Civil Socety in Burma

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CIVIL SOCIETY IN BURMA
By David Steinberg

>From FDL Quarterly, Winter 1995

Civil Society is composed of those local or national
organizations, which are independent of the state and act as
alternative loci for power and influence. These
organizations may be indigenous or foreign - based. Usually,
indigenous civil society includes the media, business,
religious, political, labor, community. and / or professional
organizations, but it always includes the NGO community as
an essential component.

Burma today effectively has no civil society. This is not a
new development under the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC). but may be traced directly to
the military coup of 1962 and the role of the military - run
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). There are no
groups in Burma that are not under direct or indirect
government control or supervision, beyond those associated
with raising funds or performing other merit - making
activities for a local temple. Even the Sangha. or Buddhist
clergy, as a whole is under state guidance and registration.

During the summer of 1988, with a people's revolution in
the making, civil society began to emerge in Burma. An
alternative, although ephemeral, press began to develop and
spontaneous local organizations began to appear. This
movement was crushed by the coup of September 18, 1988,
and there was a return to the rigid control characterized in
the BSPP era. This should not be surprising, since the
military coup of 1988 was a means to shore up, but only
cosmetically change, the regime in power, namely, the
military in civilian dress.

The SLORC reestablished the rigid control that had been the
hallmark of the BSPP, with two partial exceptions. First.
they began to encourage the development of the private
sector. Second. they allowed the formation of a myriad of
political parties before the elections of May 1990, which
they then proceeded to ignore when the voting went
dramatically against them. Although the economic
liberalization was a welcome change from the rigidity of the
previous command economy, it is unlikely that the private
sector will be allowed to function free from state control.
Indeed, the military through various intermediate means has
effective control over the economy.

Similarly, allowing political parties has been a charade.
They have been emasculated and have neither influence nor
authority. The release of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi from
house arrest was, of course, most welcome, but she has been
released into a controlled environment where power is still
concentrated in the hands of a single group.

In a sense the SLORC has been attempting to create its own
 civil society' -- one that it controls. This contradiction in
terms does not make the effort any less intrusive or
ubiquitous. The United Solidarity and Development
Association (USDA), the military's answer to voluntary
associations, is designed to force private individual and
group activities into state - authorized channels. In a sense,
the private NGO community is alive and well -- and run by
the government.

Several indigenous NGOs are allowed to exist. and with
which related foreign NGOs may have relations, although
they are not allowed to exercise influence. But these NGOs
have no independent roles and their leadership is
determined by the state.

Because of the obvious need and the  allure' of poverty,
foreign NGOs have been anxious to explore avenues of
possible action within Burma. A few NGOs work in the
Arakan; however such operations are carried out in cir-
cumscribed conditions.

The SLORC has determined that they wished to work with
foreign NGOs separately and would consider their possible
entry into Burma on a case - by - case basis. It is apparent
that the approval of a foreign NGO to operate in the
minority areas would require that organizations get
sponsorship of the relevant substantive ministry (Education,
Health. etc.), register with some branch of the government
(perhaps the Ministry of Home Affairs), receive the
approval to work from the Ministry concerned with border
areas, and have the authorization of the local military
commander. Goods imported into the country for
distribution (health supplies, educational materials, etc.)
would require separate authorization. in each individual
case, for duty - free customs clearance. Funds or equipment
would be distributed by the local military in accordance
with the approved project, although the NGO would be
allowed to ensure that the matenals reached their designated
recipients. Only after a suitable probationary period would
the NGO be allowed to carry out projects directly without
involving the local military in distribution, although they
would still be involved in the approval process.

Thus, it is apparent that the SLORC wishes to deal with the
foreign NGO community in a classic  divide and rule'
approach. The restrictions that were said to be imposed on
the operations of NGO activities would effectively make
anything beyond the distribution of emergency food or
humanitarian supplies administratively indefensible to any
foreign NGO that wished to retain a semblance of
autonomy.

In sum, foreign NGO activities, as an element of civil
society in Burma, should be treated with great caution and
circumspection, and the complete range of conditions under
which operation; would take place should be understood in
advance. Furthermore, indigenous NGOs are likely to
remain under government control for the foreseeable future.

David Steinberg is a representative of the Asia Foundation
in Korea and former distinguished professor at Georgetown
University in Washington D.C.

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