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SANCTIONS? MAYBE, MAYBE NOT



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SANCTIONS? MAYBE, MAYBE NOT

by David Arnott (Burma Peace Foundation, Geneva)


Summary

On 30 November the measures adopted  in June by the International Labour 
Conference will take effect, but these cannot be described as sanctions. 
They might possibly lead to sanctions in some cases, but this will be 
decided by the ILO constituents (governments, workers and employers) and 
the ILO's fellow international organisations. On the other hand, the 
measures provide the Burma support community in its widest sense with a new 
set of tools for combatting forced labour in Burma and even, perhaps, 
achieving effective international coordination in developing long-term 
solutions.


The ILO measures

On 16 November 2000, the Governing  Body of the International Labour 
Organisation declared by an overwhelming show of hands that it was "not 
satisfied" that Burma had taken the necessary steps to fulfill the 
recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry. The measures adopted in 
June 2000 by the International Labour Conference (ILC) will therefore take 
effect from 30 November.

Out of the 56 members, only China, Russia, Malaysia and India raised their 
hands to declare themselves "satisfied". Japan and some others did not 
declare themselves either way. It is regrettable that Japan, India, China 
and the ASEAN countries could not be drawn into a consensus, even though 
this might have meant sacrificing one or more of the measures, since they 
are the countries with the greatest influence on the Burmese military, and 
their support would have made the ILO action more effective.

Central to the debate were the recommendations of the ILO Commission of 
Inquiry into forced labour in Burma. These are, in brief, that Burma should 
(1) bring its legislation into line with ILO Convention 29 which prohibits 
forced labour (some of Burma's laws, dating back to the British colonial 
period, permit forced labour); (2) end the recruitment of forced labour in 
actual practice, particularly by the military; and (3) punish those found 
guilty of exacting forced labour. If the Governing Body had been satisfied 
that Burma had adopted the necessary framework for fulfilling these 
recommendations, the ILC measures would not have been implemented. This did 
not occur, however.

The measures, which will take effect from 30 November, are:

(a) to decide that the question of the implementation of the Commission of 
Inquiry's recommendations and of the application of Convention No. 29 by 
Myanmar should be discussed at future sessions of the International Labour 
Conference, at a sitting of the Committee on the Application of Standards 
specially set aside for the purpose, so long as this Member has not been 
shown to have fulfilled its obligations;

(b) to recommend to the Organization's constituents as a whole -- 
governments, employers and workers -- that they: (i) review, in the light 
of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, the relations that they 
may have with the member State concerned and take appropriate measures to 
ensure that the said Member cannot take advantage of such relations to 
perpetuate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labour referred to 
by the Commission of Inquiry, and to contribute as far as possible to the 
implementation of its recommendations; and (ii) report back in due course 
and at appropriate intervals to the Governing Body;

(c) as regards international organizations, to invite the Director-General: 
(i) to inform the international organizations referred to in article 12, 
paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the Member's failure to comply; (ii) to 
call on the relevant bodies of these organizations to reconsider, within 
their terms of reference and in the light of the conclusions of the 
Commission of Inquiry, any cooperation they may be engaged in with the 
Member concerned and, if appropriate, to cease as soon as possible any 
activity that could have the effect of directly or indirectly abetting the 
practice of forced or compulsory labour;

(d) regarding the United Nations specifically, to invite the 
Director-General to request the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to 
place an item on the agenda of its July 2001 session concerning the failure 
of Myanmar to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the 
Commission of Inquiry and seeking the adoption of recommendations directed 
by ECOSOC or by the General Assembly, or by both, to governments and to 
other specialized agencies and including requests similar to those proposed 
in paragraphs (b) and (c) above;

(e) to invite the Director-General to submit to the Governing Body, in the 
appropriate manner and at suitable intervals, a periodic report on the 
outcome of the measures set out in paragraphs (c) and (d) above, and to 
inform the international organizations concerned of any developments in the 
implementation by Myanmar of the recommendations of the Commission of 
Inquiry; (from the ILC resolution, 15 June 2000)

These paragraphs merit careful reading, alongside the conclusions and 
recommendations of the  report of the Commission of Inquiry, the legal 
document which is central to the ILO action on Burma. It can be found at 
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm


How the measures might work

These notes are somewhat speculative, and really only deal with measure 
(b), the recommendation to the ILO constituents.  Measures (c) and  (d) are 
intriguing, but it is too early to see how they will go. Measures (a) and 
(e) deal mainly with reporting.

