ILO Report Extract, Part 2 of 4

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REPORT OF THE ILO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA

Below, please find, in three parts, extracts from parts IV (Examination of
the case by the Commission) and V (Conclusions and Recommendations) of this
report.  Footnotes and some sections of text have been removed to make this
posting as concise as possible.

Text (ASCII) versions of the Report can be obtained by email from the Burma
Peace Foundation in 50 sections of up to 37Kbytes (total 1.298 MB).  Send
an email message to darnott@xxxxxxxxxxx requesting the Report (expect a
delay of several days as a list of recipients is built up).

The Report is also on the ILO website:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/20gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm

Paper copies of the Report can be obtained from ILO Distribution -- contact
Mr Dunand, Email prodoc@ilo,org. 

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FORCED LABOUR IN MYANMAR (BURMA)
 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the
Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the
observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29),
Geneva, 2 July 1998

(2) Military camp work

(a) Documentary material

351. Nature and conditions of work. The Commission received detailed
information on various aspects of forced labour related to military camps.
The information indicated that when a new military camp was established,
the land would often be confiscated from local villages. No compensation
would be paid.

352. All the villages in the area would then be required to send at least
one person per household to construct the camp. [ ? ].

353. In addition to constructing and repairing the camps, the villages
would also have to provide a number of workers on a permanent basis to
carry out a number of services at the camps, such as cleaning and
maintenance, cooking, collecting water or firewood, washing clothes and
acting as messengers. It was these messengers who would normally deliver
written orders or summonses from the camp to village heads, in addition to
carrying out a variety of other tasks for the army camp or its
officers.(467) These workers were often women, sometimes because the camp
specifically demanded women, but often because this was generally a less
arduous form of forced labour than others such as portering, for which men
from the household tended to go. Army camp workers might be able to return
home at night, but in certain circumstances this might not be possible,
either because they were not permitted to do so, or because of the distance
of the village from the army camp. In such cases these workers had to stay
at the army camp for a number of days, until replacements arrived from
their village, in accordance with the schedule arranged by the village
head. In such circumstances, women were particularly at risk of abuse and
rape. This did not appear to be uncommon. However, abuses other than sexual
abuse of women appeared to be less common than with portering and some
other forms of forced labour.(468)

[ ? ]

 (b) Oral testimony

365. The evidence obtained by the Commission concerning military camps
refers to camps located in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan Sates
as well as in Tanintharyi Division. More than two-thirds of the witnesses
met(493) claimed to have been obliged to construct, renovate or provide
services to military camps or to have seen others performing these tasks.
The Commission questioned persons who had directly witnessed the
performance of this work, workers who had been forced to take part in these
tasks, section or village heads and former soldiers of the Tatmadaw; all
these testimonies corroborate each other and illustrate the characteristics
and extent of the labour required by the authorities for this purpose.
Moreover, most of the testimonies cover a recent period from 1993 to early
1998.

366. The evidence shows that civilians may be forced to work on the
construction, renovation or servicing of camps for the various public
authorities in Myanmar,(494) for instance the Tatmadaw, the police, the
customs authorities as well as the NaSaKa and the Democratic Kayin Buddhist
Army (DKBA) in areas where these operate. Requisitions by these various
groups are in no way coordinated and may thus overlap each other, which
means that the burden of labour for camps is in direct proportion to the
number of such camps in the vicinity of a given village. For example,
several witnesses claimed to have been obliged to service at least three
camps.

367. The military usually recruit labour by using the services of village
heads to whom they pass on an order specifying the work to be carried out
and the time allowed to find the required number of workers;(495) the
village heads have no choice but to comply with the prescribed conditions
on pain of fines, if not of physical punishment.(496) In the event that an
order is not carried out to the satisfaction of the military, they may
intervene directly and forcibly seize the workers that they need.(497)

368. As a rule, one person per family is requisitioned to work on military
camps.(498) Men, women and children as young as seven claimed to have been
obliged to go to a camp at one time or another to carry out the tasks
imposed by the authorities.(499) Children who would otherwise be at school
were sometimes sent by their parents to do this work.(500)

