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FEER: INDONESIA
Dawn of a New Age
Amid its economic crisis, Indonesia is preparing for dramatic
political
changes. A team of seven academics is fashioning a
legislative
framework aimed at producing a truly representative
government, to be
elected in general and presidential elections in 1999.
By John McBeth in Jakarta
September 17, 1998
I t has been an exhilarating and exhausting summer for Ryaas
Rasyid,
rector of the Institute of Government Studies, and his team
of six. Night
after night, starting shortly after Suharto quit as
Indonesia's president on
May 21, the political scientists have been working into the
pre-dawn
hours on an awesome task--fashioning a legislative framework
for the
country's first truly representative government since
independence in
1945.
"At the first session, everyone took turns to throw out their
ideas," says
Andi Mallarangeng, 35, who like other members of Tim Tujuh or
Team
Seven is an academic who previously had little practical
political
experience. "We put everything on the table and criticized
each other.
The only thing we didn't do is up-end the table."
Acting under a mandate from the Home Affairs Ministry, Team
Seven
has been hammering out the rules for general and presidential
elections
promised next year by President B.J. Habibie. On the drawing
board is a
package of laws that will foster a multiparty system and
shift more power
to the House of Representatives. It will preserve a strong
presidency, but
also prepare the way for regional autonomy. Perhaps most
controversially, the proposed laws will reduce--but not
eliminate--the
number of seats for the military in the legislature.
Habibie's office is
expected to submit the draft to parliament this month.
Working in spare time left by their regular academic jobs,
the law drafters
are preparing for a historic moment: Indonesia's first taste
of real
democracy since Sukarno, Suharto's predecessor, hijacked the
promise of
the 1950s by reinstating authoritarian rule with the
military's help.
Suharto maintained a tight grip on political life throughout
his 32 years of
rule, and it was only with his dramatic resignation amid
student protests
that Indonesians have dared to hope for a real say in
government.
That hope is as yet just a glimmer. The old habits of
autocratic rule are
unlikely to be replaced overnight by new habits of grassroots
consultation. Moreover, many former Suharto cronies remain in
power,
and the influential army is reluctant to pull out of politics
completely.
Racial hatred, particularly towards the Chinese minority,
which bore the
brunt of the May riots, has not ended. Nor is there any
solace in the
economy, which has shrunk 10% in the past year while
unemployment
has grown by 50%.
Not surprisingly, many people are sceptical about Indonesia's
chances of
attaining and maintaining democracy. Alfred Stepan, a
professor at
Oxford University and a leading expert on democratic
transitions, argues
that Indonesia is not even at first base yet, because
remnants of the old
order still linger in power. As a rough yardstick of how
slowly such
processes can move, he notes that only one of the 15 former
Soviet
states has developed a truly democratic system, even though the
process began early in the decade. Indeed, the transition
from autocracy
to democracy is rarely easy: Pakistan went through several
military
regimes before getting a democratically elected government,
and the
army still casts a long shadow there; and in post-Marcos
Philippines,
democracy has been tumultuous.
Some observers are more upbeat, however. Says Ben Reilly, a
programme
officer of the Stockholm-based Institute for Democracy and
Electoral
Assistance, who has visited Jakarta to advise Team Seven:
"Most of the
other comparative countries that have gone through such a
transformation have taken two or three years. Here they're
trying to do
the same thing in about three months. It's going very, very
well."
To be sure, many Indonesians are not waiting for legislation.
Interest
groups have already formed more than 70 parties of various
hues, and
Jakarta is pushing ahead with proposals for East Timor, which
it annexed
in 1976, even though the regional-autonomy law has still to be
completed. Non-governmental agencies, the media, and
intellectuals have
been swept up in a ferment of political discussion about the
country's
future.
If anything lasting is to be built, it will have to be on the
basis of a new
set of laws that will entrench and protect the gains of the
May reform
movement. As yet there are no plans to amend or rewrite the 1945
Constitution; by commissioning the new legislation, however,
Habibie
has shown he is sticking firmly to his 1999 timetable.
General elections
will take place on May 15, and presidential ones on December
6. The
government "need us, because they need legitimacy," says Team
Seven
member Andi.
