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The BurmaNet News: October 13, 1998



------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
 "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
----------------------------------------------------------

The BurmaNet News: October 13, 1998
Issue #1116

HEADLINES:
==========
BURMANET: PUBLIC OPINION?
AFP: MYANMAR JUNTA IN A MUDDLE DEALING
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: UNWANTED AND UNPROTECTED
ANNOUNCEMENT: BELGIAN TOURS TO BURMA 
ANNOUNCEMENT: FBC-AUSTRALIA HOSTS SEMINAR 
ANNOUNCEMENT: RECENT NLD MESSAGES AND STATEMENTS
****************************************************************

BURMANET: PUBLIC OPINION? 
13 October, 1998 by BurmaNet Editor 

The public rallies recently staged by the SPDC to denounce the NLD and Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi are but the most visible attempts by the military to
present an image of public opinion -- or at least a façade of public
opinion -- against the democratic opposition.  In the same vein, and only
slightly more subtle, the government also has begun pressuring the print
media to regularly include articles that attack Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

The print media in Burma falls into three categories -- state-owned, joint
venture (co-owned by the government and private individuals or
organizations), and private.  Late last month, all publishers from the
state-owned and joint venture publications were ordered to a meeting by
government officials and forced to accept the demand to include articles
containing scathing attacks against the NLD leader.  As the publications
hit the stands, readers realized that the print media had been drawn into
the current battle of political wills.

Weekly journals such as the Newsletter, Pyi Myanmar, and Thadin Zon
["Collective News"] now carry articles attacking NLD leader Aung San Suu
Kyi, following SPDC's directive, "each journal unconditionally has to
include at least one article."  According to sources in Rangoon, the order
has sent a wave of concern through the publishing sector as those trying to
publish material, already subject to acute censorship, worry that the
SPDC's demands will increase.

Recently, an editor who included one of these scathing articles in his
publication commented that the authorities ordered him to publish an
article they had written attacking Aung San Suu Kyi in his journal.
Although he is the editor of the journal, he had no choice but to include
the article.  He said, "we work for a joint-venture media group -- it
belongs to the government.  They give us an article.  We have to publish it."

Some of the attacks that have appeared in these journals have drawn on
Burmese myths, casting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as the antagonist in the modern
day reenactment of the myth.  One translation that appeared recently on the
Internet (burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx) was "The Byamma's Head," based on a
Southeast Asian legend.  The story goes that King Byamma lost a bet and was
beheaded.  Because the head was purportedly very hot and would scorch the
earth or dry up the oceans, the King who won the bet ordered four female
celestial beings to hold it and keep it from reaching earth, each for a
period of one year.  The passing of the head from one celestial being to
another marks the beginning of a new year.

The important part of this story for the current political situation,
readers were told, was that in Burmese tradition, a "Byamma's head" is the
name given to a trouble-maker. "Hoodlums, hecklers, bullies, and persons
who borrow money from whom they meet are always referred as the Byamma's
Head."  The article then names Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a Byamma's head, and
outlines various "trouble" she has stirred up.  The article concludes with
an echo from the mass rallies:  "Even though you are being held by golden
hands, your terrible heat will melt them down as you are the Byamma's Head.
So, you'd better leave this nation. As citizens, we are demanding
deportation of Mrs. Aris. The only word we have to say to you is 'Get out.'"

The reaction on burmanet-l, where subscribers do not have the heavy hand of
the SPDC to keep them in line, was a quick and decisive defense of Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and a denunciation of the author.  Inside Burma, readers are
not free to make such comments publicly, but sources in Rangoon commented
that some of the articles are so insulting that even those who are
ambivalent about the current political situation are angry about them.  If
such sentiments are widespread, the junta's façade of a unified public
opinion against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is generating the very discontent it
intends to hide.

(Sources:  29 September, 1998 story on Radio Free Asia (RFA) by Aung Zaw;
"Byamma's Head" message, posted in 2 parts, by MYANPERSP@xxxxxxx on
burmanet-l, 19 September, 1998; and recent interviews conducted by BurmaNet
Staff.) 

****************************************************************

AFP: MYANMAR JUNTA IN A MUDDLE DEALING WITH VOCAL OPPONENTS
1 October, 1998 

BANGKOK, Oct 1 (AFP) - Myanmar's junta is increasingly confused about how
to deal with its vocal pro-democracy opponents, analysts say, noting mixed
signals from the various arms of the all-powerful military.

While press releases sent to foreign correspondents and the
English-language New Light of Myanmar often take a conciliatory tone, the
Burmese-language media and officials within the country are adopting a
hardline against opponents who seek their removal from office, they say.

