The BurmaNet News: June 10, 1998

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The BurmaNet News: June 10, 1998
Issue #1023

HEADLINES:
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ASIAWEEK: AUNG SAN 
REUTERS: MYANMAR ETHNIC LEADERS WANT PARLIAMENT CONVENED 
THE NATION: ASIAN RECESSION BRAKES FOREIGN STAKES IN BURMA  
THE BANGKOK POST: A WHIMPER IN RANGOON 
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Asiaweek: Aung San 
12 June, 1998 by Aung San Suu Kyi 

My father was a child of his times who grew into a man for all time. He
combined a traditional upbringing with a British colonial education.
Influenced by socialist ideas, he was a student revolutionary who plunged
into the anti-imperialist movement which galvanized Asia before World War
II. In all this he was no different from thousands of his contemporaries
who dreamt of wresting independence for their nations from the mighty
British Empire.

By the end of his life he had matured into an astute, thoughtful statesman
with a strong abhorrence of fascism and a deeply rooted belief in
democratic values. His vision encompassed an "internationalism of creative
mutuality" which would bring "abiding peace, universal freedom and
progress." He foresaw that time and space would be conquered and that we
would become a world of "immediate, not distant neighbors." He envisaged a
"new Asian order" to build Asian unity and co-operation, and win freedom,
security, peace and progress for the world.

Born in 1915 to a solidly respectable family in a small town in central
Burma, my father was a simple person with a simple aim: to fight for
independence. But that single-minded drive took him along a complex path.
Though he was an outstanding schoolboy, after joining Rangoon University he
began to neglect his studies for politics. He was a moody young man,
taciturn and garrulous by turns, indifferent to social niceties. His close
friends, however, spoke of his warmth; only his shyness made him appear
stern and aloof to those with whom he was not at ease.

After becoming President of the All Burma Students' Union, my father
graduated to the activism of the Dohbama Asiayone, an organization of young
men more aggressively nationalist than earlier generations of Burmese
politicians. However, its members, the thakins, worked closely with some
older counterparts in established parties. Through these contacts, my
father left Burma clandestinely in 1940 to seek help. The original plan had
been to approach the Chinese, but it was with the Japanese that my father
negotiated a military training program for 30 young Burmese men. This was
the birth of Burma's armed forces.

My father made it abundantly clear that the army was meant to serve the
people, that it should abide by principles of justice and honor, and that
unless it could win and keep the trust and respect of the people, its
purpose would be vitiated. He never intended the army to meddle in
government. A liberal and a democrat, he saw from the fascist Japanese army
the dangers of military absolutism. When he decided to work for freedom
after the war, the beloved, respected general transferred command to a
capable Sandhurst-trained Karen officer.

He then plunged into intense political activity culminating in his
appointment as deputy chairman of the Governor's Executive Council, the
colony's ruling body, in September 1946. Four months later, he signed the
Aung San-Attlee agreement with the British prime minister in London, paving
the way to full independence.

One of my father's best-known photographs shows him on Downing Street in a
military greatcoat (pictured) provided by Jawaharlal Nehru during a
stopover in Delhi. Appalled by his young friend's wardrobe, the elegant
Indian leader mobilized a team of military tailors. Thus, my father had
talks in London attired in warm flannel uniform suits, the smartest clothes
he ever had.

In February 1947, my father signed the Panglong accord with the leaders of
ethnic nationalities, who agreed to work with the Burmese for Independence.
In April, his party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, won a
landslide election victory, setting the scene for the writing of Burma's
Constitution. The nation felt a gentle euphoria: they had a leader they
loved and trusted, and Independence was just around the corner.

But for my father the struggle remained unremitting. He had to grapple with
the factionalism and envy in Burmese politics. On July 19, 1947, a jealous
rival had him and six of his cabinet members gunned down. He was 32. During
the last months of his life, he often spoke wistfully of the time he could
leave his grinding duties and live quietly with his family. All good things
were to come with Independence but it came six months too late for him.

My father's greatest strengths were the largeness of his spirit and an
immense capacity to learn from his experiences. He recognized his faults
and worked to remedy them. His life is a lesson in revolutionary politics,
the hardness and the heartbreak of it. At the same time, it is an
inspiration which proves the simple truth that a good leader who serves
honestly will be loved and cherished throughout the history of his nation.

Aung San Sun Kyi won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. Her National League for
Democracy won Burma's 1990 polls. 

