The BurmaNet News - 21 March, 1998

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------------------------------ BurmaNet -----------------------------
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies
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The BurmaNet News, 21 March, 1998 (Weekend Edition)
Issue #962

HEADLINES:
==========
REUTERS: SUU KYI URGES INVESTORS TO AVOID MYANMAR -
REUTERS: STRICT MEASURES KEEP BOOSTING MYANMAR'S BKK POST: RANGOON RESUMES
DYKE BUILDING
THE NATION: NAP BLAMED FOR SALWEEN

Feature:
JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW: BURMA RECEIVES ADVANCES FROM ITS SILENT SUITORS
IN SINGAPORE

Cross-Border Crisis:
SPDC: MYANMAR REJECTS U.S. PRESS STATEMENT REGARDING
KNL STATEMENT ON HUAY KALOKE ATTACK
AUSTRALIAN GOVT MEDIA STATEMENT: ATTACKS ON THAI
OBLF STATEMENT TO AKO RALLY OUTSIDE SPDC EMBASSY IN
EVENTS DURING FEBRUARY - MARCH IN THE BEH KLAW AREA

Announcements:
AKO: KARENS IN AUSTRALIA UNITE UNDER ONE BANNER
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

REUTERS: SUU KYI URGES INVESTORS TO AVOID MYANMAR - REPORT
19 March, 1998 [abridged]

 NEW YORK - Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has urged companies to 
avoid investing in Myanmar (Burma) because it props up the ruling
military regime, according to an interview in BusinessWeek. 

"We do not think investment at this time really helps the people of Burma,"
Suu Kyi said in the interview, published in  magazine's March 30 issue. 
"It provides the military regime with a psychological boost." 

The Nobel peace prize winner also said the United States should not soften
its sanctions against the regime. 

"We very much appreciate the U.S. sanctions because they have been a
tremendous psychological boost for the democracy movement, and also they 
have made businesses think carefully about what is really going on in 
Burma," she was quoted as saying. 

The United States last year imposed economic sanctions banning new American
investment in Myanmar because of Yangon's record of human rights abuses and 
its failure to recognize the democracy movement led by Suu Kyi. 

Companies such as Motorola Inc, Levi Strauss and PepsiCo Inc have stopped
operations in Myanmar. Unocal is one of the few U.S. companies that have 
remained. 

Suu Kyi said the current economic situation in Myanmar was "very bad," 
with rising prices, not much new investment and a poor rice harvest. 

The NLD and the government are in a political stalemate after the NLD 
refused to take part in any talks without Suu Kyi, although some diplomats 
say discussions are going on at lower levels. 

In response to a question about resolving the impasse, Suu Kyi said,
"Everything has to start with dialogue. If anyone is interested in power-
sharing, they can put it forward in the process of dialogue. We have said,
with regard to dialogue, we are prepared to discuss anything." 

********************************************************

REUTERS: STRICT MEASURES KEEP BOOSTING MYANMAR'S KYAT
20 March, 1998

YANGON - Myanmar's (Burma's) kyat has continued to firm following strict 
measures imposed by the military government to shield the currency from the
region's economic turmoil. 

The kyat, which hit all-time lows in December, has risen sharply against the
U.S. dollar and the dollar-denominated foreign exchange certificates (FEC). 

On Friday it was trading around 233 to the FEC and 250 to the dollar -- a
sharp difference from lows of 340 and 370, respectively, in late December. 

The currency's recovery comes after a series of strict measures were
implemented by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to 
stop speculation and stop the kyat falling. 

The government began to warn major dealers against speculation, then in
January it revoked the licences of seven of the country's 30 FEC dealers,
apparently on charges of illegal currency speculation. 

Some other dealers suspended business for a while, giving various excuses. 

Since then the kyat began to rise as some panicked FEC and dollar holders
began to sell their bills, dealers said. 

The SPDC also suspended all border trade, sharply cut back on imports and
encouraged people to buy local products. 

Earlier this month the Central Bank of Myanmar revoked permission given to 
10 semi-government and private banks to undertake foreign currency 
transactions. No reason was given for the revocation. 

"The most panicking measure the government took recently was revoking
licences to operate foreign currency transactions," said one analyst. 

Even Myawadi Bank and Innwa Bank, both run by the economic wing of the 
Ministry of Defence, had their licences revoked. 

All those who had foreign currency accounts with these banks had to transfer 
their accounts to either the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank or Myanma Investment 
and Commercial Bank. These are the only two banks now allowed to handle
foreign currency transactions and both are run by the finance ministry. 

"These measures were the basic immediate causes of the fall in demand and
rise in supply of the FECs and the dollar," an analyst said. 

"In the near future, the kyat will fluctuate...but within a narrow range,"
he said. "Because the government will never allow the kyat to go out of
control."

************************************************************

BKK POST: RANGOON RESUMES DYKE BUILDING
20 March, 1998

Burmese refuse to heed Thai protests

MAE SOT - In defiance of repeated protests from the Thai government, Rangoon 
has resumed construction of a concrete dyke in the Moei River which
demarcates 
the Thai-Burmese border.

A border source said that the Burmese military in Myawaddy had mobilised
men, women, children and construction equipment to start piling work about
50 metres into the river. Dredgers have been busy sucking sand from the
riverbed 
for use in the construction.