"There has been a marked change of tone in what they are saying in
English," said one foreign diplomat in Yangon.

"It's as if someone else is writing the press releases for them, perhaps a
native English-speaker."

The junta initially ignored the May call by the leading opposition National
League for Democracy (NLD) for parliament to be convened, but has since
branded the move illegal and said democracy would be gradually introduced
in Myanmar, others noted.

"They've taken this international stance of saying 'we are a developing
nation and must take things slowly, but we also want democracy'," another
diplomat in the Myanmar capital said.

"But domestically, they have told the NLD they won't tolerate any convening
of parliament and that the party itself could be outlawed if they persist."

The NLD, led by Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, claims more than
1,000 of its members and supporters have been detained since the May
demand. The NLD-led opposition won 1990 polls by a landslide but the junta
has refused to relinquish power.

"It's as if there are two stories here," said the first diplomat.

"For international consumption, it is a government doing its best in
difficult circumstances. For domestic consumption, it is the usual threat
and use of force. Either you do what you're told or you go to jail."

The junta has been at pains to stress internationally that no NLD members
are being ill-treated.

Photographs posted on the junta Internet site show the detainees eating,
resting and talking at government "guesthouses" and the English-language
propaganda regularly talks of former dissidents making peace with authorities.

"They have been hurt by all the international criticism and realise it is
getting them nowhere," said the second diplomat.

"Now they want legitimacy and they know they only way is to show they are
moving towards democracy."

NLD chiefs, excluding Aung San Suu Kyi and others who are not officially
recognised as political figures, recently met with junta representatives
and authorities have repeatedly called for a united effort to develop
Myanmar, one of the world's poorest countries.

"At the same time they are locking people up at a faster rate than ever,"
the second diplomat said.

"The two approaches just don't gel. If they are serious about
reconciliation then I have yet to see any proof."

[ ... ] 

****************************************************************

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: UNWANTED AND UNPROTECTED: BURMESE REFUGEES IN THAILAND 
September, 1998

[BurmaNet Editor's Note: Thanks to the Free Burma Coalition for posting the
summary and recommendations sections of this report, which appear here.
The full report can be found at: http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/thai/.]

I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At almost no time since Burmese asylum seekers started arriving on Thai
soil in 1984 has the need for protection of this group been greater.1 Human
rights violations inside Burma continue almost a decade after the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) seized power in Burma in September
1988. The announcement on November 15, 1997 that SLORC had been dissolved
and replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has done
nothing to improve the situation, and refugees continue to flow into
Thailand. As of September 1998, there were over 110,000 refugees in camps
along the Thai-Burmese border and hundreds of thousands more in Thailand
who were unable or unwilling to stay within the refugee camps but who had
suffered clear abuse at the hands of the Burmese government. Deportations
of undocumented Burmese migrants, some of whom would have a clear claim to
refugee status had they been permitted to make one, were also on the increase.

Thailand is not a party to the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status
of Refugees (Refugee Convention), the main international treaty for the
protection of refugees, nor to its 1967 Protocol, despite being a member of
the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the High Commissioner's Programme of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 1979.2 Thailand
nevertheless has obligations towards refugees based in customary
international law, the most important of which is the obligation not to
send refugees back to any country where they are likely to face
persecution; this is the principle of non-refoulement.

Over the past ten years, the Thai government has repeatedly violated this
principle with respect to Burmese. Human Rights Watch is concerned that
economic and political pressures caused by the continuing economic crisis
in Thailand place refugees and asylum seekers in even greater danger of
refoulement as the Thai government seeks to expel all undocumented migrants
and often makes little distinction between migrants and refugees. UNHCR,
the preeminent agency charged with the protection of refugees, has had an
office in Bangkok since 1977 but, in the face of significant obstacles from
the Thai government, is to a large degree failing to protect refugees from
Burma. Only in February 1998 did the Thai government begin negotiations
which would allow UNHCR a formal role on the Thai/ Burmese border. Although
these negotiations were ongoing as this report went to press, indications
were that they would result in a limited protection role for UNHCR,
restricted to those refugees in camps on the border and with the primary
aim of facilitating eventual repatriation to Burma.

This report, based on Human Rights Watch research since 1988, documents the
history of the treatment of Burmese refugees in Thailand. It examines the
factors affecting Thai government policy, including its experience with
Indochinese refugees in the 1970s and '80s and the changing relations
between Thailand and Burma. It then profiles the two major groups of
refugees from Burma, the "students" - a catch-all phrase to denote the
mostly urban students and professionals who took part in the 1988 uprising
and subsequent political protests - and members of the different ethnic
minority groups living close to the Thai-Burmese border who have fled armed
conflict, forced displacement, forced labor, and other abuses.

