Special Posting: KHRG Report

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Human Rights in Rural Burma

Karen Human Rights Group April 30, 1998


[These briefing notes were presented at the Burma conference and related
meetings in Canada in late April and early May 1998.]

In November 1997 the State Law & Order Restoration Council (SLORC) military
junta ruling Burma changed its name to the State Peace & Development
Council (SPDC).  However, there was no change in the four key leaders of
the junta, and judging by the testimonies of villagers throughout Burma and
the continuation of all of the regime's military operations, there has been
no change in policy; in fact, the forced relocations and related abuses
occurring in many rural parts of the country have only intensified, making
it appear that the SPDC regime is even more ruthless and repressive than
the SLORC ever was.  Like many dictatorships, the SLORC/SPDC is an
extremely paranoid regime, believing that it must control every inch of
territory and the daily lives of every citizen of Burma; that if it relaxes
its repression for one moment, the people will rise and destroy it.  This
mentality explains the junta's refusal to negotiate or compromise with its
opponents, even in situations where there would be nothing to lose by doing
so.  SPDC leaders regularly state that "only the Army can hold the country
together", and they feel that to do this the Army must control absolutely
everything which happens in the country.

In order to gain this control, the military continues to expand at a rate
far beyond the means of the junta or the country.  In many regions,
particularly the central and urban areas, the military has already
established near-complete control, but in remoter areas, such as the non-
Burman ethnic areas towards all the borders, it has only partial or no
control, and in some of these regions there is still armed resistance.  The
policy of the SPDC, and before it the SLORC, in the case of any form of
armed resistance is to "drain the ocean so the fish cannot swim"; in other
words, undermine the opposition by attacking the civilian population until
they can no longer support any opposition.  This is the fundamental idea of
the Four Cuts policy (cutting supplies of food, funds, recruits and
intelligence to the resistance) which General Ne Win initiated in the
1970's.  The current SPDC plan for consolidating control over areas where
there is resistance appears to consist of the following steps:
1) mount a military offensive against the area;
2) forcibly relocate all villages to sites under direct Army control and
destroy those villages;
3) use the relocated villagers and others as forced labour, portering and
building military access roads into their home areas; 
4) move more Army units in and use the villagers as forced labour to build
bases along the access roads;
5) allow the villagers back to their villages, where they are now under
complete military control and can be used as a rotating source of extortion
money and forced labour, further consolidating control through
"development" projects, forced labour farming for the Army, etc.  If
resistance attacks still persist at this last stage, retaliation is carried
out against villages by executing village elders, burning houses and other
means.

Throughout Burma we can see examples where this process is at various
stages; in eastern Tenasserim Division the SPDC is still on a military
offensive, while in parts of Chin State they are conducting initial forced
relocations, and in central Shan State they are combining the two.  In
parts of central Karen State which they have now occupied for 1-3 years,
they are constructing access roads and new Army bases with forced labour.
In areas which the junta has controlled for longer periods and those where
there has never been active resistance, the process is well into its last
stage of systematic forced labour and economic exploitation of the local
population.

Many villages now being burned by SPDC troops were first burned in 1975
when the Four Cuts were first implemented, and some villagers speak of
having been on the run from Burmese troops since 1975; but even these
villagers say that in the past 2 to 3 years things have grown much worse.
The direct attacks on the civilian population, characterised by mass forced
relocations, destruction of villages and the village economy, and
completely unsustainable levels of forced labour, have now become the
central pillar of SPDC policy in non-Burman rural areas of Burma.  In the
past, the regime would strategically destroy 2 or 3 villages at a time when
there was resistance.  Now when they perceive a possibility of armed
resistance, they delineate the entire geographic region and forcibly
relocate and destroy every village there is, as many as hundreds of
villages at a time.  In many cases, these villages have had little or no
contact with resistance forces and do not even understand why they are
being targetted.

