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Subject: [theburmanetnews] BurmaNet News: March 3, 2000
=========== THE BURMANET NEWS ===========
== An on-line newspaper covering Burma ==
=========== www.burmanet.org ============
To view the version of this issue with photographs,
go to-
http://theburmanetnews.editthispage.com/stories/storyReader$161
NOTED IN PASSING:
'To keep the lid on the spread of malaria and the
deadly HIV virus, the [Thai] government needs to
encourage Rangoon to take an urgent and viable
approach to it, not the least of which would be a
political solution to the armed conflicts in the country
to allow the displaced to return home. Otherwise, no
amount of humanitarian aid can effectively stop
this human suffering.'
Editorial in The Nation newspaper (See NATION: REFUGEE HEALTH CRISIS
NEEDS MORE THAN AID)
Friday, March 3, 2000
Issue # 1477
Inside Burma--
ASIAWEEK: DIPLOMATIC RECALL
AFP: MYANMAR ACCUSES US OF HYPROCRISY
SPDC: U.S. COOPERATION ESSENTIAL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
NARCOTIC DRUGS
TANJUG (Yugoslavia) YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER ON OFFICIAL VISIT TO
BURMA
International--
AP: 50 KAREN REBEL SOLDIERS FEARED EXECUTED ALONG BORDER
RADIO JAPAN: JAPAN TO JOIN GROUP TO ASSIST ECONOMIC CHANGE IN BURMA
BANGKOK POST: TALKS TO SUPPRESS ILLEGAL DRUGS
USG: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, 1999
Opinion/Editorial--
NATION: REFUGEE HEALTH CRISIS NEEDS MORE THAN AID
WASHINGTON POST: THE PAEZ AND BERZON VOTES
=========================================
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
INSIDE BURMA
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
ASIAWEEK: DIPLOMATIC RECALL
March 3, 2000
It has not been announced publicly, but Asiaweek
has learned that all of Myanmar's ambassadors have
been ordered to return home for an unprecedented meeting.
It will take place in March, shortly before an international
conference in Seoul to discuss ways of bringing the Yangon
junta in out of the cold (see THE NATIONS, Jan. 14). The
Korean session replicates a 1998 World Bank-U.N.
sponsored meeting in Chilston Park, England, that
reportedly tried to win over the military leaders with
a $ 1 billion aid package in exchange for political
liberalization -- an initiative that remains stalled.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
AFP: MYANMAR ACCUSES US OF HYPROCRISY
YANGON, March 3 (AFP) - Myanmar accused the
United States of hypocrisy Friday in an angry
response to a report which found the junta had done
little to shed its tag as one of the world's top
opium producers. In a statement sent to AFP, a
government spokesman said Washington was "scapegoating"
drugs producers and should instead tackle its own
drugs problem.
"Efforts to eliminate narcotic drugs cannot and must not
be pushed on the shoulders of other nations while the nation
with the biggest drug market ... is self exempted from
any kind of blame," said the statement.
The spokesman said Washington should fund anti-drugs
efforts in Myanmar and other states instead of
simply offering criticism.
In the 1999 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report the US on Wednesday renewed
its designation of Myanmar and Afghanistan as
uncooperative in the fight against drugs.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said
a drop in opium yields in the military-ruled
state was the result of bad weather rather
than a serious anti-drugs drive.
The Myanmar spokesman said the assessment
had been critical of Myanmar for "political
reasons," adding that agents of the US Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) had carried
out six joint opium yield surveys with the
government.
Officials here often portray criticism of the
drugs trade as a political plot to undermine
the government which refuses to hand over power to
the elected opposition of Aung San Suu Kyi.
Myanmar has introduced a program which it says
will wipe out drugs production within 15 years
and officials say they are determined to shed the
pariah status f drugs producer.
Critics charge however that even if it is
serious about reducing heroin production,
Myanmar encourages the trade in amphetamines
which are easy to produce and export.
The spokesman claimed that unlike the State
Department, DEA agents "do understand and
do appreciate Myanmar's efforts in the fight
against drugs."
The US was among countries which last year
boycotted an Interpol drugs conference in
Yangon at which senior officials called
for cooperation and foreign funding for
anti-narcotics efforts. Interpol's director
of criminal intelligence Paul Higdon described
such cooperation as "a pact with the devil"
at a conference in aYngon last year, but
nevertheless endorsed Myanmar's anti-drugs
policies.
Critics of Myanmar's vaunted efforts to fight
drugs, accuse the government of turning a blind
eye to trafficking in exchange for ceasefire deals
with ethnic groups.
They say generals have siphoned off drug money to
support their military state apparatus and harbour
drug lords like notorious Shan State kingpin Khun Sa.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
SPDC: U.S. COOPERATION ESSENTIAL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
NARCOTIC DRUGS
>From MYANMAR INFORMATION COMMITTEE, YANGON
Information Sheet No.B-1284 (I) 3rd March, 2000
It is not surprising that for political reason the
U.S. State Department has put Myanmar under the
uncooperative country list again. While the State
Department is issuing such hypocritical statements the
Government of Myanmar has recently exercised a joint
annual opium-yield survey together with U.S. officials
for the sixth time already. It is also not surprising
that D.E.A. and other U.S. drug experts are not in
favor of their State Department's allegations on
Myanmar since they do understand and do appreciate
Myanmar's efforts in the fight against the narcotic
drugs.