369. Villagers would be forced to take part in the construction, renovation
and servicing of military camps. Camp construction very often involves
confiscation of land by the military.(501) The construction work proper
consists of clearing and levelling the ground and in the erection of
buildings; workers are also obliged to provide, without compensation, the
necessary materials, such as wood, bamboo, plaster and cement.(502) The
workers must also attend to the fortification of the camps by digging
trenches(503) or installing bamboo spikes,(504) and other defensive
traps.(505)

[ ? ]

372. As for the general conditions under which these tasks are performed,
the workers are not fed,(514) and sometimes even have to bring food to the
military.(515) The workers are neither paid(516) nor compensated for the
materials that they have had to provide.(517) Some have been subjected to
ill-treatment resulting in serious injuries(518) and most are constantly
exposed to insults and violence.(519) Abuses of a sexual nature would also
appear to have been perpetrated in some cases by the military.(520)

373. The witnesses indicated that it was possible to be exempted from such
work in as much as if a certain sum of money was paid to the authorities
requiring such work,(521) or a substitute provided.(522) In one case the
entire village preferred to pay 26,000 kyat to hire four replacements to
carry out the servicing work required by the military in a nearby camp.(523)


(3) Other work in support of the military

(a) Documentary material

374. Nature and conditions of work. In addition to portering and work on
military camps, there are other tasks which are required to be performed
for the benefit of the military or other authorities. For example,
villagers were forced to act as guides for the military in areas which were
unfamiliar to the soldiers. This was particularly the case in areas which
the military had recently occupied. Since these areas were conflict areas,
villagers taken to act as guides also had to serve as hostages for the
military: if the column was attacked, the guide would be punished or killed
for supposedly leading the column into an ambush. In some cases the whole
village could face retaliation in the event of an attack on the column,
supposedly for providing information to opposition groups about the
movements of the column.

375. Civilians, including women and children, were also used as human
shields and minesweepers. [ ? ].  In potential conflict areas civilians,
including women and children, were often forced to sweep roads with tree
branches or brooms to detect or detonate mines. It was suggested by certain
sources that this was because the military hoped that if insurgents knew
this, they would be less likely to plant mines.(524) If villagers did find
mines, the village would often face retaliation.(525)

376. Villagers were also forced to act as sentries, particularly at night
and in conflict areas, guarding military camps, roads, railways and other
important places. They were unarmed, and had to alert soldiers if they saw
anyone. If so alerted, the soldiers would often beat the person for
supposedly making a false alarm, or failing to detain the suspect; if the
site they were guarding was attacked or if mines were laid, those people
who were guarding it, or the entire village, could face retaliation. If
sentries were caught sleeping during their duty, they were punished,
usually by being beaten.(526) Villagers would often also be required to
build fences along the sides of certain roads to make it more difficult for
opposition groups to lay mines or conduct ambushes.(527)

377. Owners of bullock carts, boats, motor vehicles or other means of
transport were also regularly required to place their services at the
disposal of the military. They were used for transporting personnel,
equipment and supplies for the camp, transporting forced labourers to work
sites, and in relation to income-generation projects by the military.(528)

[ ? ]


(b) Oral testimony

382. Twenty-two witnesses(544) from Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and
Shan States as well as Bago and Tanintharyi Divisions provided information
on the additional tasks which had to be carried out for the benefit of the
military and other public forces. The relevant evidence covers the period
from 1986 to early 1998, though most of it refers to events that occurred
between 1996 and 1998.

383. Persons from all parts of the country have claimed that they or others
had to stand guard along roads(545) or railways,(546) at the entrance to
villages(547) or in the vicinity of military camps, which they had often
previously had to construct.(548) Others had to stand watch at specific
places so as to be able to inform the military of suspicious movements from
the direction of the sea or the neighbouring border.(549)

384. The military generally use the services of village heads to transmit
the order specifying the nature of the sentry duty to be performed.(550) As
a rule, one person per family is sent,(551) irrespective of whether they
are men, women or children.(552)

385. The persons on sentry duty work in groups(553) during a period which
may range from one to seven days.(554) They must remain permanently at
their look-out posts, spend the night there and divide up the guard so as
to have a sentry on duty night and day. Falling asleep may be punished by
physical punishment,(555) or even reprisals against the entire village.(556)