The worst example of this is central Shan State, where SLORC and SPDC have
destroyed over 1,400 villages since 1996, making over 300,000 people
homeless.  The campaign began by relocating and destroying about 400
villages in an attempt to undermine the Shan United Revolutionary Army
(SURA).  Villagers were given 3 to 7 days to move to Army- controlled
sites, after which many of their homes were burned and anyone seen in their
villages was shot on sight.

When this operation failed to have any effect on the SURA, SLORC/SPDC
expanded the relocation area and also forced many of those already
relocated to move again, to even more crowded and tightly controlled sites.
 By early 1998 this forced relocation campaign had expanded to cover all
the villages in an area of 7,000 square miles, totalling over 1,400
villages, and the area is still being expanded despite the fact that many
of these villages have never had any contact whatsoever with Shan
opposition groups.

The SURA has now joined with other groups to form the Shan State Army (SSA)
and is seeking negotiations with the SPDC, but the junta has refused
negotiations and vows to crush them.  The villagers are starving in the
relocation sites, where the SPDC gives them nothing and uses them as forced
labour building Army camps and an air base and maintaining and guarding
roads into the area.  Many villagers can be seen begging for food along
these roads, while many others have been shot on sight or massacred by
SLORC/SPDC troops because they try to return to their villages to find
food.  An estimated 80,000-100,000 refugees from the region have already
fled to Thailand and more continue to do so, but there are no Shan refugee
camps in Thailand so they have no option but to enter the illegal
workforce, ending up as cheap labour on plantations, construction sites, in
sweatshops and as bonded labour in Thai brothels.  The SPDC freely allows
the ethnic Shans to flee into Thailand, and has now begun a practice of
stripping them of their Burmese identity papers as they leave, probably in
order to ensure that they can never return.

In Karenni (Kayah State), over 200 villages have been forcibly relocated
and destroyed since 1996, after the SLORC broke a ceasefire agreement to
attack the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).  Almost every hill
village in the entire state has been destroyed.  First the Army issued
orders that all villagers move to military-controlled camps within 7 days
or be "considered as enemy".  Patrols then went from village to village,
burning and destroying everything and capturing or killing any villagers
found. Some villagers are still struggling to survive in hiding in the
forests, but most have fled to the towns or gone to the relocation sites,
where they live in starvation conditions and are used by SPDC troops as
forced labour maintaining Army camps and as servants for soldiers.  Since
the beginning of 1998, SPDC troops have swept and destroyed villages in the
south of the State where the relocation orders had not previously been
strongly enforced, and have now begun expanding the relocations to include
villages in northern Karenni along the Shan border, which had previously
not been relocated because they are in an area partly controlled by the
Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), a group which has
a ceasefire deal with the SPDC.

In northern Karen State, SLORC and SPDC have destroyed at least 200 Karen
villages since March 1997 as part of their campaign to consolidate control
over this rugged region adjacent to the Thai border.  Villages close to
Army garrisons in Papun, Nyaunglebin and Toungoo districts were ordered to
move to Army sites by mid-1997, and some were used to build military access
roads while others were taken as porters by troops setting out to destroy
all villages in the region.However, most of the villages are small and
remote in the forested hills and troops can never catch villagers there, so
Army columns have never even given them relocation orders; the columns
simply approach each village, shell it with mortars, then enter and burn
down every house.

As stated in a typed and signed SLORC order issued to 64 villages in 1997,
"The abovementioned villages must move and consolidate. ? Small villages,
even those not included in the above list, must move and consolidate to
nearby consolidation villages before May 6th.  Villages which fail to move
will be destroyed."

Food supplies are systematically hunted out and burned and villagers are
shot on sight. Most villagers have fled into the forest where they hide in
groups of 2 or 3 families, trying to stay near their ancestral fields so
they can grow some food.  However, SPDC patrols sweep the area at least
once a month to hunt out and destroy their shelters, destroy any crops or
food supplies, and shoot villagers and livestock on sight.  An estimated
30,000 villagers are still living in hiding in the forest, and the area of
village destruction continues to expand.  About 2,000 people have escaped
to refugee camps in Thailand, but this is difficult and dangerous because
of landmines and SPDC patrols.  In March, Thai authorities moved these
refugee camps further south and barred non-governmental organisations from
this part of the border, so it is likely that any new arrivals will be
forced back across the border at gunpoint by Thai troops.

