indicated the presence of such groups. The military’s use of arson throughout the country echoes its past attacks on civilians in Rakhine State. Incidents in which homes and neighbourhoods have been set on fire have risen by 380% in the second year after the coup -- leading to an estimated 1,200% increase in the number of homes destroyed. Particularly in Sagaing Region, northwest of Mandalay, we continue to receive daily reports of new incidents, with soldiers reportedly moving from village to village, looting and then setting fire to homes and farms. UN colleagues indicate that since the military takeover, some 39,000 structures have been burned in villages and towns where the military has operated. Satellite images confirm that numerous incidents have involved destruction of entire villages, while other villages have been set on fire on multiple occasions. People who are unable to flee risk being burned to death. Those who can escape – over 1.3 million people displaced since the coup was launched – face destitution. Overall, credible sources have verified that at least 2,947 civilians have been killed by the military and its affiliates since 2021, including 244 children. More than one third of these confirmed deaths occurred in military custody. The actual number of civilian killings is almost certainly far higher. Excellencies, The disregard and contempt for human life and human rights that are continuously demonstrated by the military constitute an outrage to the conscience of humanity. Cases have been reported of some armed groups attacking and killing civilians perceived to be working for or with the military. In some of these incidents, the targets have included family members. Such acts are not in any way a legitimate form of opposition or resistance. They constitute murder and must be condemned. While I note that the scale of human rights abuses committed by armed groups appears considerably lower than the violations committed by the military, I must emphasise that all armed parties must institute or strengthen efforts to comply with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, notably civilian protection. It is imperative that the military respect the Security Council’s December resolution S/RES/2669 and take steps to end the violence. Mr President, On 1 February 2023, two years since seizing power, the military extended the state of emergency, and since then has twice expanded martial law to cover large areas of the northwest and southeast of the country. This subjects civilians to the expanded jurisdiction of military tribunals, with no right of appeal – even upon imposition of the death penalty. Credible sources verified that since 1 February 2021, at least 17,572 people have been arrested (including 381 children) with 13,763 remaining in detention. Detainees across the country have reported severe beatings; mock executions; suspension from ceilings without food or water; electrocution; and acts of sexual violence. I condemn this apparently widespread use of torture and ill-treatment, as well as consistent reports of squalid conditions of detention. The rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement have been increasingly – it appears, strategically – restricted, and continue to strangle media freedoms and civic space. Merely “liking” a Facebook post may lead to terrorism charges, with sentences of ten years or more in prison, following opaque trials that do not meet fair trial standards at all. Additional burdensome restrictions have been imposed on the registration of non-profit organizations and their capacity to function. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on people’s basic subsistence and poverty levels in the country is also alarming. Across the country, 17.6 million people now need humanitarian assistance, and over 15.2 million face acute food insecurity. At a time of such dire humanitarian needs, these regulations will impede the capacity of many NGOs to deliver essential goods and services. Excellencies, The Rohingya community still remaining in Myanmar, which has already endured decades of persecution, continues to face widespread and systematic discrimination in every area of life. The necessary conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified returns of refugees to Rakhine State simply do not exist, and the over one million Rohingya who remain in forced exile in Bangladesh and other countries, as well as hundreds of thousands who are internally displaced, face a bleak present, and worse future. Over the past year, thousands more Rohingya have sought to flee unbearable conditions. At least 3,500 attempted sea crossings in 2022– a 360 percent increase from 2021. At least 348 of them died or went missing at sea. It is a tragedy. In addition, around 2,000 Rohingya people were arrested in 2022 for so-called “unauthorised travel” within Myanmar. The urgent goals must be recognition of citizenship, and the exercise of rights associated with it, as well as security – repeatedly requested by the Rohingya as essential to conditions that would be conducive for their return. In the interim, I appeal to all countries to provide continued robust support to people fleeing Myanmar, and to their host communities in the region, notably in Bangladesh. Host countries really need continued and sustained support. The terrible fire that raged last night across part of the camps in southern Bangladesh where more than one million Rohingya refugees take shelter underscores the precarity of their position. Recent sharp reductions of food rations in the camps – due to shortfalls in funding – compound their hardship and the general insecurity in these camps. There needs to be increased international support, as well as the provision of education and livelihood opportunities to the refugees, to uphold their dignity and reduce their dependency. I was moved last month to see the gesture of a number of Rohingya, who have lost everything, but nonetheless providing support to earthquake victims in Türkiye and Syria. There will be no durable vision for the future without accountability for the cruel violence of the past. The continuing proceedings before both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, with respect to the severe violations of the most basic human rights that have been visited upon the Rohingya as a group, simply for who they are, warrant every support. Mr. President, I remain deeply concerned by the prospect of new elections taking place in Myanmar while violence spirals out of control, amid mass displacement, and the arbitrary detention of elected political leaders in February 2021, and thousands of others since then, whose only crime was to oppose the military takeover. The elections of November 2020 made clear that what the people of the country wanted was to continue the hard-won path of democratic reform. It is critical that the country’s future is decided by a process led by the people of Myanmar. I call on members of this Council to do their utmost to deliver humanitarian support directly to Myanmar’s people, including by channelling operations through grassroots organisations. And I call on all United Nations Member States to promote dialogue and sustainable solutions that are representative of the will of the Myanmar people, in order to bring an end to this brutal crisis. The people of Myanmar deserve a better future. Thank you..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
2023-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2023-03-06
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Description: "According to the first sentence on Page 1 of the 2015 Defense White Paper, “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (was) first founded, not in 1948 as is universally accepted, but “by the Bagan dynasty over a thousand years ago.” Incredible as it may seem, the “proof” is in the statues of the three kings overlooking the parade ground in Naypyitaw. Any ordinary Bamar seeing them may feel proud of being a descendent of such warrior-kings, and that it’s his/her duty to preserve this land no matter what the consequences are. But we can also ask non Bamar visitors especially Shans, Mons and Arakanese, to Naypyitaw. What their feelings are on seeing these awesome figures. The likely answer may be if the Bamars go on revering kings that forcefully occupied our ancestral lands, their descendants have no right to call for our allegiance to them. On the other hand, the psychological effect on all of them may be different, if there were, say, statues of Aung San and non-Bamar leaders stood together and held the 1947 Panglong Agreement instead. Because to them, what the three kings, and later the British, had forged were not unions as claimed but empires. Then Aung San and leaders of the Frontier Areas, notably Chin Hills, Kachin Hills, and the Federated Shan States signed an agreement with the aim to establish a union. We should remember, said the late Shan politician Shwe Ohn, hadn’t it been for the Panglong Agreement, we could have been separate countries. However as far as the non-Bamars are concerned, the terms of the agreement, except for one, have not been fulfilled: Appointment of Frontier Areas representatives as central government ministers then called counselors which academics term “Shared-rule”. Accordingly, state chief ministers were also union ministers until 1962, but not afterward. Full autonomy (meaning with its own laws) which academics term as “self-rule”. But far from being able to have their own constitutions, states were not able to choose their own chief ministers without the consent of the prime minister even during the short lived democratic era. Establishing a Kachin State (With Chin Hills, it became a Special Division until 1974 when the status as a state was accorded) Human Rights and Democracy (Tun Myint of Taunggyi, another prominent Shan politician, in his Shan State’s Grievances presentation in 1957, reported bullying, tortures, rapes, Shan girls being sold in cities by TMD soldiers, and providing cash and arms to dissident movements to sow discord. In short, practicing the Divide and Rule policy. “If one compares this kind of behavior to the Japanese excesses, the TMD is clearly enjoying a comfortable lead,” he wrote. Financial autonomy (meaning the right to manage its own finances as in the British days plus “Bamar one kyat, Shan one kyat”) Taxes from extraction of minerals and wood were paid to the Shan States during the British era. It also received percentages of various taxes. One discovers that the financial relationship between Shan and Burma even during those days was not that between the DONOR and RECIPIENT, but in terms of LIABILITY to pay and to receive. It is unfortunate that after we have become free, we have to use the the word “Subsidy”, discrimination even in terms of terminology, said Tun Myint. Now about the application of the “Burmese One Kyat, Shan One Kyat” principle. According to the 1952-53 Fiscal Year Budget statistics, calculated by population figures from the 1941 census, one finds that while Mainland Burma got 1 kyat, and the Shan State got only 0.48 kyat. By the time, U Thein Sein became president in 2011, it became worse. Asia Foundation reported that the 14 states and regions received only 3.6% of the total expenditures. Thereby drawing a comment from a Canadian friend, “Why, Khuensai, you are only 3.6% federal.” Tun Myint concluded that Shan State bore all the characteristics of a colony: political and legal domination, economic dependence, and exploitation. The situation was such that there were calls for secession, a right provided by the 1947 constitution. As older, cooler headed leaders opted for political means to resolve the crisis, hot-headed and educated young ones decided to choose the armed struggle in 1958. 65 years have passed since then and the result? Neither the secessionists nor the Unionists are winning Especially the former, whose Mong tai Army, the strongest of all anti-military forces, as conceded even by the MIS, was defeated in 1995, after China decided an independent Shanland was against its interests. As for the Unionists, they have not fared better either. Panglong Agreement. However, the Bamar elites had refused to insert the Agreement, let alone discuss it, in the much-vaunted 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The Peace Process that followed it has also steadfastly steered clear of including it in their negotiations, avoiding it as though it were an infectious disease. After 7 years of negotiations, it has become quite clear nothing significant will be achieved as long as both sides are beating around the bush. And the non-Bamar states, as pointed out by the late Shan politician Tun Myint of Taunggyi in 1957, will continue to be Burmese colonies. Peace will still be an unattainable goal. It wasn’t like this when we were still under British colonial rule until 75 years ago. The situation was not perfect but we had peace and stability. In the Federated Shan States (as Shan State was known in those days) there were only 2 infantry battalions of the Burma Frontier Force. On the contrary, today we have a hundred times more battalions in the Shan State alone. And there is no peace. If this situation continues without any glimpse of hope for the people, some suggest perhaps we should ask the British to return and tell us what is going wrong in our country. Why other former colonies like US, India and Malaysia which had suffered under the same “Divide & Rule” British policies are getting ahead while we are still left behind. The question now is what’s next? Let’s see what fool’s idea I may have about this. As said earlier, we have fought for Independence but failed. We have also fought for a federal union, still to no avail. Today the situation is more complex. When I wrote “The Making of a Rebel”, there were only a few tens of thousands of rebels. But now we have hundreds of thousands. And more options: like elections, reactivation of Daw Suu’s role, diplomacy, supporting non-violent movements, building a golden bridge, as Chinese expert Sun Zi terms it, for the military to retreat across, more sanctions and embargoes, international involvement in peace talks, resetting the media’s role in reshaping society, etc. A mixture of carrots and sticks. To me, one thing is quite clear. Alone by itself, each of these carrots and sticks won’t work. However, if all or most of them can become parallel lanes of the same road leading in the same direction, there may be hope. This is not a new idea. The highly respected late Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who was both a scholar and armed resistance leader, used to exhort us to apply the principle: Common Goal, Diverse Actions. Like Sun Zi had done earlier with his “qi” (Indirect Approach) and “zheng” (Direct Approach) principles, because one method alone is insufficient to win. But in order to put it into practice, a competent, dedicated and patient coordination, like Nick Fury did for the Avengers will be necessary. Without people like him, our heroes, however talented they are, would be a long way from winning. Before I end this article, here’s another fool’s food for thought. Right now, the Three Kings are the present military leaders’ Bible while the Panglong Agreement is the non-Burmans’ Ten Commandments. Until we have a common history text, we may still be living in the same country, but they are worlds apart. One encouraging fact is that we have not a few historians who follow in the steps of the late Dr. Than Tun, who championed writing history without bias. It will nevertheless take some time. The Oxford Sayadaw Dr. Khammai Dhammasami said it took even experts of the three Buddhist schools 7 years to come up with the Common Buddhist Text. This means for a common history text, we will need the same growth mindset (in contrast to the fixed mindset). And with the same growth mindset, and a common history text, we can live together happily ever after..."
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Source/publisher: "Shan Herald Agency for News" (Chiang Mai)
2023-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-02-22
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Description: "BANGKOK – The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer today highlighted key areas for concrete action where greater regional and international unity can support a Myanmar-led process to end the violence and suffering and help Myanmar return to the path of democracy guided by the will of the people. In her urgent call, the Special Envoy focused on humanitarian aid without discrimination and through all available channels, a unified position on the military’s plans for elections, and protection of civilians including both people inside Myanmar and refugees. Over the past two years, the military’s disruption of Myanmar’s democratic transition has inflicted enormous damage on the country and people, and led to a multidimensional crisis spanning severe humanitarian, human rights and socio-economic consequences with serious regional ramifications. As of the end of last year, 15.2 million people were food insecure, more than 1.5 million internally displaced and an estimated 34,000 civilian structures had been destroyed since the military takeover. The Rohingya people in refugee camps and those remaining in the country, as well as other marginalized communities, are at heightened risk with 2022 marking one of the deadliest years for people forced to undertake perilous sea journeys. The Special Envoy renewed the United Nations’ solidarity with the people of Myanmar and the need for protection of all communities, which the United Nations Secretary-General reinforced in his recent statement. She reiterated the Secretary-General’s concern regarding the military’s stated intention to hold elections, which threatens to worsen the violence and instability in the absence of inclusive political dialogue and conditions that permit citizens to freely exercise their political rights without fear or intimidation. The Special Envoy urgently calls for greater unity and commitment among the international community in three key areas: First, the international community, and particularly donors and Myanmar’s neighbours, must come together with humanitarian actors including local humanitarian networks to scale up urgently needed assistance to all those in need without discrimination and through all available channels. A commitment to increase levels of cross-border aid, along with more flexible banking and reporting rules, will facilitate humanitarian support to people most in need. Second, the international community must forge a stronger unified position regarding the military’s potential elections which will fuel greater violence, prolong the conflict and make the return to democracy and stability more difficult. Third, the international community must implement measures to increase protection for civilians inside Myanmar as well as for Myanmar refugees in the wider region. Such measures could include an on-the-ground monitoring mechanism as part of the implementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and its commitment to stop the violence in Myanmar, and regional frameworks for the protection of refugees and forcibly displaced people. “It is inconceivable any form of peaceful and democratic transition can be initiated by those perpetrating harm on their own citizens,” Special Envoy Heyzer said. “The violence has to stop, including the aerial bombings and burning of civilian infrastructure along with military’s ongoing arrests of political leaders, civil society actors and journalists.” Guided by her ongoing consultations with women and youth, ethnic, political and community leaders, and refugee representatives, the Special Envoy is focusing on the following four areas: an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum; upscaling access to education for Rohingya refugees and host communities; regional frameworks for the protection of refugees and forcibly displaced people; and advancing the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: United Nations Myanmar
2023-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-31
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Description: "Seventy-seventh session Item 72 (c) of the provisional agenda* Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms Summary In July, Myanmar’s military junta executed four political prisoners, including a prominent pro-democracy activist and a former member of parliament. These unconscionable acts are consistent with the junta’s unflinching embrace of violence against the people of Myanmar. In recent months, military forces have systematically bombed and burned villages and massacred innocent civilians, including eleven children in Sagaing Region who were shot and killed when junta forces attacked their school in September. These forces have killed thousands and displaced nearly one million people since the coup. Many of the more than 12,000 political prisoners have been tortured and an unknown number have died in custody. In the midst of this darkness, however, Myanmar civil society is a shining light and inspiration. Activists, human rights defenders, aid workers, community leaders, journalists, health care professionals, and educators are among those who are taking great personal risks to document atrocities, deliver humanitarian assistance, and respond to the needs of displaced and traumatized communities. Human rights organizations, women’s associations, professional networks, trade unions and labour activists, and grassroots groups are adopting strategies to remain safe and effective in a deadly environment. In many cases, individuals and organizations are operating with little international support and few opportunities to communicate with the outside world. In this report, the Special Rapporteur outlines the human rights and humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar. He also describes the essential and awe-inspiring work being done by Myanmar civil society in the most challenging of circumstances. He calls on the international community to view Myanmar civil society as a vital partner in addressing the crisis in the country, working with grassroots networks to deliver aid and increasing financial and technical support to civil society organizations. Myanmar’s fate depends on the activists, organizations, and networks that have risen up to defy military rule, defend human rights, and prepare for a free and democratic future. They need and deserve a significant increase in support from the international community..."
Source/publisher: United Nations General Assembly (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2022-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2022-10-12
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Sub-title: Opening statement by Nada Al- Nashif UN Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights
Description: "Distinguished President, Excellencies, I welcome the opportunity to provide you with this oral update on the human rights situation in Myanmar, further to Human Rights Council resolution 49/23. Since the last update to this Council in June, the people of Myanmar have been caught in a rapid downward spiral, with growing suffering, fear, and insecurity. Urgent action is needed to reverse this catastrophic situation and to restore peace, democracy, and sustainable development. The Myanmar military’s offensives throughout the country are designed not only to target its opponents but also to punish any communities it deems to be supporting them. Military tactics increasingly involve indiscriminateattacks andweaponry. The growing use of air power and artillery during the monsoon season is significantly impacting civilians and residential areas. In Magway and Sagaing regions as well as Kachin, Shan, Kayah, and Kayin states, residential buildings – as many as 30,000 - schools and other civilian infrastructure have been burnt to the ground during military ground operations. In an emblematic incident documented by OHCHR, on 11 August military forces attacked an armed group presence in Yin Paung Taing village in Sagaing region with jets and helicopters, and then raided the village. Over 100 villagers were arrested, alleged to have been used as human shields and porters by the military. After three days of intense fighting, villagers, including women and children, were found dead, and 20 of those arrested are still missing. In another airstrike in Let Yet Kone village in Sagaing on 16 September the military targeted a school and a nearby monastery killing at least six children and injuring many others, including teachers. Eyewitnesses reported that 11 wounded people, including nine children and two teachers, were taken away and remain missing. Since February 2021, at least 2.316 people (including at least 188 children) have been killed. Widespread fear and insecurity among the civilian population has forced over 1 million individuals (of whom, 45,500 into neighboring countries) to leave their homes and now live in precarious conditions without access to food, medical assistance, and other basic services. The humanitarian crisis now brings fears of starvation, with the military largely denying humanitarian access, including recent orders to halt humanitarian operations in northern and central Rakhine State. Over 15,607 people have been arrested with some 12,464 remaining in detention. The death toll of people in custody is steadily rising. At least 273 persons have died in formal detention settings, such as prisons, detention and interrogation centers, and police stations as well as at least 266 reported deaths following raids and arrests in villages, at least 40 of whom were reportedly killed with headshots. Family members reported seeing signs of physical abuse, ill-treatment, or suspected torture, despite being informed that the death was a result of natural causes. There are 111 reported cases of people being burned, either alive or after being executed, in what appears to be a tactic of summary executions and attempts to destroy evidence of crimes. Myanmar’s military-controlled judicial system has also been weaponized to execute opponents. The military executed four individuals, including a former member of Parliament and a democracy activist, following a secretive military court trial, in violation of fair trial standards and rule of law principles. These executions, which are the first in about thirty years, represent an important indicator of the regression of human rights in Myanmar and the military’s complete disregard for international law. OHCHR has also documented that the military has arrested and charged at least 10 lawyers who were defending people charged with spurious, politically motivated offences. Since February 2021, civic space has been decimated. The military’s announced plans to create a register and impose a new tax on mobile phones will increase the risk of surveillance, further imperilling human rights defenders, journalists and members of the pro-democracy movement. It will also increase the cost of accessing the internet for ordinary people and further restrict freedom of expression and access to information. Just days ago, the military also announced that expressions of solidarity on social media to the National Unity Government and Peoples’ Defense Force, including by posting a “like” or an emoji, risked up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Excellencies, The relative stability experienced in Rakhine State since the start of the coup has proved very short lived. My office has received reports of killings, injuries, arbitrary detention and mass displacement of civilians resulting from clashes between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in several townships of Rakhine and Chin State and along the border, with reported cases of shelling into Bangladesh. Minority communities especially Rohingya and Kaman Muslims are particularly vulnerable, with the military imposing new restrictions on delivery of humanitarian aid and essential goods in large areas of Rakhine. Last month marked the fifth anniversary of the military’s 2017 campaign of violence against the Rohingya, involving the killing of thousands and pushing over 740,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh. During the former High Commissioner’s visit to the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar last month, Rohingya refugees shared their hopes of being able to return home when the conditions permit. However, conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet evident. The international community should support Bangladesh in providing protection, education and livelihood opportunities for the refugees, while continuing to pursue international accountability efforts. Despite widespread international condemnation, Myanmar is yet to address the root causes of Rohingya persecution. Rohingya are deprived of citizenship rights and civil documentation, limiting their freedom of movement, and access to health and education services. They face daily extortion by camp authorities, village administrators, police, and military. Most Rohingya in Rakhine live in desperate poverty, driving them, at high risk, to flee Myanmar, often paying large sums of money to human traffickers. United Nations figures indicate that informal attempts to leave and arrests for travelling without authorization doubled in 2022 compared to the previous year. Rohingya are often deprived of adequate legal representation and coerced into accepting guilt in order to avoid longer sentences. Mr. President, The cycle of violations must end. Unfortunately, diplomatic efforts have so far yielded limited results. I hope the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar’s recent visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh can build momentum. ASEAN must also reinvigorate its efforts to bring humanitarian support and promote a resolution to the crisis, in consultation with the people’s representatives, and with support from regional powers. I reiterate calls to the military to cease violence, including by imposing a moratorium on executions, to free all political prisoners, to ensure access to humanitarian aid and return Myanmar to democracy based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. I also urge this Council to consider strengthening OHCHR’s existing documentation mandate in order to enhance monitoring of the situation and support accountability efforts, including the work of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar. Thank you..."
Source/publisher: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Human Rights Council
2022-09-26
Date of entry/update: 2022-09-26
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Description: "GENEVA (16 September 2022) – UN experts said today human rights defenders documenting and responding to atrocities by Myanmar's military junta urgently need comprehensive support, including financial, and called on the international community to end apparent indifference to the violence targeting the country's population. “In the face of inaction by the international community, and with human rights violations continuing to be perpetrated on a daily basis by the military junta, human rights defenders are persisting in their support for those targeted and working to preserve the possibility of justice in the future,” said Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. Along with Tom Andrews, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Lawlor highlighted the grave risks defenders face and the specific challenges confronting women human rights defenders. “Defenders have been murdered and disappeared by the military since the coup took place. They now risk arrest, detention, torture, including sexual violence and death when going about their work and fear having their documents seized at military checkpoints,” the experts said. “Many have had to go into hiding after being targeted by the military for assisting survivors of gender-based violence. They are on the move constantly, and women human rights defenders often have no choice but to take their children with them when they flee.” Others have had to relocate to neighbouring countries, where they remain vulnerable. Lawlor and Andrews said they had publicly expressed concerns for the safety of defenders in the country just over a year ago. “What's needed is concrete support for Myanmar human rights defenders, including those who have had to flee the country: stronger, coordinated pressure on the junta, timely and responsive direct financial support for defenders on the ground, and visas or resettlement for those fleeing the country,” the experts said. “The international community must not adopt a passive stance when it comes to the crimes that are being perpetrated by the military junta and the risks for human rights defenders in Myanmar.” The experts: Ms Mary Lawlor (Ireland) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. She is currently an Adjunct Professor of Business and Human Rights in Trinity College Dublin. She was the founder of Front Line Defenders - the International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. As Executive Director from 2001-2016, she represented Front Line Defenders and had a key role in its development. Ms. Lawlor was previously Director of the Irish Office of Amnesty International from 1988 to 2000, after becoming a member of the Board of Directors 1975 and being elected its President from 1983 to 1987. Mr Thomas Andrews(United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide. Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council’s independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms. Special Procedures mandate-holders are independent human rights experts appointed by the Human Rights Council to address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. They are not UN staff and are independent from any government or organization. They serve in their individual capacity and do not receive a salary for their work..."
Source/publisher: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
2022-09-16
Date of entry/update: 2022-09-16
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Description: "GENEVA (16 September 2022) – States must do more to cut the Myanmar military’s access to revenue and arms supplies to halt its repression of the people, a report released today by the UN Human Rights Office said. The report was requested by the Human Rights Council to follow up on earlier recommendations made by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (‘FFM’) on economic interests of the Myanmar military (the Tatmadaw). Today’s report reiterates the FFM’s recommendations to impose targeted financial sanctions on the Tatmadaw and its economic interests as well as arms embargos, while at the same time highlighting that such measures must respect human rights and that efforts must be made to mitigate foreseeable socio-economic impacts. Several States continue to supply weaponry and engage in military cooperation, it states. Since seizing control of State organs, the so-called State Administration Council has “failed to govern in meaningful and sustainable ways, instead continuing to repress and terrorize the Myanmar people,” the report says. While some progress has been made on the FFM’s recommendations to economically isolate the Tatmadaw, there remain significant gaps, which are ever more important following the coup. Targeted measures should particularly focus on the military’s foreign currency access, said the report. It urges the international community to step up efforts to support the people of Myanmar and to ensure the military’s financial isolation in a coordinated fashion. Appropriate sanctions should be implemented in consultation with civil society and the democratic movement, including trade unions and the National Unity Government, to calibrate their impact. Myanmar’s military authorities are clearly prioritizing its military campaigns over the welfare of the population and economic recovery, the report said. In comparison with the previous annual Government budget, the military authorities’ 2022/23 budget increased defence spending, while reducing allocations to education, health, and social welfare. Poverty in Myanmar has increased at least two-fold and the public health system has effectively broken down since the coup, and more than half of all school-age children have not had access to education for two academic years, the report said. It also reported that some States and companies continue business relationships with military-owned enterprises in a number of sectors. All businesses active in Myanmar or sourcing from the country should take steps to ensure they do not economically benefit the military, including by conducting ongoing and transparent heightened human rights due diligence, the report says..."
