Secretary of State Madeleine K.ALBR

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Subject: Secretary of State Madeleine K.ALBRIGHT at Sixth ASEAN Regional

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Secretary of StateIntervention at Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum Intervention
at Sixth ASEAN Regional Forum 
Singapore, July 26, 1999
As released by the Office of the Spokesman
U.S. Department of State 
<Picture: Blue Line>





Fellow ministers and distinguished colleagues, I am honored to represent
the United States at this sixth meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
It is also a pleasure to renew or make acquaintance with each of you.



I want to begin by thanking Foreign Minister Jayakumar and his government
for their hospitality and by congratulating them for their leadership of
the Forum this past year. Singapore has worked hard to advance the goal of
Asia Pacific security cooperation, and shown a real determination to make
this conference a success by encouraging frank and substantive
discussions. That determination is reflected in the strength of our agenda
and provides a firm platform for a productive exchange of views.



I also want to thank Foreign Minister Surin and our Thai colleagues for
the superb job they have done as co-chairs, with the United States, of the
Intersessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (ISG/CBMs). I look
forward to working with them even more closely in the year ahead, as
Thailand serves as Forum chair. I look forward, as well, to cooperating
with Japan and Singapore in their capacity as ISG co-chairs.



The United States is a strong supporter of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In
this period of advanced technology and rapid change, it is essential that
nations consult and cooperate wherever possible on matters of shared
security concern. This Forum provides us with an indispensable means for
doing just that. 



As we scan the horizon in the Asia Pacific today, we see potential dangers
and real opportunities for progress. This poses a test of leadership and
vision for us all. Together, we must strive to build on shared interests,
increase mutual confidence, resolve differences and create the basis for
lasting stability, prosperity and peace.



The Security Implications of the Asian Financial Crisis



Last year, when we met in Manila, large parts of the Asia Pacific were
experiencing or threatened by economic and financial crisis. There was
real concern that the crisis would spread and produce instability that

would undermine security and political relationships in the region.



The crisis has caused very substantial hardships and suffering. And as a
matter of economic and social policy, we have much left to do to restore
growth and help those most affected get back on their feet.



But in the realm of security, we can be thankful that our fears have not
been realized. In fact, one effect of the crisis has actually been
constructive. The changes in government that may be traced, at least in
part, to economic disruptions have been generally positive. As a rule, the
new governments in our region have shown a deeper understanding and
commitment to financial transparency, political openness and democratic
principles than their predecessors.



This bodes well for the stability of these governments and for our
ability, as a group, to work together effectively on security concerns.



The Strategic Relationship of the Major Powers and Its Impact on the
Region



In the Asia Pacific region, as elsewhere, mutual security depends on
mutual cooperation and effort. To these ends, the United States continues
to play an important and constructive role.



This is reflected in our treaty alliances with five major countries in the
region. It is shown by our effort to develop strong and multifaceted
bilateral relationships with key nations, including fellow members of the
UN Security Council. It is illustrated by our forward-deployed military
presence. And it is evidenced by our strong support for regional and
subregional dialogues aimed at resolving hard problems and preventing
conflicts.



The cornerstone of our support for stability is our alliance with Japan;
an alliance our two governments have taken steps to modernize during the
past few years.



As we have previously made clear, the new U.S.-Japan Joint Security
Guidelines we have developed are situational, not geographical. They are
not directed against any particular country, nor were they devised with
any particular contingency in mind. Rather, they are needed to update our
alliance in a manner that reflects the realities and complexities of the
new era. Japans fundamental defense policy is unchanged.



Together, the United States and Japan have contributed much to regional
stability by supporting the Agreed Framework on Korea and other
nonproliferation measures, by encouraging democratic development, and by
working along with the IMF and World Bank to facilitate economic recovery.



Americas relationship with China is also a key to the Asia Pacifics
future. My government is strongly committed to its policy of purposeful
and principled engagement with China. This approach serves the interests
of both our countries and of the region, as a whole. In recent years, it
has yielded important dividends towards controlling the spread of weapons
of mass destruction and promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. 



