Lallah report to the 55th UNHRC (Pa (r)

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Subject: Lallah report to the 55th UNHRC (part 2)


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III.  MISSION TO THAILAND

25.   The Special Rapporteur has previously addressed the situation in the
ethnic minority States, especially those along the Myanmar/Thai border, in
his reports to the General Assembly (A/51/466, annex, paras. 37-51 and
A/52/484, annex, paras. 69 142) and to the Commission on Human Rights
(E/CN.4/1997/64, paras. 65-100).  His initial concern related to reports of
military attacks and looting on civilian settlements, forced relocation of
the ethnic groups, forced labour for development and industrial projects
and portering for military operations.  In his last report to the
Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur called upon the
Government of Myanmar to take immediate steps in order to put an end to the
forced displacement of persons, to prohibit the practice of forced labour
and forced portering and to prevent arbitrary killings, and confiscation of
property in the ethnic minority areas.
26.   The Special Rapporteur visited Thailand in order to inquire into the
current situation of the displaced persons on the border of Myanmar with
Thailand, and on the human rights violations committed against ethnic
minorities and others who had been subjected to various forms of repression
by the Government.  The itinerary of the Special Rapporteur included
Bangkok, Kanchanaburi, Mae Sot, Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son and camps in the
Tak province with large populations of displaced persons.  During these
visits he was received by representatives of the Thai authorities and met
with representatives of international non governmental organizations  and
representatives of several ethnic groups.  During his visit, the Special
Rapporteur received the testimonies of a total of 50 persons selected from
among newly arrived persons from Myanmar, mostly Karen, Shan and Karenni.
The information and views obtained in the course of his visits are
reflected below under the relevant subject headings.

A.  The problem of displacement

27.   Internal displacement in Myanmar represents a particular case of
human tragedy resulting from conflict between the Government and different
ethnic groups.  It is estimated that over half a million displaced
persons,living in Mon, Karen, Shan and Karenni States, are in need of

humanitarian assistance.Since the independence of Myanmar in 1948, the
country has suffered from unresolved conflicts between most of the ethnic
minorities and the central authorities in spite of a number of ceasefire
agreements.  These conflicts precipitated insurgencies in several parts of
the country which have resulted in large numbers of internally displaced
persons and a considerable number who have sought refuge in neighbouring
countries, particularly Thailand, Bangladesh and India.
28.   The Special Rapporteur is not in possession of independently verified
statistics on the number of displaced persons in Myanmar, but local and
international NGOs estimate the number in Karen State to be between 100,000
and 200,000.  Unofficial estimates place the current number in Shan State
to be over 300,000  and in Karenni State, 70,000.  Finally, there are
reportedly
about 40,000 persons displaced in Mon State.
29.   By the end of June 1998, the refugee camp caseload of displaced
persons from Myanmar living in Thailand was 112,841.  The breakdown by
ethnic group was as follows:  86,823 Karen, 12,665 Mon, 13,353 Karenni.  In
addition, there were a number of Shan displaced persons who were not living
in refugee camps but were scattered mainly throughout the north of
Thailand.  It is generally believed that tens of thousands of people from
Myanmar have entered Thailand during the last three years.

B.  The main causes of displacement

30.   The problem of displacement in Myanmar is complex and open to so many
different interpretations that a comprehensive assessment is difficult. The
causes of displacement are numerous and differ from one region to another,
although certain common features and trends can be discerned.
31.   The role of the army, in this context, is paramount.  Since
independence, it has exercised a strong influence over the governing of the
ethnic states.  Many Karen, Karenni and Shan do not perceive the army as a
national army, and soldiers, particularly ethnic Burmese, generally behave
towards the local population as if they were enemies.
32.   Violence against civilians would appear to have been a fundamental
component of the overall military strategy of the Myanmar army.  That
strategy is designed first to secure resources from the local population,
in particular food, combatants and workers, and second to weaken the
resource base of insurgent groups and their capacity to govern.  To this
latter end, the army not only has undertaken systematically to destroy most
of the villages but also, as the local economy is largely based on
agriculture, forcibly to displace the rural population so as to disrupt
agricultural production.
33.   In flagrant violation of the basic rules of humanitarian law,
civilians living in rural settlements have been attacked.  In some cases,
this has resulted in massacres, in others in disorderly flight to safety,
often separating families.  Those who are captured are often subjected to
rape and arbitrary killing, or are held captive to grow food for the army,
or made to provide forced labour or portering for the army.
34.   After these general observations, it is appropriate to specify the