The ILO itself cannot impose sanctions. What it has done by adopting these 
measures is to call for action by its tripartite constituents and fellow 
international organisations. The measures give multilateral legitimation to 
bilateral action by governments, employers, workers and international 
organisations to take what steps they can to end forced labour in Burma and 
in particular, make sure their relations with Burma are not used, directly 
or indirectly,  to increase or abet forced labour. This also means that it 
will make very little difference if the SPDC stops "cooperating" with the 
ILO, since the initiative is now with the other actors.

Since this is the first time the ILO has taken such a step, no-one really 
knows how or even if it will work. It is now up to governments, trade 
unions,  employers and international organisations to explore what actions 
they can take with the new powers provided by the measures.  There is a 
complex set of interactions that could come into play: certain governments, 
for instance, might not wish to accede to the ILO's request, and there is 
nothing the ILO can do to force them. However, trade unions in those 
countries might have a different position, and see it as part of their 
responsibility under the ILO measures to put pressure on their governments 
to take action. Or trade unions with members who work for companies trading 
with or investing in Burma might feel obliged to act within the company - a 
first step might be serious discussions with the directors. An active 
government, especially if supported by trade unions and prodded by its 
neighbourhood Burma support group, might use the measures as extra leverage 
to persuade a recalcitrant company to withdraw from Burma. We may expect 
some interesting manoeuvres in France and Belgium involving the trade 
unions, the two governments and TotalFinaElf (the Franco-Belgian oil 
company operating in Burma), no doubt chivvied along and cheered on by the 
French and Belgian Burma groups.

Supporters of democracy in Burma including ethical investment groups, some 
governments, trade unions, Burma solidarity groups and others will 
therefore find in these measures a new legal framework for working together 
on initiatives to end forced labour in Burma (and let us not forget that 
the Burmese military regime is dependent on forced labour for its survival, 
since the regime is the army, and the army depends on forced labour for its 
survival in the field). Such initiatives can now be regarded not as 
bilateral or individual, but as steps taken at the explicit request of the 
international community. The measures would makes it much easier for the 
European Union, for instance, or individual European states such as 
Britain, to impose sanctions if they think this is the best policy.


Towards coordination

But these synergistic interactions and possibilities, interesting and 
exciting as they may seem, are unlikely to bring about long-term change 
unless they are carefully thought out and coordinated at the international 
and particularly, at the regional level. This means with Burma's neighbours 
and Japan.

It would be a mistake to think that the region is happy with Burma. The 
situation in Burma is a problem for everyone, first for its own people, and 
secondly, for the neighbours. China gets heroin, AIDS, unstable trade and a 
dead end for the development of Yunnan and neighbouring provinces; India 
gets heroin, AIDS, unstable borders and refugee flows; Thailand gets a 
growing methamphetamine crisis, border clashes, eccentric trading 
restrictions and refugee flows. In addition to the 20,000 or so remaining 
in the camps, Bangladesh has up to 200,000 "invisible" Rohingya refugees 
from Burma, as well as a build-up of Burmese troops on the border 
reminiscent of the events of 1992 which almost led Prime Minister Khalada 
Zia to take the matter to the Security Council. All the neighbours get an 
abysmally-managed country sitting right in the middle of the region which 
as a pariah state is excluded from international assistance and for these 
and other reasons is a major block to regional development.

What is needed is clearly international and regional coordination to bring 
Burma back to the rule of law and sensible economic management. This may or 
may not involve sanctions. The fact that the neighbours use a soft and the 
Western group a harder approach should not prevent coordination. After all, 
if someone offering a carrot and another wielding a stick are trying to get 
a donkey to move to the north-east corner of a field, they can coordinate 
easily, so long as they agree on where they want the donkey to go, and 
apply the measures to the appropriate ends. A prosperous, economically 
stable Burma is in everybody's interest. Perhaps the implementation of the 
ILO measures will provide an international stimulus and context for a 
coordinated movement towards this goal.

19 November 2000

N.B. David Arnott will be travelling till the end of December.
You can keep on sending messages, but do not expect replies.

