[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

Subject: The Nation- An air of hope



Subject: Subject: The Nation- An air of hope prevails in Burma

/
>From: "TIN KYI" <tinkyi@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>To: <burmanet2-l@xxxxxxxx>
>Subject: The Nation- An air of hope prevails in Burma
>Date: Wed, 8 Sep 1999 01:39:53 +0900
>
>The Nation - Sep 8, 1999.
>Editorial & Opinion
>
>An air of hope prevails in Burma
>
>Skeptics, calling the Burmese population ''numerilogically-obsessed'', have
>misinterpreted the 9-9-99 movement. But the situation in Burma is ripe for
>positive social change, with or without the four 9s, writes Min Zin.
>
>Will the people of Burma take the 9-9-99 numerical cue and participate in a
>planned uprising to end military rule tomorrow? In an atmosphere of tight
>control and zero tolerance of dissent, the overt call for demonstrations may
>seem mere wishful thinking. However, an analysis of the current situation
>shows that the 9-9-99 movement coincides with conditions that are ripe for
>major social change in Burma.
>
>Skeptics, calling the Burmese population ''numerilogically-obsessed'', have
>misinterpreted the movement, suggesting that opposition leaders have called
>for an uprising this Thursday out of context of the true social situation.
>
>In fact, setting that date is a practical publicity consideration in a
>society where information is tightly controlled. It has also captured the
>imagination of the people, both inside and outside of Burma. Moreover,
>9-9-99 is not so much a leader-designated date as a manifestation of the
>hope for social change of a broad base of mostly anonymous people inside
>Burma.
>
>Indeed, the situation in Burma is ripe for positive social change, with or
>without ''9-9-99''. The current momentum of growing dissent indicates that
>the military and the opposition are approaching a final showdown.
>
>The opposition groups calling for change have a number of factors in their
>favour. The political, social, and economic situations have become
>untenable. Politically, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has
>had to shift toward considering tripartite dialogue with the National League
>for Democracy and ethnic leaders (the opposition's political agenda) because
>its own previous priority, the National Convention, has lost almost all
>legitimacy. In addition, the regime has failed to create any lasting
>political solutions with the ceasefire groups, many of which have damaged
>the regime politically through involvement in the illicit drug trade.
>
>The most severe problem the military is facing is the economy. Economic
>crises tend to politicise ordinary people and embolden them to call for
>change. Related to this problem are the broader social problems, including
>the education and health crises. The people's frustration is understandably
>high.
>
>The military also has internal problems to contend with. Since the
>government reshuffle in late 1997, the new SPDC structure has intensified
>the power struggle among the various factions within the military, and there
>is growing dissent among grassroots military men. Even if the high-ranking
>officers seem to agree on maintaining the basic status quo, they disagree on
>how to handle Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
>
>That is not to say that the military is going to split soon. However, if
>something like a nationwide mass mobilisation were to happen, it would be
>very difficult for the generals to convince the soldiers to shoot the
>demonstrators, as they did on Aug 8, 1988. When the generals gave the order
>to crack down on the students during the 1996 December student
>demonstration, even the riot police were reluctant to beat the students and
>twice resisted the orders. The protesters will have increased international
>attention working in their favour as well. In contrast, the grassroots
>underground networks of students, monks and workers are strengthening. The
>current increase in political activity by high school students has
>encouraged long-term activists and suggests that the movement will continue
>to broaden.
>
>In a recent interview with Asiaweek (June 11), Suu Kyi said: ''If you mean
>would we support a spontaneous demonstration by the people for better
>conditions, certainly we would. Why shouldn't we? We know that there is a
>need for better conditions.'' Her statement lends considerable legitimacy to
>the call for demonstrations.
>
>Mass uprisings, whenever and wherever they happen, cause a crisis of
>legitimacy for the government, and a power vacuum inevitably ensues. A mass
>uprising alone cannot bring about genuine positive social change unless the
>people manage to fill the power void. This was the problem that
>pro-democracy advocates encountered in the 8-8-88 movement when they failed
>to form an interim government. Now, with last year's formation of the
>Committee Representing People's Parliament (CRPP), the vital leadership is
>in place to fill the power vacuum and solve the transitional needs.
>
>The people's high expectations, based on these prospects for change, must
>take into account a number of significant challenges to their aspirations.
>
>Over the past month, the SPDC has stepped up its intimidation efforts to
>preempt an uprising. Troop deployment in ''hotspots'' around Rangoon and
>Mandalay have become more visible. Arrests, restrictions on gatherings,
>domestic guest registration requirements, and checkpoints have all
>increased. The SPDC has even threatened civil service personnel with
>imprisonment if they boycott their work.
>
>The logistical challenges in trying to organise mass resistance are
>significant. With universities shut down, there are very few open places for
>students, who historically have led the popular movements in Burma, to
>gather. Also, because of Buddhist Lent and related precepts, monks are not
>allowed to travel and move freely. Communication problems also abound.
>
>Many activists have trouble communicating because of severe government
>restrictions on travel, tight control on gatherings, and suspicions of
>spies. Leaders such as Suu Kyi and the CRPP are forced to use an information
>network that is so slow that sometimes it causes vagueness and a lack of
>guidance in operational planning.
>
>The pro-democracy forces also expect major challenges from the military if
>and when people do come out onto the streets. The use of violent force is an
>obvious potential response, but the SPDC may be more subtle. The government
>may create communal disturbances and counter-riots to divert attention by
>enflaming religious and racial tensions. Civilian supporters of the
>government may be used to intimidate and suppress anti-government protests
>through ''civilian'' clashes.
>
>If the SPDC begins to feel it is being backed into a corner, it is likely to
>offer a fake dialogue to appease the people. In such a situation, cosmetic
>concessions are likely, even more so with the UN Deputy Secretary-General
>Alvaro de Soto planning to visit Burma soon. With the growing momentum of
>people power in Burma, the opposition will be on guard against such ploys,
>and may even be able to turn them to their own advantage. They should raise
>their expectations beyond a compromise of power-sharing arrangements and
>demand a full transfer of power to the winners of the 1990 elections.
>
>The outcome has not been predetermined, of course, and the future is
>unpredictable. Martin Luther King Jr noted, though, that the arc of history
>bends toward justice. The Burmese opposition needs to make preparations
>conducive to a mass movement. Without the necessary preparations, even
>numerology is of little use. But the current prospects for social change in
>Burma indicate that there is a real atmosphere of possibility for positive
>social change. If the people take to the streets, 9-9-99 will mark the
>beginning of a wave of change that will wash over Burma. Whether or not the
>people publicly express their desires on the given date, the high
>expectations for 9-9-99 will likely spill over into the next few months and
>increase the pressure on the SPDC to finally transfer power to the people.
>
>
>
>