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4/6)FIDH'96:REPORT ON THAI-BURMA GA



FIDH REPORT ON THAI/BURMESE GAS PIPELINE (4/6)
RECEIVED date: Wed, 27 Nov 1996 18:36:28 +0100 (GMT)
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IV - HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PIPELINE

Contrary to the declarations of TOTAL's and UNOCAL's representatives,
human
rights violations have increased dramatically in the pipeline region
since
the launching of the project and the clearing of the pipe-laying zone.
Numerous enquiries by national and international human rights
organisations
establish a link between the deterioration of the human rights situation
in
the region and the activities connected to the Yadana gasfield. In 1994,
the HCR representative in Thailand, Mr. Von Arnim, indicated that "it is
likely that forced labour will be used on the pipeline" . In his 1995
report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma, Yozo Yokota, emphasised the
link between the human rights violations and foreign investments:
"Forced
labour, forced relocation, arbitrary killings, beatings, rapes and
confiscation of property by the SLORC are most commonly occurring in the
>border areas where the army is engaged in military operations or regional
development projects" . In March 1995, the US State Department Burma
Desk
Officer, John Lyle, recognised that "repeated unquestionable accurate
reports of human rights violations" are coming from the pipeline region
 .
It is therefore difficult to argue, as TOTAL does, that the allegations
of
human rights violations caused by the project come solely from various
opposition groups (students, ethnic rebel group, etc) who have a
political
interest in attacking TOTAL and the junta, and who use propaganda in
order
to "continue the fight against the SLORC by other means" . More
precisely,
outside the local sources of information, the representatives of several
human rights organisations, as well as journalists, have been able to
interview the refugees arriving into the camps in Thailand since the
beginning of operations linked to the Yadana project. These interviews
confirm that the violence and exactions against the civil population
have
reached unprecedented levels since the start of the operations and that
those exactions are most often the very reason why the people left their
villages .

At this point, it must be reiterated that, given the imposition of
martial
law in Burma, there is no legal recourse for the victims of the
violations;
and that independent observers are not allowed entry in Burma, or on the
construction sites.

The massive human rights violations linked to the TOTAL worksite, and
which
it has been possible to verify in the scope of this report, may be
classified into two categories:

>=85 According to the agreement, the SLORC has to guarantee the security of
the zones crossed by the pipeline, zones which are ethnically diverse
and
prey to the movements of rebellion. The security of the region therefore
results in a massive militarisation which means:
              - forced relocation of the population
              - forced labour (construction of military camps,
                access roads, etc...)
              - other human rights violations (violations of the
                right to life, tortures, etc...)
              - ethnic pacification (including offensives against
                the rebels, retaliation against civilians, etc...)

This security clause is the major cause for human rights
violations in the area.

=85 The pipeline project has itself necessitated a clearing of the
construction zone. If it is true that the construction of the
infrastructure (wharves, helipads, etc...) falls under the
responsibility
of TOTAL, a preliminary clearing of the construction zone was undertaken
by
SLORC troops, which also proceeded to construct military infrastructure,
all of which entailed, here too:
              - forced relocation of the population
              - forced labour
              - diverse forms of violence (tortures, rapes,extortion of
                funds...)

The violations are massive and systematic. The absolute impunity enjoyed
by
the exactors, noted by Y. Yokota , further worsens the climate of
systematic violence. The fact that the SLORC troops are the principal
party
implicated in these violations does not exonerate the officials of TOTAL
and UNOCAL. The pipeline construction is at the very least the occasion
of
massive human rights violations, perpetrated by the SLORC, known and
documented. These violations are due to the site's very existence.
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A. Militarisation

During the reign of the BSPP, the Burmese territory was divided into
three
categories, according to the degree of control exercised by the army.
This
classification was kept by the SLORC:
              - black zones, or free fire zones: zones under
control of the opposition
              - brown zones: zones which are neither under the
control of the SLORC nor of the opposition;
              - white zones: zones under the control of the
SLORC;

