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Foreign Policy In Focus: Burma



Foreign Policy In Focus: Burma

Volume 2, Number 43 
August 1997

Editors: Martha Honey (IPS) and Tom Barry (IRC)
Written by Philip S. Robertson Jr., Social Change and Development
Program,
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Key Points

   * The SLORC military junta is a world-class human rights abuser
     condemned by the UN every year since 1989.
   * Foreign investors continue to play a critical role in providing
     financial backing for SLORC.
   * SLORC continues to refuse to recognize the results of the 1990
     elections, overwhelmingly won by Aung San Suu Kyi and the National
     League for Democracy (NLD).

Springing from obscurity to America's editorial pages, college campuses,
city councils, and state legislatures, Burma has emerged as a major
foreign
policy issue. A nonaligned, economically autarkic, one-party state under
harsh military rule since 1962, Burma has metamorphosed into a test case
for action on several fronts: human rights in Southeast Asia,
international
trade relations and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the growing
worldwide heroin epidemic, and the role of foreign investors in
supporting
dictatorships. Part of the reason is that many observers view Burma as
nothing less than a fight between good and evil. On one side is the
democracy movement led by 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu
Kyi,
the daughter of modern Burma's founding father. On the other is a
military
junta called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The
fight
even encompasses the name of the country: the democracy movement calls
it
Burma, while SLORC insists on Myanmar.

SLORC came to power in September 1988 by commanding the Tatmadaw
(Burmese
army) to smash a nationwide democracy movement, which it did by gunning
down more than 3,000 protesters in Rangoon and thousands more in smaller
cities and towns. The latest UN Commission on Human Rights resolution
criticized SLORC for "extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
death
in custody, torture, arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and
detention, absence of due process of law, severe restrictions on freedom
of
opinion, expression, movement, assembly, and association, including
portering for the military." President Clinton's order imposing
sanctions
against Burma cited SLORC's "deepening pattern of severe repression"
against the democracy movement.

The People's Republic of China (PRC)-SLORC's closest ally and primary
diplomatic and financial supporter-has included $1.8 billion in military
equipment for SLORC's military modernization drive. The Tatmadaw aims to
field a 500,000-man army, one of the largest in Southeast Asia. Western
and
Asian multinationals have moved to strike deals with the generals who
control Southeast Asia's most resource-rich country. American
corporations
led by energy companies like Texaco, Unocal, and Arco were among the
first
foreign companies to invest in SLORC-controlled Burma. Most foreign
investments are made with government ministries or entities like the
Union
of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH), controlled by active-duty and
retired
military officers.

Attempting to legitimize its rule, SLORC organized a multiparty election
on
May 27, 1990. Despite restrictions on key opposition political leaders,
the
move turned out to be a huge miscalculation. Suu Kyi's NLD won a
landslide,
taking 392 of 485 seats in the Parliament. The official military party
won
just 10 seats. SLORC refused to honor the results of the election and
began
a systematic effort to destroy the NLD. Currently, 24 NLD MPs are
serving
long-term jail sentences, 68 MPs have been dismissed by SLORC, 43 have
been
forced to resign, three MPs have died in prison, and another 28 are in
exile. In November 1996, Suu Kyi was the target of a rock-throwing,
baton-
swinging mob organized by SLORC and an affiliated organization--the
Union
and Solidarity Development Association (USDA)--that Suu Kyi has compared
to
Hitler's brownshirts.

SLORC has consolidated control over ethnic areas long outside the
effective
authority of any previous central government. Employing the infamous
"Four
Cuts" strategy designed to cut off insurgents from food, funds,
intelligence, and recruits, the Tatmadaw's scorched-earth tactics have
been
as effective as they have been devastating. The coercive relocations of
hundreds of villages have turned ethnic areas into free-fire zones in
which
heavily armed SLORC battalions, using civilians as forced porters and
minesweepers, have wreaked havoc. Over 100,000 refugees have fled to
Thailand, where (without UN recognition) they remain vulnerable to
forcible
repatriation by the Thai army. SLORC continues to vilify Suu Kyi as a
foreigner (her husband is British) and to call for the annihilation of
"destructive elements," a code phrase for the NLD.