386. Sentry duty sometimes involves building fences along the roadside or
sweeping the roads, morning and evening, to check that no mines have been
laid.(557) This mine-detection is effected by using a stick or a log
attached to a cart and may also be demanded in the vicinity of villages and
military camps.(558) This is dangerous work; witnesses claimed to have seen
people injured or even killed by exploding mines.(559)

387. Persons performing guard duty are neither paid(560) nor fed(561) and
are regularly subjected to insults.(562) It is, however, possible to avoid
performing this work by paying the military who require it(563) or by
sending a substitute.(564)

388. Finally, other witnesses claimed that they had to keep carts,
tractors, rickshaws, canoes and boats on stand-by to meet the transport
needs of the military.(565)


(4) Forced recruitment

(a) Documentary material

389. Information provided to the Commission indicated that there was
regular forced recruitment throughout Myanmar, including of minors, into
the Tatmadaw and various militia groups. It appeared that this did not
occur pursuant to any compulsory military service laws,(566) but was
essentially arbitrary.(567)

390. In cases where a certain number of recruits was demanded, it was
common for the village or ward authorities to hold a "lottery" to choose
those who had to undertake military service. Those chosen were then
forcibly conscripted and commonly included minors.(568) Less direct methods
of coercion were also used: in many areas, families of soldiers were exempt
from forced labour, arbitrary taxation or forced relocation.(569)

391. Information was received regarding forced conscription into the
Tatmadaw in various parts of the country. In Tanintharyi Division the
Coastal Area Command reportedly required each battalion to obtain 5
recruits per month in 1996 and 3 recruits per month in 1997, with a fine of
25,000 kyat for each recruit less than the quota, and a reward of the same
amount for each recruit in excess of the quota. Because of this, many men
and teenage boys in the region were recruited against their will, and many
others fled to avoid conscription.(570) In a document provided to the
Commission, a 22-year-old Karen man from Ayeyarwady Division described how
government soldiers came to his village at least once a year and demanded
10 recruits for the army. The only way for a household to ensure that it
would not be forced to provide a recruit was to pay 200 kyat.(571) There
was similar information in regard to other parts of the country, including
Bago Division, Kayah State, Kayin State, Rakhine State, Sagaing Division
and Shan State.(572)

392. The Commission also received information relating to forced
conscription into various militia groups. A number of orders from the
authorities requiring villages to provide recruits for both full-time and
reserve service in the People's Militia in Chin State were received by the
Commission.(573) These orders were dated 1995 and 1996. One of the orders
threatened that "decisive action" would be taken against villages failing
to provide the required number of recruits. From the text of one of the
orders it appeared that villages were also required to pay for the cost of
food for the recruits during their military training.(574) In 1996 and
1997, 30 villages in Dawei (Tavoy) and Thayetchaung townships were also
required to provide recruits to the People's Militia, and were threatened
with relocation if they failed to do so.(575) Villages in Hlaingbwe and
Myawady townships in Kayin State were forced by the DKBA since at least
1995 to provide DKBA recruits, under threat of fines or death.(576)

(b) Oral testimony

393. Eight witnesses who deserted the Tatmadaw between the early 1980s and
1996 gave testimony before the Commission. (577) None of them gave specific
evidence on the way they were recruited, save for one who specified that
when joining the army he had to sign for at least ten years.(578) If found,
deserters are usually put in jail or, if they deserted with arms,
executed.(579) The Commission is not in possession of oral evidence which
would confirm the documentary material submitted to it with regard to the
conditions of recruitment into the Tatmadaw and various militia groups.


