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20/4/99 SPDC/SLORC, NLD AND ASSK AF



POSTED 20 APR 99, 5:00AM

SPDC/SLORC, NLD AND  ASSK AFTER THE DEATH OF MICHAEL ARIS

Most of Burmese pro-democracy campaigners had little or no information
about the personal hardships of ASSK and her family, until late last
month on the news about Michael Aris's grave illness broke. After
Michael Aris death, tributes  by fellow Burma democracy campaigners were
pouring in especially on Internet and various media. Michael Aris was a
remarkable man who can face such the personal hardships  with a great
calmness and integrity. As an "admirer from a distance", I do not
personally know nor had any contact with him. His death, however, has
saddened me. I am outraged by the fact that  Burmese generals
manipulating the ASSK's family tragedy to their advantage.  I am even
more concerned about SPDC/SLORC's tendency to use any leverage to
destroy its opponents, especially Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD.

SPDC/SLORC'S PLOT AGAINST  AUNG SAN SUU KYI

As all of us are aware, the SPDC/SLORC  since 1988 has mounted a
relentless campaigns against Aung San Suu Kyi and her  leadership,
especially in connection with her marriage to a foreigner. In speaking
of the truth, SPDC/SLORC has some point to contend on this fact.
However, because Suu Kyi is the daughter of Burma's national hero,
General Aung San,  the Burmese public opinion on Suu Kyi has not
changed. On the other hand, Suu Kyi's commitment to Burma democratic
cause that combined by her  political work, in particular establishing
and maintaining the National League for Democracy party,  in its own
right becomes respectable to the Burmese public. Adding to this
respectability was various international awards, including Nobel Peace
Prize, as recognition of her work. ASSK now has an enormous  political
profile, both domestically and internationally, that unmatched to her
opponents.

>From the SPDC/SLORC's part, ASSK's marriage to a foreigner had been the
biggest draw-card to attack Aung San Suu Kyi. No doubt, for the
'Propaganda writers' of the New Light of Myanmar as well as the Burmese
generals, including junta's chief strategist General Khin Nyunt, the
single focal point of attack on Suu Kyi's leadership is her marriage.
Aung San Suu Kyi on her part has reportedly maintained her Burmese
passport and citizenship despite living in Britain for many years.
Undoubtedly, after the death of Michael Aris, SPDC/SLORC no longer have
a foundation to attack Aung San Suu Kyi--a widow. In fact, both in
SPDC/SLORC's eyes and in actual fact, Aung San Suu Kyi has now become
politically invincible leader.

One objective for SPDC/SLORC's  writing the constitution and holding a
new election is to get rid of Aung San Suu Kyi from Burma's political
scene. As we all know, the SPDC/SLORC laid down a guideline in writing
constitution in order to exclude  Aung San Suu Kyi  in future political
process. SPDC/SLORC leaders must have been hoping to exclude Aung San
Suu Kyi in a new election--i.e. after writing the constitution--probably
on the ground of her marriage. With the death of Michael Aris, those
Burmese generals' hope were also dashed. In fact, the SPDC/SLORC
leadership now have no justifiable reason to exclude Aung San Suu Kyi
from any future political process.

SPDC/SLORC AND POLITICALLY-CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

An alarming  trend  observed in recent years is the SPDC/SLORC
leadership's unwillingness to reconcile with the opposition. SPDC/SLORC
use almost any political space--some being made available for
reconciliation with the opposition--in order to attack NLD and Aung San
Suu Kyi. Some Burmese democracy campaigners complain to it as the
shortcomings of the (politically) constructive engagement towards
Burma(i.e. Burmese junta). In a  constructive engagement, the
international community may, for example, give some political concession
to entice the junta to make a further reform. Unfortunately, this does
not happen in dealing with the Burmese junta. Such a lack of success
about constructive engagement for Burma probably lies not on the merits
of the engagement itself.  The failure, in part, rests with the
international community's inability to backed-up such engagement with a
proper leverage with a substantial political power. On the other hand,
the political intransigence of the Burmese generals that generated by
narrow  mindness and non-openness  can also be the problem.

One example of constructive engagement is the ASEAN membership. In this
case, the international commnity has given some political concession  to
SPDC/SLORC to make further reform. The Burmese junta, however, is unable
to use such initiative for further reforms. Whist the junta is making
propaganda for its membership within ASEAN, the pressure on opposition
has increased and failing to move forward on reconciliation.

If a man's judgment on others people's action is believed to be based
upon his self image, there will indeed be an enormous gap for the
Burmese generals, including General Khin Nyunt, to enter any genuine
political negotiation. This problem occurs because of the Burmese
military clique's  fundamental mis-understanding about politics and
political processes (In Burma, that problem is not only confined to
military establishment, I must say). To many of those Burmese, politics
or political process is not being considered as that of mutual
understanding and cooperation of the masses. But the politics is
primarily considered as playing dirty tricks upon its opponent and
exercising power on the subordinate
(Thu-myar-myet-khone-hmway-paw-zin-gyan-shout). With this kind of
outlook on politics, any initiative--including the genuine moves for
reconciliation--by the opponent will be interpreted by military as
simply playing tricks.

Recent incident of the late Michael Aris' request to visit Rangoon is an
example. Michael Aris' request for visit to Burma was  considered by the
Burmese generals as a possible trick by the opponents to publicise the
cause of Aung San Suu Kyi. Tragically, in this case, Michael Aris'
request was a genuine one made in the desperate circumstances. It is a
prime example of how Burmese generals will perceive any of their
political opponent's words and actions as the tricks.

