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John Ralston Saul speech



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<font size=3D2>SPEECH BY JOHN RALSTON SAUL<br>
1999 JOHN HUMPHREY FREEDOM AWARD CEREMONIES<br>
MONTREAL, DECEMBER 10, 1999<br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0 It seems for me, that every time I speak about Burma =97it=92s =
been
20<br>
years now=97 I have to be cautious. I come, as many of us do here, from
a<br>
country in which human rights and freedom of speech mean something that
is<br>
clearly defined. There are some flaws. Some things are missing. There are
a<br>
couple of mistakes and weaknesses, but it is mainly well defined. Let=92s
for<br>
a moment turn ourselves towards people that live in a different
situation,<br>
in which human rights and freedom of speech are not as well defined,
living<br>
in some kind of anarchy. Let=92s turn to them with modesty and
restraint.<br>
Individuals like Min Ko Naing and Dr. Cynthia Maung do not need our<br>
sympathy, our emotions, our love, our lessons or the certainties=20
and<br>
opinions that emerge from our comfort. They need our respect. We need
to<br>
give them our admiration. We need to be ready to put ourselves beside
them,<br>
even in our comfort situation, and as Mr. Allmand, president of
ICHRDD,<br>
said, to defend, even if it is just a little, their rights, which do
not<br>
exist at this moment. It is somehow important to show our inability
to<br>
understand their personal strength, mainly because we have not lived
their<br>
situation, though some persons here may have lived them. People=20
from<br>
Canada, the United States or Europe generally never experience that<br>
reality. We cannot imagine the lives they are living. Many of us have
seen<br>
that kind of situation, by visiting countries just as I=92ve visited
Kosovo<br>
recently, just as when I visited Burma ten years ago, looking at
Burma<br>
during the eighties. But visiting a country is not living a situation.
It<br>
isn=92t experimenting imprisonment, being an =91outcast=92 as is one of
our<br>
recipients tonight. So when I talk about Burma, I always do it with
certain<br>
reservations, mainly because the particular situation is so
appalling.<br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Above all, I am very careful always to put forward easy,
clear,<br>
certain answers to the obvious problems of Burma. I have a tendency
to<br>
force myself to speak with a certain pessimism about Burma. If you
don=92t<br>
speak with a certain pessimism, you are pretending that it is going to
be<br>
easier or that it can be done in a classical Canadian way, as opposed
to<br>
the very difficult and complex way which Dr. Cynthia knows far better
than<br>
we do and Aung San Suu Kyi knows far better than we do, sitting in a
form<br>
of prison for years.<br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 I=92ll give you a small example of why I am careful. Twenty =
years
ago,<br>
I started writing about, something which many of us knew then: the<br>
involvement of the military junta in Burma, in the drug trade. For
years,<br>
it was impossible to get any respectable newspaper or Western government
to<br>
pay attention to this fact. Because international politics is
international<br>
politics: There is a certain nobility to the diplomatic profession and
to<br>
the journalistic profession when they are writing about diplomacy. On
the<br>
other hand, drugs is police work and that=92s not dignified. It belongs
on<br>
another page in the newspapers or in police headquarters, not in
diplomatic<br>
headquarters. The result was that it was for years impossible to get
people<br>
to discuss openly the fact that Burmese leaders were involved in some
ways<br>
in drug traffic. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Finally, about three or four years ago, there was a
breakthrough.<br>
Western governments began to say what they should have said long
before,<br>
which was the self-evident involvement of the junta in various ways and
at<br>
various levels. Only now have we begun to talk about the fact that
this<br>
repetitive war on drugs in the United States and Canada is directly
related<br>
to our policies on Burma. Most of the heroin on our streets comes
from<br>
Burma and the junta in Burma plays some sort of role in that heroin
getting<br>
this far. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 If we were serious about a war on drugs, we would be putting
an<br>
enormous effort, throughout the Western world, I=92m not talking about
any<br>
specific government, into working for a change in Burma. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 People say that it is hard to get public attention for the
situation<br>
in Burma because we have so little relations, we sell and buy so
little,<br>
people know so little. I can only suggest that every time we say the
word<br>
=91heroin=92, =91overdose=92, =91addiction=92, =91organized crime=92, =91cri=
me-related=92
or<br>
=91death of youth in the street=92 we simply add three words: =91Burmese
military<br>
rulers=92. It will then become far easier to concentrate on the situation
in<br>
Burma as being absolutely central to the situation in our streets in
the<br>
West. If Burmese military rulers is too long, we could use the word
SLORC<br>
(State Law and Order Restoration Council), which I persist in using
as<br>
being an accurate description somehow, verbally, the sound of it
seems<br>
right. Just as Burma is more accurate, SLORC sounds right for what we
are<br>
dealing with. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 I would suggest also that when people talk or argue about=
 the<br>
possible benefits of investing in Burma=97building a pipeline for
example<br>
from Burma to Thailand and talking about the positive trickle down
effects<br>
