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ILO REPORT ON FL IN BURMA: SLICE 10



[ILO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA, SLICE
10]
 
 
     12. FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION CONCERNING THE FACTS(309)
 
 
A.  ADMISSIBILITY AND PROBATIVE VALUE 
    OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND 
    DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL
 
 
259. In addition to the testimony heard during the hearings in
November 1997 and the visit of the Commission to the region in
January and February 1998, 274 documents, totalling nearly
10,000 pages in the official Commission registries, have been
communicated to the Commission since the commencement of the
procedure. This written information was transmitted by the
parties and other solicited sources,(310) as well as by
witnesses and other persons during the hearings(311) or the
visit of the Commission to the region.(312) These documents
have been carefully itemized by the secretariat and indexed
according to the date on which they were received by the
Commission; the lists of documents transmitted to the
Commission are to be found in Appendices IV, V and VI to this
report.(313)
 
260. The Commission is thus in possession of evidence
submitted in both written and testimonial forms. While the
Commission, in its pursuit of gathering full and detailed
information, prefers the direct testimony of a witness who
claims to have experienced or observed facts relevant to the
inquiry, it nevertheless considers that the copious
documentation communicated to it constitutes an important
source of information which may serve to support or refute in
one way or another the allegations contained in the complaint.
The Commission notes that there is no rule in international
law restricting the admissibility of written or oral evidence.
The practice of the International Court of Justice is that
flexibility is the guiding principle; international tribunals
are not bound by such strict rules of evidence as those of
national tribunals, many of which are not appropriate to
international disputes.(314) In this spirit, the Rules of the
International Court of Justice aim at making the procedure as
simple and expeditious as possible and its provisions "have to
do with time-limits and other matters designed 'to guarantee
the sound administration of justice, while respecting the
equality of the parties'. They do not bear on the categories
of material admissible as evidence, or on the principles by
which evidence is assessed by the Court".(315)
 
261. Moreover, the ILO Governing Body left the Commission
entirely free to decide on its own rules concerning the
admissibility of evidence in accordance with the provisions of
the ILO Constitution. Accordingly, in adopting its own rules
of procedure the Commission followed the custom established by
the nine Commissions of Inquiry which preceded it. In these
circumstances, the Commission considers that both written and
oral forms of evidence should be admitted.
 
262. Oral testimony. The clear preference of the Commission is
that direct oral testimony of a witness claiming to have
experienced or observed facts, if accepted, has the highest
probative value.
 
263. In the course of the inquiry, testimony was given by
witnesses in Geneva, and further on locations as described
respectively in Chapters 2 and 5 of this report.
 
264. With regard to the evidence obtained for the Commission
with the assistance described in paragraph 81 above, the
Commission also considers this to be direct oral testimony and
to be of high probative value because of the circumstances of
its taking, though clearly not as high as that which the
Commission heard itself.
 
265. Documentary material. The documentary material which was
submitted and admitted before the Commission fell into a
number of different categories:
 
(1) written statements from persons who had themselves
obtained statements from others claiming to have experienced
or observed relevant matters ("secondary statements") and who
were questioned before the Commission. The statements from
persons who gave evidence also included statistical,
historical and research material as well as analyses;
 
(2) written communications containing secondary statements
from persons claiming to have experienced or observed relevant
matters, as well as containing statistical research,
historical and material analyses. However, the purveyors of
that material did not give evidence before the Commission;
 
(3) written communications from parties, persons or
organizations which contained assertions, statistical,
historical and research material as well as analyses, but not
secondary statements. Some of the purveyors of that material
were questioned before the Commission and some were not;
 
(4) other documents including (a) originals or copies of
military orders, (b) videos and photos, and (c) newspaper
reports.
 
266. Generally speaking documentary material was regarded by
the Commission as less probative on the facts than the oral
testimony. Further, some categories of documentary material
were more probative, prima facie, than others.
 
267. With regard to category 1 documentation, this was clearly
admissible and, prima facie, had greater probative value than
the other categories of documents save category 4(a). The
persons who provided the written statements also gave
testimony about the manner and circumstances of the taking of
the secondary statements. To this extent this material could
have been described as oral evidence but for convenience is
characterized as documentary evidence.
 