Source/publisher: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva)
2022-09-16
Date of entry/update: 2022-09-16
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Description: "MIDDAY The Human Rights Council this morning held an interactive dialogue with Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar, followed by an interactive dialogue with Nada Al-Nashif, Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, on the situation of human rights in Sri Lanka. Nicholas Koumjian, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, said crimes in Myanmar had intensified. The people of Myanmar continued to suffer because of the lack of accountability for those who believed they answered to no law. There was increasing evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Women and children were at particular risk in conflicts, yet experience showed that crimes against them were typically under-reported and under-prosecuted. The Mechanism was united in its efforts to break the cycle of impunity and to ensure that those responsible for crimes would face justice. In the discussion on Myanmar, some speakers welcomed the report and strongly condemned the human rights abuses and violations in Myanmar. Reports on systematic and sexual-based violence and crimes affecting children were appalling. The human rights situation in Myanmar had deteriorated, in particular for those who were part of religious or ethnic minorities. The military should end the attacks on civilians and allow the population to express its human rights, including the right to freedom of expression. Other speakers pointed out that political mandates did not foster an environment of protection and promotion of human rights. Political dialogue was the only way to resolve the situation in the country. Nada Al-Nashif, Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, presenting a report on the situation of human rights in Sri Lanka, said since the previous update in March 2022, the country had been suffering from an unprecedented economic crisis. Months of countrywide protests eventually led to the President’s resignation and a new President was elected by the Sri Lankan Parliament on 20 July 2022. Ms. Al- Nashif encouraged the new Government to embark on a national dialogue to advance human rights and reconciliation and to carry out the deeper institutional, reforms needed to combat impunity and to tackle the economic crisis. Ms. Al-Nashif said 13 years since the end of war in Sri Lanka, tens of thousands of survivors and their families continued to seek justice and to know the whereabouts of their loved ones, with Sri Lanka repeatedly failing to pursue transitional justice. Instead, successive governments had created political obstacles to accountability, and actively promoted some officials credibly implicated in alleged war crimes, into the highest levels of government. The Acting High Commissioner called on States to pursue alternate strategies to advance accountability at the international level, including through the consideration of targeted sanctions against alleged perpetrators, as well as cooperation to initiate prosecutions based on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Ali Sabry, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, speaking as a country concerned, said the Government was extremely sensitive to the socio-economic hardships faced by its people, and had initiated immediate measures to address challenges and to ensure their wellbeing. Discussions on debt restructuring were in progress. The Government was in dialogue with United Nations agencies as well as bilateral partners to protect the most vulnerable from the adverse impacts of the crisis. Sri Lanka would endeavour to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The State looked forward to constructive engagement with the Council through the Universal Periodic Review process. Sri Lanka along with several Member States of this Council had opposed resolution 46/1, fundamentally disagreeing with its legitimacy and objectives. In the discussion on Sri Lanka, some speakers welcomed the formation of a more inclusive Sri-Lankan Government and constitutional reform. The peaceful transition of power and the efforts taken to restore peace and stability were applauded. Some speakers were concerned about the current situation in Sri Lanka, which was characterised by an economic crisis and violations of fundamental human rights. There were high levels of concern around freedom of expression, as peaceful protests resulting from the crisis situation were met with violence. Sri Lankan authorities were urged to protect the freedom of expression and assembly for all, and to stop arbitrary arrests of those engaging in peaceful protests. Some speakers reiterated their position to reject country-specific initiatives and resolutions that were confrontational and did not have the consent of the country concerned. For these speakers, it was important to provide technical assistance to Sri Lanka and strengthen its national institutions. Some speakers maintained that the mandate was costly, with no effect on the situation, and did not support solidarity. Also speaking in the morning meeting was Alfonso Nsue Mokuy, Third Deputy Prime Minister in charge of human rights of Equatorial Guinea, who said that the effects of the international economic crisis and the health crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic had constituted a challenge for the effective exercise of human rights in general, in particular economic, social and cultural rights. Each country had its own values, legislation and social demands, but it was also vital for all to reach basic agreements to foster respect and non-discrimination, and combat violence in all spheres. The Government of Equatorial Guinea had worked tirelessly to combat the pandemic, making it possible to reduce incidents of mortality in the country, with significant economic resources provided by the Government. The Government had also worked to eliminate corruption, and had carried out positive activities in this context. Speaking in the discussion on Myanmar were Finland, on behalf of Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden; European Union; Pakistan, on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; Switzerland; Egypt; France; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Australia; Ireland; Japan; Venezuela; China; Malaysia; United States; United Kingdom; Indonesia; Bangladesh; Timor-Leste; Romania; Belgium; The Gambia; New Zealand; Italy; Iran; Türkiye; Malawi; Canada; and Armenia. Also speaking were the following civil society representatives: Centre for Civil and Political Rights; Jubilee Campaign; International Commission of Jurists; International Federation for Human Rights Leagues; Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development; Meezaan Centre for Human Rights; iuventum e.V.; Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada; and the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Speaking in the discussion on Sri Lanka were the Netherlands on behalf of the three countries of the Benelux; Finland on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic countries; European Union; Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council; Liechtenstein; Switzerland; Egypt; India; France; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; North Macedonia; Australia; Ireland; Japan; Maldives; Ethiopia; Cuba; Kazakhstan; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Russian Federation; China; Nigeria; Syrian Arab Republic; Nicaragua; United States; Nepal; United Kingdom; Bangladesh; Pakistan; South Sudan; Burundi; Zimbabwe; Yemen; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Montenegro; Azerbaijan; Cameroon; Canada; New Zealand; Thailand; Uganda; Philippines, Kenya; Iran; Türkiye; Bolivia; Lebanon; Sudan; Cambodia; Eritrea; and Niger. The following civil society organizations also spoke: Khiam Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Torture; Christian Solidarity Worldwide; Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development; Baptist World Alliance; World Evangelical Alliance on behalf of Alliance Defending Freedom; Centre for Civil and Political Rights; Franciscans International; People for Equality and Relief in Lanka Inc-; International Commission of Jurists; and Global Life Savers Inc. The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-first regular session can be found here. The next meeting of the Human Rights Council will start at 1:45 p.m. to hold an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue on Afghanistan. Interactive Dialogue with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar Report The Council has before it the report of the Independent Investigative Mission for Myanmar (A/HRC/51/4) Presentation of the Report NICHOLAS KOUMJIAN, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, said crimes in Myanmar had intensified. The people of Myanmar continued to suffer because of the lack of accountability for those who believed they answered to no law. Five years had passed since the 2017 military clearance operations in Rakhine state led most of the Rohingya population to flee Myanmar. Almost all remained in neighbouring countries awaiting the day when conditions would allow their safe and dignified return home. There was increasing evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, deportation, and forcible transfer and persecution. The Mechanism prioritised gathering evidence of sexual and gender-based violence and crimes against children. Women and children were at particular risk in conflicts, yet experience showed that crimes against them were typically under-reported and under-prosecuted. Children in Myanmar were tortured and arbitrarily detained, sometimes to target their parents. There were strong indications that the executions of four individuals in July were without due process. The Mechanism faced many challenges collecting evidence, being denied access to crime scenes and witnesses in Myanmar. The Mechanism had obtained millions of items from networks of Facebook accounts controlled by the Myanmar military that were taken down by the company because they misrepresented their identity. Posts from these military accounts incited fear and hatred of Rohingya. The Mechanism was united in its efforts to break the cycle of impunity and to ensure that those responsible for crimes would face justice. Discussion Some speakers strongly condemned the human rights abuses and violations in Myanmar, which amounted to systematic crimes against humanity. The reported systematic and sexual-based violence and crimes affecting children were appalling. The human rights situation in Myanmar had deteriorated, in particular for those who were part of religious or ethnic minorities. Perpetrators must be held accountable. All partners of the international community should cooperate fully with the Mechanism so that victims could get justice. Some speakers strongly condemned the military coup. Human rights violations had been committed in a manner that was a widespread and coordinated attack on the civilian population, to an extent which could constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. The executions of pro-democracy individuals were condemned. The military should end the attacks on civilians and allow the population to express its human rights, including the right to freedom of expression. The Mechanism should continue to collect and preserve information about the situation, some speakers said. Myanmar’s persistent non-cooperation with the Mechanism was deplored: it should fully cooperate with the view to delivering justice, including and in particular to the Rohingyas. All social media platforms should share information with the Mechanism as and when they were approached, and the Mechanism should ensure that principles of “do no harm” were at the centre of their outreach in this context. The security forces and armed groups should ensure the protection of civilians, and reinstate immediately the moratorium on the death penalty. There should be a political resolution to the situation, ensuring that those culpable were brought to justice. There were serious international crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. The continuation of the tragic situation of the Rohingya was deplored, and they should be protected, with a lasting solution found to the crisis. The Office of the High Commissioner should communicate and cooperate with the Special Envoy to Myanmar. Bangladesh’s efforts to deal with the Rohingya crisis were applauded, and the international community was urged to cooperate in all ways with its efforts. Some speakers said politically-mandated mandates did not foster an environment of protection and promotion of human rights. The Universal Periodic Review was the suitable mechanism for addressing the human rights situation of countries around the world, not the unilateral imposition of mechanisms that only undermined the work of the Council. Political dialogue was the only way to resolve the situation in Myanmar, with the support of peace-loving nations, and this was the only way that Myanmar could overcome its existing challenges. It was regretted that Myanmar could not attend the dialogue, and the work done to boost its economy was recognised. There should be a political solution to the situation, in order to restore the dialogue within the country. The international community should speak in one voice that could further help all parties to further bridge differences, instead of creating tension and causing the situation to deteriorate further. The international community should also actively promote dialogue within Myanmar in order to restore peace and truly protect and promote human rights. Concluding Remarks NICHOLAS KOUMJIAN, Head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, said that under international law, the lack of due process could amount to an international crime. The Mechanism was interested in gathering evidence on the fairness of legal proceedings. No response had been received from the authorities in Myanmar. A key challenge was reaching those who had evidence, and achieving this required cooperation from States in the region. The Mechanism had conducted voluntary interactions, and needed the support of States to operate on territories hosting witnesses of human rights abuses. The Mechanism did not have the resources to provide all of the psychosocial and medical support that victims and witnesses needed, and requested the support of States in this regard. The Mechanism was committed to providing judges of a case dealing with genocide with the best evidence. The time that the Mechanism had to share evidence with courts was limited, and so it was redoubling efforts to collect evidence within the required timeframe. Statement by the Third Vice Prime Minister in Charge of Human Rights of Equatorial Guinea ALFONSO NSUE MOKUY, Third Vice Prime Minister in Charge of Human Rights of Equatorial Guinea, said the activities of the Office of the High Commissioner had moved forward and promoted many projects to protect, guarantee and defend human rights. The effects of the international economic crisis and the health crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic had constituted a challenge for the effective exercise of human rights in general, in particular economic, social and cultural rights. Each country had its own values, legislation and social demands, but it was also vital for all to reach basic agreements to foster respect and non-discrimination, and combat violence in all spheres. The work fostered by the Office of the High Commissioner aimed at improving the human rights situation was commended, particularly with regard to the Sustainable Development Goals. The Government of Equatorial Guinea had decided to change the track of the National 2020 Horizon Plan, with the support of development partners, mainstreaming the Sustainable Development Goals and the Agenda 2030, and the Agenda 2063 in its planning schemes, which enshrined a global vision of Equatorial Guinea and its role at the international level, including its commitment to strong economic growth, making it possible to improve living standards, eradicate poverty, protect the environment, and make it a country where all could live. The new Criminal Code had already been approved by the Head of State. The Government had worked tirelessly to combat the pandemic, making it possible to reduce incidents of mortality in the country, with significant economic resources provided by the Government. After the pandemic, the lack of public security had been the second concern facing the inhabitants of the country, due to the threat of juvenile crime. Thanks to the clean-up operation run by the Government, there had been a positive impact and the usual serenity had returned to the society. The Government had also worked to eliminate corruption, and had carried out positive activities in this context. Interactive Dialogue on the Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Sri Lanka Report The Council has before it the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Sri Lanka (A/HRC/51/5) Presentation of Report NADA AL-NASHIF, Acting United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, presenting the Office’s report on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, said that since the previous update in March 2022, the country had been suffering from an unprecedented economic crisis. Inflation was at a shocking 66.7 per cent and Sri Lankans had been facing severe shortages of fuel, electricity, food, medicines, and other essential items, while 6.3 million people were estimated to be food insecure. Months of countrywide protests eventually led to the President’s resignation and a new President was elected by the Sri Lankan Parliament on 20 July 2022. Ms. Al- Nashif encouraged the new Government to embark on a national dialogue to advance human rights and reconciliation and to carry out the deeper institutional reforms needed to combat impunity and to tackle the economic crisis. Concerningly in recent weeks, leaders and members of the protest movement and trade unions had been arrested. Ms. Al-Nashif urged the Government to take positive action to foster an environment for peaceful protest. She welcomed the tone set by the President in his first speech in parliament where he promised constitutional reforms. Thirteen years since the end of war, tens of thousands of survivors and their families continued to seek justice and to know the whereabouts of their loved ones, with the State repeatedly failing to pursue transitional justice. Instead, successive governments had created political obstacles to accountability, and actively promoted some officials credibly implicated in alleged war crimes, into the highest levels of government. The High Commissioner called on States to pursue alternate strategies to advance accountability at the international level, including through the consideration of targeted sanctions against alleged perpetrators, as well as cooperation to initiate prosecutions based on extraterritorial jurisdiction. The team established in the High Commissioner’s Office had made progress, including through conducting proactive analytical work, including in relation to gender and child-related violations, and was consolidating evidence collected by the United Nations into a repository, which would assist future accountability initiatives. The scale of this work required time and financial resources supported by States, and Ms. Al- Nashif urged the Council to ensure this work was supported. Impunity remained a central obstacle to Sri Lanka’s sustainable peace and development, and risked enabling further violations. The mandate granted by the Council to continue monitoring the human rights situation and pursue accountability for crimes under international law was now more important than ever. Response by Country Concerned ALI SABRY, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, speaking as the country concerned, said that the Government was extremely sensitive to the socio-economic hardships faced by its people, and had initiated immediate measures to address challenges and to ensure the wellbeing of its people. Discussions on debt restructuring were in progress. The Government was in dialogue with United Nations agencies as well as bilateral partners to protect the most vulnerable from the adverse impacts of the crisis. Sri Lanka would endeavour to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Sri Lanka along with several Member States of this Council had opposed resolution 46/1, fundamentally disagreeing with its legitimacy and objectives. Operative paragraph 06 violated the sovereignty of the people of Sri Lanka and the principles of the United Nations Charter. The High Commissioner’s report’s extensive reference to “economic crimes” exceeded the mandate of the Office. The proposed twenty-second amendment to the Constitution introduced several salient changes which would strengthen democratic governance and independent oversight of key institutions, as well as public scrutiny, participation in governance, and combatting corruption. Amendments included the establishment of the Constitutional Council and the reintroduction of the National Procurement Commission and the Audit Service Commission. Sri Lanka had extended a standing invitation to all thematic Special Procedure mandate holders to visit Sri Lanka, and facilitated a high number of visits in the recent past. The State looked forward to constructive engagement with the Council through the Universal Periodic Review process. It was time to reflect realistically on the trajectory of the resolution, which had continued on the agenda of the Council for over a decade. The State’s immediate concern was economic recovery, but advancing the human rights of Sri Lankan people was of equal priority. The State looked forward to the genuine support and understanding of the Council in this regard. Discussion Some speakers welcomed the formation of a more inclusive Sri-Lankan Government and constitutional reform. The peaceful transition of power and the efforts taken to restore peace and stability were applauded. Some speakers acknowledged the difficult circumstances Sri Lanka was facing, expressing solidarity with the Sri Lankan people. The current crisis presented significant challenges, but could also offer an opportunity to advance reforms, ensuring inclusiveness. Some speakers welcomed the major progress made by Sri Lanka when it came to human rights and appreciated the Government’s commitment to advancing human rights in the country. Sri Lanka’s commitment to a constructive approach provided space for engagement. Some speakers commended the Government of Sri Lanka for its sustainable progress despite many challenges, and for its clear commitment to remain engaged with the United Nations system, including the Human Rights Council. Sri Lanka’s achievements in the pursuit of post-war reconstruction were recognised, including the rehabilitation and social reintegration of more than 12,000 former members of armed groups, some speakers said. The amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism Act this year were seen as an initial step in a long-awaited legal reform, while fundamental reform was needed to bring counter-terrorism legislation fully in line with international standards. Some speakers encouraged efforts by the Sri Lankan Government to reach national reconciliation, aimed at stabilising it and ensuring the adoption of a common vision for the promotion of human rights on their territory. Some speakers were concerned about the current situation in Sri Lanka, which was characterised by an economic crisis and violations of fundamental human rights. They were deeply concerned by increased food insecurity, shortages of fuels and medicines and reductions of household income, and urged Sri-Lankan authorities to take all measures to guarantee Sri Lankans’ social and economic rights. There were high levels of concern around freedom of expression, as peaceful protests resulting from the crisis situation were met with violence. Sri Lankan authorities were urged to protect the freedom of expression and assembly for all, and to stop the arbitrary arrests of those engaging in peaceful protests. There was an urgent need to strengthen mechanisms for investigating violations of international law and transitional justice, some speakers said. More than 13 years after the end of the civil war, the search for truth, justice and reconciliation had brought limited progress, and despite the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, accountability had never been fulfilled. Therefore, some States supported an ongoing monitoring of the situation by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. They called on the Government to adhere to its international human rights obligations and to establish an inclusive process towards reform supported by all parts of the population. The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the Government would also be a welcome start. There was concern about recent reports of the increased vulnerability of women and girls to sexual and gender-based violence in Sri Lanka, with some States asking how this could be addressed. Some speakers stated dismay at the use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act against student activists, despite an alleged moratorium, urging Sri Lankan authorities to repeal the Act and stop its use. Concern was expressed at the constitutional commitment to give Buddhism special status, as ethno-religious tensions had been fuelled by Buddhist nationalist groups in Sri Lanka since 2012. Some speakers were also disturbed at the lack of progress in investigating the 2019 Easter bombings, and the delay to the publication of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, calling for the Inquiry’s publication; a follow-up independent investigation; and justice for the victims and their families. Some speakers reiterated their position to reject country-specific initiatives and resolutions that were confrontational and did not have the consent of the country concerned. Imposing mechanisms on a country without consent was counter-productive; the support of the country concerned was critical in the achievement of human rights. Instead, it was important to provide technical assistance to Sri Lanka and strengthen its national institutions, to ensure it had the required support, in accordance with its sovereignty. Some speakers maintained that the mandate was costly, with no effect on the situation, and did not support solidarity. The Council was urged to support the Sri Lankan Government in achieving economic and social recovery. Concluding Remarks NADA AL-NASHIF, Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, reiterated the continued commitment of the Office of the High Commissioner to maintaining a dialogue with Sri Lanka. Restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and economic crisis had exacerbated the impact of violence on women. Support efforts required a gender-sensitive approach. The Office had encouraged a transitional roadmap that included mechanisms for identifying criminal accountability. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission needed to be independent and have significant financial resources. Existing mechanisms had failed because they had failed to win the confidence of victims and their families. States were encouraged to empower victims and civil society. Young people and women should be given meaningful roles in establishing accountability. There was also a need to establish accountability for economic crimes. Ms. Al-Nashif said Sri Lanka was at a critical juncture. Sustainable recovery, development and peace could only be achieved by eliminating impunity. The Office of the High Commissioner encouraged the international community to support Sri Lanka in its recovery and work to end impunity in the State. The Council should remain engaged in the issue and continue to support recovery efforts in the State..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2022-09-12
Date of entry/update: 2022-09-12
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Description: "NAY PYI TAW – Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer met with State Administration Council (SAC) Chairman Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw today, in her first visit to Myanmar as Special Envoy, to communicate in person the pragmatic steps to de-escalate the violence, address the multidimensional crisis and advance unfettered humanitarian assistance free of discrimination to all people in need. The Special Envoy’s meeting with the Senior General and his senior advisers is part of broader efforts by the United Nations to urgently support an effective and peaceful Myanmar-led political pathway to return to civilian rule based on the will and the needs of the people. The Special Envoy’s mandate as an impartialactor is to engage with all stakeholders in Myanmar, the region and globally consistent with the principles of the United Nations. The Special Envoy’s visit follows her extensive consultations with actors from across the political spectrum, civil society and as communities affected by the conflict. “The United Nations Secretary-General is extremely concerned about the gravity of the humanitarian, security, economic and political crisis,” Special Envoy Heyzer said. “My visit is to convey the concern of the United Nations and propose concrete steps needed to reduce the conflict and suffering of the people. UN engagement does not in any way confer legitimacy. The people of Myanmar have the right to democracy and self-determination free from fear and want, which will only be possible by the good will and efforts of all stakeholders in an inclusive process.” She added that the United Nations was focused on providing support to women in Myanmar, the protection and empowerment of whom is key to achieving peace and any economic and social transformation. The Special Envoy stated that any progress in Myanmar depended on an end to the violence and visible and significant improvements in the lives of people on the ground. Following the recent death sentences carried out against pro-democracy activists that the United Nations has strongly condemned, the Special Envoy directly urged the Senior General to impose a moratorium on all future executions. She also reiterated the United Nations Secretary-General’s call for the release of all political prisoners. “I urged the SAC to implement the Secretary-General’s appeal,” the Special Envoy said. “I also conveyed a specific request from the Australian Government that has asked for the release of Australian economist Sean Turnell. Personally, I call for the release of all children who are being detained in prisons or other facilities.” The Special Envoy amplified the latest call from the Security Council for an immediate cessation of all forms of violence, full respect for human rights and the rule of law, and full, safe and unfettered humanitarian access to all those in need. She called for immediate and specific de-escalation steps including ending aerial bombing and the burning of civilian houses and infrastructure. The Special Envoy stated her deep concern about civilian displacement across communities and the need for greater space for humanitarian actors to reach those affected with lifesaving support. She underlined that all parties must facilitate the unimpeded and immediate delivery of humanitarian assistance to all people in need without discrimination and free from instrumentalization. She highlighted the importance of delivery through all channels and raised the issue of an inclusive forum for humanitarian engagement, which several key ethnic armed organizations and other actors have asked her to establish, focusing on the emergency that is a direct result of the political crisis. The Special Envoy raised her request for a meeting with State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi following her latest sentencing. “I’m deeply concerned about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s health and well-being in her current situation, and request that she can return home soon,” Special Envoy Heyzer said. “I want to have an opportunity to meet with her as soon as possible, both because I care about her personally and I believe she is a critical stakeholder for my dialogue with all parties concerned.” Ahead of her mission to Bangladesh later this month, the Special Envoy told the Senior General she plans to consult with the Government and visit the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazaar that host about 1 million Rohingya and other forcibly displaced people. She highlighted Myanmar’s responsibility for conducive conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees as well as to ensure that the Rohingya’s rights and well-being are integral to the future of a peaceful and prosperous Myanmar. The Special Envoy presented the Senior General with a copy of the UN Charter, on which the ASEAN Charter is based, and emphasized that sovereignty must come with development for all, leaving no one behind, and the promise that every individual in every country has an equal claim to dignity, respect and freedom from want or fear. The UN Charter is the foundation of the rule-based world order, the Special Envoy told the Senior General, adding that these norms and standards must be met if peace and stability are to be achieved. The Special Envoy emphasized the strong commitment of the United Nations to continue making all efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and community-based resilience support and protection services to people in need, guided by the internationally recognized principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, and asked the Senior General to respect and support these efforts. She highlighted her continued resolve to act in a bridging role and leverage her convening power to address the protection needs and suffering of the most vulnerable and to end the conflict. Going forward, the Special Envoy and the Senior General agreed to engage in frank conversations, focusing on the need for inclusive solutions to a peaceful and democratic Myanmar, reflective of the will of the people..."
