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6/10/93 REPORT TO UN GENERAL ASSEMB



Subject: 6/10/93 REPORT TO UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/* Written 18 Aug 6:00am 1997 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* -----------------"The 1993 Report to UNGA "-------------------- */

BURMA ACTION(SOUTH AUSTRALIA)
6 October 1993 

TO:
------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------- 

RE: The United Nations protection for the Burma's displaced people in Thailand. 

Concerned with the lack of progress towards the transfer of power to the
elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and continuing human rights
abuses on un-armed civilian population in Burma, the Burma Action (South
Australia) call upon the internationa l community to (1) address the
humanitarian needs of the internally displaced people in Burma and, (2) to
join in calling for the United Nations and The Government of Thailand to
give protection for Burmese refugees in Thailand. 
 
Despite the international community's demands to respect the result of the
election in 27-May-1990, Burma's first multi-party election in 26 years,
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the military junta,
who staged a military coup in 1 988, shows no sign of transferring power
to the elected civilian government. 
 
SLORC's repression on the un-armed civilian population continues in spite
of condemnations by United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the
international community. Unlawful detention of hundreds of political
prisoners, including 1991 Nobel Peace Pri ze winner Aung San Suu Kyi,
continues this year despite a release of 2000. 
 
The Military Government of Burma(SLORC) clearly continues to show its
intention to keep the strangle-hold on state power.  SLORC's strategies
which weaken the strength of the opposition, enables it to stay in power.
SLORC used modest concessions as a b uffer for the international criticism
and, at the same time, trys to find ways to establish its legitimacy. 
 
As the political conflict in Burma has dragged into its 5th year, the the
situation for Burmese refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand has
deteriorated. Within the country, the number of internally displaced
people has increased due to SLORCs counter insur gency campaign. The
muslim refugees in Bangladesh are living in an egregious conditions while
Burmese dissidents and ethnic Karen/Mon refugees in Thailand live in
constant fear of arrest, detention and deportation. A new influx of
refugees have crossed the Thai border because of the humanitarian
situation for the internally displaced people worsens. 
 
While the political settlement of the conflicts in Burma still seems
remote, we call upon the international community to address the
humanitarian needs and protection of Human Rights for the displaced people
of Burma. We also urge the Government of Thai land and the United Nations
to provide protection for the Burmese refugees in Thailand. 
 
<B> I. Introduction</B></FONT>
 
Following the brutal crackdown on the nationwide pro-democracy
demonstrations in 1988, Burma's military assumed state power and continues
ruling in the name of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
SLORC promised to hold a multi-party election in order to form a
democratic government. It also promised to carry out economic
liberalizations to revitalize the economy.  The promised election was held
in 27-May-1990 and the opposition party, the National League for Democracy
(NLD), won a majority of seats. The military then refused to transfer the
state power to NLD and rephrased that elected parliamentarians are to draw
a new Constitution [1]. 
 
SLORC's move on the Constitutional restructure was found to be an attempt
to legalize the military's role on the state power [2]. The guideline for
a new Constitution was set by SLORC to secure a leading role for the armed
forces in future politics. Fur thermore, the constitution framed under the
control of SLORC is illegitimate and will not guarantee to meet the
democratic aspirations of the people of Burma [3]. 
 
The SLORC also fails to liberalize the economy [4]. In addition to the
obvious political instability within the country, the Burma military is
simply incompetent to enact a genuine economic reform. SLORCs invitations
for free trade and investments only at tract those who try to exploit
Burma's natural resources for a quick and easy profit. Most of the
multinational oil companies which joined in search for Burma's possible
oil reserve in 1989 have abandoned the military, further weakening the
SLORC's finan cial position. 
 
The people of Burma bear all the sufferings that are caused by the
economic mis-managements of the previous military regime(BSPP) and SLORC.
There are signs of moral decline in a traditionally conservative Burmese
family due to destitution and poverty . The unemployment situation,
combined with high inflation, make impossible for many families to feed
their children. There is increase in trafficking of children, especially
young girls, into Thailand as sex-slaves [5,6]. The humanitarian situation
with in the country, especially of women and children, is said to have
been in a state of silent emergency [7]
 
Despite SLORC having made a few changes in its conduct with the
international community, the actual transfer of power to NLD still seems
remote. 
 