The source said that the dyke had been extended from about 500 metres to
almost one kilometre long running parallel to the river bank.

A border official said Burmese authorities did not heed the Thai protests
because they were not backed up with pressure from the Thai government.

He said that when the Burmese demanded that a row of shophouses and stalls 
built near the friendship bridge be dismantled as a condition of the
reopening of the border, Thai authorities responded without any bargaining
power.

The border was shut for about a year between March 1995 and March 1996 
by Rangoon.

Meanwhile, pro-Rangoon Karen guerrillas killed a man and his wife and
seriously wounded their son when they robbed the couple's shop in Mae Ramat
district yesterday police said.

According to the police, eight guerrillas of the Democratic Karen Buddhist
Army crossed the border into Ban Huay Phai about 1.30 a.m.

Three of them stormed into a shop selling miscellaneous items, while the
rest went into a nearby house where a group of people were watching video
tapes and forced them at gun point to remain silent.

At the shop, the raiders opened fire at Boonsi Konlom, 56, and Uan, 45,
killing them instantly. Their son Pakasit, 37, was seriously wounded in the
right ankle. His bag containing 3,000 baht in cash was taken away. The
robbers also went upstairs but did not harm four people sleeping there.

The intruders fled back into Burma after the robbery.

Meanwhile in Mae Hong Son, border patrol police have been accused of
collaborating with a logging company in undertaking illegal logging near 
the Thai-Burmese border, border security sources said.

A large number of logs are reported to have been felled in the Mae Pai
National Reserve and processed less than 100 metres away from an operation 
base of a BPP unit near Ban Doi Saeng border pass.

The logs are allegedly being stored at the base and at a logging company,
the sources said.

A number of Burmese soldiers have been allegedly hired to take the processed 
wood to the base.

According to the sources, the Police Department is preparing to launch an
investigation into the allegation and take action against the officers
involved.        

Sayan Sangsuang, Pai district chief, has asked the governor to investigate a
group of forestry officials for alleged involvement in illegal logging.

************************************************************

THE NATION: NAP BLAMED FOR SALWEEN
20 March, 1998

AGRICULTURE Minister Pongpol Adireksam yesterday alleged the New Aspiration 
Party turned a blind eye to the massive illegal logging in Salween National 
Park while the NAP was leading the Chavalit coalition in 1997.

Pongpol said two Democrat MPs, Tripol Johjit and Panya Jinakham, filed an 
urgent motion to the House committee on agriculture on April 3, 1997,
demanding the panel investigate the illegal logging.

The Democrats were then an opposition party and the House panel was headed 
by NAP MP Charoen Chankomol.

Pongpol said the House committee ignored the motion and the Chavalit
government had done very little to stop the illegal logging carried out by
16,000 Karen refugees in Mae Hong Son.

"Six months after the motion was filed, the House committee still had never
travelled to Salween park although the two Democrat MPs said it was a very 
urgent motion," Pongpol said.

The agriculture minister said the Chuan government immediately tackled the 
problem after it took office in November.

****************************************************

JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW: BURMA RECEIVES ADVANCES FROM ITS SILENT 
SUITORS IN SINGAPORE
1 March, 1998 / ASIA; Vol. 10; No. 3; Pg. 32 
by William Ashton 

WHILE CHINA MAY BE THE MOST OBVIOUS COUNTRY TRYING TO WIN OVER BURMA'S 
AFFECTIONS, RANGOON HAS, IN FACT, RECEIVED SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES FROM 
AN ALTOGETHER MORE SUBTLE SUITOR, AS WILLIAM ASHTON REPORTS. 

Ever since the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) almost 10 years ago, there have been persistent claims that Burma's
military government has been secretly supported by Singapore.  Rumours of a 
close strategic relationship continue to circulate under the SLORC's 
successor, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the formation of 
which seems to have been prompted by representations made to General Ne Win 
during his recent Southeast Asian tour.  While Singapore's motives clearly 
include a wish to take advantage of the commercial opportunities flowing 
from Rangoon's new 'open door' economic policies, wider strategic factors are
just as important. 

Following the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators and creation of 
the SLORC in September 1988, Burma was severely criticised by most of the
international community.  Aid and financial flows critical to the survival
of the military regime were suspended.  In addition, Burma's traditional
arms suppliers announced that they would not sell it any new weapons or
military equipment.  Even West Germany, until then the main source of
Burma's military technology, suspended co-operation on indigenous arms
production.  The SLORC, faced with the country's economic collapse and
fearful of a link-up between ethnic insurgents in the countryside and
urban-based dissidents, was desperate to restock its depleted armouries.
China and Thailand were quick to step in with offers of support, but the
first country to come to the regime's rescue was in fact Singapore. 

TRACES OF A RELATIONSHIP 
Details are hard to come by but, according to one regional journal, in
October 1988 hundreds of boxes marked 'Allied Ordnance, Singapore' were
unloaded from two vessels of Burma's Five Star Shipping Line in Rangoon's 
port.  These shipments reportedly included mortars, ammunition and raw 
materials for Burma's arms factories.  The consignment also contained 84 mm
rockets for the Burmese army's Carl Gustav recoilless guns, which were made 
by Chartered Industries of Singapore under licence from Forenade
Fabriksverken 
in Sweden.  The shipment thus violated an agreement under which the
original export licence had been negotiated, requiring that any re-exports
only be made with the permission of the Swedish Government.  No such
clearance was granted. 

