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News Related to Burma on the Public
Subject: News Related to Burma on the Publications
Aisa Week (June 13, 1997)
AND THEN THERE WERE TEN
In July, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos will join ASEAN.
Are they ready?
By Robin Ajello and Roger Mitton / Kuala Lumpur
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MYANMAR'S MILITARY JUNTA IS acting downright charitable these days.
Having jailed scores of opposition politicians in recent weeks, the
State Law & Order Restoration Council has magnanimously let many of them
go. The regime can afford to be nice for a change. Next month, the
so-called CLM nations -- Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar -- will sign up for
the region's most exclusive club, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. At the annual ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in Kuala Lumpur
on July 24, the participants are bound to be wearing big grins. Thirty
years after its birth, the organization will at long last have fulfilled
the dream of its founding fathers -- a strategic alliance that
encompasses all of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, which joined two
years ago. ASEAN's famous logo of six rice stalks bundled together will
morph into 10. No longer will it resemble a "fat lady," jokes a senior
ASEAN official, but a lady who is "slim at the waist, with nice
dimensions."
Yes, but what about the organization itself? Will it have Not everyone
believes it will -- and many of those who feel that way are most
definitely not Western liberals. Some, it seems, even hail from ASEAN's
inner circles.
No one, not even Myanmar's suppressed democrat Aung San Suu Kyi,
disagrees with the principle that the new troika should be a part of
ASEAN. Says Malaysian analyst K. S. Balakrishnan: "ASEAN 10 will be a
powerful force -- a force that the superpowers will reckon with." And
yet there has been no shortage of argument as to whether the timing and
circumstances of admission are propitious. On May 31, when ASEAN foreign
ministers convened in the Kuala Lumpur Regent Hotel to take the historic
step, demonstrators outside were crying foul. One was former Malaysian
MP Fan Yew Teng; he and eight others were held overnight for refusing to
disperse. "We are not against the admission of Myanmar," explains Fan,
"but not under this bunch of military gangsters. They are so blatant in
their refusal to hand power to a duly elected group of people."
Nor is everyone bullish on Laos and Cambodia: the former is a backwater;
the latter is the definition of unstable. "Economically all three aren't
really ready," says Singapore academic Yeo Lay Hwee. "The decision to
admit them wasn't made on a sound, logical and rational basis, but was
primarily political." She might have added symbolic, for no politician
worth his popularity polls would have missed the historic opportunity to
complete ASEAN on its 30th birthday. Certainly not Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the avowed "Aseanist" who will preside over
the expansion.
It is also worth remembering that when Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia set up ASEAN in 1967, Southeast Asia
was divided into two Cold War blocs: communist Laos, Cambodia and
Vietnam, versus the other essentially pro-Western nations (apart from
non-aligned Burma). ASEAN was formed to promote regional peace and
prosperity, but also it was a bulwark thrown up against the Soviet
"dominoes." To the likes of Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew,
once the region's best-known anti-communist, it must be sweet music to
usher Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos (and Vietnam) into the ASEAN fold.
There are also new strategic considerations. Until the Cold War ended,
the main fear was that the CLM nations would fall permanently under the
sway of the Soviet Union. Today, the fear is of Chinese hegemony.
Vietnam was accepted in part to provide a buffer against the People's
Republic. The decision to admit Myanmar was partly an effort to keep the
resource-rich nation out of the Chinese orbit. That may explain why U.S.
officials did not act especially perturbed when ASEAN announced its
decision on Myanmar, despite Washington's anti-SLORC rhetoric.
With Myanmar inside the tent, free-trade policies will continue in
Yangon, and gradually ASEAN's influence will start to kick in. At least
that is the theory. Another one is that military ties will strengthen
between Myanmar and the rest of ASEAN (and the West by extension). This
is considered a good thing because SLORC has been buying truckloads of
Chinese arms. Not that the junta will cut its links to old friend
Beijing anytime soon, if ever.
