REPORT - PROTECTION FROM DISPLACEME

[Rangoonp@xxxxxxx]

Subject: REPORT - PROTECTION FROM DISPLACEMENT in the Shan State Burma

PROTECTION FROM DISPLACEMENT 

The principles state clearly that "all authorities and international
actors shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under
international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all
circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to
displacement of persons." 

The SHRF is convinced that the SLORC/SPDC could indeed have prevented
the forced relocation program in Shan State by sincerely addressing the
political issues being raised by the Shan opposition and engaging the
Shan resistance forces in political negotiations, as offered by the
leaders of the Shan armed groups over the past few years. Instead of
seeking political solutions, the regime has simply been using military
means to crush the opposition, which is leading to a path of total
devastation in the Shan State. 

"Military reasons"

In the section of the Guiding Principles relating to protection from
displacement, Principle 6 states that every person should be protected
against arbitrary displacement from his or her home or place of habitual
residence, including "in situations of armed conflict, unless the
security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so
demand."

The stategy of relocating villagers to cut off support for the
resistance has long been employed by the military regime as an
anti-insurgency measure, and it is clear that the immediate cause of the
forced relocations that started in 1996 was to prevent the villagers
from supporting the Shan troops. The fact that the area of forced
relocation corresponds almost exactly to the area in which the active
Shan resistance (SSA-south) is operating appears to confirm this. 

When the villagers were relocated, they were usually told by the
SLORC/SPDC troops that they had to be moved because they had been
harbouring, assisting or providing supplies to the resistance. Once in
the relocation sites, their movements outside the sites have been
restricted, and if allowed to their farms they have been prohibited from
carrying more than small supplies of rice, in case it is given to the
resistance. 

Given the suffering, abuse and loss of life inflicted by the SLORC/SPDC
military on the civilian Shan population during the forced relocations,
it would be absurd to claim that the program has in any way ensured

security for the civilians involved. Thus, the only excuse that the
regime can claim for conducting the relocations is "imperative military
reasons." 

However, it is interesting to note that the regime has yet to publicly
admit that there is even a resistance war currently being waged in Shan
State. In the state-run media, it has repeatedly stated that only one
remaining armed resistance group (the Karen National Union) has yet to
"return to the legal fold". The regime is thus being blatantly
duplicitous: on the one hand conducting a massive anti-insurgency
campaign in Shan State, and on the other hand denying the very existence
of a Shan insurgency. 

It is also noteworthy that the forced relocation as a military strategy
does not appear to be succeeding. Despite the relocation of most of the
villages in the central Shan State area in 1996, the SSA-South has
proceeded to expand its area of operation in 1997 and 1998. 

Regardless of the effectiveness of the forced relocation program as a
military strategy, it is evident that the 

regime is using the program as an excuse to commit gross human rights
violations against the Shan civilian population. The Guiding Principles
state clearly that governments must adhere to basic humanitarian norms
during relocations conducted for whatever reason, and the regime's
troops have blatantly violated these rights in every respect (see later
sections of the report for details). 

The extent of the atrocities committed indicate that in practice other
motives are involved in the continuing forced relocation which are
expressly prohibited by the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement. 

Ethnic cleansing 

"The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement ....
when it is based on policies of apartheid, "ethnic cleansing" or similar
practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or
racial composition of the affected population." (Guiding principle 6)

The brutality with which the relocations were conducted, the depriving
of almost the entire rural population of Central Shan State of their
lands and livelihood, and the repeated mass killings of villagers caught
outside the sites has inevitably resulted in a huge flow of Shan
refugees to neighbouring Thailand (over 100,000 people: see earlier
section).

Although in 1998 there appears to have been increased restrictions on
the movement of people into Thailand (see later section), certainly
during 1996 and 1997 there was no effort at all to prevent the outflow
of Shan refugees. "The Burmese are letting people come to Thailand.
Their aim is just to stop people from staying in the villages, to drive
them out, that's all." (KHRG #3, June 1996)

It is hard to prove a premeditated plan on the part of the regime to
drive out the indigenous Shan population from Central Shan State, but
the forced relocations have clearly been having this effect. While there
does not yet appear to have been any noticable migration of Burmese
civilian communities into the areas of forced relocation, there has
certainly been an increase of Burmese military bases and accompanying
mililtary personnel including their families. The building of military

bases involves confiscation of and from local Shans:

"Before I left, the Army just came and announced they would confiscate
some land and start building their base (near Namzarng). Now they have
confiscated a lot of land and forced people to build their base."
(KHRG#6, 98-03)

At the same time, as a result of the economic crisis in Burma, the
Burmese military are increasingly confiscating land around the Shan
towns and forcing the local Shans to grow food and cash crops for them
there (see later section), which is driving some Shans to Thailand since
they can no longer survive.