In August 1989 Singapore was again accused of providing arms to the SLORC 
when weapons and ammunition originating in Belgium and Israel were trans-
shipped to Burma, apparently with the assistance of SKS Marketing, a newly 
formed Singapore-based joint venture with the Burmese military regime. There
have been reports that these latter shipments included second-hand 40 mm
RPG-2 grenade launchers and 57 mm anti-tank guns of Eastern Bloc origin.
One well-informed Burma -watcher has suggested that this equipment may have
come from Palestinian stocks captured in southern Lebanon by Israel in 1982
and re-sold 
to Burma. 

It is highly unlikely that any of these arms shipments to Burma could have
been made without the knowledge and support of the Singapore Government. 

WINNING FRIENDS 
These gestures of practical assistance to the SLORC, at a time when it felt
most vulnerable, won Singapore some powerful friends in the military
regime.  Largely because of this high-level support, the bilateral
relationship has blossomed.  Since 1988 there have been frequent exchanges
of senior visitors, including the heads of state of both countries.
Economic ties have also greatly expanded.  Singapore is now Burma's largest
foreign investor, with over US$1 billion committed to nearly 50 different
projects (mainly in hotels, property development and tourism).  Both 
governments appear to be prepared to overlook the fact that some of these
investment dollars have been generated by narcotics production in the
Golden Triangle.  Notorious traffickers like Lo Hsing-han are thought to
control a number of companies in Singapore that are investing heavily in
Burma.  The flow of illicit funds can also go in the opposite direction.
For example, it has been suggested that in 1991 foreign currency generated
by narcotics sales was used by the SLORC to pay for a large shipment of
arms from China, with the money being passed through a bank in Singapore. 

The close political and economic ties that now exist between Singapore and
Burma are well known, but much less publicity has surrounded the bilateral
co-operation that is occurring in a number of more controversial areas.
Burma's armed forces, for instance have apparently continued to order arms
and ammunition from Singaporean companies.  They also seem to have turned
to Singapore for military training, intelligence advice and defence
technology.  This has placed Singapore in a category reserved for Burma's
special friends, a category currently shared only by the Burmese junta's
main financial backer and strategic ally:  China. 

BOLSTERING THE FRIENDSHIP
Since those early consignments, a wide variety of additional arms and
ammunition has reportedly been shipped to Burma from firms based in
Singapore, and Singaporean brokers appear to have facilitated the sale of
munitions to Burma from other suppliers.  The details of these deals are
not always clear, but they are believed to have included M16A1 automatic
rifles and 5.56 mm ammunition (apparently in violation of another export
agreement attached to their licensed production in Singapore), 7.62 mm
assault rifles and ammunition, communications equipment of various kinds
and at least one (but possibly more) British Aerospace Bloodhound Mk 2
surface-to-air missile systems with Scorpion target illuminating radars.
If this latter report is true, then Singapore would be responsible for
providing the Burmese armed forces with their first guided missile system. 

BILATERAL LINKS 
The close bilateral relationship is also reflected in links between the
armed forces of both countries.  For example, the Singapore Armed Forces
(SAF) have provided training in Singapore to specialist units like the
Burmese army's parachute team, and there have been persistent rumours in
Rangoon that the SAF are providing the Burmese army with artillery training 
in Burma.  Another version of this story has it that the SAF are, in fact,
undertaking artillery training on Burmese ranges.  This is one explanation 
iven to account for the occasional visits to Rangoon of Republic of Singapore 
Air Force (RSAF) Fokker F-50 and Lockheed C-130 transports.  In fact, RSAF
aircraft regularly stage through Rangoon on their way to Bangladesh,
reportedly 
on 'navigational training' flights.  While some of these reports are
difficult 
to prove, the relationship between the armed forces of the two countries is
clearly much closer than publicly
acknowledged. 

Singapore is also believed to be the main source of information technology
being obtained by Burma's military regime.  For example, a Singaporean
firm, or group of firms, has apparently installed computers throughout
Burma's Defence Ministry and helped to upgrade its communications links
with the 10 Regional Military Commands.  Singapore is probably also the
source of the equipment installed in the ministry's ' cyber war centre'
(created a few years ago under a new Directorate of Defence Services
Computers).  This centre is reported to be closely involved in the
monitoring and recording of foreign and domestic telecommunications,
including the satellite telephone conversations of Burmese opposition
groups.  A recent study has also suggested that Singapore may have provided 
the Burmese armed forces with modern frequency-hopping radios and
encryption devices to protect their own signals from interception (see p35). 

Bilateral co-operation may have also been extended to other intelligence
areas.  One Australian analyst has recently cited a claim that Singapore 
is providing intelligence training to Burma's 'secret police' in central
Singapore.  Hundreds of Burmese officers are reported to be involved.
There has also been at least one credible press report that Singaporean
intelligence officers have been observed in Burma near the Thai- Burma
border.  The current Singaporean ambassador to Burma is a former senior SAF
officer and a past director of Singapore's defence-oriented Joint
Intelligence Directorate.  This appointment may simply be a coincidence,
but it is curious that Singapore has chosen to assign someone with a
military background to this new member of the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and not one of its many capable professional diplomats. 