"There is also the fear Myanmar and Cambodia will fall into Thailand's
sphere of influence," says Filipino political scientist Carolina
Hernandez. Indeed, ever since Thai ex-PM Chatichai Choonhavan talked
about turning battlefields into a marketplace, there have been
persistent worries that Bangkok hopes to dominate Indochina and turn it
into a "baht bloc." As for Laos, it is practically a Thai province
already. ASEAN may dilute Thai influence.
With all the fuss about Myanmar, it was easy to overlook the other new
members and, in particular, Cambodia. One of the key criteria of ASEAN
membership has been stability. Myanmar may be an international pariah
and Laos an economic underachiever, but neither seems about to erupt in
civil war. The same cannot be said for Cambodia -- and there were
last-minute jitters about accepting it. The Cambodian ironies are
particularly depressing. This is the one nation where "constructive
engagement" was abandoned for wholesale global intervention. To be sure,
something had to be done to halt the blood-letting, but the result of
U.N.-sponsored elections in 1993 are two premiers who distrust one
another and are stockpiling guns.
The situation is so tense in Phnom Penh that when the ordnance left over
from previous wars was blown up last week, residents panicked and ran
for cover. A few days earlier someone took a shot at powerful Second
Premier Hun Sen. He and First Premier Norodom Ranariddh agree that ASEAN
membership must go ahead, but seem incapable of setting aside a feud
that could pitch the country back into the bloody past.
So while the ASEAN leaders publicly congratulate each other for
expanding their regional clout, privately they know that the bigger the
organization the messier it can get. The first casualty may be ASEAN's
much-hyped consensus. A Jakarta official believes "a six-four split" may
emerge between old and new members.
Then there is the group's vow to keep out of each other's domestic
affairs. "If Cambodia goes down due to problems between Hun Sen and
Ranariddh, what would that mean to ASEAN?" asks Malaysian analyst Razak
Baginda. "Would it be dragged into a domestic issue?" Mahathir argues
that the group has weathered coups in Thailand and the Philippines. But
ASEAN has big investments in the CLM nations. If Cambodia tanks, says
Razak, "a lot of Malaysian hands will be burned."
The first test for the new ASEAN will be how it deals with the SLORC
conundrum. It is notable that the new members will not be paired with
ASEAN dialogue partners, which include Western nations. Moreover, the
existing members have ensured that it will be at least nine years before
Yangon hosts a meeting attended by Western powers.
Still, North American and European officials will come face-to-face with
a Myanmar delegation in KL next month. Says a Western diplomat: "They
may have to give up the traditional golf games after the meetings
because most of the dialogue partners won't play with SLORC generals."
The fact is, few ASEAN leaders have much time for the SLORCmen either.
Nor are they completely immune to the West's stated views on the regime.
Washington publicly says that accepting Myanmar gives the junta the
legitimacy to continue (or even worsen) its despotic ways. This is the
message the Europeans were pushing at the Asia-Europe meeting in
February. That is when the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore began
backtracking on Myanmar, though some say they were making these noises
to please their Western allies.
For all their clubbishness and golf-playing, the ASEAN leaders are
strong-willed folk running nations that have not always been friends.
The foreign ministers looked happy enough when they headed for the links
after their epochal meeting in Kuala Lumpur last week, but then that's
the ASEAN way: "agreeing to disagree without being disagreeable," as
Malaysian academic Noordin Sopiee likes to put it. Behind the scenes
more is going on than is immediately apparent.
Consider Mahathir's quiet approach to SLORC. He sent trusted chum,
tycoon Ananda Krishnan, to Yangon to try to talk sense to leader Khin
Nyunt. Ananda told him there would be less rancor about joining ASEAN if
his regime made a show of talking to Suu Kyi or appeared less
repressive. It didn't work, but such efforts may continue.
