THE NATION: Is India following Burm

[suriya@xxxxxxxxxxxx]

Editorial & Opinion 

      Is India following Burma,
      or Vice Versa? 

      Indonesia and Burma have followed
      remarkably similar courses over the last
      three decades. Htun Aung Gyaw takes a
      look at the remarkable parallels. 

      THE recent demonstrations in Indonesia
      resemble those that took place in Burma in
      1988. Twenty-six years of economic
      mismanagement and hardship as well as
      political oppression drove the Burmese
      people to nationwide demonstrations that
      year. During those protests, the army killed
      more than 3,000 people, many in
      circumstances eerily similar to those
      occurring in Indonesia now. 

      Thirty-six years ago, General Ne Win
      staged a coup that overthrew the civilian
      government of Burma. He declared that the
      country was on the brink of chaos and that it
      was the army's duty to prevent it from falling
      into disorder. Ne Win adopted socialist
      economic policies, centralising the nation's
      economy, and led Burma into a downward
      spiral from being one of the most
      prosperous nations in Southeast Asia
      during the 1960s to one of the poorest in
      the world by the 1980s. 

      Because of these economic hardships and
      widespread political repression, the
      Burmese people, led by university students,
      have protested against the government in
      the years since Ne Win's rise to power. In
      1988, working people joined the students in
      demonstrations that spread all across the
      country. Ne Win resigned his office, but the
      Burmese army put down the unarmed
      demonstrators without mercy, taking the
      lives of more than 3,000 citizens. The
      military staged another coup, and formed a
      new ruling junta under the supervision of Ne
      Win himself. 

      Thirty-two years ago, the Indonesian
      communist party, the strongest opposition
      party in that country, was crushed by
      anti-communist riots that resulted in the
      deaths of thousands of communist party
      members and ethnic Chinese. Sukarno,
      who had been named ''president for life'',
      was forced to hand over political power to
      Gen Suharto in 1966. The rise of Suharto
      was welcomed by the West and by the
      United States because he had been able to
      quash the communist threat without outside
      assistance. 

      Suharto proceeded to create the Golkar
      party, which was authorised to select the
      candidate for president. Without fail for
      seven elections, the Golkar party chose
      Suharto as its nominee and enabled him to
      rule the country for 32 years until his
      resignation last month. Under his rule,
      Indonesia benefitted from two favourable
      economic developments. One was the
      discovery of off-shore oil fields, and the
      other was the hike in oil prices in the
      1970s. The Suharto regime has always
      showered its ruling elite and his own family
      with special business privileges. 

      Corruption and nepotism have flourished in
      this system of crony capitalism, as
      Suharto's own family is said to have
      accumulated almost US$40 billion by
      means of subsidies and monopolies. As a
      result, the gap between rich and poor
      widened terribly. The Indonesian people
      have become dissatisfied with the regime
      for its corruption and misuse of power. But
      the support from the Western powers and
      the surging economic growth in Asia
      enabled Suharto to stay in power until the
      Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia. 

      Major events that have occurred in both
      Burma and Indonesia during the past three
      decades have seemed to mirror each
      other. Thirty-two years ago, Suharto staged
      a coup de force; Ne Win took power four
      years earlier on March 2, 1962. Suharto
      took power from Sukarno on March 11,
      1966. Ne Win ousted his rivals in the army
      before the coup of 1962. Similarly, the
      deaths of seven Indonesian generals on
      Sept 30, 1965 -- blamed on communists --
      still remain shrouded in mystery. To this day
      no one has established who carried out
      those assassinations. Suharto was the sole
      general to survive this incident and rose to
      became dictator without competition. 

      Both dictators used the military to suppress
      pro-democracy protests and to exploit each
      country's natural resources. In both cases
      they have monopolised the economic,
      social and political institutions of their
      respective countries. This has resulted in
      widespread corruption, financial
      mismanagement and human rights abuses.
      Each dictator has brought great riches to
      their close family and friends. The upper
      classes in Indonesia and Burma did not
      emerge from fair and legitimate economic
      competition. 

      It is also important to note that the military
      institutions of both nations emerged as a
      result of strikingly similar historical
      circumstances. Both armies were formed
      under Japanese occupation, and were built
      up into tightly consolidated units after the
      coups of the 1960s. Unlike in the liberal
      governments of the world, in Burma and in
      Indonesia the military remains a constant
      presence in everyday civilian life. 