main causes of displacement.  These are counter insurgency operations,
forced labour and portering restrictions on farmers and land confiscation. 
Each is discussed separately below.  Displacement is also attributed to
major development projects undertaken by the Government in the process of
which large numbers of persons are removed from the lands designated for
the projects without being assisted in relocation or being appropriately
compensated.

1.  Counter insurgency operations

35.   Counter insurgency operations by the army have had an important
impact on the displacement of the population, both with regard to the
number of persons displaced and the methods employed.  These operations
have also contributed to the massive uprooting of the rural population by
deliberately relocating large numbers of civilians from numerous villages
as part of the military strategy against the insurgents.  Despite a number
of ceasefire agreements signed by the Government and representatives of
ethnic groups, the army is still engaged in counter-insurgency operations
in Karen, Shan and Karenni States. 
36.   Although the practice of forced relocations by the military as a
means of controlling the population in the ethnic regions is not new, the
scale of the relocations increased significantly after 1996.  The victims
of displacement are mostly peasants, including members of ethnic groups
such as the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon, who live in areas of insurgency
and are victimized by counter-insurgency activities or are caught in the
crossfire between the army and the insurgents.
37.   Numerous testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur indicate that
the civilian population living in or near the combat zone is generally
forced to move:  in these "grey zones" (zones controlled or influenced by
the insurgents) the armed forces often resort to searches, destruction and
burning of houses, and confiscation of property and food to force the
people to move, temporarily or permanently.  Testimonies indicate that no
distinction between insurgents and non-combatants is generally made and
that the inhabitants of these zones are subjected to indiscriminate
torture, beatings and arbitrary arrests by the army. 
38.   In order to cut the main links between the insurgent groups and the
civilian population, entire communities living in the border area between
Myanmar and Thailand are moved to relocation sites which are subject to
strict military control.  Expulsion orders are issued by the army coupled
with the warning that anyone trying to remain in their homes will be shot
on sight.
39.   The following information provided to the Special Rapporteur is
illustrative of the widespread recourse to forced relocation and the
consequent violation of most basic rights.  Central Shan State has
witnessed one of the largest forced relocation programmes, which still
continues. From March 1996 the army has ordered village after village in
eight townships (Larng Kher, Murng Nai, Nam Zarng, Lai Kha, Murng Kerng,
Kun Hing, Ke See and Murng Su) to move to a total of 45 relocation sites. 
The estimated number of people relocated is over 100,000 from over 600

villages.  When relocated, the population is left to fend for itself to
find work, food and sanitary and education facilities.  In Karenni State,
throughout June and July 1996, orders were given to more than 100 villages
located between the Pon and Salween Rivers instructing villagers to move to
relocation sites near army camps in Sha Daw and Ywa Thit townships.  The
estimated number of people affected was 20,000-30,000, most of them ethnic
Karenni.  The army's purpose is apparently to isolate the population in
that area from Karenni insurgents of the Kayinni National Progressive Party
(KNPP).  Army officers are reported to have warned that those who remained
in the deserted villages would be considered insurgents or "enemies".  
40.   In addition to displacement caused by deliberate action, many persons
are said to have left for fear of being attacked when the military fronts
move close to their places of residence.  To avoid losing their homes and
sources of livelihood, many communities have resisted displacement as long
as possible and have developed different strategies for survival.  Several
displaced persons living in camps in Thailand described to the Special
Rapporteur how people in their village would hide in the forest and return
when it was safe to tend to their farms.  As the situation worsened, many
families fled the village.  Since fighting was spreading to different parts
of the district, they did not know where to go to find shelter and after
one week they returned.  The village was finally attacked and the houses
destroyed.