A further worrying development is the fact that in late 1998 in Murng
Nai, one of the areas of forced relocation in Shan State, the local
authorities have been checking the local house registration lists and
crossing out people not physically present in the household (see later
section on ID cards). This means that people who have fled to Thailand
as refugees will have no legal identity when they return.

Development

"The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement.. in
cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by
compelling and overriding public interests." (Guiding principle 6)

During the first few years of the forced relocation program from 1996 to
1997 there did not appear to be any large-scale development projects
planned in the area of forced relocation. However, since October 1998
the regime has been conducting surveys for a huge dam on the Salween
River to the east Murng Pan township, one of the townships affected by
the forced relocation. So far, Japanese and Thai companies have been
involved in the surveying, and the plans indicate that a dam will be
built to produce 3,700 megawatts of electricity, three-quarters of which
will be sold to Thailand. There is also talk of diverting some of the
water from the Salween River to Thailand. 

Since the height of the dam is planned at over 190 meters, it is likely
that vast areas of land in Shan State will be flooded if it is built.
The building of the dam will of course have serious ecological and
social impacts not only on the peoples of Shan State, but also the other
indigenous peoples of Burma who live along the river, such as the Karen,
Karenni and Mon, none of whom have been consulted about the project. 

While the forced relocation program cannot be linked from the outset to
the plans to build the Salween Dam, the regime has clearly needed to
exert complete control over the area to build the dam and thus crush all
resistance. Thus the forcible relocation of villages in the area can be
seen to be paving the way for development programs such as these. 

Collective punishment

Guiding principle 6 also prohibits arbitrary displacement "when it is
used as collective punishment." The extreme brutality exercised against
the civilian population, including women and children, during the forced
relocations indicate that collective punishment has also been a factor
in the program. 

At the very start of the relocation program, one of the first villages
to be relocated in early 1998 was the village of Ba Sar, which was near

where the Shan troops had first crossed the Teng River on their route to
try and join the resistance groups in the north. The SLORC troops were
furious at the fact that the Shan troops had managed to slip through
their control, and in what appears to be a deliberate act of vengeance
ordered the village to move immediately and torched many of the houses.
Several of the villagers were burned alive in their homes

Throughout the past 3 years there have been repeated such acts of
vengeance by the SLORC/SPDC troops on Shan civilians in the areas of
forced relocation. For example, there were several massacres of
relocated Shan civilians in the Kun Hing area in June 1997, directly
following the killing of Burmese civilians by Shan troops in the area. 

Length of displacement

Guiding Principle 6 states that "Displacement shall last no longer than
required by the circumstances." The forced relocation program is now
entering its fourth year with no indications that the regime will soon
be allowing the vast majority of the villagers to return to their homes.
The Shan resistance which the regime hoped to crush is continuing to
operate, so that it is clearly time for the regime to reevaluate its
strategy in relocating the villagers. 

Information to villagers on displacement

According to Guiding Principle 7, other than during "the emergency
stages of armed conflicts and disasters...adequate measures shall be
taken to guarantee to those to be displaced full information on the
reasons and procedures for their displacement, and (....) the free and
informed consent of those to be displaced shall be sought." 

The SHRF upholds that the authorities had the opportunity to give
information about the reasons and procedures of displacement to the
villagers that were forcibly relocated. Given that the Shan resistance
is a guerrilla struggle, the conflict cannot be seen to be in "emergency
stages" at any given time. Thus, the SPDC/SLORC authorities were under
obligation to give villagers a full explanation for the relocation and
how it would be carried out. 

However, during the relocation, soldiers simply came to the villages and
ordered the villagers out within a given number of days (usually 3-7
days), threatening that they would be shot if they did not comply. In
some cases, no warning was given whatsoever. Usually the reason given
was a general accusation that the villagers were supporting the
resistance, but in some cases no reason at all was given. The villagers
were either simply told to move to a certain village or site, or were
told to go anywhere except for their old village. There were no formal
procedures to facilitate their move. 

