[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

The BurmaNet News, March 16, 1997




------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
----------------------------------------------------------

The BurmaNet News: March 16, 1997
Issue #668

HEADLINES:
==========
NATION:REFUGEES GIVEN CHETTHA'S SAFETY ASSURANCE 
THAILAND TIMES:7,000 RELOCATED REFUGEES IN NEW CAMP
US STATE DEPT.: NARCOTIC REPORT-BURMA 2/97
KYO-KAW THOO LEI: STATEMENT REGARDING SLORC
KYO-CANADA STATEMENT: SAFETY OF KAREN REFUGEES
BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

NATION:REFUGEES GIVEN CHETTHA'S SAFETY ASSURANCE 
March 15, 1997

	Thailand will not force refugees back into the war zone in Burma
but will enforce stricter rules to ensure law and order in refugee camps on
Thai soil, Army Commander in Chief Chettha Thanajaro said yesterday.
	His statement came in response to charges form Amnesty International that
Thailand is forcibly repatriating ethnic Karen refugees to Burma.
	"I would like to reassure you that we will not send the refugees back until
the situation is back to normal where we are able to guarantee their
safety," he said.
	The London-based rights group said it was concerned that Thailand was
continuing to force Karen refugees back into Burma. "The
organisation fears that the Thai authorities may repatriate all Karen
refugees once fighting between the Karen National Union (KNU)... and the
Burmese army has stopped," Amnesty said.
	The KNU is the last major ethnic insurgency group still fighting
against Burma's military government. Last month the KNU suffered a major
setback when Burmese troops sacked their mobile camps inside Burma, causing
thousands of refugees to flee into Thailand.
	"Amnesty International appeals to the Royal Thai government to
allow all refugees to remain in Thailand until ...they will no longer be at
risk of human rights violations in (Burma)," the rights group said.

****************************

THAILAND TIMES:7,000 RELOCATED REFUGEES TO GET GOVT PROVISIONS IN NEW CAMP
March 15, 1997

TAK : Over 7,000 Karen refugees from Sho Klor refugee camp have
asked Thai government to provide some necessities before moving
them to another refugee camp, Mae Lah.
	In respond to the refugees demand the government has prepared
water supply and decent accommodation for the displaced Karen at
Mae Lah camp, a source at the Sho Klor said.
	Tha Song Yang district chief Wira Phothisuk, after a meeting with a Karen
representative, said yesterday Thai government has made a
decision to commission non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
dig artesian wells at Mae Lah camp.
	He said the camp will be able to take in 7,000 newcomers in
addition to 20,000 Karen refugees already sheltered there, without over
population problem.
	Local authorities said discussions with refugee representatives
are expected to be successful within this month and gain satisfaction from
the refugees. 
	"They will immediately move to Ban Mae Lah when everything is
completed," he cited.
	The proposal to reduce the number of refugee camps in Tak
province's Umphang district, however, does not meet the government approval
for fears of possible risks to the nearby wildlife preserve areas and
forests, Tak Governor Phongphayom Wasaphuti said.
	Charoeen Singhayakul, Umphang district chief, has been assigned
to urgently search for a suitable location, Governor Phongphayom said.
	
************************************

US STATE DEPT.: NARCOTIC REPORT-BURMA 2/97
February 1997
"Thomas R. Lansner" <TL69@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

1997 US State Dept International Narcotics Control Strategy Report   
2/97

pp 249-56

	BURMA 

I.  Summary

Burma is the world's largest source of illicit opium and, potentially,
heroin, as opium cultivation and production in 1996 increased to near
record levels.  The 1996 crop estimates indicate there were 163,000
hectares under opium poppy cultivation which could yield up to 2,560 mt of
opium gum -- enough to produce 250 mt of heroin and to satisfy the US
heroin market many times over.  Although there were some limited
improvements in the Burmese Government's counternarcotics performance with
regard to drug and precursor chemical seizures, these efforts fell far
short of what is needed to cope with Burma's burgeoning drug trade. 
Burma's antidrug efforts suffer from a lack of resources as well as the
lack of a strong and consistent commitment. 

Although the "surrender" of drug lord Khun Sa and the dismantling of his
Mong Tai Army (MTA) was portrayed by the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) as a positive development, Khun Sa has not been brought to
justice and has apparently been granted personal clemency from prosecution
or extradition. 
 He is said by authorities to be under a form of house confinement in
Rangoon and permitted to engage in business activities, but not
narcotics-related activities.  Reports suggest, however, that he and his
MTA colleagues continue to be involved in the narcotics trade. 