(there are none but which people talk about and the slave labour
which<br>
there was), I think it would be interesting to do a bit of=20
inclusive<br>
economics calculations. Even if there were a trickle down effect, or
a<br>
benefit from the pipeline (which there was not), how much was it and
how<br>
much is the cost=97direct and indirect=97of the heroin in our streets
coming<br>
directly from Burma with some involvement from the military junta in
that<br>
country? How do they stack up against each other? Well, we know very
well.<br>
At the most optimistic, the trickle down would be a few million. At
the<br>
most modest, the heroin effect is billions and billions of dollars.=20
<br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 There is an increasing number of respectable and responsible
people<br>
in the Western world who are saying we have got to be more rational
and<br>
productive in terms of Burma because we have been working at this
for<br>
awhile (a few years in other words; sort of a decade). What we are
doing<br>
doesn=92t work, so we must try something else. I would call this personally
a<br>
western frenetic approach towards public policy, the administrative<br>
approach, the management approach. It is very short term. We have got
to<br>
have results in the quarter, in the year, in the five years. If you
don=92t<br>
have results, then you are failing and therefore you=92ve got to do
something<br>
else. It is a very, very management view of reality and of course
reality<br>
has nothing to do with management, particularly in a situation such
as<br>
Burma. It isn=92t about quarterly reports. It isn=92t about showing progress
in<br>
the short term. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 The choices of people like Dr. Cynthia and Min Ko Naing
demonstrate<br>
to us that it isn=92t about short term results. It=92s about being ready
to<br>
engage for the long term. Their approach and the approach of people
like<br>
them, Aung San Suu Kyi, show that there is another view, another
approach<br>
which is not only possible but is probably the only approach possible
if<br>
you live inside a society like the Burmese society today. There is
an<br>
astonishing combination in their lives, it seems to me, between
courageous<br>
impatience i.e. willing to take risks with their lives, combined
with<br>
stubborn patience, ready to take the time necessary to get real change.
<br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 On top of that they have a memory, a positive memory, a real
memory<br>
of what has come before. I didn=92t experience or visit the first two
decades<br>
of the Burma of Ne Win from 1962 on, but I read a lot about them. I
knew<br>
the Burma of his last real decade, the eighties. That=92s when I was there
on<br>
a regular basis. That=92s what I wrote about. So that=92s three decades=97no=
t
10<br>
years, not two years, three decades=97and then 1988 happened and the
violence<br>
and the deaths and suddenly Burma disappeared and it was as if we
were<br>
beginning afresh. We no longer had a memory of those three decades
and<br>
instead we had another place called Myanmar so that you couldn=92t push
a<br>
button on a computer and have the history of the preceding decades come
up.<br>
I am joking slightly but only slightly. A new situation, apparently,
with<br>
new dictators, a new name SLORC and then suddenly 10 years later
another<br>
new name, the SPDC (State Peace Development Council). Apparently a
new<br>
situation again but of course the SPDC is the SLORC and the SLORC is
the<br>
military group which came out of and is part of Ne Win. This is still
the<br>
1962 regime of Ne Win. Soldiers grow old but they replace each other
even<br>
in situations like this. We are looking at an extremely long-lived
rogue<br>
regime, which alters itself by slight degrees every five, 10, 15 years.
But<br>
it=92s the same regime, with the same philosophy, and the same
approach.<br>
Nothing fundamental has changed since 1962. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Now, I hear phrases today from people who don=92t want to re=
member
that<br>
it goes back to 1962, saying things like our influence over Burma is
weak<br>
because we don=92t trade enough with them. If only we traded more, then
we<br>
would have more influence over them. Well, there are many other people
who<br>
have traded with Burma since 1962 who have invested in Burma in the 70s,
in<br>
the 80s, over the last 10 years and today. Do any of them have any<br>
influence over the regime? Is there any indication over the last
decades<br>
that by investing in Burma you would get any influence over this
regime?<br>
There isn=92t a single example of it. Japan, Thailand, nobody has gained
any<br>
influence by putting money into the country through economic investment.
<br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Secondly, I hear people trotting out the classic Western
argument<br>
that if we invested then there would be a trickle down effect that
would<br>
create a middle class. A middle class would lead to liberalization
and<br>
liberalization would lead towards democracy. You=92ve all heard that sort
of<br>
argument but that approach has also been tried several times over the
last<br>
30 years. Most recently it was tried just before 1988 and of course it
was<br>
tried in a small way through the pipeline to which I made reference and
it<br>
was very clear. We were promised by the people building the pipeline
that<br>
it would have an effect. I quote from their spokesperson, =91We believe
our<br>
presence in the region is a force for progress for economic and
social<br>
development.=92 Allright, the pipeline is more or less built. Has there
been<br>
progress? Has there been economic development? Has there been a
trickle<br>
down? No! There hasn=92t! We just have to remember that it didn=92t work.
