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State Dept's Human Rights Report



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Title:  Burma Human Rights Practices, 1995
Author:  U.S. Department of State
Date:  March 1996

                                  BURMA

Burma continued to be ruled by a highly authoritarian
military regime widely condemned for its serious human
rights abuses.  The military Government, the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC), headed by the armed
forces commander and composed of top military officers,
seized power in September 1988 after harshly suppressing
massive prodemocracy demonstrations.  Retired dictator
General Ne Win, whose idiosyncratic policies had isolated
Burma and driven the country into deep economic decline, is
believed by many to continue to wield considerable
influence.

The SLORC permitted a relatively free election in 1990, but
it failed to honor the results--which were an overwhelming
rejection of military rule--or to cede power to the
victorious prodemocracy forces.  Instead, the SLORC attacked
the coalition of winning parties and their leaders through
intimidation, detention, and house arrest.  In April 1992,
the SLORC began taking some steps to lessen its harsh rule.
The regime reopened universities, released some political
prisoners, and introduced modest economic reforms.  But in
January 1993 the SLORC established the "National
Convention," a body ostensibly tasked with working out a new
constitution and primarily made up of delegates handpicked
by the military.  The SLORC has carefully stage-managed the
Convention's proceedings and ignored even limited opposition
views.  Despite having no mandate from the people, the SLORC
seems determined to draft a constitution that will guarantee
a dominant role for the military in the country's future
political structure.

The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive security
apparatus led by the Directorate of Defense Services
Intelligence (DDSI).  Control is buttressed by selective
restrictions on contact with foreigners, surveillance of
government employees and private citizens, harassment of
political activists, intimidation, arrest, detention, and
physical abuse.  The Government justifies its security
measures as necessary to maintain order and national unity,
although almost all major insurgent groups have reached
accommodations with the SLORC in recent years, and the
others pose little threat to major population centers.
Members of the security forces committed numerous serious
human rights abuses.

Burma is a poor country, with an average per capita gross
domestic product of about $200 to $300 a year.  Primarily an
agricultural country, Burma also has substantial mineral,
fishing, and timber resources.  Since 1988 the Government
has slowly opened up the economy to permit expansion of the
private sector and to attract foreign investment.  Some
economic improvement has ensued, but major obstacles to
economic reform persist.  These include restrictions on
private commerce, constantly changing rules and regulations;
overcentralized decisionmaking, a bloated bureaucracy, a
greatly overvalued currency, poor infrastructure, and
grossly disproportionate military spending.

The Government's severe repression of human rights continued
essentially unchanged during 1995, despite a few potentially
significant moves on the political front and the appearance
of greater normalcy fostered by increased economic activity.
Out of sight of most visitors, citizens continued to live
subject at any time and without appeal to the arbitrary and
sometimes brutal dictates of the military.  There continued
to be credible reports, particularly from ethnic minority
dominated areas, that soldiers committed serious human
rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and rape.
Disappearances continued, and members of the security forces
beat and otherwise abused detainees. Prison conditions
remained harsh, and the judiciary is not independent of the
executive.

The use of porters by the army--with attendant mistreatment,
illness, and even death for those compelled to
serve--remained a standard practice.  The military continued
to force ordinary Burmese on a massive scale (including
women and children) to "contribute" their labor, often under
harsh working conditions, on construction projects
throughout the country.  A midyear directive ordering a halt
to certain kinds of forced labor appeared to have only a
limited impact.  Although the Government continued to
release some prisoners, it continued arbitrarily to arrest
and detain citizens for the slightest expression of
dissenting political views.  Several hundred, if not more,
political prisoners remained in detention, including
approximately 20 Members of Parliament elected in 1990.  The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) closed its
office in July as a result of the SLORC's refusal to accept
the ICRC's standard modalities for conducting prison visits.

The SLORC continued to restrict severely basic rights to
free speech, press, assembly, association, and privacy.
Worker rights are also severely limited.  Political party
activity remained severely restricted, and citizens do not
have the right to change their government.  By year's end,
the Government had still not taken up Aung San Suu Kyi's
call for a genuine dialog on political reform.  The
Government's rejection of the appeal of the opposition
National League for Democracy (NLD) for a reform of the
National Convention's working procedures led most of the
Convention's elected representatives to withdraw in
November.  Although more than 196,000 Rohingyas (Burmese
Muslims from Arakan State) who fled to Bangladesh in 1992
had returned to Burma by year's end, about 50,000 remained
in camps across the border.  A few thousand students and
dissidents continued in exile in Thailand.  Roughly 90,000
Burmese were residing in ethnic minority camps in Thailand,
among them many thousands of new arrivals driven out by
Burmese army attacks on the Karen and Karenni ethnic
minority controlled areas.  Discrimination against ethnic
minorities and violence against women remained problems.

