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STASIS IN MYANMAR?



26/7

                        Stasis in Myanmar? 



    David I Steinberg examines the political situation in
                               Myanmar 



"IT is as if a large truck were rushing headlong into a small Volkswagen",
as one anonymous
observer in Yangon recently described the political situation in Myanmar,
comparing the ruling
SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) to opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi and
the National League for Democracy (NLD). 

But is that confrontation inevitable and is it so one-sided? The strength,
citing its overwhelming
popularity in the 1990 election that SLORC ignored and continuing evidence
of anti-military
feeling, and in spite of the determined effort by the SLORC to whittle down
its leadership and
destroy its organisation. The SLORC might also demur, claiming it is simply
upholding the laws
that it has enacted. 

These views may not express the subtlety of the situation, but rather a
polarisation of opinion
reflecting internal institutional views that are incessantly externally
promulgated. Stasis may seem
evident, but there are changes that are apparent beneath the stalemate of
surface confrontation and
beyond the rhetoric. Understanding reality may require more nuanced views. 

The SLORC seems at the moment to be in a position of enhanced power; it is
most internally
secure since its coup of Sept 18, 1988. The population at present seems
disinclined to repeat the
attempted revolution of 1988 that the coup repressed. Fifteen rebellions
have ended through
ceasefires that, however ephemeral they may eventually prove to be, have
freed the military for
broader deployment and control. The last major organised resistance, the
oldest ethnic rebellion of
the Karen, has had its major bases near the Thai border destroyed, and its
leadership is talking
through intermediaries with the SLORC about a ceasefire that some of its
commanders, although
not perhaps its top leadership, desire. 

The SLORC is reinforced by its admission into Asean, which may mean little
at home but does
carry some external weight. Although the sanctions on new investments
imposed by the United
States convey considerable moral force at least internally within the US,
their economic effects on
Myanmar will be minimal; even their moral influence is diminished by the
selective imposition of
such an action against Myanmar, only one of many repressive regimes in the
world. But as one
Congressman, who believed sanctions would not be effective but who planned
to vote for them,
remarked, "It is difficult to vote in favour of the SLORC." 

The economy in much of the country is vibrant and has evidently grown in the
past few years, but
whether its apparent growth, albeit unevenly distributed, can be maintained
without more basic
reforms is questionable. 

The SLORC has not addressed the fundamental economic problems that virtually
all foreign
observers recognise as required if economic growth is to continue. 

These include a comprehensive devaluation of a currency over 30 times its
official value, control of
the money supply to inhibit an annual inflation of some 30 per cent,
rationalisation of inefficient
public sector industries now put at even more risk by foreign competition,
development of a
competent and autonomous financial sector, and payment of public sector
officials' salaries that will
combat the cancer of corruption that is evident, ubiquitous, and even
necessary for survival. The
most difficult and basic task for any Burmese regime is freeing the economy
from political influence
without which economic rationality will not prevail. 

Chinese goods and influence are so apparent as to create concerns that
should the SLORC falter
economically it will be the Chinese, the most obvious of the newly rich, who
will be the scapegoats
for SLORC errors. Rumours are rife that drug money has been laundered into
legitimate
construction and other businesses. 

There are also rumours that the SLORC itself is divided and in danger of
disintegrating into two
factions reflecting the line military (led by General Maung Aye) and the
support, specifically
intelligence, wing (led by General Khin Nyunt). Veteran observers too
describe the internal
jealousies and rivalries, but comment that these two groups need each other
and the SLORC
needs both, so that overt splits that would threaten the stability of
military rule at this juncture seem
unlikely. 

The NLD may feel that it is becoming marginalised with restrictions on its
activities and those of
Aung San Suu Kyi. It walked out of, and then was expelled from, the National
Convention in
1995, that hand-picked body that was designed to do SLORC's bidding in
writing a new, heavily
scripted constitution. The NLD now seems to want to return because, even if
the results are
predetermined to ensure perpetual military control, it is at least a forum
for internal discussion, if
not public debate. 

The military has taken two interlocking steps that will, it believes, ensure
its control over the
society into the future. It has, through the National Convention and based
on an Indonesian model,
sought to ensure the military's domination of the leadership and the
administrative mechanisms of
the state through a constitution in which it will play the legal, leading
roles at all levels and in all
branches of the government. 

It has, in tandem to writing a new constitution, created a mass base of
support for the military and
its policies through the formation and leadership of the Union Solidarity
and Development
Association (USDA), which now has over five million members. 

The pattern is reminiscent of the military's strategy in its Burma Socialist
Programme Party
incarnation in the early 1970s, when it expanded the party in preparation
for the constitution of
1974. The USDA concentration on youth indicates the SLORC's intent for
long-range control. 

Splits in the foreign community's reaction to the SLORC regime and
recalcitrance in engaging in
meaningful dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD are becoming more
apparent as the
SLORC consolidates its power. Entry into Asean puts the US at odds with that
important body,
as well as with China, SLORC's major military and moral supporter. 

Japan, which has been reluctant to break with the US on Myanmar in spite of
strong internal
pressures from its business community, has now expressed willingness to
restart its most important
foreign aid programme should the SLORC show even some modest (probably
ineffective) signs of
dialogue. Korea, with no such scruples, has a major economic role, with
Daewoo Corporation
being the most obvious of Korean conglomerates. 

The military's role in the economy is likely to remain powerful through its
Myanmar Holdings
Corporation Ltd, a wholly owned military venture, as well as through its
direct management of
numerous factories far beyond the immediate needs of military procurement,
and at a local level
through USDA-owned businesses designed to provide support to those local
branches of that
ubiquitous organisation. 

Similarly, there may be a movement to a multi-party political system as the
military forms a
constitution at some indefinite date, even though elections do not a
democracy make. Some very
modest local autonomy given under the new constitution to a variety of
ethnic groups, along a
Chinese model, will not grant them national power or influence, but it may
placate some local
concerns as will some controlled electoral process. The US call for SLORC
honouring the 1990
elections won by the NLD becomes more anachronistic over time. 

There is ferment, not stasis, in Myanmar as events unfold. The SLORC at
first may not have
planned to remain in such an obvious position of power for so long, but it
was evidently shocked
by the 1990 election and anti-military attitudes, which it has been
assiduously trying to change. It
may continue in power until it feels its future (and that of the state in
its terms) is assured. But the
likely overall direction does indicate continuing military control in mufti
and in uniform. The
immediate future seems stable, but the longer-range problems remain
unaddressed, let alone
answered, and these will likely erode the enforced tranquillity of the present. 

Dr David I Steinberg is Representative of The Asia Foundation in Korea. He
was formerly a
professor at Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA. He has long been a
Myanmar
watcher.