Source/publisher: UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs via United Nations Myanmar
2022-08-17
Date of entry/update: 2022-08-17
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Sub-title: A Myanmar Commentary by Kyaw Lynn
Description: "Tensions are rising in Arakan (Rakhine State) where a ceasefire exists between the Myanmar military government and Arakan Army. On the surface, the relative stability contrasts with the chaos that has enveloped many other parts of the country following last year’s coup. In this commentary, Kyaw Lynn analyses the changing landscape highlighting that, while confrontations are occurring, neither side appears yet ready to return to open warfare. “Retaliatory” actions, though, are increasing. Twenty months after an informal ceasefire between the Myanmar military and Arakan Army (AA), social and political stability in Arakan (Rakhine State) are deteriorating, leading many local people to worry about the future. Many changes have taken place in the country since the introduction of this de facto ceasefire, not least the coup by the military State Administrative Council (SAC) in February 2021. And it now seems that both parties to the agreement – the Myanmar military and AA – are starting to recalculate their military strategies and political interests. Tit for tat actions have become commonplace. This was highlighted on 22 June, when SAC troops arrested 30 local Rakhine people in response to the AA arresting three government staff from the “Intelligence and Investigation Department” in Mrauk-U, the ancient capital of Arakan and one of the most conflict-sensitive townships in Rakhine State. Before this event, tensions were visibly growing between the SAC and the United League of Arakan (ULA), the political wing of the AA. In the preceding weeks, the AA had arrested military and police force members in Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun and Tin Nyo, Mrauk-U township, as well as Ramree in southern Rakhine State. As an explanation, the ULA-AA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha told a party press conference on 14 June that they had been arrested in response to the growing number of ULA and AA members being seized by the SAC authorities in different parts of the state. “Hostage exchange” is possible, he said, if the SAC is willing. In the ULA-AA’s defence, he argued that the arrests were an “equivalent retaliation” for the SAC’s breaking the promises of the informal ceasefire not to arrest unarmed and non-uniformed members on both sides. Khaing Thu Kha also had sobering words of warning. During the press briefing, he repeatedly stated that the outbreak of “another war” could happen at any time and that mediation through third parties was not working. The people continue to watch the situation closely. But the past month has not shown any notable improvements, and it seems that the spate of arrests are just the tip of the iceberg in revealing deeper reasons for the changing trends in Arakan politics. A critical time is approaching. A ceasefire of distrust When the informal ceasefire was initiated in November 2020, it caused surprise for many people both inside and outside of the country. Coming in the aftermath of the 2020 general election, the timing seemed odd, and for many observers the real intentions of the leaders of the Myanmar military for accepting such a ceasefire were only revealed when they staged their coup on 1 February 2021. Until the ceasefire turning-point, it was Myanmar’s military leaders who had always refused to recognise the ULA-AA’s existence in Arakan and insisted that they would eradicate the movement by military means in line with their “black and white” definitions of combatting opponents. In essence, “white” areas are those that the government is perceived to control and “black” are under armed opposition which, military leaders say, must be destroyed. Certainly, in the months following the coup the SAC leaders sought to take advantage in Arakan by a combination of different measures. On the political front, the SAC attempted to build on the rivalry between the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Rakhine political parties – the Arakan National Party (ANP) and Arakan Front Party (AFP) – in the electoral space. To try and achieve legitimacy for the SAC, a number of ANP members were included in SAC administrative structures and Dr. Aye Maung, the AFP chair and a former ANP leader, was released from prison. Such gestures appeared more profitable for the SAC in Rakhine State where, given the electoral opposition to the NLD in many constituencies (especially in the north and centre of the state), the regime faced less protest reaction in urban areas when compared to other parts of the country following the coup. During these difficult months, the AA ceasefire further added to a lessening in security and political challenges faced by the regime after the SAC’s assumption of power – both in Arakan and Myanmar at large. For several months the security situation appeared more stable in Arakan in contrast to the chaos that had enveloped other parts of the country following the coup. This meant that, at the union level, the SAC military no longer needed to provide intensive operational attention to Rakhine State which, until the AA ceasefire, had been the most active conflict region in Myanmar. In line with this new strategy, the SAC leadership sought to contain ULA-AA activities on the one hand while taking profits from political stability and economic extraction on the other. Located on the country’s western seaboard, Rakhine State is an important source of revenue to the regime, including oil and gas pipelines that run to Yunnan Province in China. Containing the ULA-AA, however, did not prove a simple option after several years of warfare. To implement this policy, a raft of activities was laid out. These included re-building military and police apparatus across the state and adjoining Paletwa township in Chin State where the ULA-AA is also based; increasing intelligence surveillance; re-organising broken administrative structures by forcing village-tract leaders not to cooperate with the ULA authorities; and threatening ULA administrative and judiciary activities in territories that the SAC regards as its exclusive sphere of influence. The main focus of these pressures was generally in urban areas of northern Rakhine State as well as southern townships, such as Kyaukpyu, Ramree and Taungup, where there had been no strong AA movement during the previous round of conflict. At the same time, the SAC military presence was reinforced by the maintenance of trade and travel sanctions inside and along the borders of Rakhine State. In essence, although the truce was sustained, many people experienced a more difficult economic and security situation following the 2020 ceasefire. Inevitably, such behaviour proved unacceptable to the ULA-AA leadership. After several months of ceasefire initiation, the ULA-AA chief, Gen. Twan Mrat Naing, declared the movement’s policy of “state-building” and “nation-building” as the fundamental task of the Arakan people on 10 April 2021 on the 12th anniversary of the Arakan Army’s foundation. ULA-AA leaders also called for faster action to support progress on the ground in the ceasefire aftermath. After three years of intense conflict and deepening poverty, the ULA-AA wanted to prioritise reconstruction, resettle displaced peoples, build new infrastructure and promote socio-economic development for the general population while securing political stability in Rakhine State. For this reason, Yohei Sasakawa, Japan’s Goodwill Ambassador for the Welfare of the National Races in Myanmar and Chairman of the Nippon Foundation, had been welcomed to play a visible role in the initiation of the Arakan ceasefire. However, within months of the SAC coup, it quickly became clear that the situation was not developing as the ULA leadership had desired. While trying to crack down on the expansion of ULA administrative and judiciary systems in southern Rakhine State, the SAC was continuing to impose trade and travel restrictions on local communities across the territory. The ULA-AA spokesperson Khaing Thu Kha spoke openly of deepening concerns at the party press conference in June this year: “We, the ULA-AA, are waiting and watching such aggressive and inhospitable actions of the SAC authority as we want more freedom and better socio-economic conditions for our people while maintaining political stability in Rakhine State. However, if their actions are becoming more aggressive than we can tolerate, we want to warn that it could lead to an even greater deterioration in relations.” As tensions continue to deepen, many people are asking the same question: “What do we actually get from a de facto ceasefire like this?” Ceasefire in Arakan but fighting in other areas In his 2021 address on the 12th anniversary of the AA’s foundation, Gen. Twan Mrat Naing stated that the ULA-AA does not want the Civilian Disobedience Movement and other anti-military or pro-democracy movements to become active in Arakan because the organisation has its own “Way of Rakhita” philosophy to bring about social and political change. Since this time, many people in Arakan and outside became interested in what the “Way of Rakhita” means and how it can guide the civil and political movements in Rakhine State in the face of the complex political landscape that exists countrywide. There is, in fact, no official definition or document about the “Way of Rakhita”. But based on interviews and speeches by the ULA-AA leadership, it is usually summarised as a “way of thinking which is solely based on the national interest of Arakan people rather than any other philosophical or political values and principles.” In line with this philosophy, the ULA-AA leadership started to re-shape the politics of Arakan in new ways following the SAC coup. At the time, they thought this strategy would be better following the ceasefire in pursuit of their political goals and interests. In Gen. Twan Mrat Naing’s most recent speech, however, there was a very different tone. Speaking two months ago on the 13th anniversary of the AA founding, he said: “Comrades, be ready to fight when ordered!” It was an occasion that attracted attention. On the same day, the rival National Unity Government (NUG) and more than a dozen armed opposition groups, including the (Kokang) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, sent their own “congratulatory statements” in solidarity with the ULA-AA. Notably, a number of these movements are newly established since the coup and are engaged in anti-SAC military activities in other parts of the country. New groups include the Burma People`s Liberation Army, Student Armed Force, People’s Revolutionary Alliance (Magway), Karenni National Defence Force, Asho Chin Defence Force, Mara Defense Force and Chin Defence Force (Mindat). In some of their statements, they mentioned the support of the ULA-AA in terms of military training and equipment. This is not the only link that exists between the ULA-AA and anti-SAC movements. News has continued to emerge about AA soldiers fighting – or being present – in conflict frontline areas in Kachin and northern Shan States alongside other ethnic armed organisations since the SAC coup. In a recent example, six AA soldiers were killed in an air raid in Karen State in early July where they were stationed in territory administered by the Karen National Union (KNU). Technically, the KNU also has a ceasefire with the Myanmar military (initiated in 2012), and the air strike was considered a hostile act. But it is generally safe to argue that the AA, outside of Arakan, has not truly been under a ceasefire following the SAC takeover. Against this backdrop, relations between the SAC and ULA-AA leaderships have been stalling. A lower-level ULA political team attended the 73rd anniversary of Union Day, held by the SAC at Nay Pyi Taw in February, where they argued for the release of their members who have been arrested. But ULA-AA leaders declined a peace talk invitation by the SAC Chairman, Sen-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, in May this year. Although two key ULA-AA allies in the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee – the United Wa State Army and National Democratic Alliance Army – chose to participate in the talks, the ULA-AA did not release an official statement explaining their refusal. But one informal response by the ULA Secretary Dr. Nyo Twan Awng appeared on social media: “The SAC still does not change its policy about ethnic rights for the peace talks.” Reflecting the deepening divide, the NUG then declared its recognition of the “Arakan People’s Government”, which is led by the ULA, at the end of May following an online meeting between NUG and ULA leaders. All such events are raising speculation in Arakan politics. During the past two years, changes have happened rapidly, and the path that the ULA-AA is following is sure to make the SAC leadership angry. However it is still too early to say that the ULA is totally on the side of the NUG against the SAC, and it will mostly like not want to choose one “government” over another in the struggle between the two camps: the SAC and NUG. In explanation of this ambiguity, the strategy of ULA leaders cannot be understood on the basis of dialectical thinking between the SAC or NUG but only realised through the “Way of Rakhita” philosophy, which is centred upon the “Arakan National Interest” and not subject to any outside political domain. The Rohingya crisis: old challenges and new questions Adding to the complexity of pressures, the question of the Rohingya community in Arakan is also becoming more difficult to answer. On 21 June, the ULA released a statement warning the people to avoid a recurrence of communal violence in Rakhine State due to a series of incidents that were causing tensions to rise and accused the SAC of being involved. These included the kidnapping of two ethnic Rakhine teachers in Maungdaw township, who were released one week later in exchange for 5 million takas on the Bangladesh side of the border, and the bullying and beating of a young Rohingya man in Pauktaw township. Subsequently, the ULA-AA leader Gen. Twan Mrat Naing accused the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army of being the culprit behind the kidnappings, stating that this was a grave disservice to efforts for social cohesion and trust-building among communities in Arakan as well as to Rohingya refugees who want to come back to their homes. The situation, however, is much changed since the first round of communal violence in 2012. Large segments among both communities today believe that they cannot allow another outbreak of violence in Rakhine State and, if this happened, it would only prove beneficial to the SAC which prefers the tactics of “divide and rule” to cause disharmony among different peoples and communities. At the same time, it needs to be recognised that community reconciliation in Rakhine State is not an all-finished task, and there is still no common vision about the future of Arakan. This theme was taken up in a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report about the political situation in Arakan, which made a number of points suggesting the formalization of the informal ceasefire with the initiation of a Rohingya repatriation process.* The ICG recommendations, which are based on achieving tripartite relations between SAC, ULA and Bangladesh government, are quite welcoming on a peace and repatriation process. There are, however, still many challenges in implementing such a sensitive programme due to the rise in political instability and lack of common understanding between the different actors and communities that need to become involved. Despite the desire to avoid any repetition of communal violence, many different opinions still exist on the ground. For example, there has been a significant change in perceptions among the ethnic Bamar majority since the SAC coup as well as a NUG policy declaration towards addressing the Rohingya crisis. But these views cannot be regarded as the same as those of ULA-AA leaders nor the Rakhine majority population in Arakan. Similarly, while there is competition between SAC and NUG leaders over gaining international recognition for their governments in handling the Rohingya issue, the ULA-AA is much more focused on building local and international support for the achievement of an Arakan State as part of any process of resolving the Rohingya and other socio-political challenges. The SAC, NUG and ULA see the Rohingya crisis with very different priorities and perspectives. In summary, collaboration will be needed among different actors to solve the Rohingya crisis, and this will mean mediation among competing interests. But, at present, this will not be an easy task at all. The possibility of another war in Arakan For the moment, it is difficult to estimate the possibility of a resumption of armed conflict in Arakan, and how this might come about. Politics aside, there are other strategic interests that both parties to the ceasefire have to consider. Two, in particular, stand out: intention and capability. Both play important roles in the power competition between the two sides, with the expansion of either party – and hence its capacity – making the other doubtful about their rival’s intentions and vice-versa. As such, an increase in capability has the potential to change the intention of one side or the other at any time. Such is the state of play in Arakan. For this reason, one of the key factors hindering another outbreak of armed conflict in Arakan is the lack of a clear “war mission” for both parties. The current situation, both in Arakan and the country more generally, encourages both parties to keep to the ceasefire status quo and be generally defensive about developing and implementing another war strategy due to their limited capacities on the ground. It is also very difficult to relate the post-coup combat involving new People’s Defence Forces and other anti-SAC movements in other parts of the country, where there are no ceasefires, to the particular challenges in Arakan. In essence, both SAC and ULA-AA leaders may feel that they have more to lose than gain by returning to open conflict in Arakan at this time. If fighting breaks out, for example, the ULA-AA would be expected to try and “conquer and control” some of the urban areas and key communication channels in northern Rakhine State at the least, while the SAC would return to the familiar tactics of the Myanmar military in launching “regional clearance” operations against AA strongholds in rural and mountain areas. In the present impasse, however, both parties appear to have limited capability to carry these objectives out. For the ULA-AA gaining control of new areas requires new technology, human resource training and supplies of military equipment. In contrast, attempts at SAC “domination” will also face logistical challenges and strong resistance because the regime cannot provide enough soldiers or open new battlefronts due to the scale of fighting in other parts of the country. Such realities indicate that the return to war in Arakan may ultimately be determined by the changing military pendulum between the SAC and anti-SAC forces in central Myanmar and the different ethnic states around other international borders. The country is presently in a deep state of civil war in which Arakan has, in many respects, been an exception until now. But this does not mean that there will be no armed clashes between SAC and ULA-AA forces in the meantime. Conditions of what can be termed “limited war” still exist in areas like Paletwa township and other disputed areas where both sides have strategic objectives. Many lives could still be lost and properties destroyed, similar to the intense fighting between 2018-20, and this time the battlefields will be even closer to the major towns and villages, especially in northern Rakhine State. Until the present day, the AA is arresting military and police members in several front-line areas, while the SAC is apprehending civilians suspected of supporting the ULA-AA in such nationalist strongholds as Ponnagyun, Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U townships. Currently, more than 30 local people have been charged by the SAC authority under Article 505 of the Penal Code, accused of incitement or state defamation, although some have been released. Occasional clashes are still being reported, most recently in Maungdaw township where it was reported this week that 14 police and troops were captured and a number killed in a “retaliatory” AA attack for the air raid that killed six members in Karen State. And causing growing anger in local communities, the Rakhine Ethnic Congress reported in early July that six civilians had been killed and eleven wounded during the previous two months in explosions caused by landmines which the SAC military is planting outside its bases. All such incidents are putting pressure on the ULA leadership to fight back against the SAC. Many fear that, whether it suits the SAC or ULA-AA or not, the clock towards a return to open warfare is now ticking. In the international community, there is only one country which can seek to manage the unpredictable and changing dynamics in Arakan: that is China. With strategic and economic interests, Chinese officials have relationships with all sides on Myanmar’s political divides. The situation is different for Western governments. But there are still many things that they can try in order to prevent the outbreak of war in Arakan. They know that Western engagement with the SAC risks legitimatization of the regime which is an outcome that all wish to avoid. Instead, they can prepare in providing emergency and humanitarian assistance through different channels, including trans-border through the Bangladesh and India borders. There is also potential, as the ICG has suggested, that reaching a formal ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army might – at some stage in the future – prevent a further humanitarian disaster and provide the chance for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to return to Arakan. This is not, however, the time for naivety nor failure to understand the complexity of challenges in Arakan and Myanmar at large. The aspirations, needs and perceptions of the people must come first. And, in this respect, the current trends in national politics are loading more weight into negative directions where the future of Arakan is concerned..."
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Source/publisher: Transnational Institute ( Amsterdam)
2022-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-22
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Sub-title: Ruling junta’s talk of peace is desperate political necrophilia and ultimately just cover for more war
Description: "Myanmar is in conflict freefall, as the State Administration Council (SAC) junta regime fights a myriad of proliferating resistance groups on fronts across the country, many galvanized to arms by the military’s democracy-toppling February 2021 coup. Fighting in western regions such as Sagaing, Magwe and Chin State has surged in recent months, as scores of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) ambush military columns and battle pro-SAC militias. The military, in turn, has pulverized civilian villages with air strikes, heavy artillery and army columns in expeditionary arson campaigns that have destroyed close to 20,000 houses, by some estimates. Internal displacement in the country, meanwhile, has surpassed one million. Despite the desperation of the humanitarian and human rights catastrophe, many analysts estimate that the military has been seriously degraded by armed resistance to the coup. That’s been led by PDFs and many established ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the Karen National Union (KNU), some of which have forged alliances with or otherwise pledge loyalty to the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel administration formed after the coup. So what does the SAC leadership do when faced with such unprecedented and geographically spread resistance? Logically, it calls for peace talks, the tried and true escape hatch for military repression in Myanmar. Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight mostly small organizations in 2015 (another two signed in 2018), but despite incessant talks and secretive mediation, the agreement was moribund by October 2018. The military commander Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the current dictator who staged the 2021 coup, announced a “Ceasefire for Eternal Peace” in December 2018, extending it every few months for years through the Covid-19 pandemic right up to the coup, even as fighting raged with EAOs in many parts of the country. The call for new peace talks in April this year conforms to a consistent pattern of perfidy over peace talks. Using a motley crew of desperate or insignificant NCA signatories is for the SAC desperate political necrophilia. The first round of “talks” in May was with Chairman Yawd Serk of the insurgent Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) resulted in a number of agreements related to the “Union Accords”, which were negotiated for several years in a pre-coup process. The RCSS’s eagerness can be largely explained by its strategic missteps since late 2015. It used the cover of signing the 2015 NCA as a pretext to expand operations in northern Shan state, triggering a multi-sided conflict for control of territory and commodities between various EAOs, especially the ethnic Ta’ang armed group and the RCSS parent organization the Shan State Army (SSA) formed in 1964. This conflict displaced thousands of civilians, many for several times a year, disrupting livelihoods and trade and exacerbating intercommunal tensions amid aid restrictions by the military and previous government. The RCSS has decided to sit out the post-coup resistance and prioritize its own survival now that it has been restricted to territory closer to the Thailand border. The arrival of Saw Mra Razar Lin of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) at the junta’s peace talks was particularly surreal. The only senior woman leader of an EAO to attend peace talks for several years, she commands few troops, most of which are based on the Thailand-Myanmar border far away. The ALP and its armed wing are meaningless compared to the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army (AA), which is estimated to field more than 8,000 troops. In heavy fighting between 2019 to the end of 2020, AA fought the Myanmar military to a standstill, inflicting hundreds if not thousands of casualties during a conflict that displaced some 200,000 civilians. An uneasy ceasefire has allowed space for the AA to expand its own judicial and taxation system on an estimated 60% of western Rakhine state, incorporating Rohingya Muslim representatives of the Arakan People’s Authority (APA). The AA suffered a blow on July 4 when an air strike killed six of its soldiers in a base in Kayin state close to the Thailand border, raising new questions about the durability of their uneasy post-coup ceasefire. Other groups that attended the talks included the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the New Mon State Party and the Pa-O Nationalities Liberation Organization (PNLO). These groups could potentially muster several hundred troops combined among them, but they have essentially been artificially inflated by Western donors to the peace process for several years. They are now ornamental bit-part actors in the SAC’s shoddy process. The largest EAO in Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), controls its own autonomous region on the Chinese border with an estimated 30,000 troops and sophisticated weaponry, and didn’t really need to attend the peace talks. It dispatched a nominally senior official of no real significance in the hierarchy, and released a statement following the talks which basically stated that the Wa had their own autonomy and this was a Burman problem they wanted nothing to do with. Planned talks with the Shan State Progress Party, or SSA, have not been held as fighting continues between their forces and the SAC’s army in northern Shan State. In another indication of renewed bellicosity, well-known Myanmar model and actress Thin Zar Wint Kyaw has reportedly been arrested after wearing an SSA military uniform at a recent wedding ceremony close to the EAO’s headquarters at Wan Hai, after traveling to the area to endorse business initiatives. The SAC is making enemies of everyone, even as it supposedly cultivates peace. Further adorning the pretense of peace talks, the SAC has called for PDF members, or people involved in the civil disobedience movement (CDM), to defect from the “terrorist” NUG and return to the “legal fold”, a euphemism for the peace process of the 1990s which resulted in reduced conflict fighting but no conflict resolution. The SAC in recent days has even pledged to open “reception centers” for resistance actors to surrender along the borders, another indication of the junta’s underlying desperation. The subterfuge of peace talks extends to efforts at mediation by the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose Special Envoy Prak Sokhonn visited Myanmar recently and was instructed to only meet with EAOs who had attended the SAC talks. This clearly violates the terms of the Five Point Consensus the SAC’s leader reached with ASEAN in April 2021: “constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.” ASEAN is further compromised by the role of the ASEAN Humanitarian Center (AHA), which is conducting a needs assessment essentially as cover for the United Nations to operate in SAC-controlled areas and not areas of armed conflict where belligerents who are not part of the peace talks operate, and where civilian communities and aid workers are not represented and rely on cross border assistance not covered by the AHA or the UN. The NUG and main EAOs fighting the SAC issued a bitter statement condemning the role of ASEAN in humanitarian aid delivery in May, as the exercise was seen as clearly pro-SAC. Myanmar’s military leaders may lack sophistication but they possess the cunning to checkmate rule-bound international aid actors, consistent with the past decade during the previous peace process. A serious danger is that peace talks, alongside SAC announced plans for a nationwide election in 2023 with an entirely new electoral system that will likely ban the coup-ousted National League for Democracy’s participation, provide the bare minimum of a lifeline for the international community, especially the UN and international aid agencies, to justify their continued presence. It is perilous to promote fake peace while a conflict is raging elsewhere. The only accurate gauge of the SAC’s true intent is its behavior on the ground, seen in the thousands of civilian casualties, burning villages and interdiction of humanitarian assistance. In Myanmar, talk of peace is often cover for just more war..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2022-07-07
Date of entry/update: 2022-07-07
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Description: "The Irrawaddy’s editor-in-chief Aung Zaw recently spoke to Bertil Lintner, a veteran journalist and author of several books on Myanmar, on the peace process in the country. Here are excerpts. Aung Zaw: Since the coup, there are endless tragic stories in Burma, or Myanmar. And the coup has faced very strong resistance in the country; the regime still tries to consolidate their power within the country but still, they are failing. And even a year after the military staged the coup, the regime keeps facing strong resistance; people take up the form of armed-resistance known as PDF [People’s Defense Force] and we now have a government in exile. Recently, the regime leader [Senior General] Min Aung Hlaing invited ethnic armed organizations to attend the peace talks in Naypyitaw. So, there are EAOs, ethnic armed organizations, who have decided to go there and who are not going there—they are still divided. It seems to me that many major ethnic armed groups are not going there. So, but at the same time on the ground, we see a lot of fighting taking place in Chin State, Kayah State, Karen State; and a lot of clashes in Shan and Arakan [Rakhine] states. So what is your thought? I want to pick your brain. What is your thought on this—Min Aung Hlaing’s invitation and then the ongoing, very fragile peace process in the country? Bertil Lintner: Well, basically so far, for him, it’s for a military government’s attempt to get a legitimacy that they want to invite these armed groups for talks to discuss peace and this sort of thing. But I think we’ll have to look at the so-called “peace process” and how it began and how it’s developed. Ah, I will also argue that the whole timetable—the way the talks are being conducted—is wrong. Normally, in any kind of peace process, the government will announce its desires, the armed groups will respond, ‘OK, we are not going to fight’; you meet, you talk, you reach a political consensus about the future of the country; and you sign an agreement. That’s a normal procedure anywhere in the world. But here, the whole idea was everyone has to come and sign it—the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement [NCA]—first, before they could have a real talk. It’s like, you know, putting the cart before the horse. And of course it’s never going to work. And if you look at the groups that checked and signed the so-called NCA—we have altogether 10 by now, isn’t it? So how many of those actually have any armies? I mean, if you take, for instance, the Pa-O [the Pa-O National Liberation Army]; there was no army before they signed the NCA, but suddenly, it’s known; for them to become more credible, they created an army. The same with the Arakan Liberation Party or the Arakan Liberation Army that’s based on the Thai border with the Karen. […] And they are not having any armed activity for years, for decades, really. And suddenly, they have become a signatory, and therefore a player. The Chin National Front was also non-existent until the so-called peace process began. You have the ABSDF [All Burma Students’ Democratic Front], which gave up the armed struggle a long time ago. You have two small Karen breakaway factions which are insignificant. And they have the Lahu, basically an NGO, based in Thailand and they don’t have any army either. So, that leaves I would say two-and-a-half armies among the so-called signatories. It’s the Shan State Army of the Restoration Council of Shan State, and they do have an army; and then it’s the Karen National Liberation Army or the Karen National Union; and then the new Mon State Party and its army; which is so-so, they lost most of their strength but still they have a small force. All the major groups in the country, like the Wa, like Kokang, like Kachin, like the Shan State Army, or the SSPP—the Shan State Progress Party; they haven’t signed this agreement. I would say that […] 80 percent of all the armed non-state actors, if I may use that term, in the country belong to groups that never signed the NCA. So, the whole thing was a joke from the very beginning. KAZ: Why they did not sign the ceasefire [the NCA]? Those groups, the TNLA, KIA, Wa? The Wa signed an informal agreement in 1989. BL: They wanted to see some political progress first. I mean what they want is basically a federal union. Or even in some cases, a confederate mixture of states or union of states. And before they reach that, why should they sign anything? It’s like surrender, really. And it is the way, the groups that did not sign the agreement, the way they think. And if you look at two of the major armies today which are the most active, [they] are the Arakan Army and the TNLA in the Palaung area. They’re new armies. But still they’ve grown from nothing, really, to several thousand today during this so-called peace process. KAZ: It is estimated that the EAOs, the troops, the strengths, they have total numbers of about 80,000 fighters all over the country. And they have controlled roughly 30 percent, more than 30 percent of the country’s national territory. They have more political influence than in the past, since the coup. A lot of Burman people look up to them and there are a lot of expectations over which EAO, which ethnic groups are coming to join the fight against the military regime. But the peace process; the so-called peace process seems to create more problems than solutions. Why is that? BL: Well, there’s a split between those who signed the agreement and those who didn’t. Even if most of the groups who signed it are small and insignificant, they are still groups that are recognized as signatories of the NCA. They get access—this is in the past—the got access to a special office in Yangon. They got lots of money from the international community to continue so-called talks about nothing really, so it gave them some kind of prestige and legitimacy. And then of course they split with the groups who said, “Wait a minute, what they’re doing here is they are not talking about the future of the country; not talking about the Constitution, about what kind of country Myanmar or Burma should be in the future.” And this created a split. KAZ: Now after the coup, there’s more talk on, not just of a federal union, but about a confederation. AA [Arakan Army] leader Tun Myat Naing told us in 2019, he said, “We prefer a confederation of states, like Wa State, which has a larger share of power in line with the Constitution.” He said, “Confederation is better than federalism.” And then he said, “We think confederation is more appropriate to the history of Rakhine State and the hopes of Arakanese people.” What do you think? BL: Well, if you first look at the question of splits, one of the main signatories, one of the groups that actually had an army, the Karen, they have split after the coup. Because there’s certain parts, brigades of the Karen National Liberation Army that are actively fighting the Tatmadaw [Myanmar’s military], or whatever you want to call it, and there are others that are not, and they have some kind of peace agreement or ceasefire agreement with the central authorities. So it’s even caused splits within the organizations. And many of the Burman dissident groups, dissidents who have fled […] after the coup, have sought shelter in areas controlled by the Karen rebels, who supposedly are a signatory to the so-called NCA. So it has created a lot of problems and it hasn’t solved a single one. But then the question is, this is very interesting question but, I cannot really comment before I know exactly what is meant by confederation. How should the powers be divided? But these are exactly the kind of issues that should be discussed, and that should be talked about during the peace process. KAZ: Yeah. Tun Myat Naing said, in the same context, in the same interview in 2019, “We [would] have authority to make decisions on our own. But there will be a common defense system, there would be cooperation on market regulations and foreign affairs. To have control over our own destiny, self-determination, is an inspiration of every ethnic group. We can try.” BL: Well again, this comes back to question of power sharing, which would be the responsibility of the central government—because after all, they would need a central government—and then the confederate states. But then another problem arises naturally. If you look at the various states, the current states of the Union of Myanmar or Burma, there’s actually no state that has only one ethnic group. Chin State is probably the most cohesive in that sense, that there are very few outsiders, but then again, the Chin speak 20-30 different languages. They don’t even understand each other and sometimes they have to use Burmese to talk to each other sometimes, right? And Arakan State has a very large Muslim minority, Rohingya in the north and Kaman Muslims elsewhere in the state, and the hill tribes in the Arakan Yoma, right? In Shan State maybe 50-60 percent are Shan, hard to say, but you have large communities, other communities, ethnic communities there: Wa, Palaung, Pa-O, and Kachin; and would they want to be part of Shan State? Wouldn’t they like their own states? If you look at Kachin State, are the Kachin even the majority there? I doubt it. I would think that there are more Shan, Shanni, and Burman, actually living in Kachin State than Kachins. Then you have the question of the Rawang and the Lisu, they don’t really feel like they are Kachin so, so they would have a separate, kind-of, status or identity. Even in Karen State, Kayah State you have a mixture of various nationalities. So how do you solve that problem? But this are exactly, precisely the kind of issues any kind of peace talks should be focusing on: power sharing between the center and the states; and how to solve the minority problems within the minority areas; and what kind of solution should be found to that problem. KAZ: When we say ‘peace talks’, my question back to you is, peace talks with whom? Because this current military regime lacks legitimacy. They have no public mandate or public support inside and outside the country. The military is the sole problem and cause of division in the ethnically diverse country. It’s the military that’s the source of the division in our country. BL: Yeah, that’s the main problem. If you look at what the military has said since the beginning of the so-called peace process, it’s that they have the duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. In other words, they don’t want to change the Constitution. They don’t want to change the status of the various states or the various nationalities within the boundaries of the country. And this of course is a problem if you want to talk peace. It is a non-starter basically, and I think the whole peace process, so-called peace process, was a non-starter from the very beginning. KAZ: I want to ask you, since the coup, there were arguments that some powerful EAOs have an advantage in terms of promoting their political agenda and their inspirations for either the federal [Union] or confederation. They also get more support from the Burmese people. BL: If you go back to what the situation was like a year ago, in 2021, the case was very similar after the 1988 uprising. The ethnic armed organizations were very slow to react. And I talked to people from the various ethnic groups after the military intervention a year ago here. They said, it is a fight between the Burmans, it doesn’t concern us. What did the Burmans do when we were under attack up in Kachin state, for instance? But then that kind of attitude disappeared quite quickly when they realized that they do have something in common with all these urban dissidents and the people resisting the new military government […] It seems to me that the KIO, the KIA is cooperating with several of the PDFs even outside Kachin State—that’s in Mandalay and Sagaing, and so on; they even send troops there to fight. […] It was nothing like that in 1988. And in the Karen area, parts of the Karen area, there’s a lot of different groups from the cities and the towns – which are not based there. And they cooperate with the Karen rebels..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-05-30
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-30
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Description: "Of the 10 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that have agreed to attend talks with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw, seven have current or former leaders who received the Wunna Kyawhtin title from the coup leader last month. Four of the recipients are still alive and the other three were honored posthumously. Along with some other ethnic leaders, they were awarded the Wunna Kyawhtin title on April 17, which is New Year’s Day on Myanmar’s traditional lunar calendar. All seven of the groups whose leaders were honored are signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The recipients were Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council leader Major-General Htein Maung (aka Saw Htay Maung); Khun Okkar of the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO); U Khaing Soe Naing Aung of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); Yawd Serk of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS); Myaing Gyi Ngu Sayadaw U Thuzana of the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); Nai Htaw Mon of the New Mon State Party (NMSP); and Kyar Khun Sar of the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU). On April 22, five days after awarding the titles, Min Aung Hlaing called for face-to-face talks with EAO leaders, saying he sought to end the armed conflicts in Myanmar. Coming after a year of clashes with newly formed anti-regime resistance forces that have been fighting alongside ethnic armed groups to topple his regime, Min Aung Hlaing’s offer of peace is, many believe, a pretext to persuade the armed groups to distance themselves from the resistance forces. The peace talks plan has become a laughing stock as none of the groups that have said yes to the junta’s proposed peace talks is currently engaged in active fighting with the regime. EAOs and other groups that are engaged in active fighting with the regime, such as the Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Army, have officially rejected the regime’s invitation, saying the proposed talks lack inclusivity. The regime has not invited Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG) or its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), which has been fighting the regime. Many people in Myanmar see the NUG as their legitimate government and the PDF as their army. The majority of the EAOs that are planning to attend the talks are recipients of awards given by Min Aung Hlaing; this has invited suspicions that the regime chief awarded the titles with the specific intention of persuading the EAO leaders to attend the peace talks. A local political analyst on ethnic affairs shared that view. “You could say that the title is a sort of incentive from Min Aung Hlaing [to persuade some ethnic leaders to join the talks],” he said. The Wunna Kyawhtin title, which recognizes outstanding contributions to the country, was awarded to a total of 25 individuals on April 17; some 20 of the recipients are current or late ethnic leaders. Saw Mutu Say Poe, the leader of the KNU, an NCA signatory, was among those awarded the Wunna Kyawhtin title on April 17. However, the oldest armed organization in Myanmar on Monday rejected the junta’s invitation to attend the talks, saying they will not be all-inclusive. Two other NCA signatories, the Chin National Front and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, have also rejected the talks because of the junta’s limitation on participants. The Brotherhood Alliance, a tripartite military coalition of the Arakan Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, said they would take a wait-and-see approach to the peace talks. NCA non-signatories the United Wa State Army and the National Democratic Alliance Army, both of which have de facto control over their territories, as well as the Shan State Progress Party, will attend the talks in Naypyitaw. Many believe the move by the regime—which is fighting a war on various fronts against multiple EAOs and PDFs—to confer titles on ethnic leaders and invite them to peace talks is intended to undermine the unity among armed revolutionary organizations..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-05-11
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-11
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Description: "Myanmar’s long history of civil war can be categorized as periods of alternating clashes and peace talks. It is often said that politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed. Often, the warring sides will call for honesty for the sake of peace, before they question each other’s honesty. In Myanmar, peace talks are a tricky business. Though both sides will struggle for a result that is favorable to them, normally the results are determined by the more powerful side. Peace talks with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) were previously held under the civilian Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government and the military-led Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government. Those talks achieved nothing because self-determination and self-rule for ethnic people was always rejected and the existence of EAOs was never recognized, even as both the AFPFL and BSPP governments wanted EAOs to disarm and surrender. So the peace talks held between 1948 and 1988 were not successful. In the post-1988 period, peace talks became even trickier because of drastic changes in the political landscape of the country. Myanmar was going through a political crisis following the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, and its economy was also plagued by mismanagement under the BSPP rule. At the same time, the Communist Party of Burma, the major player in Myanmar’s civil war, split into several armed groups. They had financial constraints and lacked ammunition. And both the troops and local people were exhausted after many years of war. Seeing those factors, the then military regime changed its policy toward EAOs. The regime, which had always called for disarmament, made peace with EAOs by recognizing ethnic parties and armed organizations and designating their controlled areas as special regions. The process started in 1989 and by 1995 all the EAOs, except the Karen National Union (KNU) and Mong Tai Army (MTA), had agreed ceasefires with the Myanmar military. For 20 years from 1989 to 2009, the military constantly engaged in measures designed to weaken the EAOs. They included offering business concessions to the EAOs and instigating religious disputes. The then junta was able to do this because there were no fighting outside the borderlands, as the main opposition party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) – favored peaceful struggle over armed struggle. However, the military continued to attack the KNU and the MTA with superior numbers. Finally, the MTA was forced to surrender and the KNU, once the most powerful group among the EAOs, had become weaker. This is what the military did over the two decades of ceasefire and peace. In 2009, the regime went a step further and forced the EAOs that had signed ceasefires to transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or people’s militias and brought them under the army’s control. Apparently, the regime thought that it could now easily control the EAOs. But the regime broke its promise to settle ethnic issues through political dialogue. In 2005, it forced the Palaung State Liberation Organization and Shanni Nationalities Army to disarm. EAOs that were either weakened or had attached greater importance to business interests over armed struggle were swayed by the military regime. The New Democratic Army – Kachin led by Zahkung Ting Ying in Kachin State, a Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) splinter group led by Bai Suocheng, the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front led by Tun Kyaw, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and some splinter groups from the KNU all became BGFs. Other armed organizations, such as the Kachin Defence Army, brigades 3 and 7 of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), the Kayan New Land Party and some Karenni National Progressive Party and KNU splinter groups, became people’s militias. Both BGFs and people’s militias were under the command of the Myanmar military. Of them, only the Kokang splinter group led by Bai Suocheng and the PNO led by Aung Kham Hti were granted self-rule in their territories under the army-drafted 2008 Constitution. The Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization ceased to exist. This is the advantage the military was able to achieve in 20 years of peace. In those years, the military became aware that EAOs only care about their regions and territories in the borderlands, and do not bother to challenge the central government. The regime was well aware that it could focus its energy on addressing the threat of the NLD by appeasing the EAOs. While some EAOs collapsed or were weakened during the years of ceasefire, others grasped the opportunity to strengthen themselves. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were able to expand both their treasuries and arsenals of weapons during those years. Later, the KNU was able to re-unify its Karen forces. The SSPP, the MNDAA and the Restoration Council of Shan State were also able to restore their strength. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have weakened a lot compared to 1995, when their ceasefires came into effect. But they still have a strong presence in Myanmar politics due to their long history. Meanwhile, powerful new EAOs like the Arakan Army (AA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) emerged because of their dissatisfaction with the regime’s handling of ethnic issues. After 20 years of ceasefire, the EAOs became aware that they needed to rebuild strength, or otherwise risk collapse, and that the military was trying to break them up by any means. They realized that the military will compromise with EAOs when inland Myanmar is in crisis, but will always try to contain the EAOs otherwise. In ten years of peace talks from 2011 to 2021, the EAOs saw that the Myanmar military has a greater say than elected governments. Moreover, the military restricted certain EAOs from participating in peace talks, and treated smaller EAOs with arrogance. Myanmar’s military did not recognize ethnic people’s demand for self-determination and self-rule, but insisted that EAOs must join the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process under the 2008 Constitution and join the political dialogue under the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement process. The regime did not accept an all-inclusive peace process, saying instead that the peace process is “not a Taung Pyone Pwe [a popular spirit festival in Mandalay] in which everyone can participate freely.” Last month, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing offered face-to-face peace talks with leaders of EAOs. Since last year’s coup, the generals have repeatedly tried in vain to hold talks with EAOs. This has prompted Min Aung Hlaing to make the proposal himself. Everyone can see that Min Aung Hlaing is trying to keep the EAOs out of the fighting as his army is facing a military crisis nationwide and is desperate to find a way out. The regime is likely to allow EAOs to have greater territorial control and to lift its restrictions on their armaments at the planned meeting. It will be interesting to see to what extent Min Aun Hlaing will compromise. In fact, EAOs like the UWSA and the NDAA already control their territories, and all they need is legitimacy. Moreover, EAOs like the KIA, the AA, the TNLA, the MNDAA, the SSPP, the KNPP, the KNU, the NMSP and the Chin National Front that have political ambitions to control their entire states might not accept a regime offer that will only allow them to continue to control their existing territory. It is impossible to separate the EAOs from the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) – the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG) – now. In Kachin, Chin, Karen and Kayah states, PDFs are fighting alongside the EAOs. In Sagaing and Magwe regions, PDFs work closely with EAOs. The most important point is that the EAOs have little trust in the junta chief’s offer of peace talks due to their previous experiences with the military. Again, the PDFs are a great boost for EAOs which have fought Myanmar’s military for many years. So the majority of EAOs will continue to support the PDFs. Many groups have refused to attend the talks saying all stakeholders, such as the NUG and PDFs, should be allowed to join them. But some small EAOs without strong principles may accept the offer of peace for their own interests while the military is making compromises. However, strong and principled EAOs are likely to shun the peace talks. The regime is now saying EAOs don’t commit terrorist acts like the PDFs do. But for many years, they described the EAOs as insurgents and terrorist groups. But despite labelling the AA as a terrorist group, the military held talks with the AA in 2020. It previously refused to hold talks with the TNLA and MNDAA, which are allied with the AA in the Northern Alliance, but is now prepared to include them in peace talks. Throughout Myanmar’s history, we have witnessed the military’s negative attitude towards peace. If the regime is really serious about achieving peace in the country, it must first unconditionally release all those it has unfairly detained. To discuss a ceasefire and peace, the regime needs to talk with not only EAOs but also the PDFs and all the other resistance groups waging a defensive war, as well as the NUG and its legislative body. Clashes with PDFs and other revolutionary groups engaged in Myanmar’s Spring Revolution account for 70 per cent of fighting so far in 2022, while clashes with EAOs account for 30 per cent. Without talking to the PDFs, it is impossible to achieve peace in Myanmar. No peace talks will succeed when key players are excluded. The intention of the junta chief’s peace offer is to keep the EAOs at bay so that he has time and energy to crush the PDFs. It is just a political ploy. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the international community have called for dialogue among all parties to solve the Myanmar crisis. But the junta is trying to deceive them by offering peace talks only to the EAOs..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-10
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Description: "1. We have learned of the offer to enter peace discussions conveyed to the leaders of Ethnic Resistance Organizations by the chief of the Military Council, Min Aung Hlaing via television broadcast on April 22, 2022. 2. We have consistently called for the resolution of the federal crisis through political negotiations, by political means. However, to pursue such a resolution would require the inclusion of all stakeholders, as well as the participation of representatives of the United Nations and the international community as mediators to ensure fairness and facilitate negotiations. Only through such political negotiation will we attain our vision of establishing the federal union. 3. Therefore, we call upon the military council immediately to halt all offensive military operations, to hold meaningful negotiations that include the participation of all stakeholders, and allow unfettered humanitarian access for international and local responders to deliver unrestricted assistance to all people affected by conflict and crisis..."
