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SLORC to SPDC--- Gimick or real pol
SLORC TO SPDC---GIMMICK OR REAL POLITIC
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(1) Soon after the unprecedented brutal crackdown on
innocent unarmed students and civilians protestors in
1988, the Burma Socialist Programmee Party, which military
ruled the country for long 26 years under the fascist
command of General Ne Win, changed its name to State Law
and order Restoration Council (SLORC). People of Burma saw
a ray of hope then because SLORC promised holding general
elections and transfer power to the civilian elected
government. Inspite of all its Satanic calculations and
tactical precautions, SLORC received a big jolt as the
National League for Democracy, under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's
leadership, swept the elections and baffled by the
elections results, power- addict SLORC lost no time in back
tracking from its pre-election commitment to transfer power
to the elected NLD an one pretext or the other. Rather,
SLORC embarked on a well-planned programmee to consolidate
its hold over the country by restoring brutal and inhuman
oppression of pro-democracy forces which led to killing,
arresting and torturing all political opponents, including
children, women, students, old people and ethnic minority.
With the ready support of China's huge arms supply, the
land of peace-loving people of Burma was turned into a
killing field, in total defiance of all international
appeals.
(2) Against this painful, living memory, the change of
SLORC to SPDC is look upon as another political gimmick by
the military junta, both inside and outside Burma. The SLORC
had became synonymous with evil-incarnate and hence there
might have been a real need to change its name to generate
stronger support within ASEAN and improve its image for a
favorable deal in the European Union, U.S. and international
community. Explaining the formation of new outfit, the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the junta has claimed
that it meant a real move towards democracy. In the SPDC
notification No 1/97, signed by Senior General Than Shwe,
junta has claimed that reconstitution was undertaken to
ensure the Development of an orderly and democratic system
and to establish a peaceful, modern state. Our living memory
and experience is too heart-breaking and nothing short of
real, substantive and open transfer of power to Aung San Suu
Kyi's led NLD can convince us of any chance. We do not even
feel that any minor or major concessions are in the
offering. Political analysts over the world also see the
change in name as tactical, meaningless and even farcical.
But, as committed soldiers of democracy and peace, it our
duty to analyse the internal permutations and combinations
within the Junta so as to more clearly decide our own
strategy to dethrone the Junta. A cynical disregard of the
dynamics and contradictions within the junta would be only
too simplistic. It is necessary to engage in deeper
political analysis to strengthen our pro-democracy
movement.
(3) The 18 members new SPDC outfit has been formed with
whole set of newly promoted Regional Commanders, Chiefs of
Air force and Navy, though the top four in the previous
outfit remain at the helm of officers. These four, Than
Shwe, Maung Aye, Khin Nyunt and Tin Oo held the post or
Chairman, Vice-Chairman. Secretary (1) and Secretary (2) in
the SLORC respectedly. But certain significant changes
caused by the reconstitution into SPDC are worth noticing.
First, in the new outfit, post of a Secretary (3) has been
created and Lt-General Win Myint, a known Khin Nyunt
loyalist has occupied the post. This Secretary (3) will look
after and control the ten most powerful combatant forces
under the name of Light Infantry Division (LID). These
forces operate independently at the Regional Commands and
they constitute the major tool for the military
establishment to suppress the anti fascist movement.
Secondly, while secretary (1) Khin Nyunt has taken over
change of the most important foreign and home affairs,
secretary (2) Tin Oo has been allocated the less significant
affairs of Development, trade and commerce.
(4) It is well known that all the senior members of
government and military services of the former SLORC had
ganged up in full support of Maung Aye, Tin Oo clique and
were opposed to Khin Nyunt now do not figure at all in the
new SPDC outfit. Even Lt- General Tin Hla, a strong
pro-Maung Aye-Tin Oo figure, considered to be a successor of
vice-Chairman of Maung Aye, has been denied any position in
SPDC; he has to satisfy himself with a ministerial post. In
fact, many of the senior, powerful members, of SLORC had
been kept out of SPDC. However, be inducting these members
into newly formed Advisary Board, the powers-that-be have
sought to kill two birds on the one hand, by doing so they
have seated the anger of these disgrantted military
officers, and, on the other hand, it is an attempt to hide
from public attention the internal gang-war going in within
the military establishment.
