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The BurmaNet News - 14 January 1998





------------------------- BurmaNet ------------------------------------
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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The BurmaNet News: January 14, 1998
Issue #912

Noted in passing:

"The Burmese Government says one thing but does another."
Banphot Piamdi, Director of the Northern Region's Narcotics Suppression 
Center. (see BANGKOK SIAM RAHT: THAILAND FLAYS BURMA)

HEADLINES:
==========
NEWSDAY: JOKE WORTH 7 YEARS' HARD LABOR
BANGKOK SIAM RAHT: THAILAND FLAYS BURMA
BURMA DEBATE: SLORC'S "INTEL-NET" (Part 1)
ANNOUCEMENTS: 
ASIA UPSTREAM CONFERENCE
RAINFOREST RELIEF REPORT
CALL FOR LETTER S TO DAVID JONES IN AUSTRALIA
BURMA ROUNDTABLE, VANCOUVER
FREE BURMA SYMPOSIUM REVIEW
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NEWSDAY: JOKE WORTH 7 YEARS' HARD LABOR
January 4, 1997
by Matthew McAllester, NEWSDAY

KENGTUNG, Burma - Some people just can't take a joke.
On Jan. 4, 1996, Par Par Lay, one of Burma's most widely traveled
and popular comedians, was one of a group of performers who gathered to
celebrate Burmese Independence Day outside the Rangoon home of Aung San Suu
Kyi, the leader of the main Burmese opposition party and the 1991winner of
the Nobel Peace Prize.

True to his art and his political beliefs, and knowing that his
actions would be duly noted by the omnipresent Military Intelligence
Service, Par Lay, 50, and his partner Lu Zaw went ahead with a performance
that made fun of the generals who run Burma. Par Lay did this knowing what
the inside of a Burmese prison is like, having served a year in prison in
1991 for his pro-democracy activities.

"He made jokes that the government works with thieves," said a close friend
of the Mandalay-based performer.

"He went home and waited to be arrested," said the friend, who spoke on
condition of anonymity. "Three days later they knock on the door at midnight."

In all, 13 performers who were at Suu Kyi's house were arrested but
most were released after interrogation, said Par Lay's friend. On March 18,
Par Lay and Lu Zaw were sentenced to 7 years' hard labor and sent to a
prison camp in the Kachin state in the north of the country.

"People die there," said Par Lay's friend, who knows one of the few
people to have visited the comedian at the labor camp, which holds
mainly non-political criminals. "They only get watery soup to eat. They
work from sunrise to sunset on building airports and railroads. They have
to break up big stones into little stones. He wears an iron bar between his
ankles. There's no medical treatment."

One former political prisoner, Thar Nyunt Oo, 26, found that threats
were used as a form of punishment for some political prisoners.

"They tried to make us work but we always refused to work," said
Nyunt Oo, who lives in exile in Thailand, where he works to
restore democracy to Burma. "So in Thayet prison they sent some political
prisoners to the leper cells, the HIV cells, the tuberculosis cells. They
sent me to the leper cell. And then one month later they sent me to the TB
room."

Par Lay's friends are concerned for his health. During rare prison
visits he appears very ill, they say.


Until his arrest, Par Lay was famous for being one of the two
comedians known as the Mustache Brothers. Now "his head and his mustache
have been shaved," his friend said. "His release depends on the political
situation. If he's not released, he will have to keep working, and he will
die."

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BANGKOK SIAM RAHT: THAILAND FLAYS BURMA FOR NOT COOPERATING IN DRUG FIGHT
January 6, 1998 (translated from Thai)

Banphot Piamdi, Director of the Northern Region's Narcotics Suppression 
Center, said on 5 January that Thailand made a big
mistake when it supported Burma's entry into ASEAN at the recent
meeting of the organization.  This is because Thailand thought
that by doing so it could bring Burma to the negotiating table
or through diplomatic channels seek its cooperation in narcotics
suppression.  So far, Banphot said, Burma has been trying to
avoid talking about the narcotics problem or giving its full
cooperation in narcotics suppression operations.  