During the past few months, several events have complicated Sino-U.S.
relations. We believe these matters should be dealt with in accordance
with the fundamental logic underlying our strategic dialogue. That logic
provides no guarantee of agreement, but it does envision diligent and good

faith efforts to avoid misunderstandings and narrow differences where
possible.



The United States also seeks to cooperate with Russia, not only on
European security, but on matters affecting the Asia Pacific, as well. For
example, we are determined to intensify our discussions with Moscow on how
to jump-start the process of strategic arms reductions and to deal with
new missile threats without abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Success in these efforts would make Asia and the entire world more secure. 



More generally, we welcome initiatives by nations within the region to
strengthen bilateral relationships. Last Mays successful visit by Korean
President Kim Dae-jung to Moscow has the potential to contribute
significantly to security cooperation in the future. The same is true of
the important steps that have been taken by national leaders in Japan,
China and the Republic of Korea to promote closer ties and deeper mutual
understanding. 



The Security Environment and Challenges in Southeast Asia



South China Sea: Along with many other countries, the United States is
increasingly concerned about rising tensions in the South China Sea. 



Several nations have sought recently to bolster their claims in the area
by building or upgrading outposts. Incidents at sea have multiplied.
Tensions have risen. And we have all been reminded that unresolved
territorial disputes can spark violence that leaves no one better off.



The stakes are too high to permit a cycle to emerge in which each incident
leads to another with potentially greater risks and graver consequences.
We cannot simply sit on the sidelines and watch. Nor can there be any
doubt that this is an appropriate Forum for discussion of this issue. All
members of the ARF have an interest in peace and stability in the South
China Sea. 



So we must ask ourselves whether we are doing all we can to find
diplomatic approaches, identify confidence building measures, and take
other concrete steps to stabilize the situation and make a peaceful
resolution in the area more likely. 



Indonesian Democratization: The United States congratulates the people of
Indonesia for the successful and nonviolent conduct of their historic June
7 national elections. All segments of Indonesian society deserve credit
for this major stride towards meaningful multiparty democracy. 



As Indonesians are the first to recognize, however, additional hurdles
must be surmounted before their journey will be complete. Foremost is the
need for the Peoples Consultative Assembly to act with transparency and
integrity in selecting the next President. 



East Timor: The deployment of the UN Mission in East Timor is a positive
development. With others, we encourage both pro-independence and
pro-integration East Timorese to work together to build a future better
than the past.



We are deeply concerned, however, by continuing violence that could create
an atmosphere of intimidation and preclude a fair referendum. We look to
the Indonesian Government to meet its obligation to create a secure and
credible environment for the August vote. 




Burma: Burma continues to pose a threat to regional stability because of
the governments failure to prevent wide-scale narcotics production and
trafficking activities, and because its repressive policies have created
strife and caused the outflow of refugees.



The United States urges Burma to shift direction and begin a dialogue with
the democratic opposition, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and other
representative groups. We support the UN role in encouraging this, and are
disappointed that Special Envoy DeSoto has not yet been able to return to
Burma, despite several requests over the past six months. We call upon the
Burmese authorities to allow such a visit as soon as possible.



The Security Environment and Challenges in Northeast Asia



The central security challenge in Northeast Asia is to preserve stability
on the Korean Peninsula. We urge all participants in this Forum to support
efforts to that end.



We cite, specifically, President Kim Dae-jung's policy of engagement with
the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK); the Four Party Talks; and
the policy review led by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry.
These initiatives have in common a desire to reduce the isolation of the
DPRK, address humanitarian needs, and prevent potentially destabilizing
military developments.



Leaders in the DPRK should be in no doubt about the willingness of the
ROK, the United States, Japan and others in the region to respond
positively and substantively to constructive actions and concrete
indications of restraint on their part. They should also know that such
steps would be profoundly in the interests of their people who suffer
greatly from North Koreas dismal economic situation. 



The United States encourages the DPRK to take advantage of the opportunity
that now exists to improve relations and to begin to participate more
fully in the economic and political life of the region. We also encourage
all nations to continue to support implementation of the Agreed Framework
in recognition of its contribution to regional stability.