Source/publisher: Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party and Chin National Front
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-09
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Sub-title: They say the shadow government and its paramilitary group must be present for negotiations.
Description: "Myanmar’s four most powerful ethnic armed groups have rejected an olive branch from the junta, saying there can be no peace talks until the military regime allows the country’s shadow government and the paramilitary group that fights on its behalf to take a seat at the table. On April 22, junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, called for negotiations that he promised to personally attend and gave the ethnic armies until Monday to accept the offer. But the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF) all rejected the invitation. They said that by not offering all stakeholders the chance to participate, the junta showed it is unwilling to meet halfway. “We recognize that political issues need to be addressed through a political dialogue,” KIA information officer, Col. Naw Bu, told RFA’s Myanmar Service, when asked about the decision not to register for the talks. “We are not attending the meeting this time because it’s clear to us that we will not be able to reach a point at which we can discuss real political issues.” The four ethnic armies are Myanmar’s largest, most experienced and best equipped, and together have accounted for some of the strongest resistance to military rule. KNU spokesman Padoh Saw Tawney said that in addition to refusing to allow the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the prodemocracy People’s Defense Force (PDF) paramilitary group to attend talks, the junta had failed to honor commitments it had made to his and other ethnic armies, such as reducing its troop presence in their territories in the country’s remote border regions. “If the talks are not held in an inclusive environment, the consequences will be indescribable for the country,” he said. The junta has rejected requests from ethnic leaders and the international community to let the NUG and PDF participate in the talks. Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly said that the junta will not talk with “terrorists,” and vowed to continue to crack down on the groups. Padoh Saw Tawney said that if the military has good intentions, it should “leave politics” so that the rest of Myanmar’s stakeholders can form a federal democracy and begin the process of rebuilding the country. “We cannot go without these preconditions,” he said. Other ethnic leaders, such as KNPP First Secretary Khu Daniel, told RFA that peace talks without the NUG and PDF would be “meaningless,” and suggested that the junta peace offer was part of a bid to create a schism within the armed opposition. “The NUG formed political alliances with our ethnic groups,” he said. “The junta intends to separate them from these groups. But without them, there will be no solution to this problem.” Khu Daniel acknowledged that some ethnic armies had agreed to join in negotiations but noted that they have smaller forces and hadn’t made much headway in fighting against the military. “Our groups, which are really fighting, are not attending. So, nothing will come out of it,” he said. Armies that accepted In addition to the KIA, KNU, KNPP, and CNF, the other ethnic armies to reject the invitation were the All Burma Students Democratic Front and the Lahu Democratic Union — two of the 10 groups that have signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government since 2015. The United Wa State Party, the Shan State Progressive Party, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) have said they will attend the peace talks. So have the Arakan State Liberation Party, the Shan State Rehabilitation Council, the Karen National Peace Council, the Democratic Karen Army, the New Mon State Party, and the Pa-O National Liberation Organization — all of which are members of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) of NCA signatories. The 10 groups that signed the NCA have suggested that the deal remains in place, despite an already flailing peace process that was all but destroyed by the unpopular junta’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup. Previously, all 10 said they would not pursue talks with the military, which they view as having stolen power from the country’s democratically elected government. PPST spokesman, Col. Saw Kyaw Nyunt, said his group decided to accept the junta invitation with the hope that it would lead to broader negotiations. “It’s a start with the aim of finding a way to have inclusive talks,” he said. “We’ll try to determine how to create such an inclusive political environment, even though we have not yet held a political dialogue to build a federal democratic union.” The three northern alliances — the Kokang National Democratic Alliance, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army — have said they are still negotiating among themselves over Min Aung Hlaing’s offer. Speaking to RFA at the end of last week, junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, told RFA that “most” of the ethnic armed groups had accepted the invitation. On Monday, he said that “a total of nine groups” had confirmed they would attend talks — NCA signatories Democratic Karen Army, Karen National Peace Council, Pa-O National Liberation Organization, New Mon State Party, Arakan State Liberation Party, and Shan State Rehabilitation Council; and non-signatories United Wa State Party, Shan State Progressive Party, and National Democratic Alliance Army. “Some groups have issued statements saying they will not attend, and we are waiting for others to make their decision,” he said. Zaw Min Tun said the junta is committed to pushing the peace process forward, adding that it is willing to “openly discuss the establishment of a union based on democracy and federalism.” ‘Effort to buy time’ Naing Htoo Aung, permanent secretary of the NUG’s Defense Ministry, said that 15 months after seizing power, the junta has led Myanmar to ruin, and its rule is in jeopardy. “The junta is not doing well militarily, politically, or economically ... so, I think they are making a fake peace invitation as an effort to buy time,” he said. “Unity among the revolutionary forces right now is unprecedented. That’s why [the military] hopes to create misunderstanding between them.” Political analyst Sai Kyi Zin Soe called the peace talks a “failure” because the four strongest armed groups declined the junta’s invitation to attend. “The main reason they did not take the offer was not that because they don’t want to hold talks. What they want is a dialogue that leads to real peace,” he said. “They are not attending because they don’t believe it is an invitation with a genuine desire for peace. The trust has been shattered.” The military has made 12 invitations to the country’s armed ethnic groups since the February 2021 coup, but the April offering marked the first time Min Aung Hlaing said he would attend..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1. The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was formed with the goal of eliminating all forms of dictatorship, including military dictatorship, and of building a new, federal democratic union. The NUCC’s convening of the First People’s Assembly from 27-29th of January 2022 represents a historic milestone toward this noble goal. 2. On that occasion, the First People’s Assembly adopted seven resolutions, including a solemn pledge to ratify the Federal Democratic Charter. 3. The NUCC maintains a steadfast commitment to undertaking revolutionary actions that further nationwide inclusion, equality, peace, and the building of a Federal Democratic Union in full and equal partnership with dedicated revolutionary organisations, many of which have been active for over seven decades. Any actions that would serve to revitalise the undemocratic, militarydrafted 2008 Constitution - a constitution which the military terrorist junta itself violated and which has since been abolished by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) - are fundamentally incompatible with the NUCC’s shared goals and principles. 4. The 22 April 2022 invitation to in-person dialogue issued to ethnic revolutionary organisations by the terrorist military dictator Min Aung Hlaing represents just another disingenuous and hollow attempt to use the pretence of dialogue as a mean to finding temporary relief to the political, military, diplomatic and economic catastrophe it has brought upon itself. Legitimate political dialogue with a military terrorist junta that continues to oppress and attack our people is an impossibility. 5. This most recent invitation is but one in a litany of failed attempts at peace dialogue between 2010 and 2020 - dialogues undermined by limitations established by the now abolished 2008 Constitution. Furthermore, by seizing power from the legitimate government under the flawed pretext of the 2008 Constitution, the terrorist military junta has made clear that it has no genuine desire to achieve a nationwide, sustainable peace and democracy. 6. The NUCC notes with appreciation those ethnic revolutionary organisations who have definitively rejected the invitation issued by the terrorist military dictator Min Aung Hlaing as of the date this statement is issued. 7. The NUCC hereby condemns the disingenuous invitation to so-called peace talks issued by the military terrorist junta. The NUCC restates its call for all political forces, ethnic revolutionary organisations, and people’s resistance forces to stand with the people and resist all forms of dictatorship, including military dictatorship..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Consultative Council
2022-05-07
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-07
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Description: "The Asia Justice Coalition is a network of organizations whose purpose is to promote justice and accountability for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law in Asia, and to contribute to the fulfillment of the rights of victims and their families. In response to a call for input by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Asia Justice Coalition – which the Global Centre is a member of – provided its observations on the impact on the human rights of children and youth due to continuing and extensive arms transfers to Myanmar. This input covers the increase in both international arms transfers to Myanmar and the use of child soldiers in Myanmar, as well as the consequent impact on the enjoyment of human rights of children and youth in Myanmar. Arms transfers facilitate the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in particular in the current context in Myanmar. The proliferation of arms also contributes to the rise of recruitment of child soldiers with an increase in conflict and the ready availability of arms. The submission further shows the direct and indirect impact of the arms supply on the enjoyment of both civil and political, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights by children and youth..."
Source/publisher: Asia Justice Coalition via Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
2022-04-26
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-27
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Size: 279.32 KB (Original version) - 14 pages
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Description: "Time for an Evaluation of Donor-Led Peace Efforts? As recently as 2020 one of the most prominent logos on Yangon billboards, vehicles, and signs was the woven fibers of the Joint Peace Fund (JPF). The JPF arrived in Yangon in 2016, loudly proclaiming that it had pledges from nine western donors who would fund US$100 million in peacebuilding activities between 2016 and 2021. The JPF would support the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) of 2015, a Norwegian-sponsored agreement between the quasi-civilian government of U Thein Sein and a dozen or so Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Hundreds of millions of dollars also flowed into Myanmar in the name of peace from Western embassies, United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Bank, church groups, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). All parties were convinced that they could contribute to the country’s road to peace by bringing the peacebuilding skills of the outside world to Myanmar. International experts in peacebuilding, public health, gender, democracy, displaced peoples, education and a host of other subjects arrived. The Myanmar Police Force was even funded by the European Union to train in crowd control techniques in 2013 and 2016, all part of a scheme to assist them to become “a modern police agency that adheres to international standards, respects human rights and maintains gender awareness.” Conferences were held in Yangon hotels, workshops in villages, and leaders jetted off to see ‘best practice’ peace efforts in places like Northern Ireland, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Mindanao in the Philippines. And then of course it all disappeared on February 1, 2021, when the Myanmar military staged their coup. What went wrong? No answers seem forthcoming. Monitoring, Evaluation and the Coup of February 1, 2021 Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on peace and democracy efforts in Myanmar between 2016 and 2021. Myanmar’s service sector briefly flourished and rents in Yangon skyrocketed, particularly in neighborhoods favored by expatriates where houses owned by military families were snapped up. But that was OK because each dollar spent was rooted in “evidence based policy”, which meant a particular “benchmarked performance objective” pre-determined by the donor was aligned with success, however defined. So the JPF and the donor systems hummed along, always seeming to meet those benchmarked performance indicators. The Rohingya crisis of 2017 came and went, ceasefires in Shan and Kachin States collapsed, and fighting resumed in Karen and Karenni States. The Arakan Army emerged, too. Monitoring and Evaluation officers carefully noted “roadblocks” on the “road to peace”. Ambassadors lectured Myanmar people that this was the “last chance” for peace. But it didn’t work. The crash occurred on the day of the coup, when the elected leadership of the government was arrested and the military occupied Myanmar’s cities. Peaceful demonstrators were shot, military operations against ethnic peoples in the borderlands resumed, and resistance groups began to organize. All the efforts of the 2016-2021 peacebuilding seemed for naught. As for the evaluators, they seemed to have suddenly disappeared. For example, instead of acknowledging failure and announcing a new study in the interests of transparency, JPF’s website was scoured of all reports and effectively went blank. Or perhaps it went underground, as rumors have emerged that the JPF is now negotiating with the military government. It seems that the peacebuilding of 2016-2021 was in vain or perhaps even counter-productive. This means, though, that it is time to ask the critical question of what went wrong. All that data- driven policy-building can be resuscitated, and the tools used to evaluate the NGOs can now be used to evaluate the overall peace process. Monitoring and Evaluation in donor-speak meant western accounting standards benchmarking every kyat and dollar. The recipients were held accountable to the stakeholders, of whom the donors were most important. This is why endless reams of the monitoring and evaluation reports were submitted to Western embassies, JPF, World Bank, and others. Receipts for tea were carefully collated with a performance objective, budget line and benchmark. Monitoring and Evaluation Officer became a new profession in Myanmar, judging by the number of job ads advertising for this particular skill. It seems callous to ask, but isn’t the coup and the seeming collapse of the aid sector a great opportunity for a final monitoring and evaluation report? What are the lessons learned? Why did the road to peace fall off a cliff? Where did the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on peace go? Frankly were JPF still around, it seems like a perfect question for them to conduct an inquiry into. Measuring The Technology of Peace One problem is that the JPF and other donors reduce peace to being a technical problem. In the imported version of ‘Peaceland’, conflict, economics, and politics were reduced to metrics which are easily monitored and evaluated with numbers. Thus, violent incident reports seemed quick and precise and economic development was robustly measured in tenths of a percent growth. Election transparency was presumably measurable in the liters of purple gentian violet used to stain the fingers of voters. The problem perhaps is that peace is not just a technical problem. Peace is complicated, because there are many forms of it and it is more than an absence of violent incidents. Indeed in peace studies, an absence of violent incidents is sometimes called “negative peace”. Myanmar people remember well “negative peace’” from the decades of military rule when fear of government violence was constant, even when there were no violent incidents to count. For negative peace to become “positive peace,” there needs to be reconciliation and the birth of a new sense of shared destiny. Peace studies scholars use mystical terms such as soul of place, cultures of peace, social cohesion, and positive peace. The point is that peace is rooted ultimately in the morality and traditions of the local society, not dollars spent, incidents counted, or even gross national product. A Wonky Question for the Evaluators: What is Your Real Deliverable? The monitoring and evaluation profession is about measuring progress toward a goal. Peace was the goal for the NCA but that came to mean only that violent fighting between the military and EAOs should stop, even if the reign of fear continues. Monitoring and evaluation reports, though, only asked if the shooting stopped, not if steps toward what peace studies scholars call “positive peace” were taken. The incentive presented by Western embassies and NGOs was that if you could answer ‘Yes’ that violence rates had decreased, you could get the next contract. Somehow the world of monitoring and evaluation missed the fact that assigning a cup of tea from a workshop to the correct budget category was not the point. “Positive peace” is the point, but this is unfortunately not really a deliverable that can be monitored and evaluated by simply counting violent incidents. February 1, 2021 presents a classic monitoring and evaluation opportunity for the ‘lessons learned’ crowd. Perhaps what needs to happen is that the donors from the UN, Norway, UK and USA need to admit that the coup was a failure of their own policies, not just of the Myanmar people. Sadly, this is not yet happening. In Thailand, where I work, USAID, Washington’s aid agency, in particular has arrived with monitoring and evaluation specialists promising dollars for programs addressing Myanmar issues. The catch is that the extensive American accountability requirements mean that the same policies and same NGOs that engineered the failure of 2016-2021 are being funded again. More importantly, the pesky goal that is “positive peace” is still missing. So NGOs spring up, monitoring and evaluation specialists are hired and villas rented in Chiangmai and Bangkok. After that is done, some money will make its way across the border to Myanmar and the rather small number of NGOs with the wherewithal and office staff to continue satisfying the technocracy of the peace industry. What Would a Real Evaluation Look Like? What would a real evaluation of the NCA and JPF look like? First, it might start with not just the failures in the 2015 ceasefire, but the dozens of other Myanmar ceasefires which have taken place since the 1950s. And then before that there is the poisonous legacy of British colonialism well remembered by Myanmar’s peoples. Myanmar has historians who could help with evaluating why ceasefires have been ineffective for the last 100 years or so. For example, little thought is put into why the 1950s ceasefires following the 1949 Battle of Insein failed. Nor is much written about the 1990s ceasefires with the Mon, Kachin, Wa, and others. In those failed ceasefires might be found the reason why the 2015 NCA also failed. And finally why did the Rohingya repatriations endorsed by the UN in 1978, 1992, 2012 and 2017 also fail? If you are a foreigner scratching your head about the Battle of Insein, or other ceasefires, you are not alone. After all, what monitoring and evaluation officer created a career based on bragging about the ceasefire that did not work, even if it was one of the most important events in twentieth century Myanmar history? But I would guess that the unsuccessful endings of the Burmese Civil War of 1949-1950 tell us more about peace in Myanmar than the peace industry’s successes in Colombia, Sri Lanka, etc. What such studies should not start with are lectures about USAID monitoring and evaluation requirements, or critiques from Western embassies about “Myanmar’s failure”. New ideas and thoughts from outside ‘Peaceland’ need to be sought. There are excellent books in English by Johan Galtung, Severine Autessere, John Paul Lederach, Thich Nhat Hanh, Elise Boulding, and others about the nature of peace and peacebuilding which are rarely noted in the reams of reports. Myanmar scholars like U Pho Hlaing’s writings about the nature of Burmese democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi’s writings about democracy and fear, Saw Aung Hla’s writings about the Karen and Maung Maung Gyi’s thoughts regarding Burmese authoritarianism, were almost universally ignored in Yangon consultancy reports, even though they are available in English. More of course must be available in Burmese, Karen, and the other languages of Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-04-20
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Identity-based violence and hate speech are rising in South and Southeast Asia. Yet actors working to address these issues often do so in isolation and/or lack support to magnify their impact. Networks for Peace uses its regional convening power to collectively engage and support civil society organizations and key influencers in advancing tolerance and peaceful coexistence, mitigating growing polarization of ethnic and religious identities across the region. Working with partners in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and with the Central Tibetan Administration, Networks for Peace fosters intra- and interfaith harmony and social cohesion through grants, capacity building, research, and regional knowledge sharing. STRENGTHENING ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL NETWORKS Networks for Peace’s regional approach focuses on strengthening organizational capacity while providing networking opportunities for a broad range of civil society organizations and key influencers, including women, youth, religious actors, faith-based organizations, and the private sector. Networks for Peace activities focus on: (i) promoting intra- and interfaith harmony; (2) addressing dangerous speech and amplifying positive narratives of peace and inclusivity; and (3) promoting regional youth champions to foster greater understanding and tolerance among different ethnic and religious communities. Additionally, Networks for Peace programming integrates key elements of USAID’s Women, Peace, and Security strategy empowering women and marginalized groups through inclusion and meaningful participation in activities. EXPANDING KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING Networks for Peace is expanding civil society organizations’ access to evidence-based research, knowledge, tools, and resources to better understand religious nationalism and promote religious tolerance in South and Southeast Asia. By enhancing partners’ access to learning resources, Networks for Peace enables regional partners and stakeholders to design and implement more strategic interventions improving the effectiveness of their advocacy and peacebuilding efforts. KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS Networks for Peace held consultations with over 200 organizations and key influencers across Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Central Tibetan Administration and Tibetans in exile in India to better understand the context related to ethnic and religious conflict across each country and explore avenues to effectively promote peace and inclusivity. Networks for Peace regional exchanges provided critical forums for 208 civil society representatives and key influencers (60 percent women) to share experiences and best practices across multiple countries on issues such as interfaith and intrafaith dialogue, the role of women and youth in peacebuilding, and addressing online misinformation and dangerous speech. Since 2020, Networks for Peace has trained 146 persons (64 percent women) to advance gender equality or female empowerment through their roles in public or private sector institutions or organizations. Since then, 211 local women have participated substantively in Networks for Peace regional and in-country activities. Networks for Peace employs a Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) lens to ensure that women and marginalized groups are empowered and meaningfully included in all aspects of its partner networks’ operations. With Networks for Peace guidance, a regional network was able to incorporate GESI principles in the selection of its project participants. This led to a more inclusive and diverse group of regional peacebuilder participants, comprised of Buddhist monks, female clergies, and representatives from marginalized groups. Networks for Peace regional events, workshops, and grants have supported in-country and cross-border collaboration among organizations working to promote intra- and interfaith harmony and address dangerous speech. For example, following their participation in a Networks for Peace activity, a tech company in Burma and a Sri Lankan civil society organization have explored areas for collaboration and are now jointly implementing a project to adapt an existing dangerous speech monitoring platform. In Thailand, through their participation in Networks for Peace partnership building exchanges, three Thai private tech companies and a local civil society organization are establishing a Dangerous Speech Monitoring and Mitigation Network to coordinate their respective activities..."
