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KHRG #98-04 Part 1/7 (Camp attacks)
- Subject: KHRG #98-04 Part 1/7 (Camp attacks)
- From: khrg@xxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 05 Jun 1998 02:10:00
ATTACKS ON KAREN REFUGEE CAMPS: 1998
An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group
May 29, 1998 / KHRG #98-04
*** PART 1 OF 7; SEE OTHER POSTINGS FOR OTHER PARTS OF THIS REPORT ***
In March 1998, three Karen refugee camps in Thailand were attacked by
heavily armed forces
that crossed the border from Burma. Huay Kaloke camp was burned and almost
completely
destroyed, killing four refugees and wounding many more; 50 houses and a
monastery were
burned in Maw Ker camp, and 14 were wounded; and Beh Klaw camp was shelled,
though the
attackers were repelled. The attacks were carried out by the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army
(DKBA), backed by troops and support of the State Peace & Development
Council (SPDC)
military junta currently ruling Burma.
This report analyses the attacks and their results, and presents the
refugees' own descriptions of
their experiences during the attacks and their feelings afterwards. The
report consists of two
main parts: first, a summary of the attacks themselves and analysis of
related issues, supported
by quotes from refugees; and secondly, the full text of interviews with
witnesses to the attacks.
The names of those interviewed have been changed and some details omitted
where necessary to
protect them. False names are shown in quotes. The names used for the
refugee camps are
those used most commonly by the refugees, though the Thai authorities use
different names for
them. The camp referred to here as Huay Kaloke is also known as Wangka;
Beh Klaw is also
known as Mae La; and Noh Po is also known as Ban Nu Po.
Abbreviations
SPDC State Peace & Development Council, military junta ruling Burma
SLORC State Law & Order Restoration Council, former name of the SPDC until
Nov. 1997
KNU Karen National Union, main Karen opposition group
KNLA Karen National Liberation Army, army of the KNU
DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Karen group allied with SLORC/SPDC
KPA Karen Peace Army, SPDC 'proxy army' set up in Dooplaya in 1997
Kaw Thoo Lei The Karen homeland, also often used to mean KNU/KNLA/KNDO
people
Nga pway "Ringworm"; derogatory SLORC/SPDC name for Karen soldiers
Ko Per Baw "Yellow Headbands", common name for the DKBA
Kyat Burmese currency; US$1=6 Kyat at official rate, 300 Kyat at current
market rate
Baht Thai currency; US$1 = approximately 36 Baht at time of printing
Weapons Abbreviations
M16, AK47 Assault rifles commonly used by opposition forces, rarely by
SPDC
AR Smaller version of the M16, also commonly used by opposition
forces
G3, G4 Standard SPDC Army assault rifles, very rarely used by
opposition forces
M79 Shoulder-firing grenade launcher, looks like a sawed-off rifle
with a wide mouth
RPG Rocket-propelled grenade, shoulder-fired from a bazooka-sized
weapon
2 1/2-inch Small mortar shell, also sometimes described as 60mm, though
slightly
different
Table of Contents
Preface .................................... 1
Abbreviations .............................. 1
Weapons Abbreviations ...................... 1
Table of Contents .......................... 2
Background ............................ 3
1998 Attacks .......................... 4
Huay Kaloke ...................... 5
Beh Klaw ......................... 8
Maw Ker .......................... 9
Fears at Noh Po .................. 11
SPDC Involvement ...................... 11
Thai Policy and Response .............. 12
Current Status of the Camps ........... 14
Index of Interviews ................... 16
Interviews: Huay Kaloke ............... 18
Maw Ker ................... 36
Map ........................................ 49
Background
Karen refugee camps in Thailand were first formed in 1984, when the Burmese
Army changed its
approach in Karen areas from attack-and-withdraw to attack-and-hold.
