Gen. Khin RaZar No. 1 & Assassinati

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Subject: Gen. Khin RaZar No. 1 & Assassination; SPDC 

BLOOD AND SAND

SUNDAY (India)

31 May-6 June 1998

By Soumen Datta/ Port Blair and Ne Delhi with Anish
Gupta, and Sourabh Sen Calcutta

"Khing Raza, a NUPA politburo member and
commander-in-chief of the Arakan Army and leader of
the mission, had once spoken to Saw tun, his number
two, over the wireless before the boats reached
Narcondum." 


'The Army Is Trying To Scupper a CBI Investigation
Into "Operation Leeh" In The Andamans.' What Are They
Try To Hide? SUNDAY Investigate The Real Story

	It was Quiet. It was precise. It was brutal. It was
hell in the archipelago that will go down as the most
astounding encounter staged by India's war machine. As
a counterinsurgency operation, its build-up, maneuvers
and subtle subterfuge had all the qualities of
small-scale military offensive. Yet, in the end, not
many of those who took part in this
exercise-code-named "Operation Leech"-would perhaps
like to cherish its memory, tainted as it may be by
the blood of friends and the guilt that goes with
betrayal. 
	On 12 February, Maj. Gen. S.C. Chopra, additional
direct-general, military operations, ministry of
defense, told the press in New Delhi that India
security forces had intercepted, on 11 February, a
major gang of international gunrunners supplying
weapons to different secessionist groups in the
north-east. The story unfurled further in follow-ups
that claimed that a joint operation mounted by the
army, navy, air force and Coast Guards had
successfully aborted a clandestine shipment of lethal
weapons valued at around US$ 1 million.
	In the skirmish that ensued, six gunrunners were said
to be have killed in an encounter-their bodies lost to
the heaving sea-73 other arrested, four vessels
impounded and huge cache of arms and ammunition
recovered. The operation was apparently mounted
following receipt of impeccable military intelligence
about the movement of the smugglers. It was touted as
the biggest seizure of the sophisticated weapons being
landed on India territory since the Purulia Arms Drop
in December 1995. For India's security personnel, it
was yet another feather in their already-crowed cap.
	But is this the real story?
	When SUNDAY reached Port Blair on 7 March, the
authorities, including the army, navy, and the Coast
Guard, were surprisingly tight-lipped about an
incident that should normally have been trumpeted as a
major success story. The officialdom was extremely
secretive, withholding information on the plea of
safeguarding "national security interests".
	The A&N headquarters was teeming with sleuths of
every hue. Among the agencies that had flown in their
topnotch officers were CBI, the Intelligence Bureau
(IB), RAW, the Subsidiary Intelligence Branch (SIB),
the Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) and SIT, each
trying to prise out information. And SUNDAY sources
within some of these agencies were hinting at a
cover-up and rising unsavory questions. 
	Were the arrested men, and those who were killed,
professional gunrunners carrying arms for the
north-east., or were they member of Arakan Army (AA),
the military wing of National United Party of Arakan
(NUPA), which is fighting the repressive Myanmarnese
junta for separate Arakan state? Could they have been
lured into a trap and stabbed in the back by the India
authorities, who after propping them up to placate
Myanmar's dictators in council?