Problems With Current U.S. Policy

Key Problems

   * The Clinton administration's recent embrace of economic sanctions
     arose from political pressure by Congress and grassroots activists.
   * The current U.S. sanctions are inadequate because they only ban new
     investments, allowing most existing projects to continue unimpeded.
     Yet the administration opposes selective purchasing initiatives
     enacted by individual U.S.states and towns.
   * Burma accounts for over 60% of the heroin on America's streets, and
     evidence points to complicity in trafficking by SLORC.

In 1995, worsening human rights conditions prompted a bipartisan
coalition
led by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) to press for immediate, mandatory
economic sanctions against Burma. Suu Kyi and the NLD supported this
move,
but the effort did not please the White House or the State Department,
both
intent on preserving diplomatic flexibility. The McConnell amendment
failed
under the weight of presidential opposition and business lobbying after
the
White House encouraged Senators Cohen (R-ME) and Feinstein (D-CA) to
formulate a compromise with plenty of loopholes. The resulting economic
sanctions only banned new U.S. investment and required presidential
initiative.

The predictable attitude of the Clinton administration backing into a
tough
Burma policy rather than leading was that of a reluctant participant.
Following the arrests of hundreds of student demonstrators in December
1996, Suu Kyi called for the imposition of sanctions. As Texaco and Arco
signed contracts giving SLORC millions in "signing fees," the U.S.
dallied
in response to what even U.S. diplomats described as the "rolling
repression" in Rangoon. Even with a notorious human rights abuser like
SLORC, with whom the U.S. has fairly minimal commercial ties (total
bilateral trade in 1996 was $139.8 million), the inherent inclination of
the Clinton administration to encourage trade was difficult to overcome.

Only in April 1997, when displeasure on Capitol Hill was again heating
up,
did the Clinton administration finally announce its intentions to
fulfill
the letter of the law. A flurry of business deals took place as another
month passed before an executive order was issued to implement the
sanctions. Employing presidential statutory authority under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the order bans
investment, actions to facilitate investment (including that by foreign
nationals), and attempts to evade the prohibitions. But all investment
contracts signed before May 21, 1997 are legal. In an attempt to hold
U.S.
business accountable, the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) in
conjunction with Burmese dissidents has filed a lawsuit against Unocal
for
human rights violations stemming from its partnership with SLORC.

U.S. grassroots activists have recognized that real economic pressure
lies
in using U.S. market power as a purchaser of products to effect change.
Selective purchasing campaigns to convince states, cities, and towns to
pass laws prohibiting the purchase of goods and services from American
and
foreign companies operating in Burma have now passed in Massachusetts
and
14 cities, including New York City, San Francisco, and Oakland.
Selective
purchasing bills have been introduced in the legislatures of
Connecticut,
Texas, and California. The European Union (EU) has called these measures
WTO-illegal and in mid-July 1997 initiated consultations with the U.S.
that
could lead to proceedings before a WTO dispute panel. Rather than
supporting trade restrictions on moral or national security grounds (as
it
has done with Cuba), the Clinton administration has pressured state
regulators to reconsider and has intimated that the states are violating
agreements signed by the U.S. Trade Representative.

This reluctance is even harder to understand now that it is clear that
SLORC is profiting from collaboration with narcotraffickers. The State
Department's top antinarcotics official concludes, "SLORC has been part
of
the problem, not the solution". Another State Department report notes
that
in 1996, Burma's "export of opiates alone appear to be worth as much as
all
legal exports." The U.S. government estimates that 60% of the heroin on
America's streets is Burmese. Burma's banks can accept foreign currency
deposits of any size with no questions asked, as long as a 10% tax is
paid.
But the Clinton administration has failed to formulate a regional
strategy
to combat the narcotics that threaten both the U.S. and Burma's
neighbors.