Similar forced relocations and village destruction campaigns have been
occurring in other parts of the country as well, such as southern
Tenasserim Division, where at least 100 villages have been relocated and
destroyed and are now being used as forced labour building a road network
and Army camps throughout their home area, and Chin State, where some
strategic forced relocations are now occurring.  In Pa'an and Dooplaya
districts of central Karen State, the SPDC is in the next stage of
consolidating its control and is currently using villagers as forced labour
building road networks and new Army camps, while continuing to conduct
localised forced relocation and destruction of villages wherever villagers
are to be more tightly controlled or punished for opposition activity in
their area.

Another tool now being used by the SPDC to consolidate its control over
ethnic rural populations is the creation and support of "proxy armies" in
order to divide the ethnic-based resistance.  In Karenni State, the Karenni
National Democratic Army was created in 1996 at the instigation of SLORC
and used to attack Karenni refugee camps in Thailand.  In 1994 the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) formed of its own in Karen State but
was promptly made dependent on SLORC for material support, and since that
time it has primarily been used as a form of SLORC/SPDC militia and to
attack Karen refugee camps in Thailand.

The most recent such attacks occurred in March 1998, when Huay Kaloke (Wan
Kha) refugee camp was burned, leaving four refugees dead and 9,000
homeless, and Maw Ker and Beh Klaw (Mae La) camps were also attacked.  In
late 1997 in central Karen State, the SLORC helped to form the Karen Peace
Army (KPA) under the command of a Karen Army officer who was known for
corruption.  The SPDC has now given this new proxy army control over a
large territory in central Karen State, ejecting the DKBA from the area in
the process.  The KPA still has only 200 or 300 soldiers, but they are
actively recruiting by promising that the families of all recruits will be
exempt from forced labour for the SPDC.  It appears likely that the SPDC
may pit the KPA against the DKBA in the future, and if the KNU (Karen
National Union) continues to fight both groups, then the SPDC will likely
take a step back, simply supplying and encouraging the war in Karen State
until all of the resistance movements are so weak that they can be crushed
and controlled one by one.

In areas where there is full SPDC control and no resistance, the villagers
become completely at the disposal of the Army.  They must continually do
rotating shifts of forced labour as servants at each of the Army camps near
their village, and new Army camps are always being established.  They must
also go for up to two weeks per month of forced labour on infrastructure
projects, such as roads, railways and hydro dams, which the Army implements
to consolidate control and attract foreign investment. Villagers must also
pay the cost of these projects; the SPDC-controlled media often describes
"self-reliance basis" projects, meaning those which are constructed
entirely with the forced labour and money of villagers; the money forced
out of villagers for these infrastructure projects is listed as "people's
contributions" and usually amounts to one-third to half of the total budget. 

However, in reality any money provided by Rangoon is simply pocketed by
local and higher-level authorities, while villagers are forced to pay
anywhere from 100% to 300% of the actual cost of the project to these same
authorities.  In addition, many Army camps confiscate their farmland
without compensation and then force them to do labour growing rations and
cash crops for the Army or for export.  They must also do forced labour
gathering building materials for Army camps and participating in
moneymaking activities for the local Army officers, such as logging and
brickbaking.  An average family must send one person for each of 3 or 4
types of forced labour every month; women must often do this labour because
men are more likely to be beaten by soldiers at the worksite, and children
must often go because their parents need to work the fields for the
survival of the family.  If the village fails to comply with requests for
forced labourers, materials or money, the village elders are arrested and
often tortured, houses are burned down, or the Army simply storms the
village and takes two or three times as many people for labour as were
originally requested.

