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Bangkok post Review (11-9-99)

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Neighbour under the microscope <br>
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Easy- to-read study of the Burmese government's handling of ethnic
minorities <br>
<br>
</b>The Burmese government and the ethnic minority groups<br>
<br>
</font><font size=3>Rangoon's cease-fire<b>' </b>agreements with ethnic
minority groups, a <br>
main political development in Burma during the 1990's, goes under the
microscope in this book by a Thai researcher who has made a career of
following Burma issues. <br>
,Pornpimon Trichot, of Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Asian
Studies, looks at conflicts between the military rulers and the
non-Burmese people, and analyses approaches Rangoon has employed to deal
with the problem of minorities. <br>
Between 1989 and 1994, the,Burmese government, then known as the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc), successfully reached
cease-fire deals with 15 out of 16 minority groups in the country. <br>
Under the deals, the groups were required to lay down arms in exchange
for development assistance from the government. They were allowed to
maintain some troops for self-defence and continue trade activities,
mainly carried out along borders areas with neighbouring countries. 
<br>
But peace and unity remained far from reality in Burma. In 1995, Slore
launched attacks against the Karenni <br>
National Progressive Party despite their cease-fire deal earlier in the
year. The junta also seized two strongholds of the Karen National Union,
the strongest ethnic group in Burma, while negotiations were still going
on. <br>
The book attempts to give an overall picture of Rangoon's political
strategies towards ethnic minority groups. These include internal and
external factors that compelled the Burmese government to offer the
truce, the changing attitudes of military leaders, the fragile nature of
the cease-fire, and the return to the use of force under the
&quot;four-cut&quot; policy to suppress the armed insurgents and innocent
ethnic people. This policy calls for weakening opposition forces through
cuts in their sources of food, manpower, funding and intelligence. <br>
After conducting her own interviews with several minority leaders, Ms
Pornpimon attributes the failure of the cease-fire policy to lack of
sincerity from both sides, the government and the ethnic minority groups.
<br>
Slorc failed to make a real break- through because it refused to hold
political dialogue after the cease-fire. The ethnic minority groups, for
their part, entered into the deals sirnply because they were poor and
weary of decades of civil war. <br>
Therefore, the chance of the &quot;cease- ,fire&quot; policy itself
helping resolve conflict between the Burmese government and the ethnic
minority groups is dim,&quot; Ms Pornpimon concludes. - <br>
The cease-fire agreement, she adds, should be treated as part of a
&quot;process&quot; to be followed by empowerment of the ethnic people in
local administration. And this can be put forward only when the military
rulers and the ethnic minoritiesagree to hold a dialogue after the
ceas-fire, she contends. <br>
With its chronological approach to presenting material, the book is to
read <br>
Readers with some grounding in Burma issuses can go straight to chapter
four for an account on contemporary events, such as Rangoon's changing
</font><font size=2>policies towards ethnic minority groups. <br>
 . More general readers can start at chapter one and enjoy the history of
Burmese-ethnic relations dating back to the 18th century and learn the
back- ground of some ethnic minority groups and alliances formed by
ethnic minorities and other opponents. <br>
As Sunet Chutintranon, a Burma expert from Chulalongkom University points
out, a strong point of Ms Pompimon's work is her attempt to depart from
the static western-dominated study which is confined to the Burmese
government's bid to resolve ethnic conflicts through the use of violence.
<br>
Unfortunately however, Ms Pornpimon limits the players of the cease-fire
strategy to the Burmese government and ethnic minority groups, overlook
ing Thailand, Burma's immediate neighbour, and other third parties. 
<br>
Only briefly mentioned is Bangkok's role in persuading the Mon group to
accept the cease-fire agreement in 1995, in order to facilitate the
laying down of the gas pipeline from the Matarban Gulfs offshore to
Thailand. <br>
A more penetrating review of the Thai role in Burma's ethnic affairs
would not only help policy-makers learn from past mistakes in order to do
better in future. It would also help ordinary Thais understand more about
relations with their western neighbour. <br>
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