In no case was free and informed consent sought. The orders were simply
given, and the villagers had no choice at all. 

Many relocated villagers have stated that they have been bewildered by
the apparently arbitrary nature of the relocations. In many cases
relocated villagers have been repeatedly relocated during the last two
years, giving them no time to settle in any place, and driving them
further into poverty.


For example, one man from Wan Sisor Yakhe, Na Boi tract, Laikha
township, described how he had been relocated 4 times between March 1996
and April 1998. First they were ordered to Wan Zing, then to Mak Kork,
then to Wan Sarng, and finally to Laikha. 

Another man from Wan Mak Lang, Khoom Parng tract, Ke See township,
described how he had been forced to move 5 times between February 1997
and May 1998. "I don't know why they keep ordering people to move. I
think the aim of the soldiers is to make everyone poor," he commented.

Displacement of groups dependent on their lands

According to Guiding Principle 9, "States are under a particular
obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous people,
peasants, pastoralists and other groups with a special dependency on and
attachment to their lands." Almost all the 300,000 villagers in Shan
State who have been relocated are farmers who are entirely dependent on
their land. Ironically, Central Shan State is one of the most fertile
areas of Burma, where farming communities have thrived for generations.
Relocating this population has inevitably meant severing them from their
means of livelihood, and rendering barren thousands of square kilometers
of farming land. 

PRINCIPLES RELATING TO PROTECTION DURING DISPLACEMENT

Summary or Arbitrary Executions

"Internally displaced persons shall be protected in particular against
(...) summary or arbitrary executions." (Principle 10)

The report "Dispossessed" compiled in April 1998 gives detailed lists of
the relocated villagers killed by the Burmese military during 1997. A
total of 664 villagers, including women and children, were recorded by
SHRF as being killed. Most of them had been shot when caught looking for
food outside the relocation sites, but some had even been killed in the
relocation sites themselves. For example on February 21, 1997, 2 Shan
families, including 2 young children were blown up by SLORC troops while
sheltering in a ditch in Kho Lam relocation site. The troops had fired
shells into the site in retaliation for a Shan Army raid in the area.
This violates the stipulation in Principle 10 that "Internally displaced
persons shall be protected against attacks against their camps and
settlements."

During 1998, the SHRF has so far compiled the following list of
villagers who have been executed by the Burmese military in the areas of
forced relocation.