The ethnic drug trafficking armies with which the government has
negotiated cease-fires, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang Chinese), remain
armed and heavily involved in the heroin trade and have to some extent moved
into territory vacated by Khun Sa's former MTA.  The top leaders of these
ethnic groups are:
 U Sai Lin (Lin Ming-Shing) of the Eastern Shan State Army (ESSA); Yang
Mao-Liang, Peng Chia-Sheng and Liu Go-Shi of the MNDAA; Pao Yu-Chiang, Li
Tzu-Ju and Wei Hsueh-Kang of the United Wa State Army; and U Mahtu Naw of
the Kachin Defense Army (KDA).  Nevertheless, the government's limited
efforts to extend law enforcement into the ethnic areas during the year
resulted in some seizures of narcotics and precursor chemical and the
destruction of some heroin refineries.  These seizures pale in comparison
with overall production, however, and are less than those in neighboring,
non-producing states. 

Money laundering is a growing problem in Burma, and there is reason to
believe that the laundering of drug profits is having a substantial impact
on the Burmese economy.  An underdeveloped banking system and lack of
enforcement against money laundering have created a business and
investment environment conducive to the use of drug-related proceeds in
legitimate commerce.  Drug abuse -- in particular intravenous drug use --
is increasing, as is the incidence of HIV/AIDS infection. 

II.  Status of Country

Burma provides the bulk of the world's opium supply.  It produces about 84
percent of the opium cultivated in Southeast Asia.  Most of this supply of
illicit opiates is produced in ethnic minority areas of Burma's Shan
State, such as the Kokang and Wa territories over which Burmese
authorities have minimal control.  Since 1989, the SLORC has negotiated
cease-fire agreements with the drug trafficking groups that control these
areas, offering them limited autonomy and developmental assistance in
exchange for ending their insurgencies.  Because the SLORC's highest
priority has been to end the fighting and the threat to its national
security, counternarcotics efforts in these areas have been a secondary
consideration, even though the groups are said to have agreed to the
gradual phaseout of opium cultivation and drug trafficking within their
areas.  Nevertheless, we have seen no discernible effort by these groups
to reduce trafficking or production.  Following the surrender of Khun Sa,
the Kokang, Wa and Essa areas in particular became drug trafficking havens
where opium was produced and refined with relative impunity. 

As part of the SLORC's efforts to bring the ethnic groups under its
control, it granted leaders of these drug trafficking armies significant
political legitimacy, and several participate in the government's National
Constitutional Convention.  These leaders have exploited their
relationship with Rangoon to expand their businesses -- legitimate and
illegitimate -- although their prosperity has not filtered down to the
ordinary people of the ethnic areas. 

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1996

Policy Initiatives.  Burmese counternarcotics activities increased from a
very low base during 1996, especially with regard to heroin, precursor
chemical, and amphetamine seizures, but remained grossly inadequate
compared to the magnitude of Burma's drug problem. 

The "surrender" of Khun Sa allowed the Burma Army to project its authority
into the former MTA area.  The military disrupted, at least temporarily,
trafficking routes and destroyed a number of heroin refineries in the area.
There are also reports, however, of officials turning a blind eye
to refining activity in return for bribes. 

The SLORC did not announce any new drug control policy initiatives during
1996.  It continued limited efforts to implement its "Master Plan for the
Development of Border Areas and National Races."  This plan calls for a
program of integrated development combined with law enforcement.  The stated
aim is to improve the living standards in the ethnic areas and
provide viable economic alternatives to opium cultivation.  In 1993, the
Government of Burma (GOB) and UNDCP launched the China/Myanmar project and
the Thailand/Myanmar project in Mong Yang and Tachilek districts,
respectively.  These projects, while improving living standards and
introducing alternative crops to farmers within the project areas
themselves, had little, if any, impact on the enormous problem of opium
cultivation even in neighboring areas, much less other areas of eastern
and northern Burma.  The projects drew to a close in December 1996. 