In reality, the efforts to eliminate narcotic drugs
cannot and must not be pushed on the shoulders of
other nations while the nation itself, with the
biggest
drug- market including the organized criminal
syndicates and major commercial banks which are
running the money laundering making fortunes is
self-exempted from any kind of blame. Myanmar believes
that the U.S. Government should also shoulder its
shared responsibility in this fight against the
narcotic drugs. Giving out some funds to certain
countries while scapegoating others will not solve
much of the drug problem we are facing today.
The key point for the success of eliminating the
narcotic drugs is an essential cooperation rather than
scapegoating of the U.S. which is the world's biggest
market for almost all kinds of narcotic drugs in
putting its political agenda aside and working
together with the world community seriously and
sincerely in the global fight against the narcotic
drugs.
Just holding the purse does not give any nation the
right to finger point and scapegoat other nations and
to manage an automatic exemption from sharing
responsibilities with the others.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
REUTERS: MYANMAR SAYS IT WILL TURN DRUG KINGPIN BASE
INTO TOURIST RESORT
YANGON, March 3 (Reuters) - Myanmar's ruling
generals plan to turn a former base of a notorious
heroin kingpin into a tourist resort, official
media reported on Friday.
``Arrangements are being made to develop tourism
in Homong, which has the potential to become a
tourist destination,'' the official Myanma
News Agency quoted powerful military intelligence
chief Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt as saying on
Thursday.
He said arrangements were being made to
establish administrative bodies so Homong
could function as a town and to improve the
surrounding economy by encouraging rice
cultivation and hydropower generation.
Homong, in northeastern Myanmar close to the
Thai border, was formerly the base of Khun Sa,
a warlord wanted in the United States for heroin
trafficking.
Khun Sa surrendered to the generals in 1996 but
Yangon has since rejected U.S. extradition calls,
saying no treaty exists with Washington.
On Thursday, a Myanmar government spokesman denied
a news report that said Khun Sa, who has been allowed
to live free in Yangon for the past four years, planned
to move back to Homong.
`Khun Sa is not moving to Homong. He is living here
and I am sure he does not want to live there,''
the spokesman said. Earlier this year, the
Myanmar government said tens of thousands of
ethnic Wa opium growers were being moved from homes
in hills on the China border to the area around
Homong. It said the aim was to wipe out opium
production, but Thai narcotics officials said
last month they suspected the plan was to
shift drug production closer to Thailand.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
TANJUG (Yugoslavia) YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER ON
OFFICIAL VISIT TO BURMA
Source: Tanjug news agency, Belgrade, in English 1437
gmt 1 Mar 00
Text of report in English by Yugoslav state news agency Tanjug
Yangon, 1st March: The Yugoslav delegation headed by
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic arrived
Wednesday [1st March] in Yangon, capital city of Myanmar
(former Burma).
Minister Jovanovic and members of the Yugoslav
delegation were welcomed and greeted at the airport
in Yangon by Foreign Minister U Win Aung and his aides.
Immediately upon arrival official talks started in the
Foreign Ministry of Myanmar.
Welcoming Minister Jovanovic, Minister Aung expressed
deep respect for the courage of the Yugoslavs in their
resistance, as he said, to the unjustified and brutal
NATO attack.
Today the Yugoslav delegation will be received by the
secretary of the State Peace and Development Council,
supreme body ruling that Asian state, Lt-Gen
Khin Nyunt.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
INTERNATIONAL
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
AP: 50 KAREN REBEL SOLDIERS FEARED EXECUTED ALONG BORDER
2 March 2000
Fifty Karen National Union rebel soldiers, who
were last seen being led away by Thai troops,
are believed to have been executed over the
last two days along the Thai-Myanmar border.
They are believed to have been taking their
families across the border to Thailand when
the kingdom's officials prevented them from
entering while admitting their family members.
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which
reported the missing men, have asked the
Thai government for an explanation, but
the situation has increased the already
delicate border situation between the two sides.
For more, we cross to our Indochina correspondent
Romen Bose who spoke to border officials and
NGOs when he visited the border earlier Thursday.
Q1. Romen, what is the situation at the border at
this point?
Romen: Tense
Q2. What is the status of the various Myanmar
dissident groups along the border?
Romen: Student groups have been closing down
offices as Thai officials clamp down, foil
the siege, groups now a thorn in the side for
both Thai and Myanmar governments, rebuilding
of trust needed.
Q3: Romen, there have also been refugee camps
on the Thai side. Will they be closed down?
