U.N. Documentation on the condition

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Subject: U.N. Documentation on the condition/treatment of Pro-Democracy

Activists in Burma /Myanmar
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United Nations Documentation on the condition/treatment of Pro-Democracy
Activists in Burma /Myanmar

FULL UNHCR TEXT AT :

http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wrimmr02.htm


WRITENET Country Papers

  MYANMAR: PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS (May 1994) 

                  By Tessa Piper - WRITENET (UK)

THIS ISSUE PAPER WAS PREPARED BY WRITENET ON THE BASIS OF
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND COMMENT. ALL
SOURCES ARE CITED. THIS PAPER IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO
BE, EITHER EXHAUSTIVE WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN THE
COUNTRY SURVEYED, OR CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE MERITS OF ANY
PARTICULAR CLAIM TO REFUGEE STATUS OR ASYLUM.

WRITENET IS A NETWORK OF RESEARCHERS ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
FORCED MIGRATION AND ETHNIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICT. WRITENET
IS SUBSIDIARY OF PRACTICAL MANAGEMENT (UK) 



1. INTRODUCTION 

Thousands of peaceful demonstrators were arrested and thousands more
killed during the military crackdown on pro-democracy activists that
took place
in the wake of country-wide civil unrest in Myanmar in 1988. Thousands
of
others sought safety in parts of the country under the control of ethnic
minority
opposition groups, or else fled across the country's borders into
Thailand and
India. Thousands more were arrested, or fled, both before and after the
elections held in May 1990. These events have been well documented and
will
not therefore be discussed in detail here. (For further information
about this
period see for example the following Amnesty International documents:
Amnesty International, November 1989 (ASA 16/23/89); May 1990 (ASA
16/04/90); November 1990, (ASA 16/10/90); September 1991, (ASA
16/06/91);
December 1991 (ASA 16/10/91). 

This paper looks at the current reality for pro-democracy activists
living in
Myanmar. It looks at the types of repression experienced by
pro-democracy
activists and by the population of Myanmar as a whole. Starting with
political
imprisonment and the treatment of political prisoners in detention, the
paper
goes on to look at the other measures used by the government to deter
anti-government activity. It discusses the forcible relocation of urban
populations as a means of dispersing potential political opposition, and
the use

of surveillance, harassment and intimidation to inhibit involvement in
opposition
political activity. The paper also addresses the issue of portering and
forced
labour, which historically has primarily affected ethnic minorities in
rural areas,
but which in the last few years has also affected urban residents. 

The paper also assesses the situation of pro-democracy activists who
have fled
either to parts of the country controlled by armed ethnic opposition
groups or
else to Thailand or India, and the risks they face of being returned to
Myanmar.
It concludes by evaluating the current political climate in Myanmar and
assessing its implications for pro-democracy activists who may be
returned
there. 

2. POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT 

The ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has regularly
resorted to political imprisonment as a means of repressing political
dissent in
Myanmar ever since it came to power in a coup in September 1988.
Political
imprisonment affects men and women of all ages and from a variety of
walks of
life. Among those who have been detained for their peaceful opposition
to the
SLORC are religious and community leaders, students, politicians,
teachers,
doctors and lawyers as well as writers, artists and workers. This has
led
Amnesty International to conclude that anyone thought to be critical of
the
SLORC risks arrest, torture and unfair trial as a result of involvement
in
peaceful political activity (Amnesty International, October 1993, 4). 

It is difficult to estimate the scale of political arrest and
imprisonment in
Myanmar. There are several reasons for this. First, there is no routine
public
documentation of arrests. Many of those who are detained are never
formally
charged or tried; others have false criminal charges brought against
them. The
severe restrictions the SLORC has placed on access to information about
prisoners by independent investigators, and the harsh threats and
punishments aimed at those who might try to communicate such information
to
the outside world, make detailed and accurate data extremely difficult
to obtain.
Furthermore, past SLORC statements concerning figures for political
imprisonment have proved totally unreliable. For example, over a two and
a half
year period between October 1989 and April 1992 the SLORC denied holding
any political prisoners at all. By contrast, unofficial sources claimed
that more
than 3,000 people were imprisoned for political reasons in the second
half of
1989 alone (Amnesty International, October 1992, 7). These factors make
it
likely that the information that non-governmental organizations have
been able
to compile about the scale of political imprisonment in Myanmar by no
means
represents the total picture. 

Nonetheless, it does seem clear that the rate of political arrests has
declined
significantly since 1991. In addition, large numbers of political
prisoners have
been released. Between April 1992, when the SLORC issued Declaration
11/92
which stated that all political prisoners not deemed a threat to
national security
would be released, and December 1993 some 2000 political prisoners are
reported to have been released (Amnesty International, January 1994, 2).

Since then further releases are reported to have taken place, with the
result
that the number of political prisoners released since April 1992 is
believed to
have risen to around 2,500. 

While the decline in the number of political prisoners is welcome, it
would be
wrong to assume that this reflects a reduction in the level of
repression of
political opponents. Rather, the reality is that it is no longer
necessary for the
SLORC to resort to mass political imprisonment in order to maintain its
control
over the population and silence political protest. Instead it can, and
does, rely
on a highly effective surveillance system and the use of threats and
intimidation
in order to ensure that all but the bravest critics, or potential
critics, are
initimidated into refraining from public opposition to the SLORC. (These
methods are described further in Section 5, below.) 

Nevertheless, political imprisonment remains an important tool used by
the
SLORC against its political opponents, albeit on a lesser scale than
between
1988 and 1991. In its latest report, published in January 1994, Amnesty
International estimated that hundreds of political prisoners remained in
detention, and confirmed that arrests of political opponents continue
(Ibid.,
4-6).

2.1 Politicians 

Politicians - especially those from the main opposition party, the
National
League for Democracy (NLD) -