Banphot disclosed that in many meetings between officials of the
two countries, the Burmese delegation always refused to make any
commitments by saying that it had to seek prior approval from 
Rangoon.  In particular, there has not yet been any progress made
on the setting up of a special supression unit for border areas
inside Burma as proposed by the Third Army region.  

He said:  "The Burmese Government says one thing but does another.
It claims to have subdued Khun Sa's group and shows the weapons
they seized.  However, the fact is that the group under the 
supervision of Chamouang or Chahoaung, Khun Sa's son, has 
received permission from Rangoon to produce narcotics in the areas
along the Thai-Burmese border."

The director of the Northern Region's Narcotics Suppression 
Center said:  "We are now trying to assess the Burmese government's
policy in this connection.  The production of amphetamine inside
Burma is rampant.  Amphetamine tablets produced by the Red Wa
minority group always have the group's symbol stamped on them.
It is possible that local military people are joining hands with
the Red Wa in narcotics production and trafficking.  However, he
said he cannot say anything much at the moment due to a lack of 
evidence.  Meanwhile, both the United Nations and United States
are critical of and exposing Burma's misconduct in many aspects
to the world."  

Banphot revealed that it is very possible that Rangoon and the 
Red Wa have reached an agreement for the latter's disarmament.
Like Khun Sa's group, the Red Wa will be allowed to continue
their drug production after they have laid down their weapons.
If this assumption is true, Thailand will be in a very 
difficult position because it will be used as a transit route
by traffickers for the export of narcotics to other countries.
 
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BURMA DEBATE: SLORC'S "INTEL-NET" BURMA'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS
Vol. IV, No 4
September/October 1997 (Posted without notes or figures)
by  ANDREW SELTH 

An excerpt from a Working Paper published by the Strategic ~ Defense
Studies Center of the Australian National University, Canberra, June 1997.
The author is a former Visiting Fellow of the Center and the author of
Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces Since 1988.

POST - 1988 

It was perhaps inevitable that, after the armed forces formally took back
the reins of government in September 1988, Burma's intelligence apparatus
would once again be reviewed. Yet, in many respects, its structure appears
to have remained the same. The greatest change has been in the size and
scope of its operations, and the means by which they are conducted.

Under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) [Editor's note:
As of November 15,1997 the regime has changed its name to the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC)], the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) has
been retained as the country's highest intelligence organ, deciding broad
policy and overseeing the activities of the country's other intelligence
agencies. The NIB reports directly to the SLORC, and possibly consults the
Council's National Security and Management Committee.  If not actually an
extension of the Director of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), the NIB
once again appears completely dominated by it. The DDSI is still a part of
the Defense Ministry, but provides the Bureau's Director General
(Brigadier, later Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt) and its staff, all of
which are members of the armed forces.  The Criminal Investigation
Department (CID), Special Investigation Department (SID), and Bureau of
Special Investigations (BSI) all seem to have been retained by the SLORC
and, generally speaking, still appear to exercise their earlier functions.
These three agencies are now formally under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Home Affairs. The other intelligence functions exercised by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Planning and
Economic Development do not seem to have changed significantly. The
Ministry of Immigration and National Registration was abolished in 1974,
but was recreated as the Ministry of Immigration and Population in 1992. It
continues to have certain intelligence functions. All these agencies
maintain their headquarters in Rangoon.

A new addition to the country's intelligence apparatus is the Office of
Strategic Studies (OSS).  A small body directly answerable to Khin Nyunt,
the OSS was initially believed to be a semi-academic institution similar to
the strategic studies institutes and think tanks found elsewhere in the
region (and further afield). Some commentators speculated that the OSS had
been created in part to give Burma a seat at various 'one and a half track'
(a mixture of both academics and officials) and a 'second track' (academic
only) talks on security issues that were then becoming common throughout
the Asia-Pacific region.  This seems to reflect confusion, however, between
the OSS and the Foreign Ministry's 'Myanmar Institute of Strategic and
International Studies' (MISTS), which was formed around the same time. A
more likely explanation for the creation of the OSS was that a new
'Strategic Command' was required within the defense hierarchy, to justify
Khin Nyunt's elevation in 1994 to lieutenant general rank.  If this is
true, then the OSS would be formally higher than the DDSI in the Defense
Ministry structure, equating roughly to a Bureau of Special Operations in
the General Staff Department. Even so, Khin Nyunt seems to have retained
the titles of both Chief of the OSS and Director of Defense Services
Intelligence (as well as being Director General of the NIB and Secretary
(l) of the SLORC). On this basis, it would be logical for the OSS also to
be member of the NIB.