Date Site of killing (village, township) No. killed Details SPDC 

of killing unit

16.1.98 Kard Phui, Murng Kerng 36 men tortured, shot LIB 514

IB 227

27.1.98 Huay Wawn, Loilem 1 man, 1 woman raped LIB 517

28.1.98 Mawk Zarm, Murng Kerng 12 men, 6 women shot IB 65

8.2. 98 Nawng Leng, Murng Nai 10 men, 5 women shot LIB 515

8.2.98 Nam Maw Som, Murng Nai 3 men shot LIB 518

25.3.98 Wan Khem, Kae See 6 men shot LIB 513

4.4.98 Murng Larng, Hopong 3 men, 2 girls shot LIB 515

5.4.98 Nawngkwainailoi, Namzarng 26 men, 10 women burned, shot IB 22

12.4.98 various villages, Laikha 5 men not known LIB 517

19.4.98 Huay Kyawng, Murng Kerng 2 women raped LIB 513

3.5.98 Wan Pek, Murng Kerng 1 woman raped IB 9 


5.5.98 various villages, Laikha 6 men, 1 woman not known not known

11.5.98 east of Laikha 1 girl raped, burned LIB 442

18.5.98 Ta Sang, Murng Ton 4 women raped IB 225

26.5.98 Namyom, Murng Ton 1 man beaten to death IB 65

2.6.98 near Murng Kerng 18 men, 8 women shot IB 227

2.6.98 near Salween, Murng Paeng 19 men, 9 women shot LIB 333

6.6.98 nr. Kho Lam, Namzarng 1 man, 1 woman beaten, raped IB 246

25.6.98 Loilam, Laikha 3 men, 6 women beaten, raped LIB 517

27.6.98 Nawngtao, Murng Nai 3 men, 3 women, shot, dragged LIB 246

7 children to death

27.6.98 various villages, Murng Kerng 4 men shot LIB 513

13.7.98 Nam Yr Mu, Loilem 1 man, 1 woman, 1 child burned LIB 517

14.7.98 Narkharn, Murng Nai 4 women raped LIB 524

15.7.98 Narkharn, Murng Nai 1 man, 2 women raped LIB 524

17.7.98 Laikha town 1 woman raped, shot LIB 515

24.7.98 Mawkzali, Murngton 6 men tortured to death IB 65

in Aug. nr. Murng Pan 1 man trampled to death LIB 520

1.8.98 Sanin area, Loilem 1 man shot LIB 513

3.8.98 nr. Larngkhur 1 man shot LIB 511

8.8.98 Wan Phui, Namzarng 3 men shot IB247

19.8.98 Tawng Larn, Laikha 4 men shot IB 64

27.8.98 Wor Tawng, Murng Pan 2 men, 2 women raped, shot LIB 502

2.9.98 Parng Sak, Kunhing 1 man, 1 woman tortured, shot IB 246

7.9.98 nr. Murng Kerng 2 men, 2 wom., 2 child. shot LIB 514

10.9.98 Wan Lao, Kunhing 13 shot IB62



Total 276 villagers killed

The areas from which the villagers have been relocated have been
designated as "free-fire" zones, in which 

anyone caught can be shot on sight. This is also in direct contravention
of another section of Principle 10, stating that "Internally displaced
persons shall be protected, in particular, against direct or
indiscriminate attacks or other acts of violence, including the creation
of areas wherein attacks on civilians are permitted."

The methods used by the SPDC in executing people, including mutilation
of bodies, are clearly aimed at terrorizing the civilian population into
submission. As detailed in "Dispossessed": on March 30, 1997, SLORC
troops raped and shot dead a girl of 12 while she was taking hay to
cattle in a field near her old village of Ho Pung, Lai Kha township.
When relatives requested permission to buy the body, the SLORC troops
said: "She must be kept like this as an example for you people of Shan
State to see. If you bury her, you must die with her."

On July 11, 1997, SLORC troop laid out the beheaded bodies of 26
villagers beside the main Keng Lom-Kun Hing road in an apparent warning
to other villagers straying from the relocation sites. On July 12, a
further 12 headless corpses were placed by the Keng Lom-Keng Ton road in
Kun Hing township.

Such tactics violate the stipulation in Principle 11 that IDPs shall be
protected in particular against acts of violence intended to spread
terror among internally displaced persons. 

Use of IDPs to shield military objectives from attack

In most cases the relocation sites are situated near to SPDC military
bases. The main purpose of this appears to be so that the SPDC troops
can keep watch on the relocated villagers to ensure they are not
supporting the Shan resistance, and also so that the villagers can be

used to work for the military. Usually this work involves menial tasks
for the troops (see later section on forced labour), but in many areas,
the villagers are used as "guards" along roads to keep watch for Shan
resistance movements. 

For example, villagers forcibly relocated to Laikha have been forced to
stand guard along the main road: "People are being forced to guard the
main road. To prevent Shan soldiers from crossing .between a distance of
one mile, there are four points, where they have to guard the roads. Two
persons at each point. They build a little hut or tent beside the road.
They have to guard for one week. Day and night. " (KHRG#5, 98-03)

Use of anti-personnel land mines

"Internally displaced persons shall be protected, in particular, against
( ) the use of anti-personnel land mines." (Guiding Principle 10.2) 

Several of the refugees interviewed for this report mentioned that
land-mines had been planted in their areas. In recent months, SHRF has
heard increasing reports of forcibly relocated villagers being killed or
injured by land mines laid by SPDC troops when returning back to their
villages to fetch or tend their remaining livestock. In March 1999
alone, SHRF has heard of the following cases:

Date village, township villagers killed villagers injured

2/3/99 Wan Huay, Murng Kerng Kantama (aged 25) two (names not known)

Jingta (aged 31) 

Mala (aged 26)

7/3/99 Sai Murng, Kunhing Jingta (aged 45) three (names not known)

Sor Nanti (aged 29)

8/3/99 Wan Sonsang, Kunhing Kor Ya (aged 37) three (names not known)

Walingta (aged 31)