The BurmaNet News: March 24, 1999

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"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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The BurmaNet News: March 24, 1999
Issue #1234

HEADLINES:
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BI: PROPAGANDA- MANUFACTURING THE MASSES 
ABSDF: DEMANDS IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF MIN KO NAING  
XINHUA: JAPANESE AIDED HEALTH PROJECT LAUNCHED 
ANNC: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION CAMP 
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BURMA ISSUES- PROPAGANDA: MANUFACTURING THE MASSES
February, 1999 Volume 9 Number 2 by Nyah Phay Thwet

Removing and getting rid of authority defying acts of [the] NLD led by Suu
Kyi, holding negative views, at a time when peace and tranquility prevail
all over the country and all citizens are having good opportunities for
progress in life; declaring [the] NLD [an] unlawful association, as it is
breaking the law again and again, perpetrating acts in collusion with
neocolonialist group[s] to cause utter misery [to] the people... 

-Fifth and sixth resolutions from the 'Meeting expressing the people's
sentiments, wishes of the masses, Pa'an, Kayin State, 22 October 1998,' as
aired on TV Myanmar; 11 February 1999.

One means by which Burma's military government exerts control over the
nation is a virtual monopoly on media. Airing propaganda is a daily ritual.
While to outsiders it often appears little more than awkward rhetoric, its
proliferation suggests it holds a particular place in the mechanics of
power in Burma. What purpose does propaganda serve and how can it be
countered? To answer, this article will first examine some recent state
propaganda, then consider its implications for Burma's peace movement.

11 February 1999 was the day before Union Day. TV Myanmar celebrated with
typical martial pageantry in the lead-up to news time. After airing the
political, economic and social objectives of the state and People's Desires
(1), a new anti-National League for Democracy (NLD) segment reiterated the
"unanimous" resolutions from one of last year's contrived mass rallies.
(Above.) The news broadcast itself began with footage of the latest
official appointments, and the arrival of the Union Flag in Rangoon, met
with rousing festivities and much saluting. The Union Flag, after all, had
just taken a month to be shuffled around every state and division in the
country by a steady relay of underpaid civil servants. Next, a new tone
emerged:

[Images of a public rally]

"Members of the electorate of Moulmein Township Constituency 1 have
publicly announced that they do not trust anymore and do not recognize U
Lun Tin of NLD, the Hluttaw (parliamentary] representative elect from the
constituency. They put their signatures on [a] letter mentioning their
distrust and disapproval of the representative-elect and presented the
letter at rallies... held on the seventh of this month. The First rally...
was attended by 30,324 national people.
"[The rally chairman] said that... without any consideration for the
people, the NLD party took a head-on collision course by violating the
laws... With the sole objective of gaining power and negating the desire
for peace and stability of the people, the NLD committed acts to confront
the government, to create [a] chaotic situation like that of "the
four-eights " and to cause bloodshed. He said, the people... had elected U
Lun Tin not to engage in confrontation with the government, and not to
violate the laws. The people had not selected a vandal...


"In September 1998 [the NLD] formed a committee, or the Gang of Ten, to
represent the Hluttaw representatives-elect. The Gang of Ten comprises
members of parties that have been legally dissolved, Suu Kyi, who had not
been eligible for election, and U Lun Tin himself... The Gang of Ten went
too far in their unlawful actions...

"In (the] 1990 Hluttaw election, U Lun Tin received 39,624 votes, or
49.20%. But now, the number of voters who signed the letter of distrust and
disapproval of U Lun Tin is 66,012, representing 81.97%. "

There is no shortage of contemporary precedents to these latest gatherings.
In 1996, the military organized "spontaneous" people's rallies to counter
the popular house-front assemblies then held by Aung San Suu Kyi. In
1998-99, it was the NLD's stated intent to reconvene parliament, the
Hluttaw, that led to the public denouncements of the NLD. In both cases,
"voluntary resignations" of NLD members followed en masse, and continue to
the present.

However, the latest rallies are not mere reruns. Previously, great effort
was made to refer to the opposition party and it's leader obliquely, as if
catastrophe might befall the state were it to identify Suu Kyi or the NLD
by name. By contrast, rallies are now dominated by explicit personal
attacks on individual members of the NLD. Secondly, as a corollary, the
military is emphasizing its own relative legitimacy. Thus, resolutions from
the 1998 rallies inform viewers that state stability, peace and economic
progress are "already achieved" and now must be "safeguarded". While the
process of legitimization is not new, it appears to be playing a more
significant role in state propaganda than in the past.