Several positive developments occurred, most notably the
release of Burma's foremost prodemocracy leader, Aung San
Suu Kyi, her 2 top lieutenants, and 103 other political
prisoners.  Resident representatives of the office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were
permitted to continue their work monitoring the return of
the Rohingyas, and a limited number of international
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) were allowed to set up
operations or expand existing ones.

Despite these positive moves, by year's end the SLORC had
yet to make a fundamental break with its past behavior and
demonstrate a willingness to cede its hold on absolute
power.  Most importantly, the generals have failed thus far
to begin negotiating with the country's prodemocracy forces
and ethnic groups on a genuine political settlement to allow
a return to the rule of law and respect for basic human
rights.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person,
Including Freedom from:

  a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There was no evidence of an explicit or systematic
government policy encouraging summary killings.  However,
there continued to be credible reports of instances of
brutality and killings of civilians by the military,
particularly in minority dominated areas and among those
impressed as porters.  The Government's general disregard
for human rights has created a climate clearly conducive to
such abuses.

  b.  Disappearance

As in previous years, private citizens and political
activists continued to "disappear" temporarily for several
hours to several weeks.  DDSI officials usually picked up
people for questioning without the knowledge of their family
members and in many cases, though not all, released them
soon afterward.  At the same time, large numbers of people
continued to be taken away by the military for porterage or
other duties, often without the knowledge of their family
members.  The whereabouts of those conscripted, as well as
of prisoners transferred for labor or porterage duties,
remained difficult to trace (see Sections 1.g. and 6.c.).

  c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
  Treatment or Punishment

Again in 1995, political detainees were held incommunicado
for long periods.  Detainees were routinely subjected to
harsh interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and
disorient.  The most common forms of mistreatment were sleep
and food deprivation coupled with round-the- clock
questioning, but some were also kicked and beaten.  In
recent years, there have been credible reports of prisoners
being forced to squat or assume unnatural positions for
lengthy periods.  In the past, there have also been reports
of practices such as electrical shocks to the genitals,
suffocation, and cigarette burns, but there were no known
instances of these techniques being employed in 1995.

There continued to be credible reports that security forces
subjected ordinary citizens to harassment and physical
abuse.  In rural villages the military routinely entered
villages to confiscate property and food and used abusive
recruitment methods to procure porters.  Those forced into
porterage or other duties faced extremely difficult
conditions and mistreatment that sometimes resulted in
death.  There was a steady pattern of reports that soldiers
raped ethnic minority women (see Section 1.g.).

The regimen at Insein prison near Rangoon remained extremely
harsh, including widespread use of solitary confinement,
little or no exercise, no mosquito nets or reading or
writing materials for virtually all prisoners, poor
nutrition, and inadequate medical care.  A handful of
prominent political prisoners were housed in separate
bungalow accommodations on the prison compound.  Most
prisoners were permitted to receive medicine as well as
supplemental food brought by their families during the
15-minute visits permitted every 2 weeks.  Conditions for
political prisoners were reliably reported to be much worse
at some upcountry locations, particularly Thayet and
Thayawaddy prisons.

Unlike in the past, in May the SLORC refused to allow
visiting U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson to meet with
political prisoners. Similarly, the SLORC refused a request
by U.N. Special Rapporteur Yozo Yokota to visit several
political prisoners during his October trip. Credible
reports indicate a group of political prisoners at Insein
prison was mistreated after smuggling information to
Professor Yokota on conditions in that facility.  The
Government continued to bar the ICRC from visiting detainees
or convicted prisoners of any kind.  After the Government
officially notified the ICRC that it was not prepared to
accept the ICRC's standard procedures for conducting prison
visits, the ICRC closed its Rangoon office in July, though
not before indicating its willingness to renew discussions
again should the SLORC change its mind.

  d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The SLORC routinely practiced arbitrary arrest and
incommunicado detention.  Prior to being charged, detainees
do not have access to legal counsel or their families.
There is no provision in the law for judicial determination
of the legality of detention, and political detainees cannot
obtain release on bail.