We therefore call upon the international community to give attention to
the displaced Burmese people in Thailand. We also urge the international
community to join in calling for SLORC to rectify its human rights
violations against internally displaced pe ople. 
 
<B>II. Armed Conflict in Burma: the Karen State.</B></FONT>
 
There have been armed conflicts between the Rangoon central government and
the ethnic minorities since Burma's independence in 1948. The underlying
reasons of ethnic armed revolts has been the most complex issue in Burmese
politics. A common objective a mong various ethnic insurgent groups is to
establish Burma as a state of federation in order to allow greater freedom
for the ethnics nationalities. When General Ne Win took over power in
1962, there were nationwide armed insurgency from the political g roups as
well as ethnic minorities including the Communist Party of Burma (CPB),
the Karen and Kachin ethnic groups.  The nationwide armed insurgency which
threatened the security of Burma was, according to Burma military, an
emergency situation that jus tified the military to seize state power. 
 
By mid-1970, the armed insurgency within the country had been eliminated
by the government forces [8]. The ethnic rebels and CPB only operate in
the mountainous and unaccessible border areas. The renewed offensive on
Karen guerrillas in the eastern part o f Burma was launched in 1984 and
the first influx of Karen refugees crossed the Thai border at that time.
Following the government crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in
August/September 1988, Burmese refugees, mainly student activists, arrived
at the Thai-Burma border. Throughout 1988-1992, SLORC intensified its
counter insurgency campaign on Karen guerrillas, forcing students and
ethnics population further into Thailand. 
 
The struggle for ethnic freedom reached a new phase when a group of 8
parliamentarians, who were elected in May-1990 election, fled to
Thai-Burma border and formed a parallel government in December-1990
[9,10]. These parliamentarians, who claimed to have support of other 250
parliamentarians under SLORC, joined the ethnic freedom fighters, formed
the government in exile and work towards the establishment of the federal
union of Burma [11]. This government in exile, known as the National
Coalition Govern ment of the Union of Burma, certainly meet the
aspirations of all ethnic minority groups. The parallel government in
exile enjoy the sympathetic support from various countries and expatriate
Burmese abroad. 
 
To establish Burma as a federation of states has been a sensitive
political issue even since the time that Gen. Ne Win took over power in
1962. There is a perception among older Burmese leaders that the
establishment of a federal union may leads to a sece ssion. The Burmese
military always claimed itself as the saviour of Burma from disintegration
and ethnic rebels as separatists. Following the 1989 collapse of CPB [12],
there has been no ethnic insurgency left to challenge the military and no
external for ces threatening Burma. To date, the issue of the
non-disintegration of the union, in fact, is the only issue that is left
to justify the military's role in Burmese politics. 
 
The Burma Army under Gen. Ne Win therefore discourages the federalism in
Burma and suppresses any movement towards establishment of a federal
union. In dealing with the ethnic insurgency issue, the Burma Army prefers
to solve it by military means rather than making political concessions.
The emergence of NCGUB/DAB as a political alliance, therefore, becomes a
concern to SLORC. 
 
As noted by observers [13] SLORC changed its tactics in dealing with its
opponents after the leadership changes in April 1992. For the emergence of
the NCGUB/DAB political alliance, SLORC used dividing and conquering
tactics.  The rebel groups within DAB are coerced to sign separate peace
agreements with SLORC leaving the NCGUB/DAB alliance weakened [14]. It is
widely believed that SLORC is responsible for the death and disappearances
of some members of parliament of NCGUB. 
 
In dealing with the Karen insurgents, SLORC uses a special counter
insurgency strategy known as ``<I> four-cuts strategy </I>''[15] which has
been successful in eliminating communist rebels in Burma since the early
1970s. This four-cuts strategy is respo nsible for the increase in the
number of internally displaced people and consequently the increase of
refugees in Thailand. 
 