      There are, however, some obvious
      differences between the two armies. The
      Indonesian army is well-fed; Burma's is not.
      This can be attributed partly to the fact that
      Suharto's policies brought about economic
      growth that raised living standards
      nationwide, so his soldiers naturally
      benefitted. In Burma, it has only been the
      top military officers who have reaped such
      gains from the system, not by means of
      economic reform but through purely corrupt
      measures. Low ranking Burmese soldiers,
      on the other hand, resort to extortion and
      thievery to supplement their meager
      incomes. 

      They exploit in particular people in rural
      areas by simply taking their possessions or
      forcing them into slavery. This barbarism is
      a side-effect of Ne Win's failed economic
      policies. From the start he followed a
      closed-door, protectionist line, which has
      caused uncontrollable inflation and
      precipitated the rapid decline of Burma's
      economy into one of the poorest in the
      world. Thus, the economic plight of the
      country, which turned soldiers into thieves
      robbing an already poverty-stricken
      populace, was the major reason behind the
      widespread demonstrations that broke out
      all over Burma in 1988. The students had
      had enough of the disintegration of the
      economy as well as the repression of
      political freedom and elimination of basic
      human rights. The first series of
      demonstrations took place in March of
      1988 and grew into an uprising that peaked
      on Aug 8, 1988. 

      The second wave of discontent occurred
      shortly after the March demonstrations
      when the general population witnessed the
      brutality of the regime. Students were
      massacred in one peaceful demonstration
      after another, and these cold-blooded acts,
      in conjunction with 26 years of swelling
      anger among the populace, reached a
      breaking point on 8-8-88. 

      During the recent uprising, Suharto's
      military followed a pattern similar to that of
      Ne Win in 1988. In order to suppress the
      demonstrators, without making the regime
      appear to be any more brutal than it was
      already perceived to be, they used a series
      of covert tactics to provide justification for
      their savage measures. 

      The Burmese military often hired thugs to
      go out and loot or burn property in the
      vicinity of a demonstration, thus giving the
      soldiers an excuse to open fire on the
      crowds near the looting and brand all whom
      they shot as looters. There have been
      reports that only a handful of Indonesian
      students have been killed, but the reported
      deaths of hundreds of looters bring to mind
      a statement concerning the 1988
      demonstrations made by Burma's Foreign
      Minister Ohn Gyaw. 

      In those protests, 545 people were killed,
      according to the junta. Ohn Gyaw reported
      that 525 of them had been looters and that
      only 20 had been protesters. To the
      witnesses of the massacre this was far
      from the truth, both in the low numbers and
      in the true actions of the victims. Another
      tactic was to hire a few people to mingle
      among the protesters and commit acts of
      violence during a peaceful demonstration,
      giving the troops a reason to open fire. It is
      quite likely that the Indonesian junta also
      adopted this method. 

      Another common tactic employed by the
      two juntas to maintain their power without
      having to themselves commit violence has
      been to blame minority groups for the ills of
      their respective countries. Ethnic native
      Chinese have often been used as
      scapegoats in order to deflect the anger
      toward both governments. 

      In the past week, ethnic Chinese have
      found themselves in extreme peril, having to
      literally flee for their lives, because
      Suharto's son-in-law attacked Chinese
      businessmen for their lack of sympathy for
      the country's worsening economic
      problems. In Burma and Indonesia, ethnic
      Chinese own much of the wealth; in
      Indonesia's case, they own a staggering 75
      per cent of it while making up only 5 per
      cent of the population. It is clearly not
      difficult to exacerbate an already existing
      resentment on the part of the majority.
      During the 1967 rice shortages in Burma,
      the junta spread rumours that Chinese
      students were intent on taking over the
      country and that the shortages had been
      caused by Chinese merchants. 

      The results were shockingly brutal
      pogroms, in which people on the verge of
      starvation lynched many innocent Chinese
      students, with the Burmese regime
      escaping the desperate fury of the people. 

      On March 13, 1988, six students were shot
      dead at the Rangoon Institute of
      Technology while demonstrating inside
      their campus, an incident that sparked a
      series of demonstrations. Similarly, six
      students were shot dead at Trisakti
      University, which provoked the nationwide
      demonstrations in Indonesia. 

      In Burma, the March demonstration spread
      nationwide on Aug 8, 1988, known as ''four
      eights'' (8.8.88), and paralysed the
      government. In the heat of these massive
      demonstrations, various opposition forces
      came to the fore but, sadly, they failed to
      unite with each other. Former prime
      minister U Nu, once Ne Win's close aide,
      Brigadier Gen Aung Gyi, former Gen Tin
      Oo, Bo Yan Naing and Aung San Suu Kyi
      never reached an agreement over the
      formation of a coalition government. 