 (5) Work on agriculture, logging, and other production projects

(a) Information provided to the Commission

394. Nature and conditions of work. Information provided to the Commission
indicated that villagers, and to a lesser extent urban residents, were
forced to work on a variety of projects undertaken by the authorities, in
particular the military. These projects included cultivation of rice, other
food crops, cash crops such as rubber, shrimp farms, kilns for producing
bricks, and logging activities. The produce might be used by the military,
but in many cases it was simply sold. The income generated did not go to
the villagers, but either went into the funds of the military unit exacting
the labour, or individuals within that unit. Some money might be paid to
commanders outside the unit itself. In most cases the military unit
involved was the local army camp or battalion (including NaSaKa units in
areas where these operate), but larger schemes might be implemented at the
Light Infantry Division or Regional Command level.(580)

395. For cultivation, the forced labour of villagers was used for the
entire process, from clearing the land to harvesting the crop. For logging,
villagers had to fell the trees and saw them into timber. For brick-making,
they had to provide the raw materials and fuel in addition to labour for
the process. The villagers were not paid and had to provide their own tools
and equipment. Often, the land on which cultivation projects were
implemented was confiscated from villagers without compensation. In certain
cases, land with an existing crop was confiscated without compensation, the
owners of the land were forced to continue tending that crop, and when
ready the crop had to be given to the military. In other cases, the process
appeared to be one of direct extortion: a village was simply ordered to
deliver a certain quantity of crop to the military at the end of the
season, and it was up to that village to arrange land, obtain seed or
seedlings, and tend and harvest the crop. The villagers were not
remunerated in any way. In the extreme case, harvested crops were simply
seized by the military; poultry, livestock and other items were similarly
seized. Theft of such property was most common in areas recently occupied
by the military, or areas with insurgent activity.(581)

[ ? ]

397. The largest volume of information received related to the cultivation
of food and cash crops for the military. These crops included rice,
vegetables such as beans and corn, sugar cane and rubber for a number of
battalions in Kachin,(584) Kayah,(585) Kayin,(586) Mon,(587) Rakhine(588)
and Shan(589) States and Bago,(590) Sagaing(591) and Tanintharyi(592)
Divisions. In Rakhine State, Muslims were also forced by the military to do
cultivation work for Burmese and Rakhine villagers.(593) The information
covered a period from before 1994 to at least 1997.

[ ? ]


(b) Oral testimony

401. Evidence from witnesses revealed that throughout the country the
military conduct activities such as cultivation, fish and shrimp farming,
forestry and manufacturing which are likely to enable them either to meet
their material needs or produce profit. The evidence also shows that they
mobilize the population, forcing the people to carry out these activities
in difficult conditions.

402. Fifty-eight witnesses gave evidence to this effect,(604) thus enabling
the Commission to identify some of the common practices of the military.

403. Some witnesses were forced to cut wood and bamboo, which the military
subsequently sold.(605) Other witnesses were obliged to farm fish(606) or
prawns(607) for the military, including all associated work, from the
setting-up of the project to its continued maintenance.

404. Several witnesses were coerced into agricultural activities which are
organized in various ways. In some cases the military seize the land from
villagers, without compensation, and forces them to cultivate it for their
benefit.(608) Witnesses claimed to have had to leave Myanmar because they
no longer had enough land to make a living.(609) In other cases, the
military oblige the workers to cultivate land located within the military
camp,(610) or to clear the forest or jungle near the camp so as to make
this land suitable for cultivation.(611) The military often specify the
quantity of the crop to be produced. If this quantity is not produced, the
villagers have to make up the difference under pain of sanction.(612)

405. Witnesses who supplied relevant evidence referred to crops of
chillies,(613) corn,(614) rice,(615) rubber,(616) walnuts,(617) sugar
cane(618) and pineapple.(619)

406. One person per family is usually requisitioned to perform the
agricultural work,(620) the order specifying the tasks to be done being
transmitted through the intermediary of the village head.(621) The
witnesses stated that they had received no pay for the work performed and
had to supply their own food, tools or oxen for ploughing.(622)

407. Finally, the evidence reveals that the military occasionally enter
villages and seized, without any compensation, whatever animals or crops
they find.(623)