2.  Forced labour and portering

41.   The second reason has to do with the particular phenomenon of forced
conscription of civilians into compulsory labour duties for the military
authorities.  No pay is given for such labour and the period of service can
last for months.  This practice disrupts family life and prevents people
from carrying on their daily work in order to earn a living.
42.   The Special Rapporteur received reports that villagers throughout
Shan State are being forced by the SPDC to work without payment.  The
people most seriously affected are those who have been forcibly relocated,
as they have been forced to leave their land and become wage labourers and
thus cannot afford to work without pay for the military.
43.   It is common practice for the military to force villagers to go and
work on military bases, either for constructing or maintaining barracks,
bunkers or fences, or performing menial tasks like cleaning, weeding, and
fetching firewood or water.  Even children are forced to do this kind of
work: on 29 May 1998, SPDC troops are reported to have forced 10-15 boys
between the ages of 14 and 16 to work at the military bases of LIB 524 and
IB 246. They were not fed, and were even beaten up by the soldiers.
44.   The Special Rapporteur has received reports that villagers are being
forced to grow food for the army.  In June 1998, villagers in Kengtung are
reported to have been forced by the SPDC to grow chili peppers, beans and
garlic on land that was confiscated from them.  And on 11 July, SPDC base
LIB 102 apparently ordered the civilian population to provide labourers for

weeding soya bean and corn farms owned by the military in Murng Pan.  Ten
persons from each village, from some 15 villages each day, had to bring
their own food and tools.  Villagers of Kengtong, Murng Nai, said they had
been forced in September 1998 to plant yellow beans for the army, then tend
the plots and do weeding and fencing for troops at local bases.
45.   Throughout 1998, The Special Rapporteur received reports of villagers
from Murng Pan, Larng Khur, Murng Nai, Murng Ton and Nam Zarng being forced
to work for the army for periods of up to two weeks splitting rocks near
the Salween River crossing of Ta Sarng in Shan State.  The battalions
concerned were IB 225, IB 64, IB 65 and LIB 333.  The rocks were conveyed
by the army to
big cities like Yangon where they were sold for 12,000-15,000 kyats per
truckload.
46.   Since 4 July 1998, villagers from the Kengtong area are reported to
have been forced to drive their oxcarts to carry teak lumber from Kengtong
to the SPDC military base of IB 43 at Kunhing.  During July and August 427
oxcarts were used.
47.   Since April 1998, villagers in 21 villages in the Nam Kham area of
Northern Shan State, bordering on China, are reported to have been forced
to work on a dam over the Nam Mao River.
48.   Throughout 1998, the SPDC military are reported to have been taking
porters from the main towns throughout central and southern Shan, where the
Shan resistance is operating.  The SPDC had been sending out regular
military patrols from its bases around the area, each time demanding groups
of porters from the civilian population.  The households provided porters
on a rotation
basis, and if someone could not go, they were made to pay 8,000-10,000
kyats to hire a replacement.