Because of the high level of intimidation discouraging overt
political activity, detentions for public antigovernment
activities remained at a relatively low level.  Nonetheless,
the authorities continued to detain scores of political
activists for low-level political activity, such as handing
out opposition flyers or shouting political slogans in
public. For example, in February at least 20 young people
were arrested in connection with a short demonstration at
the funeral of former Prime Minister U Nu; 9 were later
sentenced to 7 years in prison.  Other small groups of young
people were detained in July for distributing flyers, and at
year's end only a few were known to have been released.

In June the authorities detained former National League for
Democracy (NLD) acting chairman Kyi Maung, who had been
released from prison only 3 months earlier.  Kyi Maung and
two of his four companions picked up at the same time were
subsequently released.  The other two were held and later
tried in a summary procedure without benefit of legal
counsel and sentenced to 7 years in prison.  This included
the former chairman of the Democracy Party, Thu Wai.  At the
same time, another former Democracy Party activist, Htway
Myint, was also arrested, tried, and given a 7-year
sentence.  All three were convicted for allegedly violating
the country's security laws when in fact they appear to have
merely engaged in political discussions.

In November three supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi were
arrested and within days sentenced to 2 years in prison for
objecting to the placement of traffic-control barriers by
police in front of the NLD leader's residence.

Forced exile is not used as a method of political control.

  e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

The judiciary is not independent of the executive.  The
SLORC names justices to the Supreme Court, who, in turn,
appoint lower court judges (with the approval of the SLORC).

The court system, as inherited from the British and
subsequently restructured, is comprised of courts at the
township, district, state, and national levels.

Throughout 1995 the Government continued to rule by decree
and was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing
for fair public trials or any other rights.  Although
remnants of the British-era legal system were formally in
place, the court system and its operation remained seriously
flawed.  Many observers believe there has been an
improvement over the last few years in judicial procedures,
at least in the handling of nonpolitical cases.  But ongoing
unprofessional behavior by some court officials, pervasive
bribe-taking, the misuse of overly broad laws, and the
manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to
deprive citizens of the right to a fair trial and the rule
of law.

Some basic due process rights, including the right to a
public trial and the right to be represented by a defense
attorney, were generally respected except in sensitive
political cases.  Defense attorneys are permitted to call
and cross-examine witnesses, but their primary purpose is to
bargain with the judge to obtain the shortest possible
sentence for their clients.  Most court proceedings are open
to the public. However, in political cases, almost all
trials are held in courtrooms on prison compounds and are
not open to the public.  In these instances, defense counsel
appears to serve no purpose other than to provide moral
support, since reliable reports indicate verdicts are
dictated by higher authorities.

During the first 3 months of the year, 105 persons believed
to be political prisoners were released, including former
NLD Member of Parliament-elect and one-time National
Convention delegate Dr. Aung Khin Sint.  This group also
included former NLD chairman Tin Oo and former acting NLD
chairman Kyi Maung.  On July 10, Aung San Suu Kyi was freed
unconditionally after serving 6 years under house arrest.
During the remainder of the year, 49 other persons believed
to have been political prisoners were released.  By year's
end, at least several hundred--if not many more--political
prisoners remained incarcerated.

  f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, and
  Correspondence

The military ruled unchecked by any outside authority, and
the State continued to interfere extensively and arbitrarily
in the lives of private citizens.  Through its extensive
intelligence network, the Government closely monitored the
travel, whereabouts, and activities of many citizens,
particularly those known to be politically active. Security
personnel selectively screened private correspondence and
telephone calls and conducted warrantless searches of
private premises. On occasion the Government attempted to
jam foreign radio broadcasts (see Section 2.a.).  Government
employees were required to obtain advance permission before
meeting with foreigners.

The SLORC continued to move people out of cities to
peripheral new town settlements, though not on the same
scale as in the early 1990's.  While facilities in some of
these areas have improved over time, residents targeted for
displacement continued to be given no option but to move,
usually on short notice.  The military also continued to
relocate forcibly some rural villages, especially in ethnic
minority areas.

Those able to remain in established cities and towns were
subject to arbitrary seizure of their property.  In a number
of urban areas, residents were compelled to cede land for
road-widening projects decided upon without any public
consultation or endorsement.  Other long-term city residents
were required to cede land for commercial redevelopment and
were compensated at only a fraction of the value of their
lost homes.  Automobiles and other movable property remained
vulnerable to arbitrary seizure.  In rural areas, military
personnel at times confiscated livestock and food supplies.

  g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
  Law in Internal Conflicts

For more than four decades the Burmese Army has battled
diverse ethnic insurgencies.  These ethnic minority
insurgent groups have sought to gain greater autonomy from
the dominant ethnic Burman majority.  In 1989 the SLORC
began a policy of seeking cease-fire agreements with most
ethnic insurgent groups.  In late 1994, however, the army
moved militarily against the largest remaining ethnic
insurgent group, the Karen National Union (KNU).  In late
1994, the KNU broke into two factions, in part because of
government efforts to stir up religious tension between the
Karen Christian and Buddhist communities.  The Buddhist
faction, known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization
(DKBO) subsequently allied itself with the Government.