Thousands of villagers
found that they could no longer return to their villages without facing
systematic human rights
abuses by Burmese troops, and if there was no place for them in Karen-held
territory then they
had to flee to Thailand. Refugee camps were formed but Thai authorities
insisted they remain
unofficial, not recognising the Karen as refugees and not allowing United
Nations agencies to be
involved in the camps. A consortium of foreign Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) was
formed to provide aid to the camps, but this aid was tightly restricted by
the Thai Government to
the bare minimum required for survival: rice, salt, fishpaste and basic
clothing. This 'unofficial'
approach in the camps allowed the refugees some freedom of movement in and
out of the camps,
so they could forage for food or find underpaid day labour to augment their
diet. It provided
them with no international protection, but the refugee camps were very
peaceful places, run by
the refugees themselves, and no protection appeared to be necessary.
However, everything
changed in 1995 after the formation of the DKBA.
The DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) was formed in December 1994 by
Buddhist
monk U Thuzana, who had travelled Karen areas and refugee camps telling
Karen people they
should no longer support the Karen National Union (KNU). He attracted
rank-and-file Karen
soldiers, most of whom are Buddhist, who were sick of being undersupplied
at the front line
while defending Manerplaw, where KNU leaders lived reasonably well, and who
were
disgruntled at the lack of opportunity for the Buddhist majority under the
strongly Christian KNU
leadership. He also attracted villagers who were tired of the deadlocked
political situation and
the constant Four Cuts retaliatory abuses they had to face from SLORC.
Though on the surface
the formation of the DKBA was presented (particularly by SLORC) as a
Buddhist-Christian split,
it was not; most Buddhists remained with the KNU, while some Christians
went to the DKBA
(and there are still Christians in the DKBA today).
SLORC supported and supplied the DKBA from its formation, and immediately
used the new
Army to help them capture Manerplaw and Kawmoora, promising that in return
for their help
SLORC would withdraw its troops from Karen State and give power to the
DKBA. Of course,
the promises were never kept. Since then, almost all of the former KNLA
soldiers have left, and
now most DKBA soldiers are villagers who joined at one point or another
because of the
inducements offered, such as cash salaries provided by SLORC and freedom
from SLORC
forced labour for their families. The DKBA probably still numbers around
1-2,000 troops, but it
no longer has any sense of political direction, the command structure is
weak or nonexistent in
most areas, and it has almost no support anymore from the civilian
population, who are more
disgruntled than ever with the KNU but now view the DKBA simply as an SPDC
militia. The
DKBA operates primarily as small local units attached to the local SPDC
battalion. They collect
money from villages and passenger cars on the roads, and they act as guides
for SPDC patrols,
helping to round up food, money and forced labourers for the SPDC soldiers
and pointing out
suspected KNU collaborators. In Pa'an District, the SLORC/SPDC has even
put them in charge
of supervising forced labour on construction of some roads.
Since its formation, the DKBA has viewed the refugee camps in Thailand as
bastions of KNU
support and has vowed to wipe them out and to force the refugees back into
Burma, where they
could then be used to support the DKBA. The SLORC encouraged this, because
they had always
wanted to wipe out the refugee camps in Thailand but couldn't risk ruining
their relations with
Thailand by flagrantly violating the border. The DKBA provided a good
front for whatever
cross-border operations the SLORC wished to carry out. Despite the fact
that the DKBA has
always received all of its material support from SLORC/SPDC, the regime
still claims it has no
control over DKBA operations.
The first cross-border attacks came in February 1995, just after Manerplaw
had fallen and
thousands of new refugees had fled across the border into Thailand. The
DKBA immediately
started attacking Thailand, kidnapping or killing refugees and burning
their houses in attempts to
frighten them into returning to Burma. Refugees were ambushed and gunned
down at Huay
Heng, refugee leaders were kidnapped at Mae Kong Kha and Ber Lu Ko, and
part of the new
Mae Ra Mo Kloh refugee camp was burned. As 1995 continued the DKBA began
targetting
long-established refugee camps. In late April, Baw Noh and Kamaw Lay Ko
camps were
completely destroyed and had to be consolidated into other existing camps.
As tension increased
and other camps were threatened, refugees were moved and camps such as Gray
Hta (Mae Salit)
and Kler Ko were closed before they could be attacked. However, only a
small minority of
refugees returned to Burma; for most refugees, the attacks only
strengthened their resolve not to
return to live under soldiers who conduct such atrocities.