Romen: Camps cater to Karen ethnic minorities
- groups that will continue to remain here
because, (they are) clearly under the protection
UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Able to
stay. But I understand it is quite clear
that some 140,000 Shan minority located just
next to the Karen are being moved further
down to Shan state - viewed by Thais as a
shift of the drug trade closer to Thailand.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
RADIO JAPAN: JAPAN TO JOIN GROUP TO ASSIST ECONOMIC CHANGE IN BURMA
NHK World Network, Tokyo, in English 0600 gmt 2 Mar
Text of report by Radio Japan on 2nd March
Japan and Myanmar [Burma] have agreed to set
up an inter-governmental body to discuss how
to help Myanmar change its economic structure.
Officials from the two countries agreed on the
plan at a meeting in Yangon [Rangoon] on
Wednesday [1st March]. Japanese Foreign
Ministry officials say they proposed setting
up the joint experts' group in order to encourage
Myanmar to make economic changes. Myanmar agreed
to setting this body up.
The Japanese government had long been hesitant about
giving economic aid to the military government of Myanmar
without first seeing more democratization, but after
Myanmar was admitted to the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations [ASEAN] three years ago, Japan decided
to help the country as part of a general closing
[as heard] of ties with ASEAN countries.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
BANGKOK POST: TALKS TO SUPPRESS ILLEGAL DRUGS
March 3, 2000
Yuwadee Tunyasiri
Prime Minister's Office Minister Jurin Laksanavisit
and the Burmese ambassador to Thailand yesterday
discussed measures to improve Thai and Burmese
efforts to suppress illegal drugs.
Mr Jurin, who oversees the Office of the Narcotics
Control Board, held talks with Burmese envoy U Hla
Maung.
Mr Jurin said Bangkok wants Rangoon to destroy drug
production bases in Burma, especially major ones run
by the Red Wa.
The request was also made that Thailand and Burma
extend their co-operation in drug suppression to
cover other issues, including the search for drug
suspects fleeing from one country to another.
It was also suggested Rangoon should initiate
measures to ensure Wa people, relocated to border
areas opposite Mae Hong Son, do not grow plants used
to produce drugs.
The Democrat MP said the Burmese ambassador had
voiced satisfaction over Thailand's efforts to combat
the smuggling of chemicals used in the production of
amphetamines in Burma.
Under the measures, eight northern provinces and five
southern border provinces have been declared special
zones where the sale and use of 19 chemicals will be
strictly controlled. In January, Burma's military
regime launched an unprecedented relocation of 50,000
people out of prime opium growing areas near China
controlled by the United Wa State Army to more
fertile areas further south near Thailand to farm
fruit instead.
"U Hla Maung explained that the Myanmar government
has a concrete plan for people in the resettlement
plan. They were moved out of the mountainous area to
the plain because Myanmar government wants them to
stop growing [opium] poppy and start a new
profession," Mr Jurin was quoted as saying by the
Thai News Agency.
In recent years, methamphetamine has surpassed heroin
as Thailand's worst drug menace. Thai authorities
seized more than 40 million tablets of the illegal
stimulant last year, claiming that most of it was
smuggled in from Burma.
However, Burma has protested to Thailand saying that
chemicals used to make illicit drugs are imported
into that country from Thailand.
In response, Thailand on Wednesday banned caffeine-an
ingredient used to make methamphetamine-from being
transported to six northern provinces that border
northeastern Burma.
Bangkok Post (March 3, 2000)
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
USG: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, 1999
March 2, 2000
For full text of this report on State's website, go to:
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999
_narc_report/seasi99.html
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999
Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC, March 2000
[BurmaNet adds--INSCR (acronym pronounced "insker")
is released by the State Department but is the result
of an inter-agency collaboration between a number of
departments, including State, CIA, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration.]
BURMA
I. Summary
Burma is the world's second largest source
of illicit opium and heroin, with Burmese
production exceeded only by that of
Afghanistan. Due in large part to severe
drought conditions in poppy growing areas,
production and cultivation continued to
decline significantly in 1999 for the
third year in a row. In 1999 there were an
estimated 89,500 hectares under opium
poppy cultivation, down 31 percent from
1998. This cultivated area could yield up
to a maximum of 1,090 metric tons of opium
gum. The opium production figure is 38
percent lower than in 1998 and is less
than half of the average amount of
production during the last decade. The
government maintained most of its opium
crop-eradication efforts, expanding some
of these only slightly. During 1999,
seizures of methamphetamine continued to
exceed last year's record seizures,
although opium and heroin seizures were
well below 1998 figures. Burma made its
first airport seizures of narcotics in
1999. The Government of Burma (GOB) made
little, if any, effort against money
laundering during the year. While there
were cases of interdiction and arrests of
members of some cease-fire groups for
narcotics trafficking, the GOB has been
unwilling or unable to take on the most
powerful groups directly. Cease-fire
agreements with insurgent ethnic groups
dependent on the narcotics trade involve
an implicit tolerance of continued
involvement in narcotics for varying
periods of time. Burma is a party to the
1961 UN Single Convention, the 1971 UN
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and
the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
II. Status of Country
Burma has been, and continues to be, one
of the world's largest producers of
illicit opium. Burmese opium production
doubled in 1989, the year after the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC-
the military junta that now rules Burma
under the Name State Peace and Development
Council, or SPDC) took power. Production
levels remained high and stable for
several years, but production began to
decline in 1997 and dropped significantly
in 1998 and 1999. The decline in potential
production in 1999 over 1998 is largely
due to drought, although the drop also
reflects the GOB's effort to keep areas
out of opium cultivation as part of its
eradication efforts. The U.S. Government
(USG) discontinued most U.S. direct
assistance to Burma in 1988 in response to
massive human rights abuses.