There have also been repeated, if still unconfirmed, reports that a
Singaporean company, or group of companies, has stepped in to help
modernise and expand Burma's arms industries, drawing on Singapore's
well-developed expertise in this field.  Singaporean technicians, for
example, have apparently replaced the German technicians formerly based 
at Padaung, across the Irrawaddy River from Prome and close to one of the
regime's well-guarded defence industrial complexes.  Once again, these
claims are difficult to verify, but Singaporean involvement in these
factories would be consistent with the SLORC's (and now the SPDC's) aim 
of making Burma more self-sufficient in arms production.  Singapore is less
likely to face the kinds of domestic pressures which in 1988 forced
Germanyto reconsider its support for Burma's arms industries. 

SINGAPOREAN DENIALS 
Ever since they began to surface, these rumours and news media reports have 
been consistently denied by the Singaporean Government.  Indeed, Singapore 
has shown considerable sensitivity to any suggestion that it is secretly
supporting the military regime in Rangoon or turning a blind eye to Burmese 
money-laundering operations.  Some of the reasons for this sensitivity are
obvious.  Despite ASEAN's ambivalent attitude toward Burma since 1988, there 
would be considerable diplomatic embarrassment to Singapore if it was known 
to be actively supporting an international pariah like the SPDC in such a 
fashion.  Singapore can hardly accuse Western countries of interfering in 
Burma's internal affairs (by condemning the military regime's repressive 
policies) when it is helping to provide the same regime with the means to 
retain its iron grip on power.  Nor does Singapore wish to lose its
reputation 
as an honest dealer in regional affairs and a staunch opponent of narcotics
trafficking. 

There is another explanation for Singapore's sensitivity on this issue,
however, and that is its wish to avoid any potential difficulties in its
developing relationship with China. 

Despite statements to the contrary from elder statesmen like former prime
minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore is acutely conscious of China's growing
economic strength and strategic influence.  It has watched China's
behaviour in the region, including its rapidly growing links with the
military regime in Burma, with some concern.  In order to avoid pushing the
SPDC further into the arms of the Chinese, Singapore and the other ASEAN
states have refused to join in the widespread condemnation of the Burmese
junta for its abuses of human rights and have undertaken instead to
'constructively engage' the Rangoon regime. 

These countries have included in their efforts the pursuit of commercial
opportunities in Burma and in some cases modest defence ties, but in
Singapore's case a close (and hidden) strategic partnership appears to be a
very high priority. 

WELL-PLACED TO GAIN 
Of all the ASEAN countries, Singapore is perhaps best placed to pursue this
particular aim.  It is not one of Burma's immediate neighbours and
therefore does not have to cope with the territorial disputes and refugee
outflows which tend to characterise Burma's relations with Thailand.
Similarly, Singapore cares little about human rights, in particular the
plight of the ethnic and religious minorities in Burma, which occasionally
troubles Muslim states like Indonesia and Malaysia.  Also, having developed 
one of the region's most advanced armed forces and defence industrial
support bases, Singapore is in a good position to offer Burma a number of
inducements which other ASEAN countries would find hard to match. 

Singapore seems to have decided that, in a number of ways, close links with
the military regime in Rangoon serves its long-term national security
interests.  Having apparently assessed that Aung San Suu Kyi and the
pro-democracy forces were unlikely to win power for the foreseeable future,
Singapore has deliberately set out to forge closer ties with the real
centre of power in Burma:  namely the armed forces.  

By assisting with arms sales, defence technology transfers, military
training and intelligence co-operation, Singapore has been able to win a
sympathetic hearing at the very heart of Burma's official councils.  From
there, it is in a good position not only to encourage its own commercial
interests but also to pursue wider strategic aims.  These relate in part to
Burma's own growing military capabilities, but also to China's future role
in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Singapore has recognised, perhaps more readily than most countries, that
Burma has the potential to become a more influential factor in the region's
changing strategic environment.  As part of an ambitious expansion and
modernisation plan, for example, the Burmese armed forces have grown from 
around 186,000 in 1988 to more than 400,000 - and at a time when all other
regional countries are reducing the size of their armed forces.  In
addition, since 1988 the SLORC has acquired around 130 new combat aircraft,
nearly 30 
new naval vessels and large numbers of AFVs, multiple rocket launchers and
artillery pieces.  The Rangoon regime has also improved its command and 
control systems, and upgraded its military infrastructure. With one of the 
largest armed forces in Southeast Asia, newly equipped with a wide range of 
more modern weapons, Burma now has the potential to play a far greater
conventional defence role than at any other time in its history. 

THE CHINESE FACTOR 
More importantly, most of the new arms and equipment facilitating this
massive military expansion programme have come from China, assisted by the
provision of generous loans and special 'friendship' prices. 

In addition, hundreds of Burmese servicemen have undertaken training
courses in China, and up to 100 People's Liberation Army instructors have
been posted to Burma at different times to teach Burmese personnel how to
use their new weapons.  China seems to have negotiated a comprehensive
intelligence co-operation arrangement with Burma, which may even extend to 
the operation of joint signals intelligence posts scattered around Burma's
long coastline.  Since 1988 China has also played a major role in the
development of Burma's civil and military infrastructure. 