>From 1995 to the present, there have been hundreds of incursions into
Thailand by DKBA and
SLORC/SPDC troops to conduct attacks. Most have been small-scale attacks
by local DKBA
units to loot Thai shops and villages, or to kidnap or kill KNU officials.
In the process, even
Thai villages have been attacked and many Thai civilians have been killed
in armed robberies by
cross-border attackers. The major attacks on refugee camps also continue
to occur every year,
usually between January and April. Some of these attacks have included
over a hundred DKBA
and SLORC troops, in some cases with clear evidence of SLORC support such
as mortar
barrages from SLORC Army positions across the border. In January 1997,
Huay Kaloke and
Huay Bone camps were attacked and almost completely destroyed, and
attackers also assaulted
but failed to destroy Beh Klaw camp. Huay Bone camp was subsequently
closed and the
refugees moved to Huay Kaloke and Beh Klaw, while Huay Kaloke was rebuilt
on the same site.
After each wave of major attacks, especially those in 1997, Thai Army
leaders have said it will
never be allowed to happen again. But every year it does. [For details on
past cross-border
attacks see the following reports: "SLORC's Northern Karen Offensive"
(KHRG #95-10,
29/3/95), "New Attacks on Karen Refugee Camps" (KHRG #95-16, 5/5/95),
"DKBA/SLORC
Cross-Border Attacks" (KHRG #96-31, 1/8/96), "Attacks on Karen Refugee
Camps" (KHRG
#97-05, 18/3/97), and "A Question of Security" (Images Asia & Borderline
Video, May 1998).]
1998 Attacks
Thus far in 1998, three major refugee camp attacks have occurred: on the
night of March 10-11
Huay Kaloke refugee camp was attacked and almost completely burned down,
Beh Klaw camp
was attacked for several days over the following week but not destroyed,
and on the night of 22-
23 March Maw Ker camp was attacked and 50 houses were burned down. All
three attacks had
civilian casualties. Subsequent to these attacks tensions in other camps
also increased and there
were fears of imminent attack, particularly in Noh Po camp.
Huay Kaloke
Huay Kaloke refugee camp is 3 kilometres from the Moei River, which forms
the border with
Burma. It is home to almost 9,000 Karen refugees. There is a paved road
from the Thai village
of Ban Wan Kaew, right on the border, to the main gate of the camp. This
road then goes
through the Thai village of Huay Kaloke, going around the camp to the
south, and continues
eastward to join with the main north-south highway 5 kilometres further
east. On 10 March 1998
just before midnight, a jeep and several motorbikes drove into the refugee
camp through the main
gate on the west side of the camp. Thai soldiers supposed to guard the
gate had left. The
vehicles drove through the camp with their headlights off, dropped off some
people and then left.
Witnesses state that the jeep was full of soldiers on the way in and almost
empty on the way out,
while each motorbike had 3 people on the way in but only one or two people
on the way out.
Then at 12:30 a.m. another group of attackers were dropped off from trucks
in a field on the
opposite side of the camp. This side of the camp faces east, so if the
trucks had come from
Burma they had driven along the paved road all the way around the outside
of the camp, then
across the fields to arrive on the camp's east side.
"The soldiers arrived on the other bank of the stream but they did not
start to shoot yet; they
were lining up and they were setting up their mortar. When I saw them, we
started to run and
then they saw us and they fired their guns. They fired guns first and then
shells of big
weapons started to land. Then the soldiers separated themselves in two
groups in front of my
house. There were more than ten soldiers in each group. They started to
burn the houses as
soon as they entered the camp. I told my family, 'Don't take anything, we
will run'. I ran with
my wife and my child. My wife could not put her slippers on, nor could my
mother-in-law. I
couldn't carry anything, not even my blankets. ? My mother was also
wounded. She was
wounded in the back by a shell. I think it was a shell from a mortar, a 2
1/2 inch shell. They
fired the mortar from near the mango tree. Now she is in the hospital but
she can talk..." -
"Saw Lah Po" (M, 25) from Section 1 of Huay Kaloke camp, who saw the main
attack force enter
the camp (Interview #H2)
This main group of attackers entered Section 1 of the camp from the east,
firing M79 grenades
and rocket-propelled grenades ahead of them, firing assault rifles, and
then setting fire to each
house as they passed. Most refugees estimate that there were about 50
attackers, but they divided
into at least two groups and it is hard to be exact. They marauded through
the entire camp,
burning 84% (about 1,300) of the houses and shooting up the entire camp
before leaving. The
houses are all built of bamboo with leaf or thatch roofing, and burn very
quickly giving off
extreme heat. Upon hearing the shots and explosions, most refugees
attempted to flee. There are
no bunkers in the camp, so most people tried to flee to the surrounding
farmfields. In 1997 the
attackers had come from the west side, so many refugees tried to flee
eastward (away from the
border), only to find that the main attack was coming from that direction,
so people panicked and
fled in all directions, trying to carry their children. Most had no time
to save any of their
belongings.
