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The Myanmar Matrix



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The Myanmar Matrix

Back on the Road to Mandalay

The Times of India (New Delhi)
November 25, 2000

By C UDAY BHASKAR

THE recently-concluded visit to Delhi (November 21) of General Maung
Aye, the vice chairman of the State Peace and Development Council - the
name for the ruling military government in Myanmar - is an important
punctuation in India's evolving `national interest policy' and both the
form and the content of this visit have a  strategic import.

Myanmar, or Burma as it was called till the name was changed in 1989 by
the military rulers, is a blank in the collective Indian consciousness
except for the persona of a determined Aung San Suu Kyi. It otherwise
remains a curious mix of myth and forgotten memory deeply embedded in
receding history, inextricably linked with the Indian subcontinent from
ancient times to the modern period. Myanmar has had a chequered
relationship with India in the literal sense of the term. Burma after
colonisation was part of British India and the imprint of the Indian
freedom struggle was evident in the growth of Burmese nationalism.

Burma was a major theatre during World War II and the leadership of the
period ? headed by General Aung San (father of Ms Suu Kyi) - has the
unique distinction of shifting allegiance from Axis to Allied powers
during the war. On attaining independence in January 1948, Burma was the
model for the developing nation in Asia and identified as a state with
the highest potential and promise.

However, the political evolution of Burma has been bloody and violent
and in July 1947, General Aung San was assassinated by his opponents and
the leadership devolved upon the first prime minister U Nu. Burma played
a major role in the emerging Asian solidarity and relations between
Delhi and Rangoon (now Yangon) were robust. A large Indian population in
Burma provided the substance to the relationship and considerable trade
flourished by way of Burmese teak, rice and gems between the Indian east
coast and Rangapatnam - the vernacular world for Rangoon. India provided
considerable support to U Nu in the early years when the state had to
deal with insurgencies and sub-national militancy.

However post-1962, Burma's fortunes underwent a radical change. Growing
internal unrest abetted by external forces and the inability of the
civilian leadership to deal with this turbulence saw the military
(tatmadaw) in the driver's seat. Then followed a period of intense
xenophobia and insularity that pushed the country into near isolation
with a resultant downturn in ties with India. Domestic policies
including the expulsion of ethnic Indians and later a closer
Sino-Burmese axis soured the relationship with Delhi and for a quarter
of a century till 1988 there was the equivalent of extended stasis.

Democratic zealotry in the Rajiv Gandhi years, the dramatic arrival of
Aung San Suu Kyi on the Myanmarese political landscape and the
ruthlessness of the tatmadaw in the bloody repression of August 8, 1988
led to Delhi distancing itself visibly and the relationship was
strained. But in 1993, India decided to repair the relationship as part
of a arger `look east' policy and seven years down the road Delhi is
able to engage Yangon hrough a matrix that leavens pragmatic national
interest considerations with regional and global realities. Despite the
opprobrium directed at Myanmar by the global community, it was admitted
into the ASEAN fold in 1997 and this led to a dramatic geo-strategic
transformation for India. ASEAN is no longer distant but now contiguous
to the Indian mainland with four states in the North East bordering
Myanmar.

India's geo-strategic interests are defined by the abiding existential
challenge of China and the influence it exerts on the Indian periphery
including Myanmar. While democracy remains a highly desirable goal where
it does not exist, India does not have the option to make that the sole
determinant in its external relations. Thus the present visit of General
Maung raises a seeming contradiction about Delhi doing business with the
military leadership in Yangon while refusing to deal with that in
Islamabad. The reality is that the former has over the last few years
provided valuable support to the Indian national interest in the areas
that impinge directly on sovereignty and territoriality. Myanmarese
troops have cooperated with Indian security forces in dealing with
insurgencies in the North East, while in the Pakistani case, the
military is doing the exact opposite. Thus the fidelity is to the core
national interest.

Till recently, the relationship with Myanmar was perceived in terms of
negative determinants and anxieties - particularly the growing links
between Beijing and Yangon. There is no denying the fact that China has
made considerable progress in establishing its presence in Myanmar over
the last decade and on a visit to Mandalay a few years ago, the Sinic
influence was more than palpable. Yes, Beijing provides attractive
military support to the 350,000-strong Myanmar armed forces and the
transport linkages with the Kunming region of China are a reality.

But in the current visit, General Maung assured his hosts that Yangon
will not allow foreign military bases to be set up on Myanmarese soil
and made a counter offer which is of strategic significance. Currently,
India has a $ 196 million two-way trade relationship with Yangon but
there is enormous potential to develop certain sectors such as energy
(where it may be the only exporter in ASEAN), agriculture, light
engineering goods and pharmaceuticals. Communication linkages are a
constraint but the opening of the 160 km Tamu-Kalemyo road west of the
Chindwin river will provide a crucial link with Mandalay. General Maung
invited India to develop the Kyaupkyu port in the Ramree Island and this
is an opportunity that must not be lost.

Myanmar is India's gateway to ASEAN and the recent Ganga-Mekong
initiative testifies to India's determined intent to engage the region.
Perhaps this visit will allow Myanmar to be seen in its own identity and
not as part of the Chinese shadow. The challenge for the Indian
professional in the public and private sector is to strengthen the
relationship in a positive manner and counter the Chinese presence in a
confident and competitive manner. The ball is now in India's court and
ONGC amongst others would be well advised to pick up the gauntlet.