(6) Construction and maintenance of roads, railways and bridges

(a) Documentary material

408. Nature and conditions of work. The Commission received considerable
detailed information concerning the use of forced labour on the
construction of roads and railways. These ranged in size from small
projects using the labour of a few local villages such as the clearing of a
dirt road to a newly- established military camp(624) to those using tens or
hundreds of thousands of labourers. For example, the government stated in
comments to the ILO that "799,447 working people ... contributed voluntary
labour"(625) for the construction of the Aungban to Loikaw railway
connecting Shan and Kayah States; elsewhere it has stated that 921,753
people contributed to the building of the Pakokku to Monywa section of a
railway in Magway and Sagaing Divisions connecting Chaung-U to Kalaymyo via
Pakokku,(626) and that over 44,000 people were "contributing voluntary
labour" on a single day on three sections of the Ye to Dawei (Tavoy)
railway between Mon State and Tanintharyi Division in January 1994.(627)

409. Witnesses informed the Commission that those persons from whom they
had obtained secondary statements consistently told them that the projects
which they had been forced to work on did benefit them. This was in part
because local forms of transport (of which the most common was the bullock
cart) were not permitted to use these roads; in general only motor vehicles
could use them, and the vast majority of villagers did not own such
vehicles.(628)

410. Once a project was completed, this did not necessarily mean an end to
forced labour connected with it. Often on completion of a road or railway,
particularly in conflict areas, people were forced to work as unarmed
sentries guarding it at night, and to sweep roads for mines before troops
pass, as discussed in paragraphs 374-388 above. People also had to provide
labour for the maintenance of the project, and repair it in the event of
damage. In the rainy season, roads and other infrastructure often washed
out, and so more forced labour was required to repair them in the following
months (around November to January). In particular, because roads were
usually not sealed, were in any case poorly constructed and sometimes
traversed paddy fields, they were damaged easily and most had to be rebuilt
every year.(629)

411. In rural areas a given household might have to provide a worker for as
much as two weeks in a month, and sometimes even more, especially if there
was more than one project being carried out simultaneously. This was in
addition to any other forced labour demands, such as portering or work at
military camps. In some cases when a project was particularly urgent or
important, all the able-bodied persons from a village were required to
participate in the work. It should be noted that the forced labour
requirement for these projects appeared to be significantly less in urban
areas than in rural villages.

412. In addition to the forced labour of civilians, there were also a
number of labour camps across the country where prisoners(630) were used
for the purpose of constructing roads, railways, and other infrastructure,
or working in quarries to provide materials for such construction. These
prisoners frequently worked in heavy shackles. Members of the Tatmadaw were
also required to work on such projects.(631)

413. The Commission was provided with detailed information on the working
conditions of forced labourers. People might have to travel considerable
distances to work sites, particularly for more extensive projects requiring
large numbers of labourers. There was information that people from as far
100 km away were forced to work on the construction of the railway from Ye
to Dawei (Tavoy).(632) In general it appeared to be common for workers to
have to walk for several hours to reach a work site.(633) When a village,
household or worker was required to complete a given amount of work (a
given length of embankment, a given number of kyin(634) of excavation or
crushed stones), they were not able to leave until that work was completed.
Often, a time period was specified within which the work had to be
completed. If the work was not completed to the satisfaction of the
soldiers supervising the work (if the work was done slowly, or was of bad
quality, for example), that village, household or worker would not be
allowed to return home, and those involved might be beaten or otherwise
punished.

414. Workers usually had to arrange their own transport to the work site,
though in some cases owners of suitable transport would be ordered to
provide free transport for workers at their own cost.(635) Workers usually
had to bring their own food and necessary tools, though in certain
circumstances tools were provided (when the population would not normally
own the necessary tools, either because it was an urban population, or
because the work required special tools). If they became sick, they were
not treated, and usually had to pay a fine or arrange a replacement to
enable them to return to their village to seek medical attention.(636) If
they were injured they were in most cases neither treated nor given any
compensation.(637) Deaths from sickness and work accidents appeared to be
frequent on some projects.(638)