The OSS is divided into five departments. These cover international
affairs, narcotics, security, ethnic affairs, and science and the
environment. Not all positions of departmental head are currently filled,
although some senior officers have responsibility for more than one
department. All OSS officers are members of the armed forces and are drawn
from the ranks of the DDSI. Some retain their DDSI roles, even as members
of the OSS.  Since its creation in the early l990s, the OSS has
demonstrated a close interest in the activities of dissidents and
opposition politicians, notably Aung San
Sun Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NED). Why Khin Nyunt does
not feel able to use the existing military intelligence apparatus to do
this, however, is not clear. 

Although the DDSI was already the largest and most powerful intelligence
agency in Burma before 1988, it has greatly expanded in numbers and is now
even more influential than before. It not only runs the MIS apparatus and
is a coordinating secretariat for the intelligence staffs of the three
armed services, but it also controls the NIB, and thus the activities of
all other Burmese intelligence agencies. A measure of the DDSI's increased
power under the SLORC is that, since 1992, DDSI/MIS branches and companies
outside the capital have once again been permitted to report directly to
Rangoon, without going through the regional military commands. Inevitably,
this has caused considerable friction with some Regional Commanders.

Under Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, DDSI is reportedly managed by a
committee of about 25 loyal, but not particularly senior military officers,
ranging from captain to lieutenant colonel in rank. At the War Office
level, the DDSI is divided into about five or six Bureaus, each of which
has responsibility for the oversight of a broad area of interest. For
example, Bureau MI- 1 oversees combat intelligence, MI-3 covers foreign
liaison, and MI-4 covers the 'communist front' organizations. Although
there is a Directorate of Public Relations and Psychological Warfare in the
Ministry of Defense, the DDSI is believed to have its own 'psychological
warfare and propaganda department,' possibly organized as another MI Bureau.

DDSI also has branches at regional command level. These branches (also
designated numerically) control smaller MIS companies scattered around
their command areas of responsibility. Confusingly, for people who do not
speak Burmese, these companies too are designated by number, such as MI14,
MI-20 etc.  In 1989 there were some 14 regional branches and 17
intelligence companies spread throughout the country.  There were also
separate branches for each of the three armed services. By 1992 the number
of branches had almost doubled to 23.  According to Bertil Lintner:

The new intelligence units cover some urban centers hit by demonstrations
[in 1988]... together with border areas fronting on Bangladesh, China and
India.

Some of these MIS companies are special units responsible for the
surveillance of armed forces personnel. A special MIS company has been
created to operate in the southern Tenasserim area. The DDSI also continues
to rely on thousands of agents and informers who spy on insurgents,
dissident groups, students and members of the public. As Amnesty
International has stated, 'Surveillance by Military Intelligence officers
of critics or people connected with critics of the government is pervasive
in Myanmar."

As a Directorate in the Ministry of Defense, the DDSI is formally based at
the ministry compound in central Rangoon, but its headquarters appears to
be located in Kone Myint Thaya, Mayangon Township, in north Rangoon.  It
also has a depot on Boundary Road in the center of the capital. The DDSI
also administers a number of detention and interrogation centers across
Burma, including the infamous Ye Kyi Aing (aka: Yai Kyi Aung) complex north
of Rangoon. This facility was reportedly opened following the 1962 military
coup and has, according to former detainees, 'been used continuously since
then for the interrogation and confinement of political prisoners.'
Amnesty International has stated that many of the people arrested in
Rangoon since the September 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations, and
particularly those arrested since July 1989 in connection with the
so-called 'communist and 'right- wing' plots, are thought to have been
interrogated in this center.