"We know we are going to get clobbered by the international media," says
Jakarta strategist Jusuf Wanandi. "We think it is worth it because it is
easier to deal with them if they're inside." That said, it would be
naive to expect ASEAN to wield much more influence over Myanmar. Many
members are in no position to do so. This is especially true of the
Indonesians, who will be wary of interfering, says activist Chandra
Muzaffar because they "don't want people to say things about East Timor
and so on."
There are other problems: few Lao and Cambodian officials speak English,
the working language of ASEAN, and Lao officials may not be able to
afford plane tickets to attend meetings. The socio-economic gulf between
the old and new members is wide. "Probably we'll end up with first- and
second-class citizens of ASEAN," says Razak. But the long-term economic
pluses are huge. Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore are moving into
high-tech manufacturing. In recent years they have built infrastructure
in the CLM nations. Once complete, their labor-intensive industry can
shift there. Analyst Prasun Sengupta calls the investment drive a "new
form of economic colonialism." Maybe so, but Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar
can use the jobs.
All this will take time, and the new members will not have to lower
trade barriers for several years in line with ASEAN's free-trade agenda.
Yet bringing together Southeast Asia's 500 million people under one
umbrella in just 30 years is a remarkable achievement. Though the
expansion of ASEAN is largely symbolic, the European Union started much
the same way.
In December, the ASEAN 10 will hold an informal summit in Kuala Lumpur
to which the leaders of China, South Korea and Japan are invited. This
is precisely the APEC-alternative Mahathir had in mind when he floated
the notion of an East Asian Economic Caucus several years ago. Last
week, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi played down the
significance of the conclave, saying "it is just a meeting we want to
have." He may not wish to talk about it, but most everyone else does.
>From small beginnings great things grow. -- With reporting by Keith
Loveard / Jakarta, Antonio Lopez / Manila, Santha Oorjitham / Singapore,
Julian Gearing / Bankok and Dominic Faulder / Phnom Penh
------------------------------------------------------------------------
How the New Troika Scores
CAMBODIA
Strengths
A democracy (of sorts)
Already boasts significant ASEAN investment
Weaknesses
Two premiers who distrust one another
Extremely unstable
Few officials speak English, ASEAN's working language
MYANMAR
Strengths
Relatively stable owing to the authoritarian regime
High literacy
A well-trained civil service
Good English ability
Weaknesses
An international pariah
Close military and economic links with China
An intractable regime
Narco-state
LAOS
Strengths
Politically stable
Market reforms well-established
Big hydropower potential
Internationally acceptable
Weaknesses
Under Thailand's thumb
Limited financial resources
Low English ability
Creaky bureaucracy
Small population
FIRST THINGS FIRST
As the Marshall Plan showed, democracy requires economic progress
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEBATE OVER DETAILS in the summer of 1947 was wrenching. In a
Harvard commencement speech half a century ago, General George Catlett
Marshall, the U.S. secretary of state, outlined an ambitious plan to
rebuild war-ravaged Europe. But how much would the United States
contribute? To what end? And to whom, exactly? Ultimately, the answers
were astute. Between 1948 and 1951, Washington disbursed $12.5 billion
in aid -- about $75 billion in today's money. Two-thirds went to four
nations: allies Britain and France got the most, but enemies Germany and
Italy were also granted more than $1 billion each. It was, in the words
of Winston Churchill, "the most unsordid act in history."
In fact what made the effort so successful -- and so relevant today --
was how Washington clearly grasped global realities and its long-term
self-interest, and bet in that direction. Rather than insisting that
Western-style democracy be put in place, especially in Soviet-dominated
states, before giving aid, Gen. Marshall told the Class of '47: "Our
policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against
hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the
revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence
of political and social conditions in which free institutions can
exist." Indeed, the U.S. even offered aid to its new arch-enemies, the
Soviet Union and emerging East European satellites (Moscow predictably
declined on behalf of the future Warsaw Pact).