<B>III. SLORC's four-cuts strategy and forced relocations</B></FONT>[16]
 
After the 1992 changes in leadership, SLORC also changed its tactics in
dealing with the Karen insurgency. To avoid the international criticism,
SLORC refrained from making a direct offensive on the Karen rebels. In an
attempt to isolate rebels from t he Karen ethnic population, villages
within the rebel operated area are ordered to relocate. The area is then
declared as the free-fire zones in which anyone seen is considered rebel
and shot on sight. Crops and villages within the area are destroye d[17].
Relocation sights are guarded concentration camps which villagers are not
allow to leave except to do slave labour, as witnesses have reported [18]. 

Such incidences were reported on the 49th section of Human Rights
Commission as follows[19]: 
 <TT>

74. The Special Rapporteur was informed that if military suspected
villagers were insurgents or were providing aid to insurgents, the entire
village was given order to relocate by township level Law and Order
Restoration Council(LORC). In a number of case s reported to the Special
Rapporteur, civilians were executed when either refuse to relocate upon
order or when they attempted to avoid relocation. </TT> 

The villagers have to leave food, land and all possessions in relocations.
The Burmese army gave no compensation to the the villagers. All villages
are reported to have a shortage of food [20]. As a result, those villagers
cross the Thai border looking for food, at a reported rate of 1000 per
day[21], to escape starvation and forced conscription by the army [22]. 
 
<B>IV. The Royal Thai Government's response to the refugee problem.</B></FONT> 

It appears that the Royal Thai Government acknowledged the conflict
between Karen guerrillas and the Burmese army as Burma's internal problem.
When first influx of Karen refugees arrived in 1984, the Royal Thai
Government call on the non-government organi zations to care for the
welfare of Karen refugees[23]. The Royal Thai Government appears to have a
policy of non-interference towards Burma's internal politics prior to
1988. 
 
The Royal Thai Governments policy on Burma became more complex after the
SLORC seized state power in September 1988. Outraged by the military's
brutal treatment of pro-democracy demonstrators, Burma's major donor
countries: Japan, Germany and other Weste rn countries- withdrew their
financial support. SLORC at that time was reported to have foreign reserve
of less than US $ 20 million. In December 1988, the Thai army chief, Gen.
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (now Minister of the Interior), visited Burma and
sign ed trade agreements with SLORC on fishing and logging in Burma[24].
The Thai logging companies, mainly owned by the Thai Generals, trades at
an estimated $100 million each year [25]. The investments of oil companies
are also substantial. By mid 1990, Burm a's foreign reserve rose to \$550
million, facilitating SLORC to buy $ 1.2 billion worth of arms from China
[26]. 
 
The Royal Thai Government has always been in favour of the policy of a
constructive engagement for Burma. By which it means the economic
liberalization and support of foreign capital would induce social and
political changes. This policy of constructive e ngagement fell through
when the government responsible lacked the will to implement change. Such
is the case of Burma, SLORC spends most of its foreign exchange solely to
buy arms and are used in oppressing the unarmed civilian population. 
 
The Royal Thai Government's treatment of Burmese refugees and displaced
people is also controversial [27]. The Royal Thai Government is unwilling
to acknowledge the events developing in Burma. It also trys to prevent the
conflict between the Burmese milit ary and the ethnic minority being
addressed at the international level. The displaced people along the
Thai-Burma border are considered a result of violence in Burma and their
existence on Thai territory has been informally tolerated. The
international ob servers, UNHCR and ICRC, are not allowed permanent
presence on these refugee camps, leaving the refugees to negotiate their
own safety with local authorities. The shortcomings of such a policy are
evident due to the persistent abuse on refugees having bee n reported. The
abuse and mis-treatment to Burma's ethnic refugees by Local Thai
Authorities for commercial interests was reported in Asia Watch as: 
 <TT>
	"In April 1991, Sangklaburi officials cut all delivery of 
	food and medicines to the more than 10,000 Mon refugees residing 
	in five camps in their district. The cut was at a crucial 
	time when stockpiling was a imperative, prior to the May-August 
	rains which prohibits access to the camps.  The threat of 
	starvation that this posed forced Mon leaders to agree to a 
	fine of 800,000 Baht, in logs from the Mon State, to the
	Phathumthani logging company. The fine was compensation for the
	destruction of a logging truck and death of its driver in 
	February 1991 which the Mon claimed had illegally entered 
	their territory. Once the agreement between Phathumthani and 
	the Mon was reached, the District authorities allowed food and 
	medicine to be transported to the refugee camps." 