Burma currently accounts for approximately
80 percent of the total production of
Southeast Asian opium. Most of this supply
of illicit opiates is produced in ethnic
minority areas of Burma's Shan State. Over
the past few years, the GOB has increased
its presence in this region, particularly
the southern portion of it, an area
formerly under the control of Chang Qifu
(Khun Sa). Since 1989, Rangoon has
negotiated cease-fire agreements with most
of the drug-trafficking groups that
control these areas, offering them limited
autonomy and development assistance in
exchange for ending their insurgencies.
The regime's highest priority is to end
insurrection and achieve some measure of
national integration; counternarcotics
interests in these areas are a lesser
priority, reflected in the fact that many
of the cease-fire agreements effectively
permit the minorities to continue their
narcotics cultivation and trafficking
activities. Moreover, the cease-fire
agreements have had the practical effect
of condoning money laundering, as the
government encouraged these groups to
invest in "legitimate" businesses as an
alternative to trafficking and some chose
this opportunity to sanitize past illicit
proceeds with investments in hotels and
construction companies, for example.
The ethnic drug-trafficking armies with
whom the government has negotiated cease-
fires (but not permanent peace accords),
such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA)
and the Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang Chinese),
remain armed and heavily involved in the
heroin trade. Through cease-fire
agreements, the GOB appears to have given
the trafficking armies varying degrees of
autonomy; for example, Burmese troops
cannot even enter Wa territory without
explicit permission. Among the top leaders
of those ethnic groups believed by the USG
to be involved in the heroin and/or
amphetamine trade are, Peng Jiasheng, and
Liu Goushi of the MNDAA; Pao Yuqiang, Li
Zuru, and Wei Xuekang of the UWSA; Mahtu
Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA); Mong
Sa La and Yang Maoliang of the Mongko
Defense Army (MDA); and Yawd Serk of the
Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA),
which was formerly part of drug lord Chang
Qifu's Mong Tai Army. Chang Qifu disbanded
his army in January 1996 in return for
generous terms of surrender, which allowed
him to avoid criminal prosecution.
U Sai Lin (Lin Mingxian) of the Eastern Shan
State Army (ESSA) has been listed in
previous years as a major narcotics
insurgent leader, but he has successfully
rid his area of opium cultivation. There
are no current, confirmed reports of Sai
Lin or the ESSA still being involved in
narcotics trafficking, although it is
likely that ESSA territory is a
trafficking route because of its location
along the border with China.
There is reason to believe that money
laundering in Burma and the return of
narcotics profits laundered elsewhere are
significant factors in the overall Burmese
economy, although the extent is impossible
to measure accurately. Political and
economic constraints on legal capital
inflows magnify the importance of
narcotics-derived funds in the economy. An
underdeveloped banking system and lack of
enforcement against money laundering have
created a business and investment
environment conducive to the use of drug-
related proceeds in legitimate commerce.
Drug abuse-in particular intravenous drug
use-is on the rise in Burma and is
accompanied by an alarming spread of the
HIV/AIDS virus, especially in the ethnic
minority areas that are the source of the
drugs. HIV/AIDS infection rates in gem and
jade mining areas are particularly high.
In the past four years, as overt military
challenges to Rangoon's authority from the
ethnic groups have eased somewhat, the
government, while maintaining its primary
focus on state security, has stepped up
its counternarcotics enforcement efforts.
The GOB garrisoned troops on a year-round
basis for the first time in the Kokang
region during 1997, but it still does not
have troops in Wa territory. The MNDAA,
the KDA, and the MDA in Shan State have
declared their intention to establish
opium-free zones in territory under their
control by the year 2000; the ESSA has
already declared its territory an opium-
free zone. The Wa have announced their
territory will be an opium-free zone by
the year 2005.
Ethnic groups have made "opium-free"
pledges since 1989, but, with the
exception of the Kachin State and ESSA
territory, results have been limited. In
view of the extensive opium cultivation in
northern Shan State, the area of greatest
opium density, expanded reduction in
cultivation will require considerable
eradication, much greater law-enforcement,
and alternative-development efforts by the
authorities. Such efforts necessitate
vastly greater financial resources than
the government has, however.
Implementation of such a program would
also require increased cooperation between
the government and the ethnic groups
involved in production and trafficking.
The GOB, for its part, stated that it
would support its eradication efforts with
development assistance in the form of
infrastructure improvements and advice on
crop substitution. The GOB also requested
USG assistance in verifying whether these
groups fulfill their commitments. The USG
has requested additional information to
pinpoint the areas in question. The GOB
has promised to provide this information.