This dramatic departure from Burma's traditional neutrality in
international affairs, along with its new strategic partnership with a
major power like China, has sent ripples of concern around the region.
There are fears that Burma may eventually become a 'client state' of China,
provide support to Chinese naval deployments to the Indian Ocean or act as
a stalking horse for Chinese interests in regional councils such as ASEAN.
At times, these fears appear rather exaggerated and fail to take into
account Burma's passionate nationalism and deep-seated suspicions of
Chinese intentions.  Some of these fears may in fact be politically
inspired by countries like India in an effort to discredit China and garner
favour with the ASEAN members.  Even so, real concerns remain - including
in Singapore - that China is developing such a hold on Burma's economy and
armed forces that it will constrain the Rangoon regime's ability to act
independently 
in the future. 

SINGAPORE'S MOTIVES 

Thus, Singapore has a number of immediate and obvious reasons for wanting 
to develop a close working relationship with Burma.  These relate mainly to
Singapore's own perceived commercial and political interests.  Less
obvious, perhaps, is Singapore's desire to cultivate better links with a
regional 
country that is expanding its military capabilities and external contacts 
after decades of self-imposed isolation.  In the final analysis, however, 
China's shadow falls constantly across Singapore's relationship with Burma, 
and it is concern about China's future role in the region that has prompted 
many of the steps taken by Singapore in recent years to consolidate its 
special relationship with the military regime in Rangoon. 

While this remains the case, Singapore will continue to be very sensitive
about any publicity which may complicate its long-term plans.  These
include a two-track approach of cultivating close relations with China
while hedging its bets by supporting an independent Burma within ASEAN.  
In these circumstances, any prospect of Singapore's hidden partnership with
Burma being re-examined as a result of international pressure seems remote. 

[William Ashton is a freelance journalist based in Canberra, Australia.]

GRAPHIC:  Photograph 1, Key men in the SPDC, including Than Shwe (front
left), Maung Aye (centre) and Khin Nyunt (front right).  Singapore won
powerful 
friends among these men when it supplied moral and materiel support
following Burma's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in September
1988. Most other nations had ostracised the junta. P A News; Photograph 2,
Flying visits:  
RSAF C-130s regularly stage through Rangoon on their way to Bangladesh, 
reportedly on 'navigational training' flights but possibly also in support 
of an artillery training programme.  D Boey.

*********************************************************

SPDC: MYANMAR REJECTS U.S. PRESS STATEMENT REGARDING INTER-FACTIONAL
FIGHTING AMONG KAYINS 
13 March, 1998

Press Release No 2/98 issued by the Embassy of Myanmar, Washington DC 

The Myanmar Embassy firmly rejects the spurious charge made by the U.S.
Department of State on 11 March in a press statement that armed elements
associated with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) attacked 
unarmed civilians in a Kayin camp in Thailand.
 
It bears to be repeated that SPDC is committed to peace and development.
Just as it is dedicated to strengthening the fabric of the nation, it is
committed to maintaining good and friendly relations with all countries 
of the world , including in particular the neighbouring countries . 
		
Myanmar does not condone acts of terrorism on its territory or elsewhere.

It should be noted that the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army(DKBA) is a
breakaway faction of the Karen National Union(KNU). The DKBA who were 
the majority in the KNU opted to quit the armed group as they were 
disillusioned by the senseless campaign of terror waged against innocent 
civilians by the KNU. 
		
In the past year, the KNU has carried out a relentless campaign to punish
the DKBA leaders and the rank and file who returned to their kith and kin 
in Myanmar. The recent clashes, including that of 10 March, are undoubtedly 
the direct result of the murderous campaign of terror carried out by the
KNU leadership who have taken refuge across the border in Thailand and who 
maintain a belligerent attitude towards Myanmar. 
	
The clashes between the Kayin factions should be seen for what they really
are and no one should attempt to partition blame on the Myanmar Government. 
If anyone deserves to be blamed, it is those organizations who are aiding
and abetting the insurgent KNU. The State Peace and  Development Council
has not signed any pact with the DKBA and has nothing to do with the
inter-factional strife among the Kayins. 

It should be noted that the Myanmar Government's efforts to promote the 
unity of the nation is bearing fruit as 17 armed groups have returned to 
the fold and peace reigns in the country as never before. A small and 
remote jungle area within the Kayin State is the only exception. 
	
It is the hope of the people and government of Myanmar that the inter-
factional clashes among the Kayins, resulting in the lost of life and
property, can be terminated in the near future and that the entire KNU
insurgents and their families will return to their hearths and homes. 
The Myanmar Government continues to offer the olive branch.

*********************************************************

KNL STATEMENT ON HUAY KALOKE ATTACK
19 March, 1998 [abridged]

Released by Department of Information and Communication, Karen National
League 

Recent armed attack on Huay kaloke Karen Refugee Camp provoked
international outcries.   Many Burmese opposition groups, non-governmental
organizations and government agencies released their statements of concern
over the situation of 
the refugees and demanded the Burmese military regime to stop killing its
own people.   

Also, several international media and news agencies released several reports
about the incident.  Reporting to the world about this ruthless armed attack
on innocent civilian refugees, some stated in their reports that it was done
by "renegade Karen faction supported by Burmese military regime."  But
sadly enough, some did not even mention either the Burmese military regime
or SPDC, instead simply put "DKBA troops attack refugees camp."
Regrettably, the Thai government portrayed the incident as "problem between
Karen and Karen" and completely omitted SPDC (formerly SLORC) from the scene. 
    