The GOB and UNDCP initiated a 12-month pilot integrated rural development
project in 1994 in the Wa region in an effort to take advantage of the
United Wa State Army's decision to establish five "opium poppy-free zones"
in its area of control.  The stated goal was to bring about a gradual
reduction of opium cultivation in the WA area.  The pilot project was
designed to test the feasibility of a planned five-year, $15 million rural
development project aimed at crop substitution.  Negotiations on the "Drug
Control and Development in the Wa Region of Shan State" project between
the GOB, the UNDCP, and the Wa leaders were concluded in November 1996. 
The SLORC raised a number of obstacles to implementation of the project. 
Protracted negotiations between UNDCP and the Burmese resolved many of these
issues, but some remain, and donors are concerned about
implementation.  The Burmese cabinet has not yet formally approved the
project.  In contrast to UNDCP's previous projects in Mong Yang and
Tachilek, the Wa project will incorporate a monitoring and evaluation
component designed to measure progress in eliminating opium cultivation. 
As an integrated development scheme, it will also focus on infrastructure,
as well as on the provision of educational and health facilities in the Ho
Tao and Mong Pawk districts of the Wa region. 

Accomplishments.  The GOB negotiated the "surrender" of the notorious drug
lord Khun Sa and his MTA in January 1996.  According to the GOB, the terms
of the surrender stipulated that in return for ending his insurgency and
surrendering his weaponry, Khun Sa would be allowed to live under close
government supervision in Rangoon, where he could engage indirectly, via
third-party investors, in legitimate business -- but not drug trafficking --
and would not be prosecuted for his trafficking activities or extradited to
the US.  The MTA drug trafficking network has been
disrupted, but reports suggest that Khun Sa and his MTA associates are
still involved in the trade.  Overall trafficking from Burma has not
diminished, as other groups, particularly the Wa, took up the slack caused
by the dissolution of Khun Sa's army.  Moreover, Khun Sa has not been
brought to justice in Burma, and the GOB has refused USG requests to turn
him over for prosecution in the US.  Indeed, the SLORC treats him with
respect, addressing him with the traditional honorific. 

Seizure of drugs and precursor chemicals, while still minimal, increased
from a low base during 1996.  The combined police and military narcotics
task forces seized 493 kgs of heroin, as opposed to 72 kgs in 1995.  In
October, the authorities seized for the first time the amphetamine
precursor ephedrine -- more than three mt -- which apparently originated
in China for conversion at labs in Burma.  They also seized 5.6 million
tablets of amphetamines.  Seizures of acetic anhydride more than doubled
from 1995 totals to 2,668 gallons.  However, opium gum seizures continued to
decline from previous years, totaling 992 kgs versus 1,060 kgs in 1995.  In
the July-October period, the Burmese reported that they destroyed 11 heroin
refineries compared to the 12 destroyed from 1988 through June 1996.  The
GOB conducted these counternarcotics activities in areas controlled by
ethnic drug trafficking groups such as the Kachin Defense Army, the Kokang
Army, the MNDAA, and the United Wa State Army.  These limited inroads into
the ethnic areas do not, however, constitute a serious challenge to the drug
trafficking armies, which by and large continue to conduct their trade
unimpeded. 

Unlike previous years, when heroin seizures involved small quantities,
this year the SLORC claimed some larger seizures, including the largest
ever recorded in Burma -- 143 kgs seized near Kutkai in Northern Shan
State in August.  Authorities seized another 44.8 kgs in Hopong in
Northern Shan State in August and 45 kgs in Tachilek in September.  These
seizures are small in comparison with Burma's actual production and with
seizures in neighboring countries.  The unprecedented precursor and
amphetamine seizures have alarmed the Burmese authorities because they
signal a possible future stimulants problem for the Burmese populace. 
Thus far, the amphetamines produced in Burma have been primarily for
export to Thailand and China rather than for domestic consumption. 

The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law brought the
Burmese legal code into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention.  As such,
the 1993 law contains useful legal tools for addressing money laundering,
the seizure of drug-related assets, and the prosecution of drug conspiracy
cases.  However, to date these provisions remain largely unused as Burmese
police and judicial officials have been slow to implement the law, targeting
few if any major traffickers and their drug-related assets. 
Undermining SLORC credibility, a Burmese official involved in
counternarcotics declared flatly in December that money laundering did not
exist in Burma because of the country's strict banking laws.  In one
instance, however, the authorities reportedly seized buildings belonging
to the Wa of the southern military region as the result of the heroin
seizure in Tachilek mentioned above, although the disposition of these
assets is unknown. 

Law Enforcement Efforts.  The GOB's coordinated drug enforcement effort is
led by the Office of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC),
which is comprised of personnel from various security services, including
the police, customs, military intelligence, and the army.  CCDAC now has 18
drug enforcement task forces around the country, most located in major
cities and along key transit routes near Burma's borders with China, India
and Thailand.
 While CCDAC and its task forces are responsible for effecting the bulk of
narcotics seizures and arrests, the agency suffers from a lack of adequate
resources.  The UNDCP and DEA in the past provided various CCDAC units with
modest equipment and training, but they were unable to do so this year.
CCDAC's resources are inadequate to support its law enforcement mission. 