Exchange of information on the status of
opium cultivation could then occur during
the opium poppy survey carried out jointly
with the GOB on a year-by-year basis. In
view of China's long border with the Wa
area, the GOB asked China for assistance
in curbing Wa trafficking. Both countries
have established a regular forum for
discussing counternarcotics cooperation.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1999
Policy Initiatives.
Burmese counternarcotics efforts in 1999
made progress with regard to increased
methamphetamine and ephedrine seizures and
Burma's first seizures of drugs transiting
the airport in Rangoon. An improved
security situation in parts of northern
Shan State permitted the Burmese anti-drug
forces to conduct more vigorous law-
enforcement efforts, especially in the
Kachin and Kokang regions. The GOB has
continued its cooperation with Japan to
plant opium substitute crops on 14,565
acres. Such efforts must be stepped up, if
they are to have a significant impact on
the overall trafficking problem.
With encouragement from the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and U.S.
Embassies in Rangoon and Bangkok, the
Burmese and Thai governments agreed to
undertake joint operations against drug
trafficking along Thailand's northern
border with Burma. Operation of a joint
anti-drug task force in Tachilek, Burma
and Mae Sai, Thailand, however, has been
hampered by political disharmony between
the two countries.
The Burmese continued to refuse to render
drug lord Chang Qifu on grounds that he
had not violated his 1996 surrender
agreement. This agreement reportedly
stipulated that if Chang Qifu ended his
insurgency and retired from the drug
trade, the GOB would provide him with
security in Rangoon and allow him to
conduct legitimate business. Burmese
authorities assert that he will continue
to enjoy immunity from prosecution in
Burma or rendition to another country as
long as he does not violate his surrender
agreement. This issue remains a source of
friction between Burma and the U.S. The
1988 UN Drug convention obligates parties,
including Burma, to prosecute such
traffickers. GOB officials have stated
they would be willing to prosecute Chang
Qifu or his subordinates, if it can be
proven that they have engaged in narcotics
trafficking after the surrender agreement
was signed.
The SPDC affirmed its intention to
increase its efforts to implement the
ongoing "Master Plan for the Development
of Border Areas and National Races." The
plan calls for a program of integrated
development combined with law enforcement
aimed at improving living standards in the
ethnic areas and providing viable economic
alternatives to opium cultivation. Few GOB
resources have been devoted to such
development projects, however; health,
education, and infrastructure in border
areas remain poor. GOB policy is to force
the leaders in the ethnic areas to spend
their own revenues, including from the
drug trade, on social and physical
infrastructure. The GOB's ability to
continue or expand its opium eradication
efforts is likely to be adversely affected
by the lack of such economic alternatives.
The UNDCP has begun an integrated rural
development project in the southern
portion of the Wa region in furtherance of
the United Wa State Army's unilateral
decision announced in 1995 to establish
five "opium-poppy-free zones" in its area
of control to reduce opium cultivation
gradually. The project is part of a
planned five-year, $15 million rural
development project aimed at crop
substitution and alternative development.
The project area has expanded to include 2
more townships for a total of five, with
over 200 villages participating. UNDCP has
begun projects in agriculture, road
building, water and sanitation, and
community development. The Wa project will
incorporate a monitoring and evaluation
component designed to measure progress in
eliminating opium cultivation. As an
integrated development scheme, it will
also focus on developing the
infrastructure as well as providing
educational and health facilities in the
Ho Tao and Mong Pawk districts of the Wa
region.
Accomplishments.
While the extent of the drug threat from
Burma remained high, law-enforcement
efforts, particularly seizures of
amphetamine, showed some improvement.
Opium production during 1999 showed a
significant decline; much of the decline,
however, was the result of a region-wide
drought. Seizures of 28.8 million
amphetamine tablets in 1999 represented a
notable increase over the previous year's
record seizures of 15 million tablets.
Opium and heroin seizures as of October
1999 declined from the 1998 seizure rate.
The decline largely resulted from changes
in trafficking patterns and refining
methods adopted by traffickers in response
to GOB enforcement efforts in prior years.
The combined police and military narcotics
task forces seized 273.2 kilograms of
heroin in 1999 compared to 490 kilograms
seized in 1998. By October, officials
seized 1.44 metric tons of opium, compared
with 5.2 metric tons for all of 1998. As
indicated above, opium cultivation dropped
by 31 percent and potential opium
production by 38 percent to the lowest
level in ten years. GOB law enforcement
also made its first arrests of traffickers
at Mingaladon Airport in Rangoon in
October and November, seizing a total of
10.7 kilograms of heroin. To date, the GOB
has also seized 6.43 metric tons of
ephedrine in 1999, most of it coming from
India. The GOB destroyed 23 heroin
refineries and six methamphetamine
refineries during 1999. The GOB also
eradicated 9,800 additional acres of poppy
fields, according to Burmese figures. The
USG is unable to verify the accuracy of
the eradication figures.
Law Enforcement Measures.
