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select3 /junta's military offensive



Subject: select3 /junta's military offensive.....

Dear All:  FYI. This piece was submitted to the Nation (Bangkok) early AM 
today.  Best Regards, CTY
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The Impending Military Offensive in Burma and the Burmese Politics of War
-----------------------------------------------Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe

With regard to the Rangoon regime's impending military offensive against
rebels -- if it is directed against the Karenni, Karen and Shan rebels --
the significance of it is clear: more trouble for the civilian populace. 
It will result in further displacements of thousands of villagers and 
loss of civilian lives. Some will lose their life as porters -- either 
beaten and killed by the military, blown up by mines, or death from being 
caught in the crossfire.
   In addition, the already internally displaced villagers hiding in the
bushes will be trapped or caught by military patrols and killed as rebel
sympathizers (for having been found in the "free-fire" or killing zones).
The women among them will be gang-raped and killed. Losses among
combatants on both sides will likely be very light, however. This has for
long been the pattern of the regime's "military offensive" against rebel
forces in the ethnic areas.
   What is not clear is whether the targets of the planned military
offensive will include the Wa armies. There are three such armies: the
northern Wa army, the southern Wa army, and the smaller Wa forces on the

Thai-Shan border. The latter army is small and is able to easily slip
into Thailand, and any military push against this small, very mobile
guerilla force will be ineffective and militarily meaningless.
   The former two Wa armies are well-armed and are under the control of
or are heavily influenced by crossborder Chinese drug trafficking
syndicates (forming a network of trade and finance straddling five
countries: Burma-China/Yunnan-Thailand-Laos-Cambodia). The two Wa armies
have as well have signed ceasefire agreements, in particular with General
Khin Nyunt and the Military Intelligence/MI establishment of the army (or
the "tatmadaw").
   It is reported that the tatmadaw's field commanders and General Maung
Aye's faction are unhappy with the protection afforded the two powerful
Wa armies by Khin Nyunt and the MI people, and also with the subsequent
close, and mutually beneficial, relations thus established (for more than
ten years) between these elements.
   Another inducement for Maung Aye and the tatmadaw's combat wing
factions to take on the two Wa armies is to convince the international
community (the United States in particular) that the military (minus the
intelligence camp, that is) is seriously committed to fighting the war on
drugs -- the opium-heroin trade. According to diplomatic sources in
Thailand, this kind of thinking is also being advocated, paradoxically,
by some elements in the OSS (Office of Strategic Studies headed by Khin
Nyunt, and staffed mostly by MI officers).
   It remains to be seen whether the Maung Aye's faction will dare to
take on the two Wa armies. Burma-watchers are of the opinion that if the
impending military offensive also targets either of the two Wa armies,
this will be politically most significant. It might be "read" as a show 
of defiance on the part of the tatmadaw's combat wing against the long
dominance (since 1962 or even earlier) over the military as a whole by
the intelligence wing. It will also represent a power-play by the Maung
Aye-Tin U faction against Khin Nyunt.
   However, close observers of the politics of war in Burma maintain that
a show of defiance by the tatmadaw's combat wing in this manner -- taking
on tough, well-armed Wa warriors -- is unlikely. It is unlikely because
the Wa are better armed, better commanded, better disciplined, and more
battle-experienced than the tatmadaw. The enlarged and now bloated
tatmadaw is, military experts (including military attaches posted to
Burma) agree, is no match for the Wa armies, which are in addition
well-connected with intelligence elements or cliques (in Yunnan) of
China's PLA (People's Liberation Army).
   It can be concluded that the military offensive threatened by the
regime will largely be a "search and destroy" operation, or series of
such operations, that seek out and kill villagers and destroy villages;
it will not change the military equation in any way.
   It would therefore not be wrong to portray the impending military
offensive as waging war against the defenceless ethnic population, aimed
at sowing terror and emptying the land of unwanted ethnic groups which,
from the regime's viewpoint, constitute an obstacle to "national unity" 

and/or pose a threat to "national solidarity".

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