Corruption.  There is no evidence that the government, on an institutional
level, is involved in the drug trade.  However, there are persistent
reports that lower level officials, particularly in outlying areas of the
border regions, take bribes in return for looking the other way and that
some local officials and commanders are actively involved in the drug
trade.  The lack of a vigorous enforcement effort against money laundering
leaves Burma vulnerable to the growing influence of traffickers through
the use of drug proceeds in legitimate business ventures.  Although there
is no concrete proof that drug money is involved, businesses owned by
family members of known traffickers invested heavily during the year in
infrastructure projects, such as roads and port facilities, as well as in
hotels and other real estate development projects. 

Agreements and Treaties.  Burma is a party to the 1971 and 1988 UN drug
conventions.  The SLORC deposited instruments of ratification to the 1988
Convention with the UN International Narcotics Control Board in Vienna. 
However, the Rangoon regime maintains its reservations on two of the
Convention's Articles, one on extradition of Burmese citizens to third
countries, and one on the use of the International Court of Justice to
resolve disputes relating to the Convention (Articles 6 and 32,
respectively).
 The US does not have a mutual legal assistance treaty with Burma.  It is
the opinion of the USG, however, that a US-UK extradition treaty, which
was accepted by the post-independence Burmese Government in 1948, remains in
force and is applicable to the extradition of drug fugitives from Burma to
the US.  The SLORC refuses to recognize the applicability of this
treaty, as well as the US request to render Khun Sa to face trial in the
US.  In May, the GOB and the UNDCP signed a six-nation (Burma, Cambodia,
China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam) memorandum of understanding on a
sub-regional action plan aimed at controlling precursor chemicals and
reducing illicit drug use in the highlands of Southeast Asia. 

Cultivation and Production.  Burma is by far the world's largest producer
of opium, as opium poppy cultivation increased six percent and production
increased nine percent over 1995 levels due to good weather, growing
conditions and lax enforcement.  The 163,100 hectares cultivated in
1995-96 had the potential of producing up to 2,560 mt of opium.  The bulk
of Burma's opium poppy cultivation traditionally has been in the
mountainous regions of the Shan Plateau, which extends the length of the
Shan State, from the Chinese border to the Thai border.  Since 1989,
however, cultivation has been expanding into areas under Burmese
Government control on the west bank of the Salween River. 

Drug Flow/Transit.  Until 1996, heroin tended to be produced in large,
relatively static refineries in the Shan State, well ensconced in ethnic
enclaves protected by drug trafficking armies.  These labs, run by the
ESSA, MNDAA (Kokang), KDA, UWSA, and MTA, were left untouched by the GOB, in
keeping with the SLORC's cease-fire agreements with these drug militias.
However, in 1996 the GOB made inroads into these defended areas, reportedly
destroying a number of labs and forcing some traffickers to use smaller and
more mobile labs to refine heroin.  A growing amount of methamphetamines
reportedly is produced in labs co-located with heroin refineries along the
Chinese, Thai and Lao borders.  Heroin produced by Burma's ethnic groups is
trafficked largely through unmarked transit routes crossing the porous
Chinese and Thai borders and, to a lesser extent, the Indian, Bangladeshi
and Lao borders.  Although Thailand was once the primary route for Burmese
heroin to exit Southeast Asia, trafficking through China is now increasing. 

As in 1995, traffickers moved a growing amount of heroin through central
Burma, often from Lashio, through Mandalay to Rangoon or other seaports
such as Moulmein, for sea-borne export to Singapore or Malaysia. 
Trafficking routes leading through Kachin and Chin States and Sagaing
Division in northern Burma to India also are used to a lesser extent. 
Traffickers import acetic anhydride, an essential chemical in the
production of heroin, primarily from China, India and, to a lesser extent,
from Thailand. 

Demand Reduction/Domestic Programs.  Drug abuse is a growing problem in
Burma.  Official estimates put the addict population at approximately
60,000, but UNDCP and NGO's working in the health sector estimate the
actual population is at least five times that figure.  Heroin is the drug
of choice and its intravenous use is contributing to the rapid spread of
HIV/AIDS, particularly in the Kachin and Shan states.  According to the
GOB's "Rapid Assessment Study of Drug Abuse in Myanmar," sponsored by the
Ministry of Health and UNDCP in 1995, drug treatment services are not
reaching most drug users because of a lack of facilities, lack of properly
trained personnel, and inadequate treatment methods. 