The Security Implications of Transnational Issues: Nonproliferation,
Terrorism, and Transnational Crime



Nonproliferation: There is no more important global or regional security
challenge than strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. To this
end, the United States is: (1) working for timely entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; (2) promoting negotiation of a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and in the interim seeking a moratorium on
fissile material production; (3) striving to strengthen the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty through the NPT review process; (4) urging
support for strengthened IAEA safeguards; and (5) discussing with Russia
how best to continue reducing our stockpiles of strategic weapons. 



Other advanced weapons technologies concern us as well. Thus, we are
working to strengthen controls on ballistic missiles and other sensitive
technologies; striving to give teeth to the Biological Weapons Convention;
and moving to implement the treaty that seeks to banish poison gas
worldwide. 




The dangers posed by these categories of weapons and technologies are
clear. It is in the interests of every country represented here to
contribute in every way it can to international nonproliferation efforts. 



South Asia: Last years nuclear and missile tests have intensified the
spotlight on proliferation issues in South Asia. We urge both India and
Pakistan to avoid steps that would lead to an arms race, and hope that
both will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and support negotiation
of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in Geneva. 



Terrorism: Governments participating in this Forum are united in their
opposition to international terror, which has claimed victims in every
part of every continent on Earth. The United States urges the ARF to serve
as a regional rallying point for effective international action to deter
and disrupt terrorist networks and to oppose those who finance, harbor and
support them. By making life more complicated and less secure for
terrorists, we will make it better and safer for our citizens.



Transnational Crime: Whether directly or indirectly, transnational crime
harms us all. Left unchecked, it can fray the fabric of our societies and
threaten the security of our nations. We believe this Forum has a
distinctive contribution to make in this regions fight against
transnational crime. We support the proposal to convene an experts group
to consider how best to deal with such issues as small arms trafficking
and piracy and armed robbery at sea. 



Track I Activities



The Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures made
significant progress this year by implementing or proposing measures that
include the U.S.-Brunei hosted Professional Development Program and
Australias planned seminar on the Law of Armed Conflict. We also urge all
ARF members to support and implement the new maritime CBMs.



Our ISG Co-Chair, Thailand, deserves much credit for its work on the
"overlap" between CBMs and Preventive Diplomacy. The four proposals
outlined in the Thai working paper would assist parties to a dispute, with
their consent, to resolve differences before they affect other ARF
members.



We see particular value in a willingness on the part of member states to
reduce tensions and build trust by voluntarily briefing other members on
issues affecting regional security. We hope this approach can become a
regular element of the ARF process.



The United States also supports the idea of establishing a "good offices"
role for the ARF Chair, so that ARF members to a dispute could call on the
Chair for assistance. This would be done on a strictly voluntary basis,
and would be similar to the role played by the ASEAN Troika in Cambodia. 



We recognize that this Forums evolution must proceed at a pace with which
its members are comfortable. We acknowledge that we are likely to progress
in increments, not giant leaps. It is important, however, that we continue
to move in the direction of concrete and effective security cooperation.
It is in that spirit that we look forward to further examination of
preventive diplomacy by the ISG in the year ahead.




The Future Direction of the ARF



Membership: We believe that when North Korea is ready to do so, it should
reapply for admission -- on the same terms as any other qualifying
country. Otherwise, the United States supports a period of consolidation.
At 22, the ARFs membership already risks becoming unwieldy. And aside from
North Korea, no other appropriate applicants exist within the East
Asia/Oceania region.



Institutionalization: As this Forum matures, it will need to communicate
and distribute materials more quickly. We hope the ISG study of an
Internet-based, dedicated system will help. 



Some form of institutional structure will also likely be needed, which
should take into account the interests of all ARF members. No specific
decisions are yet necessary -- but it may be wise to begin discussing
general approaches soon.



Conclusion



I want to again thank Singapore for hosting this Conference and for its
praiseworthy effort to ensure a focused discussion of the security
challenges that confront our region. 





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