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FEER: Spot the Strongman
- Subject: FEER: Spot the Strongman
- From: nin@xxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 17 Mar 1997 08:24:00
Signs of a power struggle within the ruling junta
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By Bertil Lintner in Bangkok
March 20, 1997
This is not divide and rule, it's decimate and rule," Burmese opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi recently told an acquaintance. Arrests of
members of her party, the National League for Democracy, have risen
markedly nationwide over the past few weeks. But this time, an increased
army presence in many towns indicates that it's more than yet another
crackdown on the NLD: "We see much more of the army now than before,
when military intelligence officials came and knocked on your door in
the middle of the night," says a source in Rangoon.
The stronger army showing, Rangoon-based diplomats say, may be a
reflection of a power struggle between the country's army chief, Gen.
Maung Aye, and the intelligence boss, Lt.-Gen. Khin Nyunt, who for years
was considered Burma's strongman. Opinions vary as to when their rivalry
escalated into a more serious personality clash, though there's a
consensus that the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council is
divided not over whether to crush the opposition but how best to do so.
An Asian diplomat suggests that the rift between the two men became
evident after a highly publicized visit to Burma by American Congressman
Bill Richardson in February 1994. Richardson was the first nonfamily
member allowed to see Suu Kyi, then under house arrest in Rangoon.
In September the same year, Khin Nyunt met Suu Kyi, taking the first
step towards what could have become a dialogue. "All that was Khin
Nyunt's idea," the diplomat says. "He basked in publicity, but achieved
nothing for Slorc. The other generals were quite annoyed with the whole
thing."
A Western diplomat argues that the conflict between Khin Nyunt's policy
of neutralizing opponents through negotiation rather than force was even
more apparent in dealings with ethnic-Karen rebels in late 1994: "Khin
Nyunt favoured a more tactful approach, and several rounds of talks were
held with the rebels near the Thai border. But the military wanted to
use force."
The talks led nowhere, so the military launched an offensive. Karen
headquarters at Manerplaw fell in January 1995, and the rebels have been
on the defensive ever since.
Khin Nyunt, meanwhile, has been pushed into the background, and it is
uncertain how much power he wields today. Significantly, he was not in a
high-powered delegation that went to Beijing in October to negotiate the
terms of future cooperation with China. Until then, Khin Nyunt had been
seen as the architect of Burma's close relationship with China. This
time, the delegation was headed by Maung Aye and his army chief of
staff, Lt.-Gen. Tin Oo.
With Slorc's chairman, Gen. Than Shwe, getting older and more removed
from day-to-day decision making, Maung Aye is clearly consolidating his
grip on power. Burmese sources say he is behind the current crackdown on
the NLD. Adds a Western NGO worker who recently visited Rangoon: "Maung
Aye is sending his boys out to finish off the opposition. They're
everywhere now."
Since December, 28 members of the NLD's youth wing have been rounded up,
along with 42 older members and 56 others, according to a list compiled
by the League. Sweeps against the NLD have been reported from places as
diverse as Mandalay, Pegu, the Irrawaddy delta, Yawnghwe in Shan state
and the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina.
Among those targeted in Rangoon is Than Nyein, a doctor and prominent
NLD organizer. He also happens to be the brother of Khin Nyunt's wife,
Khin Win Shwe. Than Nyein has had his medical licence revoked for
"operating an unlicensed clinic." Although his relationship to Khin
Nyunt may be coincidental, the move has nevertheless embarrassed the
intelligence chief.
Cautious observers stress that the government has so far maintained a
remarkable unity, overriding serious internal disagreements. Despised by
the majority of Burmese, its unity is precious to its survival. So is
its military muscle.
The strength of the armed forces has increased from about 185,000 before
the 1988 pro-democracy uprising to more than 300,000 today. At the same
time, Burma's military-intelligence apparatus has grown from 17
battalions in 1988 to at least 21 today, supported by a network of
thousands of neighbourhood informants. "But their duty is also to spy on
the military, and to detect dissent within the ranks," says a Western
military analyst. "Khin Nyunt's military intelligence has become a state
within the state, and that's not tolerated in Burma."
That, combined with his general muscle-flexing and publicity-seeking,
hasn't made Khin Nyunt popular with Maung Aye's professional military.
Or, as a Western military analyst put it: "Slorc is no longer the
monolith it used to be." For the first time, Burma watchers are
witnessing a serious power struggle within the regime. And judging from
recent developments, Khin Nyunt is on the losing side.