In urban areas the SPDC has decreased its demands for forced labour,
because it fears the possibility of uprisings in the cities and because
forced labour in the cities is more visible to foreign visitors.  Instead
the regime uses convicts for forced labour in the cities or brings in
villagers in from rural areas, while those who live in the cities simply
pay cash in lieu of doing forced labour.  In some forced labour projects on
tourist routes the SPDC has even taken to paying forced labourers, though
the amount paid is usually 20 or 40 Kyats per day, which is no more than
25% of the money needed for daily food.  This allows them to show
foreigners that forced labourers are "paid", even though in the rest of the
country forced labourers are never paid.

In some rural areas thousands of acres are confiscated and the villagers
must do forced labour establishing fishpond projects and rubber
plantations.  These projects are often promoted in the media as "local
income generation", but all proceeds go to the Army.  Officers also steal
the wages and rations of rank-and-file soldiers and then order their
soldiers to survive by looting the villages.  All farmers who still have
land must hand over 25-50% of their crops as a quota to the Army and are
paid only 10-20% of market price.  The quotas increase every year, even
when there are bad crops and natural disasters, and farmers often have to
sell their belongings to buy rice at market price just so they will have
enough to pay the quota and avoid arrest.  Many of the crops grown by
forced labour and those handed over as quota are used to support the Army,
but local officers take and sell a great deal of it, and it is likely that
much of it is also sold to foreign companies for "countertrade" export;
"countertrade" is a practice whereby foreign companies convert profits
earned in Kyat, the local currency which cannot be exported, into
exportable goods by buying agricultural products from SPDC agencies.  Cash
crops and rubber are often used for this.

Every Army camp demands money from every village in its area, and usually
this is calculated to amount to all the money a village can raise each
month.  With the arrival of new Army camps, the amount increases
proportionately.  In 1995 the Karen Human Rights Group studied a group of
28 villages averaging 50 families in size and found that each village was
paying an average of approximately 100,000 Kyat per month to local Army
battalions just in established cash fees, not including extra fees to avoid
forced labour, ad hoc extortion demands or forced contribution of food and
other material goods.  100,000 Kyat is US$15,000 at official exchange rate
or US$350 at market rate, but for a subsistence farming village it is a
very large amount of money.  This amount continues to increase because of
the constant expansion of the number of Army camps near every village.

Just looking at this amount and considering the number of villages in
Burma, it appears that at least one to two billion Kyat per month is being
robbed from rural villagers by SPDC field military officers, and this does
not even include other money which these officers make by selling rations
and village goods, or by stealing the wages of their soldiers. These
officers have no expenses while in the field.  They remit a portion of
their profits to higher-level officers and send the remainder to their
families, most of whom live in Rangoon, Mandalay or other large towns.
Their families can then use these billions of Kyat flowing into the towns
as seed money to start businesses, and it is these businesses which lead to
the false impression of "economic growth" in the cities.  In fact, all of
the "growth" in the cities is financed by this steady flow of money and
goods robbed from rural villagers, combined with the laundered profits of
the narcotics trade.

The SPDC is systematically stripping rural Burma of all it can produce in
order to finance a façade of economic improvement in the cities, while at
the same time destroying the food production capabilities of most non-
Burman ethnic areas.  Even rural villages which have never been burned or
forcibly relocated cannot sustain this system.  Having to do so much forced
labour that they no longer have enough time to farm, to hand over crop
quotas which are often more than they can grow and cash which is more than
they could ever obtain, and always facing the additional looting by SPDC
soldiers, many villagers can only survive by selling off their livestock
and valuables.  When those are gone or when another Army camp comes to
their area, they have no choice but to flee or face arrest. Many end up as
beggars in the towns, internally displaced people in the forests, or
"economic migrants" and refugees in neighbouring countries. Over 80% of
Burma's population live in rural villages, but the SPDC is looting the
countryside until the village is no longer viable as a social unit. This is
the key factor causing Burma's current economic crisis.  The SPDC
apparently hopes to keep operating this unsustainable system, propping it
up with money from foreign investment and aid.  This explains their current
attempts to attract investment and aid money.  However, without political
or policy changes, any outside support will only prop up an unsustainable
system and ensure a greater disaster in the future.

- [END OF REPORT] -