The 1993 Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic
Substances Law brought the Burmese legal
code into conformity with the 1988 UN Drug
Convention. As such, the 1993 law contains
useful legal tools for addressing money
laundering, the seizure of drug-related
assets, and the prosecution of drug
conspiracy cases. However, Burmese policy
and judicial officials have been slow to
implement the law, targeting few, if any,
major traffickers and their drug-related
assets. Burmese drug officials claim they
lack sufficient expertise to deal with
money laundering and financial crimes, but
money laundering is believed to be carried
out on a massive scale.
Formally, the Burmese government's drug-
enforcement efforts were led by the
Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control
(CCDAC), which is comprised of personnel
from various security services, including
the police, customs, military
intelligence, and the army. CCDAC now has
18 drug-enforcement task forces around the
country, most located in major cities and
along key transit routes near Burma's
borders with China, India, and Thailand.
The CCDAC, which is under the effective
control of the Directorate of Defense
Services Intelligence (DDSI) and relies,
in part, on military personnel to execute
law- enforcement duties, continues to
suffer from a lack of adequate resources
to support its law-enforcement mission.
Corruption. There is no evidence that the
government, on an institutional level, is
involved in the drug trade. However, there
are persistent and reliable reports that
officials, particularly corrupt army
personnel posted in outlying areas, are
either involved in the drug business or
are paid to allow the drug business to be
conducted by others. Army personnel wield
considerable political clout locally, and
their involvement in trafficking is a
significant problem. The Burmese have said
that they would welcome information from
others on corruption within their ranks,
and a few military personnel are known to
have been arrested for narcotics-related
offenses in 1999.
The lack of an enforcement effort against
money laundering encourages the use of
drug proceeds in legitimate business
ventures by traffickers or former
traffickers. Businesses owned by family
members of former or present traffickers
have invested heavily in infrastructure
projects, such as roads and port
facilities, as well as in hotels and other
real-estate development projects during
the year. Some of these investments are
intended to supplement government
expenditures on rural development projects
in areas under control of the ethnic
insurgent and trafficking groups. There is
solid evidence indicating that drug
profits formed the seed capital for many
otherwise legitimate enterprises in the
commercial services, and manufacturing
sectors.
Agreements and Treaties.
Burma is a party to the 1961 UN Single
Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN
Drug Convention. The Rangoon regime,
however, has always refused to extradite
Burmese citizens to other countries. The
United States does not have a mutual legal
assistance treaty (MLAT) with Burma. The
USG believes that a U.S.-U.K. Extradition
Treaty, which was accepted by the post-
independence Burmese government in 1948,
remains in force and is applicable to U.S.
requests for extradition of drug fugitives
from Burma. The GOB continues to refuse to
recognize the applicability of this
treaty.
The GOB is one of six nations (Burma,
Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam)
that, along with the UNDCP, signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) covering
a sub-regional action plan aimed at
controlling precursor chemicals and
reducing illicit drug use in the highlands
of Southeast Asia. In addition to periodic
meetings with counterparts from the other
signatories to the MOU, Burma has held
counternarcotics discussions with Russia
and India in 1999. The GOB signed
bilateral drug control agreements with
India in 1993, with Bangladesh in 1994,
with Vietnam in 1995, and with the Russian
Federation, Laos, and The Philippines in
1997.
Cultivation and Production.
Burma is the world's second largest
producer of opium. Potential production
decreased sharply from 1998 levels,
however, marking the third straight year
of decline after a decade of steady
production at a high level. Opium
cultivation declined an estimated 31
percent and production declined an
estimated 38 percent to 1,090 metric tons.
Since the early 1990s the areas of most
intense cultivation have gradually shifted
from southern to northern Shan State. The
bulk of the opium crop has been in areas
controlled by ethnic minority groups. The
GOB has signed or tried to sign cease-fire
agreements with many of these groups since
1989. In the last few years, however, the
GOB has begun to increase its presence in
areas previously under ethnic control,
with the notable exception of the Wa
region. The government continued its
eradication efforts during 1999 in areas
previously subject to eradication, but did
not expand the program significantly. A
drought that affected both northern and
southern areas of Shan State, was largely
responsible for the sharp decline in
potential opium production in 1999.
The GOB conducted a baseline survey of
opium cultivation for the second year
aimed at determining actual opium
production (as opposed to potential
production that the USG measures)
throughout the country. According to
Burmese figures, there were 102,066 acres
cultivated in 1999, producing a total of
449 tons. The methodology used to arrive
at these figures is unknown, and the U.S.
must rely on the higher figures resulting
from the joint U.S.-Burma opium yield
survey.
Drug Flow/Transit.
Most heroin in Burma is
produced in small, mobile labs located
near the borders with Thailand and China
in Shan State in areas controlled by
ethnic narcotics insurgencies. A growing
amount of methamphetamine is reportedly
produced in labs co-located with heroin
refineries in the Wa region and the former
Shan United Army territory in southern
Shan State. Seizures of amphetamine tabs
as of November had outpaced the record 15
million seized in 1998, reflecting the
growing popularity of methamphetamine
production among traffickers. Heroin and
methamphetamine produced by Burma's ethnic
groups are trafficked largely through
transit routes crossing the porous Chinese
and Thai borders; to a lesser extent over
the Indian, Bangladeshi, and Lao borders;
and through Rangoon onward by ship to
other countries in the region. Although
Thailand remains an important route for
Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia,
trafficking through China is on the
increase.