The U.S. policy to urge wider support for economic sanctions has also
been
weak. A public announcement of efforts to lobby the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) played into the hands of those who contend
that
outsiders shouldn't dictate to ASEAN, making a tough sell even tougher.
More importantly, the U.S. has failed to make support for sanctions a
major
issue with potential colleagues Australia, Canada, and key European
nations. As a result, the ASEAN policy of constructive engagement toward
SLORC, primarily composed of commercial links and noninterference in
politics, has not been significantly challenged by the wider
international
community. ASEAN even decided to assuage Burma's international pariah
status by accepting it as an ASEAN member in July 1997.

Toward a New Foreign Policy

Key Recommendations

   * The U.S. needs to expand efforts to delegitimize SLORC
internationally
     and must work with allies to apply economic and political pressure
on
     the junta.
   * The U.S. should ensure that ASEAN understands that admitting Burma
as
     a member will have strong negative impacts on certain aspects of
     U.S.-ASEAN relations.
   * The U.S. should defend "selective purchasing" initiatives against
     international pressure branding these measures as illegal under the
     WTO.

ASEAN's decision to admit Burma as a member creates important policy
challenges for the U.S., the EU, and ASEAN. Encouraged by ASEAN
recognition, SLORC may assume a freer hand in cracking down on its
internal
opponents. Yet student demonstrations in December 1996, riots in
Mandalay
(Burma's second largest city) in March, and NLD resistance in May
indicate
that SLORC is trying to keep the lid on a population that is passionate
in
its opposition to military rule.

U.S. policy correctly urges an internal tripartite dialogue (as
advocated
by the unprecedented Mae Tha Raw Hta agreement) in which representatives
of
all of Burma's ethnic groups called for talks between SLORC, the NLD,
and
ethnic leaders. This call, echoed by the international community, has
fallen on deaf ears. Washington lacks the unilateral leverage to
persuade
the recalcitrant SLORC to come to the table. The U.S. needs to pursue a
two-track strategy of seeking to more thoroughly delegitimize the SLORC
regime internationally while devising a mix of incentives and penalties
to
prod ASEAN to strive for a regime change in Burma.

ASEAN members fear that browbeating SLORC will simpy enhance China's
influence in Burma. But ASEAN fails to differentiate between the regime
and
the people of Burma. Highly dependent on China's arms, trade, and
support
at the UN, SLORC has already placed its bets. It has granted the PRC
access
to the Indian Ocean and has signed a military-training agreement for
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) to train 300 Burmese officers.
But
these actions have further diminished SLORC's legitimacy.

Among the Burmese, there is widespread suspicion and fear of China,
which
was the imperial power in the region until Western colonization in the
mid-1800s. Recently an influx of Chinese businessmen from Yunnan
province
into the northern city of Mandalay together with a flood of cheap
Chinese
exports forcing local crafts people and producers out of business have
increased anti-Chinese sentiment.

New Chinese initiatives and alliances with the SLORC have also angered
many
Burmese while indicating a move away from the rigorous nonalignment that
has characterized modern Burmese foreign policy. In dealing with ASEAN,
the
U.S. should be proactive in addressing concerns about rising PRC
influence
in Burma while pointing out that a democratic Burmese government with
popular support would have little incentive to continue SLORC's special
relationship with the PRC. The U.S. could stress to ASEAN that Burma as
an
independent ally (rather than a Chinese client regime) would no doubt be
preferable in internal ASEAN councils. If ASEAN wishes to continue its
"constructive engagement" policy with Burma, it should be willing to
establish clear indicators of progress toward political dialogue such as
the end of human rights abuses and the beginning of discussions with the
democratic forces led by the NLD.