Source/publisher: US Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C.) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2022-04-08
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1.Today marks the Sixth Anniversary of the signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) by the leaders of Ethnic Revolutionary Armed Organizations, government, tamadaw and Hluttaw on 15th October of 2015, in the presence of foreign diplomats which included the UN, EU, China, Japan and Thailand in order to establish a Union based on the principles of democracy and federalism that guarantees democracy, national equality and selfdetermination. 2. PPST upholds the essence of NCA which embodies resolving political crisis through political means, fostering a meaningful political dialogue with all the stakeholders, and protection and security of the people's lives and property. 3. During the past six years, four sessions of the Union Peace Conference - 21st Century Panglong had been convened according to the Seven-step culminating in the signing of three parts of the Union Accord. However, we were still unable to lay down concrete principles to establish a Federal Democratic Union as desired. Implementation of ceasefire matters and interim arrangements made no headway. Another disappointment was the inability to convince remaining ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to sign the NCA which included the principle of all-inclusiveness. 4. On the bright side, we have stimulated the widespread awareness and substantial understanding of federalism among the public and public participation in the peace process. We have faced numerous obstacles and challenges in fostering a new political culture that seeks resolution for the long standing political crisis through political means. We believe that those lessons learnt will become instrumental in resolving the nation's current political crisis. 5.The entire peace process including implementation of NCA has stalled due to the coup on February 1, 2021. In order to overcome the political crisis, the PPST has adopted the following political goals based on the NCA essence that embodies resolving political conflict through political means, fostering meaningful political dialogue with all the stakeholders, and protection of civilians: 1) To release immediately and unconditionally all the state leaders and other detainees arrested after the coup, and seek to resolve the political differences as soon as possible. 2) The future political dialogue for a political solution is to include all stakeholders and to take place with the assistance of the international community. 3) To find solutions for the earliest transfer of power to the civilian leadership within the democratic framework through a collective approach. 4) To implement institutional reforms to enable the Union of Myanmar to stand with dignity among the International Community. 5) To establish a security system that protects the people in pursuant of peace, stability and prosperity of the nation. 6) To implement programs that advance the protection of the lives and property of the people, and resettlement and rehabilitation for their losses. 7) To build a Federal Democratic Union which ensures stability, peace and prosperity. 6. We welcome the efforts of the international community including the ASEAN to resolve the Myanmar political crisis. We will also collaborate with all political forces to work towards the solution. 7. PPST is seeking humanitarian assistance for the people displaced by the conflict, as well as Covid-19 related support and programs for people in the NCA-S EAO based area. 8. On this special occasion of the 6th Anniversary of the Signing of the NCA, we solemnly call for immediate and unconditional release of all detained political prisoners and urge all the stakeholders to find peaceful means to resolve the current political crisis..."
Source/publisher: NCA-S EAO
2021-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Over the past decade, Myanmar has undergone a rapid period of political reform as it has transitioned away from a military junta towards a civilian and democratically elected government. This period has witnessed a series of land governance reforms, being pulled into various directions by Myanmar’s pluralistic society and land use and tenure practices, resulting in overlapping and conflicting policies and legal frameworks in land governance. Struggles over control and access to land and territory are one of the most pressing political issues facing the new National League for Democracy (NLD) government, which won a historical victory in the 2015 general elections under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Maintaining its broad base support and legitimacy largely hinges on the government’s ability to tackle pressing land governance issues, while dealing with various democratic, ethnic, and developmental crises that plague the country (Callahan 2003; Ferguson 2014; Grundy-Warr and Yin 2002; Willis 2013). The military and its cronies have engaged in a long history of land grabbing that has sparked protests and civil strife (Aung 2015; Gee 2005; Jones 2014a; Woods 2011). Ongoing discussion on peace processes between ethnic armed organizations and the central government and military are in large part concerned with territorial boundaries of ethnic states and authority within them (Einzenberger 2016; Hong 2017; Kramer 2015). Insecure peasant access to and unclear ownership over land, due to the central government’s lack of recognition of customary land tenure systems, has hampered prospects of rural economic development throughout the country (Boutry et al. 2017; Huard 2016). This paper looks at how farmers and state actors shape and reshape legal pluralism within the context of dual authority, where both the Myanmar central government and the Karen National Union1 (KNU), the latter being the leading political organization representing the Karen’s struggle for political self-determination, are responsible for land management in their respective, albeit overlapping, territories. It illustrates the ongoing power struggle centered on the central government’s and the KNU’s interests and strategies to increase the land area under their respective administration, and how this corresponds with customary tenure systems and farmers’ views on land tenure security and strategies to ensure their land rights. Two village case studies in Karen State are used to illustrate how farmers shape their strategies to secure their land rights while navigating through the blurred boundaries of competing legal systems and spaces, embedded in the context of dual authority. The paper looks at state spatiality as complex processes and practices of socio-spatial regulation across scales shaping and reshaping state-society relations. Placing dual authority as one of the building blocks for state transformation, it illustrates how political authority produces rights, and vice versa (Lund and Rahman 2018), within the context of legal and institutional pluralism. It shows how these processes and practices are rooted in the production of political space, centering on farmers’ strategies to strengthen their land rights, and how these are entangled in the central government-farmers-KNU power relations. In particular, it looks at: (1) the conflicting legal frameworks pertaining to land governance in the country; (2) how these legal frameworks are negotiated and appropriated at the village level through various means and institutional set up, including how they interact with customary land rights; and (3) how it reflects back on and influences farmers’ land tenure security. Building on legal pluralism research (von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Spiertz 1996; Moore 1986; Van der Linden 1989), we argue that while inconsistent policies and legal frameworks leave the door wide open for land expropriation, as powerful actors shop for suitable and applicable laws to serve their interests, it also serves as an entry point for less powerful actors to increase their room to maneuver and reclaim their rights. Here, rather than portraying inconsistent, conflicting legal frameworks as merely a sign of a weak legal system in Myanmar’s land governance, we position it as an entry point for farmers and local communities to fight for their land rights. Building on Mann’s definition of states as merely [consisting of] ‘some degree of authoritative rule making and some organized political force’ (Brenner et al. 2003, 125), we view states as both sets of institutions and an expression of social power relations. As stated by Jones (2014b, 146): ‘States are seen as being produced, transformed and constrained by conflicts between social forces, … as they struggle for power and control over resources’. 2 Building on Brenner et al.’s (2003, 11) definition of states as ‘dynamically evolving spatial entities that continually mold and reshape the geographies of the very social relations they aspire to regulate, control and/or restructure’, we view state transformation processes as the creation of new political space and institutional emergence shaped by ongoing power struggles and contestation between and within political actors across scales. Or, as stated by Lefebvre (2003, 99): ‘State space hinders the transformation that would lead to the production of a differential space’. Here, state transformation is not limited to formal state actors, but also includes other actors and institutions with statutory capacity. Or, as stated by Lund and Rachman (2016, 1201): ‘The mutual constitution of rights and authority takes place in many institutional settings … Government institutions are not the only source of state effects’. The paper contributes to the wider literature on legal pluralism and state transformation processes in two ways. First, it brings to light the blurred boundary between the different forms of (legal) ordering (e.g. state law, customary law, religious law), and thus between legal systems and spaces. It argues that while legal scholars tend to view legal pluralism as the conception of different, yet interlinked legal systems and spaces, they are in fact more than just a compilation of different legal orders. On the contrary, it illustrates the messy realities where boundaries between the different forms of ordering are at best blurred, as actors and institutions transcend the different legal systems and spaces in pursuit of their interests, reconfiguring the boundaries of those spaces in the process. Second, it presents the concept of dual authority as a theoretical underpinning to unpack the politics of legal pluralism, centering on the question of ‘who makes the law’. Current discourse on legal pluralism has highlighted the importance of power analysis surrounding the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the overall shaping of law-society relations (Boelens, Bustamante, and de Vos 2007). However, it lacks a theoretical concept to unpack the political power shaping and reshaping the plurality of legal practices (Barzilai 2008). Legal pluralism entails that different institutions can assume jurisdiction, depending on how they view and cope with the conflict situation emerging from overlapping policies and legal frameworks. As stated by von Benda-Beckmann (1981, 145): ‘While actors in a dispute shop for various institutions of dispute settlement, institutions also shop for dispute. Depending on which aspect of the dispute is emphasized, a different institution can assume jurisdiction’. The case studies examined in this paper show how jurisdiction itself is blurred by plural legal systems and state spaces of dual authority that interpenetrate one another. As such, political authority and rights that emanate from different power domains are in a constant state of flux. Rights can emerge and submerge, depending on what legal system is referred to as well as what authority and legitimacy actors attribute it in a particular place and time. It highlights the centrality of political space and institutional emergence in state transformation processes through the illustration of how ‘state space is represented and imagined both in geopolitical struggles and in everyday life’ (Brenner et al. 2003, 7). Additionally, it raises the question as to what ‘state law’ and ‘non-state law’ is and where the boundaries lie in the context of multiple political spaces and institutions competing for authority (Sikor and Lund 2009), as manifested in the context of dual authority (Huard 2016). Taking two neighboring villages in mixed government-KNU controlled areas in Karen state as a case study, the paper shows the localized dynamics that shape the creation of new political spaces, manifested in states actors’ strategies to increase political authority and farmers’ strategies to strengthen their land rights, and how the two are intertwined within the established, yet ever changing geography of state regulation..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Journal of Peasant Studies
2019-10-31
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 2.13 MB
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Description: "It is hardly surprising that the ethnic rebellions in states like those inhabited by the Kachin and Karen have flared anew since the military seized absolute power in Myanmar on Feb. 1, and that Bamar dissidents from cities and towns have sought refuge in areas controlled by ethnic rebels in the north and east. That happened after the military crushed a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988 as well. But this time, the sound of gunfire and bomb blasts can be heard in Yangon, Mandalay and other cities and towns in the country’s heartland. And, in the ethnic areas, some of the heaviest fighting has raged in Chin and Kayah states, which for decades have not seen any widespread insurgencies. Even there, it is a new type of rebellion. Myanmar’s older ethnic rebel armies, who have been battling for self-rule and autonomy for decades, are dressed up in uniforms with insignia, the officers have ranks, they are based in camps and are organized along the lines of regular armies anywhere in the world. The “new rebels” in Chin and Kayah states have none of that, and, unlike the ethnic rebel armies, are not equipped with automatic rifles but hunting guns, homemade weapons and bombs they have assembled themselves. Even so, if reports on social media sites are to be believed, they have managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. Dozens of soldiers have been killed in ambushes and by roadside bombs—which, in turn, has provoked a massive and brutal response from the Tatmadaw. Heavy artillery and airpower have been used, but since the Tatmadaw is facing a largely invisible enemy, the firing into villages suspected of harboring the rebels has been indiscriminate, houses have been torched and even places of worship, like churches in predominantly Christian areas of Kayah State, have been damaged. As a result, according to a June 24 statement by Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for UN Secretary General António Guterres, “an estimated 230,000 people have been displaced because of violence, fights and insecurity.” According to local sources in Demoso, Kayah State quoted by The Irrawaddy, Tatmadaw troops have also looted shops and entered homes and taken whatever they feel like. With all of that comes widespread anger at central military authorities—and the possibility of strengthening older, centrifugal forces on the periphery, which would be a challenge to anyone who wants to keep the country together. Kayah State is inhabited by several ethnic groups of whom the Karenni, or Kayah, are the predominant among the state’s population of approximately 286,000. Originally Animist, many of them were converted to Christianity, mainly by Baptist missionaries, in the 19th century. But the Mong Pai (Mobye in Burmese) area on the Shan State border—where more than a dozen Tatmadaw soldiers were killed by local rebels in May—is where the Kayan, or Padaung, people live. They are predominantly Roman Catholic and their women are famous for wearing brass neck rings, which make their necks seem longer. There is an old rebel army in Kayah State, the Karenni Army (KA), which is the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) but has been engaged only in sporadic fighting since it was formed in the 1970s. But Kayah State has a very different administrative history from other Myanmar states. Although Animist or Christian, its people adopted at an early stage in history Shan political culture and established their own principalities. Following the advent of British colonial power in the 19th century, central Burma, as it was then called, became a colony, while the 40-or-so Shan states achieved a status similar to that of being protectorates. The Karenni states, on the other hand, were recognized as “independent” under an agreement signed in 1875 by T.D. Forsyth for the British crown and Kinwun Mingyi U Kaung, the representative of the king in Mandalay: “It is hereby agreed that the Burmese and British Governments that the states of Western Karenni shall remain separate and independent and that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be claimed or exercised over that State.” Consequently, the Karenni states of Kyebogyi, Kantarawaddy and Bawlake were marked as “independent” on maps throughout the colonial era although, in reality, they enjoyed the same status as the Shan principalities. But British presence was light, and there was little interference in the internal affairs of the Karenni states. The Karenni and Shan states were the only states which, according to the 1947 constitution, had the right to secede from the then proposed Union of Burma after 10 years of independence. The Kachin and Karen states, which were to be formed after independence, did not have that right. But the Karenni rose in rebellion as early as 1946 in anticipation of the formation of the Union. The United Karenni Independent States were proclaimed to safeguard the “independence” of the area. An armed wing called the United Karenni States Independence Army was formed in 1948 but the rebellion petered out after the arrest of the main leader, Saw Maw Reh, in 1949. He was released in 1953 and was among those who formed the KNPP in 1957. The KA was set up in 1974, but like its mother organization the KNPP, it was based mainly on the Thai border opposite Mae Hong Son, where it benefited from the black-market trade between the two countries. A smaller faction broke away and formed an alliance with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), but its presence in Kayah State was very limited. When Saw Maw Reh died in 1994, the KNPP/KA lost most of its remaining strength and the movement slipped more or less into oblivion—until now. The Kayan formed their own organization called the Kayan Newland Party (KNLP). Set up in 1964, it was for years led by Shwe Aye, aka Naing Hlu Ta, a former university student, who allied the movement with the CPB. In 1994, the KNLP was one of many rebel groups that made peace with the then military government. Local conflicts with rival groups and government demands for total surrender have decimated the group and it is now no longer active. The recent surge of fighting in Kayah State, therefore, appears to be unconnected with older insurrections. The Chin, like the other hill peoples, including their distant relatives the Kachin, were also Animists before the arrival of the Christian missionaries. But unlike the Kachin they never managed to establish a formidable rebel army. One reason is that—again unlike the Kachin, among whom the Jinghpaw dialect became the lingua franca—the Chin remained divided by more than 30 (according to some counts, 44) different, mutually unintelligible dialects. In the 1970s, the Kachin Independence Army made an attempt to raise an allied force in Chin State—the Chin Independence Army, with the unfortunate abbreviation of CIA—but it soon vanished from the scene. The Chin are more closely related to the Mizo (or Lushai, as they were called during the colonial era) of northeastern India, and cross-border contacts have always been strong and frequent. The establishment of Mizoram, a separate state for the Mizo, in India in 1987 also had repercussions in Chin State. Much to the embarrassment of the Indian government, the Indian flag was hoisted in several towns in Chin State in 1988. It was followed by a demand by local leaders that Chin State should secede from Myanmar and join newly formed Mizoram. A smaller rebel group called the Chin National Front (CNF) with the Chin National Army (CNA) as its armed wing was formed when a number of Chin students went underground after the 1988 uprising. They did get some support from across the border in India, where the Research and Analysis Wing (India’s external intelligence agency) used them to collect intelligence. They were also unofficially allowed to set up a base in a remote part of southern Mizoram. It was known as the Victoria Camp and named after Mount Victoria (Nat Ma Taung in Burmese), the highest mountain in Chin State. But it was abandoned in 2005 and the CNF remained an insignificant group—until ex-general U Thein Sein launched his so-called “peace process” after assuming the presidency in 2011. In 2015 the CNF became one of the eight original signatories of U Thein Sein’s “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement”, but it was then so small and insignificant that it was awarded an area in Chin State where it could set up a headquarters, also called Victoria Camp. It was seen as important that the so-called “signatories” were credible forces, although only two of them, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Karen National Union, had any actual armed forces. Photos of uniformed CNA troops began to appear on social media sites, but their weaponry seems to consist almost exclusively of wooden cutouts. The CNA does not appear to have taken an active role in the recent fighting in Chin State, where in May a local force calling itself the Chinland Defense Force (CDF) seized control of a town called Mindat and, according to local sources, killed more than 30 Tatmadaw soldiers before being forced out after heavy bombardment from the air and by artillery fire. The CDF has also launched attacks near the Chin State capital Hakha and other places in the area. But on May 28, the CNF, perhaps because it did not want to be overtaken by events, declared that it had forged an alliance with the National Unity Government (NUG), which consists of elected MPs who were ousted on Feb. 1 and other pro-democracy individuals. It is also worth noting that the main spokesman of the NUG, Dr. Sasa, is a Chin who is among the thousands of Chin who fled to India after the coup and the subsequent flare-up of fighting in the home areas. Some sources put the number of refugees in India at more than 20,000, nearly all of them from Chin State and adjacent lowland areas. A smaller number of refugees are in Manipur, the Indian state north of Mizoram. It is too early to say whether the new rebellions that the coup has ignited will have any significant, long-term impact. The initial success of their ambushes could not have been carried out without widespread popular support, but in order to fight an insurgency, they would need more sophisticated weaponry than they presently have at their disposal. In the past, Thailand had a huge gray weapons market where many Myanmar rebel armies bought their guns. But that is no longer the case and China, the only other possible source of military hardware, would provide only the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and, indirectly, the allied forces of that group with weapons. None of the new rebel armies would fall into that category. The UWSA has also shown through its inactivity that it wants to be aloof of the post-coup anti-Tatmadaw movement, and will remain uninvolved. It is also not possible that the new rebels will have access to safe havens in neighboring countries, which they would need in order to survive and expand. The Thais are not even willing to let the thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Myanmar cross the border, and those who did manage to escape to Mizoram can, at most, expect humanitarian assistance from their fellow Mizo. And then there is the issue of ethnic identity. Is there any coordination between the new rebel groups in ethnic areas and urban guerrillas carrying out attacks in cities and towns? Will the new armies in ethnic areas, in the end, join kindred rebels fighting for autonomy or, in some cases, secession from an oppressive, Bamar-dominated central power? The only thing that can be said with certainty is that junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing probably had no idea of the forces he and his henchmen would unleash when, nearly five months ago, they decided to launch a coup, a move that has thrown the country into turmoil, causing immense suffering and tearing the country apart..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A new brand of militant is throwing bombs, torching targets and killing junta officials in the name of restoring democracy
Description: "Five months after the military coup in Myanmar, resistance to the anti-democratic takeover is evolving and intensifying. In the old capital Yangon, groups of mostly young people appear for brief moments in the streets, shouting slogans and flashing the three-finger salute, the symbol of the pro-democratic struggle. They then disperse as quickly as they had appeared to avoid arrest. Upcountry, people are also showing their anger at Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s power grab, with most protests taking place in Mandalay, Sagaing and Tanintharyi Regions. Demonstrators from across the country have expressed solidarity with each other. When clashes occurred between protesters and security forces in urban areas in Mandalay in early June, people in Yangon staged a demonstration chanting “Stay strong Mandalay, we, Yangon will be with you.” More militant elements have taken to throwing low-grade bombs and grenades at government buildings on a near-daily basis, while police, suspected military informants and leading members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party are being targeted for assassination. Moreover, a loose alliance of local resistance forces known as the People’s Defense Force (PDF) was formed in May in response to the coup. Officially, it is the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), which is made up of MPs who were deposed in the February 1 coup and other anti-junta activists. The evident aim is to topple Min Aung Hlaing’s government by military means. Judging from what happened in February, when millions of people in virtually every city, town and major village across the country marched against the coup, it is plausible to assume the NUG and PDF may have widespread popular support and getting recruits would not be a major problem. But more than that will be needed in order to wage a successful armed struggle. The first would be access to weapons, then fall-back areas and, preferable, safe havens across the borders of a neighboring nation from where supplies could be sent to forces inside the country. It will also need money to sustain its activities. On the surface, the PDF doesn’t appear to have any of the above. According to a May 23 Myanmar-language NUG announcement, the PDF is made up of five divisions, each having at least three brigades. Each brigade consists of five battalions which, in turn, are divided into four companies, the announcement said. That sounds like a formidable military force but, in reality, it’s so far only on paper. Groups of urban dissidents have taken refuge in areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Union (KNU) ethnic armed organizations. Reports from inside sources indicate that the urban guerrilla warfare that Myanmar is now experiencing is an outcome of that alliance. Indeed, the well-planned attacks have been daring and dramatic. On June 18, for instance, an army truck with regime soldiers on board was blown up in Yangon’s Tamwe township. The Irrawaddy cited witnesses who said they saw soldiers on board the truck, which was parked outside an office of the USDP. The blast also occurred within walking distance of the township’s police station, the Irrawaddy reported. Both the KIA and elements of the KNU, which disagree with their leaders’ signing of an earlier, ineffectual Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), have since the coup also carried out widespread attacks in their areas of operation. The KIA in particular has hit Tatmadaw targets all over Kachin state. But elsewhere in Myanmar, armed resistance appears to have been launched by local groups which may or may not have any links to the NUG and the PDF. That is especially true in now restive Chin and Kayah states, parts of the country that have not seen any large-scale insurgency for decades. The PDF’s prospects look initially bleak. Decades of experience show that neither side in Myanmar’s many, mainly ethnicity-based civil wars can win solely by military means. The Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has been unable to defeat the rebels and none of the ethnic armed groups has had enough strength to force any central government to agree to their demands for self-rule or autonomy. The International Crisis Group sums it up as such in a June 28 report on Myanmar’s new emerging armed struggle: “The resistance has taken on an increasingly revolutionary character, with most dissidents no longer aiming for restoration of the status quo ante, but for the Tatmadaw’s disbandment and its replacement by a new armed force that is not dominated by the Burman ethnic majority.” That, the ICG concludes, would require the “Tatmadaw’s defeat or capitulation” – a remote possibility in today’s Myanmar. The most recent attempt at finding an alternative, political solution to the civil wars was made by Thein Sein, a former Tatmadaw general, shortly after his appointment as president in 2011. Talks between his government, the Tatmadaw and a variety of ethnic armed groups were held and resulted in eight of them signing the NCA in October 2015. The problem, however, was that only two of those groups — the KNU and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) — had any armed forces to be reckoned with. The rest were tiny, largely irrelevant groups whose signatures were required to solidity the credibility of the NCA. None of the major groups, among them the KIA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army or the United Wa State Army (UWSA) which, along with their respective allies, represent more than 80% of all armed rebels in the country. The PDF will add to the Tatmadaw’s troubles. Unable to identify the new rebels, who unlike other ethnic insurgents are not dressed in uniforms with insignia showing the name of their army and their ranks, the Tatmadaw has resorted to firing indiscriminately into villages, causing widespread destruction of civilian homes and properties. As a result, an estimated 230,000 people have been displaced in Myanmar because of violence, fights and insecurity, according to a June 24 statement by Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres. Myanmar’s “new rebels”, with or without collaboration with older, ethnic armies, may be able to inflict heavy casualties on the Tatmadaw. But even the older armies are facing similar problems as the new ones. In the past, Thailand’s grey weapons market was a treasure trove for any group looking for weapons, but, as relations between the Thai military and Tatmadaw have improved, that is no longer the case. Informed sources say they are struggling to keep even their own soldiers with guns and sufficient ammunition. And Myanmar’s largest and best-equipped ethnic armed group, the UWSA, has shown no interest in arming or even sheltering urban dissidents and other pro-democracy activists. That could be explained in the context of the UWSA’s close relationship with China’s security services on the other side of the border. While democratic countries all over the world have condemned the coup, China, along with Russia, have come out in support of Min Aung Hlaing’s junta. The future for Myanmar thus looks bleak, with only a split within the Tatmadaw likely able to bring about fundamental change. But there are no signs yet of that happening as Myanmar’s resistance shifts from peaceful protests to more violent means. The most the “new rebels”, alone or together with ethnic allies, may be able to achieve would be to disrupt its efforts to consolidate its grip on the country. In other words, Myanmar is back to square one in the history of its decades-long civil wars where neither side can win. That can only mean more suffering for the people with villages being torched and civilians killed — and refugees gathering in the jungles and mountains or trying to escape to neighboring countries. Myanmar will remain a source of instability in an otherwise relatively prosperous part of the world..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "It has been four months since the Myanmar military seized power from the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and arrested most of the NLD leaders including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The reason originally given was irregularities in the voting process and lack of redress by the Union Election Commission, which was controlled by the NLD, although such reasoning, especially amidst new accusation of corruption amongst other things remains suspect. Soon after the coup, the military formed a body, the State Administration Council (SAC), under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces Min Aung Hlaing. Not unsurprisingly the return to military rule was met with widespread protests in the country and condemnation from the international community while Myanmar security forces took to the streets to brutally suppress the protestors, known as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Security forces used not only riot control techniques but live-fire resulting in the deaths at the time of writing over 860 civilians had been killed, including children, and more than 4,840 civilians convicted or arrested. 1 Protests have taken place throughout the country including areas under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The EAOs, before the coup, had been involved in an NLD led and ostensibly military supported, peace process – the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. While the peace process had been flawed and at one point stalled for two years it was expected that 2021 could see some progress made in addressing many of the problems that had occurred. The EAOs largely came out in favour of the protestors and the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) an alliance of the 10 NCA-signatories2 immediately issued the following statement 1). We condemn the Myanmar military’s way of addressing the current political crisis by carrying out a coup d’état. 2).We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all leaders who are detained and arrested. 3).We urge the resolution of political problems by peaceful means and negotiation, rather than by force of arms. 4.) We stand firm on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and act accordingly regarding the peace process. 5.) We call for the unconditional declaration of a nationwide ceasefire. 6.) We will collaborate with the public in seeking solutions, as we are aware of the difficulties faced by the people by the coup as well as the global pandemic (COVID-19). 7.) We call on the support of the international community including the UN in resolving the current crisis.3 That said, however, at least one ethnic political party the Arakan National Party (ANP), the biggest Arakanese political party in Arakan State, released a statement signalling that it would cooperate with Myanmar’s military. In its statement, the ANP said it will work together with the Tatmadaw to resolve specific Arakanese crises including the removal of the terrorist label for the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army, which the SAC later did. On March 11, the PPST, which had already suspended all political dialogue with the military on February 20, held a meeting to discuss strategies to stop the Myanmar military’s ongoing violent crackdown on anti-coup protesters and also future dialogue with the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a shadow NLD government.4 According to reporting there had been concerns among some EAOs that it could be dangerous for the PPST to prioritize coordination with the CRPH. One leader was quoted as saying, We were a dialogue partner of the military. We were a dialogue partner of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Now we cannot stand the people’s suffering. The main discussion is how to calm the situation down. We are thinking of the plight of the citizens,5 Despite several concerns, the Karen National Union, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Chin National Front still held separate talks with the CRPH. In addition, the Karen National Union’s Chairman Mutu Say Po wrote a letter on 22 March 2021, after Min Aung Hlaing had sent a letter requesting a meeting. The reply from Mutu Say Po stated, The KNU finds it completely unacceptable that police and Tatmadaw personnel, whose responsibilities are to protect and defend its own people, have killed, attacked, and threatened peaceful protesters. Such events have damaged our country's reputation and caused great pain and suffering of our people. These included a number of requirements the military had to meet before further discussions could take place these were, 1. Withdraw all riot squads and Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed against protesters and withdrawal of all Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed in ceasefire areas and send them back to their outposts and bases; Declare and implement a nationwide ceasefire. 2. Release and remove charges against those detained since Tatmadaw took over power on the 1" February 2021. 3. Fully allow access for medical assistance and healthcare to support the people's protest movement. 4. Issue orders to police and Tatmadaw troops to comply with all NCA provisions — and urgently release the following provisions regarding proper treatment of civilians: A. Stop acts violating a person's dignity, violence, extrajudicial detention, kidnapping, torture, inhumane treatment, imprisonment, killing or causing the disappearance of individuals B. Stop forcibly taking money, property, food, labour or services from civilians; in addition, halt unlawful and arbitrary arrest, entrapment, forced confession, lawsuits and prosecution against civilians; C. Stop denying individuals' right to healthcare and restriction of public health resources; and halt blocking the legal transportation of medicines for public use; D. Stop the destruction or actions that would lead to the destruction of schools, hospitals, clinics, religious buildings and their premises and the use of such places as military bases or outposts; E. Immediately stop any form of sexual attack on women, including sexual molestation, sexual assault or violence, rape and sex slavery; End all killing or maiming, forced conscription, rape or other forms of sexual assault or violence, or abduction of children. 5. Abolish laws issued by Tatmadaw since Feb 1" that violate human rights. 6. Agree to address the root causes of internal conflict of over 70 years through negotiations. 7. Agree to accept international mediation to support negotiations to end the current military administration and transfer power to a National Unity Government. 8. The Tatmadaw should publicly declare its commitment to democracy and federalism and withdraw from active engagement in politics..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-06-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "NCA အတိုင်း လိုက်နာသွားမည်ဟု KNLA စစ်ဦးစီးချုပ် ထုတ်ပြန် ဇွန်လ ၉ ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်။ ကေအိုင်စီ ကေအဲန်ယူ-ကရင်အမျိုးသားအစည်းအရုံး လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုးထားသည့် တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးပစ်ခတ်တိုက်ခိုက်မှု ရပ်စဲရေး သဘောတူ စာချုပ် (NCA) အတိုင်း တိကျစွာလိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကရင်အမျိုးသား လွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော်-KNLA စစ်ဦးစီးချုပ် ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး စောဂျော်နီက ယနေ့ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ၎င်း၏ သဘောထား ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သည်။ ကရင်အမျိုးသားလွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်မတော် -KNLA အနေဖြင့် KNU၏ နိုင်ငံရေး ဦးဆောင်မှုလမ်းညွှန် မှုကို ခံယူလျက် ဒီမိုကရေစီအရေး၊ တန်းတူရေး နှင့် ကရင်အမျိုးသားအရေးကို အစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်လာခဲ့ရာ မေလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့က ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော KNU ဥက္ကဌ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီးစောမူတူးစေဖိုး၏ သဘောထားအတိုင်းလိုက်နာ ခံယူသွား မည်ဟုလည်း ဖော်ပြထားသည်။ ထို့အပြင် ကရင်အမျိုးသား လွတ်မြောက်ရေး တပ်မတော်(KNLA) တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များအားလုံး အနေဖြင့်လည်း စစ်စည်းကမ်းများနှင့်အညီ တိကျစွာ လိုက်နာကြရန်လည်း ၎င်း၏ သဘောထားတွင် တိုက်တွန်းထားသည်။ ပြီးခဲ့သည့် မေလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့က KNU ဥက္ကဌ ဗိုလ်ချုပ်ကြီး စောမူတူးစေးဖိုးက သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အစုအဖွဲ့ များ အနေဖြင့် အပစ်ရပ် စာချုပ်(NCA) မူဘောင်များအတိုင်း တိကျစွာ လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကြရန် တိုက်တွန်းထားသည့် သဘောထားထုတ်ပြန်ချက်တစ်စောင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သေးသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Karen Information Center -KIC via The Irrawaddy - Burmese Edition