Aides say the president, a one-time technology tsar, is
taking a personal
interest in political reform. "Habibie wants to be remembered
as a
president who brought Indonesia out of an authoritarian
system and into
a democratic era where human rights is a guiding principle,"
says adviser
Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Team Seven members, who have consulted
Habibie
as they proceed, say he has a keen grasp of what's needed for
reform to
work.
For example, Akbar Tandjung, state secretary and recently
elected
chairman of Golkar, wants to preserve the ruling party's
close links to the
government bureaucracy. However, Habibie is adamant that civil
servants shouldn't join parties or run for office. Says Team
Seven
member Ramlan Surbakti: "The president was even firmer than
we were."
If that piece of legislation goes through, it will be a major
departure from
the Suharto years when Home Affairs Ministry officials commonly
chaired local branches of Golkar, ensuring that the election
odds were
stacked in the party's favour.
In addition to Habibie, the team has also consulted the
military and a
broad spectrum of political and community groups. The
law-drafters say
both Golkar and the military support the new voting system.
In the past,
that support would have been sufficient for the law's passage
through
parliament. But in the new era of reformasi, Team Seven's
efforts will also
have to pass scrutiny by the public, political activists and
pressure
groups--all of which are anxious to make their presence felt.
It is unclear
how the politicians will react to laws that will deprive many
of them of
comfortable careers and plump benefits.
Another factor that could yet derail the process is the
deepening
economic crisis, which Jakarta admits has pushed 90 million
Indonesians
below the accepted poverty line. The resultant frustration
has led to
increasing outbreaks of social violence.
If law-and-order deteriorates further, Jakarta might decide
that the
country isn't stable enough to hold polls. That would be a
major blow for
reform. By throwing the military's crucial support behind
Habibie,
armed-forces chief Gen. Wiranto is signalling his conviction
that the way
to breed confidence is continuity. That, and time. Analysts
say the lack
of a genuine transitional administration--and a resurgence of
student
activism--makes it vital for Indonesia to put a new system in
place as
soon as possible.
One of the biggest changes under the new laws will be to the
electoral
system. Previously, legislators were chosen by proportional
representation from each of Indonesia's 27 provinces. Voters
cast ballots
for one of the three officially recognized parties--Golkar,
the Indonesian
Democratic Party, known as the PDI, and the United
Development Party,
or the PPP--rather than for individual candidates. The latter
were chosen
by the parties and therefore gave their loyalty to party
bosses, rather
than to constituents.
The draft election law changes that. It establishes 420
voting districts,
where ballots are cast for individuals and the top
vote-getter wins in a
first-past-the-post system. In addition to 55 seats being
allotted to the
military in the newly expanded 550-member House of
Representatives, 75
seats will be parcelled out to local parties on a quota basis
from a
national party list. Drafters argue that this uniquely
Indonesian
innovation will ensure representation for smaller parties
with a popular
base but not enough strength to muster seats at the district
level.
But Team Seven has found it difficult to defend a proposed
stipulation
that parties must win at least 10% of the 550 seats in the
first election in
1999 or lose the right to contest the next, in 2003. At a
recent seminar in
Jakarta, Indonesian scholar Daniel Lev of the University of
Washington
called the measure a way of "smoking them out in the first
election, then
shooting them in the second." Duke University's Donald Horowitz
dismissed it as a "bizarre" mechanism aimed at muffling
"legitimate
expressions of political interest."
For their part, the drafters argue that some criteria are
needed to prevent
a proliferation of "nuisance parties," such as helped to
derail open
politics in Thailand after the overthrow of Thanom
Kittikachorn's military
government in 1973. They say they had suggested a threshold
of 5% of
seats, but Habibie had insisted on 10%.
To qualify for registration, parties will also be required to
either set up
branches in at least half of Indonesia's 27 provinces or to
collect 1 million
signatures in support. Afan Gaffar, another Team Seven
member, says
the rule is intended to discourage political groups based on
ethnicity or
religion. "We think parties like that could be a recipe for
national
disintegration because they will support lost causes and
create conflicts
with the national government," says Gaffar.
The drafters also hope that a legislature more truly
accountable to its
constituents will be a better check on the presidency, which
Suharto had
turned into a personality cult. A separate law, still on Team
Seven's
drawing board, redefines the president's role as head of
state, limits the
tenure to two five-year terms and attempts to curtail the
president's
powers to issue decrees. Under Suharto such diktats were
routinely
endorsed by a rubber-stamp parliament that never drew up its
own laws.