The "students," who generally have better access to UNHCR's Bangkok office
and constitute the overwhelming majority of those deemed to be "persons of
concern to UNHCR," were told by the Thai government in 1992 to move to a
site known as the "safe area" situated in Ratchaburi province or face
deportation. In mid-1995 Thailand suddenly announced the closure of the
"safe area" to new entrants, and UNHCR extended the use of its "border
case" category, meaning that many of those who applied for protection in
Bangkok and were recognized to be persons of concern must return to the
border camps. Only if a person could show "secondary persecution" at the
border camps would UNHCR provide assistance and protection in Bangkok for
those waiting to enter the "safe area."

For the Burmese from ethnic minority groups, some of whom were allowed to
establish camps on the Thai-Burmese border, the situation is often worse.
At the time this report went to press, UNHCR had no presence in and only
limited access to these camps, which since 1994 have been vulnerable to
cross-border attacks by Burmese troops or breakaway factions of rebel
groups. A generally benign laissez faire attitude on the part of Thai
authorities toward the camps that was in effect from 1984 shifted to a much
more hard-line stance around 1992, as relations between Rangoon and Bangkok
warmed and Thai investors saw increasing economic opportunities in Burma.
The Thai government also took the position that as SLORC concluded
cease-fire agreements with various ethnic armies and the level of fighting
decreased, ethnic minority refugees had nothing to fear by returning home.
They ignored the pattern of systematic human rights violations, including
forced labor, that had led many of the refugees to flee in the first place.
As a result of the tougher stance toward refugees, however, there were
repeated instances of refoulement by the Thai army. The camps are becoming
increasingly closed, and many will not permit any new refugees to enter.

This report analyzes the difference in treatment that the two groups of
refugees have received from the Thai government and UNHCR. It concludes
with an analysis of why protection of Burmese refugees in Thailand has
failed and makes the following recommendations to the parties involved.

Recommendations

To the Royal Thai Government:

· Thailand should ratify the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

· Thailand must immediately cease the practice of closing its borders to
new asylum seekers arriving from Burma. It must abide by its obligations
under customary international law in relation to all refugees, including
the obligation of non-refoulement, which applies to rejection at the
frontier in addition to the forced return of those with a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion.

· Thailand must abandon its current position that only those fleeing direct
fighting are entitled to temporary stay in Thailand, in favor of a position
which recognizes the Refugee Convention definition of "refugee" and places
greater emphasis on what the conditions in Burma must be before a voluntary
repatriation of refugees can take place.

· Thailand should establish refugee status determination procedures by
which asylum seekers can seek recognition as refugees in order to
distinguish them from other migrants, thereby enabling Thailand to act
consistently in accordance with its obligations under international law to
provide refugees with international protection.

· Thailand must permit UNHCR to carry out its full mandate to protect and
assist refugees and asylum-seekers from Burma. Thailand should allow
unimpeded access by UNHCR to all refugees and asylum-seekers and a UNHCR
presence in all places where refugees and asylum-seekers reside. It should
allow unimpeded access by humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
to all such areas, including the Ratchaburi safe area.

· Thailand should allow the establishment of refugee camps which are
situated at a safe distance from the border with Burma in accordance with
international standards. Those presently located so close to the border as
to be vulnerable to cross-border attacks should be relocated to a safer
distance inside Thailand. Pending such camp relocations, while it is
recognized that a level of increased security within those camps aimed at
increasing the protection of the refugees is to be welcomed, the nature of
these camps should not be such as to amount to detention or detention-like
conditions.

· Thailand should seek, by all available means, to encourage the government
of Burma to respect human rights and in particular to cease those
practices, such as forced labor and forced relocation or displacement,
which result in refugee outflows. Thailand should seek assistance and
support from the Association of South East Asian Nations to ensure that the
Burmese government takes meaningful steps to promote the civil, political,
social, economic, and cultural rights of all Burmese without restriction or
discrimination.

To the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) :

· In its negotiations with the Royal Thai Government, UNHCR should insist
on free and unimpeded access to all refugees and asylum seekers from Burma
at all times, including those in the Karenni camps, those from Shan state
and those in the migrant labor workforce with a genuine fear of persecution
in Burma. All reports to date of discussions between UNHCR and the Royal
Thai Government refer only to those refugees already in camps. It is
imperative that any agreement must be comprehensive, including all refugees
from Burma.