"We heard explosions from section one and section four, we were afraid and
we ran. They
fired big weapons and guns. ? When we ran into the field a shell landed in
front of us and we
ran quickly. We shouted, 'Run, run!' Some were shouting, some were
running, some were
crying, some were running but they had no sarong." - "Naw Eh" (F, 38), Huay
Kaloke camp
(Interview #H3)
"I heard the explosions and I ran to the toilets [the school toilets, which
are made of
concrete]. They saw me and they fired their guns near the toilets. ? I
stayed in the toilets
until the fire went out. I didn't see them because I dared not get out. I
dared not lift my head
up to look outside. They shot nonstop. The shell of a big weapon landed
near me so I dared
not lift up my head. But I heard them going and swearing in Burmese when
they came and
shot up the school's library." - "Pu K'Mwee Htoo" (M, 58), Huay Kaloke camp
(Interview
#H11)
"?my brother was in our house trying to gather our clothing, food and
blankets. He was
hurrying to follow us, but luckily while he was grabbing the bottle of my
children's milk
powder in his frightened hands, he dropped the bottle. Just as he bent to
pick up the bottle a 2
1/2-inch shell exploded behind my house. That shell wounded 6 people
behind my house." -
"Naw Eh Moo" (F, 24), Huay Kaloke camp (Interview #H1)
While fleeing, some people were fired on by the attackers and some came
face to face with them.
The attackers spoke Karen and the general consensus appears to be that most
or all of the
attackers in the camp were Karen from the DKBA, though there is some
confusion about what
they were wearing. Most witnesses say that most of them were wearing
camouflage uniforms
while others were in plain olive uniforms, and they were wearing a mixture
of Burmese Army
hats and military-style baseball caps. Witnesses consistently state that
the attackers were clearly
drugged or drunk; they were hyperaggressive, their eyes were glazed and
they were unaware of
exactly what they were doing. When they encountered refugees they stole
personal bags, watches
and jewellery, and usually asked "Are you Buddhist or Christian?" Most
refugees answered
"Buddhist" regardless of their religion; the attackers often then said they
would kill all the
Christians, or asked the Buddhists why they haven't yet returned to Burma.
Some attackers told
refugees they would return 3 days later to kill all refugees who still
remained in the camp.
"They told us, 'Don't run, we will shoot you and kill you all'. They
asked, 'Have you seen any
Kaw Thoo Lei [KNLA soldiers]?' One man said, 'There is no Kaw Thoo Lei'.
They touched
me with their guns. They were M1 [carbine] and M16. I dared not move. ?
They grabbed
two bags and some watches from the people. ? Then they asked, 'Are you
Buddhist or
Christian?' We said, 'We are Buddhists', and they said, 'If you are
Christian, we will kill all
of you. Tomorrow you must go back to Myaing Gyi Ngu [DKBA headquarters in
Pa'an
District]. If you don't go back, in three days we will come back again.'