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives.  Direct USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has remained
suspended since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally suppressed the
popular pro-democracy movement.  Initiatives such as an aerial eradication
program, which had been effective in containing the expansion of Burmese
opium cultivation, have not been carried out by the Burmese Government
since 1988.  Currently, the USG engages the Burmese Government on a very
limited level.  DEA shares drug-related information with the GOB and
conducts joint drug enforcement investigations with Burmese police and
military intelligence.  Various US agencies have twice joined Burmese
counterparts in conducting annual opium yield surveys in the mountainous
regions of the Shan State;  the Burmese Government invited USG
participation in a third such joint survey in February 1997.  However, the
Burmese Government cancelled a planned survey in 1996 at the last minute,
shortly after the "surrender" of Khun Sa.  Results from the surveys gave
both governments a more accurate understanding of the scope and magnitude of
Burma's opium crop. 

The USG continues to urge the SLORC to take serious steps to curb Burma's
runaway opium production and heroin trafficking.  Specifically, the Rangoon
regime has been encouraged to: 

--undertake opium poppy eradication on a wide scale in areas under its
direct control or immediate influence; 

--press ethnic groups such as the Wa, the Eastern Shan State Army and the
Kokang, with which it has made political accommodations, to undertake
credible measures to reduce opium cultivation and end heroin trafficking
and production; 

--actively enforce existing antidrug, conspiracy and money laundering
legislation; 

--provide strong support to multilateral drug control projects in the Shan
State; 

--hold Khun Sa accountable for his decades of drug trafficking and deprive
him of assets derived from the drug trade; 

--take action against drug-related corruption, including prosecution and
appropriate punishment of corrupt officials and money launderers. 

Bilateral Cooperation.  USG counternarcotics cooperation with the Burmese
regime is restricted to basic law enforcement operations and involves no
bilateral material or training assistance from the US, due to concerns over
Burma's shallow commitment to the counternarcotics effort, disregard for the
rule of law, and violation of basic standards of human decency. 
DEA's liaison with Burmese police and military -- conducted through DEA's
three-person office in Rangoon -- will continue at its limited level. 
Although DEA was unable to provide training to Burmese counternarcotics
personnel during the year, it did encourage cooperation by the CCDAC on
two major investigations of international drug trafficking groups
operating in Burma. 

The Road Ahead.  Based on experience in dealing with large-scale narcotics
trafficking problems elsewhere around the world, the USG recognizes that
ultimately large-scale international aid, including developmental assistance
and law enforcement aid, will be needed to curb drug production and
trafficking.  The USG is prepared to consider such assistance, contingent
upon the GOB's demonstration of a strong commitment to counternarcotics, the
rule of law and significant movement toward political reform. 
 BURMA Chart
-------------------------------------
Excerpt From Report Executive  Summary:

HEROIN AND OPIATES
 
A deadly partnership between cocaine and heroin has been developing over
the past few years.  Though cocaine long ago displaced heroin as America's
most dangerous illegal drug of choice, heroin has been gradually creeping
back onto the US drug scene, not as rival, but as a partner Taken along
with cocaine, it can moderate cocaine's stimulant effects.  By itself, it
can provide a mellow euphoria.  Once dÈclassÈe as the drug of dead-end
derelicts, heroin unfortunately may be acquiring a false respectability
among younger drug users. 

Though just as deadly and addictive as cocaine, heroin, as an opiate, has
a special property that appeals to the drug trade and the addict alike: it
permits many addicts to develop a long-term tolerance to the drug. 
Whereas constant cocaine use may kill a regular user in five years, a
heroin addiction can last a decade or more, as long as addicts have access
to a maintenance "fix."  Some heroin addicts on maintenance doses have
been known to preserve the facade of a normal life for years.  For the
drug trade, this insidious property holds out the long term promise of a
steady customer base.

Unfortunately the US customer base may be on the rise.  Estimates of the
US heroin addict population, which for two decades had remained steady at
500,000 individuals, are being revised upward.  Evidence of combined drug
use suggests that more of the US's 2 million-plus hard-core cocaine
addicts are using heroin to cushion the "crash" that follows the euphoria
of using crack.  Moreover, the heroin addict no longer need be the
archetypal junkie shooting up heroin with a dirty needle.  The high purity
Colombian heroin now available in the US can be snorted like cocaine. 
This not only frees the user from the need for syringes but from the fear
of contracting AIDS from infected needles.  In order to develop an assured
and profitable market in the United States, the drug trade seems to be
counting on a new generation's ignorance of the devastating consequences
of heroin use. 