(5) It is important to point out that at least small
section within the ruling military junta is strongly
"patriotic" and self- respecting, in terns of resisting
total subjugation of the country under China. For quite some
time, Lt-Gen Sein Aung and Lt- Gen Chit Swe have been angry
over the increasing Chinese influence in Burma affairs..
they have have repeatedly and strongly criticised their own
outfit, SLORC for its over indulgence with giant dragon
China.
(6) Another indication of infighting within SLORC is the
secret, inofficial agreement signed by Lt-General Myint
Aung after the SLORC take over in 1988. Though the
contents of the agreement are yet to know, this agreement,
signed in the first commanders meeting in 1989 and by the
four prominent military officers who had total control of
most of the strategic region of Burma, is of great
important to SPDC. Hence, according to recent reports, Tun
Kyi, Kyaw Ba and Myint Aung have been intimidated and
interrogated by Khin Nyunt's MIS (Military Intelligent
Service), apparently for reasons related to this agreement.
However, the widespread unofficial belief is that they were
interrogated in connection with corruption charge. It is
difficult to arrive at any conclusion since virtually all
military officials from top to bottom are deal in
corruption and most of them have amassed huge wealth during
a short period.
(7) Interestingly, all these changes have occurred soon
after the return of the infamous dictator Ne Win after his
visit to Indonesia and Singapore. Ne Win had met with his
old time friends- Indonesian dictator, General Suharto and
Singaporean strongman Lee Kuan Yew, Presumably, Ne Win had
detailed discussion about the political crisis within Burma
and they must have worked out certain strategic plans. It is
widely believed that the latest change of name from SLORC to
SPDC and the major reshuffling of officials, including the
expulsion of many former strongmen are all part of Ne Win's
plan to strengthen the military junta's grip over power. It
is also indicative of the fact that real political
strategy and reigns of power remain with Ne Win.
(8) What has been analyzed above is also borne out by a
recounting of events and incidents during the last couple
of years. Since 1995, the Maung Aye-Tin Oo gang outnumbered
and dominated Khin Nyunt and the five of his confidants. The
former gang successfully checkmated the authority of Khin
Nyunt. A clear example is that Than Shwe issued the order
for release of Aung San Suu Kyi (after six years of house
arrest) just the day after Khin Nyunt had announced through
the foreign media about the impossibility of her release in
near future. Further, while Khin Nyunt was engaged in
negotiation with the Karen National Union (KNU, the long
powerful ethnic group which is continues its fight against
the Rangoon junta) after a temporary cease-fire in
1996/1997, then commanders of Southeastern Military
Command, Major General Ket Sein, a known loyal to the Maung
Aye-Tin Oo gang, violated the cease-fire by launching an
offensive against the KNU, bluntly declaring that the army
had nothing to do with Intelligence (MIS) and that he did
not care about what the MIS did. A according to a disclosure
by a MIS spy (Second Lieutenant rank arrested by democratic
forces in India last April), the internal contradiction
between the gangs of Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye-Tin Oo gang
deployed about twenty thousands of troops under their
command in the Burmese capital, Rangoon, without even
informing Maj-Gen Khin Maung Than, commander of Rangoon
Regional Military Command and trusted Khin Nyunt follower.
This is perhaps the most consequential infighting within
SLORC since its formation. The two rival group are thus
engaged in an open-secret power struggle. One issue of the
infighting is the successor to Maung Aye.. presently Vice-
Chairman and the projected successor to Chairman Than Shwe
who is scheduled to step down in March 1997 after the
Resistance Day (renamed as Arm Forces Day by the junta)
celebrations. Maung Aye-Tin Oo gang have projected their
henchman Lt-General Tin Hla for Vice- Chairmanship. It seems
such infighting is the major cause dealing to confusion and
unpredictability about the resignation schedule of the
Chairmen.
(9) In April 1997, a parcel bomb blasted at the residence
of secretary (2) Tin Oo causing the death of his daughter.