******************************************************

AUSTRALIAN GOVT MEDIA STATEMENT: ATTACKS ON THAI BORDER REFUGEE CAMPS
18 March, 1998 [abridged]

[From the Office of the Australian Government Foreign Minister, Mr
Alexander Downer]

The Australian Government condemns recent attacks by a Burmese Government
sponsored Karen splinter group on two refugee camps on the Thai Burma border.

The SPDC must prevent such attacks on civillian refugee populations in
Thaland.  I have instructed our Embassy in Rangoon to make this point
directly to the SPDC.  On my instruction, our Embassy in Bangkok has also
held discussions with the Thai Government on the need to ensure security 
of the camps.

The Australian Government has a long standing commitment to providing
material assistance to Burmese refugees in camps who have fled the
fighting in Burma.  In 1997 / 98 we are providing $1,000,000 to assist these
people.  

Media Inquiries:
Ministerial: Innes Willox (02) 6277 7500 or 0411 414 695
Department:  Tony Melville (02) 6261 1555 or 0418 623 327

*************************************************************

OBLF STATEMENT TO AKO RALLY OUTSIDE SPDC EMBASSY IN CANBERRA
19 March, 1998

The Overseas Burma Liberation Front (OBLF) and it's supporters strongly
condemn the SPDC for cross border attacks by it's military forces on Karen
refugee camps in Thailand.

OBLF congratulates Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, for his
statement contained in the media release of 18th March 1998, however, we feel 
that the time has come for more decisive pressure to be applied.  

We strongly urge the Australian Government to consider closing the Austrade 
Office in Rangoon as a symbolic gesture displaying revulsion of continuing
repression by the military junta of Burma.

Contact:
Hugh Wood, Spokesperson, OBLF Australia (02) 6297 7734
Raymond Thaung, Chairperson OBLF Australia (089) 342 1772

*************************************************************

EVENTS DURING FEBRUARY - MARCH IN THE BEH KLAW AREA
21 March, 1998

Late Jan - early Feb
DKBA and Tatmadaw troops build up in the 7th Brigade HQ area.
About 50 DKBA troops commanded by Maung Soe on the Karen side of the Mae La
Hta area (2 hours walk north west of Beh Klaw camp). Mae La Hta is a
village on the Moei River which is reached from a western turnoff at Mae La
Police Gate, which lies 1-2 kms north of Beh Klaw on the Mae Sot-Mae
Sariang road.

Sun Feb 15th
12 DKBA soldiers, led by Maung Soe, cross the river between the Thai
village of Mae La Hta and the unpopulated Thai village of Noe Tee Du Baw
(30 mins walk north of Mae La Hta, also near the Moei riverside) and fire
at least 10 M79 shells towards Beh Klaw camp from Thaw Pee Der (1-2 kms
north of the camp on the southern turn off to Sho Lu from the east-west Mae
La Police Gate to Mae La Hta road). They all fall short, landing on the
camp's northern perimeter hills.

Late Feb - early March
Further build up of Tatmadaw/DKBA troops in the areas of Lay Rgaw (west of
7th Brigade HQ), Mae La Hta (2-3 kms north of HQ), and Maw Pa Thu (2-3 kms
south of HQ). About 50 DKBA in the Maw Pa Thu area commanded by Maung Chit
Thu.

Early March
Threats and intercepted messages that attack imminent. Beh Klaw residents
start sleeping in the forest to the east of the Mae Sot-Mae Sariang road.

Tues March 10th
Intercepted messages that Beh Klaw and Huai Kolok to be attacked at the
same time (same as last year). 100+ Tatmadaw troops cross at Noe Tee Du
Baw, seemingly unable nor willing to attack Beh Klaw and make it back to
the Moei River without incurring huge losses. They stay on the Thai side
until Mon/Tues March 16/17th, laying mines and posing a real threat to the
camp and villages in the area. Huai Kolok attacked and burnt. Many people
now sleeping in the forests to the east of the Mae Sot-Mae Sariang road.
Many shops in Beh Klaw packing up and closing.

Weds March 11th
Between midnight and 1:00 am (Thurs) Thai soldiers based at Mae La Police
Gate and Maw Pa Thu road junction (6 kms south of the camp on the Mae
Sot-Mae Sariang road) fire 6 flares in total (only 2 ignited) and 2-3
mortars from each base. The mortars are blank and reportedly are not fired
into Burmese territory. Beh Klaw residents in real fear of attack. Most
prone areas considered to be the Bible School area in zone C1 (scene of
last year's attack and last month's attempted mortar attack), the market,
the areas around the hospitals and camp leaders' houses.

Thurs March 12th
Beh Klaw residents start digging bunkers en masse, and more moving to the
forests opposite Beh Klaw and to the base of Beh Klaw ridge, which protects
the camp from the west. KNLA booby trap DKBA with multiple bomb at Daw Oo,
north of Myawaddy, killing 5 and wounding 16. This is in the Kyaw Noe /
Hker Rgaw area (DKBA Commander Maung Chit Thu's HQ area). In the middle of
the night Thai soldiers based at Mae La Gate and Maw Pa Thu road base fire
1 flare and 2 mortars from each base. The mortars are blank and reportedly
are not fired into Burmese territory.

