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News Related to Burma on the Public



Subject: News Related to Burma on the Publications

Aisa Week (June 13, 1997)

AND THEN THERE WERE TEN

In July, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos will join ASEAN. 
Are they ready?

By Robin Ajello and Roger Mitton / Kuala Lumpur


------------------------------------------------------------------------
MYANMAR'S MILITARY JUNTA IS acting downright charitable these days. 
Having jailed scores of opposition politicians in recent weeks, the 
State Law & Order Restoration Council has magnanimously let many of them 
go. The regime can afford to be nice for a change. Next month, the 
so-called CLM nations -- Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar -- will sign up for 
the region's most exclusive club, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations. At the annual ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in Kuala Lumpur 
on July 24, the participants are bound to be wearing big grins. Thirty 
years after its birth, the organization will at long last have fulfilled 
the dream of its founding fathers -- a strategic alliance that 
encompasses all of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, which joined two 
years ago. ASEAN's famous logo of six rice stalks bundled together will 
morph into 10. No longer will it resemble a "fat lady," jokes a senior 
ASEAN official, but a lady who is "slim at the waist, with nice 
dimensions."

Yes, but what about the organization itself? Will it have Not everyone 
believes it will -- and many of those who feel that way are most 
definitely not Western liberals. Some, it seems, even hail from ASEAN's 
inner circles. 

No one, not even Myanmar's suppressed democrat Aung San Suu Kyi, 
disagrees with the principle that the new troika should be a part of 
ASEAN. Says Malaysian analyst K. S. Balakrishnan: "ASEAN 10 will be a 
powerful force -- a force that the superpowers will reckon with." And 
yet there has been no shortage of argument as to whether the timing and 
circumstances of admission are propitious. On May 31, when ASEAN foreign 
ministers convened in the Kuala Lumpur Regent Hotel to take the historic 
step, demonstrators outside were crying foul. One was former Malaysian 
MP Fan Yew Teng; he and eight others were held overnight for refusing to 
disperse. "We are not against the admission of Myanmar," explains Fan, 
"but not under this bunch of military gangsters. They are so blatant in 
their refusal to hand power to a duly elected group of people."

Nor is everyone bullish on Laos and Cambodia: the former is a backwater; 
the latter is the definition of unstable. "Economically all three aren't 
really ready," says Singapore academic Yeo Lay Hwee. "The decision to 
admit them wasn't made on a sound, logical and rational basis, but was 
primarily political." She might have added symbolic, for no politician 
worth his popularity polls would have missed the historic opportunity to 
complete ASEAN on its 30th birthday. Certainly not Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the avowed "Aseanist" who will preside over 
the expansion. 

It is also worth remembering that when Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia set up ASEAN in 1967, Southeast Asia 
was divided into two Cold War blocs: communist Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam, versus the other essentially pro-Western nations (apart from 
non-aligned Burma). ASEAN was formed to promote regional peace and 
prosperity, but also it was a bulwark thrown up against the Soviet 
"dominoes." To the likes of Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
once the region's best-known anti-communist, it must be sweet music to 
usher Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos (and Vietnam) into the ASEAN fold.

There are also new strategic considerations. Until the Cold War ended, 
the main fear was that the CLM nations would fall permanently under the 
sway of the Soviet Union. Today, the fear is of Chinese hegemony. 
Vietnam was accepted in part to provide a buffer against the People's 
Republic. The decision to admit Myanmar was partly an effort to keep the 
resource-rich nation out of the Chinese orbit. That may explain why U.S. 
officials did not act especially perturbed when ASEAN announced its 
decision on Myanmar, despite Washington's anti-SLORC rhetoric. 

With Myanmar inside the tent, free-trade policies will continue in 
Yangon, and gradually ASEAN's influence will start to kick in. At least 
that is the theory. Another one is that military ties will strengthen 
between Myanmar and the rest of ASEAN (and the West by extension). This 
is considered a good thing because SLORC has been buying truckloads of 
Chinese arms. Not that the junta will cut its links to old friend 
Beijing anytime soon, if ever.