Acetic anhydride, an essential chemical in
the production of heroin, and ephedrine,
the principal chemical ingredient of
methamphetamine, are imported primarily
from China and India. Traffickers
continued moving heroin through central
Burma, often from Lashio through Mandalay
to Rangoon or other seaports, such as
Moulmein, for shipment to Singapore or
Malaysia. Trafficking routes leading
through Kachin and Chin States and Sagaing
Division in northern Burma to India
continued to operate as secondary routes.
Demand Reduction. Drug abuse is a growing
problem in Burma. Official estimates put
the drug-addicted population at
approximately 86,537, up from last year's
estimate of 66,463. According to UNDCP and
non-governmental organizations working in
the health sector, the actual number is
significantly higher, totaling about 400-
500,000. Heroin is cheap in Burma, and
intravenous use of heroin contributed to
the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly
in the Kachin and Shan States. According
to the GOB's "Rapid Assessment Study Of
Drug Abuse In Myanmar" sponsored by the
Ministry of Health and UNDCP in 1995, drug
treatment services are not reaching most
drug users because of a lack of
facilities, lack of properly trained
personnel, and inadequate treatment
methods. The Non-Governmental Organization
(NGO) "World Concern" is implementing a
demand-reduction project in Kachin State.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives
Direct material USG counternarcotics aid
to Burma has remained suspended since
1988, when the Burmese military brutally
repressed the pro-democracy movement. In
1998, the GOB refused to renew a crop
substitution project, Project Old Soldier,
by the U.S. NGO 101 Veterans, Inc., in 25
villages in the Kutkai area of northern
Shan State. Currently, the USG engages the
Burmese government on counternarcotics on
a very limited level. DEA, through the
U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, shares drug-
related intelligence with the GOB and
conducts joint drug-enforcement
investigations with Burmese
counternarcotics authorities. Various U.S.
agencies have conducted opium yield
surveys in the mountainous regions of the
Shan State in 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, and
1999, with essential assistance provided
by Burmese counterparts. In cooperation
with Burmese counternarcotics personnel,
the USG plans to conduct another survey in
early 2000. Results from the surveys give
both governments a much more accurate
understanding of the scope, magnitude, and
changing geographic distribution of
Burma's opium crop.
The U.S. Government continues frequently
to urge the Burmese government to take
serious steps to curb Burma's large-scale
opium production and heroin trafficking.
Specifically, the Rangoon regime has been
encouraged to:
Prosecute drug-trafficking organizations
and their leaders, and deprive them of
assets derived from the drug trade;
Take action against drug-related
corruption, including prosecution and
appropriate punishment of corrupt
officials and money launderers;
Take action against fugitive drug-
traffickers and turn them over to third
countries;
Undertake opium poppy eradication on a
wide scale in areas under its direct
control or immediate influence;
Press ethnic groups, such as the Wa, the
Kokang, and the Kachin, who have pledged
to create opium-free zones in their
regions, to make good on their
commitments;
Enforce existing anti-drug, conspiracy,
and anti-money-laundering legislation;
Provide strong support to multilateral
drug-control projects in Shan State.
Bilateral Cooperation.
USG counternarcotics cooperation with the
Burmese regime is restricted to basic law-
enforcement operations. The U.S. provides
no bilateral material or training
assistance due to U.S. concerns over
Burma's commitment to effective
counternarcotics measures, human rights,
and political reform. DEA's liaison with
Burmese policymakers and military
officials-conducted mainly through DEA's
office in Rangoon-will continue and will
focus on providing intelligence on
enforcement targets and coordinating
investigations of international drug-
trafficking groups.
The Road Ahead.
Based on experience in dealing with
significant narcotics-trafficking problems
elsewhere around the world, the USG
recognizes that ultimately large-scale and
long-term international aid, including
development assistance and law-enforcement
aid, will be needed to curb fundamentally
and irreversibly drug production and
trafficking. The USG strongly urges the
GOB to commit itself fully and
unambiguously to implementing effective
counternarcotics measures, respecting the
rule of law, punishing drug traffickers
and major trafficking organizations
(including asset forfeiture and seizure),
combating corruption, enforcing anti-
money-laundering legislation, continuing
eradication of opium cultivation,
destroying drug-processing laboratories,
and respecting human rights.
.
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OPINION/EDITORIALS
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
NATION: REFUGEE HEALTH CRISIS NEEDS MORE THAN AID
March 3, 2000
Deputy Prime Minister and Public Health Minister
Korn Dabaransi's humanitarian visit to Burma this
week was understood to be an incremental step
towards improving bilateral ties which have nose-
dived since the October storming of the Burmese
Embassy in Bangkok by five armed Burmese activists.