 The pipeline will run through zones of all three categories, and it has
become rapidly apparent to the partners of the project that its progress
could not be sustained at a satisfactory pace unless the region around
the
route of the pipeline was perfectly controlled by the SLORC, thus
becoming
a white zone. Were this condition not fulfilled, the pipeline was under
threat to suffer not only collateral damage due to fights between the
SLORC
and the armed groups, but also direct attacks - which have indeed taken
place. In entrusting the SLORC with the responsibility of guaranteeing
the
security of the project, the contract authorises, and thereby
legitimises
the consolidation of the military presence in the region. The army has
indeed progressively increased its presence in the region. In 1990,
there
were around 5 batallions in the pipeline region ; in May 1996, at least
12,
and perhaps as many as 15 batallions were deployed there. Four light
infantry battalions (LIB 273, 408, 409, 410), totaling close to 3,000
men,
are exclusively assigned to the protection of the pipeline. In all,
according to estimates, around 10,000 soldiers are in charge of pipeline
security. This number does not include the reconnaissance units, the
police
forces or special forces, which the SLORC has dispersed through the
region.

In December 1994, the SLORC launched a vast military action, Operation
Natmin, which had two principal objectives:
                        - guaranteeing the security of the pipeline
                        - eliminating the resistance
As Operation Natmin came to a close in July 1995, thousands of civilians
had been forcibly removed from their homes, and multiple armed
offensives
had been undertaken against the armed ethnic groups. Thousands of
persons
had also fled the Tenasserim region in direction of the Thai border.
Another military offensive was launched by the Tatmadaw in the region of
Nat Ein Taung, the pipeline junction point with Thailand, in February
1995.
On the occasion of this offensive, TOTAL lent a helicopter to colonel
Zaw
Tun (see supra., p.17).

Although the NMSP has signed a cease-fire accord with the Tatmadaw, the
KNU
still pursues its offensives against the Burmese army in the Tenasserim
region. Until now, the peace negotiations between the SLORC and the KNU
have failed. More insidiously, the SLORC provides military support to a
dissident faction of the KNU, the DKBA, which, as of a few months ago,
intensified its campaign against the Karen refugees at the Thai border,
along the Moei river, in order to force them to return to SLORC-held
zones.

The pipeline therefore directly serves:
                i) the perpetuation and the increase in the fighting
between the army and the armed rebel groups. The oft-repeated argument
by
TOTAL and UNOCAL claims a) that the confrontations had begun prior to
the
pipeline project, anyway, and b) that there would be no need for the
military presence if the rebel groups were not attacking the pipeline
construction. Mr. John Imle, president of UNOCAL, directly explained
that
"if you threaten the pipleine, there's gonna be more military (...). For
every threat to the pipeline there will be a reaction" . Mr. Valot of
TOTAL
specifies: "Let the Karen gentlemen begin!", if they do not want any
more
soldiers in the region . That is an insufficient explanation, insofar as
the pipeline runs through regions until recently controlled by the rebel
factions and which have always been populated by indigenous groups. The
indigenous people have never been consulted about the pipeline, and
TOTAL
and UNOCAL have always refused any contact with them. In the terms of
the
Australian Council for Overseas Aid, "the issue of indigenous rights is
clearly relevant in the gas pipeline allegations. Companies operating in
the vicinity of a large forced labour project like the Ye-Tavoy railway,
constructing a large project without the permission of the indigenous
ethnic communities, are leaving themselves open to serious problems and
criticism" .
                ii) the perpetuation and the incrase of the army's
violations against the population. This intensive militarisation of the
pipeline region carries a negative impact on the population of the
region,
as, besides the imbalance it creates, it gives rise to all sorts of
abuse
against the population, particularly through the forced relocation of
villages and the systematic use of forced labour for the construction of
military barracks and of projects connected with the pipeline (see
infra;,
p.28). John Imle, president of UNOCAL, has acknowledged that the
military
presence entails an increase in human rights violations, particularly
hrough forced labour: "If forced labour goes hand and glove with the
military, yes, there will be more forced labour" . A representative of
UNOCAL has also condemned the use of violence against civilians by the
troops charged with pipeline security - implicitly acknowledging the
existence of such violence .