"There is also the fear Myanmar and Cambodia will fall into Thailand's 
sphere of influence," says Filipino political scientist Carolina 
Hernandez. Indeed, ever since Thai ex-PM Chatichai Choonhavan talked 
about turning battlefields into a marketplace, there have been 
persistent worries that Bangkok hopes to dominate Indochina and turn it 
into a "baht bloc." As for Laos, it is practically a Thai province 
already. ASEAN may dilute Thai influence.

With all the fuss about Myanmar, it was easy to overlook the other new 
members and, in particular, Cambodia. One of the key criteria of ASEAN 
membership has been stability. Myanmar may be an international pariah 
and Laos an economic underachiever, but neither seems about to erupt in 
civil war. The same cannot be said for Cambodia -- and there were 
last-minute jitters about accepting it. The Cambodian ironies are 
particularly depressing. This is the one nation where "constructive 
engagement" was abandoned for wholesale global intervention. To be sure, 
something had to be done to halt the blood-letting, but the result of 
U.N.-sponsored elections in 1993 are two premiers who distrust one 
another and are stockpiling guns.

The situation is so tense in Phnom Penh that when the ordnance left over 
from previous wars was blown up last week, residents panicked and ran 
for cover. A few days earlier someone took a shot at powerful Second 
Premier Hun Sen. He and First Premier Norodom Ranariddh agree that ASEAN 
membership must go ahead, but seem incapable of setting aside a feud 
that could pitch the country back into the bloody past.

So while the ASEAN leaders publicly congratulate each other for 
expanding their regional clout, privately they know that the bigger the 
organization the messier it can get. The first casualty may be ASEAN's 
much-hyped consensus. A Jakarta official believes "a six-four split" may 
emerge between old and new members.

Then there is the group's vow to keep out of each other's domestic 
affairs. "If Cambodia goes down due to problems between Hun Sen and 
Ranariddh, what would that mean to ASEAN?" asks Malaysian analyst Razak 
Baginda. "Would it be dragged into a domestic issue?" Mahathir argues 
that the group has weathered coups in Thailand and the Philippines. But 
ASEAN has big investments in the CLM nations. If Cambodia tanks, says 
Razak, "a lot of Malaysian hands will be burned."

The first test for the new ASEAN will be how it deals with the SLORC 
conundrum. It is notable that the new members will not be paired with 
ASEAN dialogue partners, which include Western nations. Moreover, the 
existing members have ensured that it will be at least nine years before 
Yangon hosts a meeting attended by Western powers. 

Still, North American and European officials will come face-to-face with 
a Myanmar delegation in KL next month. Says a Western diplomat: "They 
may have to give up the traditional golf games after the meetings 
because most of the dialogue partners won't play with SLORC generals."

The fact is, few ASEAN leaders have much time for the SLORCmen either. 
Nor are they completely immune to the West's stated views on the regime. 
Washington publicly says that accepting Myanmar gives the junta the 
legitimacy to continue (or even worsen) its despotic ways. This is the 
message the Europeans were pushing at the Asia-Europe meeting in 
February. That is when the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore began 
backtracking on Myanmar, though some say they were making these noises 
to please their Western allies. 

For all their clubbishness and golf-playing, the ASEAN leaders are 
strong-willed folk running nations that have not always been friends. 
The foreign ministers looked happy enough when they headed for the links 
after their epochal meeting in Kuala Lumpur last week, but then that's 
the ASEAN way: "agreeing to disagree without being disagreeable," as 
Malaysian academic Noordin Sopiee likes to put it. Behind the scenes 
more is going on than is immediately apparent. 

Consider Mahathir's quiet approach to SLORC. He sent trusted chum, 
tycoon Ananda Krishnan, to Yangon to try to talk sense to leader Khin 
Nyunt. Ananda told him there would be less rancor about joining ASEAN if 
his regime made a show of talking to Suu Kyi or appeared less 
repressive. It didn't work, but such efforts may continue. 