Fri March 13th
Most Beh Klaw residents now digging bunkers. Many more moving to the
forests opposite Beh Klaw and to the base of Beh Klaw ridge.
Most shops now closed. Those open are not restocking their goods, and are
packing up well before sunset. In the middle of the night Thai soldiers
based at Mae La Gate and Maw Pa Thu road base fired about 3 mortars from
each base. The mortars are blank and reportedly are not fired into Burmese
territory.

Sat March 14th
DKBA based at Maw Pa Thu/Mae Kot area on the Karen side of the Moei river
(about 6-8 kms west of the Maw Pa Thu road junction and south west of Beh
Klaw camp) fire mortars at the Thai Army base at Maw Pa Thu road junction.
3 shells land, but only 2 explode. No reported injuries, but people who had
been caught travelling along the road without Thai identification and who
were being detained at the roadblock/base are released for fear of further
attack. DKBA also fire mortars into the Thai village of Nya Mu Klo (30 mins
walk east of the Moei River and 2 hours walk south west of Beh Klaw),
setting fire to some houses. DKBA capture Maw K'Lah Lay cliff from the
KNLA, from where the 7th Brigade HQ and Beh Klaw camp are both within
shelling range (30 mins walk west of the Thai village of Nya Mu Klo on the
Karen side of the Moei River, and 2 1/2 hours walk west south west of Beh
Klaw).

Sun March 15th
Thai generals (inc. Chamlong and Chetta) come to Beh Klaw area and issue
instructions to the troops to provide an 'active defence' of Beh Klaw and
the surrounding area. Tatmadaw/DKBA troops fire 8 mortars from Maw K'Lah
Lay at Thai and Karen sections in the area between Nya Mu Klo and Beh Klaw,
to push them away and provide the attackers with closer access to the camp.
At about 12:00 midday, Tatmadaw/DKBA troops fire 7 105mm shells from Maw
K'Lah Lay to Beh Klaw. 3 land inside the camp within 3-5 minutes of each
other. The first lands in zone A3 on the hill above the southern most
section of the camp. The second lands about 150 yards above the Bible
School in zone A3, injuring Pah Kyot Klot, a middle-aged man. He suffers a
shrapnel wound to the calf. The third lands on the hill above zone A2,
where many refugees have recently built new houses, having been ordered to
relocate from Sho Klo for fear of their safety. 

The attackers seem to have been in radio contact with someone who could see
where the shells landed, as each of the 3 shells landed progressively
further into the camp in a direct line about 100 yards apart. Within a few
minutes, Thai troops at the Maw Pa Thu road junction and other
positions start to return fire, firing a total of about 30-40 shells to Maw
K'Lah Lay. Radio Free Asia report on Weds March 18th that 6 DKBA were
killed and many others wounded from these volleys. 

Tatmadaw/DKBA troops cross the Moei River and plant landmines in the area
around Nya Mu Klo. They kidnap 5 villagers from the village before
retreating to Maw K'Lah Lay. The villagers are released after 2 nights.
3 Thai soldiers are wounded, and 1 Army motorcycle and 2 Army vehicles are
damaged, from landmine explosions not far from the Moei River, on the road
to Nya Mu Klo village, which cuts west from the Maw Pa Thu road junction
south of Beh Klaw on the Mae Sot-Mae Sariang road and then travels north
parallel to the Moei River to Nya Mu Klo, which is south west of Beh Klaw.
Troops from Mae La Gate go to provide assistance.

Mortars are heard being fired throughout the afternoon on the Karen side of
the river. Thai and Tatmadaw representatives accuse each other of firing
first. Apparent cessation of shelling.

Following the Chetta/Chamlong visit and discussions with Karen security
representatives, approximately 200 more Thai troops and 6 105mm guns are
sent in to reinforce the existing 150 troops and 3 105mm guns.
Armoured Personnel Carriers patrol the Mae Sot-Mae Sariang highway during
the night from Mae La Gate to the Maw Pa Thu road junction.
Sunday sees the apparent end of overt confrontation on the Thai side (as of
Fri March 20th)

Mon March 16th
Tatmadaw/DKBA troops in small companies move around the area trying to
outmanoeuvre and find weaknesses in the Thai/ Karen defence.
Tatmadaw and KNLA troops are 150 yards apart in areas around 7th Brigade
HQ. Some people return to their houses. A few shops start reopening, but
not restocking and closing well before sunset.

Tues March 17th
11:00 am. Intercept enemy message that Maung Chit Thu has gone back to his
HQ with at least 20 men, following the KNLA booby trap on Tue March 12th.
Intercepted message that Tatmadaw troops will now focus their attack on 7th
Brigade HQ from one direction - Pweh Mu Khee - which is at least 1 hour's
walk away from HQ. The Tatmadaw are using mine detectors, but KNLA
landmines are planted 2, and sometimes 3, deep on top of each other, thus
foiling clearance. Casualties remain high and progress slow.
Tatmadaw troops cross back to Karen side near Noe Tee Du Baw after 1 week
on the Thai side.

