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: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION, REPOR
- Subject: : PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION, REPOR
- From: moe@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 16:27:00
FILE ID:97120402.EEA
DATE:12/04/97
TITLE:04-12-97 TEXT: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION, REPORT ON U.S. BURMA POLICY
TEXT:
(SLORC made no progress toward Burma democracy, life) (3940)
Washington -- President Clinton transmitted to Congress December 2 a
required report on conditions in Burma and U.S. policy toward Burma
for the period from March 28 - September 28, 1997.
A U.S. statute (Public Law 104-208) requires that such reports be
given to Congress every six months.
"The people of Burma," the report says, "continue to live under a
highly authoritarian military regime that is widely condemned for its
serious human rights abuses. The military regime in Burma, the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), has made no progress in the
past six months in moving toward greater democratization, nor has it
made any progress toward fundamental improvement in the quality of
life of the people of Burma.
"Observers agree that the Burmese economy appears to be further
weakening and that the government has a serious shortage of foreign
exchange reserves with which to pay for imports. Money from the
trafficking of illicit narcotics likely accounts for a substantial net
inflow of what foreign exchange is coming in. The SLORC continues to
dominate the political, economic and social life of the country in the
same arbitrary, heavy-handed way that it has since seizing power in
September 1988 after harshly suppressing massive pro-democracy
demonstrations."
The report states that U.S. policy toward Burma seeks progress in
three key areas: democracy, human rights, and counternarcotics.
"We have taken strong measures to pressure the SLORC to end its
repression and move towards democratic government. Since 1989, the
United States has been unable to certify that Burma has cooperated in
efforts against narcotics. The United States has suspended economic
aid, withdrawn GSP and OPIC, implemented an arms embargo, blocked
assistance from international financial institutions, downgraded our
representation from Ambassador to Charge, and imposed visa
restrictions on senior leaders and their families."
In addition, the President signed Executive Order 13047 which imposes
a ban on new investment by U.S. persons in Burma effective May 21,
1997.
The United States, the report says, is engaged in vigorous
multilateral diplomacy to encourage ASEAN, Japan, the EU, and other
nations to take similar actions to encourage progress by the SLORC.
"The EU imposed visa restrictions similar to ours and, earlier this
year, withdrew GSP. Canada also withdrew GSP in August, imposed a
requirement that all Canadian exports be issued an export permit prior
to shipment to Burma, and issued a government statement discouraging
further investment in Burma by Canadian firms. Japan's suspension of
much of its bilateral aid program remains in force," the report says.
"The net effect of these U.S. and international measures has been a
further decline of investor confidence in Burma and deeper stagnation
of the Burmese economy," according to the report. "While Burma's
economic crisis is largely a result of the SLORC's own heavy-handed
mismanagement, the SLORC is unlikely to find a way out of the crisis
unless political developments permit an easing of international
pressure."
Following are the official texts of the determination and the report:
(begin text)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
December 2, 1997
Presidential Determination
No. 98-6
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Report to Congress Regarding Conditions in Burma and U.S.
Policy Toward Burma
Pursuant to the requirements set forth under the heading "Policy
Toward Burma" in section 570(d) of the FY 1997 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act (Public Law 104-208), a report is required every 6
months following enactment concerning:
1) progress toward democratization in Burma;
2) progress on improving the quality of life of the Burmese people,
including progress on market reforms, living standards, labor
standards, use of forced labor in the tourism industry, and
environmental quality; and
3) progress made in developing a comprehensive, multilateral strategy
to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and the
quality of life in Burma, including the development of a dialogue
between the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and
democratic opposition groups in Burma.
You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit the attached report
fulfilling this requirement to the appropriate committees of the
Congress and to arrange for publication of this memorandum in the
Federal Register.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
(end text)
(begin report text)
REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN BURMA
AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA
FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 28, 1997-SEPTEMBER 28, 1997
In accordance with Section 570(d) of the FY97 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act (Public Law 104-208)
The people of Burma continue to live under a highly authoritarian
military regime that is widely condemned for its serious human rights
abuses. The military regime in Burma, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC), has made no progress in the past six
months in moving toward greater democratization, nor has it made any
progress toward fundamental improvement in the quality of life of the
people of Burma.