The collusions of the Thais and Burmese army to capture the rebel outposts 
has also been reported. 
 <TT>

	" ... The reported use of Thai soil by Burmese troops in 
	their recent attack on Nai Et Thaung, once captured the 
	uncontested replacement of a Thai border flag with a Burmese 
	and a new road under construction for the past 10 months from 
	Thai side leading directly to Nai Et Thaung, leaves no
	illusions at the collaboration and vested interests of Thai 
	and Burmese officials." </TT>

 Burmese dissidents within Thailand are also subject to arrest, detention
and deportation. For example, after General Chavalit visited Burma for
trade talks in December 1988, Burmese students were deported as was
reported in Asia Watch[28]: 
 <TT>

	"Following these events, 8-10,000 Burmese dissidents fled 
	to the Thai-Burmese border seeking shelter and support from 
	the ethnic minorities and the international community. In a 
	meeting on November 22, 1988, the cabinet of Royal Thai 
	Government decided to offer asylum to Burmese student 
	dissidents. On December 22, however, the government reversed 
	its policy and announced the establishment of the Tak 
	Repatriation Center. >From this Center, located in Tak 
	province on the Thai Burmese border where the large number 
	of dissidents had fled, the Thal military with the
	cooperation of the provincial office of Thai Red Cross 
	(but with the concern raised by the national office) began 
	flying these asylum seekers back to Rangoon and into hand of 
	SLORC. Durin g the months between December 1988 and February 
	1989, some 328 Burmese dissidents were repatriated. There 
	were no international observers involved and claims of
	forced repatriation were frequent...." </TT>

Since Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees or to its 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR in Bangkok is unable
to give protection to the Burmese students dissidents. There were
incidences where Burmese students who registe red with UNHCR (persons of
concern to UNHCR) are treated inhumanely by Thai police: 
 <TT>

	"That vulnerability was illustrated when, in the latter 
	half of 1991, two Burmese ``persons of concern to UNHCR'' 
	were shot and killed by Thai police upon arrest. Min Thein 
	was fatally shot in the back on July 31, while attempting 
	to run away from Thai immigration officers. Ye Soe Aung 
	was brutally beaten, stabbed and then shot twice by Thai 
	police on November 4, 1991. His body was recovered on 
	November 10 approximately 10 km from the place of arrest. Both 
	incidences had numerous witnesses and yet to date no 
	officer have been indicted. UNHCR has reportedly pressed for 
	such an incident.}
</TT> 

As of June 1992, the Royal Thai Government has set up a refugee camp in
Ratchaburi province known as 'Safe Area'. Under this arrangement, the
Burmese dissidents who registered with the Ministry of Interior(MOI) will
be permitted to go to the `Safe Area'.  In early 1993, Asia Watch reported
that Burmese students in Bangkok are persuaded by UNHCR to go to the `Safe
Area' [29]. 
 
<B>V. Illegal entrants and Prostitutes</B></FONT>
 
There are people whose homes are deep inside Burma and have enter
neighbouring Thai provinces and worked illegally [30]. These new arrivals
are not absorbed by minority groups at the Thai-Burma border camps and
Thai authorities designate them as 'Burmese illegal immigrants'. Their
numbers significantly increase after the 1990 election crackdown. The
reason for their flight has been:  opposition party support, unreasonable
taxation and price fixing, bribery, and forced conscriptions.  In fact, as
the auth ors of Asia Watch noted and can be seen in (III), there is no
clear distinction that can be drawn between these groups, but all are
suffering from persistent and gross violations of Human Rights in Burma. 
 