	Preparation for the assault had begun several days in
advance. From 3 February onward, the quietude of
Landfall, an uninhabited island 250 km off Port Blair
in the pristine Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) archipelago,
was shattered by unprecedented flurry of activities.
	Thee vessels-GGS Vivek. CGS Ganga Devi, CGS
Lakhmibai-belonging to the Cost Guards, and two-LUC-33
and LUC-35-belonging to navy, had sailed from Port
Blair.
	Two other naval ships-INS Santvti, INS
Vindhyagiri-brought in crack marine commandos (Marcos)
and hardware from Visakhapatnam, headquarters of
Eastern Naval Command. And all seven ships, with 180
sailors and officers, took up position in a line
between Landfall and Narcondum Islands.
	Five helicopters belonging to the air force (two
MI-8s), navy (two MI-8s) and the Coast Guard (one
Chetak) did sorties from Madras, Car Nicobar and the
Brichgunj cantonment near Port Blair, ferrying in men
and material.
	Aircraft based at navel base INS Utkroh in Port Blair
flew several sorties to Landfall and East Islands with
a few army officers. Among them was Lt-Col. A.J.
Grewal, a military intelligence officer.  There is,
however, confusion regarding his initials. Some say
his name is P.S. Grewal, other seem to know him as
Vijay Grewal. He is believed to have been born in
Mayanmar and was in touch with Myanmarese military
intelligence.
	Lt.Col. Grewal, say intelligence sources, was the key
man in this operation. They say he speaks Burmese
fluently, and had apparently visited Myanmar and
Thailand in January this year. That he did go to
Bangkok has also been confirmed by SUNDAY's sources in
NUPA from Arakan. 
	By the time the sun went down on 9 February,
everything was in place. The net had been perfectly
laid to trap an approaching flotilla of four
vessels-two speedboats and two fishing trawlers-that
had already reached the vicinity of Narcondam Island,
about 140 nautical miles from Landfall. And as night
fell, the India armada waited.
	One vision of what happened in the next 36 hours can
be had from the FIR filed on 18 April-seven days after
the incident by R.S. Dhankar, Lieutenant Commander,
Deputy Naval Provost Marshal, for Fortress Commander,
Commander A.S. Rai, A&N, with the station house
officer, central crime section of the A&N Police.
              It says: "Hard intelligence was received
that a consignment of arms, ammunition and equipment
was being brought by some foreign nationals to
Landfall Island in trawlers/speed boats. They were
reported to be of South East Asia n region.
Intelligence sources intimated that the purpose of
bringing the arms, ammunition, stores and equipment to
Landfall Island was to subsequently trans-ship them
illegally to terrorists/militant outfits in north
eastern states of India via Cox Bazar in Bangladesh?
	"A joint tri-services operation was lunched on 09 Feb
98 to apprehend the foreigners along with their arms,
ammunition and equipment. Coast Guard ships and Police
were also used in the operation. The operation
progressed successfully and resulted in the capture of
73 foreign nationals?six foreign national tried to
escape into the adjoining area while operating fire
with their weapons on our troops. Our troops
immediately responded in self defense and fatally
injured six of them whilst in the water. They were
seen disappearing in the sea and presumed dead. After
a search none of the six bodies could be recovered."  

	Dhankar also stated that the 73 arrests men were to
be handed to over (to the civil authority) at Camp
Bell Bay, but requested that the "arms, ammunition and
equipment" be allowed to be retained by the army/navy
for further investigation. "The same," he declared,
"will be produced as and when desired by the court."

 Within days of the FIR, the Government of India (GOI)
ordered a CBI probe. 
	It was an open-and-shut case as far as the defense
establishment was concerned. Some foreign nationals,
abating terrorism in the north-east has been killed in
an encounter, their accomplices arrested, and arms
seized. The services had jointly acted on the basic of
tip-offs given by military sources and had succeeded.
And there, on that victorious note, the matter should
have rested. Such encounter, in the interest of
national security, are not unusual in Kashmir and even
in the north-east. The CBI is rarely, if at all, asked
to meddle in such cases.
	But here, the OGI's decision to put the CBI on the
trail seemed to suggest there was more to it than meet
the eye. 
	CBI sources say the Union home ministry asked them to
investigate after the army's hush-hush attitude had
fuelled speculation in the local press and had sent
the A&N administration into a tizzy. 
	On 12 February, newspapers in Port Blair carried
reported of a joint anti-smuggling operation by the
navy and the army the day before, but the A&N
administration had been kept in the dark. And even
though days passed, the civic administration wasn't
informed, nor was any FIR field. Besides, the arrested
men had neither been headed over to the police nor
produced in court even three days after their arrest,
when, by law, is mandatory to do so within 24 h ours. 
	Sources in Port Blair told SUNDAY that in order to
cover its own back, the A&N administer pressured the
fortress commander to file a case. A&N
inspector-general of police Y.R. Dhuriya took a
personal initiative to make the defense establishment
conform to law.
	The services complied on 18 February by formally
filing an FIR and handing over the detained
foreigners. But the arms, ammunition, and other
hardware seized in the operation-which form vital part
the body of evidence-were withheld. Only a list of
materials was provided.
	Since then, it has a period of unbroken silence. Even
three months after taking up the case, the CBI is
nowhere near filling a chare-sheet against the
detainees. In fact, they are likely to be set free by
the court because of the CBI's failure to frame
charges within 90 days of their arrest. 
	CBI sources in New Delhi told SUNDAY on condition of
anonymity that the defense authorities have completely
stonewalled the investigation by refusing to
cooperate.
	More than three months after the incident, the seized
weapons have not been handed over to the CBI despite
several requests attempts to interrogate defense
personnel who took part in the operation have been
repeatedly blocked and relevant log books and papers
sought by the investigators are yet to reach them.
"The defense authorities are deliberately adopting
dilatory tactics," complain CBI sources.
	CBI officers even say that the deadlock has been
refereed to the PMO but are special about being
allowed to go the whole hog given the nature of the
case. Its sensitivity can be gauged from the bulk of
information so far gathered from the detained
foreigners. And their version of what has happened on
9 February and after is completely different from the
story contained in the defense FIR. 