Debunk the enemy and sing your own praises. This apparently simple strategy
is in fact complex. As the government has effectively managed to quash any
form of functioning opposition through state security mechanisms, what is
the point in stage-managing public diatribes? Do NLD members really need to
be pried from their seats through pseudo-democratic pantomimes, or is some
other psyche-cultural need being satisfied in their performance? These
questions demand consideration to understand in part why, at a time that
western nations might expect an iota of conciliation from the regime, it
demonstrates increasing recalcitrance.

Is the process of denouncement an end unto itself! Assuming that the latest
attacks are not designed to achieve explicit political ends more easily
reached through other means, their primary function could be to tap the
collective national subconscious. Anthropologist Melford Spiro, conducting
research in Burma prior to military take-over in 1962, identified an
apparently important political phenomenon that would support this
assertion: plans, accusations and threats are verbalized without
corresponding action. "On the one hand, it seems as if words are not meant
to be taken seriously, that they are meant to be tokens in a game, rather
than preparations for action. At the same time, one also had the impression
that words are serious, because for the actor words (in some sense) are
action..." (2)


But if sound and fury signify something, then what? The current strategy
may be to symbolically diminish the public presence of the opposition
before that of the military. The government would thereby satisfy' both its
need for a sense of dominance while appealing to the tastes of its
audience. Although sources claim that the recent rallies are met with
general disbelief by people in Burma, (3) the psychological impact of mass
propaganda on the broad population should not be taken lightly. Burmese
social traits identified by Spiro included a tendency to submit to
authority, and the common use of mildly hostile humor. (4) In this light,
state sponsored slander becomes a psychological trigger for culturally
defined satire, converting everyday interaction from streets and villages
to the national stage. An incompetent worker ridiculed in a paddy field is
recontextualized as a villainous NLD Member, absurdly inferior to the
prestigious Armed Forces, cemented into popular consciousness through a
cultural ploy.

>From playful social device to tool for political dominance? Acontentious
argument perhaps, yet one borne out every time Burmese expatriate
opposition groups rally with cries that are simply predictable inversions
of military sloganeering. The demonization of the foe is a commonality.
Whether Khin Nyunt is labeled a "bloodthirsty dog" or Suu Kyi a "camel
woman", the generals denigrated as "puppet-masters" or the NLD again deemed
"axe-handles", the parallel lines of jargon stem from the same sociological
source.

What does this imply about the state of the opposition movement?  By
nature, sloganeering is the non-pursuit of issues, ultimately a dead-end.
The victors are those who remain in power. The people in the middle are
stymied, critical thinking stifled and potentially powerful voices muted by
the constant barrage overhead. (5) The propaganda process ultimately
dominates not a single party or personality but society as a whole,
powerful by its prevalence. The state ends are achieved.

And what does it imply for the movement towards genuine change in Burma? As
noted above, there is a tendency by opposition forces to respond to
propaganda merely in kind. Much of the time, when there is talk of putting
"pressure" on the government, there is little or no examination of its
qualitative elements. To simply "apply pressure" on an inflexible
authoritarian regime may be morally satisfying, but there is a greater
imperative: the need to find lasting solutions to the complex nationwide
problems that Burma faces. To reach this point demands that real issues be
addressed.

Effective pressure involves critical use of resources and alternative
tactics. Ways to lend support for genuine people-centered change must be
identified and prioritized. Just as the government is capable of employing
socio-cultural tools to maintain the status-quo, with appropriate support,
the people themselves can also identify cultural mechanisms to work towards
true peace. Just as psyche-cultural weaknesses are exploited by the state
propaganda machinery, so can equally powerful societal strengths be
identified to use in the fight for real change. Ultimately, effective
nonviolent pressure on an autocracy comes only from those who suffer its
burden. That point is often reiterated in this publication, but it cannot
be understated. One need look no further than TV Myanmar for evidence of
the importance of getting on with building the movement - a movement of
alternatives.


Endnotes

1 See "The People's Desire", BI, June 1996.
2 Melford Spiro, "Factionalism and Politics in Village Burma",
Anthropological Other or Burmese Brother?
3 See for example "The Current Situation in Irrawaddy Division," BI,
]anuary 1999.
4 Spiro, "A Study in Burmese Psychocultural History," Ibid., pp,. 18 7-221
5 See also "Propaganda and the Human Rights Agenda", BI, July 1 996, for
more on the role of propaganda in the activist community.

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ABSDF: ABSDF DEMANDS IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF MIN KO NAING
23 March, 1999 from <lurie@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> 

Media Release - 22/99

The All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) has demanded the immediate
release of student leader Min Ko Naing, who was jailed ten years ago on
March 23, 1989 by the Burmese military junta for his role in the 1988
pro-democracy movement.