In January the Burmese army offensive led to the fall of
Manerplaw, the longtime headquarters of the KNU and of
semiexiled prodemocracy forces. Less than a month later, the
KNU's last major defensive encampment along the Thai border
also fell to army troops.  These two incidents unleashed a
flood of as many as 10,000 refugees into Thailand.
Throughout the rest of the year, the DKBO staged
cross-border raids resulting in injury and death,
destruction of refugee camps, and the forced repatriation of
some refugees.  In June several thousand more fled to
Thailand after troops attempted to move into Karenni-held
areas of Kayah State, which led to the breakdown of the
SLORC's cease-fire agreement with the Karenni National
Progressive Party (KNPP).

In connection with the military's campaign against the
Karen, Karenni, and drug trafficker Khun Sa and his Shan
United Army, as many as several thousand civilians were
believed to have been coerced into working as porters in
jungle areas in or near combat zones.  According to reliable
reports, military sweeps for porters or demands for porter
"taxes" (i.e., cash payment instead of porter duties)
reached as far as Rangoon and other urban areas in central
Burma.  It was also credibly reported that some members of
the military used sham threats of impressment to extort
money.

Antigoverment insurgent groups were also responsible for
violence; mines laid by insurgents caused both civilian and
military deaths.  At least one former insurgent group that
concluded a cease-fire agreement with the SLORC is known to
have used forced labor.  In addition, the
narcotics-trafficking Shan United Army brutalized and
murdered villagers, conducted forced recruitment of boys,
and impressed porters while fighting against the army and
ensuring continued cultivation of opium by peasant farmers.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

  a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press
persisted throughout 1995.  The security services continued
to clamp down on those attempting to express opposition
political views, such as by handing out flyers or chanting
slogans (see Section 1.d.).  Many more refrained from
speaking out for fear of arrest and interrogation.  Major
exceptions were Aung San Suu Kyi, and NLD Vice Chairmen Tin
Do and Kyi Maung, who following Aung San Suu Kyi's release
in July regularly gave short speeches in front of her
residence to those willing to run the risk of being seen by
military intelligence.

All forms of domestic public media were officially
controlled or censored.  This strict control in turn
encouraged self-censorship on the part of writers and
publishers.  Private citizens were generally unable to
subscribe directly to foreign publications.  A limited
supply of secondhand copies of international newsmagazines
and a sizable number of private publications on nonpolitical
issues were available to the public at large, but censors
occasionally banned issues or deleted articles deemed
unwelcome by the Government.

The government-monopoly television, radio, and newspaper
media remained propaganda instruments.  With the exception
of coverage of some limited aspects of the National
Convention, these official media did not report opposing
views but rather attacked those in the democratic opposition
who dared to take issue with government policies.  Editors
remained answerable to military authorities.  While the
English-language daily New Light of Myanmar continued to
include many international wire service reports on foreign
news, domestic news hewed strictly to and reinforced
government policy.

Many foreign journalists, including television crews, were
able to visit and report on developments in the country,
although their movements were sometimes restricted and
monitored.  However, other journalists were denied visas or
issuance was so delayed as to render a planned visit
impossible.

Foreign radio broadcasts, such as those of the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), and
Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma, remained prime
sources of uncensored information.  The authorities at times
attempted to jam or otherwise interfere with the reception
of these broadcasts.  However, the head of the BBC's Burmese
service was officially received in May, and two reporters
for VOA's Burmese service were each allowed to remain in the
country for several months.  The Government also allowed
some foreign government-sponsored information programs.

The authorities took new steps to restrict the use of
satellite television.  After imposing a September 1993
deadline for registering satellite dishes, they failed to
approve additional licenses or clarify who in the future
would be allowed to have access to foreign television. In
June the Government issued an official warning threatening
up to 3 years' imprisonment for operation of an unlicensed
satellite television receiver.