During the night, reports received of a small number of Tatmadaw/DKBA
troops crossing the Moei River between Maw K'Lah Lay and Mae Tha Way Hta (1
hour's walk north of Maw K'Lah Lay and 1 hour's walk south of 7th Brigade
HQ). Intercepted messages that Tatmadaw troops have planted 500+ landmines
and booby traps in areas that the KNLA will try to reinfiltrate. Rumours of
further battalions being drafted in to make the Tatmadaw troops' strength
up to a full Division.

Intercepted message received from Tatmadaw radio communications saying, "If
you (the DKBA) do not burn Beh Klaw by tomorrow, we'll take away your
weapons". Villagers returning from the Moei riverside speak of some DKBA
requesting permission from their Tatmadaw counterparts to take dogs with
them on attack, as the dogs will go ahead and will detonate any mines on
the path. It is thought that some DKBA are being forced into this offensive
and dogs would not detonate landmines due to their light weight, but would
rather act as a warning to the waiting KNLA troops that soldiers were
approaching. This is not confirmed.

Weds March 18th
Intercepted messages report that Tatmadaw/DKBA troops have suffered more
than 50 landmine casualties. Unconfirmed report that Tatmadaw frontline
troops request permission from their commanders to withdraw as landmine
casualties very high and no progress being made - no known response.

Thurs March 19th
Intercepted messages report that Tatmadaw/DKBA troops have suffered more
than 70 landmine casualties.

Notes
- Beh Klaw has about 200 sentries around the camp day and night. Groups of
6-7, armed and in radio communication.
- In certain camp zones 1 milk tin of rice per refugee per fortnight being
forfeited to fund sentries in their camp section.

Other News
- Report that Major Thu Mu Heh's nephew has arrived in Beh Klaw recently.
Camp officials are concerned about his activities and their attempts to
locate him are continuing.

- 2 Tatmadaw Army and 1 DKBA battalions based at Hlaing Bwe arrived at
Manerplaw on Sunday 15th, posing a potential threat to Mae Ra Mu camp.

- Major Myo Win, a close associate of Pu Bo Mya and P'Doh Aung San, was
asked by Pu Bo Mya to go to Wah Lay in 6th Brigade area to negotiate taxes
that are not being paid by a Thai businessman for saw mills in the area.
The saw mills are in DKBA territory and only pay tax to them. A young man
named Chano went with him. When they arrived there, Major Ka Su of the DKBA
and his men tried to kidnap them both, but Major Myo Win drew a pistol and
fired 3 times, but the gun didn't fire. Major Ka Su's men shot and killed
Major Myo Win and kidnapped Chano. Chano has been sent to Klaw Htaw/Myiang
Gyi Nu - DKBA's HQ.

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ANNOUNCEMENTS:

AKO: KARENS IN AUSTRALIA UNITE UNDER ONE BANNER
19 March, 1998

AUSTRALIA KAREN ORGANISATION ANNOUNCEMENT

Since the overthrow of a democratic government in Burma, many Karens
migrated and found a home in countries like Australia where they have
enjoyed freedom of expression and the democratic way of life.

They express their concern and disapproval of the military regime's
treatment of their fellow men, the denial of basic human rights to all the
people in Burma, including the Burmans, and the brutal and harsh injustices
meted out to their own Karen people in their native land. They promote the
establishment of a federal country where all can enjoy their equal rights
and the right to self determination.

Over the last two years the number of Karens living in Australia has
increased appreciably and the need for of an Australia Karen Organisation
embracing all Karens living in the different states was deemed necessary. A
working group 
was formed to act as the mouthpiece of the Karens and to make representations 
to the world community through the media in order that attention be focussed 
on the thousands of refugees who were being driven out of their homes to
take refuge on the Thai border. 

The Australia Karen Organisation (AKO) is glad to announce that on the 
14 February, 1998, a constitution was formerly adopted to meet the needs of 
the majority of the Karen people living in Australia and to achieve its 
stated objectives which are :-

*To act as an umbrella organisation for the Karen people in Australia and
to represent them and voice their concerns in all political, social,
cultural and economic matters and to facilitate their affiliation to the AKO.
*To encourage and foster the development and perpetuation of the Karen
culture and language.
*To act as the representative of the Karen community at all levels of
government and other authorities, be they state, Federal or Local.
*To act as the representative of the Karen community in the Ethnic Affairs
Commission and other cultural, social or political organisations.
*To promote public awareness of the problems and hardships suffered by the 
Karen ethnic groups that have been forced to emigrate from their homeland 
and take refuge in foreign lands.
*To represent the Karen ethnic group and participate in forums and
conferences at national and international meetings in order to achieve
Equality, Peace, Freedom, Justice and Human Rights for the Karens in Burma
and abroad.
*To initiate and participate in welfare projects for the Karen communities
in Australia and in areas where they have been forced to take refuge from
the on-slaught of the illegitimate Burmese government.
*To prepare and maintain a census of the Karen people residing in Australia.

(Saw A. Ganemy Kunoo)
General Secretary.
Dated the 14 day of February 1998

Australia Karen Organisation National Spokespersons
1.   Saw Raymond Thaung  [Perth] Tel/Fax: (08) 93437295
2.   Saw A. Ganemy Kunoo [Melbourne] Tel/Fax: (03) 93975320
3.   Dr. Saw Joe Pereira  [Sydney] Tel/Fax:  (02) 96215060

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