2021
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Sub-title: Just as during the decades-long civil war and recent elections, Myanmar’s ethnic minorities will be pivotal in the post-coup status quo
Description: "The diverse ethnic minorities in Myanmar have a long and often troubled history with the Burmese military that seized power in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, spanning across the bloody civil war, as well as the country’s democratic reforms in the past decade. Ethnic relations and the delicate, changing balances of power between the Bamar majority, the Tatmadaw, the civilian government officials, and amongst themselves have long dictated the reality and prospects of Myanmar’s politics, peace, and prosperity. In this policy paper, Michael Martin, a long-time Myanmar expert, traces the history of ethnic minorities in the 2008 constitution, the three ensuing parliamentary elections, and now the fluid and contentious political environment after the February 1 coup. Martin outlines three potential outcomes for the future of Myanmar, either federal democracy, fragmentation, or military power consolidation—all of whose outcomes intrinsically depend on the complex political and security dynamics of the ethnic minorities dispersed across the country.....About this Series: This paper is part of Stimson’s Civil-Military Relations in Myanmar series, which seeks to analyze the complex relationship between the civilian and military sides of the Burmese government and the implications for the country’s future peace and development. Since the founding of the country, the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, has held a unique and privileged status across institutions of power. And despite movement toward democracy in the past decade, the relationship between the civilian and military sides remains deeply unsettled. This contest for power and the political, security, and constitutional crises it creates have had far-reaching effects on Myanmar’s political processes, its ongoing civil war, the Rohingya crisis, and regional peace and stability—a reality most recently and poignantly seen in the 2021 coup d’état staged by the Tatmadaw against the civilian government. The series brings together the expertise of leading experts on Myanmar, Southeast Asia, democratization, and policy to uncover the complex dynamics between the two sides. The series provides key insights and recommendations for disentangling the contentious relationship and charting a path forward for relevant stakeholders in Myanmar. More than three months have passed since Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the Tatmadaw staged their palace coup in Myanmar (Burma), setting up a new military junta entitled the State Administrative Council (SAC). The actions of the nation’s ethnic minorities1 and their associated ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) will be critical if Min Aung Hlaing and the SAC are to be defeated, either by political or military means. The failure to secure the support of the ethnic minorities and their EAOs could either doom the people of Myanmar to many more years of oppressive military rule or lead to the fragmentation of the nation into several smaller sovereign states. To properly appreciate the importance of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities and their EAOs to the nation’s future requires an examination of the country’s political developments since 2010, Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to depose the civilian side of the hybrid civilian-military Union Government, and the role of the ethnic minorities and their EAOs in determining Myanmar’s future. However, in order to understand why the ethnic minorities and the EAOs are so critical to Myanmar’s future, it is necessary to first examine the Tatmadaw’s original plan for the political transition of Myanmar into a “flourishing and disciplined democracy.”2.....The Tatmadaw’s Plan for Myanmar’s Political Transition: On August 30, 2003, Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced that Myanmar’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), would undertake a “seven-point roadmap for democracy.” 3 The roadmap called for the reconvening of a constitutional convention that was suspended in 1996, the drafting of a new constitution for the nation, the adoption of the constitution in a national referendum, the holding of nationwide parliamentary elections, and the transfer of power from the SPDC to the new government.4..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Stimson Center
2021-06-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 251.04 KB (18 pages)
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Sub-title: Fostering the untapped potential of Myanmar’s youth
Description: "In January 2017, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi gathered 18 young people from across Myanmar for a Peace Talk in Nay Pyi Taw. These youth, representing a range of ethnic identities, shared their fears, hopes, and insights on how to transform conflict into peace, and how to build trust between, and within, communities. While the Peace Talk was considered by some to be symbolic rather than substantive, the meeting brought the issue of youth inclusion to the fore and reaffirmed previous statements delivered by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi calling for greater engagement of youth in peace.8 Throughout Myanmar’s history young men and women have been active at the community level in activities ranging from youth-led social affairs groups (Tha-yay Nar-yay ah thin) to supporting social and community projects such as free funeral and wedding services, cultural activities, blood donations, among many others. In the more formal peacebuilding sphere, youth have supported and sustained peacebuilding processes but have rarely featured in formal, influential public decision- making roles. In the lead up to the partial signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015, young men and women were the backbone of Government and Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) coordination structures, but were never selected as formal negotiators. Furthermore, key documents guiding formal peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar — such as the NCA and the Framework for Political Dialogue — do not contain provisions related to youth inclusion. These documents also do not consider youth as a cross-cutting issue across thematic discussions. In other words, speeches and statements articulating the importance of youth inclusion have yet to be matched by inclusion strategies and structures that secure the meaningful engagement of young people in the future of their country. While low levels of youth inclusion in public decision-making persist, there is an opportunity to capitalise on nascent youth policy commitments and harness the contributions of youth leaders, innovators, facilitators, and policy-advocates to increase the likelihood of reaching sustainable peace in the country. Global evidence shows that broadening public participation – including to young people – in peace increases the prospects for it lasting.9 Empowering young peacebuilders has also been shown to create active citizens for peace, to reduce violence and to increase peaceful cohabitation.10 With the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in 2015, there is also potential for Myanmar to lead globally and set good practice for sustainably increasing the involvement of young people at all levels of decision-making, policy-making and peacebuilding. Myanmar youth are contributing formally and informally to a host of peacebuilding initiatives; leveraging these contributions, often innovative and catalytic in their approaches, can support the multiple transitions the country is undergoing. Bringing the role of young people to the forefront of Myanmar’s transition also builds on Myanmar’s history where students and youth movements have influenced the trajectory of the country. This Discussion Paper provides a starting point for understanding the status of youth inclusion in peacebuilding in Myanmar. In Section 1, this Discussion Paper assesses the involvement of youth and inclusion of youth perspectives in peace at both national and sub-national levels since 2011. Section 2 analyses the challenges young women and men face to their substantive involvement in peacebuilding. Section 3 draws upon national and international good practice, articulating a strategic framework for action to overcome obstacles discussed in Section 2. (For a detailed overview of the methodology used to inform this Paper, see Annex 2.) opportunities and challenges to young men. Other identity factors often supersede age-related identity. Thus, when discussing youth in Myanmar, it is critical to understand other elements of identity that intersect with age, such as: gender, ethnicity, religion, class, disability, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Questioning (LGBTIQ), migration, nationality, drug use, among others..."
Source/publisher: Paung Sie Facility, UKaid, SWEDEN, Australian Aid
2017-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 1.86 MB (72 pages)
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Description: "It is saddening to see that it had resorted to armed conflict during a time of political change and that the Karen National Union (KNU) will be looking to seek solutions through dialogue, said the ethnic armed group's chief General Saw Mu Tu Say Poe on May 10, April 2021 via a statement. The statement and the signature of the KNU chief has been confirmed by other top level officers of the KNU. "Yes. It is his opinion for the peace of the union," said a top-brass member of the KNU. The statement urges the rest that are involved to follow the policies as indicated in the National Ceasefire Act (NCA). It also says that the KNU is a group that had, for years, working toward through taking up arms to achieve equality and betterment for the Karen people and that through political dialogues aimed at regional development and peace that it was able to sign on to the NCA. KNU, together with other ethnic armed groups, signed the NCA on October 15, 2015. There have been multiple battles between the Tatmadaw (military) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), specifically the KNLA's Division 5. The KNLA is an armed organisation under the KNU and battles against the military had sent many locals in those areas to flee into Thailand..."
Source/publisher: "Eleven Media Group" (Myanmar)
2021-05-10
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 65.24 KB
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Topic: Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Topic: Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Description: "ABSTRACT: A reform process initiated in 2011 in Myanmar brought hope to end decades of civil war and ethnic conflict. But new ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the ‘peace process’ has stalled, and fighting continues in parts of the country. Economic reforms have favoured foreign investment and local elites, and have had detrimental impacts on communities in ethnic borderlands. The new ceasefires facilitated this, and coupled with economic reforms brought loss of land and related natural resources, and strengthened the central government and the military’s political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. This article argues that this is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of a previous round of ceasefires in the 1990s, but by different means. In the past this focused on coercion and military pressure, but now these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the new legal framework.....Introduction: Myanmar has suffered from ethnic conflict and civil war since independence in 1948, and the national armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) have played a dominant role in national politics since it staged a coup d’etat in 1962. In 2011, a reform process started that brought hope at home and abroad that finally a political solution could be found at the negotiation table to more than sixty years of armed conflict. Almost a decade later, newly agreed ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the so-called ‘peace process’ has all but stalled, and fighting continues in many parts of the country, causing new displacement of the civilian population. Meanwhile, economic reforms initiated in the same period favouring foreign investment and local elites have had detrimental impacts on rural communities in ethnic borderlands.1 The new ceasefires have played a large role in facilitating these negative consequences. Rather than bringing peace and inclusive development that respects and promotes social justice and local customs, the ceasefires and economic reforms have brought loss of land and related natural resources and the destruction of local cultures. Legal reforms have further paved the way for these negative developments. This article analyses why the new ceasefires have not transformed into a lasting political settlement, by comparing them with previous ceasefire attempts and by placing them into the larger conflict dynamics in Myanmar. It will explain the impact of these failed ceasefires on the right to land for rural communities in the ethnic borderlands. It will show how the ceasefires and the economic reforms strengthened the central government and Tatmadaw’s military, political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. It is argued that what is being experienced currently is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of the first round of ceasefires in the 1990s (Kramer 2009a), but by different means. While in the previous round of ceasefires this involved mostly coercion and military pressure, in the present times these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the country’s new legal framework..."
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Source/publisher: The Journal of Peasant Studies via Routledge (London)
2020-12-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-27
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Sub-title: An EBO commentary on the ICG’s ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’
Description: "The following paper has been written in response to the International Crisis Group’s latest Report No.308/Asia of 19 June 2020, ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’ and is designed to further complement and put forward some of our conclusions to facilitate further discourse. ICG’s Executive Summary The Panglong-21 peace conference would be largely symbolic and do little to address the fundamental obstacles on Myanmar’s road toward sustainable peace… the primary objectives for both sides are modest. The NLD sees the Panglong-21 meeting mostly as a way to boost its political campaign, while ethnic armed groups want to ensure that the peace process continues after the vote, regardless of who comes to power. The ICG fails to understand that ensuring the peace process continues after the elections is not symbolic and it is not a modest objective. It would be a very significant achievement. The Tatmadaw has never believed in negotiations and still does not. In 2011, for the first time in over sixty-four years, Thein Sein, decided to try to find a political solution to the civil war. If the talks do not continue after the elections, it means a return to war. The Commander-in-Chief has in the recent past stated that the peace talks must end by 2020 and that the ethnic forces must be either disbanded or demobilized. Aung San Suu Kyi has also said that she wants the peace talks to end by 2020. If both of them can be made to agree to continue the peace talks beyond 2020, it would be a major achievement indeed. The election period, however, will also be an opportunity to reflect on how to take the peace process forward… The current government, the military and ethnic armed groups should use this period to review their own strategy and goals, ramp up informal dialogue and examine crucial issues that have so far been put aside, such as the growth of the illicit economy and the mounting might of military-aligned militias… This downtime constitutes a unique opportunity for all parties to reflect on how to restart the process with a more constructive approach in 2021. The downtime may apply to the government and the Tatmadaw. ICG has mistakenly assumed that the ethnic armed organizations (like the government) have been idle during the two-year period when the peace talks were deadlocked (2018 and 2019). The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have been very busy reviewing their strategy and goals, having intense internal dialogue and examining crucial issues in order to see how they can be addressed in a way that will be acceptable to all stakeholders. They do not want to go back to war and are committed to trying to find political solutions. They have not had, and will not be having, any downtime. The problem lies with the government and the Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The need for a combined Ethnic approach in the 2020 election
Description: "Many expected the 2016 election which saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy gain power to be a major step forward, not only towards democracy but also ethnic equality. Such hopes now seem somewhat misguided in retrospect, with many ethnic political parties feeling abandoned by the NLD and especially Aung San Suu Kyi, therefore the 2020 election will allow ethnic representatives to redress the balance at the ballot box. The NLD had been able to win the majority of seats in ethnic states based largely on the iconography of its leader and the perception that she would rule justly. While the ethnic political parties had been able to secure seats in Rakhine and Shan states, their power was largely curtailed by the NLD appointing non-ethnic State Ministers, or those with NLD loyalties. The winning ethnic political party representatives were forced to accept NLD appointments and the NLD largely ignored ethnic political parties in the governing process. During by-elections in 2018, the NLD retained its overall parliamentary majority but lost several seats previously held in minority-dominant areas. According to NLD spokesman Myo Nyunt, We lost five out of six seats in ethnic areas. Ethnic people are not satisfied with our performance on the peace process . . . This result is a lesson for us. We will come up with a strategy for each constituency for the coming election.1 While the NLD appears to be insistent on tying its electoral future, and its ability to retain ethnic votes, to the peace process, it is unlikely to see progress made on the issue before the election date. The NLD turning its back on ethnic political parties (EPPs) has not gone down well with ethnic leaders and as the election draws nearer, they need to rally their constituents around ethnic aspirations. Also, what needs to be taken into account, is the fact that it is not necessarily in the military’s best interests to have the NLD in power for another four years as the NLD continues to try to chip away at the military-drafted constitution. Already, pro-military demonstrations have taken place in Yangon seeking to prevent constitutional amendments that would weaken the military’s 25% grip on power in the legislature.2 It would, therefore, be better for the military, and the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) the most likely challenger to the NLD, to delay the peace process until after November regardless of current constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While some ethnic political parties have seemingly learnt from the mistakes in the last election and have organised along state lines, joining together to create united fronts, large scale communication strategies need to be implemented putting forward the benefits of ensuring a much larger voice for ethnic representation in the governance of the country..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Description: "The current tripartite (government/Tatmadaw, EAOs, and political parties) Framework for Political Dialogue in the peace process was based on an assumption of ethnic unity, not to mention, a unified stance between the government and Tatmadaw, and amongst the political parties. However, this unity remains more of an ideal in all three cases, rather than an actuality. It was widely expected that the EAOs would at least have similar aspirations on what the future federal union would look like. But past years have shown that this assumption was inaccurate. The more substantive and detailed the negotiations have become, the more divided and fragmented the EAOs have turned out to be. This fragmentation could not only be seen between the different EAOs (horizontal fragmentation) but also potentially within the EAOs (vertical fragmentation). At the horizontal level, different factions have emerged indicating the groups’ different interests and the different realities each group is trying to cope with. Particularly, the division is clear between the Ethnic Armed Organisation – Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signatory groups (EAO NCA-S) and the EAO NCA Non-Signatory groups (EAO NCA-NS), currently consisting of the Northern Alliance, and the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP). Horizontal Fragmentation – NCA Non-Signatories: Within the Northern Alliance (NA) 1, federalism is not a key issue. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA – Mong La) have never articulated a desire for federalism. In fact, the two organizations, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (originally formed in 1989, forcibly disbanded by the Tatmadaw and its proxy in 2009, and re-emerged in 2014), which is a member of the NA’s splinter Three Brotherhood Alliance, are offshoots of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which collapsed in 1989. The UWSA and NDAA managed to not only continue operating but to also secure their territories through a ceasefire (‘gentlemen’s agreement’) brokered by intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. Rather than a federal Union, the UWSA would likely be more comfortable with a one-country, twosystems arrangement – a reverse of the China-Hong Kong situation where a Communist country tolerates a democratic enclave, i.e., a democratic country tolerating a Communist enclave. Chinese officials have informally suggested that unless and until the Myanmar economy catches up with that of Wa State, they do not see how Wa State could integrate into the Myanmar system. In the case of Hong Kong, China’s economy has caught up with that of Hong Kong, and the process of trying to integrate the democratic enclave into the main system has begun. Given their background, the NDAA and the MNDAA might have similar aspirations albeit with less chance of succeeding. The situation of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), however, may be more complicated. Its ideology may be more aligned with its three ex-CPB colleagues, but it cannot afford to be seen as not supporting the cause of Shan nationalism. If it did, it would lose popular support to its competitor, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), which in its opinion is using its legal status in the peace process (and NCA) with the government to encroach on both its territory and legitimacy. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which like the UWSA enjoyed from 1995, 17 years of a pretty autonomous existence until 2011, might like a similar arrangement but not being Communist, it does not enjoy the same kind of patronage from China as the USWA does. And with the Kachin State being a signatory of the original 1947 Panglong Agreement, the KIO has thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, what constitutes ‘genuine’ federalism is a point of contention. Not being an NCA signatory, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks. Unlike its ‘big brothers’ in the NA, the Arakan Army (formed in 2009) and a member of the NAsplinter, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, is demanding confederate status for Rakhine State,2 The position on federalism of the remaining NA member, the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (current iteration formed in 2009 with military activities starting 2011), is unclear. It definitely wants equality and autonomy for the Ta-ang people, but how that can be achieved within a federal system and within Shan State where the Ta-ang people live, has not yet been articulated or made public. It is also continuing to clash with both the Tatmadaw and the RCSS. The last NCA Non-Signatory, the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), has also like the KIO, thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, in terms of its true aspiration, the KNPP harks back to 1875 when the British recognized the sovereignty of the Karenni States. Recognizing the difficulty of claiming independence, ‘genuine’ federalism is seen as the next best-case scenario, however, it would likely opt for confederation like the AA if that option were open. But not being an NCA signatory, like the KIO, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism or confederation is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: The continued use of Militias in Shan State
Description: "On March 26, the Tatmadaw abolished one of its local proxy armies, the Khawngkha militia, amid accusations that some of its leaders were involved in the illegal drugs trade, or had failed to inform the authorities about drug trafficking in the area.1 Since the 1950s, various Myanmar Governments have officially created and sanctioned the operations of militia forces in the county’s ethnic states. These groups have been used primarily as a military force to fight against ceasefire and non-ceasefire ethnic groups, to control the lives of ethnic populations, and to further secure the country’s border areas. These militias quickly became notorious for taxing the local population, drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and a wide variety of human rights abuses. They have been allowed to do this with the express permission of local military commanders who have themselves allegedly earned money from the variety of illegal activities that the groups operate. Article 340 of the 2008 constitution states that: With the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, the Defence Services has the authority to administer the participation of the entire people in the Security and Defence of the Union. The strategy of the people’s militia shall be carried out under the leadership of the Defence Services. The Kawngkha Militia had previously been the 4th Brigade of the Kachin Independence Army and was based out of its headquarters at Kawngkha, eight miles east of Kutkai, and was responsible for a largely Kachin area north of Lashio town. It opened a number of refineries in the area and was responsible for the transhipment of heroin north to the border of Manipur State. In addition to its narcotics involvement, it also derived some of its income by operating a number of gambling dens.2 In 1991 it signed a ceasefire with government forces before becoming a People’s Militia Force (PMF) in 2010. The Myanmar Army had attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the KDA to surrender all of its weapons in May 2010 after Yaw Chang Fa, the KDA treasury official and Bang Hpik village military officer was involved in a shootout with Police and Special Branch. Yaw Chang Fa and his troops had opened fire on the officials on the road between Mung Hawm and Bang Hpik villages when they illegally arrested villagers from Bang Hpik and took them to Mung Hawm police station. Six were shot dead, seven fatally injured and three were detained. Consequently, more than 300 Myanmar soldiers from Infantry Battalion No. 45, No. 241 and No. 242 from Kutkai Township surrounded the KDA’s Kawngkha HQ. and asked for Yaw Chang Fa to be handed over. Yaw Chang Fa and a number of KDA troops fled..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: The Peace Process Steering Team’s role in the peace process
Description: "On October 15, 2015, the government led by the then president U Thein Sein and eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The original signatories were the PNLO, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Chin National Front (CNF), All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Karen Nation Union Peace Council (KNUPC) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The original eight groups would be later joined, in February 2018, by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU). To ensure a common negotiating position the original eight groups formed the Peace Process Steering Team on 26 March 2016 under the leadership of General Mutu Say Poe of the KNU and General Yawd Serk of the RCSS as deputy leader. The team stated, Purpose: 1. to provide leadership (guidance and supervision) when meeting with non-signatory groups and the new government. 2. provide direction when making urgent decisions. 3. direct projects for the JMC (Joint Monitoring Committee) and the UPDJC (Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee) Guidelines: 1. Convening of NCA signatory EAOs, together with observers and technical advisors, totalling 79 persons; 2. Reassess NCA implementation; 3. Welcome the new government for its peace commitment and the EAOs readiness to cooperate: 4. The necessity for all EAOs to participate and be represented in the forthcoming 2nd Union Peace Conference; 5. Believe in the need for all EAOs’ enthusiastic participation until an agreement to form a federal union is achieved through political negotiations; 6. The formation of EAO Peace Process Steering Team (EAO PPST); and 7. Pledge to adhere to the NCA and cooperate with the new regime and the Tatmadaw (Military) to implement the agreement.1 Two days later on March 28 2016, at the 2nd EAO-8 summit, the Delegation for EAO Unity (DEU) led by Khaing Soe Naing Aung with members including Padoh Kwe Htoo Win, Than Khe, Saw Kyaw Nyunt, Lian Sakhong, Dr Sui Khar and Mi Su Pwint. The purpose of the DEU was ostensibly to focus on further discussions with non-signatories EAOs and meetings with the then United Nationalities Federal Council’s Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) about how both can work together under an NLD government.2 Numerous meetings have taken place between the PPST and the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) prior to the election, and the NLD’s successor peace broker the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC). The PPST has actively involved itself in the various Union Peace Conferences that have taken place under the auspices of the NLD government. The first UPC saw 73 proposals made but resulted in no agreements. The second saw agreement on 37 points, and the third UPC on 14 points. The agreement or Union Accord currently covers political, economy, social, land and environment categories, however, a major sticking point has been with the composition of a single armed force and the ethnic states non-cessation. However general dissatisfaction with the peace process and perceived disagreements within the organisation itself led to the KNU suspending its participation in the NCA process,3 . . . in order to create meaningful participation of the organization in the peace process and to seek enough time for the creation of the unified participation of the whole organization.4 In response to what was perceived to be a lack of movement on the peace process, General Mutu resigned his position in the PPST in March 2019. He was replaced by KNU Secretary-General Ta Doh Moo. General Mutu was quoted as saying the peace process had deviated from the goal of creating a federal democratic union that includes ethnic equality and rights of autonomy.5 He also noted that The ethnic armed organizations that comprise the PSST have common goals for reaching a federal system, but their views on what kind of federal system they want differ from those of the ethnic armies implementing the terms of the NCA. 6 The PPST also formed a working group to discuss with government officials three agenda items outlined in a letter to Aung San Suu Kyi and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. These issues related to earlier assurances by Min Aung Hlaing to secure peace by 2020 and by Aung San Suu Kyi that three Union Peace Conference sessions would be held in 2019; a review and renegotiation of all NCA mechanisms to ensure they are fair for all parties; and the formation of a consensus among differing opinions on the degree of federalism.7 In May 2019, the PPST held its fourth conference, which included the participation of the KNU and formed two working groups with one group responsible for addressing the deadlock and federal issues while another group would work on the structure of all-inclusive participation.8 At the same meeting, EAO leaders discussed the possibility of transforming the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) into the Peace Process Consultative Meeting (PPCM), but there were disagreements on how or if this should take place.9..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Description: "Despite a ceasefire that began on 10 May and the COVID-19 pandemic, low-intensity conflict continued throughout 2020. The Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) was held from 17-19 August 2020, and while there remains far to go, the general outcome of the meeting was treated favourably by several ethnic leaders and it is hoped there will be a stronger basis for future talks in 2021. That said, however, intermittent clashes continued in some ethnic states throughout the year and there is little to suggest that such clashes in some states will stop as peace negotiations continue in 2021. Skirmishes occurred in Karen State largely in areas controlled by the Karen National Liberation Army Brigade-5 area (Mutraw District). Clashes have largely been linked to the Myanmar military’s construction of a road linking Kyaukkyi in Bago Region and into Papun. The reconstruction of the old road originally began in early 2018. The construction was halted temporarily but has since resumed. The KNU has claimed that the reconstruction of the road would allow further Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) expansion into KNU controlled areas, while the Myanmar military has said that existing roads need to be upgraded or they will deteriorate.1 In large part, the reason for such continued clashes is the interpretation by both sides of clauses in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. On December 1, 2020, the KNLA’s 5th Brigade issued a statement expressing its impatience with the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. According to Brigadier General Tamala Taw the 5th Brigade G1, Even though we have signed the NCA, there has been no implementation, particularly, of the NCA Chapter 3 and Article 25 of Chapter 6. None of these issues – ceasefire areas, deployment of troops, the common definition of some terms used in the NCA, and the avoidance of using the public spaces mentioned in the NCA as military outposts or encampments – these have never been discussed. The lack of discussion of the interim period in the NCA Article 25 of Chapter 6 has led to a decline in trust. In the bilateral meeting of KNU and the Myanmar government in 2012, there was a KNLA proposal for the relocation of military bases from civilian areas and troop routes to be moved. We have been waiting for this to happen for more than eight years now, but so far no action has been taken, so it leaves us in a state of despair. This has been seen as giving the military a huge advantage in the ground – trust has now been further eroded.2..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: Moving forward after the election