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Reuters: Myanmar Ethnic Leaders Want Parliament Convened
9 June, 1998 

YANGON -- Four ethnic leaders in Myanmar, elected in the 1990 general
elections ignored by the ruling military, on Tuesday appealed to the
government to convene parliament based on the poll results.

They were the latest to support a similar call made by the main opposition
National League for Democracy (NLD) party led by Aung San Suu Kyi late last
month.

The elected ethnic parliamentarians making the call in an open letter were
Saw Mra Aung from Rakhine (Arakan) State, Khun Tun Oo from the Shan state,
Naing Tun Thein from the Mon state and Kyin Cin Htan from the Chin state.

The opposition, led by the NLD, swept the 1990 polls but the result was
never recognised by the military government, which also dissolved 83
political parties after the election.

Saw Mra Aung represents the now dissolved Arakan (Rakhine) League for
Democracy and Naing Tun Thein the now-dissolved Mon National League for
Democracy. Kyin Cin Htan was chairman of the dissolved Zomi National
Congress and Khun Tun Too is chairman of Shan Nationalities' League for
Democracy, which is still registered as a legal party.

``It was a noble performance directing towards democracy of the Tatmadaw
(the armed forces) to allow formation of political parties and to hold free
and fair general elections,'' their letter said.

``However, being still unable to implement the result of the elections
remains as a black mark in the history of Myanmar.''

``To erase that black mark, there is no other way but to implement the
result of the elections and to summon people's parliament.''
The letter said: ``With the existing political, economic, social and
national races affairs remaining unsolved, the Union of Myanmar at present
is facing various difficulties.''

``We are firmly convinced that the only way to overcome these difficulties
is to hold politically significant talks among the Tatmadaw group (present
government), democratic forces, including the National League for Democracy
and ethnic groups, comprising ethnic parties that won in the general
elections and ethnic armed groups,'' the letter added.

The major opposition NLD held a two-day special gathering to mark its
unrecognised 1990 polls victory on May 27-28 and also sought the convening
of parliament based on the poll results.

State-owned newspapers in Myanmar, usually considered as the mouthpiece of
the ruling State Peace and Development Council, hinted in a commentary on
June 7 that convening parliament would be impossible without a
systematically drafted constitution.

The SPDC and the opposition have been at political loggerheads ever since
the aborted election. The opposition charges the military with abusing
human rights and curbing its political activities, and has sought dialogue
with it.

But the SPDC has said that it will not hold talks with the opposition so
long as Suu Kyi represents the party in any dialogue. 

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The Nation: Asian Recession Brakes Foreign Stakes in Burma 
9 June, 1998  

The Asian financial and economic crisis has sharply slowed foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Burma with enterprises planned by Thai, Malaysian and
Singapore investors put on hold for one year, according to a senior Burmese
official.

Speaking at a seminar on new members of Asean in Vientiane, Thinn Maung,
director of Burma's Department of Foreign Investment, the Ministry of
National Planning and Economic Development, said the Asian crisis had first
seen investors from Thailand and Malaysia seeking a delay in their projects
and more recently Singaporean investors had done likewise.

Singapore is the largest Asean investor in Burma with 66 enterprises worth
a total of US$1.48 billion approved by Rangoon as of May 31. Thailand and
Malaysia, the second and third largest Asean investors, has got approval
for 42 enterprises and 25 enterprises worth $1.23 billion and $587 million
respectively as of the same date.

Thinn Maung said investors wanted to delay starting their enterprises by
one year. According to official statistics, the approved Asean investment
in Burma, totaled $3.69 billion (143 enterprises) as of the end of May,
accounting for slightly more than half of total FDIs in that country.

However, Dr Mohd Haflah Piei of the Malaysian Institute of Economic
Research, noted that it was difficult to differentiate between realised
FDIs and the FDI inflow based on approval by the authorising agencies in
new members of Asean, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam.

"There are strong reasons to believe that the realisation rates of FDIs in
these, countries are as low as 20-30 per cent," he said.

The bulk of FDIs in Burma, about 40 per cent, went to the hotel and tourism
industry, while oil and gas exploration accounted for 30 per cent and
manufacturing 10-15 per cent, according to Piei. 

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The Bangkok Post: A Whimper in Rangoon 
7 June, 1998 by David I. Steinberg 

The efforts of the authorities to limit news of the events in Indonesia may
indicate fears of overt discontent that feel they are required to suppress.

Finally, on May 22, in an inside story sandwiched between international
stories of no significance, the government of Burma finally noted in its
controlled press, and in only a paragraph or two, that there was a change
in the leadership of Indonesia. But it was an article that just mentioned
that Suharto had stepped down. There was nothing in it of the turmoil the
discontent, the student demonstrations, or the mayhem preceding it that
would have given the average reader the context of this important event. If
its past was ignored, its significance and future importance was also
unstated. It was a whimper of a story that purposefully omitted the bang of
the change or its impact on the future.