3.  Restrictions on farmers

49.   Because of the massive displacement of the population, farming has
apparently been drastically reduced.  This has led to food shortages among
the rural population generally and has provoked voluntary displacement to
other areas in search of assistance and security.
50.   The army is reported to be increasingly placing restrictions on the
kinds of crops grown by the local farmers, forcing them to grow crops for
the troops which they will either consume themselves or sell.  On 4 May
1998, in Murng Pan, IB 66 is reported to have ordered farmers to grow no
more than a small amount of garlic, whereas farmers had traditionally grown
this crop for export to Thailand.  They were told they had to grow soya
beans for the army instead.  On 23 June, IB 286 in Kaesee told villagers
from Murng Nawng and Murng Nang (who had been forcibly relocated) that they
needed licences to grow rice and if licenced, they had to give half their
rice crop to the army. If they had no licence, their rice fields would be
confiscated.  On 2 July, SPDC IB 99 in Larng Khur is reported to have
ordered all sugarcane farmers to clear two thirds of their sugarcane farms
and grow soya beans and yellow beans for
the army instead.  One farmer who had apparently been granted permission to
continue farming as usual was reported to have been beaten, kicked,
tortured and then shot to death on 3 August 1998.  In September, the

villagers of Kengtong, Murng Nai, were said to have been forced to
cultivate yellow beans for the SPDC troops at local bases.

4.  Land confiscation

51.   Another important cause of displacement relates to land confiscation.
The majority of the population lives by agriculture.  Farms tend to be
small and constitute the only income for families.  Moreover, land is
culturally part of a person's identity.  The Special Rapporteur was told
that very few legal titles to land exist.  This permits the military to
confiscate the land that had traditionally belonged to peasants and farmers
living in Karenni, Karen and Shan States and to redistribute it to military
officials and soldiers.
52.   Since June 1998, the authorities are reported to have issued orders
for the confiscation from the people in Tachilek of 1,000 acres of land
stretching along the Tachilek-Kengtung main road.  The confiscated land has
been bulldozed, divided into small patches and sold to those who can afford
it. People from nine villages have been affected.  On 4 June 1998, the
Golden Triangle Military Command Commander ordered LIB 422 to confiscate 13
plots of land and rice fields owned by villagers of King-Ka in Zone 2 in
Kengtung to expand the military base.  The villagers were given a small
plot of land each to build a house on, but they had to buy it.  They were
still forced to pay their rice quota to the SPDC even though their land had
been taken from them.
53.   While development and industrial projects such as railway
construction, and the creation of tourist attractions are being carried out
in areas inhabited by minorities, many people are having their lands
confiscated without any compensation and are forced to move to designated
sites.

C.  Patterns and consequences of displacement

54.   The Special Rapporteur has ascertained from his contacts with those
who have sought refuge in the camps on the Thai side of the Thai Myanmar
frontier that since 1996, there are two distinct categories of internally
displaced persons in the ethnic States:  the "displaced" and "dispersed". 
The first category consists mostly of families who were forced to go to
relocation sites or army camps, while the second category includes persons
who instead fled to the mountains or the jungle, trying to avoid the main
roads and to hide from the military.  It is much more difficult to identify
the dispersed, since they are not concentrated in a group but are literally
dispersed throughout the country.  While visiting the camps, the Special
Rapporteur spoke with both categories of displaced persons who subsequently
fled to Thailand, and in the context of the present report the term
"internally displaced" implies both categories.
55.   Testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur, as well as
observations made by representatives of non-governmental organizations,
indicate that the victims of displacement are mostly villagers and farmers
who were living in remote areas of Karen, Shan and Karenni States.  Most of
them have not been officially registered and do not possess any
identification cards or other documents.