THERE was no encounter, the detainees have told the
Andaman police in Port Blair. If anything, it was
cold-blooded manslaughter. 
	Their story began on the night of 8 February. They
were members of the AA, which fighting Burmese ethnic
domination and the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), Myanmar's repressive military junta. The
contingent also had a few members of AA the Karen
National Army (KNA), an ally of the AA in its
anti-junta fight. "I along with my leader told me, in
Landfall Island, we have no problem. India government
allow us all times," recounted one the detainees. 
	There were 43 of them when they sailed out of the
Thai waters in two speedboats laden with sophisticated
arms. They were to briefly halt at Landfall and then
proceed to be sent to their comrades in the Arakan
hills.
	On their way to Landfall, they accosted and captured
two Thai trawlers with 36 fishermen for refusing to
pay a "routine tax" to the AA. Now, four boats, with
79 men in all, sailed again, reaching Narcondum Island
at 7 pm on 9 February. 
	They were already aware of India ships stationed off
Landfall Island. Ordinary poachers or smuggles would
have fled immediately. But these boats waited,
confidently.
	Khing Raza, a NUPA politburo member and
commander-in-chief of the Arakan Army and leader of
the mission, had once spoken to Saw tun, his number
two, over the wireless before the boats reached
Narcondum. In accordance with their plan, explain,
explained the detainees, Saw Tun had already arrived
at Landfall with India Army officers, who were there
to receive the Arakanese boats. And now, from
Narcondum, Khing Raza contacted Saw Tun again over the
VHF, informing his deputy about his arrival. Nothing
happened after that. "That night we slept near
Narcondum Island," said one detainee.
	The next morning at 10 am the wireless crackled
again. On the other end was Saw Tun calling from
Landfall. He told Khin Raza that it was times to start
for Landfall, and response to that beckoning call the
flotilla weighed anchor. The smaller speedboat, said
to be fitted with Volvo engines capable of doing 35
knots per hour, surged ahead of the rest. It carried
on doing board Khing Raza, and his close comrades Pado
Mulway (in-charge of AA marine operation), Captain
Myint Shwe (of Karen National Army) and Pho Cho, the
vessel's pilot.
	When the speedboats, with trawlers in tow, boldly
passed the through the cordon of naval ships and
reached Landfall towards the evening the evening, they
were warmly welcomed by a reception party that
included among others Lt-Col. Grewal. Apparently,
there was much handshaking and embracing. Five bottles
of rum were produced and toasted raised a small camp
site was cleared food was arranged and there was
merrymaking around the campfire that night. That very
evening, they were asked to display their weapons. The
request did not strike them as ominous or even fishy.
The arms were unloaded from the speedboats and laid on
the shore in full vies of the Indian armymen.
   	At 8am on 11 February, an India naval ship was
seen taking up position close to Landfall Island. The
unsuspecting Arakanese solders were told in Myanmarese
that an Indian leader would soon arrive by helicopter
and breakfast would be "taken together" once he
arrived. Moments later, six top members of the AA were
led away by two Indian officers inside a patch of
forest "to greet the leader at the helicopter landing
point." Among them were Khing Raza, Saw Tun, and Padu
Mulway.
	And as soon as the six disappeared into the wood,
Indian  securitymen brandished their carbines and
ordered the rest to threw up their hands. They did.
They had no choice. And as they stood with their hands
raised they were blindfolded and their hands tiled bu
Indiam soldiers. Minutes past as they stood helplessly
on the sands. Then they heard what they thought was
the whirr of a sescending chiioer. And the
unmistakable sound of gun shots. 
	They then never saw the six men again. 