Observers agree that the Burmese economy appears to be further
weakening and that the government has a serious shortage of foreign
exchange reserves with which to pay for imports. Money from the
trafficking of illicit narcotics likely accounts for a substantial net
inflow of what foreign exchange is coming in. The SLORC continues to
dominate the political, economic and social life of the country in the
same arbitrary, heavy-handed way that it has since seizing power in
September 1988 after harshly suppressing massive pro-democracy
demonstrations.
U.S. policy toward Burma seeks progress in three key areas: democracy,
human rights, and counternarcotics. We have taken strong measures to
pressure the SLORC to end its repression and move towards democratic
government. Since 1989, the United States has been unable to certify
that Burma has cooperated in efforts against narcotics. The United
States has suspended economic aid, withdrawn GSP and OPIC, implemented
an arms embargo, blocked assistance from international financial
institutions, downgraded our representation from Ambassador to Charge,
and imposed visa restrictions on senior leaders and their families.
In addition, the President signed Executive Order 13047 invoking the
authority of section 570(d) of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 and of
section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to
impose a ban on new investment by U.S. persons in Burma effective May
21, 1997. The order prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any of the
following activities if they are undertaken pursuant to an agreement,
or pursuant to the exercise of rights under such an agreement, that is
entered into with the Government of Burma or a nongovernmental entity
in Burma on or after May 21, 1997:
-- entering a new contract that includes the economic development of
resources located in Burma;
-- entering a new contract providing for the general supervision and
guarantee of another person's performance of a contract that includes
the economic development of resources located in Burma;
-- the purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity interest,
in the economic development of resources located in Burma; or
-- entering into a contract providing for the participation in
royalties, earnings, or profits in the economic development of
resources located in Burma, without regard to the form of the
participation.
Additionally, the executive order prohibits:
-- persons from facilitating transactions of foreign persons that
would violate any of the foregoing prohibitions if engaged in by a
U.S. person; and
-- any transaction by a U.S. person or within the United States that
evades or avoids, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions in
the order.
We are engaged in vigorous multilateral diplomacy to encourage ASEAN,
Japan, the EU, and other nations to take similar steps and/or other
actions to encourage progress by the SLORC in these areas of key
concern. The EU imposed visa restrictions similar to ours and, earlier
this year, withdrew GSP. Canada also withdrew GSP in August, imposed a
requirement that all Canadian exports be issued an export permit prior
to shipment to Burma, and issued a government statement discouraging
further investment in Burma by Canadian firms. Japan's suspension of
much of its bilateral aid program remains in force.
The net effect of these U.S. and international measures has been a
further decline of investor confidence in Burma and deeper stagnation
of the Burmese economy. While Burma's economic crisis is largely a
result of the SLORC's own heavy-handed mismanagement, the SLORC is
unlikely to find a way out of the crisis unless political developments
permit an easing of international pressure.
Measuring Progress Toward Democratization
In the past six months the SLORC has shown no sign of willingness to
cede its hold on absolute power. Since refusing to recognize the
results of the free and fair 1990 elections in which the National
League for Democracy (NLD) won a vast majority of both the popular
vote and the parliamentary seats, the generals have continued to
reline to negotiate with pro-democracy forces and ethnic groups for a
genuine political settlement to allow a return to the rule of law and
respect for basic human rights. Although SLORC Secretary-1 Lt. General
Khin Nyunt did relent in response to prompting by ASEAN nations and
Japan and agreed to meet with NLD Chairman Aung Shwe in July, the lack
of substance of the meeting made clear that the SLORC remains
unprepared to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi or to discuss meaningful
steps toward resolving the political crisis in Burma with the NLD.