As the directors of the involved corporations acknowledge not only that
the
construction requires an increase in the regional military presence, but
also that such an increase has direct implications on the human rights
violations committed by the Tatmadaw and on the fighting with the rebel
groups, it follows:
        - firstly, that the corporate heads acknowledge that the accrued
military presence has a clearly negative impact on the population;
        - and, secondly, that the construction has political
implications
to the extent that it intensifies and legitmises the combat against the
rebels. Once again, the statements by the directors of TOTAL - "we are
not
a political actor" , and of UNOCAL - "we are apolitical"  - are
indefensible.

        1. Attacks against the project

The project is also perceived to have a highly political dimension from
the
point of view of the opposing rebels: at least three attacks on the
pipeline have taken place.

FIDH wishes to state here that it unequivocally condemns the use of
military force, regardless of its origin.

March 1995

On March 8, 1995, three trucks left the TOTAL quarters at Kanbauk in the
direction of Ohnbinkwin. The first of these was a truck transporting
civilians, and was not a target. The two trucks behind it carried armed
soldiers of the SLORC, as well as civilians. A KNLA soldier fired a 62mm
rocket-launcher on the second truck, and a 79mm mortar on the third
truck,
then followed by arms fire from M16 and AK-47 assault rifles. Five
people
were killed and at least 11 others injured in this attack . Afterwards,
the
KNU declared that the attack on March 8, 1995, was not a planned
offensive,
but rather a standard military procedure, as the SLORC troops had
stepped
onto the KNU-controlled territory - the TOTAL trucks being considered
legitimate military targets and not a civilian convoy. In the attack's
aftermath, the troops of the LIB 408 are reported to have exacted some
100,000 kyats from the surrounding villages, claiming it as the
compensation for the losses suffered in the attack .

TOTAL has acknowledged the existence of this attack, but has nonetheless
remained silent about the event, after which it proceeded to hire the
security consultants.

December 1995

The second attack took place in Ohnbinkwin in the middle of December
1995.
Armed villagers tried to reach the TOTAL headquarters with a 107mm
rocket,
which missed the camp; the explosion was not confirmed. Following the
attack, the SLORC informed the leaders of villages around that there
would
be retaliation should ammunition be discovered in the village or its
vicinity: "Your village will be ash" , a threat which, considering the
common practices of the SLORC, is certainly not to be taken lightly.
 February 1996

On February 2, 1996, an unidentified armed group launched an attack
against
the TOTAL quarters at Ohnbinkwin. Three 107mm rockets were launched from
the Kyauk Than Ma Ni Pagoda Hill, between Kanbauk and Pyin Gyi. One of
the
shots hit the TOTAL helipad, but failed to explode; the second struck
the
quarters of the TOTAL employees and exploded; the third, which also
exploded, fell into the Lan Bar river. There were six persons injured
among
the employees, and unconfirmed reports also cite four deaths.

TOTAL has always denied that the last two of the attacks had ever taken
place. Mr. Joseph Daniel of TOTAL insists on the fact that he is
"absolutely sure that no attacks have taken place since March 8 [1995]"
 .
It should nonetheless be noted that in a July 19, 1996 letter to Mr.
Johannsen, the director of the Danish Burma Committee, Mr. Daniel does
not
dispute the existence itself of the attacks, but only denies that there
were any victims therefrom.

Another attack by an unindentified armed group against SLORC troops in
charge of securing the pipeline is reported to have occurred in early
November 1996, and to have caused several casualties among the soldiers.

        2. Reprisals

Three days after the February 1996 attack, the LIBs 273 and 403 entered
the
village of Shin Bin in the vicinity of Kyauk Than Ma Ni Pagoda Hill. The
soldiers seized Saw Kyi Lwin, the head of the village and, accusing him
of
collabouration with the KNLA, proceeded to interrogate and torture him.
He
was then executed by the SLORC troops. Following the death of Saw Kyi
Lwin,
the SLORC troops went towards Ein Da Ya Za, where they arrested 12 local
residents, took them to Migyaunglaung and killed four of them. Major Ko
of
LIB 403 is being held responsible for these executions. Six other men
were
killed in LIB 403's camp. The remaining two men were arrested and
imprisoned, with their current situation unknown.

It has been confirmed by independent sources that these 12 persons were
not
linked to KNLA, nor to the attack of February 7, which means this was a
retaliation arbitrarily targeting the civil population.
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