The deteriorating economy is also mounting pressure on the Burmese people
as their social and moral life declines. Under SLORC, the economy in Burma
is deteriorated to a point where many will do anything to survive. There
have been reports of an increase in prostitution inside Burma [31]. The
trafficking of Burmese woman, especially young girls, into Thailand as
sex-slaves has also increased [32,33]. 
 
The Royal Thai Government responds to this influx of illegal entrants and
prostitutes by rounding them up, detaining and deporting them immediately
[34]. There are frequent reports of inhumane detention and mistreatment of
Burmese prostitutes. There is no screening procedure to check whether
those deportees have well founded fears of persecution. 
 
<B> VI. Recent developments</B></FONT> 

Thailand presently accommodates an estimated 80,000 Burmese dissidents and
ethnic refugees [35], in addition to 500,000 illegal immigrants [36].
Despite the presence of such a high number of Burmese refugees, the people
of Thailand - Thai students in particular -appear to have sympathy and
tolerance towards Burmese refugees. 
 
The Royal Thai Government, on the other hand, continues with its dubious
policy on Burmese refugees and Burma. The Royal Thai Government's
unwillingness to address Burma's ethnic refugee problem could be seen as a
gesture that reflects the Thais neutral policy towards Burma's internal
politics. However, it must be stressed that such neutral policy is
responsible for Burma's displaced people's vulnerability and abuse by the
Royal Thai Government's own members. Therefore, Thailand must change its
Burmese R efugee Policy and give the UNHCR and ICRC access to the refugee
camps along Thai-Burma border. 
 
With regards to Burmese dissidents in Thailand, the UNHCR in Bangkok have
no mandate to protect refugees, even if they are registered with UNHCR,
since the Royal Thai Government has not prepared any special legislation.
The Royal Thai Government's arrange ment of a Safe Area is an attempt to
give justification of its generosity and sympathy towards Burmese students
[37]. At the same time, however, the Royal Thai Government continues its
practice of rounding up ``Burmese illegal immigrants'' and deported them
immediately [38]. There have been no independent observers present at
those deportations. In fact, all Burmese Refugees in Thailand are
technically illegal and there are no screening processes for the
deportations. Burmese dissidents are therefore concerned of arbitrary
detention and deportations. As a consequence, some Burmese students choose
not to report to the MOI, and do not register with UNHCR. There were
recent reports of conflicts between the Burmese students and the Thai
Authorities[39].  Therefore, the Royal Thai Government would need to enact
a legislation similar to the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese
Refugees to prevent further tragedy. 
 
In July 1993, SLORC announced that the logging deals with Thailand would
not be renewed [40]. This was interpreted by expatriate Burmese and NGOs
as SLORC applying pressure on the Royal Thai Government for better
cooperation in eliminating ethnic rebel s along Thai-Burma border[41].
There have also been fear that refugee villages in the vicinity of the
proposed natural gas pipeline between Thailand and Burma being attacked in
an attempt to clear the area[42]. 
 
<B> VII. Conclusion.</B></FONT> 

Clearly, the constructive engagement policy doesn't work for a better
Burma as the Burmese Military Government have no will to enact genuine
social and economic reform. In past 5-years, SLORC used most of its
resources to built up military power. Unless there is a change in this
attitude, the Royal Thai Governments constructive engagements with Burma
simply amounts to collusions with an evil power. The Royal Thai
Government's policy of constructive engagement as well as policy on
Burmese refugees need to be rectified. 
 
Presently, there is not enough political will among the members of the
international community to impose an effective trade embargo on Burma.
However, the international community and Thailand must not overlook the
implications of doing trade with Burma.  The international community must
ensure that the Burmese unarmed civilian population is protected from
Human Rights abuses. The measure must be taken to ensure the economic
development and establishment of a democratic government with a just
constitution being fulfilled. The United Nations and international
community must therefore actively seek for the implementation of an
international arms embargo. 
 