This was reinforced with the subsequent sentencing of four NLD
members, all close associates of Aung San Suu Kyi, to lengthy prison
terms after closed trials, and the continued attacks on Aung San Suu
Kyi in the government-controlled press.
The SLORC claims that the military-dominated National Convention is an
appropriate forum for dialogue with the NLD and parties representing
the country's ethnic minorities. But the National Convention, a body
ostensibly tasked since 1993 with drafting a new constitution, is not
a democratic forum as currently structured. The Convention is
overwhelmingly made up of delegates hand-picked by the SLORC, which
has carefully stage-managed the proceedings and ignored even limited
opposition views. The SLORC appears determined to draft a constitution
that would ensure a dominant role for the military forces in the
country's future political structure. The NLD withdrew from the
National Convention in November 1995 because of the undemocratic
nature of the institution and was formally ejected by the SLORC in
December of that year. However, the Convention has not met since
mid-1996, and the SLORC's current plans for the body are unclear.
The worsening narcotics situation in Burma reflects the SLORC's
disregard for the rule of law. Burma is the world's largest source of
illicit opium, and output increased by an estimated 9 percent in 1996
to 2,560 metric tons. Nevertheless, Burmese law enforcement actions
against producers and traffickers remain limited. Leading trafficker
Khun Sa, who "surrendered" to Burmese forces in early 1996, has never
been brought to justice. Even as heroin production remains high,
Burmese traffickers are also diversifying into methamphetamines, which
are posing severe problems for neighboring states. As well,
traffickers are increasingly investing in legitimate sectors of the
economy, and there is reason to believe that drug profits are being
laundered through the Burmese economy at substantial levels. The SLORC
has taken limited actions to counter this dangerous trend.
Measuring Progress on Improving the Quality of Life
In the past six months the quality of life of the Burmese has
worsened. The SLORC's severe violations of human rights have
continued. There continue to be credible reports, particularly from
ethnic minority-dominated areas along the Thai border, that soldiers
have committed serious human rights abuses, including rape, forced
porterage, and extrajudicial killing. Disappearances continue, and
members of the security forces beat and otherwise abuse detainees.
Arbitrary arrests and detentions continue for expression of dissenting
political views. Several hundred, if not more, political prisoners
remain in detention, including 29 Members of Parliament elected in
1990. Prison conditions remain deplorable and prisoners are subject to
a lack of food and adequate medical care. As an example, U Tin Shwe, a
former NLD Central Executive Committee member, died in Insein prison
in June after prison authorities refused to allow him to see medical
specialists to obtain treatment for his heart condition.
The SLORC reinforces its rule via a pervasive security apparatus led
by military intelligence and sharply restricts basic rights to free
speech, press, assembly and association. Political party activity
remains severely restricted. The activities of the NLD and Aung San
Sun Kyi are monitored and circumscribed by the regime. Since late last
year Aung San Suu Kyi has been prevented from addressing party
supporters in front of her house, as the SLORC puts up blockades to
prevent gatherings there.
In response to street protests by large groups of students in November
and December 1996, the SLORC closed the nation's schools and
universities. While the SLORC finally reopened primary schools in
August of this year, universities remain closed to prevent another
outbreak of student protest.
Prior to the onset of the rainy season in June, the Burmese Army
continued its assault begun in February on the forces of the Karen
National Union near the Thai border. Up to 20,000 Karen were forced to
flee into Thailand, the vast majority of them civilians, including
women, children and the elderly. Thousands of civilians were forcibly
conscripted to serve as porters for the Burma Army in its offensive.
The Democratic Kayin Buddhist Association (DKBA), with the support of
the Burmese army, attacked refugee camps in Thailand, burning shelters
and destroying the meager possessions of hundreds of refugees as well.
Thousands of other citizens of Burma remain in exile because of fear
of persecution and poor economic conditions. About 21,000 Rohingya
Muslims from Arakan state remain in camps in Bangladesh. A few
thousand students and dissidents remain in exile in Thailand.