WHY are the defense forces stonewalling the CBI
investigation? Are these men mere gunrunners "waging
war" against India as claimed by the fortress
commander in his FIR, or are they indeed members of
the Arakan Army who have had closed links with India
defense establishment? Did India decide to double
cross and liquidate the cream of the Arakanese rebel
force to please the Maynamrese junta?
	Home secretary B.P Sight has gone on record saying
that the India Army had been tipped off about the arms
shipments by the Myanmarese authorities. The defense
force had, according to him, acted on the basis of
that information.
	But this appears to be a piece of disinformation in
the light of the claims made by NUPA in a letter,
dated 25 April to India defense minister. 
	The letter written by Khin Maung in-charge of foreign
affair, NUPA, stated following:
· "Those who have been caputed min the incident of
Operation Leech on the Andaman Islands on February 11
this year are the members of our organization, NUPA
and AA. They are neither armed smugglers nor
gunrunners to anti-India N-E rebels.
· "They are our men carrying our own belongings for
our Arakan independence war against the Burmese
colonists."
Next, the NUPA goes on to add what it calls three
"extraordinary points" that show the India Army's
close ties with the AA and expose the India defense
establishment's complicity in this so-called
gunrunning expedition that was frustrated by Operation
Leech.
·  The India military intelligence officer Col. Grewal
had been fully briefed about the 8 February AA
expedition on 8 January. Detailed photos of combat and
non-combat materials and the list of men who were to
be on the broad had also been given to him.
· To have army-to-army relationship, Saw Tun, the CEC
of NUPA and member of the military committee of AA was
assigned as an equivalent of military attaché to deal
with the India defense service through Col. Grewal.

SUNDAY is in possession of a copy of this NUPA letter
along with lists of AA fighters and the arms involved.
There is also the copy of a letter by Khin Raza dated
13 February 1997, authorizing Saw Tun to deal with the
India defense authorities.
	SUNDAY also spoke to Khin Maung, NUPA's foreign
affair in-charge and the writer of the letter. How
could he be sure that  Lt-Col  Grewal had been 
informed about the AA expedition in Thailand in
January? " Because I was there,"  said Maung.  "Crewal
was in Bangkok between  8a nd 10 January, staying  in
a hotel with Saw Tun , discussing the plan ."  
     	 So, what was Grewal doing with Saw Tun, a
senior member of AA's military committee in Bangkok?
And for that matter, what was he doing with Saw Tun in
Delhi  on 5th  February ,six days before the Arakanese
rebel leader was to be slain on Landfall ?  
                SUNDAY sources in Delhi  say Saw was
in the capital that day and had met the army officer. 
  Saw Tun disclose the sources, had left Delhi on the
morning of 6th February by an Indian Air Force plane. 
                They are unable to say Where Saw Tun
went directly from Delhi, but insist that he was to be
present at Landfall Inland along with Indian defense
personal to receive the Arakanese mission being led by
Khaing Raza. Significantly, the accounts of the
detainees do seem to corroborate this piece of
information.   
     	What's more the seizer list accompanying the FIR
lodged by the fortress commander is a major giveaway.
Among the many things included in the "list of other
items" under "Exhibit D" are 50 pieced of Arakan Army
vests and 12 pairs of Arakan Army uniform (pant and
shirt). Also seizers were "Burma Map/Charts." These
materials do seem to suggest very strongly that the
men involved were indeed member of the AA.
	So what had really happened at Landfall? The vision
of A&N Fortress Commodore A.S. Rai and those of the
captives vary wildly. Were some of the slain men
indeed liaising with India Army for nearly a year as
claimed by NUPA? Were six actually killed in encounter
as claimed in the FIR or were they shot, as the
captives say, after being received and feted as
friends? Was Operation Leech convincing victory
against international gunrunners or did it amount to
human rights violation of the most despicable kind?
And why, may we ask, are the defense authorities
frustrating the CBI's efforts to investigate?
	Three months have already passed since the incident
and the detainees have been given bail, as the CBI
failed to produce a charge-sheet within the mandatory
90 days. The captured men have, however, been
reasserted on charged of unlawful entry.
	Perhaps it is time for the Center to intervene. The
country surely deserves to know the truth. The whole
truth. 
                         
    					 ***************
 
 Note by Khin Moe Lin No. 2 (Secretary of State of
Arakan): 'General Khin RaZar number 1 (Commander in
Chief of Arakan Army known as AA) was assassinated by
SPDC and India MI one year ago, and the General Khin
RaZar number 2 (Join Cheif of Staff of Arakan Army)
now is taking an acting commander for the AA.
Similarly, President Khin Moe Lin No. 1 of Rahine
Independent Army (RIA) was killed 20 years ago by the
Burmese army in Chin hill. Now, Khin Moe Lin No. 2
myself is taking as acting Secretary of State for the
Natainal Government of Arakan (NGA-Arakan). 




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