Secretary 9!) and MIS chief Khin Nyunt has accused
pro-democracy activists from Japan for this incident, though
without any prima facile evidence. Japanese authorities
denied Khin Nyunt's false allegations. As a result, some
sections of SLORC officials lost confidence in Khin Nyunt's
MIS. Several top SLORC's officials formed their private
intelligence corps for self-protection. Personal fear seems
to have overpowered these officials and they dare not
venture out without their own private security outfits. This
is a direct affront to the commanding position of the MIS
apparatus which constitutes the heart of the military
establishment. It also amounts to a real challenge to the
unofficial authority of Ne Win and his lieutenant Khin
Nyunt.
(10) Ganging the seriousness of these developments, Ne Win
came out of his hybernation in September last and has
jumped into the fray of infighting and power struggle in
SLORC. He is reported to have called his erstwhile
lieutenant but now estranged Maung Aye and Tin Oo to his Ady
Road compound and kept them under close vigil for about a
month. Ne Win attempted to persuade them to bury their
differences with Khin Nyunt unitedly face the "danger" and
"challenge" of the revitalised democratic forces.
(11) It seems most major developments in the recent past,
including the change of SLORC into SPDC, are outcomes of
the game plan of master brain Ne Win on the other hand and
factional infighting within SLORC on other. At the moment,
it seems Khin Nyunt and co has emerged victorious by
relegating Maung Aye- Tin Oo gang to the backseat. Khin
Nyunt has successfully planted his trusted lieutenants in
major, important positions. The larger game plan of Ne Win
Khin Nyunt is to install a hand-packed "civilian government'
in Rangoon by 2000, while relaining the real power within
junta. That involves a manipulated conclusion of the sham
Convention and validating a constitution where in the Army
retains a prominent place in affairs of state and
governance.
(12) While the factional infighting by the junta power
brothers is for all the democratic forces see, the Vacuity
and vulnerability of SLORC-turn SPDC in more than clear to
us. First, the SPDC has no courage to hold an open
referendum for popular approval of their draft, new
constitution. Second, if they have to install a civilian
government, be it puppet or hand-packed, they have to hold
fresh elections. But do they have the courage and
confidence to hold another general elections? The
humiliation, the pain, the shock and helplessness of the
1990 verdict is too fresh in their memory! The SPDC might
plan to declare second highest vote-setter as declared
elected after expelling, (forced) voluntary resignation or
(killed) death of the first-highest vote- setter by the
junta's own Election Law of 1988. If we the 1990 election
results, we find that the junta-supported the National
Unity Party (NUP) candidates got second position in most of
the constituencies. Now that a large number of 1990 elected
NLD's M.Ps have been expelled, forced to resign of flee the
country, a good number of NUP candidates with second
position are ready to state their claims. It these people
are allowed to manipulate the election verdict, they would
not only try to mange approval of the junta- constitution,
they would also form a puppet government of SPEC. Part of
the game would be to retain Than Shwe as Chairman till the
"civilian government" is installed. Once all this is
achieved, Prime Ministerial red carpet would be laid for
Khin Nyunt. None within the junta dare to challenge Khin
Nyunt's candidature and the military politics of Ne
Win-Khin Nyunt duo.
To conclude, our preliminary analysis of the situation in
Burma, on the basis of very restricted information though,
indicates that "Ne Win is in COMMAND". Ne Win's choice
Khin Nyunt seems to have taken over the reigns of SPDC,
relegating Maung Aye- Tin Oo gang to a secondary position.
No doubt, the newly promoted to regional commander posts and
inducted members of SPDC, will play a significant role in
the future cause. Both faction within SPDC will try to
pocket these members as well as win the confidence of some
sections of the general public (through deception or
coercion) who wins in this game remains obscure. But what
is no obscurse for us, all democratic forces within and
outside Burma, is that our struggle has reached a new phase
which is much more complex and critical than ever. Today, we
are confronted with a highly politicised junta. The SPDC
has learnt its lessons apart from brute firce, it will use
political, economic, cultural and diplomatic tactics to
suppress the democratic movement, Bribery, corruption,
deception, lies, mis-information, false propaganda, drug
and sex are the new weapons in its arsenal. We also have
grown more delicated and committed to our cause; we have
matured politically to see through the SLORC-SPDC; we will
fight the Junta on all fronts. We will not simply shout, we
will do it we will overthrow the usurpers of power and an
end to any form and brutal of military rule. We will usher
in an era of peace and justice, of democracy and human
rights. The sun is rising.
Central Committee
All Burma Students League.
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