The circumstances on Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD that led up to recent time
also need examining.  Although the general public, only until recently,
was unaware about Michael Aris's serious illness, the SPDC/SLORC
certainly have had the knowledge about it and also the pressure on Aung
San Suu Kyi (NB: every phone conversation with ASSK were monitored by
Military Intelligence Services). It appears that SPDC/SLORC had try to
take advantage of this fact in order to expel ASSK from Burma. After the
NLD demanded to convene the parliament in last August, SPDC/SLORC put
all MP-elects  under the detention and, then, the most serious campaign
to expel ASSK was launched, with the knowledge that ASSK has been under
pressure to reunite with her family. This is a rather disturbing example
of SPDC/SLORC attempting to destroy its opponent whenever an opportunity
arise. In this case, however, the SPDC/SLORC has grossly miscalculated
ASSK's commitment to the cause of Burma democracy movement.

In sum, the Burmese generals' mistrust about other political leaders (
&the political non-openness), the narrow outlook on politics and the
pettiness of mind are to be considered as the major obstacle for
negotiation. Nevertheless, recent change in circumstances, hopefully,
may force Burmese generals to rethink their stand on the opposition  NLD
and Aung San Suu Kyi.

THE WAY FORWARD FOR RECONCILIATION

We, the pro-democracy campaigners, must remind ourselves that, in a
political movement, having a leader with a high and invincible profile
is not enough. The democracy leaders who have genuine goodwill and
understanding of general public can only be a starting point.  Doing
politics and engaging in political negotiation will require the plans
and policies. Political negotiation is not simply about two opposing
leaders shaking hands.  Following facts, therefore,  may be worth
examining for the pro-democracy campaigners and the NLD leadership.

(A) The NLD leadership must have a clear set of objectives when offering
negotiation with SPDC/SLORC. In my personal view, forming an interim
administration with the NLD(& CRPP) to take Legislative role and
SPDC/SLORC to take Executive role  presents  the best possible solution.
As such, the NLD leadership should clearly spell-out their intention on
their moves on convening parliament. Part of the anxiety of  SPDC/SLORC,
which resulted in arresting the MPs last August, appears to be the NLD's
possibility to declare an alternative government of Burma.

In my view, there will be no stigma for NLD  making compromise with
Burmese junta in this way. In changing a military dictatorship to
democracy, there has to be some form of interim arrangement.  For
example, in South Africa, the ANC and de Klerk Government have to
compromise before a full democratic process can be exercised. The
development in Indonesian democracy movement is also worth noting. In
Indonesia, the democracy movement does not attempt--except students-- to
replace the Soherto regime with a completely new government. Soherto
regime was replaced by a somewhat softer Habibi government whilst moving
towards greater democracy. This can be considered as a shrewed decision
on the part of Indonesian democracy movement. The point is that, as
contrast to changing  government within an established system, the
changing of political system  will require to take certain  intemediate
steps.

(B) Political accommodation for ethnic minority groups should be made
clear by the NLD. In politics, there is no substitute for a publicly
agreed plan and policy when various political actors are involved.
Holding trust on the goodwill and honesty of the NLD leadership alone is
not sufficient to resolve the ethnic minority issues in Burma. The UN
General Assembly recommending a tri-partite dialogue is a good start.
It will be appropriate for the NLD leaders to guarantee to the ethnic
minority leaders about the participation in drafting federal
constitution.

(C) The U.N. contact group for Burma should be supported by NLD
leadership. To my knowledge, there had been initiatives by U.S.
Congressman Bill Richardson in 1995 and the Canadian Foreign Minister L.
Anxworthy in 1997 to establish a U.N. contact group for Burma. The fact
such U.N. contact group failed to get up from the ground, I suspect, is
that whether there might be some objection by NLD leadership to have
such contact group.

When we look around the world's trouble spots, such as Middle-East,
former Yugoslavia or, of recent, Kosovo, there has to be an
international contact group to deal with the crisis. One of the Burmese
concerns might be that such contact group may become an avenue for
foreign powers to interfere in Burmese politics. However, the truth of
the fact is that we, the Burmese, must seek valuable advise and support
from the international community as a whole. As long as we Burmese
ourselves "know what we want" and able to make the political decisions,
there can be no such thing as interference. I believe the U.N.Contact
group  is not only fashionable but also is a necessity for Burma.

Our Burma democracy campaigners and, especially NLD leadership, should
be aware that current non-violent struggle in Burma is primarily the
contest between the military power and other different form of powers,
such as the powers of influence, legitimacy, truth and justice. The
power of truth is an important one, but proven to be less effective with
the Burmese generals. The Burma democracy movement must enhance its
powers of influence through such international contact group.

(D) In dealing with SPDC/SLORC, the international community should
prepare to marginalise the Burmese junta if it fails to make
cooperations on following matters: (1) the U.N. Human Rights Special
Rapporteur to visit Burma, especially to the Shan State, immediately;
(2) unreserved cooperation be given in eliminating opium cultivation and
drug production; (3) the unhindered  access for non-governmental and
humanitarian organisations to various parts of Burma, particularly to
the Shan State and (4)  to release all political prisoners, especially
the MP-elects held in detention since last August.

With best regards, U Ne Oo.
--
HTTP://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~uneoo
EMAILS: drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx, uneoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
POSTMAIL: Dr U Ne Oo, 18 Shannon Place, Adelaide SA 5000, AUSTRALIA
[http://freeburma.org/[http://www.angelfire.com/al/homepageas/index.htm]

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