THE BATTLE OF TANGYAN

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Shan Herald Agency for News

Vol. 16, No. 6, November, 1999

THE BATTLE OF TANGYAN

A Blow That Threw A Long Shadow

 No, it wasn't quite a Saratoga. But don't tell that to Shans whose =
memories of the battle are still tinged with fond nostalgia, comparable =
to the memory of a teenage lover....... long lost but never forgotten.

Tangyan is, just as Bertil Lintner describes  it in his work, "Burma in =
Revolt", a town "on a broad, grassy plain" 83 miles southeast of Lashio, =
the Shans' northern capital. At the time when the historic battle took =
place, it was still under Mongyai's rule, a rule that was waning with =
the increasing power of the Burmese Army in the whole Shan States, which =
had joined Burma in 1947 under the treaty known as the Pang long =
Agreement.

According to the treaty, the Shan States were supposed to enjoy full =
political and financial autonomy, human rights and democracy. However, =
in 1951, the area was invaded by the Burmese Army ostensibly to help =
Shans fight against Kuomintang troops, who were occupying eastern Shan =
States as a base to "recover" China from Mao Zedung's communist rule. =
Since then, state rights, human rights and democracy had "all gone to =
hell", as one contemporary puts it.

Grievances were such that many Shans were already talking aloud of =
invoking the Union Constitution's Chapter 10, which grants both the Shan =
States and the Karennis the right to secede. To which Premier U Nu =
responded by saying, on 27 April 1957, "...the reason that the United =
States today is the strongest and most influential nation in the world =
is due to the fact that Abraham Lincoln prevented the southern States =
from seceding and thus consolidated the whole country. Only if we are =
united will our future indeed be bright. Therefore, it is my constant =
prayer that this remarkable episode from American history may serve as a =
very valuable lesson for all of us".

Not surprisingly, U Nu's thinly veiled threat did not help to calm the =
situation. Instead, this "declaration of war", as some regarded it, only =
served to heat Shan sentiments to a boiling point.

Thus, on 21 May,1958, Sao Noi a.k.a Saw Yanda, 31, a northern Shan, =
together with his small band, 31 strong, took a solemn vow to recover =
the Shan States' sovereignty and independence. With hit-and-run tactics, =
and with support from the local people along the Thai border, the =
movement grew steadily but slowly.

Tangyan was to change all that.

On 15 November 1959, Sao Hsowan of Mongyai and Bo Deving, commander of =
Mongtawn Guards, both of whom were just back from Parngtawng, Sao Noi's =
headquarters in the south, met Khun Maha, Chief Minister of Mongyai and =
Bo Maung, Wa Commander of a paramilitary Union Military Police (UM P) =
unit at the viltage of Pang Tettiao in Loimaw Tract to discuss the =
operation.

The meeting chose Bo Maung as the supreme commander of the operation. =
The participants were given individual targets to attack once hostility =
broke out. The Dark Moon day, 30 November, was fixed as D-day.

However, the next day, while the meeting participants were travelling to =
their designated locations, a clash broke out between Burmese and the =
UMPs at Son Gwei between Loimaw and Tangyan. The only choice was for the =
Shans to fight on with the available troops at hand.

Bo Dewing, with only 60 fighters, made a surprise attack the next day on =
Loi Pangpra, a strategic elevation between Mongyai and Tangyan, thus =
cutting off Burmese reinforcement to the defense of Tangyan. Bo Lai also =
staged am-bushes at Nampawng, between Lashio and Loi Pangpra, to ease =
off Bo Dewing's burden.

On 22 November, Sao Hsowan and Pawlarm Homang, with less than 300 men, =
entered Tangyan, beating drums and gongs, not unlike the Scots with =
their bagpipes.

However, 5 days later, the Burmese began their counter-attack. Bo Maung, =
who was in Panghoong trying to persuade the Gurkha unit to join him so =
he could occupy Lashio was strafed with bombs by the Burmese air force =
and had to retreat.

Then, infantry, backed by artillery, tanks and airplanes attacked both =
Loi Parngpra and Tangyan. Out manned and outgunned, Bo Deving decided to =
retire. Thus ended the battle on 30 November.