Korn witnessed the setting up of the first Thai-
Burmese Commission on border public health co-
operation in an urgent response to the growing
cross-border spread of malaria and HIV, the virus
which causes Aids.
Korn also handed over medical provisions, including
anti-malaria pills and other medication, as well as
medical equipment, worth about Bt5 million to his
Burmese counterpart Lt Gen Khin Nyunt as part of
the government's assistance programme to Burma
which was launched in 1992.
Khin Nyunt, who is secretary number one of the
ruling State Peace and Development Council,
strongly praised the assistance package as being a
sincere gesture and one that should be continued.
The diplomatic niceties aside, it is difficult to
know whether Rangoon is sincere about putting an
end to the well-documented human suffering along
the border, much of which it is responsible for.
While the supplies are meant to help alleviate the
suffering of Burmese people in the area, it should
be remembered that many are dying each year from
malaria and other illnesses because of fighting
between government troops and armed insurgency
groups.
At the same time, the pro-active approach has
helped health care authorities in Thai border
provinces adjacent to Burma to better control the
spread of deadly epidemics, in particular malaria
which has recently become a problem again, albeit
small at this stage. Nevertheless there was an 80
per cent increase in the number of Thais infected
with malaria and Aids along the border in Chiang
Rai last year.
The government also revealed that it spent about
Bt180 million last year on border health care
services in which 80 per cent of the clients were
Burmese migrants who had fled disease and
starvation caused by Burma's political troubles in
order to scratch out a living in Thailand.
The flip-side to this humanitarian gesture is that
Thailand may well be wasting its money, that the
aid may help to ease the health problems but will
not have any effect on the suffering inside Burma.
There is also the fact that the economic benefits
from the supply of cheap Burmese labour go only to
a handful of business people and in no way matches
the hidden cost of social damage caused by the
intake of migrants.
The government should be aware that this evanescent
assistance could serve to perpetuate Rangoon's
harsh treatment and annihilation of its people.
Cooperation with Thailand could also assist Rangoon
to attract more financial resources that it badly
needs even as international sanctions against its
repressive regime remain intact.
The stark reality is that it is the continued
conflicts in Burma that have been the main
contributor to the country's internal displacement.
Relief workers at Bangkok's recent regional meeting
on internally-displaced persons have estimated
there are five million displaced people in Asia,
with the Burmese making up the biggest portion in
Southeast Asia.
To keep the lid on the spread of malaria and the
deadly HIV virus, the government needs to encourage
Rangoon to take an urgent and viable approach to
it, not the least of which would be a political
solution to the armed conflicts in the country to
allow the displaced to return home. Otherwise, no
amount of humanitarian aid can effectively stop
this human suffering.
The Nation
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
WASHINGTON POST: THE PAEZ AND BERZON VOTES
March 3, 2000
SENATE MAJORITY Leader Trent Lott has indicated
that the Senate will finally hold up-or-down
votes on judicial nominees Richard Paez and
Marsha Berzon by March 15. Judge Paez has waited
four years for the Senate to consider his
nomination, and Ms. Berzon has waited two. Both
nominees to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals are
well qualified. It is time both were confirmed.
The ostensible reason for the opposition to these
appointments is that the nominees allegedly harbor
tendencies toward "judicial activism." In neither
case, however, is the allegation justified. Judge
Paez made a single ill-advised remark about a
proposed anti-affirmative action ballot initiative
in California; his opponents also criticize him
because, as a district court judge, he refused
to dismiss a human rights lawsuit against a
company doing business in Burma. Ms. Berzon stands
accused of favoring abortion rights and supporting
the labor movement. Such positions may trouble
principled conservatives, but they are not the sort
of ideological differences that should keep
well-qualified nominees off the bench.
Some conservatives dislike the comparative
liberalism of the 9th Circuit itself and
so are reluctant to confirm judges who do
not obviously break with that court's current
tendency. But diversity among circuits
is healthy, and the 9th Circuit is by no
means a rogue operation out of the bounds
of respectable legal thinking. Judge Paez
and Ms. Berzon would be good additions to
the court--and they have waited too long for
the Senate to say so
[BurmaNet adds: Judge Richard Paez is presiding
over the two cases filed primarily by Burmese
refugees who claim they were subjected to forced
labor, forced relocation and other harms because
of the Yadana Pipeline, a joint venture between
Union Oil of California (Unocal), Total and the
Burmese regime.
Currently, both cases are nearing the end of
discovery and Unocal has moved for summary judgment.
Depending on the outcome of the summary judgment
motions, it is possible the cases could go to trial
during 2000.
If Judge Paez is confirmed for a seat on the
9th Circuit, the cases would have to be
turned over to another Federal judge in
Los Angeles and could significantly delay
the trial.
Related Link: http://www.burmafund.org/Research_Li
brary/yadana_natural_gas_pipeline_proj.htm
End]
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The BurmaNet News is an Internet newspaper providing
comprehensive coverage of news and opinion on Burma
(Myanmar). For a subscription to Burma's only free
daily newspaper, write to: strider@xxxxxxx
Voice mail +1 (435) 304-9274
Fax +1 (810)454-4740
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