Description: "After the Myanmar peace process had been deadlocked from the end of 2018 until the beginning of 2020 the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi along with the military and a number of armed ethnic organisations (EAOs) were able to hold another Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) from 17-19 August 2020. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had made resolving peace with the many armed ethnic groups in the country a priority after coming to power in 2015. And both the State Counsellor and Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing had voiced an opinion that talks must restart prior to the 2020 general election. Several criticisms have been made about the results of the UPC which saw representatives from all 10 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-signatory EAOs participate. Invitations had also been offered to non-signatory EAOs from Kachin (KIA), Wa (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), Mong La (NDAA), and Shan (SSPP) in the northeast, but all declined due to the exclusion of the Arakan Army (AA) which the government has designated a terrorist organisation. Regardless, the talks continued with the adoption of a further 20 principles for the Union Accords (UA), and an agreement among the parties to continue formal peace talks with the incoming government in 2021. While some believe there were no substantive results from the UPC, 1 the fact is that the UPC meeting has led to the reinvigoration of a stalled peace process and allowed further time for EAOs to reconsider their position in moving forward. At least one participant, Sai Leng from the Restoration Council Shan State Army, pointed out that, It is meaningful to agree on how to build a federal union beyond 2020. We also agreed on some guiding principles of building the federal union, such as power-sharing between Union and States,2 Similarly, the State Counsellor said the peace process was now back on track and the principles signed were “more sincere and have more substance.”3 Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, the military delegate and chairman of the Joint Monitoring Committee on the nationwide ceasefire, Now we can draw a conclusion that countless negotiations have reduced the mistrust that has been deep-rooted on both sides . . . [stakeholders] should not leave the negotiation table, whatever the reason.4 According to one EAO advisor, one of the more important points was that, Part 3.3 (a) Power, resource, tax and finance will be divided between the Union and regions/states in line with the federal system (official translation). But he also noted, [But] Some observers have pointed out that it was only a repetition of UA#1 (political sector) 4 (d). But according to the negotiators, the difference is the emphasis shown here, which was not in UA#1. Therefore, they [ethnic leaders] say, the key to a federal union is now open. Accordingly, it can be regarded as a second breakthrough after the NCA.5 Another negotiator in the talks had suggested that the talks were ‘more disappointing’ but expressed the desire to move forward regardless.6..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: Challenging Christianity in Wa Special Region
Description: "On 13 September 2018, Myanmar’s largest non-state armed actor, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), issued a statement saying it was curtailing the practising of Christianity. The statement said that all churches built after 1992 would be destroyed as they had been built illegally and that only churches built between 1989 and 1992 were legal. It also noted that authorities would also check on the number of Christian schoolteachers and students in the region.1 In addition, it also said authorities would monitor the activities of organizations that support churches in the region and Evangelical Christians would not be allowed to proselytize at schools.2 Only ethnic Wa would be allowed to train as religious leaders, and they would be under the authority of the UWSA central government. Myanmar media quoted Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) chairman Rev. Samson as saying that that action had been prompted by the work of ‘extremist missionaries’ and, You can’t call them typical Christians. They are just people who want to attack established churches. They are against what we Christians believe.3 According to another media report, the UWSA detained 92 Lahu Christian leaders and 42 Wa students in Shan State, and the students were forced to serve as soldiers.4 There is an estimated 221,000 Lahu living in Myanmar - 80% of whom are Christians with 43% believed to be Evangelical.5 In a statement dated Sept. 25, Lahu Baptist Convention (LBC) said that 52 churches had been closed and stripped of all Christian symbols. Three other churches were demolished, and religious schools shut down, the LBC is based in Kengtung, eastern Shan. In addition, to closing down LBC churches the UWSA have also closed those operated by the Kachin Baptist Convention and the Wa Baptist Convention. On 5 October, 100 ethnic Wa Christians the UWSA had detained were freed, but the group continued to hold more than 100 ethnic Lahu Christians..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: The UWSA and Statehood
Description: "Once again, the leader of the United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA) Bao Youxiang has reiterated his call for state recognition of the Wa self-administered zone this time at the organisation’s 30th anniversary. During his speech in the Wa capital of Panghsang, on northern Shan State’s border with China, the chairman apparently told the assembled that Wa state is an inalienable part of the Union of Myanmar, and solemnly promised not to split from it or seek independence.1 In his speech, he was reported as saying, What we need is ethnic equality, ethnic dignity, ethnic autonomy, and we ask the government to give the Wa an autonomous ethnic state; then we will fight for our lives . . . Until our political demands are realized, we will hold high the banner of peace and democracy on one hand, and armed self-defence on the other, and maintain the status quo. 2 The success of the UWSA and its ability to maintain an all but in name autonomous state in Myanmar is largely due to its support from China. The UWSA is especially supported by members of the PLA and Yunnan Province administration. 3 Many Chinese advisers, including Chinese intelligence officers and former PLA personnel, are close to the Wa leadership, and the UWSA often echoes official Chinese talking points. China’s links with the Wa are also strengthened by language, investment, communications, and transport, all of which are linked to Yunnan. 4 While other armed ethnic groups up until the 1990s had also been able to maintain semiautonomous enclaves, the Karen especially, bordering Thailand, this ended when the Thai Government warmed to successive Myanmar military governments. As a result, pressure was put on such groups to acquiesce to the then government, the NMSP ceasefire being an obvious case. The UWSA had not previously maintained ethnic aspirations but was borne out of the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma and is largely a political construct underscored by ethnicity. Khin Nyunt after signing a ceasefire with the group used it to fight against the Mong Tai Army (MTA) and in doing so it was able to take over large swathes of Shan territory north and south of Kengtung which they still control today and see as part of a future Wa State. After signing the 1989 ceasefire agreement, the UWSA used money from the narcotics trade and invested in a number of casinos, hotels, and other entertainment enterprises. One of the five largest banks in Myanmar, Mayflower Bank, prior to its suspension by the Myanmar Government, had been linked to the UWSA and was subsequently accused of money laundering by the U.S. which has designated the UWSA as significant narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. In addition, the UWSA also set up a number of other businesses including the Hongpang Group, founded in 1998, and involved in import/export, general trading, production of textiles, wires and cables, electric appliances and agricultural goods. It is also engaged in livestock breeding, gem mining and highway construction. In addition to its more legitimate concerns, the UWSA has also been implicated in the arms trade supplying not only other Myanmar based ethnic armed groups but also Naga and in the past Maoist rebels. Currently, the group has used proxies such as Ho Chin Ting to invest in enterprises such as Yangon Airways and a chain of hotels in Myanmar, among them the luxurious Thanlwin Hotel in Yangon.5 In reality, the Wa region is a prefecture of China in all but name, despite this, the government has asked the UWSA to sign the NCA, but as head of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) alliance which also includes the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front /Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), Peace and Solidarity Committee/Shan State East National Democratic Alliance Association (PSC/NDAA), many of whom continue to fight with government forces, it has rejected calls to do so unless major changes are made to the agreement.6 While many commentators have generally recognised former CPB organisations on a par with those ethnic armed groups that emerged since 1948, the objectives and most importantly the constructs that define them are not similar. While many in the FPNCC believe that the UWSA shares the same over-arching objective in ethnic unity for all – it remains unclear as to whether the UWSA see this as a genuine objective or merely a convenient identifier to achieve its own aims. For the UWSA, the overall veneer of ethnic equality is a useful tool towards establishing its own statehood and assuaging doubts about its somewhat controversial past deeds not to mention those alleged in the present. While Bao Youxiang may call for ‘ethnic equality, ethnic dignity, ethnic autonomy’ which is a particularly noble aspiration, it could be argued when conflict occurred in 2009 against the MNDAA it did little to support their brothers in arms with whom they had an alliance.7 Rather, the UWSA moved to secure its own flank and did little else to change the course of the conflict.8..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Territorial Concerns in Karen and Mon States
Description: "The death, on 17 October, of a Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) soldier in a clash with troops from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) furthers highlights territorial concerns that need to be addressed within the peace process and also at a local level. According to reports, the KNLA attacked two MNLA bases in response to what Saw Edward, a spokesman for the KNLA at the Three Pagodas Pass, because,. . . the MNLA destroyed a Karen flag three days ago after his armed group [KNLA] put it up on the dividing line between Karen and Mon territory at Thee Ba Dot. 1Major Nai Aye Mann from the MNLA said the KNLA had put its flag in front of an MNLA base, so it was destroyed, but also asked why the KNLA also attacked another base at Ma Yang Chong if the dispute was just about the flag. The KNLA is the armed wing of the Karen National Union and the MNLA is the armed wing of the New Mon State Party. Both have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the government and have had previous disputes in the past. It had been hoped that with both groups now signatories to the NCA such disputes could easily be negated, but such a belief belies the fact that the situation on the ground still remains tense. Somewhat bizarrely, it has been suggested that the KNLA action was undertaken in response to what has been described in the media as the arrest of seven DKBA-splinter group members.2 According to one report, the KNLA was unhappy that the MNLA arrested seven members of the group and seized 11 firearms in an attack on a base, which they said was inside Mon territory, although such a proposition is unlikely to be the case.3 The Mon State government had addressed the DKBA-splinter issue and asked that all members of the group, believed to have around thirty troops, be arrested as ‘insurgents’ according to a statement signed by Colonel Nay Htut Oo, the border and security and affairs minister in Mon State, The group’s intention is to profit politically from creating instability and disrupting the peace process,4 That said, a number of smaller armed ethnic militias, many of which are under Myanmar military control, each with their own vested interests, continue to operate in ethnic areas controlled by NCA-signatory groups further complicating the peace process. But perhaps, more worryingly, regardless of the reasoning for the recent clash, the fact remains that territorial claims, the most likely cause, have yet to be addressed. In an attempt to prevent further conflict, officers from the MNLA and KNLA met at the Three Pagodas Pass on the Thai border and verbally agreed to stop fighting. Major Nai Aye Mann from the MNLA said low-level officers on the ground could not resolve the territorial dispute and future meetings between the groups’ leaders would be needed to end the issue..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "Since 9 June 2011, Kachin State has seen open conflict between the Kachin Independence Army and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military). The Kachin Independence Organisation had signed a ceasefire agreement with the regime in 1994 and since then had lived in relative peace until the ceasefire was broken by the Tatmadaw in June 2011. The increased territorial infractions by the Tatmadaw combined with economic exploitation by China in Kachin territory, especially the construction of the Myitsone Hydropower Dam, left the Kachin Independence Organisation with very little alternative but to return to armed resistance to prevent further abuses of its people and their territory’s natural resources. Despite this, however, the political situation since the beginning of hostilities has changed significantly. Although a number of groups agreed to a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015, with the continuing conflict in Kachin State, the KIO has sought a number of different methodologies to realise their political aims and secure its people’s legacy. Strategy One – The UNFC Alliance The origins of the UNFC began in May 2010 when three 1990s ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and three non-ceasefire groups, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF), formally announced the creation of the Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union (CEFU). The Committee’s purpose was to consolidate a political front at a time when the ceasefire groups faced perceived imminent attacks by the Tatmadaw. However, in November 2010 shortly after the Myanmar elections, the political grouping was transformed into a military united front. At a conference held from the 12-16 February 2011, CEFU declared its dissolution and the formation of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The UNFC, which was at that time comprised of 12 ethnic organisations1 , stated that: The goal of the UNFC is to establish the future Federal Union (of Myanmar) and the Federal Union Army is formed for giving protection to the people of the country. Shortly after, wide-scale conflict occurred throughout areas controlled by the SSPP and a number of their bases were lost to the Tatmadaw. Then, in June 2011, the KIO ceasefire broke down, resulting in the current conflict in Kachin State. The formation of the UNFC had occurred at a time of increasing uncertainty in relation to how the new Myanmar Government would settle the 1990s ceasefire groups issue. It could be argued that the Tatmadaw’s insistence that the ceasefire groups become Border Guard Forces precipitated the fighting, or that the creation of a military alliance consisting of both ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups precipitated the fighting..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Ethnic Political Parties and the 2020 elections
Description: "As Myanmar moves towards the 2020 election, ethnic political parties now, more than ever, need to work together and find common ground if they ever want to influence the future politics of the country and ensure ethnic equality. Minority ethnic groups make up a third of the country's 51.5 million people.1 Currently, ethnic politics can be defined as consisting of five main actors: merged ethnic political parties, the NCA non-signatory armed ethnic groups, NCA signatory groups, the Nationalities Brotherhood Forum (NBF), and the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA). All of these groups have divergent interests and it is these interests that may weaken ethnic policymaking in the future. While all groups profess a singular goal – ethnic equality and a genuine federal union, it is how they work together, if they can, that will ultimately decide the future of ethnic representation in the country after the 2020 election. One of the main ethnic alliance is the United Nationalities Alliance which was formed after the 1990 election and was considered one of the most influential and experienced political alliances operating in the country.2 The UNA encompassed a varied spectrum of ethnic political parties, dominated by the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which had contested and won seats in the 1990 general election. Originally, in the UNA there were 12 different political parties. Today, there are 15 parties:..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "The Karen National Union (KNU), alongside the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), were instrumental in encouraging a number of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) to sign Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on 15 October 2015. It was the actions of these two groups and the positions they have held within the armed ethnic resistance movement that allowed for the peace process, no matter how flawed it may be, to move forward. That said, however, despite their support for the process and the current government’s efforts, through the Union Peace Conference, to secure a more permanent peace, both groups have found themselves attacked by the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. While such skirmishes were expected initially due to little official demarcation of territory and a lack of conflict solving mechanisms,1 one and a half years later it would appear the Myanmar military is selectively applying the NCA in areas where it operates. Most recently the Tatmadaw has attempted to exert its influence further into the KNU controlled 5th Brigade area of Mutraw (Papun) resulting in human rights abuses, displacement and the unlawful killing of a local environmental activist. The main reason given for the incursion was the reconstruction of an all-weather road, the Bu Hsa Kee Road, connecting the Myanmar military camps at Ler Mu Plaw and Kay Pu. The original road had been built during the Tatmadaw's offensives in 2006 and 2007, Tatmadaw soldiers had the north-south road built to connect their camps, and many small security outposts were built at intervals along the side of the road. According to Free Burma Rangers, roads built by the Myanmar Army served three purposes in the projection and expansion of Myanmar army power and control in Karen State, namely, 1. To resupply and connect camps 2. To more rapidly launch offensives and patrols and 3. To compartmentalise and isolate ethnic communities to better be able to control them within a network of roads and camps..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The recent change of leadership within the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) further draws attention to the future of the group and that of the role it plays not only in Myanmar’s peace process but also the country’s ethnic landscape. 1 On 17 August, the group removed Lt-Gen Khango Konyak, who is a western Naga and an Indian national, from his role as chairman following a three-day meeting from 15-17 August at its HQ in Taga. Konyak, 70, is a Naga of Indian origin and a China-trained rebel, he had taken over as chairman of the NSCN-K after Khaplang died in June 2017 after a prolonged illness.2 He was replaced by Yung Aung, the deputy minister of the NSCN-K defence department, as interim chairman and also the head of the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) which holds sway over the Naga inhabited region in Myanmar’s northern Sagaing Division. Yung Aung, 45, is the nephew of the group’s founder SS Khaplang and is a Hemi Naga from Myanmar. The move has been seen by many as an attempt by the Myanmar Naga to expel their Indian brethren. How this will change the situation in regards to the peace processes in India and Myanmar remains unclear. According to reports, Yung Aung has deep links with China and maintains close ties with the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) ‘commander-inchief’ Paresh Baruah and the Manipuri militant leadership.3 According to an NSCN-K statement, Konyak had been impeached because He was found guilty of absolute control of powers and functions without collective leadership, nondistribution of powers and functions exposing a one-man government policy, incompatible traits…4 However, an NSCN-K official based in India said, “For quite some time, Konyak was unable to assume an active role in the organisation and discharge his duties due to his sickness.’ Also, He had been away from Taga for a long time which widened the gulf that existed between him and other top leaders,” 5 In addition, there appear to be some issues in relation to tribal affiliations. A number of senior leaders were unhappy at his appointment. Many of them belong to the Pangmi tribe, a conglomerate of several tribes inhabiting a large area from the border in Arunachal Pradesh to the hills bordering Hukawng Valley in Myanmar. 6..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-10-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "The date for the next Union Peace Conference (UPC) is scheduled for May, but their remains some doubts in regards to the likely achievements to be made. At the beginning of the year, two Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) members showed they were displeased with the process. The Karen National Union (KNU) called for its postponement while the Restoration Council of Shan State suggested it would not attend due to constant obstruction by the Myanmar military of state-level dialogue. Although two more groups, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) signed the agreement on 13 February a number of other groups are still not prepared to move forward. While such delays and indecision have been indicative of the entire peace process, what needs to be considered, however, is who is likely to gain by yet further delays in the process. There is little doubt that the process has significant flaws, the problems that have plagued it since it was taken over by the NLD-led Government are many. While it is essential that ethnic armed organisation try to ensure they get the best deal possible it must also be noted that the only stakeholder likely to gain through postponement of the process is the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, which will see its position strengthened for every delay made..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: The future of the NSCN-K
Description: "In what appeared to be a coordinated effort between the Myanmar and Indian militaries, operations against Indian insurgents on the Indian side of the border and the Naga Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) in Sagaing, Myanmar, have largely been successful in diminishing the threat the NSCN-K posed to both governments Hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the NSCN-K heightened after 400 soldiers from six battalions led by the Hkamti district tactical commander under the Tatmadaw’s North-West Command took control of the NSCN-K’s headquarters in Taga area of Nanyun township on January 29, 2019. A month later ‘Operation Sunshine-1’ from February 22 to 26, occurred with the Indian Army acting against suspected Arakanese Army (AA) camps inside Indian territory, with fleeing Arakan troops arrested by the Myanmar Army on their side. The move was largely seen as a tit-for-tat action to encourage Myanmar to increase operations against anti-India rebels. The latest operation known as ‘Operation Sunshine-2’, took place between May 16 and June 8, and included two battalions of the Indian Army — along with Special Forces, Assam Rifles and infantry Ghataks (commandos) — on the Indian side of the border, while clearance action was taken by four brigades of the Myanmar Army resulting in around 70-80 insurgents being detained. 1 Although, the NSCN-K is based in Myanmar’s Sagaing division its primary dispute is with the Indian Government as it wants to create a united independent Nagaland based on a federal system2 that is to include parts of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh in India and parts of Sagaing Division. 3 That said, however, the group's presence, its support for Indian rebel groups, and its refusal to take part in the Myanmar Peace Process remain a contentious issue within the Myanmar government..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-07-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "There had been much hope regarding an end to ethnic conflict in Myanmar with the then Thein Sein’s government’s attempts to bring long-term armed ethnic organisations around the table. The international community including the United States and Europe were quick to remove sanctions and offer support to the government, even more so when the National League for Democracy was elected. However, with the length of time so far taken and differences over what individual actors want, the possibility of an actual ceasefire in conflict affected areas and an eventual political solution seem far away. While eight armed ethnic organisations signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on 15 October 2015, many others remain reluctant to do so as competing interests and objectives vie with the overall demand for equality in a federal union. Many observers see the conflict, and the peace process, through a singular black and white prism. This view sees the Military/Government pitted against armed ethnic organisations the latter all wanting the same outcome. However, this is not the case, the number of actors involved and their motivations is what currently drives the conflict, and the solution to it, in the country. Before 2010, armed ethnic resistance was seen as a unitary issue. Armed ethnic groups were united in the common aim of overthrowing a military regime that was seen to have invaded ethnic states and trampled on the rights of ethnic peoples in favour of the predominant Burman, or Bamar, majority. While some groups had come to an accommodation with the military government, it was primarily the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) that had decided to break with perceived ethnic unity and try and find an alternative to conflict. Putting trust in the then military Government and what was called the National Convention these two groups believed that their voices would be heard only to find this would not be the case. As a consequence, and as the Myanmar military gradually eroded ethnic territory given to those groups, fighting once more broke out in Kachin State in 2011. It is therefore understandable that some, the Kachin especially, are wary of further negotiation with the government. It was believed that with the arrival of the NLD-led Government that more progress would be made towards securing peace and achieving genuine federalism. Two Union peace conferences have been held, and while some view the recent concessions about 37 agreed on points as positive, many ethnic leaders believe that the current peace process is being badly mis-managed and that the process under Thein Sein yielded better results..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2017-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Refocussing Rakhine Nationalism
Description: "Many observers have characterised the recent events in Rakhine State in which the Arakan Army attacked Myanmar Police Posts as a further extension of ongoing ethnic armed conflicts in Myanmar. However, the underlying objectives of the Arakan Army do not correlate with the objectives of most other armed ethnic organisations that have been fighting for equality over the last sixty years. Rather, the Arakan Army’s creation and its later political position does not just seek equality and federalism but rather an autonomous Rakhine State.1 This is in itself should also be seen in the context of connections between Rakhine nationalism and the possible involvement of the Arakan Army/United League of Arakan (AA/ULA) in furthering that nationalist agenda. As AA/ULA Commander-in-Chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing notes, We prefer [a confederation of states] like Wa State, which has a larger share of power in line with the Constitution, adding that, . . . a confederation is “better” than federalism. . . And we think it [a confederation] is more appropriate to the history of Rakhine State and the hopes of the Arakanese people,2 He also continued, In a confederation, we have the authority to make decisions on our own. But there would be a common defence system. And there would be cooperation on market regulation and foreign affairs. To have control over our own destiny—selfdetermination—is the aspiration of every ethnic group. We can try,3 It remains unlikely the AA will ever see it objectives realised, seventy years of ethnic conflict suggests that the Myanmar Army, is unlikely to allow it to achieve any form of confederation. Instead the conflict is likely to continue and put further burden on an already over burdened populace. An issue the AA is acutely aware of the AA’s deputy chief, Brigadier General Dr. Nyo Twan Aung in a video message told ordinary Arakanese that if the current fighting in northern Rakhine State continues to worsen, it could spread to other places in the state. 4 In the same address he gave advice to residents in relation to an authorisation by the Rakhine State government giving permission to state police and military to carry out household checks in seven townships of northern Rakhine State, in an attempt to find..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Description: "China promised to continue to support Myanmar’s peace talks with ethnic minority groups and to boost its coronavirus aid on the first stop of the foreign minister’s six-day tour of Southeast Asia. During Monday’s meetings with President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, Wang Yi also urged Myanmar to speed up construction work on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor – a key element of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative. “China will support the new Myanmar government in revitalising the economy, improving people’s livelihoods and accelerating the industrialisation process. We hope that both sides will work together to effectively implement the agreement on building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and promote connectivity at the western, northern and eastern ends of the corridor,” Wang told the president, according to a report by state news agency Xinhua. China shares more than 2,100km (1,300 miles) of border with Myanmar’s north, an area that has long been troubled by the fighting between government and ethnic minority rebel groups, making China a crucial player in peace talks between the government armies and ethnic armed groups. Wang said Beijing would do whatever it could to support the peace negotiations, adding: “China supports Myanmar government’s commitment to national reconciliation in the country … and will continue to provide assistance within its capabilities, as well as upholding justice and safeguarding Myanmar’s legitimate rights and interests in the international arena.” In response, Win Myint told Wang that Myanmar was keen to cooperate with China on vaccine distribution and would continue to support Beijing’s positions on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, according to Xinhua..."
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2021-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Despite her promise to welcome new voices into the peace process, many fine-grained obstacles to progress remain.
Description: "In a New Year’s address to the nation on January 1, Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi promised to take a new approach to long-delayed peace negotiations aimed at ending the country’s tangled web of civil conflicts. According to a report in The Irrawaddy, Aung San Suu Kyi, whose second five-year term begins in March, announced plans for a “New Peace Architecture,” which would welcome participation by political groups, civil society organizations, and the public. She said that the aim was to broaden the scope of who had a say in the ongoing talks, with the hope of consolidating inter-ethnic trust and inducing more ethnic armed groups to join the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in time for the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence in January 2023. “We recognize the important role of public participation [in the peace process],” Myanmar’s leader said, according to The Irrawaddy. “This depends on how much we can pave the way for all stakeholders to participate.” The NCA was signed in late 2015 between the Myanmar government and eight ethnic rebel organizations, while two more joined in February 2018. But the peace process continues to exclude some of the country’s largest and most prominent armed rebel groups, and since the signing of the NCA, fighting with some of them has reached levels not seen in years..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2021-01-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Crisis and Conflict , Disasters and Displaced Populations , Sexual Violence and Rape , Women and Armed Conflict
Sub-title: End Assistance to All Military-Controlled Entities
Topic: Crisis and Conflict , Disasters and Displaced Populations , Sexual Violence and Rape , Women and Armed Conflict
Description: "The Japanese government should immediately cancel plans to donate money to purchase vehicles and communications equipment for the Myanmar police force, Human Rights Watch said today. The police force, which operates under the auspices of the military, outside the control of the civilian government, has a well-documented record of serious human rights violations. On July 2, 2020, Japan’s Foreign Ministry announced a grant of 100 million yen (US$930,000) to the Myanmar police for the purpose of purchasing vehicles and wireless equipment for “protecting dignitaries.” The Foreign Ministry claimed the donations would “strengthen the Myanmar police’s ability to carry out public security measures,” create “social stability,” and contribute to Myanmar's “socio-economic development.” “It’s inexplicable that the Japanese government would try to curry favor with Myanmar’s abusive security apparatus by providing financial assistance to the police,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “Instead of supporting Myanmar’s police, Japan should be helping the victims of rights abuses and ethnic cleansing by working with other donor governments to hold the security forces accountable.” Myanmar’s police acted as a pillar of repression during Myanmar’s 50 years of military rule, arbitrarily arresting dissidents and student activists, engaging in widespread torture, and creating a climate of fear in the country, Human Rights Watch said. The police remain abusive and unconstrained, in large part because the military-drafted constitution maintains military control of the police. The police operate under the authority of the Home Ministry, which is led by a minister who the constitution mandates must be a serving military officer, and operates under the de facto control of the military..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
2020-07-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar has indirectly called out China for arming 'terrorists' on its soil. WION's Palki Sharma tells you how Myanmar fears that this situation could endanger Indian development projects along the Myanmar-Mizoram border..."
Source/publisher: "WION"
2020-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-04
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Sub-title: The polls approaching in Myanmar are an opportunity for the government and ethnic armed groups to re-examine their positions in the country’s peace process. All parties should use the election-related hiatus to ask why talks have not succeeded and how to make them more productive.
Description: "A flurry of negotiations among Myanmar’s government, its military and ethnic armed groups belies deeper problems in the country’s moribund peace process. The government and armed groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) are eager to hold a Panglong-21 peace conference before electoral dy­namics take precedence later this year. As a result, two prominent armed groups that had suspended their participation have formally re-entered the peace process. Although these are positive developments, even if it takes place the conference would be largely symbolic and do little to address the fundamental obstacles on Myanmar’s road toward sustainable peace. By putting formal negotiations on hold for at least six months, the election and subsequent transition period constitute a unique opportunity for a rethink. All parties involved should use this window to examine blockages that have hindered genuine progress so far, multiply informal meetings to rebuild trust and examine ways of reinvigorating the peace process from 2021. and the overwhelming Burman dominance in political institutions. The discontent is most evident in Rakhine State, where the political marginalisation of the Rakhine ethnic minority under the NLD has boosted support for the Arakan Army insurgency. Armed conflict and insecurity are likely to result in the cancellation of voting in some constituencies in minority areas, particularly in Rakhine State, which will only deepen local minorities’ alienation. The election period, however, will also be an opportunity to reflect on how to take the peace process forward. The formal negotiations will likely be put on hold for six to twelve months, until after the next cabinet is sworn in (scheduled for late March 2021). The current government, the military and ethnic armed groups should use this period to review their own strategy and goals, ramp up informal dialogue and examine crucial issues that have so far been put aside, such as the growth of the illicit economy and the mounting might of military-aligned militias. Even if the COVID19 pandemic delays the Panglong-21 conference, there will still be a significant period during which formal peace negotiations will not take place. This downtime constitutes a unique opportunity for all parties to reflect on how to restart the process with a more constructive approach in 2021. If the NLD forms the next government, as appears likely, it should use its second term in office to reinvigorate its leadership of the peace process. Overcoming the deadlock in negotiations toward a political settlement requires a fundamental shift in approach. As a first step, Naypyitaw should overhaul institutions like the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, to rely less on former government bureaucrats and instead draw in new negotiators and advisers from a range of backgrounds, such as business, academia and civil society. The key to substantive progress, however, lies in renewed political commitment from Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to the peace process, a stronger sense of empathy with the grievances of ethnic minorities, and a clear vision for where the peace process is going..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2020-06-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The peace process has made little progress since the National League for Democracy took office and stakeholders will need to embrace a new approach if the guns of war are to be silenced under the next government.