· UNHCR must address the question of how to protect refugees from Burma's
Shan state, given the high level of suspicion on the part of the Thai
government that any border crossers from Shan state are economic migrants
or drug traffickers. If no other mechanism can be found, at the very least
refugee camps for this group should be established so that the refugees are
given the opportunity to receive assistance and protection.

· UNHCR must provide guarantees that its primary role with the Burmese
refugees will be to monitor the protection and welfare of the refugees and
will not be conditional on its involvement in a voluntary repatriation
program. Repatriation to Burma should only be considered once the human
rights conditions in the country are conducive to return. While forced
relocations, forced labor, and other human rights abuses continue in Burma,
UNHCR should neither endorse nor participate in the repatriation of the
refugees.

· UNHCR should actively encourage the Thai government to move refugee camps
to a safe distance from the border and out of range of attack from troops
inside Burma. It must also ensure that new arrivals from Burma are provided
ready access to the camps and protected from deportation back to Burma.

· UNHCR should insist that the Thai government not hold refugees and
asylum-seekers from Burma in conditions amounting to detention, either in
immigration detention centers, prisons, police lock-ups, or closed refugee
camps. UNHCR has stated on several occasions that freedom from detention is
a fundamental human right and that the use of detention is contrary to the
principles of international refugee protection and, in many instances, is
contrary to the norms and principles of international law. As a general
rule, asylum seekers should therefore not be detained.

· Until the above recommendations are implemented, UNHCR should abandon the
policy of "border cases," that is insisting that those determined to be
refugees (or "persons of concern") must return to the refugee camps on the
border unless they can show secondary fear of persecution there.

· UNHCR should continue to press for a permanent presence in the "safe
area" in Ratchaburi province.

· UNHCR should issue those recognized as refugees with documentation
certifying refugee status in accordance with Conclusion No. 8 (1977) of the
Executive Committee of the UNHCR program on determination of refugee status.

· UNHCR should actively encourage Thailand to establish its own refugee
status determination procedures, particularly in view of Thailand's
expressed intention to do so as early as 1977. In the absence of a
state-run refugee status determination procedure which is open to all
asylum-seekers, UNHCR should reaffirm that all those who cross into
Thailand seeking refuge from persecution in Burma are considered to be
prima facie refugees. UNHCR should avoid use of terminology such as
"displaced persons" or "person of concern" in place of "refugees," given
the legal protection, primarily protection against refoulement, that flows
from being a refugee.

· UNHCR must thoroughly reassess aspects of its refugee status
determination procedure with respect to Burmese who apply individually to
its office in Bangkok. In particular:

  (1) UNHCR should restate publicly that the criteria applied when
determining whether an applicant from Burma is a refugee are those set out
in the Refugee Convention. It should ensure that decisions are made in
accordance with these criteria, using its own handbook as a guide. It must
ensure that narrower criteria, particularly a tendency to focus just on
those who have been politically active inside Burma, are not adopted.

  (2) The transcript of the interviews conducted by UNHCR eligibility
officers of each applicant in the course of the refugee status
determination procedure should be read back to the applicant to enable
correction of inaccuracies or inconsistencies. The applicant should be
provided with a copy of the interview transcript.

  (3) UNHCR should permit the applicant to be accompanied by a
representative or adviser at the interview conducted by the UNHCR
eligibility officers in the course of the refugee status determination
procedure.

  (4) UNHCR should set out in writing a reasoned decision in the case of
the refusal of an application in order to allow a proper and meaningful
appeal to be lodged and to improve the transparency of the decision-making
process.

  (5) Until such time as UNHCR abandons the category of "border case," it
should allow a formal right of appeal against that categorization and tell
applicants of the existence of that right of appeal in the letter informing
them that he or she has been classified as a "border case."

To the government of Burma:

· All cross-border attacks on unarmed civilians in refugee camps in
Thailand perpetrated by groups operating on Burmese soil and with the tacit
consent of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) must immediately
cease. Those responsible for such acts, which have resulted in deaths and
abductions, must be prosecuted.

· The government must comply with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
resolution of April 20, 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/L.91/Rev.1). In particular, it
must "end the enforced displacement of persons and other causes of refugee
flows to neighboring countries and to create conditions conducive to their
voluntary return and full reintegration in safety and dignity, including,
where these are lacking, full rights of citizenship, in closecooperation
with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees."

To the International Community:

· Governments with an interest in the region - notably Japan, the U.S.,
member states of ASEAN and the European Union (E.U.), Australia, and Canada
- must press Thailand to accede to the Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol, and give support to UNHCR in its negotiations with the Thai
government to ensure that the rights of the refugees will be adequately
protected in any future agreement between the two bodies.