Approximately 119,000 individuals now reside in ethnic minority camps
along the Thai-Burma border, among them thousands of new arrivals
driven out by army attacks in the areas controlled by the Karen and
Karenni ethnic minorities.
Burma is a poor country, with an average per capita GDP of perhaps
$200 to $300. Even after adjusting for the relative purchasing power
of the Burmese currency, per capita GDP is perhaps $600 to $900.
Progress on market reforms has been mixed and uneven. Beginning in
1988 the Government partly opened the economy to permit expansion of
the private sector and to attract foreign investment. Though modest
economic improvement ensued, since 1993 the pace of economic reform
has slowed and major obstacles to further reform persist. These
include disproportionately large military spending, extensive overt
and covert state involvement in economic activity, excessive state
monopolization of leading exports, a bloated bureaucracy prone to
arbitrary and opaque governance, and poor human and physical
infrastructure. In addition, the SLORC does not have access to
external credit from the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank.
Money laundering in Burma is a growing problem, and the laundering of
drug profits is thought by some analysts to have a widespread impact
on the Burmese economy.
Since June, the Kyat has depreciated in value on the open market quite
rapidly, briefly rising to a level of almost 300 Kyats to the dollar
before the government stepped in and briefly detained foreign exchange
dealers. Currently, legal foreign exchange dealers are allowed to sell
Kyats at a rate of roughly 200 Kyats to the dollar, though the
official rate remains six to the dollar. In an effort to stem the loss
of scarce foreign exchange reserves, the government imposed strict
import and remittance controls on the private sector in July, allowing
companies to remit only $50,000 in profits overseas and permitting
importers to bring in only $50,000 worth of goods per month. Foreign
investors still operating in Burma note that the situation regarding
remittance controls is untenable. Should such controls continue, the
climate for foreign investment in Burma will be even more seriously
damaged than it already has been by the U.S. ban on new investment and
by consumer-led boycotts in the West. In June, the government raised
gasoline prices for most consumers from 25 Kyat to 180 Kyats per
gallon, causing a concomitant rise in the price of transportation for
most Burmese and further fueling the serious rise in inflation in the
country, which was estimated to be over 40 percent during the month of
August.
Despite rampant inflation, the government has thus far been able to
maintain a stable and low price for rice. However, severe monsoon
flooding throughout much of Burma in July and August, concentrated
particularly in rice-growing regions of central Burma and in the
Irrawaddy delta region, could severely impact the country's main
monsoon rice crop and lead to a serious rise in the price of rice.
The Government restricts worker rights and uses forced labor on a
widespread basis. The use of porters by the army -- with attendant
mistreatment, illness, and even death for those compelled to serve --
remains a common practice. Although the use of forced labor on some
infrastructure development projects appeared to be lessening as 1997
progressed, the military authorities nonetheless continue to force
ordinary citizens (including women and children) to "contribute" their
labor, often under harsh working conditions, on construction projects
in some parts of the country. Some of these projects -- such as the
moat of the Mandalay fort -- were undertaken to promote tourism to the
country. In the past year, the military has begun using soldiers
instead of civilians at certain infrastructure projects, following the
issuance of directives in 1995 to end the practice of forced civilian
labor. Child labor continues to be a serious problem.
As a largely underdeveloped country, Burma, with a rapid population
growth rate, faces increasing pressure on environmental quality.
Although the government has taken some steps to stem widespread
clear-cutting, Burma's large tracts of remaining tropical forest
remain under intense commercial exploitation. Some NGOs have charged
that Burma's teak forests in the Thai-Burma border area are being
rapidly destroyed by clear-cutting and deforestation. Because of the
severe restrictions on Embassy travel to outlying parts of Burma, it
is difficult to document the overall extent of the problem.
The poor quality of life is also reflected in rising drug abuse.