268. With regard to category 2 documentation, this also was
admissible but was of, prima facie, less probative value than
category 1 as the Commission did not have the benefit of being
able to satisfy itself as to the voluntariness and
truthfulness of the statements.
 
269. With regard to category 3 documentation, this contained
more generalized rather than specific material but provided
helpful background where it could be corroborated by other
material.
 
270. With regard to category 4, documents in (a) being the
military orders were of high probative value as to relevant
matters. Documents in (b), except where the contents were the
subject of explanatory evidence, had little probative value.
Documents in (c) were largely from government publications The
"New Light of Myanmar" and its predecessor the "Working
People's Daily" and were taken as being indicative of
government attitude.
 
271. In reaching the findings of fact set out in section B,
the Commission relied on documentary material as described in
the four categories above. This material provided a
generalized background and pattern of practices.
 
272. In reaching the findings of fact set out in section C,
the Commission again relied on the same documentary material
as in section B and has identified those parts within section
C. This again reflected a general pattern of practices.
Further, in section C, the Commission has relied on oral
testimony and has identified those parts within section C.
This oral testimony confirmed the pattern of conduct which
emanated from the documentary evidence.
 
273. The reason for dividing the material in this way was to
place the oral testimonies in an overall context of practice
in Myanmar, and also to isolate this material which was the
most probative evidence before the Commission.
 
 
B. GENERAL PATTERN OF CONDUCT 
   BY MYANMAR AUTHORITIES
                   
 
274. Information provided to the Commission indicated that the
Myanmar authorities, including the local and regional
administration, the military and various militias, forced the
population of Myanmar to carry out a wide range of tasks.
Labour was exacted from men, women and children, some of a
very young age. Workers were not paid or compensated in any
way for providing their labour, other than in exceptional
circumstances, and were commonly subjected to various forms of
verbal and physical abuse including rape, torture and killing.
The vast majority of the information covered the period since
1988, the year in which the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) came to power. While the information indicated
that the use of forced labour for all the purposes discussed
was prevalent since at least 1988, the use of forced labour on
infrastructure-related work appeared to have been much less
common before 1992. In the paragraphs which follow, some
indication of the range of purposes for which labour was
requisitioned will be given, as it appears from the various
documents and testimony provided to the Commission.
 
275. The information provided indicated that Myanmar's
military and various militias made systematic and widespread
use of civilians to provide logistical support. This most
commonly involved the use of porters to carry a range of
supplies and equipment. In comparison to other forms of
compulsory labour, the treatment of porters, especially during
military offensives, was particularly brutal; such porters
were also likely to be exposed to danger in combat
situations.(316)
 
276. In addition to providing porters for the military,
villagers across the country, and to a lesser extent urban
residents, were required to construct and repair military
camps and provide general workers for these facilities on a
permanent basis. A number of villagers had to be on permanent
stand-by at camps to act as messengers. Villagers also had to
provide the necessary materials for the construction and
repair of these facilities. This included camps for militia
groups such as the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA).(317)
 
277. The information also disclosed a variety of other tasks
that people throughout Myanmar were requisitioned to carry out
in support of the military, such as acting as guides, sentries
and minesweepers. It appeared that such people were also used
as human shields, in that they would be sent ahead of troops
to draw enemy fire, trip booby-traps, or as hostages to
prevent attacks against columns or army camps. This most often
occurred in the context of portering, but also occurred
independently. In addition, owners of vehicles regularly had
to place these at the disposal of the military.(318)
 
278. The question of forced recruitment into the "Tatmadaw"
and various militia forces was also brought to the attention
of the Commission. In some cases recruits appeared to be
arbitrarily requisitioned, without any reference to compulsory
military service legislation, and included minors.(319)
 
279. Information was also received concerning the use of
civilians on a variety of projects undertaken by the Myanmar
authorities, most commonly by the military authorities for
what appeared to be income-generation purposes. This ranged
from the use of forced labour for cultivation and production
of goods to extortion and theft of property.(320)
 