· All member states of the United Nations should press Burma to implement
the 1997 U.N. General Assembly resolution.

     1 Throughout this report "Burmese" refers to all the peoples of Burma.
"Burman" refers to the major ethnic group in Burma.

     2 The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (ExCom)
is an advisory body comprising fifty-three member states which was
established in 1958. It considers policy matters relating to refugees. Its
decisions and "ExCom Conclusions" are not binding on states in themselves,
although they are often drafted in language suggestive of standard setting
and as they are adopted by consensus they carry persuasive authority as
representing the views of the international community.

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ANNOUNCEMENT: BELGIAN TOURS TO BURMA 
9 October, 1998 from <Kwia@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> 

The KWIA Burma Group has recently been summoned by the Belgian tour
operator, Anders Dan Anders for its boycott-Burma campaign. The tour
operator who frequently organises "very exclusive" trips to Burma demands a
compensation of  28.000 USD (!!) for an alleged loss due to clients who
decided not to go to Burma or cancelled their trips. Anders Dan Anders also
demands the complete suspension of all KWIA activities against its Burma
programme.

The tour operator says that the KWIA allegation that "organising exclusive
trips to Burma could be considered as a support of a non-democratic regime"
is sheer slander ?!

In two articles in the Belgian press the KWIA Burma Group criticised the
tour operator for staying at Shangri-La Traders (in Rangoon) - reputed as
the major investment project of drug baron, Lo Hsin Han. Although the tour
operator confirms that it is using Shangri-La Traders Hotel, it considers
the criticism as a "false and unfounded accusation".

KWIA, Burma Group is confident that the arguments used in its campaign are
correct and completely "legal." We would very much appreciate it if you
would also give a sign of protest against this attempt to stop us from
making the truth public.

Please join us in our campaign and write/fax to:

Anders Dan Anders
Mr. Wygers
Nieuwelaan 29, 2950 Kapellen, Belgium
Fax. 0032.3.605.34.9; Please fax a copy to KWIA at 0032.3.230.45.40

Thanks a lot for your support !!

Michel - KWIA Burma Group

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ANNOUNCEMENT: FBC - AUSTRALIA HOSTS SEMINAR 
12 October, 1998 from azappia@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
 
Free Burma Coalition, Australia, Amnesty International Australia proudly
presents the second seminar in our series, 'Human Rights in a Changing
World: 50 years on...' 'Burma on the brink' featuring Alison Vicary
(Macquarie University economist/Burmese Democracy protestor) and The Hon.
Janelle Saffin MP (Member of the Legislative Council, NSW Parliament), Kate
Gilmore (Amnesty International Australia), Helen Vatsikopoulos (SBS
Dateline program) on Monday 19 October 1998.  Refreshments at 5.30pm
followed by the seminar at 6pm at The Bishop Barry Centre, St Andrews
Cathedral School, 51 Druitt St, Sydney (near corner of Kent St).

FREE ADMISSION - ALL WELCOME

Contact: Tel: 9217 7670, Fax: 9217 7677, e-mail: nswaia@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Seminar III: 'Human Rights & Globalisation' to be held on 24 November

Free Burma Coalition, Australia, working for the National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma Federation of Trade Unions, Burma
Australia Burma Council

PO Box 2024, Queanbeyan  NSW  2620
Ph: +61-2-6297-7734  Fax: +61-2-6297-7773

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ANNOUNCEMENT: RECENT NLD MESSAGES AND STATEMENTS AVAILABLE 
11 October, 1998 from <sayagyi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> 

Dear Burmese readers,

We have published two booklets on current messages and statements of the
NLD in Burmese.

The first issue covers:

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's message on 17-6-98
U Aung Shwe's message on 17-6-98
U Tin Oo's message on 17-6-98
U Lwin's message on 17-6-98
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's appeal
NLD statements (# 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26)
NLD's appeal to the people on 18-8-98

The second issue covers:

Daw Aung Sann Suu Kyi's appeal to the people 28-7-98
Daw Aung Sann Suu Kyi's appeal to the Army
Bohmu Aung's appeal 3-9-98
Daw Aung Sann Suu Kyi's appeal to the people on 19-9-98
NLD Statement 35, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 58, 60, 68, 70, 71, 72, 75
CRPP statement # 1
CRPP statement # 2
CRPP statement # 3

Although they are for inside readers, those abroad who are interested can
ask for a few copies by providing postal address.

Communication Center (NCGUB)

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