"We know we are going to get clobbered by the international media," says 
Jakarta strategist Jusuf Wanandi. "We think it is worth it because it is 
easier to deal with them if they're inside." That said, it would be 
naive to expect ASEAN to wield much more influence over Myanmar. Many 
members are in no position to do so. This is especially true of the 
Indonesians, who will be wary of interfering, says activist Chandra 
Muzaffar because they "don't want people to say things about East Timor 
and so on."

There are other problems: few Lao and Cambodian officials speak English, 
the working language of ASEAN, and Lao officials may not be able to 
afford plane tickets to attend meetings. The socio-economic gulf between 
the old and new members is wide. "Probably we'll end up with first- and 
second-class citizens of ASEAN," says Razak. But the long-term economic 
pluses are huge. Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore are moving into 
high-tech manufacturing. In recent years they have built infrastructure 
in the CLM nations. Once complete, their labor-intensive industry can 
shift there. Analyst Prasun Sengupta calls the investment drive a "new 
form of economic colonialism." Maybe so, but Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar 
can use the jobs.

All this will take time, and the new members will not have to lower 
trade barriers for several years in line with ASEAN's free-trade agenda. 
Yet bringing together Southeast Asia's 500 million people under one 
umbrella in just 30 years is a remarkable achievement. Though the 
expansion of ASEAN is largely symbolic, the European Union started much 
the same way. 

In December, the ASEAN 10 will hold an informal summit in Kuala Lumpur 
to which the leaders of China, South Korea and Japan are invited. This 
is precisely the APEC-alternative Mahathir had in mind when he floated 
the notion of an East Asian Economic Caucus several years ago. Last 
week, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi played down the 
significance of the conclave, saying "it is just a meeting we want to 
have." He may not wish to talk about it, but most everyone else does. 
>From small beginnings great things grow. -- With reporting by Keith 
Loveard / Jakarta, Antonio Lopez / Manila, Santha Oorjitham / Singapore, 
Julian Gearing / Bankok and Dominic Faulder / Phnom Penh






------------------------------------------------------------------------




How the New Troika Scores 




CAMBODIA
Strengths
A democracy (of sorts)
Already boasts significant ASEAN investment



Weaknesses
Two premiers who distrust one another
Extremely unstable
Few officials speak English, ASEAN's working language





MYANMAR
Strengths
Relatively stable owing to the authoritarian regime
High literacy
A well-trained civil service
Good English ability



Weaknesses
An international pariah 
Close military and economic links with China
An intractable regime
Narco-state



LAOS
Strengths
Politically stable
Market reforms well-established
Big hydropower potential
Internationally acceptable



Weaknesses
Under Thailand's thumb
Limited financial resources
Low English ability
Creaky bureaucracy
Small population


FIRST THINGS FIRST

As the Marshall Plan showed, democracy requires economic progress


------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEBATE OVER DETAILS in the summer of 1947 was wrenching. In a 
Harvard commencement speech half a century ago, General George Catlett 
Marshall, the U.S. secretary of state, outlined an ambitious plan to 
rebuild war-ravaged Europe. But how much would the United States 
contribute? To what end? And to whom, exactly? Ultimately, the answers 
were astute. Between 1948 and 1951, Washington disbursed $12.5 billion 
in aid -- about $75 billion in today's money. Two-thirds went to four 
nations: allies Britain and France got the most, but enemies Germany and 
Italy were also granted more than $1 billion each. It was, in the words 
of Winston Churchill, "the most unsordid act in history."

In fact what made the effort so successful -- and so relevant today -- 
was how Washington clearly grasped global realities and its long-term 
self-interest, and bet in that direction. Rather than insisting that 
Western-style democracy be put in place, especially in Soviet-dominated 
states, before giving aid, Gen. Marshall told the Class of '47: "Our 
policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against 
hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the 
revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence 
of political and social conditions in which free institutions can 
exist." Indeed, the U.S. even offered aid to its new arch-enemies, the 
Soviet Union and emerging East European satellites (Moscow predictably 
declined on behalf of the future Warsaw Pact).