Analysts say if coalition politics hampers the normal
law-making process,
future presidents may be tempted to resort again to ruling by
decree.
The incumbent's powers will also be severely trimmed in the
People's
Consultative Assembly, the body that meets every five years and
chooses the president. A draft law cuts the size of the
assembly to 700
members from 1,000; it will comprise 550 legislators, 81
representatives
from elected provincial councils and 69 from community
organizations.
Suharto used to hand-pick the nonlegislative members of the
assembly,
selecting the very people who were to decide whether to award
him
another term.
Also on the anvil is a law that allows autonomy down to the
provincial
level--a major step for a sprawling archipelago with a
history of regional
rebellions and a lack of confidence in its own unity.
"Suharto's New
Order Government said autonomy will lead to disintegration,"
says Team
Seven's Ramlan. "We're shifting the paradigm. We're saying
that if you
provide for more autonomy, it will actually defuse separatist
tendencies."
The most heated debate, though, is over Team Seven's decision
to allot
the military 55 seats in the new legislature--conceivably
enough to give it
the balance of power. Although that number is down from 100
six years
ago, the presence of retired colonels and generals in a
democratically
elected chamber will touch a raw nerve among many Indonesians
who
only now are learning the full extent of the military's
brutal excesses
under the Suharto regime.
International experts can't recall another case where
military appointees
get to sit alongside elected delegates. Apart from the
obvious case of
Burma, the only other comparable country in Asia where the
army retains
an institutionalized role is Thailand, where active-duty
officers occupy 56
of the 262 seats in the appointed Senate.
Indonesian military leaders also oppose efforts to reduce
their presence
in local government, which both enhances their political
control and
provides seconded employment for mid-ranking officers. Half
of the 27
provincial governors and 40%-50% of the 309 bupatis, or
district chiefs,
are active-duty officers, and the military is estimated to
control an
average of nine positions on each of the 45-man district and
regional
councils.
Already under heavy fire for abducting and torturing
pro-democracy
activists over the past year, the Indonesian military still
has to face
potentially explosive allegations over the extra-judicial
killings of
hundreds of suspected Muslim separatists in Aceh province in the
1990s. "Public confidence in the institution may be near
collapse," says a
Western military observer. "And confidence is something
that's very
difficult to win back."
The military argues that it needs to have influence in
government if it is
to avoid bearing the brunt of ill-advised policies. The
military "don't want
to be just a fire brigade, they want to share in making
public policy," says
Afan Gaffar. But critics reject this argument. "It's a hoax
we have been
forced to swallow in the past because of the army's might,"
says political
analyst Marsilam Simanjuntak. "But if the argument is that
its function is
to protect the integrity of the state, then why can't it do
it without
entering parliament?"
While few people doubt his sincerity, Gen. Wiranto has given
himself the
unenviable task of trying to disentangle the military from
its past and yet
protect senior officers with skeletons in their closets.
Certainly, the furore
over his decision to dismiss Suharto's son-in-law, Lt.-Gen.
Prabowo
Subianto, and forgo a court-martial for now has demonstrated how
difficult it is going to be. "They're trying as much as
possible to defend
what they have, but they are in retreat," says law-drafter
Ramlan. "Their
capacity to hold their ground is diminishing along with their
loss of
credibility."
Indonesian scholar William Liddle of Ohio State University
told a recent
gathering in Jakarta that under the restraining influence of
globalization,
the military has found it difficult to work out a vision of
the future that
will allow it to fill the vacuum left by Suharto's downfall.
But if an
"opening" has been provided, as he says, it will take massive
pressure
on the street for the political elite to pluck up the courage
to end the
military's long tradition of dwifungsi, its dual political
and military role.
For one thing, the generals still have the ability to stir up
social disorder
if they are unhappy with the reforms. And the president will
have to
ensure investigations into human-rights abuses don't lead to a
disintegration of the armed forces, muses presidential
adviser Anwar. "If
the military thinks the civilian government is bent on
destroying it, then it
could take precipitive action," she says. That's something
Team Seven
doesn't want to think about.