The Japanese role in Burma's democr

[brelief@xxxxxxx]

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PD Burma Annual meeting in Bangkok, August 1998
  
The Japanese role in Burma's democratisation process and a gendered
perspective.
  
      25 August 1998 Tokyo
  
    Yasuko Takemura
 Member, House of Councillors
 Chairperson, Committee on General Affairs
 Member, PD Burma
  
 In this report, I would like to focus on the different possibilities for
Japanese policy towards Burma and also examine the situation of women and
children inside Burma who are the most vulnerable people under the
iron-fist rule of the military junta.
  
I.  Japanese ODA
  
 The analysis of the resumption of yen loans for Burma by the Japanese
government is often reported by Japanese media.  The yen loans are not to
be resumed until the military junta shows visible progress towards
democracy.  This was the clear policy of the Hashimoto cabinet and the
newly built Obuchi cabinet will continue this policy with the appointment
of former vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Masahiko
Komura, as the new Foreign Minister.
  There have, however, been many demands from pro-democracy activists to
stop ODA to Burma.  Let me outline the types of Japanese ODA given to Burma.
  
A.  Aid for Rangoon Nurses College
 The first visible change toward democracy was observed in the release of
Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in July 1995.  The Japanese government
welcomed this event and decided to grant aid as a token of its approval.
This was the 1.625 billion yen (US$13 million) in aid for the Rangoon
Nurses College.
  According to the evaluation report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) in Feb.1998, the aim of this grant was to double the capacity for
students from 560 to about 1000 due to a lack of nurses in Burma, and to
fund expansion of classrooms, dormitories, and the purchase of educational
materials.
 The report adds that:
       The opening ceremony of the new classrooms and dormitory was held in
June 1997.  The facilities are well used.  The granted materials have been
checked everyday.  There has been no problem in their maintenance and
administration.  The counterpart is preparing masters and doctorate
courses. Japan is planning to send experts to this school.
  
   After this grant was reported, Aung San Suu Kyi strongly urged that
funding for the college be stopped, as it served only the elite.
  At the end of 1997, "Burma Today No. 50" quoted an article from the South
China Morning Post as follows:
    
(B   A former Burmese health minister who mistreated wounded protesters
during a 1988 uprising died after a hospital refused to admit him because
he had not money,  exiled students said Dec 13.  The  ABSDF said Htun Wai
was struck by a hit-and-run driver on August 11 in Rangoon. The students
said Htun Wai was taken to a local hospital but was refused treatment as
there were no family members with him to guarantee medical bills, and
hospital staff did not recognise the former minister.  "In  Burma today,
health care is only available for known VIPs and those who can pay," the
students said. Since 1988, Burma's military government has steadily reduced
spending on health care and education, while increasing military spending
from about 25% of the budget to more than 50%.  Diplomats have said many
hospitals suffer from a lack of medicine.  (South China Morning Post)
  
   I had a chance to see a doctor working in the Myanmar Ministry of Health
after the Japanese grant aid to the Rangoon Nurses College was reported.
According to him, the welfare policy is under the administration of the
National Health Committee under the guidance of the SLORC.  The Ministry of
Health also functions under this Committee.  The Ministry has five
Departments and 8 Divisions, but the problem is that all the Divisions are
suffering from lack of medical equipment, testing equipment, and all kinds
of medication.  Also, the officials working in each Division are receiving
incredibly low salaries, the average monthly salary being only 3000 Kyat
(US$10).  Even in an LDC country, this amount is close to nothing.  This is
the reason why corruption is common in Burma.

   Medical treatment and welfare services are limited to Rangoon, Mandalay,
and the capitals of each state.  They all lack syringes and medicine.  I
think that aid from Japan can contribute to training nurses to study at the
masters and doctorate levels, but without the appropriate salary and
medical equipment, how can they serve their people?

    The Japanese government should study the overall welfare situation
including conditions of welfare workers in Burma.
    It is for this reason that I think the large grant for the Rangoon
Nurses College from Japan can only contribute to an isolated medical
facility which ordinary people in Burma cannot access.  What Aung San Suu
Kyi said is very realistic considering the welfare conditions in Burma.
  