Heroin's popularity elsewhere in the world seems assured.  Since opium
poppies can grow in almost any country, there is no dearth of heroin.  The
USG estimates for 1996 place potential opium production at nearly 4,300
metric tons, probably a record amount.  Sixty percent of that quantity
grows in Burma, which by itself probably could satisfy world heroin
demand.  A bumper crop in Southeast Asia more than offset a drop in
Southwest Asian production, which by itself meets most of Europe's heavy
heroin needs, while satisfying important domestic demand in many of the
source countries.  As the chapters in this report indicate, heroin
availability--and addiction--is rising throughout Europe and the countries
of the former Soviet Union.  The Balkan Route's northern, central, and
southern branches form the artery carrying high quality Afghan heroin into
every important market in Europe.  With Nigerians controlling much of the
intercontinental heroin trade, Africa is an important region for not only
heroin trafficking but for transshipment to European destinations. 
Southeast Asia, the world's largest source of heroin, not only contributes
to the bulk of world supply but is an important consumer of heroin itself. 
As the region's economies boom, we can expect to see an even greater rise
in heroin consumption.  Even China, which once had all but eliminated
heroin addiction, is experiencing a serious rise in teenage addiction.  In
short, except from the vantage point of the heroin trade, the near-term
outlook is not encouraging. 

Source and Transit Country Highlights. 

In Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle region, the world's major source of
opium, opium poppy cultivation increased for a second consecutive year. 
Burma remains the bread-basket of the opium trade, since it accounts for
65 percent of estimated total world opium poppy cultivation and 60 percent
of estimated total potential opium gum production.  Estimated production
in Burma increased by nine per cent in 1996, for an estimated total of
2,560 metric tons, sufficient to produce 256 metric tons of heroin-probably
more than enough to meet most of the world's heroin needs. 
Production in Laos also increased by 11 per cent, for an estimated total
of 200 metric tons, or about 7 per cent of the Southeast Asian total. 
Production in Thailand increased in 1996 despite an aggressive eradication
campaign, but remained minimal, accounting for only about one per cent of
Southeast Asian production.  From these figures it is clear that Burma
remains the leading producer of heroin worldwide, and it remains the main
overall source for heroin sold in the U.S.  The USG's first survey of drug
cultivation in Vietnam revealed 3,150 hectares of opium poppy, potentially
capable of yielding 25 metric tons of opium gum. 

Opium poppy cultivation dropped by 9 percent in Southwest Asia, after a 45
percent rise the year before.  Afghanistan's poppy crop, the largest in
the region, declined marginally.  Pakistan's cultivation, on the other
hand, fell by more than half following extension of the poppy ban in the
Northwest Frontier Provinces.  Afghan opium is the source of most of
Europe's heroin.  Sophisticated Pakistani trafficking organizations
operating out of Quetta, Pakistan, smuggle heroin base and morphine out of
Afghanistan to the international market.  These groups place orders with
the Afghani processors and arrange for transshipment of the drugs from
Afghanistan through Pakistan and to Iranian or Turkish buyers who move it
through Iran and into international drug channels.  Most Afghan opium is
destined for processing into heroin in Turkey.  The finished heroin is
sold primarily in Europe, while a limited quantity goes to the United
States

Southwest Asian heroin continues to pour into Europe along the Balkan
Route.  With the branching of the route--northwards to Romania, Hungary,
and the Czech and Slovak Republics; southwards through Croatia, Slovenia,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece and Albania--each of these
countries now faces important domestic drug problems.  Turkish trafficking
groups, with distributors in ethnic enclaves in major European cities,
control much of the Balkan Route heroin trade. 

Russia is playing an increasingly pivotal role in Europe and Central Asia. 
Criminal organizations that had successfully operated under the Soviet
regime entered the post-Cold War era with smuggling and distribution
networks already in place.  Using heroin sources established during the
Soviet Union's war with Afghanistan, ethnically based gangs--many from the
Caucasus--have burgeoned into major players in the European drug trade. 
They can use their networks to move Southwest Asian heroin through Central
Asia to Russia and then onto destinations in the Baltics and Western Europe.
Russian authorities noting a rampant increase in domestic drug use believe
that there are now over 2 million drug users in Russia, with the numbers
growing every year. 