Members of the State Peace and Development Council, as the State Law and
Order Restoration Council was renamed, of course knew the full story, as
did many of the mid-level officials who also had access to CNN and BBC, and
on whose programmes the images of Jakarta in turmoil seemed ubiquitous.

The motivation of the omission of the Indonesia events was obvious.
Indonesia had been a model, and Suharto personally was the friend of
General Ne Win, Khin Nyunt and other who have called on him in the recent
past.

Even more importantly, Indonesia was the obvious model on which Burma had
hoped to build its future. The role of the military in the National
Assembly that is planned under a new constitution whose approval in a
heavily scripted-scenario seems interminable, the army's ubiquitous
position in administration at all levels, and its tight rein on the
economy, all are part of the Indonesian template.

Even the five-million-strong Burma Union Solidarity and Development
Association (USDA), under direct military guidance and patronage, is seen
as the Indonesian Golkar in its pre-party stage. General Khin Nyunt had
specifically stated in December 1993 in a press conference in Jakarta that
Burma admired Indonesia's "stability". It was just this stability that was
overthrown. The immediate impact on Burma may seem inconsequential, but the
future was important enough for the state to attempt to deny knowledge of
Indonesia's turmoil to the general population of Burma.

Although Burma has only peripherally been affected by the region's economic
crisis, Thai trade has diminished and foreign investments from the other
Asean nations have precipitously fallen. Burma has foreign exchange for
only a few weeks of imports, the unofficial exchange rate hovers around 300
kyat to the US dollar (against the official rate of about 6 kyat), and
although the government recognised an inflation rate of about 25 percent,
most observers believe it is double that figure.

Economic discontent is prevalent among those on fixed and grossly
inadequate government incomes, and political frustration is said to be
widespread. But are such problems sufficient to cause people to emulate the
students in Jakarta?
In the rise of "people power" in the Philippines in 1986, in South Korea in
1987, in Thailand, and now in Indonesia, the military may have been a part
of the problem, but it has also been a part of the solution. Significant
elements either joined in the change process, or they remained neutral. If
the events on those countries may be termed "people power", then the
militaries were "people's armies.

In Burma, the situation remains different. Although many observers discuss
tensions among elements of the Burmese military, there seems general
agreement that they know they must stick together for essential control of
power or find themselves in worse difficulties than those in other
countries. The population has memories of the bloodshed of 1988, in
comparison with which events in Indonesia of the past few weeks pale.

The Burmese economy may be in dire straits, but evidently there is
considerable economic ferment in cities such as Rangoon, even though the
population does not benefit from change in any equitable manner.

One of the major problems facing Indonesia was the status of Suharto's
family and their vast economic holdings that many regard as a product of
favouritism or corruption, as well as their alliance with some overseas
Chinese families of vast wealth. In Burma the situation is different.
Several ministers were dismissed last year for corruption, and although the
Chinese economic influence is profound (and is of concern to some in India
and Thailand), it is not focused on specific families.

The child en of the military elite in Burma may have special status, but
they are not as evident or as greedy as those in Indonesia. There may be
murmurings against the role of the Chinese in the country, and although
there were government- induced demonstrations against the Chinese in 1967
to take pressure off of the economically inept Burmese regime, a widespread
and directed campaign against the Chinese in Burma seems unlikely.

Most of the schools have been closed since the demonstrations of December
1996. There had been rumours that they would reopen soon, but the events in
Indonesia will probably cause them to rethink such plans if indeed they had
them. Volatile students even on their own campuses, whether college or high
school, are the last things the authorities want.

The Indonesian crisis is at least well- known in Rangoon and in other
places where international radio is heard. Government attempts to suppress
information, as other regimes have found, are always unsuccessful over the
longer term. But in the short run, the efforts of the authorities to
control knowledge may indicate fears of overt discontent that they feel
they are required to suppress.

Indeed, the lessons from Indonesian events for the Burmese authorities, as
the latter interpret them, may be that the Indonesians were too lenient.
They should have been tougher and nipped the demonstrations early on,
employing more, rather than less, force. If this is how the regime in Burma
responds, we may see less, rather than more, openings in Burma. That would
increase the Burmese tragedy.

*David I. Steinberg is director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University,
and representative of The Asia Foundation for Korea. The views presented
are his alone.

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