Then they went away
and they started to fire their guns in the direction of the camp." - "Saw
Po Gyi" (M, 38), Huay
Kaloke camp (Interview #H7)
"They looked like drunkards. They had taken the medicine. They looked
like fools. When
they take the medicine they don't know anything and we are afraid that they
will kill us. We
dare not go near them. We are afraid of the DKBA and of the Burmese. The
Burmese are
friendly to the DKBA, but what they will do one day to the DKBA we don't
know." - "Naw Eh"
(F, 38), Huay Kaloke camp; DKBA attackers are usually on 'myin say', an
amphetamine-type
drug common in Burma and Thailand which makes people aggressive and stupid
(Interview #H3)
At the beginning of the attack one group of attackers surrounded camp
leader Naw Mary On's
house and stormed the house, grabbing a teenage girl and asking for the
camp leader. However,
just a few minutes earlier a young boy had shouted to Naw Mary that the
camp was under attack
and she had managed to flee out the back of her house. It is possible that
the small attack group
which had entered the camp first through the front gate had been assigned
to capture or kill her.
36 refugees were wounded by bullets, shell fragments and burns (see list
given by "Naw Eh
Moo" in Interview #H1). A 36-year-old woman named Ma Pein (a.k.a. Daw
Pein) was shot and
then burned to death beside her house; she had 2 children and was pregnant
with her third. A 7-
year-old boy named Pa Lah Ghay was hit in the head by shrapnel and died on
the way to hospital.
His elder brother was also wounded and is still in hospital. One entire
family tried to hide from
the shooting in a concrete well behind their house, but the intense heat
from the burning houses
turned the well into an oven and they were all very severely burned by the
time they got out.
Their 15-year-old daughter Naw Thweh Ghay Say Paw died of her burns 3 days
later. Several
weeks later, her 17-year-old sister Naw Sheh Wah Paw also died in hospital
of her burns.
"The first shell hurt a teacher and a boy. Then they shelled nonstop with
M79 and 2 1/2 inch.
So many children were hurt by the shells. Girls and boys were wounded.
They had bad
injuries. A pregnant woman was shot and then burned to death in Section 2
behind camp
leader Mary On's house. Her daughter was hurt as well, by a shell fragment
in her hip. Her
daughter is only 9 years old. There were 4 members of a family who were
terribly burned, and
the youngest daughter died 3 days later. ? Another sleeping family was
also injured [by shell
fragments] - the mother was hit in her left breast. Her 9 year old
daughter was hit in the left
side of her head. Her 7 year old son was hit in his right shoulder and his
left hand." - "Naw
Eh Moo" (F, 24), Karen human rights monitor living in Huay Kaloke camp
(Interview #H1)
There was no resistance by Thai forces, who abandoned their checkpoints and
withdrew from the
camp well before the attack, just as they have done before almost every
refugee camp attack
since 1995. In fact, in this attack many refugees believe they recognised
the vehicles which
brought the attackers as Thai Army vehicles. The refugees fled to the camp
monastery, which
wasn't burned, and the fields surrounding the camp. Between 2 and 3 a.m.
the Thai soldiers
reappeared and wandered through the field, telling the refugees to sit
still and beating six people
who could not understand Thai, including one 70-year-old woman whom a Thai
soldier kicked in
the back with his Army boots. Later the Thai soldiers ordered all the
refugees to go back and
stay in the ashes of the camp.
"I wanted to save my things, but the Thai soldiers wanted us to sit down in
the fields. ? I
decided to go back and went to ask whether we could go or not, but I didn't
get to ask anything
because one Thai soldier kicked me, while one of his friends sat and looked
at me. ? When
the Thai soldier kicked me the first time I passed urine, and then when I
turned around he
beat me with his gun. That happened at 3 a.m. He told me to go back and
sit with my friends.
Some of my friends were kicked as well. ? The left side of my back swelled
up. It was very
painful on both sides when I coughed. ? There are no visible wounds but I'm
still on
medicine and it is still painful inside my body. ? First they only beat me,
and then they beat
some other people. They beat Maung N--- and A?'s mother. They also beat
some women." -
"Saw Klaw Wah" (M, 47), Huay Kaloke camp (Interview #H14)
Three days after the attack Thai soldiers went around the fields and the
Thai village, again
ordering all the refugees to go back and stay in the ashes of the camp,
telling them that if they
didn't obey then the Thai Army would burn the makeshift shelters they'd put
up and push them
back to Burma at gunpoint. The refugees were afraid to do so, because
during the attack DKBA
soldiers had told refugees that they would come back after 3 days and kill
anyone who remained
in the camp. That night a jeep once again entered and toured the camp,
leading some refugees to
believe that the Thai Army was bringing the SPDC or DKBA to inspect the
results of their work.