University teachers and professors remained subject to the
same restrictions on freedom of speech, political
activities, and publications as other government employees.
These included warnings against criticism of the Government;
instructions not to discuss politics while at work; and
strictures against joining or supporting political parties,
engaging in political activity, or meeting foreign
officials.  Teachers continued to be held responsible for
propagating SLORC political goals among their students and
for maintaining discipline and preventing students from
engaging in any unauthorized political activity.

  b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Government does not respect these rights.  The
government prohibition on unauthorized outdoor assemblies of
more than five people remained in effect, although
authorities enforced it unevenly.  For example, at times
between 2,000 and 3,000 people were able to gather in front
of Aung San Suu Kyi's residence to listen to her weekly
talks. However, legal political parties remained formally
required to request permission from the authorities to hold
internal meetings of their own membership.  During one
weekly gathering at the home of Aung San Suu Kyi, three
people were arrested for confronting policemen about the
placement of barriers to control the crowd (see Section
1.d.).

Despite these restrictions, the NLD leadership held internal
meetings, traveled upcountry to meet with its supporters,
and hosted large public gatherings.  Citizens engaged in
these activities, including those attending Aung San Suu
Kyi's addresses, remained subject to arrest at any time for
their activities.  Late in the year, the Government's own
mass mobilization organization, the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA), orchestrated a series of
rallies as a mass demonstration of support for the SLORC's
political objectives.  With few exceptions, attendance was
coerced, with explicit threats of penalities for those who
contemplated staying away.  Religious groups, by contrast,
sometimes encountered problems holding outdoor gatherings.

In addition to the USDA, the right of association existed
only for organizations, including trade associations and
professional bodies, permitted by law and duly registered
with the Government.  Only a handful continued to exist, and
even those were subject to direct government intervention or
took special care to act in line with government policy.
This included such benign groups as the Myanmar Red Cross
and the Myanmar Medical Association.  Only 10 political
parties (compared to 75 in 1992) remained legal at year's
end

  c.  Freedom of Religion

Adherents of all religions duly registered with the
authorities generally enjoyed freedom to worship as they
chose, although Buddhists continued to enjoy a privileged
position.  In recent years, the Government has made special
efforts to link itself with Buddhism as a means of asserting
its own popular legitimacy.  For example, during the year
the military arranged the visit of a venerated Buddha tooth
relic from China and after the visit organized construction
of two massive new pagodas to commemorate the event.
Consistent reports indicate some overzealous local officials
forced even non-Buddhists to contribute to Buddhist
construction projects.  Credible reports continued to
surface of Buddhist missionaries dispatched by the central
Government and local military personnel actively working to
expand Buddhism, sometimes through compulsion, in minority
areas.

The Government monitors the activities of members of all
religions, in part because they have in the past been
politically active.  Security services demanded that
religious groups seek prior authorization to conduct
services out of doors.  These regulations were also in
effect in and around Buddhist monasteries and pagodas.
Religious publications remained subject to the same control
and censorship imposed on secular ones.  Christian Bibles
translated into indigenous languages could not be imported.
It remained extremely difficult for Christian and Muslim
groups to obtain permission to build new churches and
mosques.

Religious groups were able to establish links with
coreligionists in other countries, although these activities
were reportedly monitored by the Government.  Foreign
religious representatives were usually only allowed visas
for short stays, but in some cases were permitted to preach
to Burmese congregations.  In August Roman Catholic Cardinal
Josef Tomko was able to visit Rangoon and upcountry
locations. Permanent foreign missionary establishments have
not been permitted since the 1960's, but seven Catholic nuns
and four priests working in Burma since before independence
continued to reside upcountry.

Credible reports continued of isolated incidents in which
the Government removed cemeteries in the course of
infrastructure projects in urban areas.  These removals
targeted adherents of many faiths, including Buddhists, but
were a particularly serious problem for Muslims and
Christians, who--unlike Buddhists--consider such "final
resting places" to be sacred ground.

  d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
  Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Although citizens have the legal right to live anywhere in
the country, both urban and rural residents were subject to
arbitrary relocation (see Section l.f.).  Except for
limitations in areas of insurgent activity, citizens could
travel freely within the country but had to notify local
authorities of their whereabouts.  Those residents unable to
meet the restrictive provisions of the citizenship law,
(e.g., Chinese, Arakanese Muslims, etc.) had to obtain prior
permission to travel (see Section 5). Rural farmers were
also not free to leave the land at will.