The Central Asian countries of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, formerly important poppy growing regions for the Soviet Union,
are well placed to be conduits for much of this drug traffic.  Kazakstan
provides a bridge for Southeast Asian heroin to move to Europe and Russia
from Asia.  The other countries offer profitable access routes for Southwest
Asian, primarily Afghan, heroin into Russia, the NIS and Europe. Heroin,
which can fetch high prices in Russia and Europe, has been a tempting source
of cash to finance the civil wars in Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. 

Nigeria is critical to the heroin trade.  Nigeria is Africa's most
significant transshipment point.  But Nigerians also surface as the heroin
traffickers par excellence on every continent.  Though they are among the
principal smugglers of Southeast Asian heroin into the United States,
Nigerians are regularly arrested in Bangkok, Rio de Janeiro, New York,
Moscow, Riyadh, Bombay, etc.  Unfortunately, rampant corruption at all
levels of government in Nigeria virtually assures Nigerian trafficking
organizations a favored place in the heroin trade. 

Colombia is the Western Hemisphere's largest grower of opium poppies. 
Colombian heroin is being sold in greater quantities in the United States,
and poses a particular threat because of well established marketing
strategies and channels developed by cocaine traffickers.  In addition,
Colombian heroin is of high purity. For 1996, USG estimates showed
Colombian opium poppy cultivation at 6,300 hectares, four percent less
than last year, but enough to yield an estimated 63 metric tons of opium
gum, or 6.3 tons of heroin, assuming no losses.  Venezuela's border with
Colombia has made it a potential poppy growing country.  So far, however,
USG-assisted eradication efforts have kept growth to insignificant levels. 
Over the past three years, the eradication program has destroyed over
3,000 hectares of opium poppy in the Sierra de Perija region along the
Colombian border. 

Mexico is Latin America's second largest cultivator of opium poppies.  The
1996 crop was almost identical to the previous year's.  After Mexican
government eradication operations destroyed 7,900 hectares of poppy, there
were 5,100 hectares available for exploitation by the drug syndicates,
with an estimated potential yield of 54 metric tons of opium gum, or 5.4
metric tons of heroin.  Though most of this heroin is destined for US
markets, a USG-supported national drug use survey revealed a significant
rise in intravenous heroin use in Mexican cities along the northern border
with the US. 

********************

KYO-KAW THOO LEI: STATEMENT REGARDING SLORC OFFENSIVE
March 14, 1997
KYO-USA <KYOUSA@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Statement of Karen Youth Organization Kaw Thoo Lei (KYO-KTL). Pertaining to
an intensive military operation waged by SLORC against KNU.

1).  The SLORC broke off peace talk with KNU arbitrarily after the fourth
meeting.  They are now trying to annihilate the Karen by means of intensive
military operations against (KNU).  We KYO strongly oppose and severely
condemn the inhuman action of the SLORC.

2).  The war of annihilation waged against the KNU by SLORC will not end the
civil war which has occurred between the opposition armed forces and SLORC,
instead all the ethnic nationalities and people of the country will suffer
loss of life, deterioration of health poverty and uncertain security.

3).  Because of the SLORC military operation, all the displaced persons
including Karen who seek refuge in the THAI territory are discouraged and
disappointed.  All are fearful due to the threat of the SLORC and it's
lackey the DKBA as their brutality is well known.

4).  The SLORC proclaimed "non disintegration of the soldarity of the
people is our cause, non disintegration of the union is our cause" but in
practice their action contravene their proclamation, moreover the SLORC has
no sympathy for the ethnic nationalities including the Karen.  We the Karen
youth organization KYO are very disppointed by the SLORC's action. 

5).  We KYO earnestly implore that the international benevolent
organizations and UNHCR may kindly take care of those many thousands of
displaced Karen people and other ethnic nationalities who take care refuge
in the THAI territory, to promote their well being, their health, education
for young folk and guarantee their security.

6).  The risk is that the war of liquidation against the KNU will prolong
the civil war and engender a chaotic situation for all the nationalities
including the Karen people.  Such action will only create more suspicion
fear and disppointment.  Therefore to be able to establish internal peace
by an early date and procure genuine human rights, we KYO earnestly request
the international communities to be sympathetic and consider our cause and
give the Karen the necessary help.