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<html>
<font size=+3>The Myanmar Matrix</font>
<p><b><font size=+2>Back on the Road to Mandalay</font></b>
<p><b>The Times of India (New Delhi)</b>
<br><b>November 25, 2000</b>
<p><b>By C UDAY BHASKAR</b>
<p>THE recently-concluded visit to Delhi (November 21) of General Maung
Aye, the vice chairman of the State Peace and Development Council - the
name for the ruling military government in Myanmar - is an important punctuation
in India's evolving `national interest policy' and both the form and the
content of this visit have a&nbsp; strategic import.
<p>Myanmar, or Burma as it was called till the name was changed in 1989
by the military rulers, is a blank in the collective Indian consciousness
except for the persona of a determined Aung San Suu Kyi. It otherwise remains
a curious mix of myth and forgotten memory deeply embedded in receding
history, inextricably linked with the Indian subcontinent from ancient
times to the modern period. Myanmar has had a chequered relationship with
India in the literal sense of the term. Burma after colonisation was part
of British India and the imprint of the Indian freedom struggle was evident
in the growth of Burmese nationalism.
<p>Burma was a major theatre during World War II and the leadership of
the period ? headed by General Aung San (father of Ms Suu Kyi) - has the
unique distinction of shifting allegiance from Axis to Allied powers during
the war. On attaining independence in January 1948, Burma was the model
for the developing nation in Asia and identified as a state with the highest
potential and promise.
<p>However, the political evolution of Burma has been bloody and violent
and in July 1947, General Aung San was assassinated by his opponents and
the leadership devolved upon the first prime minister U Nu. Burma played
a major role in the emerging Asian solidarity and relations between Delhi
and Rangoon (now Yangon) were robust. A large Indian population in Burma
provided the substance to the relationship and considerable trade flourished
by way of Burmese teak, rice and gems between the Indian east coast and
Rangapatnam - the vernacular world for Rangoon. India provided considerable
support to U Nu in the early years when the state had to deal with insurgencies
and sub-national militancy.
<p>However post-1962, Burma's fortunes underwent a radical change. Growing
internal unrest abetted by external forces and the inability of the civilian
leadership to deal with this turbulence saw the military (tatmadaw) in
the driver's seat. Then followed a period of intense xenophobia and insularity
that pushed the country into near isolation with a resultant downturn in
ties with India. Domestic policies including the expulsion of ethnic Indians
and later a closer Sino-Burmese axis soured the relationship with Delhi
and for a quarter of a century till 1988 there was the equivalent of extended
stasis.
<p>Democratic zealotry in the Rajiv Gandhi years, the dramatic arrival
of Aung San Suu Kyi on the Myanmarese political landscape and the ruthlessness
of the tatmadaw in the bloody repression of August 8, 1988 led to Delhi
distancing itself visibly and the relationship was strained. But in 1993,
India decided to repair the relationship as part of a arger `look east'
policy and seven years down the road Delhi is able to engage Yangon hrough
a matrix that leavens pragmatic national interest considerations with regional
and global realities. Despite the opprobrium directed at Myanmar by the
global community, it was admitted into the ASEAN fold in 1997 and this
led to a dramatic geo-strategic transformation for India. ASEAN is no longer
distant but now contiguous to the Indian mainland with four states in the
North East bordering Myanmar.
<p>India's geo-strategic interests are defined by the abiding existential
challenge of China and the influence it exerts on the Indian periphery
including Myanmar. While democracy remains a highly desirable goal where
it does not exist, India does not have the option to make that the sole
determinant in its external relations. Thus the present visit of General
Maung raises a seeming contradiction about Delhi doing business with the
military leadership in Yangon while refusing to deal with that in Islamabad.
The reality is that the former has over the last few years provided valuable
support to the Indian national interest in the areas that impinge directly
on sovereignty and territoriality. Myanmarese troops have cooperated with
Indian security forces in dealing with insurgencies in the North East,
while in the Pakistani case, the military is doing the exact opposite.
Thus the fidelity is to the core national interest.
<p>Till recently, the relationship with Myanmar was perceived in terms
of negative determinants and anxieties - particularly the growing links
between Beijing and Yangon. There is no denying the fact that China has
made considerable progress in establishing its presence in Myanmar over
the last decade and on a visit to Mandalay a few years ago, the Sinic influence
was more than palpable. Yes, Beijing provides attractive military support
to the 350,000-strong Myanmar armed forces and the transport linkages with
the Kunming region of China are a reality.
<p>But in the current visit, General Maung assured his hosts that Yangon
will not allow foreign military bases to be set up on Myanmarese soil and
made a counter offer which is of strategic significance. Currently, India
has a $ 196 million two-way trade relationship with Yangon but there is
enormous potential to develop certain sectors such as energy (where it
may be the only exporter in ASEAN), agriculture, light engineering goods
and pharmaceuticals. Communication linkages are a constraint but the opening
of the 160 km Tamu-Kalemyo road west of the Chindwin river will provide
a crucial link with Mandalay. General Maung invited India to develop the
Kyaupkyu port in the Ramree Island and this is an opportunity that must
not be lost.
<p>Myanmar is India's gateway to ASEAN and the recent Ganga-Mekong initiative
testifies to India's determined intent to engage the region. Perhaps this
visit will allow Myanmar to be seen in its own identity and not as part
of the Chinese shadow. The challenge for the Indian professional in the
public and private sector is to strengthen the relationship in a positive
manner and counter the Chinese presence in a confident and competitive
manner. The ball is now in India's court and ONGC amongst others would
be well advised to pick up the gauntlet.
<br>&nbsp;
<p>&nbsp;</html>

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