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IHT: Burma's Generals Don't Get th



Subject: IHT:  Burma's Generals Don't Get the Point


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Subject: IHT:  Burma's Generals Don't Get the Point
Date: 1999/06/14
Newsgroups: soc.culture.burma
Paris, Monday, June 14, 1999
Burma's Generals Don't Get the Point

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By John J. Brandon International Herald Tribune
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JAKARTA - Last week's elections in Indonesia appear to have ended almost
half a century of military-backed rule.
Since President Suharto's resignation in May 1998, the day-to-day role of
the armed forces in politics has declined. Their neutrality in the recent
election campaign was a significant departure from the past.

The military retains clout. It could have a decisive say in choosing the
next president, given that no party will emerge from the elections with a
majority. Building a political coalition will be essential for the
country's next leader. The military is likely to be an important factor in
such a
coalition. 

But the future role of the armed forces in politics will have to be worked
out in an increasingly pluralistic, democratic Indonesia. The result could
have a significant impact on military regimes or military-backed
governments elsewhere - especially in Burma, where the ruling junta looked
to the
Suharto government as a model.

While Indonesia seeks to become the world's third largest democracy, Burma
has moved in the opposite direction. In 1990 it held its first free
elections in 30 years. But the military refused to honor the result - an
overwhelming victory for the National League for Democracy, headed by Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi. Winner of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, she was kept under
house arrest for six years. Her movements remain strictly confined, and her
party members have been repressed through intimidation, imprisonment and
torture. 


Indonesia's military realizes that it does not have the expertise to
manage affairs of state in a sophisticated and modern world. Witness how
little
the generals have offered in trying to solve Indonesia's worst economic
crisis in more than 30 years.

The situation in Burma is different. When the regime that called itself the
State Law and Order Restoration Council was dissolved in November 1997, it
recast itself as the State Peace and Development Council. The Burmese
military was signaling that it had no intention of relinquishing power. Yet
military rule is ultimately untenable in Burma, just as it has proved to be
in Indonesia.

Given the historical role of the army in both countries, the military will
have to play some role in development. The Indonesian generals see the need
to evolve a role for themselves in a political system that they no longer
dominate. They realize that if their country is to succeed in an era of
globalization, the military will have to work with a more open, democratic,
civilian government. 

Burma's generals are not prepared to put this lesson into practice. In the
turbulent days leading to Mr. Suharto's resignation, not a word was
mentioned about Indonesia in Burma's official media. The state-run
newspapers carried only a small article about the resignation, which made
it appear
as if he was stepping down in an orderly transfer of power.

There was no mention of students taking over the Parliament building in
Jakarta, people rioting in the streets, and how Indonesia's economic crisis
had helped precipitate the president's downfall.

This head-in-the-sand approach was no surprise. Burma's military government
declared in 1993 that Mr. Suharto's ''New Order'' government was a model
worth emulating. 

Burma is not as exposed as Indonesia is to foreign investment and
influence. So it is not as susceptible to international opinion, trends and
pressure. The Burmese military regime pays no attention to IMF
recommendations. Rangoon has defaulted on repayments of past loans from the
World Bank.

In the view of Burma's generals, Mr. Suharto's mistake was not crushing
demonstrations before they began. They will probably continue their
isolationist and repressive policies. But they need to understand that
threats instill obedience only temporarily, and that lasting authority can
come
only from respect.

Indonesia's elections are an attempt to bring legitimacy, and thus
long-term stability, to government. Indonesia's generals are beginning to
learn
this lesson, albeit slowly and reluctantly. If Burma's generals want their
nation to realize its potential, they need to learn this lesson as well.

The writer is assistant director of The Asia Foundation, a private aid
group in Washington. He contributed this personal comment to the International
Herald Tribune.


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