The instruction provided to Burma's intelligence operatives in recent years
has been reported by some observers as 'elementary.' Yet, a greater effort
has clearly been made by the SLORC to increase the quality and scope of the
training provided. There have also been reports that several countries have
provided training and other assistance to Burma's intelligence services
since 1988. China in particular has reportedly provided technical equipment
and training to the SLORC's intelligence agencies. Singapore has developed
a close relationship with the SLORC in recent years and is thought to be
training large members of Burmese 'secret police' at an institution in
central Singapore. There have also been persistent rumors that Israel's
Central Institute for Intelligence and Security (otherwise known as Mossad)
has provided training for Burma's intelligence agencies. (Israel is also
believed to have trained Burma's new anti-terrorist squad and the SLORC's
personal bodyguards.) All these claims, however, are very difficult to verify.

The public statements made by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, and the
publications issued in connection with the 'communist' end 'right-wing'
plots, give a good indication of the DDSI's current interests and
capabilities. It is clear, for example, that a major effort is put into
gathering information about the structure, membership, policies and methods
of various 'underground' and 'above ground' organizations. These range from
the Communist Party of Burma, insurgent armies and illegal opposition
groups, to dissident student movements and openly declared political
parties. Enormous resources have been put into building up personal dossiers
on known and suspected dissidents in Burma, members of the diplomatic
community and even foreign critics of the regime who live abroad. For
example, a book entitled Burma Communist Party's Conspiracy to take over
State Power, published by the SLORC in 1989, reproduces dozens of
biographies of 'subversives,' together with illustrations of confiscated
documents, book and photographs. 'Leftist' Literature seized from the homes
of arrested dissidents and shown to journalists ranged from the official
biography of North Korean leader Kim-II-sung to Armies of the Night by
American novelist Norman Mailer. Other materials displayed at a press
conference about the 'plot' included surveillance photographs of particular
suspects, as well as pamphlets, leaflets and other campaign literature
distributed during the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations. All had been
collected and filed by the DDSI to build up a comprehensive picture of an
alleged 'plot' by the CPB to infiltrate political parties and student
groups, and to cause civil unrest throughout the country, all with the aim
of seizing power.

Similarly, The Conspiracy of Treasonous Minions Within the Myanmar
Naing-Ngan and Traitorous Cohorts Abroad, another book, published by the
SLORC in 1989, also demonstrated the breadth of DDSI's interests.  To
support the SLORC's claim that it was the target of a "rightist plot,' this
book showed the results of what was described as a 'meticulous and careful
investigative operation' by Burma's intelligence agencies.  The book
reproduced numerous surveillance photographs, organizational charts,
dissident literature and intercepted correspondence. There were also
numerous illustrated biographies of insurgents, political dissidents and
critics of the regime. The people named in this publication covered a wide
range of positions and political opinions. They included US Senator Patrick
Moynihan, Rutgers University Professor Josef Silverstein, Burma scholar and
Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Bertil Lintner, Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO) leader Brang Seng, Karen National Union
(KNU) leader Bo Mya, and Dr. Raymond Tint Wai, Chairman of the Committee
for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB), who is based in
Australia. All this material was presented to invited journalists, to
support the SLORC's claim that there was a conspiracy to 'do great harm to
the country' by anti-government elements within Burma and abroad, including
certain foreign powers, by manipulating 'simple and honest people.'