280. The information revealed that over the last ten years the
Government of Myanmar had implemented a large number of
national and local infrastructure projects, in particular the
construction and improvement of various roads and railways and
associated infrastructure such as bridges. These projects
appeared to be constructed in large part with the use of
forced labour, sometimes involving hundreds of thousands of
workers.(321)
 
281. Similarly, it appeared that forced labour was used by the
Government in relation to a range of other infrastructure
projects and public works such as dams, irrigation works and
airports.(322)
 
282. Urban residents in particular were required to work,
usually one day per week, on the cleaning and maintenance of
urban areas. This was organized by the ward authorities, but
was often supervised by the military.(323)
 
283. The information provided indicated that the use of forced
labour for the purposes mentioned above occurred throughout
Myanmar, and affected Burmans and the other ethnic groups in
the country. It appeared, however, that there was
significantly more forced labour in rural areas, particularly
in less developed areas such as the seven States. Since these
States have a majority non-Burman population, the burden of
forced labour thus fell disproportionately on the non-Burman
ethnic groups in Myanmar.
 
284. It appeared that persons exacting forced labour in
Myanmar were not subject to legal sanction, and were therefore
enjoying full impunity. Several witnesses who had undertaken
general research and investigation informed the Commission
that there had been, to their knowledge, no cases of persons
being punished for forcing others to provide their labour, or
for committing abuses against those so forced.(324)
 
285. The numbers of people in Myanmar affected by forced
labour appeared to be vast. In 1995, Human Rights Watch/Asia
estimated that since 1992 at least two million people had been
forced to work without pay on the construction of roads,
railways and bridges.(325) An indication of the large scale of
some of the projects on which it is claimed that forced labour
was used can be gained from statistics published by the
Government of Myanmar in its official newspaper, "The New
Light of Myanmar".(326)
 
286. In rural areas, orders were transmitted to villagers
through their village head. The village head received
instructions, sometimes verbally, but more often in written
form, from either the local administration (at the
village-tract or sometimes the township level) or the military
(the local military camp or battalion headquarters).(327)
These instructions usually specified that a given number of
persons had to be provided by a given date, or that a given
amount of work had to be completed within a given time-frame.
It was then left to the village head to make the arrangements.
Often, the village head would instruct a certain number of
households in the village to provide one person for a certain
period of time, usually one to two weeks; at the end of
this period, the workers were replaced by villagers from the
other households in the village. On certain occasions, the
order given to the village head would specify that one person
from each household in the village had to be sent, leaving no
possibility for rotating the requirement among the households
in the village.
 
287. In urban areas, orders were transmitted to individuals
through officials of the ward administration. These officials
received instructions from the township administration or
local military specifying the number of workers required or
the amount of work to be completed in a given time. The ward
administration officials then made the necessary arrangements.
They often rounded up people arbitrarily or sent them as a
punishment for some minor offence, but they also commonly held
a "lottery" to choose which of the residents of the ward had
to go. The only way to avoid taking part in the lottery, or
avoid the obligation once chosen, was to pay a sum of money so
as to be exempted.
 
288. Small-scale labour demands usually originated at the
battalion or township level, but larger-scale demands would
usually originate from a higher level in the administrative or
military hierarchy. For labour on large infrastructure
projects or for porters in major military offensives, the
order could originate at the national level and then be passed
down through the state/divisional, district and township
levels.(328) The Commission received copies of a large number
of these orders (mostly from local army camp, battalion,
village-tract and township levels).(329)
 
289. The written orders to provide porters and labourers which
were sent to village heads by the local military or civil
administration typically contained some kind of overt or
implied threat. Examples of overt threats included such
statements as "Anyone who refuses to come to build the road
shall be punished according to the law", "If you don't come
because you are afraid of Mon rebels, we the Army must show
you that we are worse than Mon rebels", "I warn you that if
you make excuses and fail to come, violent action will be
taken against you" or "If nobody comes this time [you] will be
destroyed by an artillery attack".(330) In one case when two
villagers ran away from portering, an order from the military
column to the village head demanding their return stated:
"Should this happen in the future, we will take action and you
will be charged with disturbing and causing delay to our
military operations".(331) Examples of implied threats
included statements such as "If you fail to comply it
will be your responsibility", which villagers knew from
experience meant that they would face serious punishment, or
"If you fail to come we will not take any responsibility for
[your] village", which the villagers knew was a threat to
destroy their village.(332) Another common form of threat was
the inclusion with the order of some combination of a bullet,
chilli and piece of charcoal, implying that the recipient
would be shot, face problems, or have their house or village
burned down if they failed to comply with the order.(333)
 