According to Martin Smith, government troops suffered 26 dead and 17 =
wounded. But, Bo Wa, who used to be Bo Maung lieutenant, thought the =
casualities could have been much higher, because the total number of =
prisoners alone was 130, most of who Burmese soldiers, police and =
civilian government servants, whom they kept locked up throughout the =
duration of the battle.

The event was also broadcast by the BBS (Burma Broadcasting Service, =
Rangoon) and the BBC.

The result was quite predictable. According to Bertil Lintner, in "Burma =
in Revolt", '(W)ord spread across the north that Bo Maung and the =
students were about to "drive the Burmese out of Shan State". Although =
based on exaggerated reports and wishful thinking, this was how the news =
was received in the villages, and more youths took to the jungle'.=20

And to Rangoon, especially the Burma Army, the Shan resistance had =
become an unwelcome reality that refused to go away unless something =
drastic was done.

More Burmese units poured into Shan hills and, with them, more abuses =
and violations, which inevitably led to more youths taking off to the =
jungles, which in turn made the Burmese military authorities more =
desperate to hold on to power...

I was 11 then and was going to school in Lashio. We talked about it =
among friends and looked out for the day when victorious Shan troops =
would be marching into the streets of Lashio. The day did not arrive, so =
I followed others into the jungle 10 years later to find out why.

For your information, I am still doing that today. So are the kids who =
were born long after the battle.

Khuensai Jaiyen



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<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff><FONT face=3DArial size=3D3>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT size=3D5><STRONG><EM>Shan Herald Agency for=20
News</EM></STRONG></FONT></P>
<P align=3Djustify><STRONG>Vol. 16, No. 6, November, 1999</STRONG></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#ff0000 size=3D4><STRONG>THE BATTLE OF=20
TANGYAN</STRONG></FONT></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT color=3D#ff0000><STRONG>A Blow That Threw A =
Long=20
Shadow</STRONG></FONT></P>
<P align=3Djustify><FONT size=3D3>&nbsp;No, it wasn't quite a Saratoga. =
But don't=20
tell that to Shans whose memories of the battle are still tinged with =
fond=20
nostalgia, comparable to the memory of a teenage lover....... long lost =
but=20
never forgot</FONT><FONT size=3D+0>ten.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>Tangyan is, just as Bertil Lintner describes&nbsp; it =
in his=20
work, "Burma in </FONT><FONT size=3D3>Revolt", a town "on a broad, =
grassy plain"=20
83 miles southeast of Lashio, the Shans' northern capital. At =
the&nbsp;time when=20
the historic battle took&nbsp;place, it was&nbsp;still under Mongyai's =
rule, a=20
rule that was waning with the increasing power of the Burmese Army in =
the whole=20
Shan States, which had joined Burma in 1947 under the treaty known as =
the Pang=20
long Agreement.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>According to the treaty, the Shan States were =
supposed to enjoy=20
full political and financial autonomy, human rights and democracy. =
However, in=20
1951, the area was invaded by the Burmese Army ostensibly to help Shans =
fight=20
against Kuomintang troops, who were occupying eastern Shan States as a =
base to=20
"recover" China from Mao Zedung's communist rule. Since then, state =
rights,=20
human rights and democracy had "all gone to hell", as one contemporary =
puts=20
it.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>Grievances were such that many Shans were already =
talking aloud=20
of invoking the Union Constitution's Chapter 10, which grants both the =
Shan=20
States and the Karennis the right to secede. To which Premier U Nu=20
responded<FONT size=3D3> by saying, on 27 April 1957, "...the reason =
that the=20
United States today is the strongest and most influential nation in the =
world is=20
due to the fact that Abraham Lincoln prevented the southern States from =
seceding=20
and thus consolidated the whole country. Only if we are united will our =
future=20
indeed be bright. Therefore, it is my constant prayer that this =
remarkable=20
episode from American history may serve as a very valuable lesson for =
all of=20
us".</P>
<P align=3Djustify>Not surprisingly, U Nu's thinly veiled threat did not =
help to=20
calm the situation. Instead, this "declaration of war", as some regarded =
it,=20
only served to heat Shan sentiments to a boiling point.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>Thus, on 21 May,1958, Sao Noi a.k.a Saw Yanda, =
31<STRONG>,=20
</STRONG>a northern Shan, together with his small band, 31 strong, took =
a solemn=20
vow to recover the Shan States' sovereignty and independence. With =
hit-and-run=20
tactics, and with support from the local people along the Thai border, =
the=20
movement grew steadily but slowly.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>Tangyan was to change all that.<B></P>
<P align=3Djustify></B>On 15 November 1959, Sao Hsowan of Mongyai and Bo =
Deving,=20
commander of Mongtawn Guards, both of whom were just back from =
Parngtawng, Sao=20
Noi's headquarters in the south, met Khun Maha, Chief Minister of =
Mongyai and Bo=20
Maung, Wa Commander of a paramilitary Union Military Police (UM P) unit =
at the=20
viltage of Pang Tettiao in Loimaw Tract to discuss the operation.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>The meeting chose Bo Maung as the supreme commander =
of the=20
operation. The participants were given individual targets to attack once =