Skip ahead 50 years. Where is Marshall's far-sighted pragmatism today,
which saw the indispensability of economic development to the rise of
political freedom? Apparently not in Washington's policies toward many
impoverished, war-torn nations, from Cambodia and Myanmar to the former
Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo. These days, such countries
are told that aid won't be gushing in until elections are held and
Western-style partisan politics given full rein. Or worse: it's either
democracy or economic embargo, take your pick. No matter that the spread
of freedom over the past decade, especially in Asia, owed much to
growing prosperity and economic exchange with the West -- a trend also
evident in the Marshall Plan's own success in Europe (which is why
Moscow rejected it in the first place).
Western trade and economic institutions are also opening up China, where
government control of personal life and livelihood has shrunk
dramatically since the Open Door policy began nearly two decades ago.
Yet despite such undeniable vindication of Marshall's view that
prosperity advances freedom, advocates of democracy continue to assail
the Clinton administration's policy of engaging China.
For the freshest example of lopsided priorities, turn to Africa. In the
Congo, Mr. Laurent Kabila, the rebel-turned-president, has been
inundated not by generous offers of sorely needed reconstruction aid,
but by hostile questions about his decision to wait until 1999 before
holding elections. "This crumbling and shattered state must be
organized," he has had to explain, "so that the Congolese people can
hold elections." Translation: let's put food on the table first. That is
something George Marshall would have understood and even supported with
American dollars. Sadly, it is a lesson lost on many of today's avowed
promoters of democracy.
Facts from Asia Study
Foreign Investment
Foreign Investment of Permitted Enterprises by Country
(as of February 29, 1996) Sr. Particulars SectorsTotal No.Permitted
Enterprises
Approved Amount
(US$ in million)1. Agriculture 1 2.69 1. Australia 6 30.002. Bangladesh
2 2.963. China 5 5.854. France 1 485.005. Hong Kong 17 64.446. Japan 6
118.217.The Republic of Korea 9 60.598. Macau 1 2.409. Malaysia 9
227.2710. The Netherlands 2 83.0011. Philippine 1 6.6712. Singapore 38
683.8813. Sri Lanka 1 1.0014. Thailand 29 421.1215. U.K. 18 666.2216.
U.S.A. 14 241.0717. Canada 6 25.0318. Austria 1 71.50Total 166 3096.01
Foreign Investment of Permitted Enterprises by Sector
(as of February 29, 1996) Sr. Particulars SectorsTotal No.Permitted
Enterprises
Approved Amount
(US$ in million)1. Agriculture 1 2.69 2. Fisheries 15 252.043. Mining 26
193.404. Manufacturing 52 180.165. Oil and Gas 24 1435.426. Transport 7
121.227. Hotels and Tourism 34 647.638. Real Estate Development 6
251.459. Industrial Estate 1 12.00Total 166 3096.01
77.7%
Government
Name of country:
conventional long form: Union of Burma
conventional short form: Burma
local long form: Pyidaungzu Myanma Naingngandaw (translated by the US
Government as Union of Myanma and by the Burmese as Union of Myanmar)
local short form: Myanma Naingngandaw
former: Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma
Data code: BM
Type of government: military regime
Capital: Rangoon (regime refers to the capital as Yangon)
Administrative divisions: 7 divisions* (yin-mya, singular - yin) and 7
states (pyine-mya, singular - pyine); Chin State, Ayeyarwady*, Bago*,
Kachin State, Kayin State, Kayah State, Magway*, Mandalay*, Mon State,
Rakhine State, Sagaing*, Shan State, Tanintharyi*, Yangon*
Independence: 4 January 1948 (from UK)
National holiday: Independence Day, 4 January (1948)
Constitution: 3 January 1974 (suspended since 18 September 1988);
national convention started on 9 January 1993 to draft a new
constitution; chapter headings and three of 15 sections have been
approved
Legal system: does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
Executive branch:
chief of state and head of government: Prime Minister and Chairman of
the State Law and Order Restoration Council Gen. THAN SHWE (since 23