While the Government relaxed restrictions on passport
issuance, it carefully scrutinized all prospective travel
abroad.  Many applicants were also forced to pay bribes to
obtain passports to which they were entitled.  The official
board that reviews passport applications denied passports in
some cases apparently on political grounds.  All college
graduates obtaining a passport (except for certain
government employees) were required to pay a special
education clearance fee to reimburse the Government.
Citizens who emigrated legally were generally allowed to
return to visit relatives, and even some who had lived
abroad illegally and acquired foreign citizenship were able
to return to visit.  In January the authorities extended
until the end of the year special procedures allowing former
citizens residing abroad to reacquire citizenship.

In anticipation of the Government's planned "Visit Myanmar
Year 1996," restrictions were further eased on foreign
travelers.  As of September 1, Burmese embassies began
issuing tourist visas within 24 hours and lowered visa fees.
However, select categories of applicants, such as human
rights advocates, certain journalists, and political
figures, continued to be denied entry visas unless traveling
under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the Government.
Although some areas of the country remained off-limits to
foreigners for security reasons, the authorities officially
opened up a substantial number of new domestic destinations.

In 1995 over 60,000 of the Rohingya Muslims who fled to
Bangladesh in 1992 returned to Burma, bringing the total
number of returnees to over 196,000.  As the year
progressed, however, the pace of repatriation slowed
greatly, with over 50,000 still in camps across the border
at year's end.  The UNHCR reported that authorities
cooperated in investigating the isolated incidents of
renewed abuse which surfaced. However, the Government
continued to refuse some independent observers access to
repatriation areas.  During the year, the Government
appeared to have halted the practice of forcibly removing
Muslims from elsewhere in Arakan State to the border
townships.

The Government was reportedly reluctant to allow the UNHCR
to play a similar role along the Thai border in connection
with the expected repatriation of large numbers of Mon
returnees.

The Government does not allow refugees or displaced persons
from abroad to resettle or seek safe haven.

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of
Citizens to Change Their Government

Despite the overwhelming desire citizens demonstrated in the
1990 elections for a return to democracy, they continued to
be denied the right to change their government.  Since 1988
active duty military officers have occupied an increasing
number of important positions throughout the bureaucracy,
particularly at the policymaking level. Despite the
appointment of several civilians to the Cabinet in 1992, the
process of placing military or recently retired military
officers in most key senior level positions once held by
technocrats in the economic ministries continued.

Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the SLORC
set aside the election results and disqualified, detained,
arrested, or drove into exile many successful candidates.
Since then 201 of the 485 Deputies elected have either been
disqualified, resigned under pressure, gone into exile, been
detained, or died.  Approximately 20 successful candidates
from the election remain in prison.

Rather than accept the will of the citizenry, the SLORC
convened a National Convention in January 1993 to draw up
principles for a new constitution.  The SLORC handpicked
delegates, and proceedings have been carefully
stage-managed; even limited opposition views have been
ignored.  Despite having no mandate from the people, the
SLORC tasked the Convention with drafting principles for a
new constitution ensuring a dominant role for the military
in the country's future political structure.  The SLORC
leadership met with prodemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi on
two occasions in late 1994, but throughout the following
year they failed to heed her call for genuine dialog on the
country's political future and instead proceeded with their
own controlled "consultations" on a new constitution.  In
late November, the NLD delegates withdrew from the
Convention pending agreement by the authorities to discuss
revising the convention working procedures.  Two days later
they were formally expelled.  This left the Convention
exercise almost solely in the hands of government appointees
and definitively removed whatever semblance of claim it
might once have had to represent the Burmese people.

Minorities and women are underrepresented in the top ranks
of government service and largely excluded from military
leadership.  Members of certain minority groups continued to
be denied full citizenship (see Section 5).

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights

The Government does not allow domestic human rights
organizations to exist, and it remained generally hostile to
outside scrutiny of its human rights record.  However, the
authorities continued formally to receive the U.N. Secretary
General's Special Representative.  In February Assistant
Secretary General for Political Affairs Alvaro de Soto held
talks with government officials, and during a visit in
August he was also able to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi.
Still, the SLORC remained unwilling to engage the U.N. in a
substantive dialog about Burma's political future.

After considering the January report of its Special
Rapporteur for Burma, Professor Yozo Yokota, the U.N. Human
Rights Commission adopted a resolution in March severely
criticizing the authorities for their human rights abuses.
The Burmese representative at the Commission in turn
rejected the criticism as "inaccurate, instrusive and
politically motivated."  In keeping with the Special
Rapporteur's mandate, in October the Government permitted
Professor Yokota to undertake another survey trip to Burma,
after which he delivered a highly critical review of Burma's
human rights situation to the U.N. General Assembly's Third
Committee.  In December the U.N. General Assembly adopted
another consensus resolution deploring continued violation
of human rights in Burma.