>From the material illustrated in these two publications, and described at
related press conferences by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt (in his capacity
as Director General of the NIB), a number of conclusions can be drawn. It
would appear, for example, that the Burmese intelligence agencies
(primarily the DDSI) have a considerable capacity to monitor organizations
and individuals believed to constitute a threat to the regime. They are also
able to collect large amounts of information, both within Burma and abroad.
Much of this material is photographic and documentary, including reports
lodged under a range of regulations and martial law decrees.  The
intelligence agencies still seem heavily dependent on HUMINT, however,
resulting from state and mobile surveillance, agents provocateurs, and the
use of informers and infiltrators to report from within suspect groups. It
would also appear that the DDSI employs the full range of
counter-intelligence techniques, including the installation of secret
listening devices, telephone taps, mail interception and unauthorized
access to bank accounts.  It is possible that the DDSI even interferes with
diplomatic bags. Outside Burma, the DDSI maintains a close watch over the
many 'politicized Burmese exiles' living in places like the United Kingdom,
West Germany, Thailand, Australia and the United States. It is commonly
assumed, for example, that such groups are infiltrated by SLORC agents, a
belief that is probably welcomed by the regime. As Bertil Lintner has
written, "Among the Burmese community abroad, no one was ever sure who was
an informer or not; mutual suspicion neutralized them as a political force."

In addition to the evidence offered by these official publications, it is
apparent to any informed visitor to Burma that the DDSI continues to mount
a major counter-intelligence effort against foreigners, including local
diplomatic missions and their staff.  Diplomatic personnel posted to
Rangoon still complain of being watched, and assume as a matter of course
that their phones are tapped. Even now, they must obtain permission to
travel more than 25 kilometers from the Rangoon General Post Office,
although fewer areas than before are prohibited to them. Burmese officials
still face restrictions on their contacts with foreigners. Domestic
servants are stir] subject to interrogation about the activities and
personal beliefs of
particular diplomats they know.  Burmese nationals who enjoy close
relations with foreign diplomats are sometimes questioned about the beliefs
and the activities of their friends.

This surveillance effort is still extended to other foreign residents and
visitors to the country, although the much larger number of people now in
this category probably means that the DDSI has to be more selective. (A
major effort is being made to attract tourists to Burma, and visas are now
valid for two months. Temporary residence permits for business purposes are
also much easier to obtain.) Official attention is paid mostly to those
foreigners who are known to be critical of the military regime, or who are
in a position to influence wider perceptions of events in Burma, such as
journalists and academics. Evidence of the old xenophobia remains, however,
as clearly demonstrated by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt in a public
address in May 1997, during which he said:

It has become especially necessary to contain the undisciplined import of
foreign beliefs under the pretext of democracy and human rights, unfettered
freedom, and Western-style behavior, such as individualism, which
determines the family or Union spirit which the Myanmar people cherish. He
said it was necessary to contain efforts to promote the spread of Western
behavior and culture in the country.

Outside Rangoon, some regional airports still require visitors to register
their arrival and departure, and hotel owners are still required to report
foreign guests to the authorities within 24 hours of their arrival. 
Particular attention is paid by the DDSI to influential opposition figures
like Aung San Suu Kyi, (former) General Tin U and other senior members of
the NLD. For example, Aung San Suu Kyi's house on University Avenue in
Rangoon is kept under constant (and obvious) surveillance, both by
uniformed and plain-clothes officials. The crowd which [used to] gather
outside her gate on the weekends to hear her speak [were] usually
photographed by DDSI officers and, presumably, later identified for the
DDSI's records. Anyone actually paying a call on Aung San Suu Kyi is
required to register their name, occupation, nationality and passport
details in a register maintained by the DDSI at a small office just inside
her compound.  Anyone speaking to her on the telephone can expect to have
their conversation monitored by the DDSI and, if the conversation is not to
the regime's liking, even disconnected. This occurred in May 1996, for
example, when the authorities cut Aung San Suu Kyi's phone line in the
middle of a live telephone conversation interview with the BBC World
Service in London. The opposition leader had just finished commenting on
the Tatmadaw's role in Burmese politics.

