The Nation - Siege outcome: Who's f

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The Nation - Oct 8, 1999.
Editorial & Opinion
Siege outcome: Who's fooling who?

THE fearless attack on the Burmese Embassy last Friday by five disgruntled
Burmese gunmen was a shocking incident, but the Thai government's haphazard
efforts and soft-handed approach to resolve the tense 25-hour siege were no
less astonishing.

Predictably, the government did not fail to proclaim success after the
heavily-armed assailants, who called themselves ''Vigorous Burmese Student
Warriors'', released all 89 people in the compound, including 13 Burmese
diplomats, in return for their escorted escape to the border.

Although the government can argue that the safety and freedom of the
captives were of paramount importance, its overall performance in countering
and dealing with such an act of terrorism was far from professional, and
thus put the lives of the civilian hostages at precarious risk.

In fact, many of the authorities involved in the rescue operation
acknowledged in private that it was a matter of ''sheer luck'' that the
whole embassy ordeal ended as it did, with no serious casualties or
bloodshed, taking into account the ''unorganised and uncoordinated''
negotiating efforts, which involved uncontrolled interference by uninvited
''well-wishers'', private negotiators, as well as local and foreign
journalists, who scrambled to get their scoops from the horse's mouth.

What happened at the embassy is a tough lesson for all parties involved in
resolving the crisis and a standing testament to how unprepared the country
is for a terrorist emergency. It also shows that the personal whims of the
powers-that-be are still more important, as they override well-laid rules
and procedures in dealing with terrorists.

Thailand, in fact, has a world-class anti-terrorist blueprint which lays out
detailed contingency measures to be followed and executed. It states first
and foremost the establishment of a command post headed by a top
well-trained bureaucrat. The head of the command post, who is appointed by
the prime minister, has the full authority to mobilise all government
resources to resolve the crisis.

The rationale behind such an appointment is to give the government a
breather to negotiate and identify the terrorists. If a senior politician
decides to take command then there is no room for manoeuvre or negotiation
as terrorists can force that person into making a swift political decision.

At last Friday's siege, the national contingency plan to counter terrorism
crumbled like a house of cards when confusion erupted as to who was actually
calling the shots as top police and administrative officials and government
ministers were seen visiting and being stationed at the scene to direct
measures to end the crisis.

To give an example, at the height of the crisis on Saturday, Interior
Minister Sanan Kachornprasart decided to commandeer the whole operation and
negotiations, which were conducted through a mobile phone with a Thai
hostage and subsequently relayed to the captors. Dramatically, the whole
conversation was simultaneously broadcast live on a local community radio
station to the attentive Thai public. It is still unclear how the station
managed to tap into the phone negotiations.

Throughout the highly tense stand-off, the attackers also made full use of
the embassy's fax and telephone lines to air and negotiate their demands
with Thai authorities. It was, surprisingly, through the same communications
lines that some of the ''well-wishers'', as well as local and foreign
journalists, called in to talk and conduct live interviews with the group's
key leader Kyaw Ni, or Johnny.

There are strong indications that the group also used the phones to
communicate with their collaborators outside the compound. A well-informed
official confirmed that there was an official instruction to cut off all of
the embassy's telephone lines to prevent tampering calls during official
negotiations. But why the order was not executed is not yet known.

The Thai negotiating team was reportedly very upset with a leading question
posed in a live radio interview in which Kyaw Ni was asked ''whether the
assailants would kill the hostages if the government did not give in to
their demands?'' Until then, the hostage-takers had not threatened to kill
any of their captives if their demand for a helicopter flight to the border
was not met.

Surprisingly, the group did not persist with their demands that the Burmese
junta release all political prisoners, open dialogue with pro-democracy
politicians and convene the elected parliament.

According to hostages' accounts, the ''aggressive'' Kyaw Ni had, at one
time, become very upset and tense after telephone conversations and
arguments with other Burmese student groups and faxed messages threatening a
pending Thai assault. He occasionally fired his machine-gun or punch his
fist into the wall to release his anger and tension.

Outside the command post at the Bayer Building adjacent to the embassy,
curious crowds of onlookers and a large army of Thai and foreign media
camped less than 10 metres from the compound. At times they mingled easily
with officers and government officials involved in handling the crisis.

Throngs of vehicles -- live television vans, private cars, ambulances,
police trucks, rescue pickups, a mobile toilet van and official cars -- were
also allowed to park close to the embassy and even obstructed some emergency
traffic in the operation. As it turned out, the authorities did not bother
to totally shut off traffic which flowed on the other side of the street.

The most controversial part of the Thai handing of the crisis is, perhaps,
what is now being called the ''Bangkok Syndrome'' -- in which not only the
hostages but also government leaders and officials seemed to have developed
sympathetic feelings towards the Burmese raiders. Publicly, Sanan said he
preferred to call them ''student activists who fight for democracy'' in
Burma instead of ''terrorists'', while Deputy Foreign Minister MR
Sukhumbhand Paribatra told iTV that he considered them ''as his own
children''.

Despite warnings from the international community, particularly from the
United States, Britain and Israel, successive Thai governments have opted
for hasty decisions to get terrorists out of the country instead of
prosecuting them for their crimes. In the Burmese Embassy case, the five
attackers were given a VIP escort to the safe haven of their choice.

Although the siege was resolved in what many call a ''happy ending'', the
government cannot expect to bet on luck every time a terrorist crisis takes
place. Moreover, many more unpleasant questions remain for the governments
of Thailand and Burma to answer.

What went wrong with their intelligence and security systems which were
supposed to be well aware of potential attacks on the Burmese Embassy? How
could five young radical Burmese travel through the streets of Bangkok
carrying AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles and a number of hand grenades, and be
let through the highly-protected embassy front gate without resistance?

Most important of all, who were the five daredevil culprits whose identities
still remain pretty much unclear nearly a week after their incredible
flight? Did they act unilaterally or with political and financial back-up?
If the latter, who or which other groups were involved?

The government's proclaimed success and self-congratulations only serve to
compromise national security standards, and regrettably invite more
potentially violent terrorist acts within the country.

BY YINDEE LERTCHAROENCHOK

The Nation