      The power vacuum was shortly filled by the
      military. The Burmese military established
      the State Law and Order Restoration
      Council, or Slorc, which has since become
      the SPDC in order to give the impression
      that a change of government has taken
      place. Ne Win declared he would step
      down, and did so officially; however he went
      on to play the role of a puppet master,
      controlling the military junta from behind the
      scenes. Ne Win's strategy was to fade
      quietly into the background while
      maintaining his grip on the military. 

      The events of the past few weeks, however,
      suggest that it will not be as easy for
      Suharto to pull a copycat act and turn
      himself into a puppet-master. The
      government of the new president,
      Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, has allowed
      the passage of laws liberalising Indonesia's
      elections. 

      Up to now only three political parties have
      been allowed to run in the elections, and
      any campaigning could only be carried out
      in the few weeks before the actual vote.
      Furthermore, in what are signs of an
      internal power struggle within the ruling
      party, the chief of the armed forces, Gen
      Wiranto has spoken out against Suharto's
      son-in-law, Lt Gen Prabowo Subianto,
      indicating that certain elements of the
      military are ready to turn on the Suharto
      clan. Pragbowo has been transferred to
      head up a military academy. 

      Other positive developments in Indonesia
      include resignations by relatives of Habibie
      and Wiranto in an attempt to make good on
      promises to put an end nepotism in public
      life. The new government has also released
      two prominent political prisoners, Sri
      Bintang Pamungkas, leader of the
      Indonesian Labour Welfare Union, and
      Muchtar Pakpahan, a member of the United
      Development Party, an opposition group
      with strong Muslim support. 

      The Justice Minister has gone as far as to
      consider for release all political prisoners,
      other than those connected to the
      communist party, and to re-evaluate the
      situation of East Timorese jailed for their
      political dissent. 

      Although it is not the time for the Indonesian
      people to take once more to the streets,
      they must remain vigilant and apply
      pressure on the government to make good
      on its promise for reforms. If they do not, the
      government might advantage of the people
      to buy time to cool down present tensions
      and leave the nation's hierarchical power
      structures largely intact. 

      The Habibie government must draft a new
      constitution that would bring about a
      working democracy and cut off the military
      from influencing the nation's political affairs.
      Wiranto has the chance to show his
      devotion to his country's best interests by
      creating a role for the army as the defender
      of the nation, apart from the realm of
      politics. 

      The Burmese regime has always looked to
      Indonesia for a model of economic
      prosperity coupled with political
      authoritarianism. The military government
      recognised that economic prosperity was
      the key to their holding power, just as
      Suharto and his circle did. But now, in
      Indonesia, Habibie has acknowledged the
      importance of a stable domestic political
      life in securing the foreign loans necessary
      to revive his country's shattered economy. 

      Indeed, Indonesia can continue to receive
      funds from the International Monetary Fund
      only after a reassessment by that
      organisation of the political and economic
      situation there. It seems that the technocrat
      Habibie has realised that the best
      economic interests of his nation lie with a
      stable and open political system. The
      regime in Burma, unfortunately, seems to
      be taking the opposite course. The military
      government has forced the closure of most
      non-military affiliated colleges and
      universities, effectively eliminating the
      chance for a strong middle class to emerge
      in Burma. Prospects for political stability
      have likewise been undercut by the
      continued policy of outlawing opposition
      parties and arresting their leaders. 

      Help from the IMF is not an option due to
      the Burmese government's flagrant human
      rights violations, so Burma's economy will
      continue its downward slide for the
      foreseeable future. 

      However, the recent events in Indonesia
      suggest a pattern of positive political
      developments in Southeast Asia. Just as
      Burma has followed a parallel course with
      Indonesia over the past three decades,
      Suharto's resignation was prompted by the
      will of the people, much like the ''people
      power'' movement that swept Ferdinand
      Marcos from office in the Philippines. 

      Ne Win was likewise forced to step down in
      1988, but the Burmese army decided to
      cast its lot with its leadership and not with
      the people, as the armies of the Philippines
      and now Indonesia have done. Just as Ne
      Win and Suharto have looked to each other
      for ideas for maintaining their authoritarian
      regimes, it is now time for the people of
      Burma to take heart from what the people
      of Indonesia have been able to accomplish.
      The military's continued hold on Burma is
      surely weakened by the collapse of
      Indonesia's authoritarian government. One
      hopes that Burma's generals are intelligent
      enough to realise that they too must come
      to the negotiating table with the opposition
      and let the people decide on the system of
      government that will serve them.