April 1992)
State Law and Order Restoration Council: military junta which assumed
power 18 September 1988
Legislative branch:
People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw): election last held 27 May 1990, but
Assembly never convened; results - NLD 80%; seats - (485 total) NLD 396,
NUP 10, other 79
Judicial branch: limited; remnants of the British-era legal system in
place, but there is no guarantee of a fair public trial; the judiciary
is not independent of the executive
Political parties and leaders: Union Solidarity and Development
Association (USDA; pro-regime), THAN AUNG, secretary; National Unity
Party (NUP), pro-regime, THA KYAW; National League for Democracy (NLD),
AUNG SAN SUU KYI, general secretary; and eight minor legal parties
Other political or pressure groups: National Coalition Government of the
Union of Burma (NCGUB), headed by the elected prime minister SEIN WIN -
consists of individuals legitimately elected to the People's Assembly
but not recognized by the military regime; the group fled to a border
area and joined with insurgents in December 1990 to form a parallel
government; Kachin Independence Army (KIA); United Wa State Army (UWSA);
Karen National Union (KNU); several Shan factions, including the Mong
Tai Army (MTA); All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF)
International organization participation: AsDB, CCC, CP, ESCAP, FAO,
G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO,
Intelsat (nonsignatory user), Interpol, IOC, ITU, Mekong Group, NAM, UN,
UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WMO, WTrO
Diplomatic representation in US:
chief of mission: Ambassador U THAUNG
chancery: 2300 S Street NW, Washington, DC 20008
telephone: [1] (202) 332-9044, 9045
consulate(s) general: New York
US diplomatic representation:
chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Marilyn A.
MEYERS
embassy: 581 Merchant Street, Rangoon (GPO 521)
mailing address: Box B, APO AP 96546
telephone: [95] (1) 82055, 82182 (operator assistance required)
FAX: [95] (1) 80409
Flag: red with a blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner bearing,
all in white, 14 five-pointed stars encircling a cogwheel containing a
stalk of rice; the 14 stars represent the 14 administrative divisions
Economy
Economic overview: Burma has a mixed economy with about 75% private
activity, mainly in agriculture, light industry, and transport, and with
about 25% state-controlled activity, mainly in energy, heavy industry,
and foreign trade. Government policy in the last seven years, 1989-95,
has aimed at revitalizing the economy after three decades of tight
central planning. Thus, private activity has markedly increased; foreign
investment has been encouraged, so far with moderate success; and
efforts continue to increase the efficiency of state enterprises.
Published estimates of Burma's foreign trade are greatly understated
because of the volume of black market trade. A major ongoing problem is
the failure to achieve monetary and fiscal stability. Although Burma
remains a poor Asian country, its rich resources furnish the potential
for substantial long-term increases in income, exports, and living
standards.
GDP: purchasing power parity - $47 billion (1995 est.)
GDP real growth rate: 6.8% (1995 est.)
GDP per capita: $1,000 (1995 est.)
GDP composition by sector:
agriculture: 60%
industry: 10%
services: 30% (1995 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices): 38% (1994 est.)
Labor force: 16.007 million (1992)
by occupation: agriculture 65.2%, industry 14.3%, trade 10.1%,
government 6.3%, other 4.1% (FY88/89 est.)
Unemployment rate: NA%
Budget:
revenues: $5.3 billion
expenditures: $10 billion, including capital expenditures of $NA (1995
est.)
Industries: agricultural processing; textiles and footwear; wood and
wood products; petroleum refining; copper, tin, tungsten, iron;
construction materials; pharmaceuticals; fertilizer
Industrial production growth rate: 4.9% (FY92/93 est.)
Electricity:
capacity: 845,000 kW
production: 3.5 billion kWh
consumption per capita: 46 kWh (1995 est.)