Burmese estimates put the addict population at approximately 60,000,
but UNDCP and NGOs working in the health sector estimate the actual
number is at least five times that figure. Intravenous use of heroin
is contributing to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. Drug treatment
services are not reaching most drug users because of a lack of
facilities and a lack of properly trained personnel. Addiction and the
spread of HIV/AIDS have become cross-border problems in China as well,
particularly in Yunnan province, on Burma's northern border.
Development of a Multilateral Strategy
The goals of U.S. policy toward Burma are progress toward democracy,
improved human rights, and more effective counternarcotics efforts.
Failing national reconciliation, Burma will not be able to address
systematically the many severe problems it faces, including narcotics
trafficking and abuse, a low level of education, and poor economic
performance.
In recent months we have forged a vigorous multilateral strategy to
seek improvement in our key areas of concern. We continue to consult
about Burma regularly and at senior levels with leaders of ASEAN
nations, Japan, Korea, the European Union, Australia, Canada, and
other countries having major trading and investment interests in
Burma. These efforts have helped build and maintain strong
international pressure on the SLORC. While acknowledging that it was
their decision to make, we urged ASEAN to postpone offering membership
in that organization to Burma this summer in light of the SLORC's
abysmal record on human rights and counternarcotics. Despite our
arguments that Burma under its current leadership has far to go to
emulate the kinds of constructive policies that ASEAN itself has
pursued for the past three decades, ASEAN leaders decided to pursue
their stated policy of constructive engagement with Burma by bringing
it into the organization on July 23. At the subsequent
post-ministerial conference in Kuala Lumpur, Secretary Albright made
very clear to ASEAN leaders her expectation that ASEAN will now seek
results from that policy by persuading the SLORC to begin a meaningful
political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD and to take
effective steps against drug production and export.
The key to progress toward democracy and human rights is, first and
foremost, a direct dialogue about the political future of the country
among the SLORC, the NLD, and the ethnic minorities. In all our public
and private messages to the SLORC, leaders of third countries, and
other interested parties, we stress the importance of beginning such a
dialogue as the key to achieving significant progress in Burma. At the
same time, we urge them to press Burma for progress in the
counternarcotics area. We work closely with our friends and allies in
Asia and Europe to press the SLORC to begin dialogue. In response,
leaders from ASEAN nations, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the European
Union have urged the regime, both publicly and privately, to move to
dialogue with the democratic opposition and to curb drug production
and trafficking.
In order to urge the SLORC to make progress in our areas of concern,
we have taken a number of steps: suspending economic aid, withdrawing
GSP and OPIC, implementing an arms embargo, blocking assistance from
international financial institutions, downgrading our representation
from Ambassador to Charge, imposing visa restrictions on senior regime
leaders and their families, and implementing a ban on new investment
by U.S. persons. We likewise have encouraged ASEAN, Japan, the EU, and
other nations to take similar steps and other actions to encourage
progress by the SLORC in these areas of key concern. Many nations join
us in our arms embargo, including European countries, Canada,
Australia, Japan and Korea. The EU and Japan limit their assistance to
Burma to humanitarian aid and, for Japan, debt relief. Our efforts in
the international financial institutions continue to be successful in
blocking loans to the SLORC, which is probably the single most
important sanction we have against the regime. Since 1988 we have
taken an active role in pressing for strong human rights resolutions
on Burma at the United Nations General Assembly and the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, as well as having worked vigorously in the ILO to
condemn the lack of freedom of association for workers and the use of
forced labor by the SLORC.
Late last year, at our urging, the EU and associated European states
joined us in imposing a ban on visas for high-level SLORC officials
and their families. In addition, the European Union and Canada
withdrew GSP trade benefits from Burma's agricultural and industrial
products in March and August respectively, bringing their trade
policies in line with the U.S. ban on GSP.
ASEAN shares many of our goals with regard to Burma, but we disagree
on the means to achieve those goals. ASEAN believes that "constructive
engagement" of the SLORC is the most effective way to promote positive
change in Burma. We will continue to raise our strong concerns about
the situation in Burma with ASEAN and urge continued steps to
encourage progress by the SLORC.
(end report text)