Under the SLORC, the DDSI appears to be responsible for most reported
arrests and investigations of political suspects in Burma. It is also most
often accused of brutality and atrocities.  Organizations like Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch/Asia, for example, have documented
numerous cases of torture by different DDSI units. Those most often named
have been MI-6, MI-7 and MI-14, all based in Rangoon, and MI-16 in
Mandalay, but their reputation may derive simply from the fact that most
public reports have come from political activists and other dissidents
captured and interrogated in these population centers. For example,
accusations of human rights violations have also been levelled at MI-5,
based in Hpa-an and MI-4 in Bassein.  Amnesty International has stated that
prisoners have been ill-treat ed not only by the DDSI and its MIS units,
but also by the SID, and BSI.36 Sometimes people have been taken in and
beaten by military intelligence officers before being handed over to the
PPF, and formally arrested.  Amnesty International has identified 20
detention centers across Burma where brutal interrogations have taken
place. These include prisons, the main DDSI interrogation center at Ye Kyi
Aing camp and over a dozen other military intelligence centers located in
Rangoon and seven other divisions and states.  There are probably others
which have not yet come to the notice of international observers.
Although the DDSI/MIS has been described as 'one of Asia's most efficient
secret police forces,' and has clearly amassed enormous amounts of
information on particular Burmese organizations and personalities, its
coverage seems to be wider than it is deep. Even with all the personnel it
has at its command (including those of its sister agencies), it clearly
cannot cover everything it would like. It has in effect set itself the
target of monitoring the entire Burmese population, as well as everyone
outside the country who may conceivably constitute a threat to the regime.
This is an enormous task which would tax agencies much larger and better
equipped than DDSI. It also appears that the influence of the DDSI is
resented by other members of the SLORC, who draw parallels between Khin
Nyunt and ambitious chiefs of intelligence in the past. Should a power
struggle occur, then Khin Nyunt is unlikely to find any great support among
other parts of the Tatmadaw, which reportedly fears the DDSI's power and
resents its surveillance of their own activities.

The ability of the DDSI staff accurately to analyze all the information it
manages to obtain, is unclear. Over the years, the military regime has
repeatedly demonstrated its deep-seated insecurity and its ability to manage
criticism (both from within Burma and overseas) in a considered and
rational fashion. Sometimes, the regime's fears seem to border on paranoia,
as occurred in 1989 when the SLORC imagined that it was about to face a
sea- and airborne invasion by the United States.  In such a climate,
balance and self-critical assessments are likely to be difficult. The
intelligence
agencies have been able to choose the best recruits, but political
reliability has often been judged more important than intellectual qualities
or a knowledge of the world outside of Burma. There will also be the
problem, in such a closed society, of intelligence officers being reluctant
to give honest views, for fear of themselves falling under suspicion. In
addition, the power and privileges enjoyed by the Tatmadaw, and the members
of the country's intelligence agencies in particular, set them apart from
the rest of the population. They clearly do not share the hardships, fears
and aspirations of most Burmese. Even with their vast networks of
informers, it seems difficult for the intelligence agencies accurately to
gauge the popular mood and predict the behavior of the average Burmese
citizen in certain circumstances.

As a consequence of all these factors, the DDSI has been guilty of some
remarkable lapses since 1988, requiring major reorganizations from time to
timed Following the massive internal unrest that year, for example,
surveillance of both the armed forces and civil population greatly
increased. The regime was badly shaken by the size and extent of the
pro-democracy demonstrations, and was particularly concerned that members
of all three armed services marched with the demonstrators.  Even some
members of the BSI reportedly joined the protests against continuing
military rule. The potential for dissident elements within the armed forces
to provoke a mutiny, or cause a major split, is something that has
attracted the closest attention from the DDSI. This concern grew even
further after the 1990 general elections. The poll demonstrated among other
things that a large proportion of Burma's population, including many in the
Tatmadaw itself, supported a return to democratic ruled The fact that the
regime permitted free and fair elections to be held at all, suggests that
it had intelligence advice predicting either that the pro SLORC National
Unity Party would win outright, or that it could form a governing coalition
with one or two smaller parties which were sympathetic to military rule.
Instead, the elections resulted in a landslide victory for the opposition
NED, forcing
the SLORC to renege on its promise to hand over power to an elected
civilian government.