A limited number of nonpolitical international NGO's
continued project work in Burma, while a few more
established a provisional presence while undertaking the
protracted negotiations necessary to set up permanent
operations in the country.

The ICRC closed its office after failing to gain access to
Burmese prisons.

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Government continued to rule by decree and was not bound
by any constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.

  Women

In part because of the strong role of religion, violence
against women, including spousal abuse, is not considered
socially acceptable and occurs relatively infrequently.

The trafficking of women and girls to Thailand for the
purposes of prostitution remained a serious problem.  In
border areas, where the Government's control is limited,
there were numerous reports of women being forced or lured
into working as prostitutes in Thailand.  While the number
of young women tricked or forced into prostitution is
unknown, a common practice is to lure young women to
Thailand with promises of employment as a waitress or
domestic (see Thailand report). Also, the military continued
to impress women for military porterage duties, and reports
of soldiers raping ethnic minority women remained widespread
(see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).

In general, women in Burma have traditionally enjoyed a high
status, exercising most of the same basic rights as men and
taking an active role in business.  Consistent with
traditional culture, they keep their own names after
marriage and often control family finances.  However, women
remained underrepresented in most traditional male
occupations, and a few professions continued to be entirely
barred to women.  As elsewhere, the burden of poverty, which
is particularly widespread in Burma's rural areas, fell
disproportionately on women.

Women did not consistently receive equal pay for equal work.
There were no independent women's rights organizations, and
no government ministry specifically targeted the
safeguarding of women's interests.  A government-controlled
agency, the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association
(MMCWA), provided some assistance to mothers, and a new
professional society for businesswomen, the Myanmar Women
Entrepreneurs' Association, was formed in 1995.

  Children

Despite the establishment of various child welfare programs,
the Government allocated few resources for programs relevant
to children, and once again cut the share of the national
budget for education (to 13 percent), with a mere 0.5
percent allocated to social welfare services (versus an
official 33 percent for the military).

There is no pattern of societal abuse of children, although
poverty and alcoholism sometimes lead to instances of abuse.
Many families allowed their young daughters to travel to
Thailand to work as prostitutes.  The rising incidence of
HIV infection has increased demand for younger prostitutes.

  People with Disabilities

Official assistance to persons with disabilities is
extremely limited. There is no law mandating accessibility
to government facilities.  While there are several
small-scale organizations to assist the disabled, most
disabled persons must rely on traditional family structures
to provide for their welfare.  Funding from the South Korean
Red Cross allowed a prosthesis program begun by the ICRC to
continue.  Because of land mines and train accidents, Burma
has one of the highest rates of amputee injuries in the
world.

  National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Burma's myriad ethnic minorities have long resented the
dominance of the country's Burman majority.  Over the last
few years and continuing in 1995, the SLORC, in the name of
national solidarity, has sought to pacify these ethnic
groups by means of negotiated cease-fires, grants of limited
autonomy, and promises of development assistance.  By year's
end, the Government had negotiated cease-fire agreements
with 15 of 16 recognized ethnic insurgent groups, and talks
with a final ethnic group, the Karen National Knion (KNU),
were believed to be underway.  However, the Government's
settlement with the Karenni National Progressive Party
(KNPP) broke down after the Burmese army forcibly entered
areas under KNPP control.

The Government included a large number of ethnic minority
representatives in the National Convention and permitted
extended debate on the issue of minority autonomy.  However,
the ethnic minority populations complain that their concerns
have not been addressed adequately by the Government, and
none is satisfied with the provisions on limited
"self-administration" which the authorities plan to accord a
few groups under the new constitution.

Government investment in the border areas in road, hospital,
and school construction has been modest at best, and
economic development of ethnic minority areas continued to
lag, leaving many living at barely subsistence levels.
Since the focus of the hostilities against armed
insurgencies has been in the border areas where most
minorities are concentrated, those populations have been
disproportionately victimized by the general brutalization
associated with the military's activities.

Since only people who can prove long familial links to Burma
are accorded full citizenship, ethnic populations, such as
Muslims, Indians, and Chinese, continued to be denied full
citizenship.  Those without full citizenship are not free to
travel domestically and are barred from certain advanced
university programs in medicine and technological fields.
Anti-Chinese sentiment remained pervasive.