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<font face=3D"Courier New, Courier">SANCTIONS? MAYBE, MAYBE NOT<br>
<br>
by David Arnott (Burma Peace Foundation, Geneva)<br>
<br>
<br>
Summary<br>
<br>
On 30 November the measures adopted&nbsp; in June by the International
Labour Conference will take effect, but these cannot be described as
sanctions. They might possibly lead to sanctions in some cases, but this
will be decided by the ILO constituents (governments, workers and
employers) and the ILO's fellow international organisations. On the other
hand, the measures provide the Burma support community in its widest
sense with a new set of tools for combatting forced labour in Burma and
even, perhaps, achieving effective international coordination in
developing long-term solutions.<br>
<br>
<br>
The ILO measures<br>
<br>
On 16 November 2000, the Governing&nbsp; Body of the International Labour
Organisation declared by an overwhelming show of hands that it was
&quot;not satisfied&quot; that Burma had taken the necessary steps to
fulfill the recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry. The
measures adopted in June 2000 by the International Labour Conference
(ILC) will therefore take effect from 30 November.<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Out of the 56 members, only China, Russia, Malaysia and India raised
their hands to declare themselves &quot;satisfied&quot;. Japan and some
others did not declare themselves either way. It is regrettable that
Japan, India, China and the ASEAN countries could not be drawn into a
consensus, even though this might have meant sacrificing one or more of
the measures, since they are the countries with the greatest influence on
the Burmese military, and their support would have made the ILO action
more effective.<br>
<br>
Central to the debate were the recommendations of the ILO Commission of
Inquiry into forced labour in Burma. These are, in brief, that Burma
should (1) bring its legislation into line with ILO Convention 29 which
prohibits forced labour (some of Burma's laws, dating back to the British
colonial period, permit forced labour); (2) end the recruitment of forced
labour in actual practice, particularly by the military; and (3) punish
those found guilty of exacting forced labour. If the Governing Body had
been satisfied that Burma had adopted the necessary framework for
fulfilling these recommendations, the ILC measures would not have been
implemented. This did not occur, however.<br>
<br>
The measures, which will take effect from 30 November, are:<br>
<br>
(a) to decide that the question of the implementation of the Commission
of Inquiry's recommendations and of the application of Convention No. 29
by Myanmar should be discussed at future sessions of the International
Labour Conference, at a sitting of the Committee on the Application of
Standards specially set aside for the purpose, so long as this Member has
not been shown to have fulfilled its obligations;<br>
<br>
(b) to recommend to the Organization's constituents as a whole --
governments, employers and workers -- that they: (i) review, in the light
of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, the relations that they
may have with the member State concerned and take appropriate measures to
ensure that the said Member cannot take advantage of such relations to
perpetuate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labour referred
to by the Commission of Inquiry, and to contribute as far as possible to
the implementation of its recommendations; and (ii) report back in due
course and at appropriate intervals to the Governing Body;<br>
<br>
(c) as regards international organizations, to invite the
Director-General: (i) to inform the international organizations referred
to in article 12, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the Member's
failure to comply; (ii) to call on the relevant bodies of these
organizations to reconsider, within their terms of reference and in the
light of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, any cooperation
they may be engaged in with the Member concerned and, if appropriate, to
cease as soon as possible any activity that could have the effect of
directly or indirectly abetting the practice of forced or compulsory
labour; <br>
&nbsp;<br>
(d) regarding the United Nations specifically, to invite the
Director-General to request the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to
place an item on the agenda of its July 2001 session concerning the
failure of Myanmar to implement the recommendations contained in the
report of the Commission of Inquiry and seeking the adoption of
recommendations directed by ECOSOC or by the General Assembly, or by
both, to governments and to other specialized agencies and including
requests similar to those proposed in paragraphs (b) and (c) above;<br>
<br>
(e) to invite the Director-General to submit to the Governing Body, in
the appropriate manner and at suitable intervals, a periodic report on
the outcome of the measures set out in paragraphs (c) and (d) above, and
to inform the international organizations concerned of any developments
in the implementation by Myanmar of the recommendations of the Commission
of Inquiry; (from the ILC resolution, 15 June 2000)<br>
<br>
These paragraphs merit careful reading, alongside the conclusions and
recommendations of the&nbsp; report of the Commission of Inquiry, the
legal document which is central to the ILO action on Burma. It can be
found at
<a=
 href=3D"http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myan=
mar.htm"=