KAREN YOUTH ORGANIZATION KAW THOO LEI
KYO-KTL

**************************

KYO-CANADA STATEMENT: SAFETY OF KAREN REFUGEES
March 14, 1997
email: tin00001@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Karen Youth Organization-Canada statement concerning the safety of Karen
refugees in Thailand

We are seriously concerned about the recent attacks and intrusions into the
Karen refugee camps and the safety of Karen refugees. We also oppose the
full repatriation of Karen refugees into the war zone in Burma.

The SLORC attacked the Karen refugee camps and set the camps on fire in late
January and early February. Many thousands of Karen refugees, mostly
children, women and the elderly became homeless.

Thai authorities failed to protect the refugees. They refused to criticize
the SLORC as well.

We, KYO-Canada, strongly condemn the SLORC for their brutal attacks on these
innocent people.

We are also concerned for the safety of thousands of refugees fleeing the
Burmese army offensive against the KNU.  Some local civilians in the area of
KNU 4th and 6th Brigade were not allowed to take refuge in Thailand. On Feb.
24th, around 500 men from the 4th Brigade were not allowed to enter Thailand.

On Feb. 25th, around 230 men were sent back into the area in Burma from
which they had fled. Thousands of Karen refugees in Thailand are fearing
that they will be repatriated into unsafe areas, referred to by Thai
authorities as a "safe corridor".

We request the Thai government not to violate the international human rights
principles which prohibit a state from returning refugees against their will
to countries where they risk serious human rights violations.

We ask the Thai authorities to protect the refugees and provide humanitarian
assistance. We also request the international community such as Canada, the
US and the EU to impose economic sanctions against the SLORC.

For more information, contact:

KYO-Canada
email: tin00001@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

**********************************

BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST

BurmaNet regularly receives enquiries on a number of different 
topics related to Burma. If you have questions on any of the 
following subjects, please direct email to the following volunteer 
coordinators, who will either answer your question or try to put you 
in contact with someone who can:

Campus activism: 	zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Boycott campaigns: [Pepsi] ai268@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx     
Buddhism:                    Buddhist Relief Mission:  brelief@xxxxxxx
Chin history/culture:        [volunteer temporarily away]
Fonts:                  		tom@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
High School Activism: 	[volunteer needed]
History of Burma:            zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
International Affairs: 	 Julien Moe: moe@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Kachin history/culture:      74750.1267@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Karen history/culture: 	Karen Historical Society: 102113.2571@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Mon history/culture:         [volunteer needed]
Naga history/culture: 	Wungram Shishak:  z954001@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Burma-India border            Aung San Myint: aungsan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Pali literature:            	 "Palmleaf":  c/o burmanet@xxxxxxxxxxx
Pipeline Campaign       	freeburma@xxxxxxx
Resettlement info:	refugee_help@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Rohingya culture		volunteer needed
Shan history/culture: 	Sao Hpa Han: burma@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shareholder activism:       simon_billenness@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Total - France		Dawn Star: cd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
Tourism campaigns:      	bagp@xxxxxxxxxx     "Attn. S.Sutcliffe"   
volunteering: 		refugee_help@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
World Wide Web:              FreeBurma@xxxxxxxxx

Geographical Contacts:
Massachusetts		simon_billenness@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

[Feel free to suggest more areas of coverage]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

FREE BURMA WEB PAGES:

http://FreeBurma.org

This single page serves only as an easy to remember URL and departure
point to resources promoting the establishment of democracy in Burma.
Please write to FreeBurma@xxxxxxxxx to add a site or for further
information." - Glen, system administrator

FREE BURMA COALITION:

to get involved in the Free Burma Coalition, send a message to:
zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  

or visit their homepage, accessible through: http:// FreeBurma.org

There is also an e-mail list-server especially for Free Burma activists


BURMANET SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION:

The BurmaNet News is an electronic newspaper covering Burma.
Articles from newspapers, magazines, newsletters, the wire
services and the Internet as well as original material are published.   
It is produced with the support of the Burma Information Group 
(B.I.G) and the Research Department of the ABSDF.  We are also 
grateful to many other friends around the world who send us articles
to post.

The BurmaNet News is e-mailed directly to subscribers and is
also distributed via the soc.culture.burma and seasia-l mailing lists. 

For a free subscription to the BurmaNet News: 
send a message to: majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxx   

a. For the BurmaNet News only: 
    in the message, type:    subscribe burmanews-l

b. For the BurmaNet News and 4-5 other messages a day:
    in the message, type:     subscribe burmanet-l  

(NOTE: all lower case letters, last letter is a lower case "L", not the
numeral one).

Letters to the editor, comments or contributions of articles should be 
sent to the editor at: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx

***************************************************