290. Local authorities regularly required village heads to
provide detailed information about the number of households in
their area, and the composition of those households. These
lists could then be used to decide how many workers a given
village was required to provide, or the amount of work a
village was required to complete.(334) When a worker was
required from each household, this was usually irrespective of
the number of able-bodied persons in the household, or their
gender. This could cause particular problems for households
without an able-bodied worker; in these cases children or the
elderly would have to go if a replacement could not be found.
 
291. It appeared that a lack of effective coordination between
the local military units, the local and regional authorities,
and other bodies demanding forced labour could lead to
sometimes impossible demands for labour. Such cumulative
demands resulted in women, children and older persons being
sent for forced labour duties, and could make it impossible
for the household to earn a living. One way for people to deal
with such a problem was to pay someone else to do forced
labour in their place, or when possible pay a sum of money to
the authorities to be exempted, but most rural villagers who
lived on a subsistence basis could not afford to do this very
often or for any great length of time. In addition, it was
sometimes very difficult to find someone willing to work as a
porter for military operations, because such work was
particularly dangerous, and because there was a great demand
for porters at such times.(335)
 
292. The information before the Commission was that the
penalties for failing to comply with forced labour demands
were harsh. Punishments included detention at the army camp,
often in leg-stocks or in a pit in the ground, commonly
accompanied by beatings and other forms of torture, as well as
deprivation of food, water, medical attention and other basic
rights. Women were subject to rape and other forms of sexual
abuse at such times. The first person to be punished if a
village failed to comply with demands for forced labour would
usually be the village head. For this reason, the position of
village head was an unpopular one, and it was often rotated
among those villagers competent to do the job, in some
instances with each villager having a rotation of as short as
two weeks. Also, it was mentioned that villages often chose
older women to be village heads, because the villagers felt
that in virtue of being women they were likely to be treated
less brutally, and by virtue of their age they were less
likely to face rape or other sexual abuse.(336)
 
293. The information before the Commission indicated that
populations which had been forcibly relocated were liable to
face demands to provide their labour. Forced relocation of
populations was a common strategy by the military in areas
with active insurgencies. Remote villages were commonly
ordered to relocate to areas which were more firmly under
government control, usually either to larger towns, or to
rural areas near to military camps. Such relocations could
affect hundreds of thousands of people. It appeared that given
their close proximity to the military, these relocated
populations were particularly vulnerable to demands for
portering and other kinds of forced labour.(337) In some cases
it appeared that forced relocation had been used to provide a
pool of readily accessible labourers close to a major
infrastructure project, or at least that the presence of large
relocated populations in the areas of some projects had been
taken advantage of and used for forced labour on such
projects. This was the case in Kayah State for the
construction of the Aungban to Loikaw railway, for road
construction in Tanintharyi Division, and for road and railway
construction in Shan State.(338)
 
294. In addition to providing labour for various purposes,
people throughout Myanmar also had to pay various fees and
taxes. It was indicated to the Commission that in some cases
these were arbitrary and discriminatory. It appeared that the
Rohingya population of Rakhine State was particularly
discriminated against in this way.(339) 
 
295. Common fees and taxes which people in Myanmar were
required to pay included porter fees, ostensibly for the
payment of porters; monetary contributions to infrastructure
projects (road tax, railway tax, etc.);(340) miscellaneous
fees to local army camps, in the form of cash or goods; and a
variety of taxes on agricultural produce, including compulsory
purchase of a proportion of the rice crop by the authorities,
at a rate well below the market rate. In addition to this,
people also had to pay regular sums of money if they wanted to
be exempted from forced labour assignments which were given to
them; because of the arbitrary nature of taxation, it was
often difficult to distinguish these payments from fees and
taxes. In cases where people were unable to pay these taxes
and fees, they were often required to provide labour or
services instead, increasing the burden of uncompensated
labour demands they faced.(341)
 