415. People forced to work on these projects were not paid, other than in
exceptional circumstances.(639) [ ? ].

416. If a worker was required from each household, this was usually
irrespective of the number of able-bodied persons in the household, so that
if a household consisted of a widow and her child, she would have to go and
either take her child with her or arrange for someone else to look after
it.(642) If there was only one adult male in a household and he had to work
for the family's income, another member of the household would have to go
or the family would starve. This was especially true in the rainy season,
which was the busiest period for farmers, but also the most dangerous at
work sites because of the increased prevalence of disease and increased
risk of injury or death from landslides and collapsing embankments.(643)
Thus, not only was there a large proportion of women, children and older
workers at work sites, but they were more likely to be at risk from disease
and accidents.(644) Such people were also particularly vulnerable to abuse
at the hands of the soldiers.(645)

417. Once they arrived at the work site, workers would usually have to make
their own arrangements for accommodation. This meant arranging to stay at a
nearby village, or building some kind of shelter at the work site. Often,
workers simply had to sleep at the work site with no shelter.(646) There
was usually no sanitation or other facilities of any kind provided at work
sites. For some larger projects, however, which had work sites established
for longer periods of time, some facilities such as sanitation and shelter
might be present, though these had been constructed using the forced labour
of other villagers.

418. The workers were usually supervised by the military, though on certain
projects soldiers might not be actually present all the time. [ ? ].
Workers were usually forced to work for long hours, typically between eight
and 12 hours per day,(647) with only a one-hour break for lunch in the
middle of the day. Workers were usually not permitted to take rest breaks
at other times.(648) Workers were subject to verbal and physical abuse by
the soldiers overseeing the project, particularly if they were not working
to the satisfaction of the soldiers; some workers had died as a result of
physical abuse.(649) Cases of soldiers raping female workers were not
uncommon.(650) Punishments given to workers in cases where they were
perceived to be working badly or refused to carry out forced labour
included kickings, punchings, beatings with canes, sticks or pieces of
bamboo, arrest and detention at a military camps, confinement in stocks, or
in some cases severe torture or execution.(651)

419. Specific examples. The Commission received extensive and detailed
information regarding the use of forced labour in connection with road
construction, repair and improvement projects. The information covered all
fourteen States and Divisions in Myanmar.

[ ? ]

423. In addition to road construction projects, the Commission received
information regarding the use of forced labour on railway construction
projects in various parts of Myanmar. A large volume of information
covering a period from 1992 to 1997 and including copies of orders from the
authorities requiring labour for the project indicated that thousands of
people(674) were forced to work on the construction of a railway from Ye in
Mon State to Dawei (Tavoy) in Tanintharyi Division.(675)

[ ? ]

(b) Oral testimony

427. Roads and related infrastructure. Almost 100 witnesses, from different
ethnic groups,(680) gave evidence that they had been forced to work or to
have observed other persons forced by the authorities to work on roads or
related infrastructure. These testimonies cover a significant part of the
territory of Myanmar; they refer to roads forming part of a network between
towns and villages, or roads linking army camps to this network or to one
another,(681) and mainly recount events occurring over recent years, if not
months.(682) One witness, who returned to Myanmar at the beginning of 1998
after an absence of six years, stated that the work demanded of the
population in respect of road construction and maintenance had increased
substantially.(683)

428. As regards work organization and working conditions, testimonies from
persons who had been obliged to work corroborate those of village
heads,(684) heads of village sections(685) and a deserter from the Tatmadaw
who had been involved with organizing such labour.(686)

429. Throughout the territory of Myanmar, the authorities recruit the
necessary labour for the roadworks according to a similar pattern. The
military transmit a written order to the village head;(687) this order
specifies the work to be accomplished and is sometimes accompanied by
threats, which are expressed by means of a bullet or a piece of charcoal
attached to the order; these symbols signify that reprisals may be taken by
the authorities against the defaulting person or village.(688) With the
exception of the situation prevailing in the northern part of Rakhine
State, to which we shall return, the military do not generally intervene
directly.(689)

430. A specific section of road to be built or repaired is assigned to each
group, section or village. The village head is responsible for organizing
the necessary labour force.(690) One person per family is generally called
up, though the authorities may demand others as needed.(691) The witnesses
stated that men, women and children between the ages of 12 and 72 performed
compulsory labour on roadworks.(692) Even members of families that might be
in a position to have a certain influence on the authorities are obliged to
work on road construction or repairs.(693) Large numbers of children can be
found working on these sites since, as soon as they are capable of working,
their parents send them to perform the work demanded; they themselves can
therefore continue to provide for the family needs, by cultivating their
land or engaging in remunerated employment or work.(694)