 eudora=3D"autourl">www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/=
myanmar.htm</a><br>
&nbsp;<br>
<br>
How the measures might work<br>
<br>
These notes are somewhat speculative, and really only deal with measure
(b), the recommendation to the ILO constituents.&nbsp; Measures (c)
and&nbsp; (d) are intriguing, but it is too early to see how they will
go. Measures (a) and (e) deal mainly with reporting.<br>
<br>
The ILO itself cannot impose sanctions. What it has done by adopting
these measures is to call for action by its tripartite constituents and
fellow international organisations. The measures give multilateral
legitimation to bilateral action by governments, employers, workers and
international organisations to take what steps they can to end forced
labour in Burma and in particular, make sure their relations with Burma
are not used, directly or indirectly,&nbsp; to increase or abet forced
labour. This also means that it will make very little difference if the
SPDC stops &quot;cooperating&quot; with the ILO, since the initiative is
now with the other actors.<br>
<br>
Since this is the first time the ILO has taken such a step, no-one really
knows how or even if it will work. It is now up to governments, trade
unions,&nbsp; employers and international organisations to explore what
actions they can take with the new powers provided by the measures.&nbsp;
There is a complex set of interactions that could come into play: certain
governments, for instance, might not wish to accede to the ILO's request,
and there is nothing the ILO can do to force them. However, trade unions
in those countries might have a different position, and see it as part of
their responsibility under the ILO measures to put pressure on their
governments to take action. Or trade unions with members who work for
companies trading with or investing in Burma might feel obliged to act
within the company - a first step might be serious discussions with the
directors. An active government, especially if supported by trade unions
and prodded by its neighbourhood Burma support group, might use the
measures as extra leverage to persuade a recalcitrant company to withdraw
from Burma. We may expect some interesting manoeuvres in France and
Belgium involving the trade unions, the two governments and TotalFinaElf
(the Franco-Belgian oil company operating in Burma), no doubt chivvied
along and cheered on by the French and Belgian Burma groups.<br>
<br>
Supporters of democracy in Burma including ethical investment groups,
some governments, trade unions, Burma solidarity groups and others will
therefore find in these measures a new legal framework for working
together on initiatives to end forced labour in Burma (and let us not
forget that the Burmese military regime is dependent on forced labour for
its survival, since the regime is the army, and the army depends on
forced labour for its survival in the field). Such initiatives can now be
regarded not as bilateral or individual, but as steps taken at the
explicit request of the international community. The measures would makes
it much easier for the European Union, for instance, or individual
European states such as Britain, to impose sanctions if they think this
is the best policy. <br>
<br>
<br>
Towards coordination<br>
<br>
But these synergistic interactions and possibilities, interesting and
exciting as they may seem, are unlikely to bring about long-term change
unless they are carefully thought out and coordinated at the
international and particularly, at the regional level. This means with
Burma's neighbours and Japan. <br>
<br>
It would be a mistake to think that the region is happy with Burma. The
situation in Burma is a problem for everyone, first for its own people,
and secondly, for the neighbours. China gets heroin, AIDS, unstable trade
and a dead end for the development of Yunnan and neighbouring provinces;
India gets heroin, AIDS, unstable borders and refugee flows; Thailand
gets a growing methamphetamine crisis, border clashes, eccentric trading
restrictions and refugee flows. In addition to the 20,000 or so remaining
in the camps, Bangladesh has up to 200,000 &quot;invisible&quot; Rohingya
refugees from Burma, as well as a build-up of Burmese troops on the
border reminiscent of the events of 1992 which almost led Prime Minister
Khalada Zia to take the matter to the Security Council. All the
neighbours get an abysmally-managed country sitting right in the middle
of the region which as a pariah state is excluded from international
assistance and for these and other reasons is a major block to regional
development. <br>
<br>
What is needed is clearly international and regional coordination to
bring Burma back to the rule of law and sensible economic management.
This may or may not involve sanctions. The fact that the neighbours use a
soft and the Western group a harder approach should not prevent
coordination. After all, if someone offering a carrot and another
wielding a stick are trying to get a donkey to move to the north-east
corner of a field, they can coordinate easily, so long as they agree on
where they want the donkey to go, and apply the measures to the
appropriate ends. A prosperous, economically stable Burma is in
everybody's interest. Perhaps the implementation of the ILO measures will
provide an international stimulus and context for a coordinated movement
towards this goal.<br>
<br>
19 November 2000<br>
<br>
N.B. David Arnott will be travelling till the end of December. <br>
You can keep on sending messages, but do not expect replies.<br>
</font></html>

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