56.   Cases of forced evictions seem to occur with great frequency and as a
matter of policy.  All the people interviewed by the Special Rapporteur
stated that they were given at most one week's notice to move and were told
that they would be shot if they did not comply.  They were forced to leave
their land, their crops and most of their animals.  Much of the property
was reportedly immediately stolen or confiscated by the army.  In some
cases, there was adequate time to prepare for departure, so that families
or even entire communities could leave together.  If not, or if attacked,
they had to flee in a disorderly manner, sometimes with the husband, wife
and children going in different directions.
57.   The internally displaced persons in Myanmar rarely flee in large
numbers.  They usually  move in small groups of a few families or
individuals. The areas of expulsion are numerous and spread throughout the
country, including in the border areas with Thailand.  The displaced's own
perceptions of where food and security might be found are determining
factors in deciding upon the destination of their flight.  The displaced
usually move to neighbouring rural areas or to the jungle; others go
directly to relocation sites and from there to camps located in Thailand,
or directly to Thailand where they often join relatives or friends from the
same area.  In this regard, the Special Rapporteur was often told during
the mission that the army is planting landmines in order to prevent the
population from using the routes which take them to their paddy fields or
to the Thai border.  According to information received, each battalion in
the front line area (along the Myanmar Thai border) was issued with about
200 landmines and ordered to plant  them.  
58.   The two main considerations which led people to flee were security
concerns and the need to have a source of livelihood.  These could at times
be contradictory concerns.  On the one hand, fear of losing one's land
constituted a motive for staying if the harvests were sufficient, while on
the other hand, fear of attacks was a motive for departing.  Conversely,
the need to find a source of subsistence had to be weighed against the fear
of being caught by the army after having been ordered to move to a
relocation site.
59.   Another problem affecting the displaced is the disintegration of
families and communities.  The Special Rapporteur noticed a large number of
widows and orphans among the displaced in camps in Thailand.  However,
numerous communities have remained more or less together in spite of
displacement and have maintained many of their cultural traditions.  This
helps to alleviate to some extent the acute problems of displacement and
would no doubt facilitate the process of return to the areas of origin.
However,  very few returns to areas of origin seem to be taking place. 
Continued insecurity coupled with destroyed infrastructure suggest that
displaced persons had compelling reasons for wanting to remain in the camps
in Thailand.
60.   As far as the security situation in the areas of return are
concerned, reports continuously reaching the camps speak of, for example,

forced labour and portering, arbitrary arrests, detentions and executions
by the Myanmar military of persons suspected of sympathizing with
insurgents, with no recourse to formal judicial proceedings.  In addition,
returnees were finding their homes destroyed and their land either burnt or
occupied by the army. In such cases, the returnees had no recourse to
justice, either because the judicial system did not exist or because it was
not functioning independently. The displaced, moreover, had very few
resources and means by which to return home.  The infrastructure of entire
villages had been destroyed and many homes levelled by warfare and looting.
Finally, it would seem that the local authorities had no intention of
dealing with the assistance and protection problems of the returnees.
61.   The Special Rapporteur was told that, for the peasants who had lost
their land, either because they had to sell it very cheaply before they
fled or because it was destroyed or taken by the army, return is not
possible.
Where the armed conflict is continuing, return is also not an option.  


1.  The situation of the dispersed in the jungle

62.   Following orders to leave their homes, many villagers avoid moving to
relocation sites and usually move first to a nearby rural area or go to the
jungle, trying to work in their fields during the day and returning for
safety at night.  They can remain in hiding for several months as long as
they are able to find sufficient food to survive.  These villagers live in
fear that the soldiers will find them, especially in the dry season.  It
was reported, for example, that at the start of the dry season in 1998,
local army troops shot on site at villagers hiding in the Mi Chaung Theit
area.
63.   Apart from the lack of security, the lack of food is clearly the main
problem facing families living in the jungle.  Families supplement their
rice porridge by eating wild roots, leaves and fruit.  Many families
interviewed said that they could not cultivate their crop safely and that
when they were discovered their fields and paddies were burned.  As a
result, without any source of income and without enough food to survive,
they try to find their way to Thailand.  In addition, people living in the
jungle have limited access to health care.  They have to rely on an
insufficient and informal health-care network in the form of "mobile health
teams", which provide medicines and vaccinations.  However, it was reported
that these mobile teams could not cover all the areas where the displaced
hide and live.