Agriculture: paddy rice, corn, oilseed, sugarcane, pulses; hardwood
Illicit drugs: world's largest illicit producer of opium (2,340 metric
tons in 1995) and source for over 60% of US heroin imports; minor
producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; Rangoon's
antinarcotic programs hindered by lack of resources, government
commitment; growing role in methamphetamine production for regional
consumption
Exports: $879 million (FY94/95 est.)
commodities: pulses and beans, teak, rice, hardwood
partners: Singapore, China, Thailand, India, Hong Kong
Imports: $1.5 billion (FY94/95 est.)
commodities: machinery, transport equipment, construction materials,
food products, consumer goods
partners: Japan, China, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia
External debt: $5.5 billion (FY94/95 est.)
Economic aid:
recipient: ODA, $61 million (1993)
Currency: 1 kyat (K) = 100 pyas
Exchange rates: kyats (K) per US$1 - 5.8475 (January 1996), 5.9170
(1995), 5.9749 (1994), 6.1570 (1993), 6.1045 (1992), 6.2837 (1991);
unofficial - 120
Fiscal year: 1 April - 31 March
Defense
Branches: Army, Navy, Air Force
Manpower availability:
males age 15-49: 11,759,636
females age 15-49: 11,588,181
males fit for military service: 6,291,986
females fit for military service: 6,184,667
males reach military age (18) annually: 473,255
females reach military age (18) annually: 454,786 (1996 est.)
note: both sexes liable for military service
Defense expenditures: exchange rate conversion - $135 million, NA% of
GDP (FY95/96)
strategic location near major Indian Ocean shipping lanes
People
Population: 45,975,625 (July 1996 est.)
Age structure:
0-14 years: 37% (male 8,637,102; female 8,308,282)
15-64 years: 59% (male 13,577,232; female 13,571,312)
65 years and over: 4% (male 853,403; female 1,028,294) (July 1996 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.84% (1996 est.)
Birth rate: 30.01 births/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Death rate: 11.66 deaths/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1996 est.)
Sex ratio:
at birth: 1.06 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
15-64 years: 1 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.83 male(s)/female
all ages: 1.01 male(s)/female (1996 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 80.7 deaths/1,000 live births (1996 est.)
Life expectancy at birth:
total population: 56.14 years
male: 54.46 years
female: 57.92 years (1996 est.)
Total fertility rate: 3.83 children born/woman (1996 est.)
Nationality:
noun: Burmese (singular and plural)
adjective: Burmese
Ethnic divisions: Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%,
Mon 2%, Indian 2%, other 5%
Religions: Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (Baptist 3%, Roman Catholic 1%),
Muslim 4%, animist beliefs 1%, other 2%
Languages: Burmese, minority ethnic groups have their own languages
Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write (1995 est.)
total population: 83.1%
male: 88.7%
female: 77.7%
Transportation
Railways:
total: 3,569 km
narrow gauge: 3,569 km 1.000-m gauge (1995)
Highways:
total: 26,861 km
paved: 3,181 km
unpaved: 23,680 km (1988 est.)
Waterways: 12,800 km; 3,200 km navigable by large commercial vessels
Pipelines: crude oil 1,343 km; natural gas 330 km
Ports: Bassein, Bhamo, Chauk, Mandalay, Moulmein, Myitkyina, Rangoon,
Akyab (Sittwe), Tavoy
Merchant marine:
total: 40 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 444,957 GRT/610,420 DWT
ships by type: bulk 11, cargo 15, chemical tanker 5, container 1, oil
tanker 3, passenger-cargo 3, vehicle carrier 2 (1995 est.)
Airports:
total: 74
with paved runways over 3 047 m: 2
with paved runways 2 438 to 3 047 m: 2
with paved runways 1 524 to 2 437 m: 13
with paved runways 914 to 1 523 m: 10
with paved runways under 914 m: 28
with unpaved runways 1 524 to 2 437 m: 2
with unpaved runways 914 to 1 523 m: 17 (1995 est.)