Skip ahead 50 years. Where is Marshall's far-sighted pragmatism today, 
which saw the indispensability of economic development to the rise of 
political freedom? Apparently not in Washington's policies toward many 
impoverished, war-torn nations, from Cambodia and Myanmar to the former 
Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. These days, such countries 
are told that aid won't be gushing in until elections are held and 
Western-style partisan politics given full rein. Or worse: it's either 
democracy or economic embargo, take your pick. No matter that the spread 
of freedom over the past decade, especially in Asia, owed much to 
growing prosperity and economic exchange with the West -- a trend also 
evident in the Marshall Plan's own success in Europe (which is why 
Moscow rejected it in the first place).

Western trade and economic institutions are also opening up China, where 
government control of personal life and livelihood has shrunk 
dramatically since the Open Door policy began nearly two decades ago. 
Yet despite such undeniable vindication of Marshall's view that 
prosperity advances freedom, advocates of democracy continue to assail 
the Clinton administration's policy of engaging China.

For the freshest example of lopsided priorities, turn to Africa. In the 
Congo, Mr. Laurent Kabila, the rebel-turned-president, has been 
inundated not by generous offers of sorely needed reconstruction aid, 
but by hostile questions about his decision to wait until 1999 before 
holding elections. "This crumbling and shattered state must be 
organized," he has had to explain, "so that the Congolese people can 
hold elections." Translation: let's put food on the table first. That is 
something George Marshall would have understood and even supported with 
American dollars. Sadly, it is a lesson lost on many of today's avowed 
promoters of democracy.



Facts from Asia Study
Foreign Investment


Foreign Investment of Permitted Enterprises by Country
(as of February 29, 1996) Sr. Particulars SectorsTotal No.Permitted 
Enterprises
Approved Amount
(US$ in million)1. Agriculture 1 2.69 1. Australia 6 30.002. Bangladesh 
2 2.963. China 5 5.854. France 1 485.005. Hong Kong 17 64.446. Japan 6 
118.217.The Republic of Korea 9 60.598. Macau 1 2.409. Malaysia 9 
227.2710. The Netherlands 2 83.0011. Philippine 1 6.6712. Singapore 38 
683.8813. Sri Lanka 1 1.0014. Thailand 29 421.1215. U.K. 18 666.2216. 
U.S.A. 14 241.0717. Canada 6 25.0318. Austria 1 71.50Total 166 3096.01

Foreign Investment of Permitted Enterprises by Sector
(as of February 29, 1996) Sr. Particulars SectorsTotal No.Permitted 
Enterprises
Approved Amount
(US$ in million)1. Agriculture 1 2.69 2. Fisheries 15 252.043. Mining 26 
193.404. Manufacturing 52 180.165. Oil and Gas 24 1435.426. Transport 7 
121.227. Hotels and Tourism 34 647.638. Real Estate Development 6 
251.459. Industrial Estate 1 12.00Total 166 3096.01
77.7% 