Section 6  Worker Rights

  a.  The Right of Association

There were no functioning trade unions; even former
government- controlled ones were dormant.  Workers continued
to be unable to strike, and there were no reported instances
of attempts to do so.

In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's
eligibility for trade concessions under the Generalized
System of Preferences Program, pending steps to afford its
labor force internationally recognized worker rights.

Because of Burma's longstanding violation of International
Labor Organization (ILO ) Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association, in June the ILO Conference Committee on the
Application of Standards devoted a Special Paragraph to
Burma in its general report.  Following February meetings
between ILO officials and government representatives in
Rangoon, the lack of a constructive government response
prompted the ILO to cancel plans for a followup visit.

  b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Workers do not have the right to organize and bargain
collectively to set wages and benefits.  The Government's
Central Arbitration Board, which theoretically provides a
means for settling major labor disputes, continued to exist
on paper but in practice was dormant.  Township-level labor
supervisory committees remained in place to address various
low- level labor concerns.

The Government unilaterally sets wages in the public sector.
In the private sector, wages are set by market forces.  The
Government pressures joint ventures not to pay salaries
greater than those of ministers or other high-level
employees.  Joint ventures circumvent this with supplemental
pay, including remuneration paid in foreign exchange
certificates, as well as through incentive and overtime pay
and other fringe benefits.  Foreign firms generally set
wages near those of the domestic private sector but follow
the example of joint ventures in awarding supplemental wages
and benefits.

No special export processing zones exist.

  c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Despite government promises to alter the Village and Town
Acts to withdraw the claimed statutory basis for forced
labor in the country, at year's end the legislation was not
changed.  As the military continued its program of road,
rail, dam, and other infrastructure projects, its recourse
to forced labor remained at a high level.  Hundreds of
thousands--if not more--of ordinary citizens were compelled
to contribute labor to these public works.  In preparation
for the "Visit Myanmar Year- 1996," in 1995 the Mandalay
Moat Project was completed by using a combination of prison,
military, and paid labor, and the Ye- Tavoy railroad in
southern Burma continued to employ large-scale forced labor,
including child labor, according to credible reports .

In June the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of
Standards cited Burma in a second Special Paragraph for its
violation of ILO Convention 29 on forced labor.

Although the Government refused to acknowledge its use of
forced labor publicly, in June it issued an internal order
instructing officials to use paid labor on large-scale
infrastructure projects.  By year's end, many instances of
forced labor (or forced monetary contributions in lieu of
labor) nevertheless continued to be reported.

  d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

Although the law sets a minimum age for the employment of
children, in practice the law is not enforced.  Working
children are highly visible in cities, mostly working for
small or family enterprises.  Children are hired at lower
pay rates than adults for the same kind of work, and
economic pressure forces them to work not only for their
survival but also to support their families.  Arts and
crafts is the only sector producing for the export market
which employs a significant number of children.  Despite a
compulsory education law, almost 40 percent of children
never enroll in school, and only 27 percent complete the
5-year primary school course.

  e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

Surplus labor conditions and lack of protection by
government authorities continue to dictate substandard
conditions for workers, despite recent annual economic
growth of at least 5 percent.  The Law on Fundamental
Workers Rights of 1964 and the Factories Act of 1951
regulate working conditions.  There is a legally prescribed
5-day, 35- hour workweek for employees in the public sector
and a 6-day, 44-hour workweek for private and public sector
employees, with overtime paid for additional work.  The law
also allows for a 24-hour rest period per week and workers
have 21 paid holidays a year.  Such provisions actually
affect only a small portion of the country's labor force.

Only government employees and employees of a few traditional
industries are covered by minimum wage provisions.  The
minimum monthly wage for salaried public employees (based on
the market exchange rate of 120 kyats = $1.00) is $5.00 (600
kyats), but this sum is supplemented by various subsidies
and allowances.  The minimum wage is insufficient to provide
a decent standard of living for a worker and family.  In
particular, the low level of remuneration of public
employment fostered widespread corruption.  The government
minimum wage for day labor is $0.16 daily (20 kyats).
Workers in the private sector are much better paid.  The
actual average wage rate for casual laborers in Rangoon in
1995 was almost four times the official minimum, but still
well below subsistence levels.  Wage increases continued to
lag far behind inflation.

Numerous health and safety regulations exist on the books,
but the Government has not made the necessary resources
available to those charged with their enforcement.  Although
workers may in principle remove themselves from hazardous
conditions, in practice workers cannot expect to retain
their jobs.

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