[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

Sub-regional mechanism for human ri



Subject: Sub-regional mechanism for human rights protection



Date: 14 May 1997 
The Nation 
Sub-regional mechanism for human rights protection

There does not exist at sub-regional level an inter-governmental mechanism for 
the protection of human rights. However, various sub-regional organisations 
have emerged in Asia in recent decades to promote close economic ties. The two 
prime examples are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The following analysis will 
focus on the former as a case study. 

Asean has been at the forefront of economic growth in Southeast Asia. It has 
broadened its emphasis on economics, trade and commerce to regional security 
issues. In this pursuit, the Asean Regional Forum was established recently to 
provide a dialogue between the seven members of Asean (Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam) and outside 
powers. 

Although some of the work of Asean touches upon human rights issues, this 
juncture is indirect rather than direct. For instance, Asean's existing 
programmes concerning women's development, child development, the anti-drug 
trade, and environmental cooperation are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
related to human rights issues, but they tend to be classified as 
''development" programmes rather than human rights programmes per se. 
Moreover, there is great hesitation in governmental circles to address the 
political aspects of human rights. Often, those aspects are shunned. 

The various concerns relevant to the regional level also apply, to a great 
extent, to the sub-regional level. For instance, the Asian values argument 
finds its most vocal proponents among some of the members of Asean, and the 
sub-region is totally against human rights conditionality or ''social 
clauses". The paucity of accession to key international human rights 
instruments is another common trait in the sub-region. While the region has 
grown well in economic terms and democracy has blossomed in some countries, 
the region is also rife with a variety of human rights violations. 

Of particular concern is Asean's reticence to put pressure on the junta in 
neighbouring Burma to abide by international human rights standards and to 
cede power to those who were democratically elected in 1990 and their leader 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who was until recently kept under house arrest by the 
junta. The so-called ''constructive engagement" policy of Asean behind this 
approach towards Burma has meant, in practice, the casting of a blind eye to 
the egregious human rights violations in Burma which have been well documented 
by the United Nations. The policy is based upon the hope that gradual dialogue 
and economic ties will render the junta more malleable ''step-by-step". It is 
a policy which opts for the primacy of economic and commercial ties with 
Burma, while marginalising the human rights concerns which have been voiced 
internationally. 

The current pre-occupation of Asean is to enlarge itself to become the 
''Southeast Asian 10" incorporating the present seven members of Asean and 
three newcomers, namely, Laos, Cambodia and Burma. The determinants for entry 
into the ''club" do not regrettably include respect for human rights. If Burma 
manages to gain admission soon, it is not unlikely that the junta will use 
Asean as a bastion to protect itself against outside influence and reprimand. 

The attitude towards Burma exemplifies a trait already noted earlier 
concerning the regional level: there is a tendency among governmental circles 
to classify human rights violations (at least in the region or sub-region) as 
internal matters. This contradicts the international position which classifies 
them as matters of international concern. 

Pragmatic self-interest 

It also exemplifies a measure of political expediency or pragmatism based on 
self-interest. It is a well-known fact, for example, that a key member of 
Asean has, for many years, illegally occupied East Timor in breach of United 
Nations resolutions. 

While it is politically expedient for that country to classify the East Timor 
issue as an internal matter, this obviously flies in the face of international 
law and human rights and conflicts with the international jurisdiction that 
legitimately seeks to protect the rights of the Timorese people. 

On another front, there is a variety of cross-border issues, especially 
cross-border crimes increasing in scope and complexity, with various human 
rights implications for the sub-region which government and other sectors of 
society will have to tackle, often with much room for convergent action, 
whether or not one classifies them formally and directly as human rights 
concerns. They include the following: 

Drug trafficking and related money laundering; 

Human trafficking, including the trade in women and children for sexual and 
labour purposes; 

Migrant workers, most disconcertingly the large number of illegals who cross 
frontiers; 

Refugees and displaced persons; 

Pollution, deforestation and other environmental damage; 

Resource conflicts, especially petroleum and fisheries. 

Although there is no sub-regional intergovernmental system for the protection 
of human rights, as noted earlier, several programmes touch upon human rights 
concerns, even though not necessarily classified as human rights programmes. 
The various cross-border issues noted above also call for more action together 
at sub-regional level to address problems which cannot be solved by one party 
alone. 

Have there been any statements from the sub-region on human rights which may 
indicate the types of ''projects" which could help to promote and protect 
human rights? 

It is worth remembering that in 1993 Asean governments, together with other 
Asia-Pacific governments, adopted the Bangkok Governmental Declaration of 
Human Rights with its homage to national and regional particularities rather 
than unqualified acceptance of the universality of human rights. 

The message was and is relatively clear: while the sub-region accepts that 
human rights are universal by nature, they may have to bend to various 
conditions in the sub-region. Taken to the extreme, this could mean lowering 
the universal standards to fit into the sub-region's governmental agenda. 

It should be noted that every year, Asean foreign ministers meet at their 
annual conferences and issue statements of their positions. These have been 
supplemented by more frequent summits between the heads of government. 

In the early 1990s, at one of the ministerial sessions, there was a brief 
reference in its statement that it would explore the possibility of human 
rights machinery for the sub-region. 

However, this has not borne fruit to date. On the other hand, what has grown 
is the number of national institutions, in particular National Human Rights 
Commissions and similar committees, in the Asean region; these are dealt with 
in the next part of this study. 

Asean's stand on human rights 

As an aside, it should be noted that in 1993, the Asean Inter-Parliamentary 
Organisation (Aipo) adopted the Human Rights Declaration of Aipo which 
reflected, and still reflects, to a large extent the attitude of Asean 
governments towards human rights, with the following features: 

*It advocates that human rights should be seen in the light of regional and 
national ''particularities". The preamble of the text states as follows: 

''Whereas, the people of Asean accept that human rights exist in a dynamic and 
evolving context and that each country has inherent historical experiences, 
and changing economic, social, political and cultural realities and value 
systems which should be taken into account." 

*Its principles begin with advocacy of human responsibilities/duties rather 
than rights. Article 1 of the text is particularly indicative of this 
approach: 

''All human beings, individually and collectively, have a responsibility to 
partic