B.  Agricultural aid in 1994
  
   Just before the release of Suu Kyi in March 1995, the Japanese
government agreed to a contract of 1 billion yen (US$ 8 million) for
agricultural aid which is outlined below.
i.  Equipment, fertilisers--Items were supplied by four corporations, C.
Itoh Co., Ltd., ; Sumitomo Corporation; Mitsui & Co., Ltd.; and Mitsubishi
Corporation.  
Fertilisers:  urea, phosphatic calcium, and potassium chloride.  
Agricultural equipment:  tractors, cultivators, pumps, and sprinklers, etc.
ii.  Distribution of the granted materials
Destinations:  Shan State, Kayah State, Kachin State, Sagaing Division,
Chin State, Rakhine State.
Distribution:  After items reached Yangon Port, the Foreign Ministry
transported them to the local agricultural divisions one by one.  Then
local officers distributed them to individual farmers.
iii.  Evaluation by Japanese and Myanmar authorities
Japan granted aid equivalent to 1 billion yen (US$8 million) for purchasing
fertilisers and agricultural equipment for Myanmar in fiscal year 1994
(official contract exchange was 22 March 1994).  The aim of this grant was 
1) to improve the quality of life for ethnic minority peoples on in the
border regions; and 
2) to contribute to alternative crops which would replace narcotics.
The project was evaluated as follows:
a) Food production effect (evaluated by Japanese embassy)
The Japanese Embassy in Myanmar researched this project from the end of
1996 to the beginning of 1997.  In the ethnic regions where materials had
been distributed, crop production such as rice, wheat, maize, and beans had
increased by 10-70%.  The development of ethnic communities is one of the
priorities of Myanmar.  This project was well appreciated by residents.
The Myanmar government has made a strong request for continued aid.
b)  Food Production effect (evaluated by Myanmar government)
 A comparison was made of the rainy season production of 1994 and 1996.
Production increased 7.7% (from 4.39 million tons to 4.73 million tons) in
the targeted areas of the 32 townships across 6 states.  In other areas,
production decreased 1.3% (from 10 million tons to 9.86 million tons).
c)  Eradication of narcotics (Report by Myanmar government)
In Mong Hlah (sp?) district, located in the southern part of the "Golden
Triangle" where fertilisers and agricultural equipment were distributed,
2,726 acres of poppy had been cultivated in 1994.  In this area, conversion
of poppy cultivation into alternatives was successful.  In April 1997, the
government invited dignitaries, including foreign diplomats, to celebrate
the "Opium free zone."
Kaw Khang (sp?)district of Shan State had the worst poppy cultivation area
in Myanmar.  But after this area was targeted by our project, the
cultivation area has decreased from 13.788 acres in 1994 to 10,341 acres in
1997 (25% decrease), and the amount of poppy production was reduced to 50
tons.

 
C.  New Food Production Aid in Fiscal Year 1998
  
1)  The plan was adopted at a cabinet meeting.  Contracts will be made in
the near future.
2)  Content of the grant:  Agricultural equipment (tractors and threshing
machines), and funds for purchase of fertiliser.
3)  Bids and execution date  
Bids will be made after contracts are exchanged.  
  
   I know many activists who are reporting the relationship between the
military junta and narcotics or money laundering in third countries.
Without substantive evidence, it is dangerous to accept these ideas.  The
government of Burma emphasizes its lack of funding to eradicate narcotics,
but also claims it will continue to fight narcotics even without help from
the international community.
   What we should do first of all is to watch very carefully all efforts by
the military government to eradicate narcotics.  Regarding the agricultural
aid from Japan basically the concept of the programme is superior.  But we
need to observe and evaluate more of the details of this project such as
what follows:
  
1)  Are tractors, cultivators, and sprinklers appropriate for local farmers
who have no access to substantial income?  The machines require gasoline
and electricity.   Are farmers able to purchase such energy resources
themselves, or are village level soldiers providing those resources for them?
2)  Are lower level officials able to distribute fertilisers with monthly
salaries of less than 3,000 Kyat?
3)  Are remote area officers distributing equipment without disturbance
from village level battalions operating under the "Four cut strategy?"
  
   I think both evaluation by our embassy and the government of Burma lacks
details of handling the materials and distribution system.
   The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs should clearly report the
points that I mentioned above.  Until they can report a thorough
evaluation, I recommend that MOFA should not grant further agricultural aid
which has already been planned for this fiscal year.
  
D.  Grassroots Grants
  
   In addition to the types of aid above, Japan also provides small amounts
of grassroots grants.  The amount of each project ranges from 2 million yen
(US$14,000) to 10 million yen (US$70,000).  These grassroots grants are
approved under the policy of humanitarian basic needs.
In 1997, grassroots grants were given for/to:
1. Manual pumps / Pegu YMCA (4 million yen)
2.  Agricultural training / OISCA International (7.2 million yen)
3.  Construction of a clinic / Chin Baptist Association (2.3 million yen)
4.  Rice mill / OISCA International (5.3 million yen)
5.  Construction of a bridge / Pakhan Gyi (sp?)Education Evolution Council
(2.3 million yen)
6.  Sonic Scanner for maternity ward / Myanmar Maternity Welfare
Association (9.6 million yen)
7.  Improvement of Education and Medicine / Border Development Association
(8.4 million yen)
8.  Water supply and income supplement / Border Development Association
(6.6 million yen)
9.  Medical equipment/Islam Charity Hospital (5.8 million yen)
10.  Expansion of clinic/Myanmar Nurses Association (4.3 million yen)
  