Government

Name of country: 
conventional long form: Union of Burma 
conventional short form: Burma 
local long form: Pyidaungzu Myanma Naingngandaw (translated by the US 
Government as Union of Myanma and by the Burmese as Union of Myanmar) 
local short form: Myanma Naingngandaw 
former: Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma 
Data code: BM 
Type of government: military regime 
Capital: Rangoon (regime refers to the capital as Yangon) 
Administrative divisions: 7 divisions* (yin-mya, singular - yin) and 7 
states (pyine-mya, singular - pyine); Chin State, Ayeyarwady*, Bago*, 
Kachin State, Kayin State, Kayah State, Magway*, Mandalay*, Mon State, 
Rakhine State, Sagaing*, Shan State, Tanintharyi*, Yangon* 
Independence: 4 January 1948 (from UK) 
National holiday: Independence Day, 4 January (1948) 
Constitution: 3 January 1974 (suspended since 18 September 1988); 
national convention started on 9 January 1993 to draft a new 
constitution; chapter headings and three of 15 sections have been 
approved 
Legal system: does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction 
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal 
Executive branch: 
chief of state and head of government: Prime Minister and Chairman of 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council Gen. THAN SHWE (since 23 
April 1992) 
State Law and Order Restoration Council: military junta which assumed 
power 18 September 1988 
Legislative branch: 
People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw): election last held 27 May 1990, but 
Assembly never convened; results - NLD 80%; seats - (485 total) NLD 396, 
NUP 10, other 79 
Judicial branch: limited; remnants of the British-era legal system in 
place, but there is no guarantee of a fair public trial; the judiciary 
is not independent of the executive 
Political parties and leaders: Union Solidarity and Development 
Association (USDA; pro-regime), THAN AUNG, secretary; National Unity 
Party (NUP), pro-regime, THA KYAW; National League for Democracy (NLD), 
AUNG SAN SUU KYI, general secretary; and eight minor legal parties 
Other political or pressure groups: National Coalition Government of the 
Union of Burma (NCGUB), headed by the elected prime minister SEIN WIN - 
consists of individuals legitimately elected to the People's Assembly 
but not recognized by the military regime; the group fled to a border 
area and joined with insurgents in December 1990 to form a parallel 
government; Kachin Independence Army (KIA); United Wa State Army (UWSA); 
Karen National Union (KNU); several Shan factions, including the Mong 
Tai Army (MTA); All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) 
International organization participation: AsDB, CCC, CP, ESCAP, FAO, 
G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, 
Intelsat (nonsignatory user), Interpol, IOC, ITU, Mekong Group, NAM, UN, 
UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WMO, WTrO 
Diplomatic representation in US: 
chief of mission: Ambassador U THAUNG 
chancery: 2300 S Street NW, Washington, DC 20008 
telephone: [1] (202) 332-9044, 9045 
consulate(s) general: New York 
US diplomatic representation: 
chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Marilyn A. 
MEYERS 
embassy: 581 Merchant Street, Rangoon (GPO 521) 
mailing address: Box B, APO AP 96546 
telephone: [95] (1) 82055, 82182 (operator assistance required) 
FAX: [95] (1) 80409 
Flag: red with a blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner bearing, 
all in white, 14 five-pointed stars encircling a cogwheel containing a 
stalk of rice; the 14 stars represent the 14 administrative divisions

Economy
Economic overview: Burma has a mixed economy with about 75% private 
activity, mainly in agriculture, light industry, and transport, and with 
about 25% state-controlled activity, mainly in energy, heavy industry, 
and foreign trade. Government policy in the last seven years, 1989-95, 
has aimed at revitalizing the economy after three decades of tight 
central planning. Thus, private activity has markedly increased; foreign 
investment has been encouraged, so far with moderate success; and 
efforts continue to increase the efficiency of state enterprises. 
Published estimates of Burma's foreign trade are greatly understated 
because of the volume of black market trade. A major ongoing problem is 
the failure to achieve monetary and fiscal stability. Although Burma 
remains a poor Asian country, its rich resources furnish the potential 
for substantial long-term increases in income, exports, and living 
standards. 
GDP: purchasing power parity - $47 billion (1995 est.) 
GDP real growth rate: 6.8% (1995 est.) 
GDP per capita: $1,000 (1995 est.) 
GDP composition by sector: 
agriculture: 60% 
industry: 10% 
services: 30% (1995 est.) 
Inflation rate (consumer prices): 38% (1994 est.) 
Labor force: 16.007 million (1992) 
by occupation: agriculture 65.2%, industry 14.3%, trade 10.1%, 
government 6.3%, other 4.1% (FY88/89 est.) 
Unemployment rate: NA% 
Budget: 
revenues: $5.3 billion 
expenditures: $10 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1995 
est.) 
Industries: agricultural processing; textiles and footwear; wood and 
wood products; petroleum refining; copper, tin, tungsten, iron; 
construction materials; pharmaceuticals; fertilizer 
Industrial production growth rate: 4.9% (FY92/93 est.) 
Electricity: 
capacity: 845,000 kW 
production: 3.5 billion kWh 
consumption per capita: 46 kWh (1995 est.) 
Agriculture: paddy rice, corn, oilseed, sugarcane, pulses; hardwood 
Illicit drugs: world's largest illicit producer of opium (2,340 metric 
tons in 1995) and source for over 60% of US heroin imports; minor 
producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; Rangoon's 
antinarcotic programs hindered by lack of resources, government 
commitment; growing role in methamphetamine production for regional 
consumption 
Exports: $879 million (FY94/95 est.) 
commodities: pulses and beans, teak, rice, hardwood 
partners: Singapore, China, Thailand, India, Hong Kong 
Imports: $1.5 billion (FY94/95 est.) 
commodities: machinery, transport equipment, construction materials, 
food products, consumer goods 
partners: Japan, China, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia 
External debt: $5.5 billion (FY94/95 est.) 
Economic aid: 
recipient: ODA, $61 million (1993) 
Currency: 1 kyat (K) = 100 pyas 
Exchange rates: kyats (K) per US$1 - 5.8475 (January 1996), 5.9170 
(1995), 5.9749 (1994), 6.1570 (1993), 6.1045 (1992), 6.2837 (1991); 
unofficial - 120 
Fiscal year: 1 April - 31 March