Description: "The Union Election Commission’s announcement that the general election will be held in November means that the two months of campaigning will begin in September and end two days before voting takes place. The election campaign period has implications for the peace process. Political parties, including the ruling National League for Democracy, will be focusing on their campaigns and will have little time to devote to complex negotiations involving the government, Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups. The election will be followed by the installation of new governments and peace process will not be able to resume until April next year at the earliest. This is why the NLD government is pushing to hold another 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference before the election campaign period begins – the last opportunity to do so before its term ends. Government spokesperson U Zaw Htay predicted at a regular news conference on May 30 that part three of the Union Accord would be signed at the next peace conference if it is held in the coming weeks. Zaw Htay said the accord consists of three parts. The first part includes topics not included in the original agreement that could be the subject of further negotiations. The second is the phases to be implemented after the 2020 election, and the third involves agreeing on the fundamental principles of a federal Union. The reason for addressing post-election matters is to provide some assurance that the peace process will continue regardless of the election outcome. Although the NLD is widely expected to win enough seats to nominate the president and form the next government, the accord will provide a greater certainty to all parties. The post-election aspect of the accord is also a sort of a roadmap for the peace process, and represents a commitment from the NLD if it does win another term in office..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-06-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In the early weeks of 2020, the signs pointed to progress in Myanmar’s convoluted effort to finally end 70 years of ethnic strife in its border areas. On Jan. 8, representatives from the government and the 10 ethnic armies that are party to a 2015 cease-fire deal convened in the capital, Naypyidaw, where they reached an eight-point agreement on the next steps to continue implementing that cease-fire. They also vowed to meet for a fourth national peace conference by the end of April, to build on three earlier summits held between 2016 and 2018. That fourth summit would have signaled the timely revitalization of Myanmar’s troubled peace process, which Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s de facto leader, has dubbed the “21st Century Panglong,” after the agreement that her father, independence hero Aung San, signed with representatives of several ethnic groups in 1947. Making progress in the peace talks after several recent setbacks would have provided a boost to Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, as they prepare for a general election later this year. But plans for the peace conference now threaten to be derailed by the coronavirus pandemic. Myanmar confirmed its first cases of COVID-19 on March 23, prompting the government and ethnic armed groups to postpone all meetings and push the summit back to July. Government spokesman Zaw Htay told reporters on May 30 that the government still plans to hold the summit next month, albeit with strict social distancing measures in place and a reduced number of delegates. Myanmar currently has some 230 official cases of COVID-19. July may represent the last chance to restart talks this year, with elections looming. The government has effectively ruled out holding the summit during the election campaign, set to run for 90 days between August and October..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "World Politics Review (WPR)"
2020-06-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar military has rejected a proposal by three ethnic armies to begin cease-fire talks in a bid to kick-start the country’s stalled peace process, instead vowing further retaliation for armed offensives and ambushes, a military spokesman said Tuesday. The Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies — the Arakan Army (AA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — extended the invitation to begin peace talks in a statement issued Monday. De facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s four-year-old government has long sought to end Myanmar’s multiple ethnic wars with historic peace talks. But those talks have sputtered, while only 10 of the country’s 20-some ethnic armies have signed a 2015 nationwide cease-fire pact that is seen as the foundation of peace talks. The Brotherhood Alliance trio, which has not signed the agreement, also announced Monday that it was extending a current unilateral cease-fire from June 1 to Aug. 31, and issued an appeal for both sides to protect civilians, end the civil war, and assist with coronavirus prevention activities. The announcement came three days after the AA launched a retaliatory attack on a border guard outpost in Rakhine state, killing four policemen and capturing six others. The AA also seized three family members of the officers, but later released them. The AA ambushed the outpost to strike back at government soldiers for an attack on the AA in Paletwa township of abutting Chin state, which the AA also claims as its territory. In March, the Myanmar government declared the AA, a predominantly Buddhist force that seeks greater autonomy for ethnic Rakhine people in the state, an illegal association and terrorist group — raising the stakes in a conflict that begin with AA attacks on government border posts in late 2018 and early 2019..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia (RFA)" (USA)
2020-06-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This report is the culmination of a year-long research project into the activities of civil society in and around the ongoing Myanmar peace process. This includes the negotiations taking place in the Union Peace Conference (UPC, also known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference (UPC/21st CPC) the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), and the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM). It also includes civil society peacebuilding outside of the peace negotiations and parallel structures. The research project aimed to identify: • the drivers of conflict in Myanmar, • the civil society actors involved in peacebuilding in Myanmar, • the types of peacebuilding activities performed by these CSOs, and to classify these activities into types, • the contributions of these activities to official and unofficial peacebuilding, • as well as any factors enabling and constraining civil society peacebuilding. The research was funded by the Joint Peace Fund Myanmar, and was conducted in partnership between the Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) and the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI). The research team conducted interviews with 160 individuals from 123 organizations, including from civil society (including CSO networks and local and international CSOs), donors, members of parliament, as well as representatives of EAOs, members of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), members of political parties, and government representatives. The CSO sample was built by asking CSOs to nominate other CSOs working on peacebuilding, hence the sample is shaped by these individuals’ understanding of peacebuilding in Myanmar. The research was guided by the Civil Society and Peacebuilding (CS&PB) framework, developed by Paffenholz and colleagues. In the context of Myanmar, the term peace process is generally used to refer to a sequence of high-level peace negotiations and associated consultations and other supporting institutions. This process began in 2011, under the government of U Thein Sein, and led to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015. The structure and sequence of the current negotiations were set out in the NCA and the Framework for Political Dialogue (also negotiated and signed in 2015). These negotiations are projected to lead to a permanent ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization of non-state armed groups, government and constitutional reforms. Since 2015, the main forum for these negotiations has been the UPC (21st CPC). The UPDJC acts as the secretariat for the UPC and has responsibility for important aspects of the process such as pre-negotiations and consensus building on issues to be brought before the UPC. This means that many issues are essentially decided by the UPDJC, with the UPC frequently acting to confirm decisions taken in the UPDJC (although this is not the sum total of its role).. The Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM), is the “consensus committee” for the UPDJC. It takes responsibility for issues that cannot be resolved in the UPDJC. Together,these three institutions make up track 1: the official or mainstream peace process. While this research framework places the mainstream peace process as the“center” of peacebuilding activity,this is more in the interest of conceptual clarity. Peacebuilding away from the negotiation table can be equally important..."
Source/publisher: JPF via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2020-06-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The many unilateral ceasefires seem meaningless — they have not stopped or even lessened the fighting so far.
Description: "In Myanmar, unilateral ceasefires have been interchangeably announced by the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) and a group of ethnic armed groups – known as the Northern Alliance – composed of the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). The first unilateral ceasefire was announced by Tatmadaw on December 21, 2018. The Northern Alliance followed by announcing their first truce on September 9, 2019, after the Tatmadaw extended the truce for a third time. Both sides have announced unilateral ceasefires five times so far (See the table below). The unilateral ceasefires of both parties look to cover plenty of days as they announced them at different times. However, the simultaneous ceasefires, covering both sides, are limited in duration. The total length of simultaneous ceasefires – in September 2019 and May 2020 – is only 33 days. (See the illustration below). But even during the unilateral ceasefire periods, the Tatmadaw and Northern Alliance could not managed to lessen or stop the fighting. Instead, tit-for-tat fighting raged on in Shan, Chin, and Rakhine states. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Although the country is grappling with the global coronavirus pandemic, the fighting between the Tatmadaw and AA in Chin and Rakhine states continues and has produced thousands of displaced persons. In addition to the AA, the Tatmadaw has clashed with the Karen National Union (KNU) that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-05-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "More than 20 rights NGOs have urged the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, which was revamped in January and has been criticized as toothless, to focus on reported rights violations committed during the COVID-19 pandemic by military troops in conflicts in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states. In a joint statement issued Wednesday, the 22 rights groups contend that the MNHRC is failing to address widespread human rights violations committed amid the coronavirus pandemic, especially in conflict zones in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states, home to ethnic conflicts of varying intensity. “We haven’t seen any acknowledgement of human rights violations during the pandemic as we had seen before,” said Aung Myo Min, director of human rights education group Equality Myanmar. “The commission has been particularly silent on rights violations related to COVID-19 outbreaks,” he said. “It has also been inactive in providing guidelines for preventing rights violations or acknowledging violations that have occurred.” Aung Myo Min said that a government-imposed internet service ban in nine townships in northern Rakhine and Chin states is a violation of human rights because residents cannot access to information about the coronavirus pandemic and how to protect themselves from it..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia (RFA)" (USA)
2020-08-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "...Instead of the usual top-down approach of the hegemonic peace-building paradigm, this research paper employs the bottom-up approach. This is done in order to analyze the role of the forced migrants in peacebuilding process. The internal conflict in Burma during the past decades has created a wave of displaced people, many of who became forced migrants into neighboring countries. Thailand, in particular, is home to a large portion of these forced migrants, in both camps and urban settings. Such migrants, moreover, are oftentimes vilified and/or victimized. As the forced migrant population lives in exile, the hegemonic peacebuilding schemes often fail to acknowledge their role in the peace processes in their home country. With limited financial and civic resources, these migrants often face the hardship of daily living. This struggle then becomes their foremost priority. Consequently, their transnational participation in peace processes is often neglected. However, peace processes, at their root, aim to create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and a stabilization of society by reintegrating the affected parties into civilian life. With this in mind, this qualitative research examines the capacity of the Burmese forced migrants in Thailand. Emphasis is placed on the transnational role and the influence of the migrants’ collective agency in peacebuilding processes. The paper examines two more points: what kinds of opportunities are currently available to support migrants’ peace-building initiatives at home; and, what kinds of challenges are present to deter their possible contribution to peace-building in their home country...."
Creator/author:
2013-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.17 MB
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Description: "The Myanmar military has denied a Karen National Union (KNU) claim they have been building up their troop deployment in Hpapun district of Kayin State. A statement dated May 15 issued by the KNU claims the Tatmadaw (government forces) are building up their forces in the area controlled by 2nd, 5th and 7th Brigades of its military wing Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). In this statement, the KNU claims that in exploitation of the current ceasefire between them, the Tatmadaw is building up their forces especially in Mu Kyaw district (Hpapun district) controlled by 5th Brigade of the KNU and adjoining areas controlled by 2nd and 7th Brigades. It also says that the building up of forces up to twice normal strength and building new outposts in these areas undermine the confidence building which is crucial for strengthening the ceasefire. KNU General Secretary Pado Saw Tado Mu said, “There are two parts. The first part is building outposts. In this part, there are new more outposts including the BGF (Border Guard Force). And another part is personnel deployed at these outposts. We found that more personnel were sent and deployed at these outposts. And then they deployed more heavy weapons such as howitzers that were never deployed in these areas. This is not a good trend for us. It is the significant things which can be pointed out.” Tatmadaw True New Information Team Secretary Brig. Gen. Zaw Min Tun said that they did not send and deploy any more troops and any more new heavy weapons in these areas but their military columns which were performing their security duty were attacked by sniper fire from KNU troops. “Firstly, I’d like to say, they claimed they opened COVID-19 checkpoints and then they shot at our military columns with sniper fire in Hpapun. Secondly, we absolutely did not do anything in sending and deploying more troops and new heavy weapons in the areas controlled by their 2nd, 5th and 7th Brigades as they are claiming. We have already had Joint Monitoring Committee - State-level (JMC-S). I would like to say it will be more helpful for both sides and ongoing peace process if we can resolve this issue through dialogue. There is absolutely no military buildup as they claim.” Although the Tatmadaw said disputes between two sides could be resolved through JMC-S mechanism, ethnic armed groups said that this JMC mechanism was not practical and workable and called for it to be rectified. KNU General Secretary Pado Saw Tar Doe Mu said that peace process was currently stalled because of COVID-19 pandemic and dialogue between them had difficulties so that they were trying to explore means to resolve this incident..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-05-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar Cardinal Charles Bo is backing a call by the United Nations chief and Pope Francis for a global ceasefire, including in Myanmar.
Description: "As the entire world is currently engaged in a war against a deadly invisible enemy that is taking lives across the globe in tens of thousands, Myanmar’s military has been ramping up its offensive against the country’s armed ethnic militias. This is why the country’s cardinal is raising his voice again, lending support to the call by the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and Pope Francis, for a global ceasefire, in favour of humanity’s more urgent war against the Covid-19 virus. With conflict Myanmar is vulnerable “The pandemic’s consequences are catastrophic for public health and for social and economic life. This is no time to escalate the conflict,” urges Cardinal Charles Bo of Yangon, in a statement released on Wednesday. “I am convinced that continued military operations, precisely when the whole nation is suffering a crisis, will have catastrophic consequences for our nation,” warns the cardinal, who is also President of the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC)..."
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Source/publisher: "Vatican News"
2020-04-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Scholars at the University of Oslo (Norway) and Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) have since 2012 conducted collaborative research on “Power, Welfare and Democracy (PWD)”, based on previous studies with research organisations in civil society, and funded by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta. The PWD project has examined the character and challenges of democratisation in Indonesia, and how it relates to power relations and social welfare in society. The project has included a baseline survey on the development of democracy; a thematic study on politics of citizenship; a thematic study on welfare regimes; a thematic study on local regimes; and comparative anthropological studies of UN-REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). As this research project comes to an end in 2017, a two-days conference will be held at the University of Oslo to summarise major findings and to discuss the implications for domestic and international policy making..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: University of Oslo (Norway)
2018-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 700.88 KB (164 pages)
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Description: "Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) spokesman Col. Sai Om Kay said that they had been fighting with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) on Loi Tuan Mountain, Mong Kong Township, southern Shan State on February 27 in the morning and the fighting between them was still raging until today. The fighting started with artillery fire on February 27 at about 8 a.m. and the fighting is reportedly still raging fiercely until the afternoon of February 28. “The fighting was almost all day yesterday and now Tatmadaw is still firing intermittent fire of heavy weapons,” spokesman Col. Sai Om Kay said, referring to Thursday. The RCSS/SSA said that four battalions with approximate strength of 400 personnel had an engagement with RCSS troops in Loi Tuan pass in Mong Kong Township, southern Shan State and it was started by firing heavy weapons and the fighting was fierce. Shan State legislative Assembly legislator from Mong Kong constituency (1) Sai Pan said that they heard the firing of heavy weapons and they had to watch and monitor the fighting between these two armies. “They fought yesterday and today. We could hear weapons firing until this afternoon. We cannot get accurate information on this battle as they fought in the jungle but nearby villages said that they heard heavy weapons fire,” he said. Political analyst Than Soe Naing said that the fighting between them appeared because of lack of trust building between them and having suspicion against each other though they had territory demarcation between them..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-02-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s history has been intertwined with the issues of postcolonial state building since it gained independence from British colonialism in January 1948. The policies and administration pursued by the British proved instrumental in deterioration of contact and cooperation between the diverse ethnic peoples of Myanmar while ethnic conflict was fostered. 1 The historical struggles of ethnic minorities for recognition and representation are vital to understanding the current transition to democracy and struggles for legitimacy in Myanmar. Undoubtedly, the initial phase of independent Myanmar, following the assassination of General Aung San on the eve of independence, was characterized by unstable but occasionally democratic governments punctuated by interventions by the Myanmar military. The last significant bid for democracy ended, however, following a military coup by General Ne Win on 2 March 1962. 2 The new military ruler led the country, first under his Revolutionary Council and then under his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), into a 26-year era of isolation following his ‘Burmese way to socialism’, an admixture of Buddhist, Marxist and nationalist principles that ethnic minorities in the country interpreted as ‘Burmanization’, which saw Myanmar decline “from a country once regarded as amongst the most fertile and mineral rich in Asia to one of the world’s 10 poorest nations.”3..."
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Source/publisher: Southeast Asia Research Centre (Hong Kong)
2012-12-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 692.19 KB (27 pages)
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Sub-title: Arakan Army's highly mobile and lethal tactics have made a mockery of government's peace process
Description: "As Myanmar’s government sues for peace, its autonomous military, the Tatmadaw, faces a new type of insurgency it seems increasingly ill-prepared to counter and combat. Myanmar’s “new” insurgents are highly mobile and, unlike the country’s older generation rebel groups, maintain few fixed positions, using instead hit-and-run attacks that have rendered the Tatmadaw’s traditional frontal assaults increasingly ineffective. The situation is in many ways similar to the one the United States faced in the Vietnam War: an invisible enemy which strikes from the shadows, making counterattacks more likely to hit civilians than enemy combatants. That’s all conspiring to undermine the Tatmadaw’s leverage and clout against ethnic armed groups that rely on local population support to sustain their insurgent fights. Previously, Myanmar’s myriad rebel groups aimed to control large swathes of territory protected by fixed and often well-armed installations. The Karen National Union (KNU), long firmly entrenched on the Thai border, maintained several bases along the Moei river and a well-fortified headquarters with permanent buildings housing its civilian administration and military command units..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military enterprises, ostensibly set up to feed and supply soldiers,were some of the earliest and largest Burmese commercialconglomerates, established in the 1950s. Union Myanmar EconomicHoldings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) are two profit-seeking military enterprises established by the military after the dissolution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1988, which remain central players in Myanmar’s post-2011 economy.• Military conglomerates are a major source of off-budget revenuefor the military and a main employer of retired soldiers. Yet few veterans receive more than a small piece of the profits from UMEHL. The vast bulk of formal dividends instead disproportionately benefit higher ranking officers and institutions within the Tatmadaw. Military capitalism entrenches the autonomy of the Tatmadawfrom civilian oversight. Despite this, obligatory or semi-coerced contributions from active-duty soldiers are a source of cash fow for UMEHL, effectively constituting a transfer from the government budget to the military’s off-budget entities. The most significant source of livelihoods support for most veterans is the service pension dispersed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoPF).• Despite delivering suboptimal welfare outcomes for most soldiers and veterans while eroding the legitimacy of ceasefires, successive governments since 1988, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s NationalLeague for Democracy (NLD) administration, have entrenched military capitalism by encouraging commercial activities of armed groups that enter into ceasefire agreements..."
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Source/publisher: Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
2019-02-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 1.55 MB (49 pages)
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Description: "A northern Shan rebel armed group, the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), says they may sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) this year if necessary to work with the Myanmar government towards political reform. SSPP leaders held a meeting from Feb. 4-18 at their headquarters in Wang Hai, northern Shan State, to discuss the possibility of signing the NCA and finding compromises with the Myanmar government. “If we need to sign [the NCA] for our group, we will do it. But first we want to discuss it with our members of our alliance,” said SSPP Colonel Sai Su. The NCA was first signed in October 2015. Col. Sai Su also said that if the government and the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, are wise, they will choose to compromise with the ethnic armed group coalition known as the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) and all of its members will sign the NCA. The FPNCC includes the SSPP, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Mong La’s National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA). According to the SSPP, the FPNCC does not have a common stand on signing the NCA and the groups need more time to discuss it. Col. Sai Su said that if the SSPP signs the NCA, they will explain the decision to ethnic Shan people. The SSPP was a member of the now-defunct United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), which worked to draft the NCA, but resigned from the group in 2017. The SSPP then joined the FPNCC, which continues to negotiate with the Myanmar government regarding the NCA..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand) via reliefweb (New York)
2020-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Masculinities, gender and social conflict in Myanmar
Description: "The Union of Myanmar is a complex country context marked by ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. It has been affected by decades of an authoritarian, isolationist regime and numerous interconnected conflicts, ranging from national-level ethnic political and armed conflicts and a pro-democracy struggle, to broader social-level land conflicts. It has also seen conflicts at the household level, such as domestic violence. In Myanmar, as in other countries, these numerous forms of violence affect men, women, boys, girls and those with diverse gender identities in different ways. There is increasing awareness that gender is important in understanding conflict and working towards peace and social cohesion. A growing number of development programmes are dedicated to addressing this. In practice, such programmes have largely focused on women’s participation in political and peacebuilding processes. This focus on increasing women’s meaningful participation in arenas and activities formerly dominated by men is an important aspect of peacebuilding. However, there is another ‘side’ to the gender inequality dilemma, which is less well understood – one that deals with the experiences of men and boys. Social expectations around masculinity are often overlooked (or oversimplified). Masculinities, that is, the social expectations of men to act or behave in certain ways because they are men, can be drivers of conflict or violence. However, limiting work on this to ‘men-engage’-type approaches focusing mainly on mobilising men to prevent sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) can mean overlooking how social expectations of masculinities can also lead to increased vulnerability for men and boys, which is often not recognised or addressed by peacebuilding programming. Understanding masculinities is important, because these masculinity norms – these social expectations – can be mobilised to manipulate the taking of violent actions. For instance, society may invoke the expectations on men to be protectors of their community from perceived external threats, including land confiscations for development projects. Where this means confronting more powerful actors such as state agencies, frustration and pressures can turn into violent action..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Paung Sie Facility, International Alert (London), Phan Tee Eain
2018-12-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 928.79 KB (52 pages)
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Description: "This report is the culmination of a year-long research project into the activities of civil society in and around the ongoing Myanmar peace process. This includes the negotiations taking place in the Union Peace Conference (UPC, also known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference (UPC/21st CPC) the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), and the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM). It also includes civil society peacebuilding outside of the peace negotiations and parallel structures. The research project aimed to identify: • the drivers of confict in Myanmar, • the civil society actors involved in peacebuilding in Myanmar, • the types of peacebuilding activities performed by these CSOs, and to classify these activities into types, • the contributions of these activities to ofcial and unofcial peacebuilding, • as well as any factors enabling and constraining civil society peacebuilding. The research was funded by the Joint Peace Fund Myanmar, and was conducted in partnership between the Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) and the Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI).3 The research team conducted interviews with 160 individuals from 123 organizations, including from civil society (including CSO networks and local and international CSOs), donors, members of parliament, as well as representatives of EAOs, members of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), members of political parties, and government representatives.4 The CSO sample was built by asking CSOs to nominate other CSOs working on peacebuilding, hence the sample is shaped by these individuals’ understanding of peacebuilding in Myanmar. The research was guided by the Civil Society and Peacebuilding (CS&PB) framework, developed by Pafenholz and colleagues.5 In the context of Myanmar, the term peace process is generally used to refer to a sequence of high-level peace negotiations and associated consultations and other supporting institutions. This process began in 2011, under the government of U Thein Sein, and led to the Nationwide Ceasefre Agreement (NCA) in 2015. The structure and sequence of the current negotiations were set out in the NCA and the Framework for Political Dialogue (also negotiated and signed in 2015). These negotiations are projected to lead to a permanent ceasefre, disarmament and demobilization of non-state armed groups, government and constitutional reforms. Since 2015, the main forum for these negotiations has been the UPC (21st CPC). The UPDJC acts as the secretariat for the UPC and has responsibility for important aspects of the process such as pre-negotiations and consensus building on issues to be brought before the UPC. This means that many issues are essentially decided by the UPDJC, with the UPC frequently acting to confrm decisions taken in the UPDJC (although this is not the sum total of its role)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) (Yangon) and Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative
2019-01-21
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 3.31 MB (101 pages)
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Sub-title: Avenues for reform and decentralization and steps towards a federal system.
Description: "Ever since the Panglong Agreement was signed on February 12, 1947, only two weeks after the Aung San - Attlee Agreement on Burma’s Independence of January 27, 1947, the issues of federalism, minority rights and self-determination have been central to Myanmar politics, confict and military-civilian relations. Accordingly, relations between the center and the periphery are at the core of the constitutions of 1947 and 1974, as well as the 2008 Constitution. Yet, by any standards, the Myanmar state has been unitary, and indeed centralized to an extreme degree, since independence in 1948, leading to 70 years of confict. To a large degree, the confict explains the other defning trait of the Myanmar state: for most of the last seven decades, it has been dominated by the military. Relations between the military and state institutions have been shaped by the relationship between the central government and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). The issues of democracy, federalism and the role of the military cannot be separated, and together they form the basis for modern Myanmar politics. In this context, it is not surprising that organizations representing the interests of ethnic nationalities spent the last two decades of military rule, after the emergence of the democracy movement of 1988 and the NLD’s victory in the 1990 elections, calling for a “tripartite dialogue” among the NLD, the military and themselves. It is no coincidence that these were also the decades when the military was drafting the 2008 Constitution. The current peace process was initiated by President U Thein Sein in 2011, the year Myanmar embarked on its transition to democracy. Although democracy and the pursuit of peace are undoubtedly two of Myanmar’s most pressing issues, the fact that two distinct processes – which will be referred to in this paper as the political process and the peace process – developed from there raises a number of issues..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Ltd (Yangon)
2018-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 368.39 KB (82 pages)
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Description: "Civil Society: Civil Society is defined broadly as the space between the family and the state, but does not include political parties, professional unions and associations, private businesses, and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). For the purpose of this Discussion Paper, research was directed predominantly, but not entirely, to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) at Union and sub-national level and their emerging networks. Research also included ethnic literature and culture associations. It is important to note that many people “wear several hats” in Myanmar, meaning that the affiliations of individuals are not always limited to one organisation. The roles of as key stakeholders often change roles over time. Due to their importance in Myanmar, faith-based networks are also included in civil society. Civil society is not synonymous with communities. It is inherently heterogeneous; its diversity relates to a range of different ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender, and class identities among which ethnicity stands out as a particularly prominent marker of identity in Myanmar. Social cohesion: A cohesive society is one that works towards the wellbeing of all, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers everyone the opportunity to prosper and advance peacefully. Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding is defined as initiatives that foster and support sustainable structures and processes that strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict.1 Within this Paper, civil society engagement in peacebuilding refers to civil society-led initiatives that seek mitigate inter- or intra- ethnic, faith, and communal tensions and promote social cohesion. Peace process: For the purposes of this research, the ‘peace process’ is defined as the national tri-lateral negotiations related to the ethnic armed conflict. Peace process architecture relates to government-led initiatives since 2011, spanning bi-lateral ceasefires, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the Union Peace Conferences (UPCs), Joint Monitoring Committees (JMCs), and the national dialogue process. For the purpose of this Paper, participation in the peace process has been categorised into direct participation (contribution to decision-making and supporting roles within peace architecture), and indirect contributions, which are equally critical, that lie outside of the peace process and political structures. Gender: The socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that determine our understanding of masculinity and femininity. The question of gender difference and the construction of masculine and feminine is not universal, but culturally specific and strongly influenced by other factors such as ethnicity, religion, race, and class.2 Youth: Myanmar’s National Youth Policy defines young people as between the ages of 15-35. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 considers young people to fall between 18-29 years..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Paung Sie Facility
2018-10-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 8.24 MB (90 pages)
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Description: "Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi said Wednesday that the country’s unresolved political problems are the root cause of failure to end hostilities between the government military and ethnic armed groups as Myanmar continues to strive for permanent peace. “The governments of the successive periods have tried their best to put an end to the armed conflicts and restore peace to our motherland, but have not yet achieved the goals of peace,” she said in her capacity as chairperson of the Central Committee for the Development of Border Areas and National Races at the 73rd Union Day ceremony in Panglong, also known as Pinlon, in Myanmar’s southern Shan state. As state counselor, Aung San Suu Kyi has made ending Myanmar’s armed conflicts and forging peace the cornerstone of her administration, but the peace process has been stymied by ongoing fighting between Myanmar forces and rebel armies in outlying ethnic regions and by the Rohingya crisis in Rakhine state. Her civilian-led government has held three sessions of the 21st-Century Panglong Conference attended by delegates from the government, military, and ethnic armed organizations..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2020-02-12
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Exiled Activists in Myanmar's Political Reforms
Description: "Myanmar’s tumultuous post-colonial history has been characterized by decades of direct and indirect military rule and corresponding political mobilizations that have ranged from armed ethnic and ideological insurgencies to mass protests, student movements, and non-violent pro-democracy uprisings. The nationalization and mismanagement of the economy, the militarization of the state, political surveillance and oppression, and the closure of universities are all factors that have triggered the flight from Burma of millions of Burmese. Several main waves of exit can be distinguished, following major political events—(1) the 1962 military coup; (2) the installation of direct rule by the Burma Socialist Programme Party in 1974 and the U Thant funeral crisis; (3) the 1988 mass uprisings; and (4) the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” protests, respectively. The largest o the extreme sensitivity surrounding this subject, in the past very few organizations inside Myanmar were able to operate openly on human rights issues. Exile organizations based in Thailand and India are widening the scope of their existing capacity-building initiatives for the documentation of local human rights issues and improving the knowledge and skills of those who defend human rights, while also expanding their (underground and above-ground) networks across the country..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Kerstin Duell
2014-11-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf pdf
Size: 213.52 KB (15 pages)
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