As trading between Thailand and Burma continues, the Royal Thai Government
must ensure the safety of Burmese dissidents and ethnic refugees and that
they are protected. The Royal Thai Government must consider granting
political asylum to the Burmese re fugees and also give full access to the
UNHCR to protect ethnic refugee camps. 
 
The attention must be drawn on the plight of the internally displaced
people in Burma, which is the root cause of the influx of refugees into
Thailand. The plight of internally displaced people can be seen as
consequences of SLORC's four-cuts strategy.  Sadly, SLORC will continue
its counter insurgency campaign unless rebels surrender to the government-
which is a most unlikely scenario. Therefore, the international community
must actively seek to implement an effective cease-fire between SLORC and
ethn ic rebel forces. 
 
As the military governments effort to eliminate rebels sets to continue,
the international community need to give attention to the protection of
basic Human Rights to the unarmed civilian population. In the case of
forced relocations, we must address the arbitrary deprivation of property
from the villagers. SLORC's insensitivity for the basic humanitarian needs
of villagers must also be condemned. We must ensure that SLORC compensates
the villagers for their property and deliver the basic humanitarian n eeds
of the villagers. 
 
<I><B>Proposed Action:</I></B> Write to Ms Sadako Ogata, United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, The
Prime Minister of Thailand, for protection for displaced Burmese people in
Thailand. Also write to Professor Yoz o Yokota, The United Nations Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar, for the compensation and welfare
of the internally displaced people. 
 
Ms Sadako Ogata<BR>UNHCR<BR>CASE POSTALE 2500<BR>CH-1211 GENEVA-2
DEPOT<BR>SWITZERLAND Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai<BR>Office of the Prime
Minister<BR>Government House<BR>Nakorn Pathom Road, Dusit,<BR>Bangkok
103000<BR>Thailand. Professor Y. Yokota<BR>The Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights in Myanmar<BR>Palais des Nations<BR>1211 Geneva 10<BR>
Switzerland. 

 Attached with this letter are collected news items concerning situation
of Burmese refugees in Thailand. Please contact the secretary regarding
your action and also further information. This report is written by Dr. U
Ne Oo, a member of Burma Action(SA). 

 
Footnotes
 

[1] SLORC Declaration 1/90, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 July 1992.
 
[2] Janelle M. Diller, <I> Constitutional Reform in a Repressive State:
The Case of Burma</I>, ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, pp. 393-407. 
 
[3] The author concluded in his paper as, "in sum, the control of the
constitution making process defeats any attempt to create a genuine
constitution reflecting the will of the people. SLORC rules in violation
of former constitutional provisions, has pr oclaimed itself above the rule
of law, and imposed its form of constitution-making process on the people
without their free consent. Only when SLORC cedes its governing power to
the elected People's Assembly can truly genuine constitution-making
process b egin.'' ibid, pp. 407. 
 
[4] Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, pp 56-60.
 
[5] Bangkok Post, 16 July 1993.[B - 1.3] 
 
[6] Burma Information Group reports, January 1993, 14 July 1993.[B - 1.1, 1.2]
 
[7] Russell Rollason et. al, International Council of Voluntary Agency,
Mission to Burma Report, 28 May 1993. 
 
[8] Bertil Lintner, <I> Outrage:Burma's struggle for democracy</I>, White
Lotus UK,(1990). 
 
[9] Asiaweek, 4 January 1991. 
 
[10] Amnesty International, <I> Myanmar, ``No Law at all'', Human rights
violations under military rule.</I>, AI Index ASA: 16/11/92. 
 
[11] The Government in exile, National Coalition Government of the Union
of Burma (NCGUB), signed an agreement to establish a Federal Union of
Burma with the umbrella organization of ethnic rebel and underground
Burmese groups, Democratic Alliance of Burm a(DAB). 
 