Defense
Branches: Army, Navy, Air Force 
Manpower availability: 
males age 15-49: 11,759,636 
females age 15-49: 11,588,181 
males fit for military service: 6,291,986 
females fit for military service: 6,184,667 
males reach military age (18) annually: 473,255 
females reach military age (18) annually: 454,786 (1996 est.) 
note: both sexes liable for military service 
Defense expenditures: exchange rate conversion - $135 million, NA% of 
GDP (FY95/96)
strategic location near major Indian Ocean shipping lanes 


People
Population: 45,975,625 (July 1996 est.) 
Age structure: 
0-14 years: 37% (male 8,637,102; female 8,308,282) 
15-64 years: 59% (male 13,577,232; female 13,571,312) 
65 years and over: 4% (male 853,403; female 1,028,294) (July 1996 est.) 
Population growth rate: 1.84% (1996 est.) 
Birth rate: 30.01 births/1,000 population (1996 est.) 
Death rate: 11.66 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.) 
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.) 
Sex ratio: 
at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female 
under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 
15-64 years: 1 male(s)/female 
65 years and over: 0.83 male(s)/female 
all ages: 1.01 male(s)/female (1996 est.) 
Infant mortality rate: 80.7 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.) 
Life expectancy at birth: 
total population: 56.14 years 
male: 54.46 years 
female: 57.92 years (1996 est.) 
Total fertility rate: 3.83 children born/woman (1996 est.) 
Nationality: 
noun: Burmese (singular and plural) 
adjective: Burmese 
Ethnic divisions: Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, 
Mon 2%, Indian 2%, other 5% 
Religions: Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (Baptist 3%, Roman Catholic 1%), 
Muslim 4%, animist beliefs 1%, other 2% 
Languages: Burmese, minority ethnic groups have their own languages 
Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.) 
total population: 83.1% 
male: 88.7% 
female: 77.7%

Transportation

Railways: 
total: 3,569 km 
narrow gauge: 3,569 km 1.000-m gauge (1995) 
Highways: 
total: 26,861 km 
paved: 3,181 km 
unpaved: 23,680 km (1988 est.) 
Waterways: 12,800 km; 3,200 km navigable by large commercial vessels 
Pipelines: crude oil 1,343 km; natural gas 330 km 
Ports: Bassein, Bhamo, Chauk, Mandalay, Moulmein, Myitkyina, Rangoon, 
Akyab (Sittwe), Tavoy 
Merchant marine: 
total: 40 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 444,957 GRT/610,420 DWT 
ships by type: bulk 11, cargo 15, chemical tanker 5, container 1, oil 
tanker 3, passenger-cargo 3, vehicle carrier 2 (1995 est.) 
Airports: 
total: 74 
with paved runways over 3 047 m: 2 
with paved runways 2 438 to 3 047 m: 2 
with paved runways 1 524 to 2 437 m: 13 
with paved runways 914 to 1 523 m: 10 
with paved runways under 914 m: 28 
with unpaved runways 1 524 to 2 437 m: 2 
with unpaved runways 914 to 1 523 m: 17 (1995 est.)