E.  Positive effects of Japanese aid.
  
   We have to observe both the positive and negative sides of Japanese ODA
policy.  Our MOFA officials have explained their policy as "the north  wind
and the sun."  It means only a relationship based on good-will can solve
the problem, not the use of a cold north wind.
   Refusing to grant visas to high ranking officials of the military junta
by the US and EU nations narrowed the ties between their counterparts. But
Japan still has good-will ties with the junta and can promote the
importance of democratisation to them face to face.
   Japanese policy is similar to that of the "bench mark policy" of
Australia.  Australia has recognized Suu Kyi's release as the first "mark
on the bench."   After her release, however, the junta has not shown any
progress towards democratisation.  It seems the bench is empty now.
   The approach by the Australian government is very reasonable and
rational but it is difficult for Asian dictators to accept, since it feels
as if they are marked by their teachers during democracy lessons.
   The Japanese attitude is more acceptable to dictators than western
approaches because it is not rational nor critical.  I think our Japanese
approach is akin to the approach used for high-jackers.  Japan always tries
to show their affirmation even if progress is far beyond that of
international requests.
   Results of this Japanese attitude lead the military junta to listen to
the voices of Japanese officials.  Every time they meet military officials
our representatives have asked repeatedly that they make certain progress
towards democracy.
   Recently, the Japanese government decided to grant grassroots assistance
for refugees in Thailand through BBC (Burma Border Consortium).  Since this
is a request by a Japanese NGO, People's Forum on Burma, it shows that the
Japanese government has started to take a wider approach towards Burma.
   Of course there are also Japanese investors who are supporting the
military's human rights abuses.  But the number of investors from the
United States and the EU is far more than those from Japan.
  
F.  Cooperation between Japan and other Nations 
  
    Prime Minister Obuchi appointed Masahiko Komura as Foreign Minister.
This indicates the will of the new cabinet to continue policies of the
former cabinet.  In spite of the existence of many military junta
supporters in the Liberal Democratic Party, the Cabinet has a policy to
support UN resolutions.
    This is a good chance to make an international framework for the
democratisation process in Burma.  I think Japan is a very useful nation
for our strategy and for fulfilling our goals.
     In this context, besides ASEAN meetings, we need to exchange policy
ideas at bilateral levels.  This can be done between Australia and Japan
which have similar attitudes towards Burma.  Both countries could help each
other to develop a common strategy for the international community.  
    Japan is very isolated from the view point of information.  Especially
in regard to the information on Burma, we are far behind Australia. 
    With other areas of common interest with human rights problems, such as
East Timor and Cambodia, both countries could build up a series of human
rights meetings which would help to disseminate information and ideas on
human rights in both nations.  Bilateral meetings could also help to build
strategies of each government.  Australia and Japan is just one example.  I
hope PD Burma members can find more effective ways, as my opinion is just
one idea.
  

II.  The Situation of Women in Burma
  
   I am deeply concerned that women and children are the targets of human
rights abuses in Burma.  I would like to emphasize the importance of
protecting these vulnerable people.
  
A.  Report by Mr. Lallah
  
 $B!!!! (BIn its resolution 1997/64, the UN Commission on Human Rights
extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Rajsooner Lallah, to
include a gender perspective when seeking and analysing information on Burma.
    His report was submitted to the 54th session of the Commission on Human
Rights.  A resolution based on his report was adopted unanimously on 21
April 1998.
    In his report, this paragraph describes the situation of women in rural
areas:
  
  1.  In recent years, increasing numbers of women, including young girls
and the elderly, have     been forced to work on infrastructure projects
and to act as porters in war zones. Such  uncompensated forced labour
continues despite Myanmar's ratification of ILO Convention No. 29
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour.  The Special Rapporteur has on
several occasions     reported on the use of forced labour for various
development and infrastructure projects.  In      these projects women are
not spared forced recruitment, even when they are pregnant or nursing
their infants.  Those who are too weak for the strenuous work have to hire
another person or face   a fine.  On the work site, the forced labourers do
not receive appropriate medical treatment.       Further, they are reported
to receive no renumeration and have to provide their own food.  While
away, the women cannot work on their farms, which results in food shortages
for the family.  On   the work site women, like men, risk exhaustion,
accidents and lack of medical treatment.  They    are also victims of many
other serious human rights violations, such as beatings, rape and murder.
  2.  The Special Rapporteur has on more than one occasion reported on
forced portering.  As      porters women are more vulnerable than men,
since they have been reported to have been used as   a) forced labour to
work as porters; b) human shields; and c) entertainment for soldiers, which
   often ends in rape. For instance, on 8 June 1997, SLORC troops from
Murngpan allegedly arrested 17 villagers (10 men and 7 women) at Ter Hung
village and forced them to carry       military supplies from Kaeng Twant
area to Murngpan.  When they reached Murngpan, the men   were released
while the women were detained.  During the night all the women were
reportedly   gang-raped before being released the next morning.
  3.  The Special Rapporteur is concerned that real access to the justice
system by the victims is    virtually non-existent.
  