Washington must develop a comprehensive strategy to further delegitimize
SLORC in the international arena. The U.S. should call a session of the
UN
Security Council to pass a resolution condemning Burma's continued
failure
to transfer power to the winners of the 1990 election, forcing China to
protect its client on the international stage (and further undermining
SLORC's independence). Washington should warn ASEAN that it will not
cooperate with an SLORC-led Burma in ASEAN's councils. Partly out of
concern of Chinese strategic objectives in the region, many ASEAN
countries
favor continuing strong U.S. military links with the region. The U.S.
could
let it known that strong ASEAN support for SLORC would jeopardize these
U.S. military links. In particular, the U.S. should use this pressure
and
other types of policy leverage to discourage any further warming of
relations between Burma and Thailand. The U.S. should urge Thailand to
allow UN Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) access to refugees on the
Thai-Burmese border, and Washington should provide the necessary extra
funding at the UN to make this effort possible.

The U.S. should continue its policy of blocking loans and assistance to
Burma from the World Bank/IMF and should pressure the Asian Development
Bank to hold the line as well. Congress should finish its job and pass
immediate bilateral sanctions to close the new-investment loophole of
the
Cohen-Feinstein amendment. On the local level, the U.S. government
should
accede to the oncoming wave of more democratic, grassroots participation
in
foreign policy and immediately cease efforts to discourage selective
purchasing by states and cities. The Clinton administration should
inform
the EU that the U.S. will use the issues of drugtrafficking and Chinese
domination to claim a legitimate national security exemption at the WTO.

Finally, the U.S. must widen the international coalition against SLORC.
It
must make the argument that the impact of the flood of heroin and cheap
amphetamines from Burma affects not only the U.S. but neighboring Asian
countries as well. HIV/AIDS is out of control in Burma, spread by the
regular intravenous drug use of 4% of Burma's male population. The
Burmese
drug crisis affects Thailand too. According to Chulalongkorn University
in
Bangkok, 750,000 Burmese are now residing in Thailand.

Different nations can play different roles in interacting with SLORC, as
Japan and the U.S. already do in a good cop, bad cop routine. But the
U.S.
must use its influence in the international community to promote a
comprehensive policy of economic pressure and political persuasion that
will result in negotiations leading to a restoration of democratic rule
in
Burma based on the results of the 1990 elections.

Sources for more information

World Wide Web

Free Burma Coalition
http://sunsite.unc.edu/freeburma/introduction.html

Organizations

Free Burma - No Petro-dollars for SLORC
c/o International Rivers Network
1847 Berkeley Way
Berkeley, CA 94703
Voice: (510) 848-1155
Fax: (510) 848-1008
Email: freeburma@xxxxxxx

Human Rights Watch/Asia
485 Fifth Ave.
New York City, NY 10017-6104
Voice: (212) 972-8400
Fax: (212) 972-0905
Email: hrwnyc@xxxxxxx
Website: http://www.hrw.org/research/burma

International Labor Rights Fund
110 Maryland Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
Voice: (202) 544-7198
Fax: (202) 544-7767
Email: laborrights@xxxxxxxxxxx

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB)
Representation Office/U.S.
815 15th St. NW, Ste. 910
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: (202) 393-7342
Fax: (202) 393-7343
Email: ncgub@xxxxxxxxxxx

Open Society Institute Burma Project
888 7th St., Ste. 1901
New York City, NY 10106
Voice: (212) 887-0632
Fax: (212) 489-8455
Website: http://www.soros.org/burma.html

U.S. Department of State
Burma Desk Officer
East Asian and Pacific Bureau
Washington, DC 20520
Voice: (202) 647-7108
Fax: (202) 647-3069

Publications

Dennis Bernstein and Leslie Kean, "People of the Opiate," The Nation,
December 16, 1996.

Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948
(Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1994).

Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991).

Alan Clements and Leslie Kean, Burma's Revolution of the Spirit (New
York
City, NY: Aperture Books, 1994).

U.S. State Department, Foreign Economic Trends Report: Burma
(Washington,
DC, June 1996).

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