Communications
Telephones: 122,195 (1993 est.) 
Telephone system: meets minimum requirements for local and intercity 
service for business and government; international service is good 
domestic: NA 
international: satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) 
Radio broadcast stations: AM 2, FM 1, shortwave 0 (1985 est.) 
note: radiobroadcast coverage is limited to the most populous areas 
Radios: NA 
Television broadcast stations: 1 (1988 est.) 
Televisions: 88,000 (1992 est.)





ASIA, INC..
Doing Business With The Generals
By David Devoss

Related Article:
Investment ABCs

Burma's military leaders still have no taste for democracy, but they've 
heartily embraced capitalism and foreign investment

Three years ago, Iain Glover moved to Burma, intent on starting an 
electrical-supply business. Selling sockets, switches and other 
electrical services seemed a good idea, since most of the country's 
wiring dated from the days of Thomas Edison. But the 45-year-old 
Australian engineer began to have second thoughts when he went to 
register his company. 

"There were 60 people sitting at 30 desks," he remembers. "Files yellow 
with age filled bookcases covered with dust. The only thing moving was 
the ceiling fan." 

Glover's apprehension deepened over at the Myanmar Investment Commercial 
Bank. For him to open a U.S.-dollar account, the bank needed to keep the 
original of his corporate articles of association. Fair enough, thought 
Glover, who produced the requested document. But when he tried to open 
an account denominated in kyat, the local currency, a second bank 
official demanded the same document for his files. "I can't give it to 
you because he's got it," said Glover, pointing in the direction of the 
first employee. "Original means one and only." 

Glover eventually got his kyat account after hiring a former classmate 
of the second banker to be a sales associate. Today he supplies 15 
retail outlets, manages an office staff of 30 and oversees 70 
subcontractors who help him install high-tension wire, air conditioning 
and other electrical systems. Says Glover: "My sales are up 50 percent 
this year, and by 2000 I expect to have revenues in excess of $20 
million. The economy is booming. I love Myanmar." 

Burma, or Myanmar as it's now officially called, is not a country 
normally associated with investment opportunity. The government is 
controlled by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a 
committee of 21 army officers that violently seized control of the 
country seven years ago. They are the same men who, after being voted 
out of power in 1990, disallowed the election and extended the house 
arrest of the victorious opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Since then 
Burma has been an international pariah, ignored by development banks, 
scorned by human-rights organizations and routinely denounced by Western 
governments. At a recent gathering in Hong Kong, former U.S. AQhr to 
Burma Burton Levin dismissed SLORC's opening of the economy in recent 
years as a cynical ploy to generate foreign currency with which to 
bolster its armed forces. "I have never encountered a greater bunch of 
idiots running a country," Levin said. "These are military morons." 

Last July SLORC, without fanfare or apology, finally released Aung San 
Suu Kyi. The Nobel laureate immediately questioned the policy of 
"constructive engagement" -- encouraging political change by dealing 
with the regime instead of isolating it -- that ASEAN countries have 
used to rationalize their investment in Burma. It is doubtful, however, 
that anything short of a return to civil unrest can deter Burma's 
economic development. 

During Suu Kyi's six-year confinement, the government privatized a 
number of state enterprises and legalized border trade with China, India 
and Bangladesh. It quadrupled the amount of irrigated land, then 
permitted farmers to sell 85 percent of their crops on the open market. 
Thanks to these and other reforms, private-sector trade now accounts 

"THERE WILL BE NO REAL DEMOCRACY IF WE CAN'T GURANTEE THE RIGHTS OF THE 
MINORITY ETHNIC PEOPLE.  ONLY UNDERSTANDING THEIR SUFFERING AND HELPING 
THEM TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS WILL ASSIST PREVENTING FROM THE 
DISINTEGRATION AND THE SESESSION."  "WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THEIR 
STRENGTH, WE CAN'T TOPPLE THE SLORC AND BURMA WILL NEVER BE IN PEACE."



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