[12] Bertil Lintner, <I> The Rise and Fall of Communist Party of
Burma</I>, Ithaca New York, (1990). 
 
[13] Russell Rollason, et al, ICVA Mission to Burma Report, 28 May 1993.
 
[14] Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 April 1993.[ A - 1.5 ]
 
[15] The four-cut strategy: the military attempts to cut links of
intelligence, food, money and recruit between armed opposition groups and
local civilians. (AI Index ASA: 16/11/92)
 
[16] These events are not only occured in the Karen State. As Burma have
various ethnic insurgency groups fighting with Rangoon central government,
an estimated 12 million people suffers a result of counter insurgency
throughout Burma. 
 
[17] The military make the area totally un-inhabitable for the rebels.}. 
 
[18] U Saw Ba Thin and Jack Dunford, ACFOA seminor on Burma, Sydney,
Australia, 28 May 1993. 
 
[19] Professor Yozo Yokota, The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights. Document E/CN.4/1993/37, 17 February 1993. 
 
[20] Bangkok Post, 27 June 1993.[ A - 1.4 ]}. As a result, those villagers
cross the Thai border looking for food, at a reported rate of 1000 per
day. 
 
[21] Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 July 1993, pp-9.
 
[22] These are not an unprecedented events only occured in the Karen
State. Amnesty International in 1992, for example, reported similar events
in Kayah State. ``... Some villagers went to Pruso town but thousands of
others were confined in poor conditions in the camps at Dorawkhu, Hoya and
Delaco villages. More than 40 people - particularly children and elderly-
had reportedly died from malnutrition in these camps by the end of July
(1992). Others, who were forced to do construction work for the army, were
reportedly beaten and shot by soldiers. During March and April 1992 over
1200 Karenni refugees from Kayah State fled into Thailand mostly from
Pruso township.''(AI Index ASA: 16/11/92)}. 
 
[23] The Burmese Border Consortium under the auspices of the Committee for
Co-ordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand. ICVA Mission
to Burma report, 28 May 1993.}. 
 
[24] Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989 (<I> see Appendix: A -
1.1</I>). 
 
[25] South East Asian Information Network report, 28 April 1993; Far
Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1992 Year Book. 
 
[26] Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, pp 56-60.
 
[27] Asia Watch, <I> Abuses Against 
Burmese Refugees in Thailand, Vol. No 4 Issue No 7.</I>, 20 March 1992. 
 
[28] See also Appendix: A - 1.1, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989.
 
[29] Asia Watch, 28 January 1993. [ C - 1.1 ].
 
[30] Asia Watch, {\em Vol. No 4 Issue No 7.}, 20 March 1992; Bangkok Post,
27 June 1993. [ A - 1.4 ]. 
 
[31] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 February 1992, pp 31. [ B - 1.4 ]
 
[32] Bangkok Post, 16 July 1993. [ B - 1.3 ]} 
 
[33] Burma Information Group reports, January 1993, 14 July 1993. [ B -
1.1, 1.2 ]}. 
 
[34] Bangkok Post, 7 July 1993. 
 
[35] See the map of refugee camps in Appendix: A - 1.2 
 
[36] Generally, people who fled from the fear of government persecution
and armed conflict are referred as refugees.  Illegal immigrants are those
who try to escape from poverty in Burma and may not have fear of political
persecution. As the author of Asia Watch noted and as explained in III,
the distinction between these two groups are only arbitrary.}. 
 
[37] Burma Action(SA) was recently informed by UN refugee officers that
the Safe Area meets accepted international standards for the welfare and
protection of refugees. 
 
[38] Bangkok Post, 7 July 1993. 
 
[39] Burma Information Group report, 31 May 1993. [ C - 1.2 ].
 
[40] Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 July 1993. [ C - 1.3 ]. 
 
[41] B.U.R.M.A. Burma Rights Movement for Action, July 1993.
 
[42] Project Maje's Edith Mirante publication, August 1993. [ C - 1.5 ].

<HR>
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