Communications
Telephones: 122,195 (1993 est.)
Telephone system: meets minimum requirements for local and intercity
service for business and government; international service is good
domestic: NA
international: satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean)
Radio broadcast stations: AM 2, FM 1, shortwave 0 (1985 est.)
note: radiobroadcast coverage is limited to the most populous areas
Radios: NA
Television broadcast stations: 1 (1988 est.)
Televisions: 88,000 (1992 est.)
ASIA, INC..
Doing Business With The Generals
By David Devoss
Related Article:
Investment ABCs
Burma's military leaders still have no taste for democracy, but they've
heartily embraced capitalism and foreign investment
Three years ago, Iain Glover moved to Burma, intent on starting an
electrical-supply business. Selling sockets, switches and other
electrical services seemed a good idea, since most of the country's
wiring dated from the days of Thomas Edison. But the 45-year-old
Australian engineer began to have second thoughts when he went to
register his company.
"There were 60 people sitting at 30 desks," he remembers. "Files yellow
with age filled bookcases covered with dust. The only thing moving was
the ceiling fan."
Glover's apprehension deepened over at the Myanmar Investment Commercial
Bank. For him to open a U.S.-dollar account, the bank needed to keep the
original of his corporate articles of association. Fair enough, thought
Glover, who produced the requested document. But when he tried to open
an account denominated in kyat, the local currency, a second bank
official demanded the same document for his files. "I can't give it to
you because he's got it," said Glover, pointing in the direction of the
first employee. "Original means one and only."
Glover eventually got his kyat account after hiring a former classmate
of the second banker to be a sales associate. Today he supplies 15
retail outlets, manages an office staff of 30 and oversees 70
subcontractors who help him install high-tension wire, air conditioning
and other electrical systems. Says Glover: "My sales are up 50 percent
this year, and by 2000 I expect to have revenues in excess of $20
million. The economy is booming. I love Myanmar."
Burma, or Myanmar as it's now officially called, is not a country
normally associated with investment opportunity. The government is
controlled by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a
committee of 21 army officers that violently seized control of the
country seven years ago. They are the same men who, after being voted
out of power in 1990, disallowed the election and extended the house
arrest of the victorious opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Since then
Burma has been an international pariah, ignored by development banks,
scorned by human-rights organizations and routinely denounced by Western
governments. At a recent gathering in Hong Kong, former U.S. AQhr to
Burma Burton Levin dismissed SLORC's opening of the economy in recent
years as a cynical ploy to generate foreign currency with which to
bolster its armed forces. "I have never encountered a greater bunch of
idiots running a country," Levin said. "These are military morons."
Last July SLORC, without fanfare or apology, finally released Aung San
Suu Kyi. The Nobel laureate immediately questioned the policy of
"constructive engagement" -- encouraging political change by dealing
with the regime instead of isolating it -- that ASEAN countries have
used to rationalize their investment in Burma. It is doubtful, however,
that anything short of a return to civil unrest can deter Burma's
economic development.
During Suu Kyi's six-year confinement, the government privatized a
number of state enterprises and legalized border trade with China, India
and Bangladesh. It quadrupled the amount of irrigated land, then
permitted farmers to sell 85 percent of their crops on the open market.
Thanks to these and other reforms, private-sector trade now accounts
"THERE WILL BE NO REAL DEMOCRACY IF WE CAN'T GURANTEE THE RIGHTS OF THE
MINORITY ETHNIC PEOPLE. ONLY UNDERSTANDING THEIR SUFFERING AND HELPING
THEM TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS WILL ASSIST PREVENTING FROM THE
DISINTEGRATION AND THE SESESSION." "WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THEIR
STRENGTH, WE CAN'T TOPPLE THE SLORC AND BURMA WILL NEVER BE IN PEACE."
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