It<br>
didn=92t turn out the way they said it would turn out. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 There is a third phrase I hear increasingly, which is :
normalize<br>
relations and then we=92ll sort of draw them out into a conversation. And
as<br>
a result of that the military were allowed into ASEAN (Association
of<br>
South-East Asian Nations) and they=92ve been in ASEAN for a little while
now<br>
and what has changed? Have they been drawn out? Has ASEAN gained
influence<br>
over them? Has something changed for the better? No! Nothing has
changed!<br>
It is still exactly the same as it was in 1962, 1963, and I won=92t=20
go<br>
through the years since then one by one=85 Nothing has changed through
this<br>
approach. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 My own sense of this regime, and I have said this in various
ways<br>
before, is that it is a very peculiar regime. If you don=92t focus on
the<br>
peculiarity of it, it is very difficult to deal with it. It is an
extremely<br>
mediocre regime. These are mediocre people. They don=92t even have=20
the<br>
glorious ambitions of your classic dictators. They are not in it for
the<br>
money, except for small amounts of money. This is a very rich
country,<br>
Burma. They could be making hundreds and hundreds of millions of
dollars,<br>
billions of dollars, but they=92re not. They=92re making five million
dollars,<br>
10 million dollars. It=92s very mediocre. And they=92re not in it for
the<br>
glory. It=92s very unglorious, their regime. It=92s very small
potatoes=97except<br>
for the deaths of individuals. It=92s a regime of mediocre people clinging
to<br>
the minimum sort of power for small amounts of money. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 These are people who are willing to destroy their own countr=
y
in<br>
order to hang on. And this is rarer than we believe, dictators who
are<br>
willing to open fire on their own citizens in order to hang on. I mean
most<br>
unpleasant dictators are willing to kill a few people, a few of their
own<br>
citizens, but very few of them are actually willing to kill thousands
of<br>
their own citizens. It=92s a relatively rare phenomenon. It is what I call
a<br>
rogue regime, not a real government at all. It has no legitimacy, not
by<br>
any standards. It doesn=92t have a legitimacy that would come from
Asian<br>
standards. It is completely at variance with Asian ethical standards.
It<br>
doesn=92t even have the legitimacy of being true to the realpolitik=20
of<br>
international politics or of Asian realpolitik. It isn=92t even a real
regime<br>
by the standards of dictatorships. It isn=92t even a real dictatorship.
This<br>
idea of a rogue, marginal, peculiar r=E9gime isn=92t new. After all, we
treated<br>
South Africa as if it were a rogue regime and brought it down in the end
by<br>
doing that. In the end, we treated the Duvaliers in Haiti=97far too late
in<br>
the day but nevertheless=97as a rogue regime. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 So, having given this rather pessimistic view, what does it
mean.<br>
Well, Aung San Suu Kyi is ready to negotiate with the military without
any<br>
preconditions. In other words, she is ready to engage in a strategic
risk,<br>
which I think is a very reasonable position. She is not ready to talk
about<br>
nuts and bolts. She is willing to talk about the big picture with
them--if<br>
they are willing to do that. And equally, I think that the proposition
made<br>
by the United Nations special representative De Soto in 1998, that he
would<br>
coordinate one billion dollars of assistance in exchange for some
positive<br>
initiatives from the military is also I think a very reasonable
strategy.<br>
If you could actually get that kind of agreement, a big agreement,
then<br>
things would move in a relatively big way. And in spite of offering
enough<br>
money for all of them to go to Switzerland for the rest of their<br>
lives,wherever they want to go, there is no response. Nothing is
happening.<br>
Because that isn=92t the essence of why they are there. The corruption
of<br>
this regime is so profound that it is impossible to imagine how one
can<br>
construct a step by step rational management process towards
normalization. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 You know, John Humphrey said about the Universal Declaration=
 of
Human<br>
Rights, &quot;There has never been a more revolutionary development in
the<br>
theory and practice of international law and organization than the<br>
recognition that human rights are matters of international concern.<br>
Revolutionary, strategic. Soon we are going to have an=20
International<br>
Criminal Court, active and capable of dealing with issues and people
who<br>
resemble in many ways those who are in power in Burma. It would be
perhaps<br>
possible to apply the rules of that court to some of those people. To
apply<br>
the court to these people would be a strategic approach. To offer them
a<br>
billion dollars in return for some sort of movement would be a
strategic<br>
approach. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 I believe what we have to do is to avoid at all costs the
temptation<br>
of Western countries, avoid the comfortable trap of the Western
approach,<br>
believing that all situations are manageable in detail. Sometimes
tactics<br>
are really aimed at the people engaging in the tactics not at the<br>
situation. Sometimes tactics, while reassuring, will actually undermine
the<br>
very strategy they are designed to serve. I have always sensed that<br>
progress in Burma would come from a strategic long-term and extremely
tough<br>
approach. <br>
<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 I feel this is the message, the real message of people like
Dr.<br>
Cynthia Maung and Min Ko Naing. We must engage ourselves, but we must
also<br>
accept that there are juntas here and there that resist other
nation=92s<br>
logic and international laws. There aren=92t many in Asia, but there
are<br>
some. And in these particular cases, we must play in a different way,
aware<br>
that we play on a long term and in a risky situation. That=92s why I
guess<br>
that the jury has recognized the engagement of Dr. Cynthia Maung and Min
Ko<br>
Naing, by presenting them with the John Humphrey Freedom Award.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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