296. The information provided to the Commission indicated that
the system for the forcible requisition of labour was largely
similar across the country, and that the nature of this system
was such that certain groups were particularly affected by
these demands. In particular, since it appeared to be almost
always possible to avoid forced labour if a sufficiently large
sum of money was paid, the burden of forced labour fell
disproportionately on the poorer sectors of society. The
existence of a cash economy in urban areas also meant that
urban residents were more likely to be able to pay to avoid
forced labour.(342) In addition, non-Burman populations
appeared to be particularly  targeted for forced labour,
particularly in rural areas (see also paragraph 283
above).(343) In particular, the Muslim population of Myanmar,
including both the Rohingya population of Rakhine State and
Muslim populations in other parts of the country, was
particularly discriminated against in this way.(344) Treatment
of this population also appeared to be especially harsh.(345)
 
297. The information before the Commission disclosed that
there was a significant social and financial impact of forced
labour on those who were subjected to it.(346) Forced labour
caused the poorer sections of society who carried out the
majority of the labour to become increasingly impoverished.
Day labourers needed paid work every day in order to obtain
sufficient income and that became impossible when they were
forced to provide uncompensated labour. Families who survived
on subsistence farming also required every member of the
family to contribute to this labour-intensive work,
particularly at certain times of the year. Demands for forced
labour seriously  affected such families. Families who were no
longer able to support themselves often moved to an area where
they thought the demands for forced labour would be less; if
this was not possible, they would often leave Myanmar as
refugees. Information provided to the Commission indicated
that forced labour was a major reason behind people leaving
Myanmar and becoming refugees.(347)
 
298. Finally, there was information before the Commission
regarding the relationship between Buddhist values and labour
contribution. The information indicated that while various
deeds, including contribution of labour for certain purposes,
were considered noble and meritorious according to the values
held by Buddhists in Myanmar, it was not the case that labour
for roads or bridges, or forced labour of any kind, could be
considered noble and meritorious in this way. According to the
information received, Buddhism was clear as to which kinds of
acts were meritorious, and such things as construction of
roads and bridges could not be considered among them; Buddhism
was also clear that merit came not from the act itself, but
from the intentions of the person in carrying out the act, so
that an act which was forced to be carried out could not be
considered meritorious. Furthermore, since much of the forced
labour in the country was exacted from non-Buddhist ethnic
people, considerations of this kind were irrelevant in these
cases.(348)
_________________
 
NOTES
 
309. References to pages in the official record of submissions
indicate the source of the information and the document number
and page number in the official record, separated by a dash.
References to the record of the hearings held at the
Commission's Second Session indicate the name of the witness
and the sitting and page, by Roman and Arabic numerals
respectively. References to the testimony of witnesses
interviewed by the Commission in the course of its visit to
the region indicate the number of the witness; summaries of
these testimonies are appended to this report as Appendix VII. 
 
310. See Ch. 3, paras. 28-54. 
 
311. See Ch. 4, paras. 55-76. 
 
312. See Ch. 5, paras. 77-98. 
 
313. Three registries have been compiled: the first lists the
documents received following the First Session of the
Commission; the second refers to documents that were submitted
by witnesses at the time of the hearings held in Geneva in
November 1997, and the third lists the documents communicated
to the Commission during its visit to the region. 
 
314. In this respect, see "Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970", p. 98. para.
58, Sir Fitzmaurice, separate opinion. Sir Fitzmaurice's
opinion was cited with approval in the case concerning the
"Application of the Convention on the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 13 Sep. 1993",
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 357, separate opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen. 
 
315.  "Application of the Convention on the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), ibid. Judge Shahabuddeen
also referred himself to: Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), I.C.J. Reports 1986", p. 39, para. 59. 
 
316. See paras. 300-350 below. 
 
317. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0189 to 0190, 001-0479 to
0480; Lin, VII/30; see paras. 351-373 below. 
 