431. Road construction work generally consists of levelling the ground,
cutting trees, breaking stones, transporting earth for embankments and
spreading tar.(695) As for repairs, the workers must maintain the roads and
are even forced to rebuild them completely, in certain regions, after each
rainy season. Several witnesses stated that the roads built or renovated
were reserved for the exclusive use of the authorities.(696)

432. Working conditions are arduous,(697) and the working day is long,
varying from 8 to 12 hours.(698) The work is sometimes accompanied by
ill-treatment, including beating and kicking.(699) Acts of torture or
extreme violence, including rape, also occur.(700) Some workers have died
as a result of complications due to hunger, malaria, other infectious
diseases and lack of timely medical care.(701)

433. Apart from rare and exceptional occasions, the persons recruited were
neither paid nor fed.(702) When questioned on this subject, the witnesses
all stated that they could not refuse to do the work, because they were
afraid of the physical punishment or fines which could be imposed by the
authorities.(703) Tools are generally not provided(704) and, if the workers
have to live on the site, they must build their own makeshift shelters in
which to sleep at night.(705)

434. In several cases, witnesses have stated that it is possible to be
exempted from work in exchange for a sum of money which varies considerably
from case to case.(706) One witness observed that the result of this
practice was that the least well-off carried the greatest burden of the
work, since they did not have sufficient means to be spared.(707)

435. Finally, the situation in the northern part of Rakhine State appears
to be more severe in all respects than that prevailing in most other parts
of the country. Most of the witnesses questioned on this subject, who were
members of the Rohingya ethnic group, and who had left the country very
recently, claimed to have been subjected to systematic discrimination by
the authorities; the discrimination took the form, in so far as work on the
roads is concerned, of an overwhelming workload.(708) In fact, the work is
not really organized systematically;(709) the Rohingyas may be required to
work by any authority, be it the army, the NaSaKa or the local police. The
order may come via the village head or directly from any authority that
needs workers for a given job. Working conditions are excessively arduous;
tasks must be performed in an atmosphere where insults, abuse,
ill-treatment and torture are commonplace.(710)

436. Railways. From the evidence of witnesses, the Commission concludes
that the authorities of Myanmar have been using forced labour for the
construction and maintenance of various railways across the country since
at least 1990. Forty-one witnesses(711) supplied the Commission with
relevant information on railways already constructed, or under
construction, in Kachin,(712) Kayah,(713) Mon(714) and Shan States and in
Bago,(715) Tanintharyi and Yangon Divisions.

437. The labour for the railway construction work is recruited in the same
manner as for road construction, the military using the services of village
heads.(716) [ ? ].

438. Soldiers and prisoners can also be found working on these sites. The
work done by them is no different from that demanded of civilians, except
for the fact that the soldiers have only to work a fixed number of hours
and are not necessarily obliged to complete the task assigned,(721) and
that the most tedious work is reserved for the prisoners.(722)

439. Work on railway construction consists, initially, of preparing and
levelling the ground.(723) Subsequently, the workers have to crush the
necessary stone,(724) lay the chippings, cut wood to make sleepers(725) and
then lay the sleepers and rails.(726) This is followed by maintenance work
involving removal of weeds and scrub.(727) Work starts early in the morning
and finishes late in the day, sometimes after dark; in some cases the
workers are not even able to take a short break at midday.(728)

440. The workers are not fed,(729) have to sleep at the work site if it is
too far from their homes(730) and usually have to provide the tools
necessary for the performance of the task.(731) They are not paid,(732)
though some claim to have been promised compensation, which they never
actually received.(733)

441. Workers are subjected to ill-treatment when the supervising military
authorities consider that the work is not progressing satisfactorily.(734)

442. It is possible to be exempted from the work by paying a certain amount
of money to the authorities(735) or by finding a replacement.(736)

443. Finally, one witness mentioned that the military demanded a tax, over
and above the work to be carried out, because of the fact that the railway
would henceforth pass near his village.(737)