2.  The situation of the displaced in relocation sites

64.   According to testimonies received, relocation sites, as well as the
living conditions in the sites, may vary from one place to another.
Displaced  persons in refugee camps in Thailand describe the sites as
either a large, empty stretch of land surrounded by fences or barbed wire
and near a military camp or as the centre of a large village where the army
has forced villagers to congregate.  The military outpost is normally in
the centre of the village. 
65.   No particular arrangements are made by the authorities to receive the

new forced arrivals.  There seems to be a food and a health crisis and a
general lack of adequate housing and basic services.  Villagers have to
build their own makeshift huts and provide their own food.  Family members
living in the relocation sites are often requested to do various tasks for
the army. Each family also has to provide one person to work for the army. 
They perform various duties such as building the fences, cleaning the
compound or guarding the site.  The interviews did not make clear to what
extent facilities for education and access to health care, especially for
children, are available.
Unemployment is a major problem in the relocation sites.  The displaced are
used to working their own land and it is difficult to start any sort of
work to generate income.  When they are able to find work, they are easily
exploited.  According to testimonies received, many displaced persons,
including children, work as daily workers (porters), whose salaries are
around US$ 2 per week, for 12-hour working days.  Others work in
construction.
Those who find such jobs are considered to be fortunate, since they have an
income.
66.   The villagers are not entitled to leave the compound without a pass,
for which they have to pay.  Their freedom of movement is extremely limited
and, in all cases, subject to authorization from the local military
battalion.
Attempting to flee is said to be interpreted by the authorities as proof of
participation in or sympathy with the insurgency and of an intention to
report on the abuses committed by the army.  Some are required to obtain
safe conduct passes or pay high fees at checkpoints for a "permission" to
leave.  Other sources have reported incidents of women and children being
shot at while fleeing in areas near the border with Thailand.

3.  Special problems affecting women and children

67.   Many of the displaced, in particular women and children, reported
that they had been terrorized and subjected to inhuman treatment before
taking refuge in Thailand.  It was reported that Myanmar soldiers raped and
abused women during incursions into the emergency zones or in the
relocation sites.
In some areas, women who work in the fields still face significant risks of
being targeted and victimized.
68.   The Special Rapporteur has noted the serious psychological problems
facing women and children affected by the crisis.  Abuses against women,
especially in the course of violent events, reportedly ranged from having
seen their children or husband killed to being raped and losing their home
and means of subsistence.  Interviews held in the course of a short visit
to a village revealed that many had suffered from such abuses.  It should
be mentioned that cultural inhibitions linked to subjects such as sex and
the serious social implications of rape and assaults on women compound the
problem of lack of outlets for expression and foment deep hatreds.
69.   Female-headed households were less able to become self-reliant and
were therefore more in need of assistance.  In some cases, they were
assisted by other families, for example, in setting up shelters.  The
numerous children who had been orphaned or separated from their families

constituted a particularly vulnerable group.  In general, there was a
willingness on the part of local families or other displaced persons to
adopt the children, at least until their parents could be traced if they
were still alive.
70.   Some of the most serious problems the displaced and dispersed
populations face are in the health domain, largely because of the lack of
health services.  Children are particularly affected by chronic
malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery.  The right to health is
seriously jeopardized in those circumstances.
71.   Displaced children living in the jungle suffer high mortality and
malnutrition rates and their flight from their homes often puts them beyond
the reach of any assistance or protection.  Frequently, displaced children
have witnessed the murder of their parents or the destruction of their
homes.
As a consequence, many children suffer from fear and parents, caught in the
day-to-day struggle for survival, often have little energy to devote to
caring for them.
72.   Rather than attending school, many displaced children have had to
help support their families.  In any event, many schools are reported to
have been destroyed or closed.  Public education is officially free;
however, many schools are under funded and parents have to pay tuition so
that the school can operate.  Many displaced children do not speak Burmese
and have difficulties in communicating with their teachers.  Many children
who used to go to school in their native village and learned their native
language have to restart their schooling upon arrival in the relocation
sites because they are prevented from learning in their own language.  This
is not only a negation of sound pedagogical principles but a violation of
the right to freedom of expression which includes the right to receive and
impart information so necessary in the educational field.