B.  Gender based Strategy
  
   We have been hearing thousands of similar reports from refugees who have
fled to Thailand.  These mass abuses are caused by the basic mentality of
the Tatmadaw (Burmese National Army).  I seriously regret that this
mentality was generated by the Japanese Army and transplanted to the
Burmese Army.  During World War II, when a Japanese soldier punched a
Burmese trainee, another Burmese trainee was surprised and wrote, "This
would never happen in Burma.  Unbelievable."
Now, violence is common in the Tatmadaw and it is believed that the
violence itself is used as an instrument for disciplining soldiers.  And
this misunderstanding is extended to villagers, making them victims of
soldiers' violence.  It seems there is no justice for soldiers but only
violence from the colleagues and supervisors.
    In this context, we need the SPDC to work towards and achieve
international standards.  But they have ignored every resolution by UN
organizations and every appeal made by its peoples or foreign organization.
   But the Burmese military has one weak point.  They need to behave as
men.  All over the world, the concept of masculinity was believed to be the
essence of the army.  The world now realises that this is an old-fashioned
idea, but in Burma, it still remains.
    There is ample evidence of this.  One example is that there are no
women among ministers or high ranking officials in SPDC.
    Most of the former resolutions and appeals on Burma were based on
general human rights abuses.  They could not lead to results from the
generals.  I think the input of a gender perspective into our strategy is a
possibility to accelerate the democracy process, as other nations have
achieved their democracies with the participation of women.
   For this, I recommend the following:
1.  To study more the gender perspective in every aspect of human rights
abuses.
2.  Request that SPDC sign or ratify gender-related treaties.
3.  Encourage journalists to write articles related to women and children's
problems in Burma.
4.  Encourage international women's organizations to address problems in
Burma.
  
C.  HIV/AIDS in Burma
  
   In July 1996, the National AIDS Program of the Union of Myanmar
submitted papers to the 11th Conference on AIDS held in Vancouver.  The
report states:
  
1.  Drug use started to spread in 1988
2.  A survey conducted with UNDCP (United nations Drug Control Programme)
shows that they studied 2,277 IDU (Injecting drug users) cases in treatment
units and 937 users in 33 prisons.
3.  Both bodies also researched 36 high and low risk townships.  The number
of drug addicts ranged from 1.7% to 25% of township populations.  Addicts
ages ranged from 12 to 77 years old, and 88-99% were male.
  
   This report shows that HIV/AIDS is a great threat to Burma.  High risk
townships have as much as 1/4 of its population addicted to drugs.  This
means that there is more than one drug addict in each family.
   I received another report issued by the Myanmar government which reports
54.5 to 74.3 % of drug addicts are HIV positive.  All of HIV/AIDS patients
who are also addicted to drugs are infected by shared syringes.
   HIV/AIDS can also spread to women from men addicted to drugs.  $B!!
(BGirls and women trafficked to Thailand also often return to their home
towns with serious HIV/AIDS infections.
   Many infants have been born with HIV in Burma since 1988. 
   In spite of the efforts of doctors and workers of the Health Ministry,
generals are reluctant to implement preventative measures to alleviate this
terrible situation.
   Women in many households in Burma have to care for HIV/AIDS patients
without medical assistance.  
   Generals have the ability to build many skyscrapers in Rangoon and are
able to equip their armies with modern-day weapons.  But they have no
ability to get rid of these many social problems.  For other governments,
it is not a difficult task.  What they can do is to stop the sharing and
reuse of syringes and stop the trafficking in women.  In addition, they
should screen donated blood.
   The cost of these three measures would be equivalent to only one
skyscraper or one jet fighter.  There would not be any side effects for the
economic development of generals.
   An international strategy to save women in Burma is to hold generals
responsible.  "You are not knights nor gentlemen, and you are not saving
your women and children."
   I recommend PD Burma to specify gender issues, not only encourage the
democratisation and dialogue process.  Psychologically, generals are very
weak.  If all nations speak of  generals of Burma as not being knights
because they are sexually abusing their women and children, the generals
must change their mentality to prove that they are noble men.
    If generals implement even one measure to alleviate one problem such as
HIV/AIDS, it will automatically be one step towards
democratisation--because one woman will be saved.
       end


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