318. See paras. 374-388 below. 
 
319. See paras. 389-393 below. 
 
320. See paras. 394-407 below. 
 
321. See paras. 408-443 below. 
 
322. See paras. 444-457 below. 
 
323. See paras. 458-461 below. 
 
324. Guest, II/24; Liddell, V/34; Lin, VII/47; Heppner,
XII/62. 
 
325. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0050. 
 
326. For example, 364,224 people reportedly contributed labour
for the Nahtogyi-Mingyan railway in Mandalay Division; 799,447
people for the Aungban-Loikaw railway in Shan and Kayah
States; over 44,000 people on a single day for the Ye-Dawei
(Tavoy) railway in Mon State and Tanintharyi Division; over
85,000 people for the Yenangyaung-Natmauk road; and 2.3
million people for the dredging of a moat and construction of
a ring-road in Mandalay. See doc. H14 for copies of some of
these reports from "The New Light of Myanmar" and its
predecessor, "The Working People's Daily". An estimate was
provided to the Commission based on these published figures
that over four million people were forced to work on
infrastructure projects over the period from 1992 to 1995. See
Steele, VIII/5. In addition, the US Embassy in Yangon
estimated the amount of forced labour used on local
development projects, based on the value of (uncompensated)
"people's contributions" given in economic data published by
the Government of Myanmar. The value of these contributions
reached a maximum in the 1995/96 fiscal year, at which point
they were valued at 186.9 million (current) kyat, which at the
official Government day labour wage of 20 kyat per day is
equivalent to over 9.3 million work-days. See American Embassy
in Rangoon, 101-3905 ff., H13-6009 to 6012; Steele, VIII/5-7
for further discussion. 
 
327. Min Lwin, VI/14; Ka Hsaw Wa, X/9. 
 
328. Mirante, I/48, 59; Heppner, XII/25-28; Heppner, XIII/6. 
 
329. Copies of orders are contained, inter alia, in docs. 1,
15 to 20, 22 to 28, 130, H6, H21, H25 and M50. 
 
330. See orders 5, 7, 8 and 4 respectively in Appendix XI. 
 
331. See order 2 in Appendix XI. 
 
332. See, for example, order 3 in Appendix XI; see also
Heppner, XII/35-39. 
 
333. Ka Hsaw Wa, X/9, 43-44; Heppner, XII/38-39; for an
example of an order containing bullets, see order 6 in
Appendix XI. 
 
334. For the text of an order to provide such information, see
order 1 in Appendix XI. 
 
335. Karen Human Rights Group, 032-2428 to 2429; UNHCR,
033-2435; Lin, VII/23-25; Heppner, XII/11-14, 49-51. 
 
336. Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2147 to 2148, 031-2393; Wa
Wa, III/7-8; Min Lwin, VI/6; Heppner, XII/31-35. 
 
337. For examples of relocated populations being used for
portering, see Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0307, 001-0481
to 0482; see also Guest, II/9-10. 
 
338. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0028 to 0030, 032-2429;
Human Rights Watch/Asia, 065-2965; Mirante, I/47-48;
Guest, II/9-10, 20-21; Heppner, XII/46-49, 54. 
 
339. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 154-5406. 
 
340. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0027 to 0028. 
 
341. See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2148;
Heppner, XII/17. 
 
342. Karen Human Rights Group, 032-2427 to 2428; Liddell,
V/10; Heppner, XII/49-51. 
 
343. Guest II/6; Lin, VII/30-31; Heppner, XIII/20-21. 
 
344. For example, Human Rights Watch/Asia noted a
disproportionately large number of Muslims among escaped
porters they had interviewed. See Human Rights Watch/Asia,
001-0054. 
 
345. Lin, VII/31-32; Heppner, XIII/21. 
 
346. Karen Human Rights Group, 032-2430; Guest, II/7-9;
Heppner, XII/63-64. 
 
347. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0028, 032-2430; Human
Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0051 to 0052; Guest, II/7-9, 14-16; Min
Lwin III/21; Liddell, V/29-30; Lin, VII/27-28; Heppner,
XII/10-11, 49-51. 
 
348. Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 001-0266; Human
Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0050 to 0051, H07-5805 to 5806;
Liddell, V/20-22. 
 
 
[END OF SLICE 10]