Min Ko Naing was charged under section 5(j) of the 1950 Emergency
Provisions Act and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment with hard labour for
his role in the movement. He was an active organizer of demonstrations
during the uprising.  As Chairman of the All Burma Federation of Student
Unions (ABFSU), he became an inspirational figure to his fellow students
and the people of Burma. His speeches, public pledges and poems caught the
spirit of the people and made him a leading light in the opposition to
military rule.

Min Ko Naing's decade in prison has been spent in solitary confinement.
There are numerous reports of his torture by the military authorities.
Although international human rights organizations, including Amnesty
International, have declared him a prisoner of conscience, his prison
conditions have not improved.

Min Ko Naing is a man of sacrifice said Moe Thee Zun, ABSDF Vice-chairman,
who led demonstrations with Min Ko Naing and is a close friend.

"Min Ko Naing's only ambition in the struggle for democracy is to
contribute and sacrifice. He has been this way since he was very young. He
has survived all these years because of his strong will and commitment to
justice and freedom."

Late last year unconfirmed reports circulated of Min Ko Naing's death. In
another rumour he was said to have been transferred to Sittwe Prison in
Arakan State. Only his immediate family members are allowed to see him
during prison visits. During one visit he asked his parents to "bring news
instead of food".

Min Ko Naing was a prime target of the authorities, and is considered to be
second only to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in his importance to the democracy
movement within Burma.

On the tenth anniversary of his detention, the ABSDF demands that the
Burmese military junta unconditionally release Min Ko Naing.

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XINHUA: JAPANESE-AIDED HEALTH PROJECT LAUNCHED IN MYANMAR
23 March, 1999  

YANGON (March 23) XINHUA - A health project for the improvement of maternal
and child health care in Myanmar was launched here Tuesday with the aid of
Japan and the involvement of the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF). The
Japanese assistance of 2.7 million U.S. dollars is to be provided to
Myanmar for the procurement of necessary medicines and medical equipment to
be distributed to the country's rural areas through the UNICEF.


Notes on the project were exchanged between Kazuo Asakai, Japanese
ambassador to Myanmar, and Juan Aguilar Leon, UNICEF representative, in the
 presence of Myanmar Deputy Minister of Health U Mya Oo and a visiting
group of Japanese parliamentarians led by Shomei Yokouchi.

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ANNOUNCEMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION CAMP 1999
22 March, 1999  

Actions Speak Louder than Words- Human Rights Action Camp 1999

Co-sponsored by the Ruckus Society and The RFK Memorial Center for Human
Rights 

When: May 27- June 3, 1999 
Where: Middleburg, VA (45 Minutes west of DC) 

Nonviolent direct action has been a vital part of human rights and social
justice campaigns from the Boston Tea Party to the US Civil Rights Movement
and China's 1989 prodemocracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Join
human rights activists from local, national and international organizations
for a dynamic and empowering six-day training program.  Share in the
history, strategies and tactics of nonviolent direct action with
experienced activists.  Learn skills in campaign and media strategy,
political theater, action climbing and on-line activism. This will be a
time for capacity and team building, leadership development and networking.

Participants from Kenya, Burma, Nigeria, Indonesia and throughout Europe
came together with their peers from North America at the 1998 Human Rights
Action Camp. This year's camp promises to draw activists from human rights
hot spots around the world along with those working in North America on
international and domestic issues.

Workshops offered but not limited to: 
Strategic Campaigning 
Action Planning And Strategy 
Media Skills 
Nonviolence (History, Philosophy & Application) 
Computer Skills/ Internet Activism 
Political Theater 
Introduction to Human Rights Law and Advocacy 
Urban Climbing Techniques 
Facilitation & Group Process 
Legal Considerations (Jail & Court) 
Banner Rigging And Hanging 
Banner Construction And Preparation 
Scouting 
Blockades And Support Roles 

How to apply: Individuals interested in attending the 1999 Human Rights
Action Camp can apply online at our website <www.ruckus.org> or call The
Ruckus Society at (510) 848-9565.

Background: The Ruckus Society increases the capacity of organizations and
campaigns struggling for environmental and social change by working to
develop our most valuable resource: our people. In just three years, we
have trained over 1,000 activists in our action camp program.  Our
graduates work for grassroots campaigns and national organizations
throughout the United States and in other countries, applying the skills
they learned at action camp.


The Ruckus Society - 2054 University Ave. #204 - Berkeley, CA  94704 - 510
848 9565 - ruckus@xxxxxxxxxx 
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