Now most refugees have been living in tiny straw shelters on the ashes of
the camp, sleeping on
the ground for over 2 months already. The site is baking hot in the
daytime, and the monsoon
rains are already beginning. A large proportion of them still carry their
most important
belongings out of the camp every night to sleep in the fields or the
adjacent Thai village.
"At night time we sleep here but we are afraid. The Thai soldiers don't
stay anywhere near
where we are staying. We have to look out for ourselves, and if we see
anything strange we
have to get ready to run. We dare not stay here." - "Saw Lah Po" (M, 25),
Huay Kaloke camp
(Interview #H2)
Beh Klaw
Beh Klaw (Mae La) refugee camp is fifty kilometres north of Huay Kaloke.
Up to 1995 it
housed about 5,000 Karen refugees, but when other camps were destroyed or
closed many of
them were ordered to move to Beh Klaw by Thai authorities. The latest
population moved to
Beh Klaw consisted of most of the 10,000 refugees at Sho Kloh, which was
closed in February
1998 as part of the Thai plan to consolidate camps. By March 1998 Beh Klaw
had a population
of over 30,000 refugees, making it the largest refugee camp on the
Burma/Thai border. In
January 1997 the DKBA tried to attack Beh Klaw but were driven back by
Karen camp security
and Thai forces. This year, fears of an attack began when a small group of
DKBA troops crossed
the border on 15 February and tried to fire M79 grenades into the camp.
The grenades fell short
and the soldiers went back, but from then on refugees in the camp were
extremely tense. In early
March there were reports that they may be about to be attacked, and many
people started leaving
the camp every night to sleep in the forested hills to the east, on the
other side of the main north-
south highway. On 10 March there were reports that an SPDC or DKBA force
had crossed into
Thailand, were looking for ways to attack Beh Klaw and were laying
landmines on Thai soil.
This force entrenched itself in Thailand until 16 March. Most refugees in
the camp began
digging bunkers.
On the nights of March 11, 12, and 13, Thai soldiers based outside the camp
and further south at
the Maw Pa Thu turnoff fired some flares and mortar shells toward Burma,
though witnesses
claim the mortar shells were either blank or not aimed at Burmese or DKBA
positions. On 14
March, the DKBA based at Maw Pa Thu fired 3 mortar shells at the Thai post
at the Maw Pa Thu
turnoff. Only 2 of the shells exploded. They also fired shells at the
Thai village of Nya Mu
Kloh, setting fire to some houses. The DKBA captured a cliff in Burma from
the KNLA, putting
the camp and the Thai positions in easy shelling range. On the morning of
15 March, these
troops fired 8 mortar shells into an area southwest of Beh Klaw, hoping to
drive out the Karen
camp security force which was blocking the SPDC/DKBA force in Thailand from
reaching the
camp. At about noon, they fired seven 105 mm artillery shells at the camp
itself. Three shells
landed inside the camp, wounding Pa Kyot Klot, a middle-aged man.
By this time many more Thai troops had been moved into the area, and they
began firing shells at
the SPDC/DKBA position across the border. The Thai Army claimed to have
killed many
DKBA, but this is unlikely. Another Burmese force crossed into Thailand,
kidnapped 5 Thai
citizens from Nya Mu Kloh village and mined the area around the village.
The villagers were
later released, but 3 Thai soldiers were wounded when their vehicle hit a
mine along the road
near the village. More Thai troops were sent in, and armoured personnel
carriers were patrolling
the roads. At the same time, fighting was continuing on the Burma side of
the border between
KNLA and SPDC/DKBA forces. By 16 March, small groups of SPDC and DKBA
troops were
still in Thailand trying to find ways to attack the camp, but they failed
and eventually went back
across the border. [Information for this section of the report provided by
Borderline
Video/Karen Community Information Service.]
- [END OF PART 1; SEE SUBSEQUENT POSTINGS FOR PARTS 2 THROUGH 7] -