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ANNOUCEMENTS

ASIA UPSTREAM CONFERENCE ON INT'L EXPLORATION
- OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN BURMA
13 January, 1998

9-11 March 1998 in Singapore

State of Asia's Upstream Industry (Session 1, Day 1)
TOTAL: E & P in Asia- an Outlook (10:15- 10:45)
Asian Hydrocarbons and Promise
Thailand, Myanmar & Indonesian Oppotunities
by Andrew Johnson, GM, Exploration new Ventures, Singpore

Indochina & Myanmar (Session 4, Day 1)
1. E: Myanmar Oil & Gas Developments (16:30- 17:00)
Yadana & Yetagun Gas Developments
Offshore Acreage Opportunities
Onshore Potential & Oil Projects
by U Tin Myint, Director, Myanma Oil & Gas Enterprise, Yangon, Myanmar

2. Asia: Gas Challenges and the Future (17:00- 17:30)
SEAsia Gas Outlook
Key Projects in Myanmar- Thailand
Issues, Risks & Strategies
by David Melzer OBE, Former Director, Premier Oil, London

3. Open Forum Discussion (17:30- 17:40)
Moderator: Dr. Jimmy Aung Khin, MD, AFKA Co. Pty Ltd, Singapore


Moe Kyaw Thu
Ocean Research Institute
University of Tokyo

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RAINFOREST RELIEF REPORT
13 January 1998

Rainforest Relief recently released a report entitled "TEAK IS TORTURE:
Forced Labor Logging in Burma, which accounts numerous instances of the use
of forced labor by the military currently in power in Burma to extract
hardwoods from in and around villages.  Much of this wood is exported (a
lot is smuggled) to Thailand, where it becomes furniture and lumber for
yachts and flooring for markets around the world, including the US.

RR's International Teak Week  of Action will again take place this summer
(date to be announce). To find out how you can help (there is undoubtedly
teak being used or sold near you) visit the Rainforest Relief web site at
http://www.envirolink.org/orgs/rainrelief, or call or email us at
718/832-6775; <relief@xxxxxxx>

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CALL FOR LETTER S TO DAVID JONES IN AUSTRALIA
13 January 1998

Free Burma Coalition, Australia

David Jones of Australia is buying wrinkle free shirts from a cloathing
manufacturer in Burma.

David Jones have said they would "change the source of these goods" after
receiving a letter of protest from Kerrie Griffin, Australian Council for
Overseas Aid.

David Jones, a huge Australian retail outlet, has agreed to look at options
to buying wrinkle free shirts in Burma.  Ms Margaret Mackenzie, Group
Merchandise Director, said that this would not be a quick process and she
hoped we understood that.

Please help make this process a little quicker.

Ms M MacKenzie
Group Merchandise Director
David Jones
86-108 Castlereagh Street
Sydney NSW 2000
Australia
Fax:  (02) 9267 3895
Tel:  (02) 9266 5010

Working for the:

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma
Federation of Trade Unions, Burma
Australia Burma Council

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BURMA ROUNDTABLE, VANCOUVER
January 8, 1998

Burmese activists, friends of Burma and democracy met for the second Burma
Roundtable, Vancouver, on January 6, 1998. It was attended by over 30
members.  Topics discussed were the recent changes in Burma, building
community harmony, a soon-to-be published journal, and plans were made to
launch a campaign against stores carrying "dirty clothes" manufactured in
Burma. A Coordinating body of five very active activists was set up to
coordinate the activities of activist groups and promote 
greater community harmony. The next Roundtable will meet in the first week
of February. 

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FREE BURMA SYMPOSIUM REVIEW
13 January 1998


The Free Burma Symposium at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis was
a tremendous success. 

We officially announced the introduction of Selective Purchasing in the
Minneapolis City Council.  Selective Purchasing will now go into
sub-commitee review, and we will keep vigilant on the Council.

The MFBC is now moving on to securing Selective Purchasing and Divestment
with vigor in our public protest and lobbying  campaigns.  We expect
success soon.

Mick Schommer
Minnesota Free Burma Coalition (MFBC)

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