hostility broke out. The Dark Moon day, 30 November, was fixed as =
D-day.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>However, the next day, while the meeting participants =
were=20
travelling to their designated locations, a clash broke out between =
Burmese and=20
the UMPs at Son Gwei between Loimaw and Tangyan. The only choice was for =
the=20
Shans to fight on with the available troops at hand.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>Bo Dewing, with only 60 fighters, made a surprise =
attack the=20
next day on Loi Pangpra, a strategic elevation between Mongyai and =
Tangyan, thus=20
cutting off Burmese reinforcement to the defense of Tangyan. Bo Lai also =
staged=20
am-bushes at Nampawng, between Lashio and Loi Pangpra, to ease off Bo =
Dewing's=20
burden.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>On 22 November, Sao Hsowan and Pawlarm Homang, with =
less than=20
300 men, entered Tangyan, beating drums and gongs, not unlike the Scots =
with=20
their bagpipes.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>However, 5 days later, the Burmese began their =
counter-attack.=20
Bo Maung, who was in Panghoong trying to persuade the Gurkha unit to =
join him so=20
he could occupy Lashio was strafed with bombs by the Burmese air force =
and had=20
to retreat.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>Then, infantry, backed by artillery, tanks and =
airplanes=20
attacked both Loi Parngpra and Tangyan. Out manned and outgunned, Bo =
Deving=20
decided to retire. Thus ended the battle on 30 November.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>According to Martin Smith, government troops suffered =
26 dead=20
and 17 wounded. But, Bo Wa, who used to be Bo Maung lieutenant, thought =
the=20
casualities could have been much higher, because the total number of =
prisoners=20
alone was 130, most of who Burmese soldiers, police and civilian =
government=20
servants, whom they kept locked up throughout the duration of the =
battle.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>The event was also broadcast by the BBS (Burma =
Broadcasting=20
Service, Rangoon) and the BBC.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>The result was quite predictable. According to Bertil =
Lintner,=20
in "Burma in Revolt", '(W)ord spread across the north that Bo Maung and =
the=20
students were about to "drive the Burmese out of Shan State". Although =
based on=20
exaggerated reports and wishful thinking, this was how the news was =
received in=20
the villages, and more youths took to the jungle'. </P>
<P align=3Djustify>And to Rangoon, especially the Burma Army, the Shan =
resistance=20
had become an unwelcome reality that refused to go away unless something =
drastic=20
was done.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>More Burmese units poured into Shan hills and, with=20
them,&nbsp;more abuses and violations, which inevitably led to more =
youths=20
taking off to the jungles, which in turn made the Burmese military =
authorities=20
more desperate to hold&nbsp;on to power...</P>
<P align=3Djustify>I was 11 then and was going to school in Lashio. We =
talked=20
about it among friends and looked out for the day when victorious Shan =
troops=20
would be marching into the&nbsp;streets of Lashio. The day did not =
arrive, so I=20
followed others into the jungle 10 years later to find out why.</P>
<P align=3Djustify>For your information, I am still doing that today. So =
are the=20
kids who were born long after the battle.<B></B></P>
<P align=3Djustify><B>Khuensai Jaiyen</B></P>
<P align=3Djustify><B>
<HR>

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